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ARMY  HISTORICAL  SERIES 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD: 
DECISION  IN  THE  EAST 


CmTER  OF  mUTARY  HISTORY 
UNITED  STATMS  ARMY 
WASHINGTON  D  C,  19B7 


Uiutaj  of  Ckn^npB  CSaid^p^^lii^Pal^^  Date 

Ziemke,  Kari  Frederick.  W^-^ 
Mtmm/  to  Sti&giad. 

(Army  historical  series) 
Bibliography:  p. 

Includes  index. 

Supt.  of  Docs,  no.:  D  114.19:Ma5 

History— 1939- M)45.  1.  Bauer,  M^oa  E.,  1902-1981.  II.  Cletttei:  of  Mililary 
History.  III.  TiUe.  IV.  Scries. 

mmMwism  ^w^i  se-soooes 

t-MH  I'ub  30^12 


Ftar  sale  by  dte  Superlitteodent  of  Dtmimet>a>,  V&.  Gammmeat  Matitig  OfSsx 


ARMY  HISTORICAL  SERIES 
David  F.  Urask,  Gtmeml  Editor 


(Ascrf'IJaiy  1989) 


Charles  P.  Roland 
UnSvemty  of  Kentudcy 

Roger  A.  Beaumont 
Ibcas  A&M  University 

Lt.  Col.  Robert  A.  Odi^It^ 
U.S.  Military  Academy 

Col.  Louis  D.G.  Frasche 
U.Si  Army  Cominand  and  General 

John  H.  Hatcher 
The  Adjutant  General  Center 

L.  Eugene  Hedbt-rg 
American  Entetprise  Institute 
for  ^t^lic  Risseardi 

Maj.  Gen.  Edward  J.  Huycke 
Deputy  Surgeon  General^  USA 


Archer  Jones 
North  Dakota  State 
University 

Maj.  Gen.  Carl  H.  McNair,  Jr 
U.S.  Army  Training  and  Doctrine 
Cominaiid 

Jamie  W.  M&mt 
1%e  Cttadd 

James  O'Neill 
Nauonal  Archives  and  Records 
Adimii^scratitHi 

Brig.  Gen.  jKiefaard  L.  Rf^nard 
Arniy  ^  CoH^ 

Donald  W.  Smythe,  SJ, 

Jnhii  ("at  r  ;))! 
University 


U.S.  Army  Center  of  Mililfny  H/.slo)y 
Brig.  Gen.  William  A.  Stofft,  Chiei  of  Militai  y  History 

Chief  Historian  id  Ti  ;tsk 

Chief,  Histories  Division  Li.  LaA.  Richard  C).  i'erry 

^fiarin Chief  '    "  ' 


Foreword 


MasemaioStaUngrnd:  Decisionill&itEast  is  tlie  second  to  be  compluicfl  in 
a  projected  three-volume  history  d£  the  German-Soviet  conflict  in  World 
War  II.  Thefir8t,5fei^j^rajitoB#r?tn  eisvered 
the  Soviet  Army^  liberation  of  its  own  rciritory  and  its  flrivc  across  <  eiitra! 
and  southeastern  Europe.  In  the  present  volume,  the  German  and  Soviet 
forces  initially  coiiFnmt  e^rdi  other  on  the  approadies  to  Moscow, 
Lening^rad,  and  Rosl<n  in  die  Iate-1941  battles  dial  produced  the  first 
major  German  setbacks  ol  die  war  and  gave  die  Soviet  troops  their  hrsl 
tastes  of  success.  Later,  the  pendulum  swings  to  the  Ge**nans'  side,  and 
their  armies  race  across  the  Ukraine  and  into  the  Caucasus  dui  ins^f  ilie 
sununer  of  1942.  In  die  course  oi  a  year,  the  Soviet  Command  goes  t  roni 
ofi^l^lv^  to  defensive  and,  finally,  at  StScti^gi^,  dedisively  to  the  otten- 
sive— -meanwhile,  frequenlly  in  desperate  circinnslances,  building  the 
Strength  and  proficiency  that  will  enable  it  to  mount  the  relendess  thrusts 
of  the  succeeding  years. 

In  tracint(  the  shifting  Soviet  and  Cierman  fortiuies,  the  author  has 
had  lull  access  to  the  German  mililarv  records,  most  of  which  fell  into 
American  and  British  hands.  He  has  also  made  extensive  use  of  the  Soviet 
war  histories,  nu  iiioirs,  and  periodical  literature.  The  result  is  bolh  a 
panorama  of  battles,  among  diem  some  of  Uie  greatest  in  die  history  of 
war  fare*  aitid  an  inL|uiry  into  the  forces  in  war  that  shapt  aud  test  the 
military  power  of  nations. 


\VILIJ.AM.\.  STOFFT 


Washington  D.C. 
1  September  1985 


Brigadier  General,  USA 
Chief  of  Military  History 


V 


The  Authors 


r.;irl  F.  Zieiiike  is  a  gi  aduate  of  the  UiiiverStQf  of  Wisamsin,  where  he 
received  M.A.  and  Ph.D.  degrees  in  history*  In  World  Wai-  II  he  served 
with  the  U.S.  Marine  Corps  in  the  Pacific  Theater.  In  fie  joined  the 
slafT  of  ihe  Bureau  ol  Ajjjjlied  Social  Rcsr.uc  h.  C'nlmxral^  Univcrsitv. 
From  1955  to  19b7  he  was  a  liisLoriau  and  supervisory  historian  widi  the 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  lii^tmf  Hfeteiry  (now  ^  Center  Military 
History),  aiul  since  1067  he  has  been  a  research  professorof  history  at  the 
University  of  Georgia. 

I>n  Ziemke  is  the  author  of  Tim  &ermn  Mmihem  Ih^aere^^^fdiAsm, 
79-/0-/tW5;  Sfalwp-od  to  Berlm  The  Gt-rmaii  Defeat  in0teSmt;md  The  U.S. 
Amy  in  the  Occupation  of  GemmVif,  19'f'f-1946,  He  Is  a  cdwtrlbutor  lo 
Comnand  Btdmm;  A  Cmtem  Hi^hny  ^  Woi^  W«r  Hi  Siwigt  Fartkems  m 
W<yrl<l  War  II;  .\'eie  Dimension.s  in  MiUlcm  fli.^tofy:  C  S.  Omipation  in  Europe 
Worki  War  II;  Strategic  Military  Deception;  and  Americans  as  Procomnh: 
Umted  States  MiMhay  Go^rnintent  inGeritvany  and  Japan. 

^^alf^a  F.  Bauer  was  a  member  oflhe  staff  oftfie  U.S.  .\rmy  Center  of 
Mihtary  History  from  1947  until  her  retirement  in  1970.  Educated  in 
Italy,  Gematty,  and  the  United  S^tes*  Mrs.  Bi^Vtia?  was  prudent  in 

German,  Ilaiian,  Fi  enrh,  and  F.nglisli.  Durinii  her  tenure  with  the  center, 
she  did  research  studies  and  translations  lor  several  volumes  in  the 
center^  WorM  War  II  series.  Ikese:  indiM^.  V&trm.  C,  Pc^e,  The 
Supreme  Command;  Hugh  M.  Cole,  The  .\riirnnes:  Ba^^if^Mulge:  AlbcT  i 
N.  Garland  and  Howard  McGaw  Smyth,  Sicily  and  ik&  Stifltmder  of  Italy; 
and  Chatles  B.  Mai^D&asid,  Thit  Imt  Offensive.  Mrs.  Bmter  ^fecji  tmxi^ 
Italian  and  German  at  the  U.S.  Department  of  .Agriculture  Cradtiate 
School  Ironi  1943  to  1980,  Mrs.  Bauer  died  in  December  1981. 


vi 


Preface 


During  1942,  the  Axis  advance  peafJiesd  its  Mgh  tide  on  all  fronts  and 
began  to  ebb.  Nowhere  was  this  more  true  than  on  the  Eastern  Front  in 
the  So\  iet  Union.  After  receiving  a  disastrous  setback  on  the  approaches 
to  Moscow  in  the  winter  (of  I04fl^l©*t2,  flie  (ici  inan  armies  recovered 
sufficiently  to  embark  on  a  sweeping  summer  ottensive  that  carried  them 
to  tlie  Volga  River  at  Stalingtad  and  deep  into  the  Caucasus  Mountains. 
The  Sovtet  araaies  ^ffisred  severe  de£eai^  ibi  t!te  spring  and  summer  of 
1942  but  recovered  to  stop  the  German  advances  in  October  and  encircle 
and  begin  the  destruction  oi  the  German  Sixth  Army  at  Stalingrad  in 
November  and  December.  Tliis  vokime  describes  the  course  of  events 
from  the  Soviet  December  1941  coimteroffensive  at  Moscow  to  the 
Stalingrad  offensive  in  late  1942  vviili  particular  attendon  to  die  interval 
from  January  through  October  1942,  which  has  been  regarded  as  a  hiatus 
between  the  two  major  battles  but  which  in  actuality  constituted  the 
period  in  which  the  German  fortunes  slid  into  irreversible  decline  and  tlie 
Soviet  forces  acquired  the  zneauB  and  capab3it«^  that  eventuaUif.'&mt^l^t 
them  victor\.  These  were  the  months  of  decision  in  the  East. 

In  the  nearly  two  decades  since  Stal/ngmd  to  Berlin:  The  German  Defeat 
in  the  East  was  published,  much  new  information  has  become  available. 
Wlien  Slalhigmd  to  Berlin  was  written,  the  cloak  of  secrecy  had  barely  been 
raised  on  the  Soviet  side  of  the  war.  Since  then,  Soviet  war  histories, 
m^oirs,  and  artid^llave  come  in.a  l^sod;  consequendy,  the  author  has 
treated  tine  So\  ief  aspect  of  the  war  somewhat  differently  in  Moscow  to 
Stalingrad  ilian  in  Stalingrad  to  Berlin.  Wliere  contradictions  or  discrepan- 
cies occur,  the  present  volume  can  be  assumed  to  be  the  more  nearly 
correct.  It  would,  in  fact,  ha\  e  been  easily  possible  to  have  written Mojcotif 
to  Stalingrad  predommantb  from  Soviet  sources.  The  audior  elected  not 
to  do  so  fer  two  reasons:  the  active  impetusMtiieO!P^'i**as  German 
din  ing  most  of  the  ]>eriod  and  the  German  militaiy  records  consdtute  a 
l  easonably  complete  and  reliable  body  of  direct  evidence  while  poliucal 
doctrine  and  policy  color  and  limit  the  Soviet  depiction  of  the  war.  The 
Soviet  war  history  has,  moreover,  undergone  two  gcaieral  revisions,  and 
there  coidd  still  be  odiers  to  come. 

The  reader  sag?  filSdia  few  explanatory  remarks  helpful.  The  order  in 
which  the  volumes  are  appearing  has  necessitated  a  fairly  comprehensive 
introduction.  Military  ranks  above  that  of  colonel  are  given  in  die  Russian 
and  the  German  forms  because  translation  or  conversion  into  U.S. 
equivalents  would  have  engendered  inconsistencies.  Appendix  A 

vii 


provides  a  table  of  equivalent  ranks — and  demonstrates  the  problem,  lb 
keep  them  readily  distinguishable  from  one  another,  German  unit  names 
are  set  in  roman  and  Soviet  in  italic  type.  Diacritical  marks  to  indicate 
hard  and  soft  signs  have  been  omitted  in  diu  transliterations  Iroin  tlie 
Russian,  which  otherwise  follow  die  U.S.  Board  on  Geographic  Names 
system.  The  maps  are  based  on  the  1:1,000,000  German  Army  High 
CommaadLage  Osl  (Siuiaiion  Easi)  maps  corrected,  with  respect  to  Soviet 
deployments,  from  the  Soviet  official  histories. 

The  author  is  indebted  to  Professor  Gerhard  L.  Weinberg,  Dr.  William 
J.  Spahr,  and  Professor  Bruce  \V.  Meiining,  who  look  time  from  oilii  i 
pursuits  to  read  and  comment  on  ilie  manuscript  and  who  contributed 
insights  from  their  extensive  knowledge  of  German  and  Russian  history. 
Mc  is  likeivise  grateful  to  his  former  colleagues  at  the  Clcnter  of  Military 
History,  Dr.  Maurice  Madoff,  Mr.  George  W.  Garand,  Mr.  Charles  V.  P. 
von  Luttichau.  and  Col.  William  F.  Slrobridge.  for  their  advice  on  the 
manuscript  and  for  their  help  atul  counsel  over  tlic  \i-ars. 

Members  of  the  Editorial  and  Graphic  Arts  Branches  in  the  Center  of 
Military  History  carried  the  main  burden  of  convening  the  manuscript 
into  a  book.  Mrs.  Sara  J.  Heynen  was  the  substantive  editor.  Mi'.  Leiuvood 
Y.  Brown  was  the  copy  editor,  and  Mrs.  Joycelyn  M.  Canery  assisted  in  the 
copyediting.  Mr.  Roger  0,  C!fin|^  and  Mr.  Arthur  S.  Hardyman  pre- 
pared the  maps  and  photographs,  and  Sp  6c.  Marshall  \\  illiams  (lesi;j;m  (l 
and  executed  the  cover  for  the  papierbacK.  edition.  The  author  hopes  that 
his  work  may  prove  worthy  of  their  efforts. 

Possible  errors  and  omissions  tan  on!v  he  attributed  to  the  authorll 
failure  to  profit  from  die  assistance  available  to  him. 

Athens,  C;eorgia  EARL  K  ZtEMKE 

1  September  1983 


viii 


ContentB 


Chapltr  P<^ 

I.  "THE  WORLD  WILL  HOLD  ITS  BREATH"  ........  3 

7%i  DeplxTjimmts    ,  ,  ,  ^  .  .  »  ^  «  ,  .  .      ,  ^  *  >  .  *  i.  S 

German  Strategy  IS 

Sovit'l  PirlMDrflne.fJi          •>..•..,....,..  *  .  ,  16- 

IJ.  THE  BLITZKRIEG   25 

Barbarosm   2S 

Ta^n    .  ,   34 

III.  mumam  ^   4? 

On  thr  Def^Xti^^^UB  Bm^lkmi       ,      ^  .  ,  ,  ,      »  ...  47 

The  'J'nivaborrt  „   SS 

IV.  THE  COUNTEROFFENSIVE:  Fli^PHASE  6f 

fMg^  ml&^M^tmoe                                              .  W 

ih;  Fuehrer  Tais&^mtimd   80 

V.  THEC:OUNTER0JFISSim;  SEGCmOJPH3&St  88 

Roks  Revmned   «                                ^  ......  c  .  ,  .  88 

On  ^  ISIfflA  §2 

ne  i^stion  of  a  Retnai   100 

VI.  CIIISIS  IN  THE  CRIMEA   105 

Si'Tasfopol   105 

Kerch  and  Feodosiya   108 

'Ihe  Trap  P&es  Not  Close   115 

VU.  HITLER  ANt»mLW   118 

lfil!i'i  Oirh'K'i  ii  Rclica!  .   .   .   .   .................  118 

Sidliii  Projects  a  Gnicral  Ojji'iisive    .  .  i  .........  .  X34 

VIII.  THE  GENERAL  OFFENSIVE    .   ,  .  143 

Oft  the  N'offy^tmk   143 

Oil  i/ii'  Siiui!)  Flank    .....  i                 i,   155 

III  the  Center   181 

IX.  THE  CLINCH    173 

The  Frniit.  Ft'bniary  1942    IfS 

Ai)iiy  Group  Center    178 

Amy  Group  North   186 


ix 


X.  THK  \^'AR  BKHIND  THE  FRONT   199 

The  Partisan  Muvemcnt,  Beginnings   199 

Tile  Utidergro^md  ,  .  ,  i   206 

German  Rear  Area  Security   207 

The  Partisan  Mfivemenl  Estahluhfd    209 

XI.  THE  NORI  HERN  THEATER    .  ,  .  .  .  .  220 

€obeW§^imitsmdMiJS^em43trArm   220 

.4  Tltrusl  to  Belommsh    224 

The  Soviet  Spring  (^^tfe   226 

7%0  Arctic  Conv^    ^$ 

im,  ACTIVE  DEFENSE,  CENTER  AND  NORTH  fSf 

Siuliu\  Bid  fur  Ihr  fiiitialivi'  .   .   ,  i  i  ,  .  $$$ 

Army  Group  Center's  Second  Front  ^  ...  *  .  •  240 

Bgm^m^  and  the  VelfeAop  Pock0t ^  ,  ...  .  254 

Xin.  ACTIVE  DEFENSE,  SOUTH  .................  261 

Kerch  Resolved   ,   .  ,  .  26 1 

The  Izyum  Bulge   .  ,  .  .  269 

XIV.  A  TIME  FOR  DECISIONS   283 

HitUr's  Strategy   283 

German  Strategy  ^tma^   i   ..  .  293 

Soviet  Strategy  299 

XV.  PRELUDE  TO  SU^^MER  .  .  _   309 

Preliminmy  Operations  .  ,  .  ,   309 

Deplayinentpr  BMU  ................  ^  .  Bfl 

Soviet  DeplaynteM    3'23 

On  the  Eve   327 

XVI.  OPERATION  BLAU  353 

ABr^e^^^im,  ,  ,   S40 

XVII.  HITLER'S  GRAND  DESIGN  .   349 

''A  Certain  Crisis"   349 

Directive  45-Ofder  No.  227    MS 

XVni.  OPERATION  EDELWEISS   366 

TMWukim.cmd0mCkmc(istis   3€6 

Tme^  md^^ip^^  ,  S7§ 

XtX.  FROM  THE  DON  TO  THE  VOLGA  .  .  .  .  .  .  ......  382 

No  Enemy  West  oj  Stalingrad  382 


0)0^ 

XX.  SUMMER  ON  THE  STATIC  fmWSS .  398 

On  the  Moscow  Axis  .   398 

iMtk^imiM^an^   408 

WePrnMi^   ,  ^  ,  .  ,  .  .  423 

XXI.  THE  CHANGE  OF  SEASONS  432 

Dfily  a,nd  Couniiy  ...........  ^  .......  .  432 

Coimierojffhtsioe  Pkms                                                 .  441 

'This  Yi'firs  Campaign  Ftm  Sem  Concivded"   447 

The  Exceptions    .  .  ^  .................  .  451 

A  Winter  Offeyisiifi—WhereT  454r 

XXII.  THRUST  AND  COUNTERTHRUST   ...........  458 

The  Battle  on  the  Volga   458 

Sixth  Army  Encircled   468 

XXin.  STALINGRAD,  FINALE   478 

The  Relief    478 

Swi^  Arm^  ImhtiBd    483 

Msth^rt^  00S^royed  ...................  492 

XXIV.  CONCLUSION   503 

"The  Beginning  oj  tlw  Road"                     ^  .>♦»,,.*  ,  ,  503 

"The  TmmBam  ,  ,  ^  ,  ...  .  3^ 

the  Decisim.  .  ,   il2 

Appttidk 

A.  'fABtE  dF  EQUIVALENT  RANICS   517 

B.  C;OMPARATIVE  SIZES  OF  MAJOR  COMMANDS   518 

NOTE  ON  SOURCES                                                         ,  .  ,  ,  519 

GLOSSARY'   §31 

COD.E  NAMES  ,   S34 

INDEX   537 

Maps 

Nft. 

1.  Gemian-So^etFTWiiief^,  g2Ju«e  1941   § 

2.  Tlic  C;erman  Advance,  22  June-12  November  1941      .  ..  i  ,  .  36 

3.  Army  Group  Center,  15  November-3  December  1941  ......  S8 

4.  Army  Group  Sourti,  2S  Ni^i^a^b**^^                       ......  5§ 

5.  Artay  Group  Nortlii  I  December  1941  .....  ^  ......  ^  58 

xi 


6.  The  Moscow  Countero£fensivej  Phase  1,  6-15  D<s<;ei)iber  1941 .  72 
f.  the  Moscow  Cbumerafflensive,  Phase  TI,  16  December  1941- 

]  January  1942   89 

8.  Soviet  Kerch  Offensive.  16  Decembei  1941-18  January  1942  .  .  .  107 

9.  The  Fanatical  Resistance,  1—14  January  1942  .  .  .  ^  ^  ^  .  .  i  ^  121 

10.  The  Soviet  fiencral  Offensive,  North  Flank,  6  January— 

22  February  1942    144 

11.  TheSovfetiCenefal  O^aienrive,  South  Flank,  16Januarv- 

1  Febniarv  1942    157 

12.  The  Getieral  Offensive,  Army  Group  Center,  24  January- 

18  FebmaTy  19^   t62 

1S»  Armv  f;rniip  C:cnier,  lit  Febniarv-2<J  Apit  1943  174 

14-  Army  Group  North,  W  February-S  May  l«#  187 

15,  Partisan  Areas,  April  I94f  ,  .  »  .  til 

1(1.  N.»i  i1k>i  11  Theniei  .  Winter  1942   221 

17.  The  Kesienga-Loukhi  Seaor,  April-May  1942  227 

18:  TheZapadnayaLitsaFront,  27AprTl--I4  Maf  I9i®   .  ,  ,  ,  .  .  .  230 

I'.i,  <)|K  1:111011  [-Lx'nnover.  24  Mav-21  Jime  1942                     i^  ,  ,  243 

20.  Operation  StVDLiTZ,  2-12  July  1942  249 

21.  Operation  Vogelsang,  6  June -4  July  1942  .  ,  ,  *  4  ,  .  .  .  ,  .  255 

22.  The  Rec<jnquest  of  Kerch.  8-19  May  1942    263 

23.  The  Soviet  Offensive,  Khaikov,  12-19  May  1942  274 

24.  l%eGerm»aGfimmdirei^  .  ,  . 

25.  Plan  for  Si«c«im».QiPimin*^  G 

26.  S«mtnef  Canipaip  Ft*^^tfiiM  ih  *  ,  .  . 

27.  T]r- Badle  for  Sevastopol,  7  Jui)e-4  July  l|48    ^  ,  ^  ,  ^  .  .  .  .  flf 

2b.  Operauon  WujiELM,  10-15  June  1942   ,  .  ......  ,  .  .  .  »  MS 

2f.  OpemtonFtett)fittifitfstl,i!^-^5J^Bel942  .  .  .  ........  Mf 

.30.  Operation  Bl.m--Br.uns(:h\vei(.,  28  June-11  [ulv  1942  ,  -  .  >  ,  S35 

31.  Operation  BLAL-BR-AiNSCHWiiiL.,  14-31  July  1942  350 

OpeiaQ0nBDei,wiuss.^l  |tily-iaOct«^  368 

33.  Th^AdVacBce  10  . StaliiiQ^rad,      Jiilv-3  September' IS42.  .  i  w  .  .  383 

34.  Sta^jgrad,  8  SepLember-(i  October  1942  389 

35.  SovieC  j^ftad^  RahrevilKi  Vorya  River  Ami,  3©  Juiy- 

2S  September  1942    399 

36.  OperadoHWiRBELwiND,  11-24  August  1.942? .  .  r  .......  .  401 

37.  ATmy  Graap  No^iJv^-^tliust  194^  .                                -  410 

38.  The  MCA  Bottleneek,^  Awgust-25  Septctnbcr  1942    41? 

39.  Operations  ScHLiNC}EpLSN^it.ajad  WiNKi.i.ititi),  27  Seplember- 

9  October  1942   .  .  .   422 

40.  The  N;ik  hik  Operation,  2.^  October-9  Noxettiber  194?.    ......  453 

41.  Sialingrad-North.  13  OcLober-19  November  1942   ,  461 

42.  Ojp^ra^on  Uranus,  19-23  Noveuiber  1942  .                          .  469 

xii 


No. 

A'i.  Mai  VT  S.m'RN,  IG  Deceinber  1942-1 9  Jiinuar)' 1943  .......  487 

44.  Operation  Koliso,  lOJanuary-2  February  1943    ........  498 

lUitstimtions 

The  Cierman  Field  Ai  [illery  Moves  Out   § 

Marshal  S.  K.  Tinioshenko   9 

6.  K.  Zhitl^   9 

Capiure4§¥Wtet'Iittx»|>s  March  Past  a  Peasatit  Village    27 

SS-MwCtfisttelSieittdnalUver  Alongside  a  Wrecked  ....  31 
Crew  aP  88^mm.  tJiin  Searches  fer  targets  ©n  the  h0ma^ 

to  Kit'\   35 

Women  Fire  Fighiers  Keep  Lookout  Over  tlie  Rooftops 

of  Leningrad   36 

Mo\  ing  Supplies  in  the  Rainv  Season    41 

KV  lank  Headed  for  ilae  Front  Rumbles  Throwgh  Pushkin  Square, 

Sovi^Guttae{«MtoaMa^tu»t^tta^^e^Mos^ 

Half^Ti^k  Attempts  Tb  Hml»i50<-mto,  Mawit4«5i!  ?! 

A  Cienniin  Colmmi  Stalled  in  the  SttOW  -  76 

German  Mortal-  Squad  on  the  March  ................  70 

GemiansStitfesidert^^t  Soviet  Soldier  ,  ^  .  ,  8S 

Soviei  Infantrjf  Ottthe  Attaji3t   91 

Frying  On  WintErGear,  Which  Was  loo  Slow  in  Coming   92 

Aifier  a  I^use  It  Is  Time  for  the  Gemrian  Troops  To  Move  On 

Again   ,,■■»(   93 

Villagers  Greet  the  Crew  ot  a  Soviet  1-60  lank   99 

Soviet  Ms^CfaRLa)*  a  Si«keSciweii  Off  Sevas   109 

Soviet  Troops  l.andinjr  on  tlic  Kerch  Peninsula   Ill 

Civilians  Shovel  Snow  lo  Open  the  Road  i  ln  uugh  a  Village  .....  119 
An  Army  Gottuoander  (Weichs,  fbtinh  fto»  l€ft)  0«t 

for  the  From    124 

{.erniaii  Infantry  Enter  a  Village    126 

Before  a  Sign  Reading,  "Defend  Moscow]  for  ifoutiselves  and  for  the 

Whole  So\iei  People."  Women  Work  on  Artillerv  Shells   136 

Soviet  152-mni.  Gun-Howilzer  Firing  North  of  Lake  llmen   146 

General  A.  1.  Eremenko    149 

SJed-Mounted  German  Antitank  (inn   160 

German  Senti^  on  the  Riiza  River  Line   165 

xiii 


Pagf 

German  Machine  Gunners  Dig  In  West  of  Syclievka  Igg 
Germans  Dug-Inr  Four  Knocked-Out  Soviet  Tanks  in  the 

Distance  .-   175 

Soviet  Infantry  Fire  on  a  VilJage  in  the  Enemy  {tegr   ,  -.  ,  ,  181 

Melting  Snow  Has  Turned  Roads  Into  Rivera  ,   183 

German  Outpost  Line  West  of  Rzhev   Jg4 

Machine-Gun  Nest  on  the  Volkhov  Front  196 

Poster  Reads,  "Partisans!  Avenge  Without  Mercyt*  .  ...  ^  .....  .  201 

Partisans  Listen  to  a  Soviet  Newspaper  Being  Read  §03 

Improvised  Armored  Train  on  Patrol  Against  Partisans   ^10 

Woman  Partisan  Hanged  From  Lenin  Statue  in  Voronezh  218 

Outpost  on  the  Verman  River  Line        .  .  i                                   .  224 

Infentry  Take  Cover  in  the  ill  Corps  Sector  ■  •  229 

Getfflan  Sid  l^trol,  ICestefi^  ftont . 

German  Submarine  on  the  Wait  in  the  Arctic  i.  \  .  .  >.  i  i  .  .  i  .  i  235 

A  Camouflaged  Tank  Trap  in  the  Forest    ...  ^         .      ^  ...  *  .  24Q 

Bringing  Up  aft  AfttitaiS^  Gun  ift  this  Belyy  Gap  ,  .      .  ^1 

Matliine-Gim  Scjuad  ai  (he  Volkhca'  PockeL  .  .  .  ,  256 

Generals  Vlasov  and  Lindemann  Talk  ^t  Eighteenth  Army 

Headquarters   2S8 

General  von  Richihofen  (second  bum.  right)  Discusses  an  Air 

Strike  With  His  Staff   gfiS 

Aiming  a  Sijc-Indi  Rdcfcet  ftojector   .                      .  .  .  >i,  .  .  .  .  |68 

Tankmen  Flush  Out  Soviet  Soldiers  AfteartfeiB^Btie  *  *  +■  .  i.-  ,        ,  271 

T—M  Tank  Crews  Brush  Up  on  Tactics  t  ^.                                   •  276 

E!|yE«[i;'75-mMi.  A«tftaniOuja><a^   2S0 

Bitler^i  "Young"  Troops  on  the  S^aRdl^   291 

liS^rovised  Mobility:  The  "Mardet^'XMartin),  Captured 

S©wet'76.t«mffl.  AntitanlrGtan  on  aia                               ....  295 

New  T-34  Tanks  Move  Up  io  the  From  .                                      ..,  ,  301 

German  150-mm.  K— 18  Guns  Open  Fire  .  ,  .   .  f  *  .  h  -  .  -  ^  .  .  ^11 

Soviet  Rear  Guards  Engage  an  Enemy  Atma«a3  Csiaf  .  ,  ^  .  .  .  ,  .,  ,  fgO 

Field  Marshal  von  Bock  (seated  in  car)                         .  >  .  ,         ,  .  §23 

New  75-mm.  Self-Propeiled  Assault  Gun  at  Practice  i. 

Panzer  nr  Tanks  oift  ttkeAt^dt  ,  .  .  -  ,  .  ,.  .  ,  .  .  334 
Se! f- Propelled  Assault Guin. aiid^>i(>t||il|^TiWp-Ct!@SsE^  the 

Oskol  River  ...........  ..^  .  i  ...........  ,  S38 

I^nzerMT^Bikift  Vditsneih  ..............  ^  ^  .  Ml 

An  Infantr\  Di\  ision  Heads  East  at  tiic  Pace  of  Its  Horses 

German  Tanks  Rove  Over  the  Steppe  in  Search  of  Targets  ,  ^S2 

G<saicMHGdi(ieeii»»r).3ESi^M<^   $56 

Soviet  Antitank  Gun  Crew  Comes  Under  Fire  ~  .}  k  ^59 

Abandoned  1-34  Tank  Provides  Cover  for  a  German  Observer  .  „ 

San4etMacMne^@mnl!i%I>li^^'&utsidbl^^                .........  iBf 

xiv 


Pag, 

German  75-mm.  Antitank  Gun  ill  the  Caucasus  Foothills  .  *  .  .  i  .  „  373 

German  Mountain  Troops  in  the  Sancharo  Pass   374 

Soviet  Mortar  Squad  Firing  East  of  Tuapse   380 

Sixth  Army's  Tanks  Crossing  the  Don  at  Vertyachiy   3gg 

German  Machine  Gunner  Looks  Across  the  Volga  North 

of  Sialingi-ad   3M 

General  Faulus  (right)  Watches  the  Atuck  on  Stalingiad, 

BeMndiflim  theComEatoderofOCorps,  Seydlitx   „   890 

FoUrtli  Panzer  Army's  Infantry  on  the  Defaasive at ElipBtOsmoye    .  ,  .  392 

M^hine-Gun  Nest  Noitli  of  Rzhev                          -  ^  .   402 

Quadruple  Antiaircraft  Guns  Guard'^Bfidge  on  the 

Zhizdra  River   406 

A  Tiger  Taijk  Waits  for  a  Tow                            i  ,  *  ^   410 

liCfofenOt  Nfear  fEestenga    415 

irh#  Cruiser  A-'rw'/;/ c>n  Station  ill  Alta  Fujixl   429 

llie  "Patriotic  War":  A  Tank  Crew  and  Their  Fank  Named 

'^EttlttjW'   #1 

Woniaii  Sniper  Lieutenant  Poses  Willi  Her  Rifle  and  MedaJS  436 

General  N.  F.  Vatutin,  Commander  of  Southwest  Front  .  ......  ^  4^ 

Oin  fhe  Attack  at  At  StEOIngtaiGiitiif^diy           ^  ........  *  4^ 

Rubble  Prin  ides  Cover  for  Soviet  Soldiers  466 

German  Field  Arullery  Fires  into  Stalingrad  467 

T-IS41linis  AdteREing  at  Speed  .   dTS 

Seif-FirOpelled  Assault  Gtins  Attack  in  Operation  WiNTERGEWTFTm  .  .  .  -^l 

ACk^muofT-34  Tanks  in  Operation  Mau  y  Saturn  ,  *  .  -  *  ..  .  .  486 

Soviet  lit&fsu:^  oxi  .  .  .  .  .  .  ; 

Si»t3i  AiTOy  Survivors  MardiOm  of  StaUngradUn^          *  .  .  .  .  500 


MOSCOW  TO  STMINCMAB: 
DECISION  IN  THE  EAST 


CHAPTER  I 

"The  World  Will  Hold  Its  Breath" 


At  first  light  on  f  2  Jtafie  1941  C5er- 
man  troops  stormed  into  ihe  Soviet 
Union.  Operation  Barbarossa  had  be- 
gttti.  *Vht  m^mm  atMeved  a  tbtid  stta?- 
tegic  surprise,  Tlic  German  offensive 
was  well  across  the  border  before 
lil^s^w  issii^'  the  first=«*dier  to  conm 
TKJfattatk.'  Rv  rlieii,  several  hours  after 
sunrise,  the  Germans  had  taken  every 
bridge  oa  ^1  ifce  bofder  iwm  firoifl 
the  Baltic  to  the  eastern  tip  of  tlie 
Carpathians.  Soviet  troops  were  being 
captured  ttt  thseif  kkri^dks.  At  Qayllgli^ 
the  Luftwaffe  had  struck  the  airfields  in 
western  Russia  destroying  the  Soviet 
plafies  on  the  gtGhxta,  ahd  €teWflaQ 
botflbers  had  attacked  the  cities  on  a 
lioe  from  Murmansk  to  Odessa  and 
Sevastopol.  By  afternoon,  theGerrftaras 
had  broken  Soviet  frontier  defenses, 
and  panzer  columns  were  gatheriiag 
speed  as  they  Icnifed  into  stutJned  and 
disorganized  So\  iet  forces. 

Adolf  Hitler  had  said,  "ITie  world 
bald  il^  ln<«:^&  md  Ml  sQent  wb'en 
Barbarossa  is  mounted,"-  The  world 
did  not  fail  completely  silent.  British 

pf(0posied  a  ittJHtafy  afljaoce  to  #ie  So- 


'Instiiut  Marksizina^Leniniznia,  Istoriya  VetUt^ 
Oteckestvennoy  Voyjiy  Sofflsktjgo  Soyuza,  1941— 1945 
(Moscow:  Voyennoye  Izdatelstvo,  1961),  vol.  11,  pp. 
11,  !7  (hereafter  cited  as /VOVSS  in  footngten  and 
HLslury  oj  llu  Great  Patriotic  Wir  in  text). 

'Max  Domarus,  ed..  Hitler,  Redrn  imd  Proktama- 
tumen,  1932-1945  (Munich;  Sueddeutschcr  Verlag, 


-Viet  IJfiion  on  the  day  of  the  invasion, 
and  Piesident  Franklin  D.  Roosevelt 
offered  U.S.  leRd-sUsase  aid  two  days 
late*;  Bttt  the  did  hcsM  tes  bmMii 
In  Washington,  the  War  Department 
War  Plans  Division  expected  a  Soviet 
d^Se^  tn  ©fte  ^  Ain6e  nienAis.*  Sir 
Stafford  Cripps,  the  British  ambas- 
sador in  Moscow,  predicted  a  German 
victory  in  three  to  four  weeles,  whflfe  the 
British  Joint  Intelligence  Committee 
gave  the  Russians  "a  few  months  at  fhe 
oiiMdfe,'*^  indeed,  BAtBAIiOSSJV  ap- 
peared to  be,  as  Hitler  claimed,  the 
greatest  military  operadon  of  all  time, 
capable  <^  tbe  Soviet  Usrion 

in  a  sin^^e  stanmef  ^  campaaga. 

The  B-^lfipmits 
Germtm  and  Allkd  t^ces 

Hider  was  the  Puekivr  ^^dei^  ^nd 
chancellor  of  Germany  and  supreme 
commander  of  the  German  armed 
fdrees.  The  latter  role  had  emerged  in 
1938  when  Hitler  had  combined  wliat 
had  been  tlie  president's  constitutional 
powers  (under  the  Weimar  Constitu- 
tion) as  commander  in  chief  of  the 
armed  Forces  with  the  minister  of  wars 
direct  compsaM  responsibiUt^.  Tlbe 
Armed  Fdrce*  High  Command 


'Robert  E-  Sherwood,  Roosevelt  and  Hopkins  (New 
York:  Harper.  1950),  p.  303. 

■•j.  M.  A.  Gwyer,  Grand  Strategy  (London:  Her 
Maji»^^  Staton^  QEBcej  1964).      1U>  pt.  t.  p,  90. 


4 


MOSCX5W  TO  STAUEflGiyi;© 


{OberkiJinmaiulij  der  Wehrmacht,  OKW), 
under  the  Chief,  OKW,  GeneralfeMx 
marschall  Wilhelm  Keitel,  liatl  assittned 
the  minister  oF  wars  foi  nici  adniiii- 
istrative  roles,  and  the  OKW  Opera- 
tions Staff  did  Hitler's  military 
operational  planning.  General  der  Ar- 
tiUerie  Alfred  Jodl,  the  chief  of  the 
OKW  Operations  Staff,  was  Hitlct's 
personal  chief  of  staff,  ilie  service 
commands — the  Army  High  Com- 
mand {Obi'rkommando  des  Hems,  OKH), 
the  Air  Force  High  Command  (Ober- 
kommando  der  Luftm^^  OKL),  and  th& 
Navv  High  Command  (Ohcrkom- 
tnandv  der  Kriegstnaii-iie,  OKM) — ex- 
ecuted operations  on  the  basis  of  stra- 
tegic directives  from  Hitler  issued 
through  the  OKW  Operations  Staff. 
Ifee  service  commanders  in  chief — 
Generalfeldmarschall  Walter  von 
Brauchitsch  (army).  Re ichs marschall 
Hermatm  Goering  (aii  force),  and 
Grossatlmiral  Erich  Raetler  (navy)  re- 
ported directly  to  HiUer  aiid  also  re- 
ceived verbal  instructions  from  him. 

"^Hie  campaign  in  the  Soviet  Union 
brougin  a  split  in  die  German  com- 
mand structure.  Hider  limited  the 
OKHs  sphere  of  responsibility  to  the 
Eastern  Front  and  gave  the  OKW  con- 
trol in  the  Western  Theater,  ilic  Bal- 
kans. North  Africa,  and  Scandinavia 
(including  Finland).  The  OKH  thereby 
lost  control  of  army  elements  in  the 
other  theaters  but  did  not  achieve  full 
independence  in  the  East  since  Hitler 
continued  to  issue  his  strategic  direc- 
tives through  the  OKW  Operations 
Staff. 

When  Barbarossa  began,  the  i^flif 
tary  and  political  decisionmakers  in 
Germany  moved  from  Berlin  to  the 
forests  of  East  Prussia.  Berlin,  witJi  its 
centers  of  mihtery  coinniumcations, 


could  have  served  as  well,  but  Hitler 
chose  to  fetjild  an  elaborate  special 
headquarters,  die  Wolfsschunze  ("Wolf's 
Lair"),  in  the  Goerlit^  Fcjrest  east  of 
Rastenburg.  A  field  headquarters  ap- 
parently had  two  advantages  that  to 
Hitler  made  it  worth  the  inconvenience 
and  expense:  it  placed  him  sym- 
bolically at  the  head  of  the  troops  and 
physically  at  the  top  and  the  center  of 
the  command  hierarchy. 

Situated  astride  the  Rastenbin  g-An- 
gerburg  railroad,  the  Vhlfsschanze  con- 
jlilited  of  painstakingly  camouilaged, 
mostly  concrele  buildings  and  bunkers 
sealed  off  li  om  die  otitside  by  rings  of 
steel  fences,  palisades,  and  earthworks. 
Hitler  lived  and  worked  with  his  inti- 
mate military  and  ]3olitical  ad\  iseis  in 
one  compound;  anothei,  a  short  dis- 
tance away,  housed  a  delac  hinent  of  the 
OKW  Operations  Stall  and  a  com- 
munications center.  About  a  dozen 
miles  away  and  also  on  the  railroad, 
which  was  closed  to  geneial  ti  alfic,  the 
OKH  maintained  a  compound  in  the 
Mauerwald  just  outside  Angerhurg. 
Elaborate  as  they  were,  the  Wbifsschanze 
and  the  Mauerwald  compound  could 
only  accommodate  fractions  of  the 
OKW  and  OKH  staffs:  the  rest  stayed 
in  and  around  Berlin  aird  keptin  cisaa'' 
tact  with  die  Wljsschame  by  air  and 
courier  train.* 

The  German  allies  were  Italy, 
Rumania,  Himgarv,  and  Slovakia.  Bul- 
garia was  an  ally  but  did  not  declare 
\var  on  the  Soviet  Union.  Finland  chd 
declare  war  on  the  Soviet  Uixioa  on  26 


*Percy  Ernst  Schramm,  gen.  ed,,  Kringslagflmch  des 
t^erkomammkuy  der  Wehrmacht  (Frankfurt:  Bernard  & 
Graefc,  1961-1965),  vol  IV,  pp.  17i2-S3  (hereafter 
dted  as  OKW,  KTB).  See  also  R.  tSs^m. 'THCJ  'Wolfii- 
Sf^ianze,'"  Afier  Ike  BaUle,  ti0.  i§  '^i^mimi  ^tSXk  tjf 
Brftain  Priois,  Ltd,.  1977% 


'THE  WORLD  WILL  HOLD  ITS  BREATH' 


5 


The  Gixman  Fhjjd  AscnuMKi  Moves  Out 


June  but  as  a  "cobelligerent,"  not  as  an 

ally.  Main^^Ql^  imt  k  was  ns^Atm  m 

base  opertfcJiS  Ofll  fiSXces  that  could 
not  be  "coutttest  Oil  with  certahity," 
Hitler  had  kept  the  allied  eetilimands, 
except  those  of  Rumania  and  Finland, 
out  of  the  plaiuiing.  He  had  allowed 
the  Riiniamaiis  and  Finns  to  be 
broiighl  in  diuung  die  final  stages  be- 
cause German  forces  would  have  to 
deploy  on  Cbose  countries'  territory — 
and,  in  the  case  of  the  Finns,  because 
their  army's  performance  against  the 
Soviet  Union  in  the  Winter  Waf  of 
1939-1940  had  favorably  impressed 
him.'^ 

The  seriior  German  field  commands 


were  to  be  three  army  group  headquar- 
ters, each  responsiWe  ist  operations  in 

one  of  the  main  sectors:  Armv  Group 
North,  led  by  Generalfcldmarschall 
Wilhelm  von  Leeb,  was  lo  attack  out  of 
Fast  Prussia,  through  the  Baltic  States 
toward  Leningrad;  Army  Gionp  Cen- 
ter, imdt  i  Generalfeldmarsc  hall  Fedor 
von  Bock,  assembled  on  the  frontier 
east  of  Warsaw  for  a  thrust  via  Minsk 
and  Smolensk  toward  Moscow;  and 
Army  Group  South,  Generalfcld- 
marschall Gerci  von  Rtnidstedt  com- 
manding, was  responsible  for  the  sector 
hetwfen  the  Pripvat  Marshes  and  llie 
Black  Sea  and  was  to  drive  toward  Kiev 
and  the  line  of  the  Dnepr  River.  Seven 
armies  and  four  pan/er  groups  \vere 
assigned  to  the  arm)  groii].)s:  SiMeenth, 
Eighteenth,  and  Fourth  Panzer  M0> 
North;  Fourth,  Ninth,  Second  Panzer, 


6 


MOSGOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


GERMAN  -  SOVIET  FRONTIER 


MAP  1 


and  Thitcl  Panzer  Lo  CeiiLer;  and  Si}Ct]ji. 
Eleventh.  Seventeefiltl,  amd  FitSt  Faii- 
zer  to  South.  Tliepanzer  groups  werein 
facL  tuli-Hedged  armored  arnues,  but 
owing  to  conservatisiii  among  some  of 
the  seruor  generals,  they  were  wot  yet 
designated  as  such.  (Map  1.) 

The  OKL  attached  an  air  fdtte 
(Luftfhtte)  to  each  of  the  army  groups: 
First  Air  Force  to  Army  Group  Nordr, 
Second  to  Army  Group  Genter,  and 
Fourth  to  Army  Group  South.  The  ;iir 
forces  were  operationally  independent, 
and  their  relationship  with  the  army 
groups  was  confined  to  cooperation 
and  coordination.  During  the  first  five 
months  of  1941,  the  Luftwaffe  had  been 
almost  totally  committed  against  Great 
Britain  and  would  have  to  continue  its 
attacks  on  a  reduced  scale  during  Ba^ 
BAROSSA.  Because  a  sudden  drop  in  the 
number  of  flights  over  Britain  could 
have  given  Barbarossa  away,  the  Luft- 
waffe also  could  not  shift  its  planes  east 
until  the  last  minute.  Moreover,  the 
Balkans  campaign  (April  1941)  and  the 
invasion  of  Crete  {May  1941)  had  re- 
quired unandcipated  expenditures  of 
effort.  Because  of  these  complications, 
particularly  the  strain  that  fighting  on 
two  widely  separafed  fronts  Woulif  im^ 
pose  on  his  resources  and  organization, 
Goering  had  talked  against  attacking 
the  Soviet  Union.'' 

Tlie  navy  also  was  hea\  ily  engaged 
against  Great  Britain,  and  Raederj,  Uke 
Goering,  would  have  pi-efeired  not  to 
become  engaged  elsewhere.  The  navy's 
missions  were  to  take  control  of  the 
Baltic  Sea  and  to  conduct  limited  oper- 
ationa  in  the  Arctic  Ocean  and  the 


^British  Air  ^j|g|St]^  femphlet  248,  7%e  Rise  gmd 
faU  qf  the  Gemm  j^m  {London:  His  Majesty's 
Stationery  Office,  19lS),  pp.  162-66. 


-im  woRUj  WILL  Hoi^  rm  bsiath" 


7 


Black  Sea.  Bui  Raeder  did  not  believe 
fee  navy  could  auty  out  any  ^  diem 
until  after  r.ennan  nir  and  ground 
action  had  eliminated  most  of  the  So- 
wet  ships  and  bases.* 

The  Finnish  Armv  operated  inrle- 
pendciitly  under  iis  own  Commander 
in  Chief,  Marshal  Carl  Maunerheim. 
The  main  direction  of  its  attack  was  to 
be  to  die  Sfuitheast  on  both  sides  of 
Lake  Ladoga  to  increase  the  pressure 
on  the  Sovifl  forces  defending 
Leningrad  and  dicrcby  facilitate  Army 
Gmup  NoEth^  advance.  An  Army  of 
Norway  expeditionary  force  of  two 
German  and  one  Finnish  corps,  under 
OKW  control,  was  to  achance  out  of 
northern  Finland  toward  Murmansk 
and  the  Murmatisk  (Kirov)  Railroad. 
Tlie  priinary  assignmenc  of  llie  Atmy 
of  Norway  and  its  air  support  com- 
mand, Fil  di  Air  Force,  was  the  defense 
of  Norway,  The  Rumanian  Third  and 
Fourth  Armies,  attaclied  to  Army 
Group  South,  had  the  very  limited 
itntisu  mission  of  ^sistil^  iipt  the  con- 
quest of  Bessarabia. 

The  OKH  assigned  3,050,000  men 
and  148  divisions,  including  19  panzer 
and  15  motorized  divisions,  or  75  per- 
cent of  the  exisdng  German  Army  field 
strength  to  Barbarossa."  The  Army  of 
Norway  deployed  another  4  German 
divisions,  67,000  trcKjps,  in  northern 
Finland.  The  Finnish  Army  added 
500,000  men  in  14  divisions  and  3 
brigades.  Rumania's  contribution  of 
about  150,000  men  consisted  of  14  divir 

gt&n  Rusdmid,  Ii32f439  file. 

He  inGtmif  is  both  wa  trwdt  otetitite^.  immeit 
^Hijiatis  had  meH  and  luoasfi^teawtt 

eqfDptnent  in  part 


sions  and  3  brigades,  all  under- 
strength.  The  Barbarossa  force 
initially  had  ?i.?>'S\)  tanks.  7.184  ai  lillerv 
pieces,  600,000  motor  vehicles,  and 
625,000  horses.  "Die  number  «tf  Ger- 
man groimd  troops  actually  committed 
up  (()  die  hrst  week  of  July  apparenUy 
was  million.  The  OKL  provided 
2.770  aircraft,  65  percent  trf"  its  total 
fn  si-liiu'  strength  of  4,300.^* 

Sfn'irl  Forces 

[osef  Stalin,  the  general  secretary  of 
the  Soyiel  Conmiunist  Party,  had  be- 
come head  of  the  Soviet  government 
on  6  Mu\  1941  when  he  made  himself 
chairman  ol  the  Council  of  People's 
Commissars.  Although  he  undoubt- 
edly could  hav  e  done  so,  he  had  not,  as 
of  22  June  1941.  assumed  a  clear  stat- 
utory retallioiiiship  to  the  armed  forces, 
which  were  subordinated  to  several 
bodies.  Nominally  the  highest  of  these 
was  the  Defense  Committee  of  the 
Council  of  People's  Commissars.  Mar- 
shal Sovetskogo  Soyuza  Kliment 
Voroshilov  was  the  chairman,  and  Sta- 
lin. Vyacheslav  M.  Molotov  (the  deputy 
chairman  ol  the  Council  of  Peoplels 
Commissars)  and  the  people's  com- 
missars of  defense  and  the  navy  were 
members.  The  Defense  Committee  su- 
pervised and  coordinated  aU  die  state 
ay^encies  engaged  in  building  up  the 
armed  forces.  The  People's  eotn- 
missariat  (jf  Defense,  under  Marshal 
Sovetskogo  Soyuza  Semen  Timo- 
shenko,  and  the  People's  Commissariat 
of  the  Navy,  under  Admiral  N.  G. 
KjwnetSQV,  were  the  top  military  agen- 

German  Campaign  in  ftasm^—^h^wg  and  Oper^hm, 
mo-m2  (Washington,  D.C.:  GPO,  1955).  pp. 
$S~4J;  OKW^  KTS,  vol.  I.  p.  1215;  Bridah  Air  Mini3ti7 
I^phtet  248,  p.  165. 


8 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


cies.  Whlim  ttie  ©rffeasie  CbifimissaMat. 

the  Main  Military  Council  was  the  deci- 
sion-making body.  Tiiuoshenko  was  the 
chaifman,  and  Sialfri,  Mdlotov,  and 
eight  deput)'  defense  commissars  (of 
whidi  the  Chiei  of  the  General  Staff, 
Gmerul  Amm  Gm&i^  ^ukm,  was 
one)  were  members.  Zhukov  was  tlie 
councirs  secretary,  and  the  General 
Sfatf  df^ied  plafis  for  ft  and  acted  m 
its  channel  to  the  lower  connnands. 
Additionally,  tire  people's  commissar  of 
defense  e*efdsed  letsatimand  of  the 
army  thrnugh  the  General  Staff  and 
his  deputy  commissars.  The  navy  had  a 

sepaTUte  t&mmi^  sMictiire  md  !te 

own  main  council."  The  war  plans 
anticipated  that  in  the  event  of  a  gen- 
eral ViSTf  sen  all-powerful  war  cabinet 
dmilar  to  one  (the  Defense  Council, 
later  Council  ot  Labor  and  Defense)  V. 
I.  LetSiia  Md  headed  fitoija  I91S  to  1920 
and  a  general  headquarters  modeled 
after  the  imperial  Stavka  ("staif ")  of 
World  War  1  would  be  crated,  bat 
neither  at  these  ousted  oa  2t  Jtme 
1941.^^ 

Tile  highest-level  army  field  com- 
mands prior  to  the  outbreak  of  the  war 
were  the  military  districts.  In  peace- 
time, iliev  conducted  training,  super- 
vised garrisons  and  cadres,  and 
pi  ovided  the  machinery  lor  mobiliza- 
tion. Those  districts  on  die  frontiers. 


"M.  V.  Zakharo\,  cci,,  X)  Irl  vmnrJii-mtykli  si!  SSSR 
(Moscow:  Voyennoye  l/.daielsivi.i,  [96H).  yip.  199.  234; 
Insiiiut  Marli.sizma-Lenini/n]<i,  Veliluiw  OlrckethieTi- 
flo^  MiyOii  Savetskogo  Soyu^a,  1941-1945  (Kratkaya  hb>- 
rij/a}  (Moscow:  Vbycnnoye  Izdatelstra,  1970),  p.  62 
(hereafter  dted  as  VOV  ( Kratkaya  Istoriyaj  in  fmitnotes 
and  Short  History  in  text.  See  also  John  lirickson,  The 
Soviet  High  Ctrmmtind  (New  York:  St.  Martins  Press, 
1962),  p,  478, 

'^I.  Kh,  Bagtaaiyan,  Islortya  veyii  i  voyennoga 
tskusstva  (Moscow;  Viiyemioye  kdmetoio;  tS^OX  ^ 
67, 102. 


•Were  set  up  to  be  convfeited  him  fiont 
(that  is,  army  group)  headquarters  in 
the  event  of  war.  As  of  early  1941,  diere 
were  sixteen  military  distriets  arid  tme 
front,  the  Far  Eastern.  ''^  The  military 
districts  on  the  western  frontier  were 
Leningrad,  BalUc  Spm^,  Wks^&n  Spe- 
cial, Kin'  Sp/'cial,  and  Odrss/i  districts. 
On  22  June  1941,  the  five  became/roHts. 
tmm0^i  ^'Sn  idbree  armies  ana  Gen- 
eral Jj^enant  M.  M.  Pojjov  in  com- 
malid,  became  North  Front  with 
respon^ihty  for  the  Baldc  coast  and 
operations  against  Finland.  Baltic  Spe- 
cial, also  with  three  armies  and  under 
6etier^  Pelkovnik  F.  I.  KtiaietsfSr,  be^ 
came  Ni)rthwesf  Front  and  took  over  the 
defense  on  the  East  Prussian  border. 
Western  Special  and  Kiev  Special  became 
WfiSt  Front  (four  armies  under  General 
Armii  D.  G.  Pavlov)  and  Southwest  Front 
(fbtir  armies  under  General  PoUtovnik 
M,  P.  Kirponos)  and  divided  die  vilal 
zone  from  East  Prussia  to  the  Car- 
^aihians  between  them  at  the  Pripyat 
K|v€f,  The  fifth.  Odessa,  which  orig- 
inailly  had  just  one  army,  became  South 
Irnit  s^\^eral  dstyi  ht&i  a^r  Gtn&t^ 
Armii  F.  V.  T)'ulenev  took  command 
with  what  had  been  the  Headquarters, 
Moscow  Military  District,  and  built  a  sec- 
ond army  from  Sotithwesl  Front  divi- 
sions. The  Soutk-Southivest  boundary 
was  at  lipkan  on  the  upper  Bug  fiisifaft" 

'■'.S.  A.  I \ usl)kf\ u li.  et  at.,  Sfn-rt\ki\i'  vunriizhfiim't' 
sih  (Moscow;  Voyesinoye  ladatelst\t),  1978),  p.  233.  (To 
help  the  reader  distingtJish  between  opposing  forces, 
,all  Soviet  military  organizations  appear  in  italics 
tliraughiHit  this  volume,) 

'■■P,  A.  Zhiiin,  ed.,  Velikiya  OtecheilveinHiv  Voyna. 
KratMy  imnihimpoputamyy  uchtrk  (Moscow;  lzdatelst^■o 
Politicheskoy  Uteratury,  1970),  p.  74  (hereafter  cited 
as  VOV  in  footnotes  and  Popular  Scienlifir  Sketch  in 
text);  liisiilul  Voyennov  Isiorii  Ministerstva  Oborony 
SSSR,  Isttirnfi  Vlunn  Minamy  Vofny,  1939-1945 
(Mos.  nw:  \'<ivcniioye  "Udaiclst\«,  1973-1982J,  vol.  IV, 
p  (hi'icaltcr  cited  as  /I'.MV  in  ioomsn^ $f)& HtSlOfy 
^tlie  Sfcotiii  World  War  in  tcxtj. 


"THE  WORLD  WILL  HOLD  ITS  BREATH" 


Marshal  S.  K.  1  imoshlnko 


General  G.  R.  Zhukov 


Soviet  command  at  all  lev^  was 
complicated  by  political  surveillance 
and  control  embodied  in  the  com- 
missar system.  As  it  had  been  de- 
veloped in  the  civil  war  and  reinsdtuted 
in  1937  following  a  period  in  whidi 
politicaUy  reliable  commanders  had 
been  allowed  to  act  as  their  own  com- 
missars, the  system  re(jnire(l  all  orders 
to  be  reviewed  and  countersigned  by  a 
commissar.  So-called  unity  of  cotti- 
mand  exchicling  the  rommissars  from 
military  decision  making  liad  been  in- 
stalled in  August  1940,  after  the  war 
with  Finland,  but  the  struaure  of  tlu- 
commissar  system  had  remained  in 
place.**  In  ^e  re^meftt^  and  higher 
stalls  ihe  forme?  commissars  had 
stayed  on  as  deputy  commanders  tor 


political  affair^  and  "members  of  the 
BDolitary  councils,"  wfiicb  ciunsisted  of 
thsKDaseh  es,  ihe  commanders,  and  ihc 
diiefe  of  staff.' «  Un  i6  JiUy  1941,  the 
Politburo  reinstalled  commissars  in  the 
inililarv  staffs  and  restored  tlicir  aii- 
diority  to  review  and  revoke  comman- 
ders' decisions;  -it  nAm  installed  ptiMtrulis 
("p<ilitical  leatlership  officers")  al  ihe 
lower  echelons,  down  to  the  platoons. 
The  Oiief  of  the  Army^  Political 
Administration,  L,  E.  Mel^fis,  Ik  iu e- 
lorth  saw  to  it  daiat  &it$f  ciommander 
had  a  political  officer  at  his  elbow 
vvalching  his  everv  moveancl  schooled 
to  see  sabotage  or  tr^^son  in  war's 
ordinary  ttiiscbances.''-'^ 

An  oroanizalion  I  hat  had  no  com- 
inand  funcdons  but  power  at  all  levels 


"/VAfV,  vol.  ni,p.4l8. 


'WMV.  voLIV.p.55. 


10 


MOSCOW  TO  S^d^NGRAD 


Tvas  the  secret  political  police  of  the 
People's  Cummissariat  of  Iniernal  Af- 
fairs {Namdnyy  Komissarial  Vnutiennikh 
Del,  NKVD).  It  had  attd  eksdc 
authority  ovei  state  security  and, 
thnmgh  its  special  duty  (Ojoijj  Otdei, 
O.O.)  secdom  ffi  the  atflfled  forces, 
maintained  surveillance  of  officers  and 
men.  It  also  had  troops  of  its  own  that 
■wepe  tsften  fomied  into  Blocking 
taefaments  and  used  to  prevent  or  stop 
tietreats  by  passing  summary  judgment 
on  anyone,  officer  or  prftslei  tlilpable 
under  NKVD  direcrives.  The  NKVD 
and  the  Main  Political  Administratiou 
provided  Stalia  with  a  constant  streaaa 
of  information,  outside  military  chan- 
nels, about  officers'  actions  and 
behavior. 

In  June  1941,  the  Soviet  forces,  the 
army  in  paiticulai,  were  in  a  state  of 
flux.  In  part  it  involved  modei^lzaiion 
and  ex]>aiision,  wliich  had  been  going 
on  tliroughout  the  1930s  and  at  an 
seceJej^tMl  rate  after  war  bitJlce  oat  in 
September  1939.  Most  immediately, 
the  changes  were  an  effort  to  act  upon 
tfie  le^SOiiff  I^raed  ill  ^  'Wat  wift 
Finland.  Mannerheim,  the  Finnish 
Army's  commander  in  chief,  had  com- 
pami  the  Soviet  perfcatnance  in  titat 
war  to  that  of  a  badly  conducted  or- 
chestra in  whicli  the  players  could  not 
keep  time.**  *Vbt  tr&ubfe'  had!  not  be<^ 
primarily  with  manpower  or  equip- 
fDi^t.  Despite  Soviet  deficiencies  in  the 
lattep,  iSm  Ftenish  Araay  had  been  so 
much  smaller  and  more  lightly  armed 
that  ec|uipment  should  not  have  been  a 
significant  factor.  Inexperience  had 
counted  heavily  at  all  levels  but  most 
particiilarlj  in  the  upper  ranks.  Purges 
in  the  i£(id49iCte  bad  c^lfiisd  m^f 

"Carl  Maiuierheim.i&i!W8n*i?gs«  <ZllsidWiAdanJis 
Verlag,  1952),  p-  374. 


many  senior  bfficers  ^o  had  been 

hurriedly  replaced  by  men  advanced 
from  posts  far  down  the  line.'^ 
Beyond  Qiat,  the  Knnish  l^r  had 
posed  deep-seated  rigidity,  lack  of  ini- 
tiative, and  failure  to  grant  and  to 
assuflse  fesponsibility.  Since  these  fafl"- 
ings  stemmed  directly  from  the  autoc- 
racy Stalin  had  imposed  to  maintain 
his  own  position  and  tliatrGlf  ^^'Glte^ 
munist  Party,  they  were  ©ttras»dinaii- 
ly  difficult  to  correct. 

Efforts  during  1940  to  correct  these 
shortcomings  had  met  with  mixed  re- 
sults. In  the  spring,  the  Connnissariat 
of  ^ffeoseand  the  army  issued  nevised 
field  regulations  and  training  manuals 
condemning  formula-ridden,  over- 
simplified traitiing.  Commissariat  of 
Defense  Order  120  of  16  May  1940  had 
called  for  combat-oriented  training 
duriiig  the  summer  and  had  empha* 
sized  military'  discipline  and  tradition. 
Also  in  May,  general  officer  and  admi- 
ral ranks,  v^aSk  Iiad  Iwien  a^lislted 
since  the  revolution,  had  been  in- 
sututed  to  enhance  commanders'  au- 
tffcCRFity  and  self-e^eiaa*  Uiiity  of 
command  was,  of  course,  the  major 
effort  to  boost  their  authority.  StUl,  by 
yeax\  end,  »npr«9iveinienr'%ad  oaly  be- 
gun." After  a  confetence  of  top  army 
commanders  in  December  1941,  die 


'"Tlie  militai-y  purge  had  begun  in  the  summer  of 
11-137  ivitli  tlie  arrest  and  execution  of  Marshal  So- 
velskogo  .Sayiiza  M.  H,  riikliathcvskis  :inci  continued 
thercafttr  thrijugli  1938,  In  ii  ilu-  Smici  ArmyloStaB 
of  its  military  district  commanders,  all  of  its  corjlB 
cominaiiders,  "nearly  all"  of  its  division  and  brigade 
rommandt-rs,  and  half  of  its  regimental  coinnian4e|& 
The  purge  reduced  the  then  existing  officer  stf^Sgt& 
in  all  l  anks  by  one  fifth.  The  navy  and  air  force  were 
hit  equally  hard.  Institut  Marksizma-Leninizma, 
Vdikaya  Otechesh'ennnya  Vimm  Sm'etshigo  S(/yuza,  1941— 
1945  (Kralkaya  tstnriya)  {Moscow:  Voyennoyc 
Izdatelstvo,  1965),  p.  39.  The  infoniMtion  dted  docs 
not  appear  in  the         cditfem:  bf  (Kratliiejit 


"THE  WORLD  WILL  HOLD  ITS  BREATH" 


n 


Defense  Gominimiiat  issued  Ordfer 

30,  "On  (liclasksof  ComiIku  and  Politi- 
cal Training  lor  1941,"  specifying  as- 
pects of  troop  and  command  training 
in  which  deficiencies  [)ci  sisted.^" 

The  effort  to  modernize  equmment 
vas  also  just  beginning  to  taite  enect  in 
June  1941,  although,  in  strictly  numet- 
ical  terms,  the  Soviet  forces  may  actu- 
ally have  been  the  best  equipped  in  the 
world  at  thai  time.  B\  I'j;>7,  l.'i.OOO 
tanks  had  been  produced,  and  the  out- 
put there^er  had  been  o*er  SjOOO  per 
year.  Stalin  may  well  not  have  C^f^^^r- 
ated  when  he  told  Hariy  L.  Hopkins, 
the  tl,St  lend-lease  negotiator,  in  July 
1941,  dmt  ilu  ^<A  iet  Union  had  24,000 
tanks  wlien  ihc  war  broke  out.  Military 
aiftraft  production  frotin  1  January 
1939  to  June  1941  totaled  17,745  air- 
planes, and  die  army  had  67,335  ai  til- 
lery  pitote  and  mortars  {ha^&  than 
50-mm,)  in  June  194].-'  But  man \  nl 
ihe  tanks  and  aircraft  were  obsolete, 
and  most  were  below  standard  for  the 
time. 

Iwo  new  lank  types,  the  T-34  and 
BLV  f£Z£Menf  V&re^&ff),  v/mt  ^  su- 
perior to  any  the  Gernian.s  had,  even 
on  tiie  drawing  boards,  llie  Soviet 
T-34  medium  tank  at  twenfys-eight 
tons  outweighed  by  three  tons  the 
heaviest  German  tank,  the  Panzer  IV, 
and  had  a  tx>p  speed  ^l^i^two  inph 
aj^ainst  the  Panzer  IV%  twenty-four 
niph.  Tire  Panzer  IV^  ^Olt-barreled 
7&-mm,  gun  was  no  matcb^  c^er  in 


range  or  velocity,  Ibr  the  T-S4^ 

longer-barreled  76-mni.  gun.  Tlie  KV. 
twenty  tons  heavier  than  the  T-34  but 
powered  wttli  tbe  samiEf  twelve-cylinder 
diesel  engine,  was  slower  (wiili  a  lop 
speed  of  twenty  mph)  but  more  heavily 
armored,  and  it  aho  carried  a  7B-i»fn. 
gun.  Despite  tlieir  greater  weights, 
wide  treads  on  tire  T-34  and  KV  gave 
them  as  mudi  as  25  percent  lower 
groiuul  pressin  cs  ]}ei  s<]uare  inch  than 
the  German  tanks  and  yielded  belter 
traction  on  imid  or  snow.  Moreover, 

their  welded,  slopiinj,  hull  aitfl  lutret 
armor  made  diem  impervious  to  all  but 
the  heaviest  German  antitank  weapons. 
Hie  Russians  began  ]>i  f>ducing  both  in 
1940  but  had  managed  to  build  only 
639  KVs  and  l»Sf  5  T-34s  before  June 
1941." 

A  third  new  Soviet  tank  type  was  die 
light  f6.S«^iae$  T-60.  It  v^  a  two-inan 
\  chicle,  inoiuiting  a  20-mm.  cannon 
and  a  7.b2-mm.  machine  gun  and  car- 
rying^ a  maxinium  30-tnm>  of  ansior. 
Roughlv  comparable  to  the  German 
Panzer  11,  on  which  it  may,  in  part, 
have  been  modeled,  the  T-60  was 
much  inferior  to  the  Panzer  III  or  IV. 
Its  outstanding  virtue  was  that  its  clias- 
sis  and  gasoline  engine  cOuld  be  built 
quickly  in  ordinary  automobile  plants 
using  standard  automotive  compo- 
nents. In  1940,  the  Russians  had  built 
2,421  T-60s  as  agamst  256  KVs  and 
117  1-348.==' 

Having  assumed  from  ^^perience  in 


-V\'(1VSS.  vol.  1.  pp.  .Si-c  also  John 

Erk.iison,  The  Rooil  III  Slfiliiigjfiil  (l.oiitliiii:  Wcidenield 
and  Nicholson.  1975),  pp.  and  A.  1. 

Ercraenko.  fbmm  tiovnv  (DoneLsk:  Uoiil>.iss,  1971),  pp. 
I2K-30. 

"  Zakbaitn.  ill  Iri.  |ip.  2(1-2,  23,6;  Bagramyan,  tsimya 
vayn,  p.  96;  Slit-i  wikkI.  RaohCveU  and  HofMtu,  3(fe: 
VdV  (Kmtkaya  htotmk  p.  45!. 


'■'S,  P.  Ivimiiv,  Nmhtilnyi  jii'iim!  vn\it\  (Mostoiv:  V(<- 
yennoye  )/<Lit('lsnri.  1974).  p.  2(11);  IV.MV.  vol.  Ml,  p. 
420.  See  alsu  B.  Pt-iTfU,  Fiiihlms  \rhi,lr^  i,t  llu-  Red 
.Inny  (London:  Ian  Alien.  IDti'.t).  pp.  32-3ti.  111-52. 

'^T\  nslikt.-\'ich,  Voontzlifiuiyi  v/v.  p.  273i  C".,  A-  [)e- 
borin  and  B.  S.  Telpukllovskiy,  /iogi  i  wote*  velihrf 
oleL-heslvennoy  (Mo$c$W.  Izdatelstvo  "Mysl," 

1975).  p.  860. 


12 


MOSjDQW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


the  Spanish  civil  war  as  otJier  annii^ 
also  did  thai  tanks  would  chiefly  per- 
form infantry  support,  the  Soviet 
AtHay  had  disbatldm  SISferal  mecha- 
nized and  tank  coi  ps  organized  in  the 
early  1930s  and  did  not  reiorm  large 
armored  units  until  after  the  fall  of 
Fiance,  In  late  1940.  it  activated  eight 
mechanized  corps,  each  with  36,000 
troops  and  an  allotment  of  1,031  tanks*. 
In  February  and  Mat  ch  1941,  it  began 
setting  up  another  twenty.  Apparently, 
few  of  the  mechanized  corps  Were  fulff 
equipped  by  June  1941.^* 

Although  the  great  majority  of  the 
Soviet  aircraft  were  not  equal  to  the 
high  performance  types  the  Germans 
had  introduced  into  the  war  in  1939, 
Soviet  designers  had  developed  some 
ti^/ver  models,  p;n  licularly  the  MIG-3, 
^(AK-1,  and  LAtiti  hghters  and  the 
lL-2  (Shturmovik).  The  Shtunm^^ 
publicized  eat  ly  in  the  war  as  a  com- 
petitor with  the  German  Stuka  (JU-87) 
dive-bomber,  was  primarily  a  ground 
attack  plane  and  dive-bomber,  slow  but 
well  armored  and  difficult  to  shoot 
down.  The  three  fighters  had  the  fea- 
tures of  tlie  advanced  western  types, 
but  only  the  MIG-3,  at  370  mph  plus, 
could  match  the  speed  of  the  standard 
German  fighter  (the  ME- 109).  By  June 
1941,  Soviet  air  units  had  received 
2,739  planes  of  these  types. 

The  Soviet  preparations  had  concen- 
trated on  weapons  but  neglected  the 
supplementary  equipment  needed  to 
make  them  effective.  The  artillery,  for 
instance,  used  ordinary  farm  tractors 
as  prime  movers,  and  tlie  mt)torized 
divisions  had  less  than  half  theur 


l^anxi^  allotments  of  trucks.  The 
army  was  weak  in  all  kinds  o\  motor 
vehicles  except  tanks  and  would  re- 
main so  until  the  flow  of  American- 
built  trucks  and  cars  ihrougii  lend- 
lease  took  effect.  Railroad  transporta- 
tion also  was  deficient.  Railroad  invest- 
ment during  the  1930s  had  mostly 
favored  industrial  development  pio- 
jects  and  hisd  ^lighl)^  the  existing  net- 
work. The  expansion  into  Poland,  the 
Baltic  Slates,  and  Bessarabia  in  1939 
and  1940  had  made  the  frontier  mili- 
tary districts  dependent  on  several  dif- 
ferent railroad  systems,  whose  varia- 
tions! m  gange^  and  odier  problems, 
ofteti  necessitated  transloading  from 
one  raiUine  to  another  at  the  old 
border.^® 

Still  another  weakness  was  signal 
communicadons.  Moscow  had  contact 
with  the  military  districts  by  telephone, 
telegraph,  and  radio  but  mainly  by 
telephone,  apparendy  over  die  lines  of 
the  civihan  system.  Communications  in 
the  field  were  tmcertain.  The  radio 
networks  were  thin.  The  masses  of 
booty  t|ie  Germans  took  in  1941  con- 
tained only  150  radio  sets.  Zhukov's 
and  odier  high  ranking  commanders' 
memoirs  confirm  that  they  spent  much 
time  out  of  touch  with  subordinate 
headquarters.  Even  the  newest  tanks 
did  not  carry  radios.  In  the  air  forces, 
only  the  squadron  commanders'  planes 
had  radios,  of  which,  because  of  their 
poor  quality,  the  History  of  the  Great 
Patriotic  War  states,  "flight  p^sonjiel 
made  little  use  while  in  the  air.*** 

On  22  June  1941.  according  to  most 
Soviet  accounts,  the  western  military 
districts  had  2.9  million  men  in  170 


-■'1.  t-  Kmjji.  In.  I  iki  I.  el  .il..  Sin'f/.\ki\r  lankai'yi:  voyska 
(Moscow:  V'(sy(.-i!iin\c  l/ikiU'lslvo.  1973),  pp.  IM^M; 
Tyuslikevith.  Vmnizitrutiyi-  uly,  p.  HW. 


■/ 1  Yn  .s.s,  vol.  I,  pp.  417-19, 4^,  4V6. 
■'Vbid.,  p.  454. 


"THE  WORLD  WILL  HOLD  ITS  BUEATH" 


13 


divisions  an^  2  brigades;  none  oi  Uie 
divisions  were  at  &1II  strength.-''  This 
figure  includes  rifle  (intantry)  and  cav- 
alry divisions  and.  apparently,  also  tank 
and  motorized  divisions,  although  the 
Soviet  accoinits  are  not  clear  on  the 
latter.^**  As  of  early  July,  the  number  ot 
divisions  increased  to  212.  of  which  90 
were  al  full  strength.  1  he  western  mili- 
tary districts  also  had  7  ef  tfie  newly 
fpniied  mechanized  corps,  and  13 
moTe  were  being  set  up  there. The 
Soviet  accounts  vary  on  the  types  and 
numl)ers  of  tanks  the  mechanized 
corps  had.  Two  give  a  total  of  1,800 
heavy  and.  medium  tanks — 1,475  of 
them  KVs  and  T-34s — plus  "a  signifi- 
cant number"  of  older,  lighter  mod- 
efet^"  One  gives  the  figure  5,500  for  the 
heavy  and  medium  tanks  and  does  not 
mention  odiers.^'  The  western  military 
distrlGts?  allotSBetit  of  artillery  pieces 
and  mortars  is  given  as  34,69.5.  a  spe- 
cific enough  nuinbei  but  one  that 
lumps  together  two  not  exacdy  com- 
parable weapons;  and  the  air  imits  are 
said  to  have  had  1,540  planes  of  the 
new  types  and  "significant  numbers"  of 
older  models.'^^ 


''\  (A.  p.  fil;  1Y;1'  (Kiiilkuya  likii nn),  jt.  ■'i  l;  Iv.iimi, 
A'«(/if(/iJVV  liriHiil.  j).  20M;  /r.AJV',  vril.  |).  LTi,  jr|\es 
g.68U,(mn  nifii, 

^"KrLipt  heiikii.  luiiliin'\r  I'lty^bi,  p.  2],  unliLait-s  ihiil 
ihe  Riissi;ii]S  tiriiiied  2\  Uirik  .iiiil  7  im mn i/ed  ilivi- 
sioti".  ntiil  wevf  lunniiiy  tank  .iiitl  I'l  im  ih  n  i/rd 
divislidis  III  ihe  westpni  !iiilitLti\  diilikls,  IIr  .niilm- 
rlzcil  siifiigtli  nl  nlle  ilivisiuui  was  sci  at  !■!.  I,S.'(  1111.11 
III  Apiil  I'.MI.  (limn  fmm  a  prcviiiLis  1M.(M)IJ,  .\  lijie 
ttivisiuii  tonsistefl  ■>!  '.i  infaoliT  ami  2  arliller)'  rcg- 
iiiR'iiiN-  l\  MV,  ^<'\.  III,  p.'  118;  Tytisfekevich, 

VmtnrJiaimye  illy,  p.  23(i. 

"IVMV.  "vol.  rv.j>.  60:  Vsus^^0xk&,^&imi^m!^, 
p-  s^i 

■"'l\:i!ni\.  Xdrltiiinn  jifiiinl.  p.  215;  V()\'.  p.  fjl. 

Kriipclir[ikii_  rmiliirrM  vii\-shii .  p.  Ivuiniv. 
hlat.halnTi  ln-nnil .  p.  111  "). 

"Ivanov,  iV(j(7(Yi/nv;y  jjeruul,  p.  214;  V()\'.  p.  51. 


On  the  last  day  of  July  1940, 

Hitler  announced  his  decision  to  in- 
vade the  Soviet  Union  to  a  small  group 
dPlMS^gieiieralSj  he  described  his  grand 
strategic  design  as  follows:  "England's 
hope  is  Russia  and  America.  If  Russia 
isl&st,  America  wfll  beMtSOi  bedttiBeJie 
loss  of  Russia  will  restilt  in  an  enor- 
mous rise  of  Japan  in  East  Asia.  If 
Rti^la  smashed,  then  England^  last 
hope  is  extinguished.  Then  Germany 
win  be  the  master  of  Europe  and  the 
Balkans.""'^  Therefore,  he  concluded, 
the  Soviet  Union  had  to  be  "finished 
off  in  one  go'  and  "the  sooner  die 
better."^^ 

To  Hitler  and  his  military  advisers, 
the  strategic  concerns  associated  with  a 
war  in  tHeSSMet  Union  appeai  erl  to  be 
mostly  geographical.  One  was  the  cli- 
mate, which  was  markedly  continentiil, 
with  short,  hot  summers  and  long,  ex- 
tremely ccjid  winters  and  an  astonish- 
ing uniformity  from  north  to  south, 
cankering  the  couniry's  great  ex- 
panse. I  litler  observed  at  the  groups 
first  conference  diat  it  would  be  "haz- 
ardous" to  winter  in  the  S()\  iet  Union, 
and,  therefore,  it  would  be  l>etter  to 
delay  the  invasion  until  the  next 
spring. Finishing  off  (lie  Soviet 
Union  then  in  "one  go"  would  mean  a 
single  smnmet  s  campaign  ol  no  more 
tfian  five  months.  Its  beginning  and 
end  would  also  have  lo  be  adjusted  to 
tiie  msputitsy  ("times  without  roads") 
brought  on  by  the  spring  thaw  and  the 
fall  rains,  uhicli  al  both  times  turned 
die  Soviet  roads  into  impassable  quag- 
mircs  for  pedods  ^  se^^gcl  nsreel^ 


'■'Hiildn  Dtan.  vol.  tl,  p.  49. 


14 


MOSCOW  TO  STiU4NGK4D 


The  big  strategic  question  was  the 
one  that  had  also  confionlfd  earlier 
invaders:  how  to  accomplisli  a  inilitary 
victory  in  the  vastness  of  the  Russian 
space?  Apart  from  the  Pripyat  Marshes 
and  several  of  the  large  rivers,  tlie 
terrain  did  not  offer  notable  impedi- 
ments to  the  movement  of  modei  n 
military  forces.  But  maintaining  u  t)op 
concentrations  and  suppljdng  armies  in 
the  depths  ol  this  country  presented 
staggering,  potentially  crippling,  diffi- 
culties. The  entire  Stniet  Union  liad 
only  51,000  miles  of  railroad,  all  of  a 
different  gauge  than  those  in  Germany 
and  eastern  Europe.  Of  8.50,000  isiks 
of  road,  700,000  were  hardly  more 
than  cart  tracks;  150,000  miles  were 
allegedly  all-weather  roads,  but  only 
40,000  sxMm  of  those  were  bard 
surfaced.^ 

Hider  and  the  OKH  agreed  that  the 
first  objeqtive  in  the  campaign  would 
have  to  be  l&  cripple  the  Soviet  resis- 
tance close  to  the  frontier.  In  De- 
ceniber,  however,  when  they  were 
drafting  the  strategic  directive,  their 
thinking  diverged  on  how  to  accom- 
plish the  second  objective,  die  final 
Soviet  defeat.  Brauchitsch  and  the 
General  Staff  proposed  to  aim  the 
main  thrust  toward  the  Moscow  area. 
Ithe  rmds  were  best  m  that  direction, 
and  the  General  Staff  believed  the  So- 
viet Command  could  be  induced  tp 
commit  its  last  strength  there,  to  de- 
fentl  the  capital,  which  was  also  the 
center  of  a  vital  industrial  complex  and 
ifee  hub  of  the  country's  road  and  rail- 
road networks.  Hitler,  however,  ditl  not 
believe  the  war  could  be  decided  on  tlie 
Moscow  axis.  Directive  21,  "for  Opera- 


rion  Barbarossa,"  \vhich  Hider  signed 
on  18  December  1940,  circumvented 
the  issue  by  providing  for  simultaneous 
thrusts  toward  Leningrad,  Moseowfj 
and  Kiev;  a  modified  main  effort  to- 
waid  Moscow;  and  a  possible  lialt  and 
diversion  of  forces  from  the  Moscow 
thrust  to  ;iid  the  advance  toward 
Leningrad,  for  the  moment,  tlie  dif- 
ferences in  opinion  on  stral£g^4id:iiot 
really  interfere  with  the  operation 
plamiing.  The  objectives  were  to  trap 
the  "mass"  of  the  Soviet  Army  in  sweep- 
ing envelopments  close  to  the  frontier, 
to  annihilate  it,  and  thereafter  to  oc- 
cupy the  Soviet  territory  east  to  the  line 
of  Arkhangelsk  and  the  Volga  River. 
The  initial  main  effort  would  be  in  the 
center  toward  Moscow,  and  staff  stud- 
ies showed  that  the  Soviet  Union  could 
be  defeated  in  eight  weeks,  ten  at 
most.^ 

lb  compel  the  Soviet  fofces  to  stand 
and  fight  appeared  to  be  the  chief 
requirement,  and  if  thc\  did  that,  they 
would  be  defeated.  The  Soviet  Army, 
Hider  maintained,  alluding  to  the  mili- 
tary purge,  "was  leaderless."  It  had,  he 
added,  recently  been  given  oppor- 
tunities to  "learn  some  conect  lessons 
in  the  conduct  of  war"  presumably  by 
the  German  early  cp^mpaigns  and  the 
war  With  Jtnlkod  but  i^iieetfter  It  was 
exploiting  them  was  "more  than  ques- 
tionable," and,  in  any^  event,  no  sub: 
staatlve  change  could  be  accomplished 
by  the  spring  of  1941.  Tlie  Soviet  ar- 
mor, he  believed,  was  no  match  even 
for  the  24-ton  German  Panzer  III, 
mounting  a  50-mm.  gun,  and  the  rest 
of  the  Soviet  weaponry,,  "excepl  for  a 


"'^Dt'i  Fuehrer  iind  Oberilf  Be/rhl\hi!hi't  il,-r  Wihnniirht, 
OKW.  WFSl.  Abl.  L  it)  Nr.  3340S/40.  WmiwK  \i.  21. 
hall  B<irlHiTi}\Mi .  IS.I2.-ll>.  (icriuiin  Higii  Level  Direc- 
tives, CMH  files;  DA  Pamphlet  20-26 la,  pp.  17-25. 


THE  WORUD  Wm-  HOLD  ITS  BREimj'* 


15 


few  modern  field  batteries*  *sfs'  "cop- 
ied old  material."'^'^ 

Und^r  these  circumstances,  al- 
thottgjh  BStlerdid  not  entirely  overlook 
other  strategic  problems,  he  did  regard 
them  as  irrelevant  to  the  kind  of  war 
b^g-^aaxied.  One  such  problem  was 
manpowei  potential.  Greater  Gei  many 
had  a  population  ol  89  million;  the 
Soviet  Union  had  193  million  people."** 
But  the  Soviet  people,  in  Hitlers  opin- 
km,  were  "inferior."^"  Also,  Hitler  had 
.ilQt^t  shifted  the  German  cconf)my  to 
a  WSitimc  footing.  The  early  blitzkrieg 
<:aiti]^gns  had  been  so  successtul  and 
M»  iSatif^f  litieap  diat  he  had  kept  the 
econofiay  oa  a  quasi-peacetime  basis. 
%fer  Jiroduction  in  1941  was  at  the  1940 
level,  which  its^tltd  been  lower  than 
the  original  economic  mobilization 

£lam  had  specified.  In  the  meaiidrne, 
owever,  the  Soviet  Union  had  more 
than  caught  up  with  Germany  in  bud- 
geting for  war  production.  From  1933 
&roiigh  1938,  the  Soviet  Union  had  in- 
vested (he  equivalent  of  ,S4.7  billion  in 
arniainents,  and  Germany  $8.6.  The 
1939  figures  had  been  $3.3  (Soviet)  and 
$3.4  (German),  fn  1940,  they  had  risen 
to  $5.0  (So\  ieij  and  $6.0  (German),  and 
in  1941,  $8.5  (Soviet)  aod  $6.0 
(German).*' 

But  Hitler  had  no  time  for  doubts. 
He  made  just  one  coinparison:  "In^iie 
Spring  [of  194 1],  we  will  be  at  a  di.scern- 
able  high  in  leadership,  material,  and 
t3-(K>|r$i  aiid  l$i&  Jlmsiaits  will  be  m  m 


■"Haider  Diary,  vol.  11,  p.  214. 

^"Nikolai  Voznesenskiy,  The  Eamomy  of  the  USSR 
During  VferW  War  11  {WaMB^tm,  J3i!^'^  Vm^  MMA 
Press,  1948),  p.  8. 

^"Holder  Diary,  vol.  11,  p,  214. 

' '  Deutsches  I  nstitut  fuer  Wirtschaftsforsehung,  Die 
deutiche  hidiiilric  im  Knegi\  S939-I945  (Berlin:  Htwi^- 
ker  &  Humblodt,  1934j!  pp.  23,  27.  34. 87. 


tuOTHStakable  low."*2  On  11  June  l^i, 

he  issued  Directive  32,  "Preparations 
for  the  Period  After  Barbarossia,''  in 
which  he^aiitidpated  leaving  sixty  divi- 
sions on  security  dtity  in  the  Soviet 
Union  and  having  the  rest  of  die  forces 
redeployed  for  Other  nusskxm 
late  faU.*^ 


For  the  Soviet  Union,  the  French 
surrender  in  June  1940  made  war  with 
Germany  a  real  and  distinctly  un- 
*eIea*Bie- ^i^astingency.  Suddenly,  fee 
government  and  the  armed  forces, 
having  just  begun  to  digest  die  lessons 
of  the  war  with  Finland,  found  them- 
selves alone  on  the  Condnent  with  a 
hugely  expanded  Germany  thai  had 
accomplished  in  less  than  six  weeks 
what  it  had  been  imable  to  do  in  the 
four  years  of  World  War  I.  Nikita 
Khrushchev,  who  by  his  own  account 
was  with  .Stalin  when  the  news  of  the 
French  capitulation  came  in,  has  de- 
scribed Stalin's  cursing  the  British  and 
French  for  having  failed  to  resist  and 
die  gloom  in  die  Soviet  govermiient  at 
being  isolated  and  facing  "the  most 
pressing  and  deadly  ihjreat  in  aU 
history.  .  . 

In  July  1940,  the  Soviet  Army  Gen- 
eral Staff  turned  to  what  from  then 
until  the  following  Jimc  would  be  its 
priority  concern:  devising  a  strategy  to 
meet  a  German  attack.  Marshal  Sovet- 
skogo  Soyuza  Boris  Shaposhnikov,  who 


*^H^  Diary,  vol.  Il,,f.  tI4. 

«&m,  WFSt,  Abt.i,  ff.m}^44^S641,  Weisur^Nr, 
files. 

**(>Jikita  Khrushchev.  Khru^vk^  l^mminers 
^BostQEU  little.  Brown,  1970).  p.  154. 


16 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


was  then  chief      fiie  General  Staff, 

assumed  rliaf  Germany  would  have 
Finland,  Hungary,  Rumania,  and  Italy 
as  allies,  and,  although  he  was  "n0t 
exckiding"  the  possibility  of  a  two-front 
war  involving  Japan,  he  took  the  most 
^ernog  threat  to  be  the  one  oa  the 
west^*  Even  though  Japan  had  been  an 
active  ^epty  of  the  Soviet  Union  for 
the  puevidms  several  years,  Shaptl- 
shnikov  concluded  that  Germany  was 
obviously  the  stronger,  was  closer  to  ttie 
So\'iet  vIM!  centers,  aiid  Was  chotiftit  to 
be  the  one  most  likely  to  attack  first.  He 
and  his  subordinates  then  undertook 
to  devise  a  response  to  the  problem  as 
he  had  broadly  defined  it.'*^ 

In  September  1940,  General  Arraii 
Kiril  Meretskov,  who  had  taken  Shapo- 
shnikovs  place  as  chief  of  the  General 
Staff  in  August,  pi  esented  the  results 
e£  t&e  General  Staff's  work  din  ing  Hue 
simimer  to  Stalin  and  the  Polilbiov  as  a 
plan  for  strategic  deployment  on  the 
western  frontier.  At  the  meeting,  by 
Stalin's  decision,  two  fundamental 
premises  became  fixed  elements  in  So- 
«iet  fwdmvasion  strategy.  One  of  dtesii; 
concerned  the  direction  of  the  German 
main  effort;  tlie  other  concerned  the 
nature  of  the  Soviet  response  to  an 
attack.  Tlie  Soviet  literature  offers  two 
versions  of  how  those  decisions  were 
reached. 

As  Marshal  A.  M.  Vasilevsktv.  who 
was  then  die  deputy  operations  chief, 
relates  it,  the  Gcncial  Staff  \  ic^\  held 
that  tlie  probable  main  lines  ol  the 
German  attack  would  lie  north  of  the 
lower  San  Rivets  ihence,  in  the  center, 
toward  Mqs^w,  and  on  the  north 


*''A.  M.  Vasiievsliiy,  Otlo  vney  ikizni  (Moscow; 
Izct.-ilelsiv(i  P')liiiiliesli(iv  Literawry,  1976),  p.  lOl; 

Ivannw  Xiifhfiliiyy  pi'i  iiiil.  [jp.  202—03. 
*WMV,  vol,  ill,  p.  434. 


flarilE.  I^erefore,  the  Genefad  Staff 

proposed  to  deploy  its  strongest  forces 
in  the  same  aiea,  specifically,  between 
die  Wtipp^  Matsties  and  the  Baltic 
(oast.  However,  according  to  Va- 
silevskiy,  Stahn  insisted  the  German 
msm.  effort  would  be  in  the  south,  to 
capture  the  "rich  resources  and  agri- 
cultural land  of  the  Ukraine,"  and  or- 
dered the  d6f>loyfflnent  reversed.*^ 
Zhuko\,  who  commanded  the Kini  Spe- 
cial Military  Dislrkl,  adds  that  Stalin  was 
caovinced  the  Germans  would  have  to 
try  to  seize  the  Ukraine  first  and  "it 
never  occm  red  to  anybody  to  question 
tile  correcinLSs  of  his  opinion."^**  The 
Hist&ry  of  the  Second  World  Wii;  citing 
Vasilevskiy  and  Zbukov,  gives  a  similar 
account  without  mentioning  Stalin. 
The  ihiee  imply  that  the  General 
Staff's  purpose  was  to  bring  the  Soviet 
main  effort  to  hsso^m  ifee  direaion  of 
the  probable  strongest  German  attack. 

A  study  on  the  initial  period  of  tlie 
war  done  undfer  -CjiineraJ  ArOaiii  S.  B 
Ivanov,  who  uas  at  the  time  of  the 
writing  coniniandant  ol  the  Voroshilov 
Academy  of  the  General  Staff,  sets  the 
mislocalion  of  the  Soviet  main  effort  in 
a  different  context.  Ivanov  says  the 
General  Staff  had  concluded  that  the 
German  main  effort  would  be  directed 
southeast,  to  take  the  Ukraine,  tlie  Do- 
xiels  Basin,  and.  eventually,  the  Clau- 
casus  oil  fields.  If  "did  not  exclude  the 
possibility,"  lunvevei,  tiial  (lie  m.iiii 
effort  might  be  north  ot  the  Pripvat 
Marshes  toward  the  "Smolensk  Gale" 
and  Moscow.°"  The  General  Staff's 
coacem  in  settaig  the  locatioci  of  the 


"Vasiievsliiy,         pp.  I<11.  lOG-07. 
""C.  K.  Zbiikuv.  Tlw  Mfmniru,!  MarlUi^Hk>t> 
York:  Ddacorle  Pres.s.  l[)7]).  p.  2tl. 
.vn'.  v<tl.  Ill,  p.  434. 
^"Ivsmuv^Nachaluyy peruxi,  p.  203. 


"THE  WORLD  WILL  HOLD  ITS  BREATH" 


17 


Soviet  main  eflfort,  the  Ivanov  study 

adds,  was  to  mouni  the  stronojest  possi- 
ble blow  with  the  aims  ot  "repulsing 
aggression  and  carrying  the  war  to  the 
enein\  s  territor\'."  Tlierefore,  the  Gen- 
eral Staff  proposed  to  deploy  the  So- 
viet main  fortes  between  the  Pripyal 
Marshes  anfl  the  Baltic  coast,  that  is,  in 
the  center  and  on  ihe  north  flank.  At 
the  meetuig  in  Se]>ieml)en  the  l«ano\ 
study  states.  Stalin  "expressed 
thoughts"  on  the  enemy's  main  erfV)ri 
being  in  the  south,  and  thereafter  the 
General  Staff  reworked  its  plan  to  situ- 
ate the  Scjviet  main  forces  in  the  souih 
as  well.'* 

From  the  Ivanov  stiidv,  whicli  in 
point  of  time  at  least,  supersedes  Va- 
alarakiy^  and  Zhukov's  writings  on  this 
period,  it  appears  that  Stalin  and  the 
General  Staff  were  independently 
agreed  on  the  location  of  the  Germao 
main  effort,  and  were  both  wrong. 
They  apparently  also  overestimated 
the  Scjviet  ability  to  respond  offensively 
to  a  German  attack.  VSIthoiit  reading 
too  mucit  into  Ivanov,  it  can  be  as- 
sumed then  that  the  real  difference  of 
opinion  was  on  the  premises  that 
would  govern  the  choice  of  location  for 
the  Soviet  main  effort.  The  General 
Staff  was  looking  for  the  shortest  lines 
on  which  to  carr\'  the  war  to  German 
territory.  On  the  other  hand,,  Stailll 
seems  to  have  concluded  that  carrying 
the  war  to  the  enemy's  territory  along 
the  line  o(  tlie  main  enemy  advance 
better  satislied  liis  own  theoretical  re- 
quirement to  "organize  the  decisive 
blow  in  the  direction  in  which  it  tnay 
produce  maximmn  results."** 


p.  2(H. 

'*J,  V.  Stalin,  Hocluiiemw  (Moscow:  hdatelstvo  Po- 
liUcht^sko^  Litctatuiy,  1947),  vol.  V.  pi  163;  tVOVSS. 
vtA.  I.  p.  4.^7. 


During  the  ]mt  week  of  December 

1040  and  the  first  week  of  January 
1941.  the  Defense  Comniissanai  held  a 
conference  of  senior  officers  in  Mos- 
( ( .  The  H/stui'x  iij  thr  Gretit  Patriot ir  War 
and  tile  Htston  oj  the  Second  Whrld  War 
depict  it  as  lia\  ing  been  an  extended 
symposium  in  \vliith  the  geneials  ex- 
changed views  and  had  an  opportunily 
lo  al>sorb  the  latest  in  .Soviet  militarv 
llioughi.  Accounts  in  ihe  memoirs  ol 
some  cjf  those  who  attended  indicate  it 
was  also  a  war  readiness  review  that 
disclosed  deficiencies  in  the  t^encrals' 
al>ility  lo  conduct  large-scale  opera- 
tions and  in  armament,  equipment, 
and  training.^^ 

After  line  conference  closed,  tlie  mili- 
tary district  commanders  and  their 
chiefs  of  staff  staved  on  to  participate 
ill  a  war  game,  which  uas  played  ironi 
S  to  11  January  and  was  based  on  tlie 
strategic  plan  ilie  General  Staff  had 
developed  in  the  past  summer  and  had 
just  finished  revising  in  December.^* 
Hie  i^ame,  Zhukov  states,  "abounded 
in  clrainadc  situations  for  the  red  (.So- 
viet)  side"  that  "proved  to  be  in  many 
ways  similar  lo  what  really  happened 

after  June  22,  1941  "^^  In  brief, 

the  Soviet  side  lost.  When  the  chief 
of  the  General  Staff.  Meretskov, 
failed  to  explain  this  development  satis- 
factorily, Stalin  relieved  him  and  ap- 
pointed Zhukov  (who  had  led  the  play 
on  the  "blue"  [enemy]  side)  as  his 
replacement.** 


"/lYM  SV,       I.  ]j.  KiBJVMV,  vol.  Ml,  p|).  W'l  in 
Sec    A.I.    I  1  c-mrrik(j,  V   nachiile  I'ovnV  (Mu,m<mv 
I/.datelsiv.>  ■X.iuk;!,"  !0B4.        .Hli- 18:  K.  A.  .Mnci- 
$\(,OV,  Sen'ing  l/ir  yn'fili  ( ,\lin.(  i  itv :  rrogtcss  l^ll)Il^hI■rs, 
1971),  PI).  125-26;  /.liiiki.v,.\/,fno((i,  pp.  1B3-84. 

■"•^See  V.i.sik'vskiy, />(•/«,  p.  106. 

■""Zhukov,  jWrmuer*,  p.  185, 

^^llnd..  p.  187;  Meretskov,  Serm^  Su  People,  pa. 
126-27. 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


Manifestly  )^;p3eased  with  I  lie  out 
come  of  the  war  game,  Stalin  critiqued 
it  in  the  Kifetn&i  on  13  January.  lii  the 
last  of  his  several  memoirs,  the  late 
Marshal  Sovetskogo  Soyuza  A.  I, 
Eremenfeo,  who  took  part  in  the  war 
game  as  a  newly  appointed  military 
district  commander,  and  who  also  at- 
tended the  critique,  has  given  the  most 
explicit  account  (o  date  of  Stalin's  com- 
meats.^^  According  to  Eremenko,  Sta- 
lin criticized  the  Commissariat  of 
Defense  and  the  General  Staf  f  for  not 
having  g^ven  the  "military  districts 
prcjJifeifti'  they  will  hme  to-  solVe  m 
actual  war,"  He  also  reminded  those 
present  of  the  'complications"  that  had 
arisen  in  finding  competent  command- 
ei's  and  staffs  for  the  Finnish  War,  and 
he  laid  down  specific  requirements:  to 
prepare  for  a  tw©-ffGMti<^,  to  eje^^liid 
and  rearm  the  forces,  to  create  re- 
serves, to  "learn  how  to  conduct"  a  war 
ol  fast  smm&mexA  smd  maneuver,  and 
fio  "work  c^jpoizttioaal  'ques- 

tipnsT  eyolf|«i|^ftE96^fe.^CT  require- 
meiits.  MTost  sigtwfiicanfly,  jEremehleo 
remembered  Stalin's  having  said,  "War 
is  approaching  fast  and  now  is  not 
jS^isini  .  i .  must  gson  a  year  anS  a 
h^f  t@l3W^  years'  lime  to  complete  the 
rearmauftent  plan.  '^^  For  Stalin,  time 
had  become  a  most  predtms  strat^c 
resource. 

OpemUomt  Phmdi^ 
The  Soviet  war  l^Eerattti?  ciifers  mo 


''El  (-iiirrikd  Lilso  dealt  with  the  critique  in  lii'j  lirst 
iii,  u  rill f  11  in  1 1 ic  r.ii  !\  I k.  I'lif  i  c  hr  r  ihc 
i[H|jrt"jMi.ii  I  lluil  SuiliiiV  n'lii.iikv  ^^t'l<.'  1 1  .ind 

siiperhtial.  (■iiiip.uisnn  iit  tlii'  Iwo  versitins  shmvs 
lhai  ilie  vai  i.iii:.<:  s  tn-i  wci. n  iliem  lie  less  in  ihi-  rfpui  i- 
itig  ifiaii  ii!  llic  aulhor  s  ciiiphasis  and  inlerprctatiorj. 
See  F,  III  IK' ok  1.1.  V  Diirhit/e,  pp.  34-37.  See  also 
tiiiksoii,  liitafi  If  Slnhnjryatl,  p.  54. 

^"Eremenko, /'owjTU  iKiyny,  pp.  129—30. 


Viests  1^  state  and  naiure  of  the 
naflon.4  op@radonal  plans  prior  to  the 
in^sien:  one  asserte  that  such  plans  as 
did  exist  were  tentative  and  not  de- 
signed to  do  more  than  provide  a  Utn- 
ited  capability  to  meet  an  attack;  the 
other  maintains  that  the  plans  were 
comprehensive  and  were  believed  to  be 
adequate  not  merely  to  meet  aggres- 
sion but  to  repel  it  and  to  initiate 
operations  to  defeat  it.  The  first  view 
derives  primarily  fe&te.  iflie  early  post- 
Stalin  version  of  the  war  given  in  the 
History  of  the  Great  Patriotic  War  but  is 
t«ta3ned  in  History  of  theSimtd  WbrM 
War.  The  second  appears  in  Va- 
sUevskiy's  and  Zhukov's  memoirs,  and 
the  Ivanov  study  on  the  initial  period 
of  the  war  pr^ents  it  in  detail. 

The  History  cf  the  Great  Patriotic  War 
thendons  two  plans  drained  in  early 
1941.  a  mobilization  plan  (MP- 41)  and 
a  "covering  plan  for  the  stale  fronder" 
(Plan  9).  It  describes  the  mobilization 
plan  as  having  been  geared  to  a  sched- 
ule that  es^nded  through  the  second 
half  of  l941  and  ifito  early  19^  and  the 
covering  plan  as  no  moie  than  one  to 
distribnie  approximately  two-thirds  of 
die  trixjps  stado^edli  in-  the  western 
military  districts  l&i^g^  or  less  uni- 
fornily  along  the  ^l^r,  their  mission 

8a  the        ef  i^  beiiig  m  hxM'&ee 

border  anrl  to  "cover"  the  mobilization 
and  assembly  of  the  main  forces.  The 
fi^ttrf^^  &m^Payk^yikfr  does  not 
mention  the  strategic  plan  the  General 
Staff  worked  on  in  the  summer  and  fall 
of  194(0  ao^  eoftcltiides  tfiat  it  is  only 
"possible  to  speak  of  a  plan  of  general 
operations'  because  the  mobilizadon 
and  covering  plans  "were  ttifusefi  w!tl» 
one  idea,"  which  was  "to  repel  the  en- 
emy's aggression  at  the  line  of  the  state 
frontier  and  $iuN@qtl^ii%       "hcim  a 


"THE  WORLD  mLL  HOUD  ITS  mEKCW 


19 


Gmshing  defeat."^^  Tkt  Mi^my  of  iM 
Second  Vibrld  Wbr  gives  some  specifics  of 
the  mobilization  and  covering  plaais, 
idludes  to  ^bet  0&<Mm  m  the 
location  of  laata  efifdrt  ^mt  nM  to 
tiie  associate  sQs^l^gk  pilais)^  and  ad- 
dresses the  a«iiiiti©nal  profelem  «f 
border  fortifications;  but  it  also  leaves 
ftie  impression  that  1  uliy  developed  op- 
eii^tioiml  fifeas      not  eida.** 

On  the  other  hand,  Vasilevskiy 
speaks  in  his  memoirs  of  an  "opera- 
^onal  plan  to  repel  aggression"  that 
was  developed  in  the  General  Staff  and 
conveyed  to  the  commanding  generals, 
duefs  of  staff,  aftd  ebiefs  of  operatioris 
of  the  frontier  militaiy  districts  in  con- 
ferences  held  in  Moscow  between  Feb- 
ruary aaid  April  1941.^'  Zhtsfe©^ 
mentions  "operational -ninhilization 
plans  regarding  preparations  lor  re- 
pulsing possfWfeaggjpfi^sion."'^" 

The  Ivanov  study  on  the  iniiiai 
period  of  the  war  describes  two  plans; 
an  "operational  plan"  smA  a  *sfp©eiafl 
plan  for  the  defense  of  the  state  fron- 
tier." The  operational  plan,  which  die 
f^fimi  Sm£t  completed  in  late  1940, 
was  concerned  with  how  "answering 
blows"  would  be  delivered  "after  the 
Strategic  deployment  of  the  main 
ff)rces  of  the  Red  Ainn."  Tlie  special 
plan,  completed  tn  eailv  1941  and  the 
basis  on  which  the  (rontier  wMl^tf 
districts  "worked  out  their  concrete  war 
plans,"  dealt  with  "coveting'"  and  "ac- 
tive defense"  in  the  first  stage  of  hos- 
tilides,  bel  ore  the  main  forces  had  been 
mobilized  and  deployed.*^ 


'fWOVSS,  vol,  1,  pp.  172-74,  i7y. 
^"IVMV,  v(,l.  III.  pp.  234-39.  See  also  Eriqliiso!!, 
iimtl  to  Stiilinf;iYui.  pp.  NO-Hl, 
"  Vasilevskiy. /JWfl,  p.  113. 
"-Zliukov.  AJfrmi/n.  p.  211. 

"'IvanoT.  Nachainyy  period,  pp.  204-05. 


1%e  special  plan,  as  described  in  t4*e 
Ivanov  study,  embraced  what  is  re- 
ferred to  in  the  History  of  the  Great 
Pti^rkMe  Wff  as  the  covering  plan  but, 
its  acti\c  defense  aspect,  also  included 
much  more:  "active  Mr  operations"  to 
deliver  agaitMt  the  enemy's  con- 
centrations and  to  achieve  air  supcii- 
ority;  coticentration  of  die  mechanized 
corps,  aiititank  artillery  bri^des,  and 
aviation  to  "liquidate"  break-ins;  and,  if 
so  directed  by  the  General  Headquar- 
ters, delivery  of  Mows  that  would 
"smash"  the  enemy  on  the  borders  and 
carry  the  war  to  his  territory.  The  mili- 
ary district  Is^ilj^^issifM^wbtilid  be  to 
cover  the  c^ilt^^tration  of  the  main 
foices,  but  ife^  would  be  done  in  a 
Qkree^etilietMi  ©ffensive  deployment 
(infantry,  armor  and  reserve.s)  from 
which  the  thiee  loirld  be  ineiged  to 
form  a  "Inst  siiategic  echelon."  Com- 
bined, the  three  original  ccliclons 
could  begin  to  carry  out  tlie  opera- 
tional plan  by  dealing  the  enemy  an 
"answering  blow"  and  "possibly,"  by  car- 
rying the  war  to  enemy  territory  Ijefoi  e 
the  ^SQ&  fefigeil  were  assembled.  In 
that  event,  a  l^etind  strategic  echelon" 
\vould  foxin  behind  die  first  to  support 
it  and  to  further  devd^ispUie  answering 
blow  "in  accordance  with  tlie  general 
strategic  idea. The  initial  three-eche- 
lon deployment  conformed  to  the  best 
Soviet  offensive  doctrine  <jf  the  time  so 
mtich  so,  m  fact,  diat  it  has  been  cited 
occasion^^f  as  ^v^d^iee  $S  a  Soviet 
intention  to  attack  Germany^^^  Va^ 
silevskiy  has  said: 

...  it  our  military  units  and  iormations 
had  been  mobilised  at  the  proper  tioJe, 

Mffiiaf.,  pp.  20.'i-()6. 

''See  nWSS.  vol.  U  (>■  443.  See  also  Keinhard 
Cehlen,  The  Sendei  fNcw  IferiE  ^Vibrid  Pablhtihig, 
1972).  p.  26. 


20 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


had  been  deployed  as  specified  in 
plans  for  border  war,  and  had,  in  accor- 
dance with  those,  organized  close  coordi- 
nation between  artillery,  armor,  and 
aviation,  it  could  be  asserted  that  the  en- 
emy would  have  been  dealt  such  losses 
already  on  the  first  day  of  the  war  that  lie 
could  not  have  advaeeed  further  eu^P 
country."* 

In  March  1941,  rumors  of  war  were 
circulating  among  the  foreign  diplo- 
fiiats  in  MOSCOW,  and  U.S.  tJttcter  Set- 
retary  of  State  SLiinner  Welles  told  the 
Soviet  ambassador  in  Washiijgton  that 
the  State  Department  had  infbinnation, 
whiUi  it  regarded  as  "authentic,"  of  a 
plan  for  a  German  attacjt  the  Soviet 
Union. *to  rite  nm  dSstattt  fottfre.***  By 

thea,  no  doubt,  information  about  the 
^{^1301^.  attack  as  autlientic  as  Welles' 
ms  avaifalite  to  the  "Soviet  govertaient 
from  its  own  sotirccs.'*^  Tlie  Histcffy  of 
the  Great  Patriotir  War  states: 

In  the  existing  atuation  it  was  necessary  to 
be  extremely  c^tt^itT  to  avoid  provocaUons 
, whUe  at  this  same  ti  me  taJtlRg  ali  possj- 
bl&  mmsttm  to  bring  the  Somt  Attiied 
Forces  to  full  leadiiiess  for  war.  But  be- 
cause ].  V.  Stalin  made  serious  errors  in 
evaluating  tlit-  politict^-militarv  situadon  as 
it  developed  prior  to  the  outbreak  ot  the 
Great  Patriodc  ^fet,  such  a  dual  policy  did 
not  exist. 

In  Vasilevskiy's  opinion,  Stalin  could 
not  decide  What  to  doJ"  The  History  of 
^ SgtmiWbrM  %r  maintaiiis  that " . .  ^ 


">*Vasilevskiy.  Delv.  p.  H?. 

*'U,S.  Dt'parl  iiit  iii  i>r  Slate,  iwr^igii  Rdutiims  nj  tin- 
United-  States,  1941  fWasliingtOii.  D.C:  GPO.  195H). 
vol.  I,  pp.  133,  7!'J-14-,  Erickson,  Rood  to  Stalingrad, 
pfL  73-75. 

'^SeelVOVSS.  vol,  I,  p,  4U3, 

"»/teV/„  p.  4i>J. 

"Vasilevskiy,  Dt'/o,  p.  116. 


thC'  ftiilitary  leadership  of  tfae  '^mitt 
Lhii<in  [which  included  Stalin]  knew  a 
coUision  with  Germany  to  be  unavoid- 
afete*  htit  "preparafiom  to  remt 
gression  were  accompanied  by  a 
necessity  not  to  give  Germany  a  direct 
^cuse  to  unleasfi  a  war:'"'* 

Stalin's  effort  to  sratn  time  failed.  His 
most  astute  move,  the  signing  of  a  neu- 
tNEty  treaty  with  Japan  on  13  April 
1941,  valuable  as  it  might  be  in  the 
longer  run,  at  best  made  only  a  negligi- 
ble change  in  his  positioo  mth  regard 
to  Germany.  The  treaty  had  no  effect 
as  a  deterrent,  and  Hitler  ignored  its 
more  likely  intecit  as  a  gesture  df  S&lfiei! 
willingness  to  collaborate.  The  treaty 

fave  Stalin  a  none  too  dependable  con- 
rmation  of  what  he  already  believed^ 
namely,  that  Germany  and  Japan 
would  not  attack  at  the  same  time,  and 
it  eifeated  a  e^O^te  possibility  that 
Japan,  freed  to  turn  toward  likely  con- 
fhct  with  the  United  Stales,  might  draw 
Germany,  its  paflZl^r  in  the  Tripartite 
Pact,  in  and  away  from  the  Soviet 
Union.^^ 

.Staitri^-  play  for  time,  however,  im& 
not  nearly  as  detrimental  to  Soviet  pre- 
paredness as  some  accounts  make  it 
appear.  He  gave  the  armed  forces  as 
much  support  as  thcv  believed  they 
needed,  l  lie  covering  plan  called  lor 
170  divisions  alaiGt  t  fenigades.  and  as  of 
June  1941,  those  were  deplo)cd:  .56 
divisions  and  2  brigades  in  the  first 


"m*v,  vol.  Ill,  p.  iw. 

"See  also  IVOVSS.  vol.  I,  pp.  399-401;  t'.rii-ksoii. 
Road  to  Stalingrad,  p.  76;  Raytnoiicl  JaiiiL-s  .Sont.tn  .iiirl 
James  Stuart  Beddie.  ed'i..  Nazi-Sm'k'!  Ri'latians,l939- 
I'-i-IJ  (VV;isliin!<Lnii.  DC..:  GPO.  ltM8).  pp.  212.  22tl; 
Geili.ird  Wembtrg,  Cerimim  and  the  Savut  Unuin, 
193  •■!  -I'-i  1 1  !  l.K-ideu-  E.  J.  Brili  1954).  pp.  159-63;  U.S. 
Dejiai  uiK'iit  ol  .Siaic,  Documents  m  German  Foreign 

p„!„\.  i9is-i9-n,  .\n-in  D  {vf^i^if^imi,  M(:k 

1960),  vol.  XI,  p.  204. 


"THE  WORU3  WILL  HOLD  ITS  BREATH" 


21 


echelon,  52  divisions  in  the  second,  and 
62  divisions  in  tlie  tliii  d  echelon.  On  13 
May,  the  General  Stall  ordered  28  divi- 
W3im  and  4  army  keadqustiters  from 
the  Urals,  tlie  Cam  asus,  and  the  Far 
East  transferred  to  die  western  fronder 
and  began  orgamzing  zn  army  at 
Mogilev  on  the  Dnepr  River  behind  tlie 
Wi'ilei  n  Special  Military  District.  (The  sec- 
ond strategic  echelon  vfm  t&  form 
along  the  line  of  the  Dnepr  and  Dvina 
rivers.)  A  call-up  of  nearly  800,000  re- 
servist in  late  May  brought  the  total  of 
men  under  arms  to  about  5  million, 
and  early  graduations  from  die  ol- 
ficersP  sdiools  provided  officers  for  ihe^ 
increase.  In  May,  also,  instructions 
went  out  to  the  Ural,  North  Caucasus, 
Mdga,  and  Kharkov  Military  Bisiifi^  to. 
ha\  e  elements  of  their  forces  ready  to 
nun  c  lo  the  Dnepr-Dvina  line.'™ 

These  actions,  of  course,  achie\efl 
far  less  than  full  war  readiness.  Aside 
from  the  gaps  in  personnel  and  ec|uip' 
Wt&Ckt  of  the  divisions  and  mechanized 
COr|)S,  the  frontier  niililary  districts' 
dispositions  were  loose. The  first 
covering  echelon  had  seven  divisions 
less  I  ban  were  planned;  the  third, 
seven  divisions  more.  The  lii  st  echelon 
was  mosdy  in  barracks  up  to  30  miles^ 
away  from  the  border.  The  second  ech- 
elons divisions  were  30  to  60  miles 
f  i oni  the  border,  and  those  of  the  third 
echelon,  as  much  as  180  miles  back.  In 
addition,  nonniechanized  units  were 
going  to  have  to  depend  for  molMUty 
on  being  able  to  draw  some  quitrter 
million  motor  vehicles  and  forty  thou- 
sand tractors  from  civilian  use.  Bring- 
ing up  the  reinforcements  from  the 


'WAfV.  vol.  III.  |)1>   938-41,  44(1:  VOV  iKmlkay, 

fstariya),  p.  53;  Ivanov,  Nachabyy  pemd,  p.  213;  be- 
borin  and  Tclpukltovskiy.  It^  i  unM,  p.  74. 
"Sec  p,  23. 


interior  and  integrating  theiii  iiito  the 
plans  would  take  time,  Morco\ef,  tjus 
border  to  be  defended  was  die  1940 
one,  almost  n&tit  dT  wbl#i  hM  been 
under  Soviet  control  before  Septeizd^ 
1939  and  some  only  since  the  ipdng 
and  stunmer  of  19^.  '#(irt£fkatioiis 
along  the  old  border,  the  so-called  .Sta- 
lin Line  built  in  die  1930s,  had  been 
abandoned  axid  tin  pan  i^mmi^eA  .  A 
new  line  had  been  under  constriu  tion 
since  November  1939,  and  2,500  rein- 
forced concrete  emplacements  had 
been  built,  biil  onlv  1,000  of  those  had 
artillery;  the  rest  had  cjnh  machine 
guns.^^ 

On  the  other  hand,  the  shori com- 
ings in  die  defensive  deployment  do 
not  seem  to  have  weighed  very  heavily 
in  the  Soviet  strategic  thinking  of  the 
time.  I  he  Histoiy  uj  the  Secuinl  Wvrld  War 
savs,  "As  a  |3ractical  matter,  the  military 
leadership  left  a  strategic  defensive  out 
of  consideration.  Defensive  operations 
in  the  initial  period  of  the  war  were 
regarded  as  significant  only  for  parts  of 
the  strategic  front  and  for  the  assign- 
ments of  the  covering  armies."'"  The 
Soviet  planning  ajiparentlv  afso  did  not 
take  tlie  possibility  ot  a  surprise  attack 
into  acGotinL  Zhiikov  tells  why: 

I  he  l'e(.»i3les  ( icimmissariai  of  Defense 
and  the  General  Staff  believed  that  war 
between  such  big  countries  as  Germany  and 
Russia  would  follow  the  existing  scheme: 
the  main  forces  engage  in  battle  after  several 
daviinl  frontier  figtiliiig.  -\n  regard*,  liie  i  cui- 
centraiion  and  deploMiietu deadlines,  ii  wits 
assumed  dial  coiidiiions  for  the  tWO  coun- 
tries weie  tlie  same. '  ^ 


"/I  M<V.  \oL  Itt.  pp.  4S5,  439,  441;  VOV  tKialkaya 
hlmiytti.  \i.  54.  Sec  <ilsi»  tlrkksijii,  Rmd  hj  Sliilmgrad,. 
p|)  711.  71  ,1111.1  ZUuki'S,  Mfiniim,  pp.  211-14. 

■'•IVMV.  w.l.  [11.  |>.  41.-,. 

"Zhukuv.At^wioir.s,  p.  215. 


22 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


In  shett,  the  military  leadership  aiitid- 

pated  a  hctwccn  the  outtjreak  of 
war,  deciarcci  or  luideclared,  and  die 
actual  beginning  (il  operations.  Zhukov 
mentions  'sc\eial  days."  Vasile\ski\ 
says  the  plans  from  the  summer  of 
1#I0  untif  BjI^rbarossa  assttmed  ten  m 
fifteen  thns."'^  Ivanov  gives  "not  less 
than  two  weeks,"  and  Marshal  V.  D. 
Sokolovsldy,  in  his  work  cto  Soviet  strata 
eg\,  s[)i-cifies  fifteen  to  lucnl\  days/" 
This  was  die  period,  Sokolovskiy  indi- 
cates, in  whkn  indbiltzati6»  was  f&  he 
completed  and  the  covering  plan 
would  be  in  effect.'*"  Moreover,  and 
perhaps  more  signiikandy/Soviet  th€f- 
orv  assumed  that,  after  the  hiatus,  the 
hos  tilt  lies  would  fall  into  a  predictable 
pattern,  and  the  war  mnald  ''inevitably 
take  on  a  character  of  extended  attri- 
tion, with  batdes  being  decided  prt- 
roarily  by  the  ability  of  the  rear  to 
provide  the  front  with  more  material 
and  human  resources  over  a  prolonged 
period  ^  tinise  thact  wext  it«^ili#le  t& 
Oie  enemy.*** 

On  the  E-m  4f  Inm^m 
Since  Staftnis  death,  some  Soviet  ac^ 

cr>imts  of  flic  uai.  jxirticularly  those 
wrilleii  during  the  Khrushchev  pei  iod, 
have  maintained  that  up  to  the  last 
minute  Stalin  refused  to  respond  (o  the 
signs  ol  an  impenduig  invasion.  11  le 
most  often  dted  evidence  is  a  TASS 
news  agencv  release  primed  in  Prm'/Ja 
on  14  June  1941.  ll  quoted  "responsible 

circles  in  Mm&m"  as  ceaajemning  the 
"absurd  rumors  of  war  hetween  Ger- 


'*Vasilevskiy,£i(/(f,  |>.  101. 

^"Ivanov,  Nachabiyy  period.^,  p.  2G6'i  X  J},  Sukolovslsiy, 
Strna  MUUfiTy  Strategy  ifx0ei«taCiA  e&t,  i$JS:i  £l«B> 
tice  HaU,  1963).  p.  232. 

"^Sofcdcwskiy,  Stmegy,  p.  232. 

"Ivanov,  MtcAa/w]9  pnriid,  f>.  203. 


many  the  Soviet  IStaas^  dis- 
missed  the  i  iimors  as  pirbpElpiIlda 
"concocted  by  forc^  Jbditile  to^  Ger- 
many and  the  Soviet  Union,"  The  "dr- 

tlcs"  dechnefl  that  Germany  and  the 
Soviet  Union  were  abiding  stricdy  by 
the  terms  of  the  nonaggression  pact.** 
Zhukov  has  added  that  on  the  same 
day,  14  June,  he  and  Timoshenko 
asked  to  pmt  the  troops  in  the  frontier 
niilitarv  flistricts  on  alert,  but  Stalin 
refused,  saying,  "That  means  war.  Do 
yott  tifldei^tand  that  or  not?"*'  The 

Hiatory  of  the  Great  Patriotic  IKsr  at- 
tributes "a  negative  influence  on  the 
nuHtary  fesfi^ftess  of  the  Soviet  Armed 

Forces  and  on  ihc  alertness  of  trtm- 
mand  and  political  personnel"  to  die 
TASS  dispatch.*'*  One  acccnint  mfers 
that  the  dispatch  sustained  a  peacetime 
atmosphere  among  die  tioops  of  the 
frontier  districts  when  the  Germans 
were  about  to  overrun  the  cotmtry.'^^ 

On  the  other  hand,  Vasilevskiy  states 
that  the  dispatch  "at  first"  aroused  mr^ 
pvhv  in  the  General  Staff,  "as  it  did  also 
among  the  Soviet  people,"  but  "there- 
afiter  no  new  imtructions  were  issued, 
which  made  clear  that  it  was  not  di- 
recie<l  to  the  Armed  Forces  or  to  the 
public."  "At  the  end  erf" the  same  day,* 
Vasilevskiv  continues,  "the  Deputy 
t  .hiel  of  the  General  Staf  f,  General  N. 
F.  Vaiutin.  expMned  that  the  objective 
oi  the  TASS  (omnninicjue  was  to  test 
the  true  inieiuions  oi  die  Hitlerites  and 
did  not  otherwise  require  out  atten- 
tion.The  HistoTj  of  the  Secuixl  Whrld 
Wilt'  maintains,  as  Vasilevskiy  does,  that 


"WA/K  vol.  tit,  p.  440. 
"  '/luikdv.  M<Tjioir.s-.  [I.  23t). 
"V\  (A  SS  vol.  11.  p.  10. 
"■■^S.  1*.  1'liiteninv.  t'd..  Vtoraya  Mifovetya 
(Mositiw;  VoycnnriM-  l/ddit  lstvo,  1958),  p- 1^79- 
"•Vasilevskiy,  jy(ri».  p.  119. 


"THE  WORIJ>  WHX  HOLD  ITS  BREATH" 


23 


lii^^spatch  was  a  probe  for  a  Germatt 
reaction  and  says  that  the  Soviet  gov- 
ernment quickly  took  the  subsequent 
^eoce  as  a  sigh  Urn  T??ar  A>m 

about  to  break  out.  TTliertToic.  the 
History  adds,  the  Commissariat  ot  De- 
fense, between  14  and  19  June,  oniered 
the  frontier  military  districts  to  set  up 
Gomnjand  posts  i  l  om  which  they  could 
efeeteise  tJifarafspdiiited  wartime  func- 
tions as  army  group  commands  and  to 
camoullage  airfields,  military  units, 
and  "important  military  objectives."*^ 
If  Stalin  and  the  military  leadersliip 
were  convinced  war  was  im]jending, 
they  also  had  a  very  good  idea  of 
exactly  when  to  expect  it.  Richard 
Sorge,  a  Soviet  master  spy  in  Tokyo, 
who  was  a  German  newspapetBoaH 
with  extremely  well-inlormed  contacts, 
gave  them  that  information.  On  15 
June  he  sent  a  radiogram  that  read, 
"War  will  begin  on  22  June.  .  .  and 
another  that  stated,  "Attack  will  pro- 
ceed on  a  broad  front  commending 'SS" 
Junc'^s 

In  any  event,  Stalin  knew  by  mid- 
Jttite        "CO  iSsm]ie  war,  even  in  the 

very  near  future,  was  impossible"  and 
permitted  the  hnal  preparations  to  be- 
pn.  The  rule,  however,  was  "to  do  what 
was  necessary  to  strengthen  the  de- 
fenses .  .  .  but  not  do  anything  in  the 
frontier  zone  that  could  provoke  the 
fascists  or  hasten  their  attack  on  iis.""" 
flic  Defense  Commissariat  ordered 
the  frontier  military  districts  tcj  shilt 
their  divisions  closer  lo  the  boi  dcr  and 
into  die  positions  designated  for  tliem 
tu  the  special  plan  for  defending  the 


«rmiifK  vol.  III.  |>.  i-n. 

*'Deborin  .iiirl  Iclpukhovskiy,  Itogl  i  uvakii  pp. 
102 -(KV 

"'^Ivajiw,  Nacluilny^  perud,  p.  212. 


State  IroiftJer.  T%e  movements  be^an 
on  15  Jime,  but,  on  the  22d,  "^only 
certain"  of  ihe  divisions  were  in  posi- 
(Soni*»<M  the  21st,  ^ePoKtbum  acted  lo 
create  a  single  command  for  the  armies 
being  brought  from  the  interior  mili- 
tary districts  to  the  line  of  the  Dnepr 
and  Dvina.  On  the  night  of  the  21st,  a 
war  alert  directive  went  out  from 
Mo8ee*#.  It  ordered  all  units  to  combat 
readiness  and  those  close  to  the  boixler 
to  man  the  forttficadons  and  firing 
points  tn  secret  during  the  n^ht. 
Troops  on  the  border  were  not  to  re- 
spond to  any  German  provocations  or 
to  take  any  other  action  without  special 
orders."'  The  directive  did  not  reach 
all  die  field  commands  in  the  hours  left 
b^ferc  the  German  attack,  and  the 
state  of  readiness  otherwise  was  far 
from  complete.  Nevertheless,  there 
wasi  in  general,  no  conflict  with  "the 
concept  of  initial  operations  projected 
by  die  Commissariat  of  Defense  and 
tiie  ©teneral  Staff,  which  assumed  that 
the  aggressor  would  first  undertake  to 
invade  om  territory  with  pardal  forces 
£md  Instigate  border  battles  under  the 
cover  of  wliicli  both  sides  would  com- 
plete their  mobilizations  and  mass  their 
forces."''" 

First  word  of  the  German  attack, 
reports  of  airfields  and  cities  being 
bombed,  reached  the  Commissariat  of 
Defense  at  about  0400  on  22  Junc-'^* 
Four  hours  later,  after  consulting  with 
Stalin,  Tnnoshenko  issued  a  second  di- 
rective. Il  ordered  fhc  giound  forces  to 
"attack  and  anniliilate  all  enemy  forces" 


■"Deboi  iu  and  Tetpukhcwsluvv i  uroM,  p.  75; 

vol.  IV,  p.  28. 

"^Ivanov,  Narltahryy  l>triiid,  p.  2J3. 
""Vasilevskiy,  ZJffo.  p,  U9. 


tliat  had  ■violated  the  frontier  and  the 

air  units  to  strike  sixty  to  ninety  mUes 
inside  German  territory  and  to  bomb 
Koenigsberg  and  Menael,** 

In  Moscow,  apparenth.  most  ul  the 
day  of  the  2  2d  was  coJisumed  trying^  to 
get  informafloit  abotit  what  was  hap^ 
pening  from  the  fronts,  which,  in  turn, 
were  trj^'ing  to  dp  the  same  with  their 
st^fdinaw  eeft&ffiaiftis.  By  evening, 
"regardless  cjf  incoinjjleie  rej^orts  .  .  . 
the  situadon  required  an  immediate 
demon  to  ar^iwm  luriiier  rej^iance 
a:gaiast  the  enemy.'***  At  2115,  Ti- 


'WC^SS,  ^tkn,  lit,  S«c  also  Zhiikw/lisw^  ft 


MOSCOW  TO  StAUNGRAD 

moshenko  dispatched  a  third  direedve: 
Norlhu'cst  and  West  Fronts  were  to  mount 
converging  tlirusts  by  infantry  and  ar- 
mor from  Kaunas  and  Grodno  to 
SLiwalki,  and  SoutJiinsI  Front  was  to  do 
the  same  toward  Lubhn  to  cut  off  the 
Getmans  cm  flie  sixt^pnt^le  stwich  of 
frontier  between  Vhidimir-Volynskiy 
and  Krystynopol.^'^  Therewith,  the 
feotttfef  l&tces  ^^©fe  to  "the 

offensive  ii)  lUallii  directions  for  the 
|jurposes  of  destroying  die  enemy's  as- 
sauh  groupings  and  carrying  tlte  i^  Eqt> 
his  Bemt^."*'' 


"tvanov,  Naclmltiyy  period,  p.  260. 


CHAPTER  U 


The  Blitzkrieg 


Several  hours  before  the  thmi  Soviet 
directive  wem  out  on  the  night  of  22 
JUiie,  Generaloberst  Fraoz  Haider, 
Chief  of  the  ^^rfiam  Gdiieral  Staff, 
had  enough  infoniia&»ia  to  condude 
that  the  Soviet  forecs  Itftd  been  tac- 
tically unprepared  and  "mtist  tJOW  take 
our  attack  in  the  deployment  in  which 
they  stand."'  flalder's  Soviet  counter- 
part, Gffliei^  1Stmho%  who  afiSved  at 
General  Kirponos'  Headquarters, 
Southwest  Fnmtt  that  night  on  the  first  of 
what  wouM  feeoome  a  long  series  of 
similar  coordinating  missions,  held 
much  die  sacci£  opinion,  beUeving  that 
meith^aP  a  <SJiiifterattack  ffbY  any  ©thef 
oonoerted  move  ought  to  be  attempted 
until  a  clear  picture  of  what  was  hap- 
pening at  flie  fmnt  was  formed.^  Yet 
Zhukov  would  not  Iiave  concurred  in 
Haider's  furtlier  assumption  that  the 
Soviet  leadership  "perhaps  tajiiiot  nsv 
act  operatively  at  all."  He  found  the 
Southwest  front  staff  confident  and  capa- 
ble. Tliat  ais  tatieh  tmM  be  saM  for  ffie 
other  twofronls,  however,  was  doiibtriil. 
West  and  Northwest  Fronts  had  become 
increasingly  confirsed  Ott  the  first  day, 
and  their  commanders  Generals  Pavlov 
and  Kuznetsov,  who  were  trying  to 


tact  with  their  own  headquarters  stMt 

of  the  time.^ 

On  23  June,  die  Main  Military  Coun- 
cil, reduced'&Om  eleven  to  seven  mem- 
bers, became  the  Slm'ka  ("general 
headquarters")  of  the  High  Conmiand. 
Six  deputy  defense  coininissa*^ 
dropped  out,  and  two  new  members. 
Marshal  Voroshilov,  the  chairman  of 
tlie  Defense  Committee,  and  Admiral 
Kuznetsov,  people's  commissar  of  the 
navy,  were  added.  Marshal  Ti- 
moshenko  continued  as  chairman,  and 
Stalin,  Molotov,  people's  commissar  for 
foreign  affairs,  and  Zluikov  remained 
as  members,  as  did  Marshal  Sovetskogo 
Soyuza  Semen  Budenny,  who  was  first 
deputy  people's  conmiissar  of  defense. 
Kuznetsov's  presence  made  the  Stavka 
an  armed  forces  headquarters  but  did 
not  resolve  the  ambiguity  as  to  where 
the  supreme  authority  really  lay.*  As 
Zhukov  later  put  it,  there  were  two 
commanders  in  chief,  Timoshenko  de 
jure  and  Stalin  de  facto,  since,  "Ti- 
moshenko could  not  make  any  funda- 
mental decisions  without  Stalin 
anyway."''  This  was,  in  fact,  the  long- 
established  Soviet  practice,  and  it 
ought  not  to  have  impaired  the  actual 
conduct  of  the  war — and  perhaps  did 
not.  However,  in  February  1936, 
Khrushchev,  as  general  secretary  of  the 


^MsMtf^Mi^  vol.  Ill,  p.  5. 


mid.;IVOVSS.  voL  %-gi.  m 
^aOshatav.  JO  lei,  p.  2^ 


THE  GERMAN  ADVANCE 

22  June  -  12  November  1941 

 '  German  positians.  21  Jun 

nonooiig  Approximate  front,  10  Jul 
Ap(in9itifn»t»  ftont,  12  Nov 

200  Miles 


MAP2 


Caftuseo  Soviet  Tsoops  March  Past  a  Peasant  Viuage 


Communist  Party,  told  the  Twentieth 
Party  Congress,  ".  .  .  for  a  long  time 
SlH&t  MiE^mcHf  not  direct  military 
operations  and  teemed  to  do  anything 
whatever."^  Soviet  accounts  written 
since  then  generally  have  had  Utde  to 
say  about  Stalin's  role  in  the  war  be- 
tween 22  June  and  3  July  1941.  Zhtikov 
maintained  tliat  Stalin  reco¥ef€€ 

auickly  from  a  spell  of  depression  on 
le  morning  ot  22  June,  but  Zhukov 
was  away  from  Moscow  until  the  26th 
and  reported  seeing  Stalin  only  twice  in 
the  week  after  he  returned/ 

The  Battles  of  the  Frontiers 

Except  at  Southwest  Front,  wherfi  six 

^Congressional  Record.  84th  Cong.,  2d  seSS.,  June  4, 
\9'j6.  p.  9395. 
'Zhukov,  Afefliairai  pp.  253-61. 


mechanized  and  three  rifle  corps  kept 
pressure  on  Army  Group  Souili  to  die 
end  of  the  month,  the  principal  e&mi 
of  the  order  to  counterattack  was  to  pin 
Soviet  units  in  exceedingly  dangerous 
positions.**  Against  West  and  Northwest 
Frcmts,  the  German  Second,  Third,  and 
Fourth  Panzer  Groups  rolled  ahead. 
By  29  June,  on  the  direct  route  to 
Moscow,  Second  and  Third  Panzer 
Groups  and  Fourth  and  Ninth  Armies 
had  closed  two  large  encirclements 
around  the fronts,  east  of  Bialystok  and 
east  of  Minsk,  that  would  yield  over 
three  hundred  thousand  prisoners.  In 
four  more  days,  Third  Panzer  Group, 
under  Generaloberst  Herman  Hoth, 
had  a  spearhead  on  the  tipper  Dvina 


WAfV,  vol,  IV,  p.  42, 


28 


MOSCOW  TO  SmtlMGRAB 


River  west  of  Vitebsk,  and  Second  Pan- 
zer Group,  under  Generaloberst  Heinz 
Guderian,  had  one  approaching  the 
Dnepr  near  Mogilev.  Army  Group 
North  by  then  had  cleared  die  line  ol 
the  Dvina  upstream  from  Riga  to  the 
army  group  boundary  and  had  deep 
bridgeheads  north  of  the  river.  Army 
Group  South,  still  under  pressure  from 
Southxvest  Front,  had  passed  Rovno  and 
Lvov.  Neither  of  the  latter  two  had 
executed  endrclements  like  those  of 
Bialystok  and  Minsk  but  all  had  cov- 
ered impressive  distances:  Army 
Group  Center,  up  to  285  miles;  Army 
Group  North,  180  miles;  Army  Group 
South,  120  miles.*'  In  ihe  meantime, 
Finland  had  declared  war  on  the  Soviet 
Union  (on  25  June),  and  Army  of  Nor- 
way had  begun  .uK.iiuo  out  of  tuiitli- 
CCU  Finland  toward  Murmansk  and 
^indalaksha.  rAfff/)  2.) 

Looking  at  ilu-  progress  as  of  3  July, 
Haider  concluded  tliat  "on  the  whole, 
one  can  say  already  now  ibai  the  mis- 
sion of  smashing  llir  massitfihe  S(j\'iet 
Army  iorward  ol  die  Dvina  and  Dnepr 
has  been  carried  out.  It  is  very  likely 
not  saying  too  mudi  when  I  observe 
that  the  campaign  against  the  Soviet 
Union  has  been  wron  tn  fess  Aan  feaf- 
teen  cla\s."'"  Haider  predicted  tliat 
beyond  the  Dvina  and  the  Dnepr,  die 
job  would  lie  tess  io  destroy  the  enemy's 
forces  than  to  take  Itib  means  of  pro- 
duction, and  "thus  to  prevent  him  from 
creating  new  armed'  forces  otif  of  hb 
powcT  t'ul  industrial  iiasc  and  his  inex- 
iiaustible  manpower  reserves."" 

*mW,KJn,  vol.  I.  p.  1217;  Kurt  von  TippelsHpA, 
•{S^ttchte  des  Zumtm  WMcrieges  (Bonn:  Athenaeunt' 
WSag,  1956),  pp.  181-S8;  Albert  Seaton,  TU  Rua^ 
Cmnan  Wtr,  1941-1945  (New  "Atiki  Praeger.  197?)^ 
pp.  98-106.  n6-225. 

^'HelderDmry^  vol.  Ill,  p. 8. 

"ftifi.,  p.  3S. 


The  Soviet  leadership,  although 
aware  that  its  situation  was  desperate, 
did  not  see  itself  as  being  as  helpless  as 
Haider  thought.  Once  it  was  clear  to  all 
of  its  members  that  not  only  the  third 
directive  of  22  June  but  the  whole 
previous  concept  of  carrying  the  war  to 
the  enemy's  territory  was  a  mistake — 
and  it  was  clear  by  die  fourdi  day  of 
the  invasion — the  newly  formed  Stavha 
set  about  developing  an  "active  strate- 
gic defense."  The  objectives  would  be 
to  stop  the  enemy  along  the  whole 
front,  to  hold  him  and  wear  liim  flown 
whUe  the  strategic  reserves  were  being 
assembled,  and  then  to  shift  to  a  "de- 
cisi\e  strategic  counteroffensive."  To 
accomplish  the  first  two  of  these  aims, 
the  Soviet  Command  would  deploy  the 
set ond  strategic  txhelon,  [>!o\i(iccl  for 
in  the  state  defense  plan,  behind  the 
first  strategic  echelon,  already  in  ac- 
tion. The  main  effort  was  to  be  in  t!ic 
center  where  foiir  reserve  armies 
(thirty-seven  divisions)  wotild  be 
moved  tip  to  the  Dnepr-Dvina  line  be- 
hind West  Front.  Northwest  Front  was  to 
use  its  reserves  to  build  a  line  between 
P.skov  and  Orlov,  160  miles  south  of 
Leningrad >  and  Southwest  Front^  to- 
ge^er  wttih  tlte  rfght  fianle  of  Simth 
Front,  was  to  occupy  and  hold  the  "old" 
Slalin  Line  fortifications  on  the 
pre-1939  border.**  The  Soviet  mm" 
power  thai  Haider  was  coiicefiseij 
about  was  coming  into  play.  An  order 
of  the  iVestdliuni  of  the  Supteine 
.Soviet,  issued  on  22  June,  had  called 
up  all  reservists  aged  twenty-three  to 
iMttti'^'m  gad  by  1  July,  5.3  million 
had  been  mobilized.*' 


44, 

**vav:  pp.  106.  UO;  ivm,  vol.  iv.  p.  53. 


THE  BUTZKMEG 


29 


In  Moscow,  on  30  June,  Stalin  cre- 
ated the  State  Defense  Committee,  the 
GKO  (Gositdarstvennyi  Komitet  Oborony), 
which  superseded  the  Defense  Com- 
mittee of  the  Council  of  People's  Com- 
missars and  became  the  war  cabinet 
that  had  been  envisioned  in  due  prewar 
plans.  Stalin  was  the  chaitnian;  Mo- 
lotov  the  deputy  chairman;  and  the 
odierfflembeirs  were  VorosWlb^  aiid  6. 
M.  Malenkov,  who  was  tlie  pativ  |)er- 
^luiei  chief  a.iid  Stalin's  right-hand 
matt.  The  GfC0  was  the  highest  war- 
time organ  of  the  So\iet  government, 
and  its  decrees  had  the  force  of  law.  Its 
authority  encompassed  both  the  ihiK- 
tarv  and  civilian  ^ipluics.  and  the 
Stavka  was  subordinate  to  it,  but  the 
GKO  concerned  itssdf  mainfy  witii  di- 
rect! ng  the  nonmiHtary  aspects  of  the 
war  effort.'"' 

Ob  the  twelfth  day  of  the  wan  3  July, 
Stalin,  who  had  marie  no  ]5rior  public 
Statement,  addressed  the  nation  by  ra- 
dio. He  was  obviously  under  strain.  iliS 
voice  was  (hiil  and  slow.  He  sfui tided 
tired,  and  he  could  be  heard  pausing  to 
diiok  water  as  he  talked.**  Addt*ssing 
the  people  as  "brothers  and  sisters"  ,n  if! 
"friends,"  he  told  them  for  the  iirst 
time,  after  two  and  a  half  we^loi  in 
which  government  c<iininuni«|llfiS  had. 
depicted  tlie  hghting  as  beiiigdonfiaesd 
to  the  bordtn  ito  ^3i^et  tefntory  had 
been  lost  and  that  the  Germans  were 


"Four  tnen^ets  wer«  added  "8  atum  wiifie  iauer*: 
tfae  0iM    dv^  Slate  Ctaio^  GmaeS^sim,  N.  A. 

SSSt%  imriftt  JfSSS  {fS6smtii  I^suSsm  "iSauSa," 

^'A^  B.  ulam.  sum.  &k!W  'Scsk:  leSdaf  ,  Wm, 

p.  Sil. 


advancing.'^  Reiterating  instructions 
given  to  all  party  offices  four  days 
earlier,  he  called  for  evacuation  and  a 
scorched  earth  policy  in  threatened 
areas  and  p;irtis;m  warfare  in  enemy- 
occupied  territory.  He  asked  the  holkiwt 
("collecflvc  farm")  peasants  to  drive 
their  livcsKxk  easlvvard  ahead  of  the 
Germans  and  the  workers  to  follow 
thdrfdtows  &i  Moscow  and  Leningrad 

by  organizing  ajjnlrli/'iiiye  ("liome 
gtiards")  "in  every  town  threatened 
widi  irtvasion.*lFliespce«ii  ismpha^zed 
the  national  rather  than  ideological 
character  of  the  war  and  referred  to 
6mtt  Bi4tain  m&  the  iJtilted  ftatis 
"trust worthy  pxrtJoi^stS'  in  ooramon 
struggle  for  "incbfiendent  and  dmio^ 
eratic  freedoia^''*'' 

To  Si/iclcH.sk 

As  the  batdes  oi  the  frontiers  ended 
in  the  first  week  of  July,  both  sides' 
atteniion  became  Hxed  on  three  places, 
Leningrad,  Moscow,  and  Kiev,  and 
most  particularly  on  Moscow.  Flanking 
the  \1iebsk  Gate,  a  fifty-mile-wide  gap 
l)et\^een  them,  the  upper  Dvina  and 
Dne|)r  n^ts  a£^rd^  me  fnost  defen- 
sible  litu'  west  the  Soviet  capital. 
Hmosheiiko  had  taijten  command  of 
Bota,  mdiw^g  tlie  iomr  iiggerve 
armies  on  the  Dnepr  Raver  line,  on  2 


"Alexander  Werth,  Ritssia  at  Mfep  m4t<-mS&im 
Kbrk;  Dultoo,  J964),  pp.  l62-eS. 

^WWSS.  vol.  II,  p.  57.  Bri^  Pdiiie  tfiu^ter 
Witistbft  S.  'G&»t«biU  had  pledged  ansdasmx  io  tiite 
Scmet  trnion  on  the  day  of  the  in^bn,  and  Fiesr- 
dent  Franklin  O.  Roosevelt  had  «0ened  die  wi^  for 
Uj^wdcxn  23  w«l  24  Jime.  See  (>Kytr.Gnm(^;miim, 
ml.  m,  p>  »9;  Iteliett  H.  Jones.  The  Boadek'  As^ 
Slat»  i^Jbm  i»  ^  Soda  (Mm  ^oman, 
iMk.'.  Vtib/eaiVf  dt  OkfalMitt^  i^«s|^  1969).  pp. 
35-37;  Richard  M.  Leighton  andllfiltenlVS  €oatu^ 
GbAai  Logistics  and  Strategic,  194(t^MtS  (1KsiKi»gtilt», 
D,C.:  GPO,1955),p.97. 


30 


MOSCOWinO  STAUNGRAD 


July.*^  By  then.  Army  Group  C^ftter 
had  regrouped  for  the  crossing.  Ge- 
neralfeldmarschall  Gueuther  VOn 
Kluge's  HeadquafterS,  FoiMth  ktmy, 
renamed  Fourth  Panzer  Army,  had 
CaJ^en  over  Second  and  Third  Panzer 
Gtdup$t  4nd  an  wrmj  faeiadcpiarters 
from  the  reserve.  Second  Aimy,  liad 
assumed  control  of  Kluge's  infantry, 
whieh  vm  tb@i  engagea  with  Mifilih 
Army  in  jBilipping  up  the  Minsk 
pocket.  The  p^Eizer  groups  jumped  pff 
Oil  10  July,  HofM  llHiM  »aate4r  Group 
north  ot  the  Vitebsk  Gate  and 
Guderian's  Second  Panzer  Group 
south  &(  it.  In  six  days,  o6e  ot 
Guderian's  corps  covered  eighty  miles 
and  took  Smolensk.  Third  Panzer 
Group  went  even  farther;  mS  ttti&i 
had  a  spearhead  a!  \'artsevo,  thirty 
miles  northeast  of  Smolensk,  on  16 
July.  Ifi  between  eatpi  and  groups' 
advances,  an  elongated  pocket  was 
forming  around  the  Soviet  Sixteenth  and 

In  the  meantime,  on  10  July  as  the 
battle  for  die  Dnepr  River  line  was 
be^mniag,  Stain  had  emerged  as  the 
suprieme  commander  of  the  Soviet 
armed  foiices.  The  Stavka  of  the  fiigh 
Gommand  then  bte^me  the  Stavka  of 
the  Supreme  Command  with  Stalin  as 
chairman  and  the  most  experienced 
Soviet  staff  trffioer,  Marshal  Shaposh- 
nikov,  was  added  to  the  membership. 
(On  19  July,  Stalin  assumed  the  post  of 


'WAfV;  vol.  IV.  p.  46.  Pavlov  had  been  recalled  to 
Moscow  at  tlie  end  of  June  together  with  his  chief  of 
Sia^ snd  deputy  for  political  affairs.  .\\\  three  were 
court-martialed  and  shot.  I  he  commander  oi  Nnrlh- 
westFwnt,  Kuznetsov,  and  his  i  liift  i  it  staff  and  depmy 
for  political  affairs  also  were  relieved  —  but  with  less 
severe  consequences.  See  Khrushchev,  Khrushchev  Rt- 
memben,  p.  132  and  Eremenko,  V  tuichate,  pp.  36-48, 

'^Tippe!skirch,G«f/!ifyiff,  p.  191;/rOVAS,  voj.II.p, 
66;  Se3ton,  Russo-Ceman  VMu*.  pp.  124-27. 


people's  mmtoissar  of  defense,  and  on 
8  August  lie  entered  the  military  hier- 
ardiy  with  the  tide  supreme  high  com- 
maiidef,  wheretspdfi  ihtWavkahersme 
ihe  Stavka  of  the  Supreme  High  Com- 
mand.) Although  directives  and  orders 
wfei*  issued  in  the  names  dt  GK&  and 
ihe  Stavka  throughout  the  war,  neitlicr 
had  any  authority  independent  of  Sta- 
lin. Afleir  he  beoiine  mmeme  high 
commander,  meetings  Ctf  the  whole 
Stavka  appareiitly  were  klfrigqpient,  and 
SteKn  tise^  tlte  ifieihtePs  as'  petj^l^ 

advisers  and  assistants  and  the-GfjOjei^ 
Staff  as  his  planning  and  ^jge^live 
agency.  Sist&M  representatimi  in  the 
field,  either  by  its  members  or  bv  otli- 
ers  acting  under  its  authority,  became 
aft  €!stablished  feature  of  Scmel 
mand  technique.  Zhiikov,  for  instaili^, 
was  almost  always  away  from  MosceiWi 
dt]^6r  as  a  Sta-aka  t^pf^^at^vt  or  ik  M 
major  field  command.^" 

Also  on  10  July,  the  GKO  authorized 
heater  ceiffliiands  for  the  main  *sofa^ 
tegic  directions"  (napravleniy):  the 
Northwestern  Theater,  under  Voroshilov; 

and  the  Southwextern  Theater,  under 
Budenny,-^  The  theater  commands 
emrespCKndted  roughly  to  the  fjcftaaa 
army  groups,  but  their  roles  appear  to 
have  been  less  clearly  defined,  and  the 
fronts  £otiitihued  as  the  main  o|sera- 
tional  commands. 

In  mid-July,  the  Stavka  set  up  a  re- 
!seirv€f;/k»if  of  fetir  artoies'bdiladMjTse^ 
west  and  Wrst  Fronts  on  the  Staraya 
Russa-Bryansk  line  and  another  of 
three  armies  flanking  Mozhaysk,  sixty 
miles  west  of  Moscow.  Not  yet  ready  to 
regard  the  batUe  for  die  Dnepr-Dvina 


*^akharov.  50  lei,  p.  267i 
*yWtfV.  vol.  IV.  p.  53. 


SS-Men  Cross 'im  Beresika  Riv£R  Ausnqsibe  a  Ws£cxEa  Beioge 


line  as  lost,  the  St0^  Mverted  twenty 
divisions  from  the  reserve  armies  for 
counterattacks  from  the  north  and  the 
wm&i  gainst  the  prongs  of  die  Gl^ 
man  pincers. Mobilization  was 
providing  men  to  fill  new  units,  but  not 
enough  officers  qualified  to  staff  and  to 
command  higher  headquarters;  con- 
sequendy,  the  Stavka  disbanded  the 
corps  headquarters  on  15  July,  leaving 
the  armies  in  direct  command  of  their 
divisions. 

In  part  by  design  and  in  part  out  of 
necessity,  the  Soviet  Army  reorganized 
in  July  to  a  basis  of  smaller  tactical 
units.  Most  rifle  divisions  were  already 
30  percent  below  authorized  strengths, 
at  between  nine  and  ten  thousand  men, 


and  they  were  short  50  percent «tf  tibeix' 
artillery,  the  equivalent  of  one  reg- 
iment per  division.  Intantry  brigades 
of  forty-four  hundred  to  six  thousand 
men  were  a  faslcr  and  ciicaper  means 
of  bringing  manpower  to  bear,  and  tlie 
army  formed  159  of  these  between  late 
July  and  the  end  of  the  year.  During 
this  period,  motorized  coi  ps  wcic  bro- 
ken down  into  tank  divisions,  brigades, 
and  independent  battalions,  appar- 
entiy  because  the  field  connnands  be- 
lieved the  armor  would  be  moi  e  useful 
in  direct  infantry  support  than  in  large 
mobile  formations.  The  authorized 
strength  of  a  tank  division  (7  of  which 
were  formed  in  1941)  was  217  tanks;  a 
brigade  (76  formed  in  1941),  93  tanks; 
and  an  independent  battalion  (100 
formed  in  1941),  29  tanks.  The  actual 


32 


MOSCOW  TO  iSlBJJ35GRAB 


strengths  oF  these  tanic  tmlfs  wied 
vvidelv.  The  8lh  Tank  Brigade,  for  in- 
stauccj  when  activated  in  Septembei" 
IMli  had  wliat  ^tti&i  mitMeteA  a  M 
complement:  61  tanks.  22  of  them 
T-34s;  7  KVs;  and  2>%  light  tanks.==^ 

Although  the  iiitefistty  t*P  fighting 
increased  through  ihc  second  lialf  of 
July,  and  Timoshenko  launched  several 
dfftenniffled  e&unterattacks,  the  battle 
for  Smolensk  and  the  Diiejir-Dv  ina  line 
was  lost.  In  tlie  fourtli  week  ol  the 
jJlorkth,  the'  pander  arniies  dosed  the 
pocket  east  of  Smolensk.  By  then,  Ge- 
n^^oberst  j^olf  Strauss'  Nmth  Army 
and  Second  Army,  under  Gene- 
raloberst  Maximilian  ^on  Weichs,  had 
broadened  die  bulge  east  of  the  rivers, 
and  the  Stavka  hj^  1^  m  ^^#5  llfig 
frontage,  giving  the  §<Sry|^t^^  jStc  |SS>' # 
newly  created  Headg|ll(i$8t%  ©ewfi-i^ 

under  Ktiznetsw.  iSttt  thfe 
Zhukov,  whom  Shaposhnikov  had  re- 
placed the  day  before  as  chief  of  the 
General  Staff,  took  met  the  reserve 
frmts  behind  No7ilnvrst  and  West  Fmnts 
sp.d  on  fhe  Mozhaysk  hue  as  the  Reserve 

Bmt.  Itke  Oeniasis  liquidated:  ikt 

Smolensk  pocket  on  5  August  and 
counted  over  three  hundred  thousand 
prisoners  and  tjiree  thousand  captured 

or  destroyed  tanks.  Soviet  accounts 
maintain  that  Sixteenth  and  Twentieth 


"IVMV,  vot  IV,  p.  61;  Ivanov,  Madtalnyy  period,  p. 
277;  Tyiishkevich,  'i^Kruzhmnye  sily.  pp.  281,  284; 
Krupchenkn,  Tari)nn"ie  vvyskn.  p.  33;  M  V,  Zakharov, 
ed..  Pro,  at  gulerovskogfi  ntistujilmn'ti  mi  Moshnu 
(Moscow:  Izdiiielstvo  "Nauka,"  1966),  p.  1(35. 

^''Seaton,  Rus.v<-Grrman  Wir,  p.  130;  Tippelsk-irch, 
Geschkkte,  p.  lyi.  For  the  Soviet  position  on  the  Iwo 
armies  in  the  pocket,  which  v  aries  somewhat  among 
the  sources  but  generaliv  holds  that  they  xvithdrew  in 
good  order.  seelVOVSS,  vol.  II,  p.  72;  IVMV.  vol.  W. 
p.  75;  VOV  (Krathaya  l^baif^.  ^  76;         %  K, 

lishers,  t9?0).j).  39. 


The  W&rSi  and  South  Flanks 

During  the  month  oi  the  battle  for 
tfee  Dra^r-Dvina  line  and  SmoleJiirft, 
Army  Groups  North  and  South  cov- 
ered as  mucti  and  more  ground  as 
Army  Group  Center,  though  less  spec- 
tacularly. For  Army  Group  Nf)rth  in 
ihc  first  week  of  Augusi,  Cieneraloberst 
Erich  Hoepnerhadthe  point  of  Icwrtif 
Panzer  Group  approaching  Luga,  ^er* 
eniy  miles  south  of  Leningrad.  On  His 
right,  Generaloberst  Ernst  Busch  s  Six- 
teenth Army  was  keeping  contact  with 
Army  Group  Center  on  the  Dvina,  and 
on  his  left,  Eighteenth  Army,  under 
Generaloberst  Georg  von  Kuechler, 
was  clearing  Estonia,  the  northernmost 
of  the  three  Baldc  States.  A  Finnish 
ctffensive  begun  on  10  July  was  tying 
down  North  Front  forces,  under  General 
Popov,  east  of  Lake  Ladoga.^^ 

Army  Group  South  broke  through 
the  Stalin  Line  on  the  pre-1939  Soviet 
border  at  the  end  of  the  second  week  in 
July,  and  Generalfeldmarschall  Walter 
von  Reichenau's  Sixth  Army  got  to 
within  ten  miles  of  Kiev  on  die  1 1th, 
Thereafter  Sixth  Army  advanced 
slowly  on  its  left  against  stubborn  resfe- 
tance  from  Soviet  Fifth  Army  under 
General  Mayor  M.  1.  Potapov  and 
stretetied  Its  right  flank  to  cover  Gene- 
raloberst Ewald  von  Kleist's  First 
Panzer  Group  as  the  latter  drove  south 
and  southeast  into  the  Dnepr  bend.  In 
the  first  week  of  August,  Kieisi  and  Ge- 
neraloberst Carl-Heinrich  von  Stuelp^ 
nagel,  commander  of  S^enteentfe; 
Ai  niy,  maneuvered  parts  of  two  Soviet 
armies  into  a  pocket  between  Uinan 
and  Pervomaysk  and  took  over  a  hun- 
dred thousand  prisoners.  At  Pervo- 

IV,  pp.  64-66- 


33 


maysk.  Kleist's  armor  was  in  position  to 
strike  behind  South  Front,  which,  on  the 
west,  faced  the  Rumanian  Third  and 
Foiirth  Armies  as  adjuncts  of  the  Ger- 
man Eleventh  Armv  under  Gene- 
raloberst  Franz  Riiier  von  Schoberi.  To 
aS'cHd  being  trapped  between  the  Ger- 
tasins  and  tlic  Black  Sea.  General 
T^plenev,  commander  of  Soutfi  Front, 
with  the  that  is  Stalin's,  ap- 

proval, began  a  reneat  lovvard  the 
Dnepr,  leaving  behind  an  independent 
imm  i®  eo^r  Odessa,** 

A  Change  in  Plans 

Meanwhile,  the  issue  of  tire  main 
effort  side-stepped  in  the  original  Bar 
BAROSSA  plans,  had  raised  a  command 
crisis  at  the  Fuehrer  Headquai  ters.  In 
I  wo  directives  (numbers  33  and  34  of 
11'  and  30  July,  rcspcciivelv)  and  sup- 
plements to  liiem,  Hitler  had  ^iven 
Leningrad  and  the  Ukraine  pnetitf 
over  Moscow  as  strategic  objectives.  He 
had  also  ordered  Army  Group  Center 
to  divert  forces,  particularly  armor,  to 
the  north  and  the  south  on  a  scale  that 
would  practically  halt  the  advance  in 
die  center  after  the  fighting  ended  at 
Smolensk.  The  objective  given  in  Di- 
rective 33  was  "to  prevent  the  escape  of 
large  enemy  forces  into  the  depths  of 
the  Russian  territory  and  to  annihilate 
them."  In  the  final  supplement.  Hitler 
had  added  anothei  :  "to  take  possession 
of  the  Donets  [Basin]  and  JCharkov 
industrial  areas."^^ 


"'■Sealun,  Riasu-Crnium  War,  pp.  136-^0;  IVOVSS, 
vot  II,  pp.  98-103.  See  also  K.  .S.  Moskak-nko,  Na 
yugu-ucpmliiiim  niipiavliin/  (Mnsiow:  [ /dm t"-lst\ n 
"NHiika."  1960).  pp.  46-. "75. 

'^'Di-r  Fiti'hu'i  und  Ohi'tMi-  Hr/rlil^/iiihri  ilrr  Wrh]  iiiiii  hi . 
OKW,  WFSt.  .4/rf.  L  (I  Op.)  Nr.  44  1230141,  Wmiing  Nr. 
J  J.  /9.7.41- Nr.  44  12^)H!4I.  Wn.ningNr.  34,  30.7.41;  Nr. 
44  7.376,  Ergaeitziwg  ih'i  Wh.'^iiiig  34^11iiiS^l^  G&-ataa 
High  Level  Directives,  CMH  files, 


The  generals  in  the  OKH,  in  the 
field,  and  e\en  in  the  OKW,  were  dis- 
mayed at  being  told  to  turn  to  what 
they  regarded  as  subsidiary  ob)actiV€s 
when  if  seemed  the  Soviet  Command 
was  dearly  determined  to  make  its  de- 
cisive' tStand  on  the  approaches  to 
Moscow.  During  a  month's  debate, 
Hitler  refused  to  change  his  mind  ex^ 
cept  to  settle  tor  a  weaker  ef  fort  in  the 
north,  and  on  21  August,  he  sent  down 
orders  that  would  dispatch  Second 
Army  and  Second  Panzer  C^^p  isdiitli 
into  the  Ukraine  and  divert  a  panzer 
corps  and  air  support  elements  from 
Field  Wlmshia^  Bock's  Army  Group 
Center  to  Army  Group  North. '^^ 
Guderian,  whom  Haider  and  Bock 
thought  Hider  might  listen  to  as  a  tank 
expert,  failed  to  get  the  orders 
changed  in  a  last-minute  interview  on 
23  August.^ 

Tlie  advances  of  Armv  Groups  Cen- 
tei  and  Soudi  ni  July  had,  by  early 
August  wrapped  their  lines  halfway 
around  the  Soviet  forces  standing  at 
Kiev  and  along  the  Dnepr  north  and 
south  of  the  city,  creating  a  potential 
trap  for  almost  the  wliole  Southwest 
Front.  Hitler,  no  doubt,  had  entrapment 
in  mind,  and  Zhukov  certainly  also  did. 
The  danger  was  obvious,  but  Stalin 
could  not  bring  himself  to  sacrifice 
Kiev,  and  a0Sef  ^wfc«(V proposed  doing 
that,  Stalin  retnov^  him  as  chief  of  die 
General  Staff.  On  4  August,  Stalin  or- 
dered Southwest  and  S)iu(li  Fmnls  lo  hold 
the  Kiev  area  and  die  line  ol  tire  lower 
Dnepr.  In  midmonth,  the  Stavka  set  up 
the  Bryansk  Front,  two  armies  under 
General  Eremenko,  between  Central 
Fnmt  and  West  Front.  Stalin's  instructions 


'■''DA  PamphkT  '2n-LI6ia,  pp.  50-70. 
'"Hem/  C;ud<-n;iii.  P'inw ijojjer  (New  l&rft;  Out-' 
ton,  1952).  pp.  19a- 200, 


34 


MOSCOW  TO  SrimiMGlAD 


to  Eremenko  were  to  prevent  the  ar- 
mor of  Gudei  ian's  Second  Panzer 
Group  from  breaking  through  toward 
Moscow.  On  the  19th,  Siia]}()shnikov 
lold  Zhuknv  tli.il  111-  and  Stalin  imw 
agreed  with  Zhukov  s  preditiioii  ot  an 
attack  to  come  south,  off  Army  Group 
Ccnlci  s  flank.  The  Stai'ka  passed  ilic 
same  information,  which  apparently 
■was  based  on  intelligence,  to  Budenny 
al  F  Icachjiiarlers.  Southwi'stcrv  Theairr, 
and  to  Smtitwest  and  Scruth  Frmits  and 
simultaneously  reiterated  its  previous 
orders  K  t  liold  Kiev  and  the  line  ctf  the 
lower  Dnepr.^" 

Second  Army  atid  Second  Panzer 
Group  started  south  against  the  lela- 
uvely  weak  forces  of  Central  Front  on  25 
August.  To  make  matters  worse  for  it, 
Hea(l<iuartei  s.  Central  Front,  was  just 
then,  as  the  result  of  another  Stavka 
decision,  at  the  point  of  being  deacti- 
vated and  was  turning  its  sector  over  to 
Bryansk  Front.  To  check  Bryansk  Fronts 
which  might  have  endangered  WsfianR 
and  rear,  Guderian  left  beliind  most  of 
Second  Panzer  Groups  intantry  and  a 
panzer  corps.  These  units  became 
Fom  iii  Army  under  KIiiLjes  headquar- 
ters, wliich  had  relinquished  its  panzer 
army  designation.  Gudiei^n%  cottrse 
took  him  on  an  ahnost  straight  line 
toward  Romny,  120  miles  east  of  Kiev. 
When  Oud«rian's  point  passed 
Konotop  on  10  Septcmhei;  narrowing 
the  open  end  of  the  bulge  to  less  than 
150  miles,  ^eist^  First  l^nzer  Gmip 
strut  k  not  til  from  a  bridgeiicad  at  Kre- 
menchug  on  the  Dnepr.  From  dien  on, 
most  of  the  Siwiet  troops  in  the  bulge 
had  farther  to  go  to  escape  than  the 
panzer  groups  did  to  close  tlie  encircle- 


'■^ukov,  Mnnoin,  pp.  289,  296;  Eremenko,  Amitf 
Kyt^  p.  [43;  VOV  (KroAojo.  Iskmfa).  p.  90. 


ment,  and  on  the  11th,  Budenny  asked 
to  withdraw  Southwest  Front  from  Kiev 
and  the  Dnepr  upstream  from  Kre- 
menchug.  St^in  refused  and  sent  H- 
moshenko  to  teplace  him.  On  the  16th. 
the  German  points  met  at  Lokhvitsa, 
S3  mQes  sotroi  of  Rdmay,  and  the  Gtbr- 
mans  wiped  out  the  pc>^ki@t&i  another 
week,  counting  665,000  prisoners,  fhe 
Short  History  gives  Southwest  Front's 
strength  as  677,085  men  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  battle  and  150,541  at  its 
end.*' 

Tatfun 

I'hc  Main  Ef/ni  l  ni  the  Cf titer 

Describing  the  advances  in  the 
north,  toward  Leningrad,  and  in  the 
south,  east  of  Kiev,  as  being  al)out  to 
create  "the  basis"  on  which  Army 
Group  Center  could  "seek  a  decision" 
against  West  Fnmt.  Hitler,  on  6  .Se[j- 
tember,  issued  Directive  35  for  wliat 
betkme  Op^eratioti  TAiFifN  {**ty- 
|)]io^''Ji  IJtiaerQie  direcdve>  theiaail» 
elfort  would  revert  to  Army  Group 
Center  at  the  end  of  the  month,  and  by 
then  it  would  ha\e  its  detached  panzer 
and  air  uiaits  returned  along  with  rein- 
forcemeiftis  in  snrtor  ft<stit  the  other 
1^vo  army  groups  and  the  OKU  le- 
serves.  rhereafier.  Army  Groups 
North  iuid  South  would  eontiiitie  their 
operations  widl  reduced  strengtli. 
Army  Group  Nortli  would  make  con- 
tact wilh  the  Krins  on  the  Isthnius  dt 

Karelia  east  ol  1  .t'nint>iad  and  push 
across  die  Voikliov  River  to  meet  tliem 


^'Gudemn,  Panar  Ltadtr,  pp.  202-25;  Tlp- 

pp.  m-ih  tvMv,  vdL  iv,  p.  m  vm  tkfo^ 

AtinjnJ,  p.  91. 


THE  BLITZKRIEG 


35 


Crew  of  88-mm.  Gun  Searches  for  Targets  on  rut  Approach  io  Kiev 


alio  east  ef  Lake  Ladoga.**  Army 
Oroup  would  (  ontinue  east  to 

take.  iCEiifffeoiv  aod  Melitopol  and  dis- 
patch Elevedth  Army  south  into  Ae 

Crimea. 

In  the  last  week  of  September.  Ann\ 
Group  Cpnter  recalled  Setond  and 
Third  Pdnzer  Groups  and  acquiicfl 
Headquarters,  Fourth  Panzer  Group, 
from  Arroy  Qrmip  North  together 
with  panzer  corps  from  Army  Groups 
North  and  South.  By  then.  Army 
Grou.|»  Notik  had  taken  Sdiluessel- 


**Hitlfi  h:\<l  already  tjitk-icd  Arniv  Gi(iu[j  Noilli 
to  invest  l.t'iiingrLKl  liul  iim  i-mc-r  ii  Luiopl  a 
silt  tfiuli  i  i[  (!nc  were  ordt-rcil.  1  lie  cilv  was  to  Ix'  k'll 
lij  si.Mvf-  OAir.  WTSt.  Ahl.  HI  Op.)  Mr.  110  2119141. 
kM/i<jif.H«/(;  Lrmn^<i<t.  21.'J.-tl.  OK\\7li>:lH  file. 

^■'I>fi  l-'iitlirfr  uiiil  Ohrrsli-  Brjfhhhiiber  der  Wehnnacill, 
OKW.    UT-Sr  .\hl.   Li  I  Sr    44  1-^2/41, 

German  High  Level  Directives,  CMH  files. 


burg  on  the  Neva  Si*er  at  Lake 

Ladoga,  thcithv  cutting  Leningrad's 
contact  b)  land  with  the  Soviet  interior, 
and  Finnish  forces  had  lines  across  the 
Isthmus  of  Karelia  north  of  the  city 
and  on  the  Svir  River  east  of  Lake 
Ladoga.  Army  Group  South  had 
spearheafls  approaching  Kharkov  and 
closing  up  lo  Melitopol.  Army  Group 
Center  held  the  line  it  had  oecuplecl 
east  of  Smolensk  in  August. 

On  the  Soviet  slcti.'.  (lie  commancU 
for  the  northwesiern  and  western  the- 
aters, whose  fiUKiious  the  General 
Staff  and  the  Slavka  had  assumed,  had 
gone  oul  c;!  existence  in  Aul;us|  ihkI 
Se(j[cmber,  lt'a\ing  only  liuioshcuko's 
SonlhiVt'sicrn  Thntter.  In  the  far  Ni)rlh. 
between  Lake  Onega  and  the  Barents 
Sea,  Karelian  Front,  under  General 
Leytenant  V.  A.  Frolov,  was  managing. 


36 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


Women  Fibe  Pightebs  Keep  Lookout  Ovm  the  Rooftops  or  Lekingrajb 


aided  by  the  approaching  winter,  to 
hold  the  Germans  and  FiniT;  awav 
from  Murmansk  and  ilu  Murmansk 
Raih-oad.  Against  Army  Ciroup  Nof^, 
Leningrad  Fnmt,  with  /hukov  in  com- 
mand alter  10  Sepieiiilnr,  clefciKlfd 
Leningrad,  and  Northwrst  Fmnt.  luidt'i" 
General  I.cvtenant  P.  A.  KuifKlikin. 
held  the  line  liom  Lake  Ladoga  south 
to  ( )siashk()v.  On  the  South  ^nk,  Ti- 
moshenko  took  personal  command  of 
Souf/nt'est  Front  on  26  September  and, 
with  it,  Smlh  Fmnt,  anct  Fiffy-^^  Inde- 
pctidmi  Army  on  the  Crimea,  was  re- 
sponsible for  the  defense  sotidi  ol  ihe 
level  of  Kttrsk.  Against  Army  Gic)uj> 
Center  were  ranged  the  Wht  Front,  un- 
der General  Polkovnik  Ivan  Konev; 
Eremenko's  Bryansk  Front:  and  the  Re- 
serve Fmnt,  where  Budenny  had  re- 


pteieed  Zhukov.  The  long  pause  in  the 
center  had  given  the  Stavica  lime  to 
rebuild  the  defense.  The  thiee  fronts 
had  a  combined  total  of  at  least 
L250,()00  men.'^  Army  Group  Center 
had  tnoie  men,  1,929,000  but  those 
included  a  lacge  auxiliary  contingent, 
rhe  armv  groups  combat  effective 
strengtli  of  seventy-eight  divisions 
would  hardly  have  given  it  more  than 
numerical  equality.^* 

The  March  to  Vkioryt 

The  quiet  west  of  Moscow  ended  on 
2  October.  In  bright  fall  sunshine, 
Armv  Gr(jup  Center's  tanks  roared 


^'ivm.  vol.  IV.  pp.  93,  110-19. 
Klaus  Rdiihardt,I>if  Wmde  vor  Maskau  (Stuttgart: 
Deatscbe  Verlags-Anstatt.  1972),  57. 


THE  BLlTZmEG 


37 


eastward  once  more.  Konev  and 
1j  cmestko  had  Wst  Bou^  ^md  Brymtsk 
Fnnil,  respectivelv.  concentrated  west  of 
Vyazma,  on  iht-  direct  roule  lo 
IktuD8Cow.  and  west  ol  Bryansk,**  Bock's 
armor.  Third  Pan/cr  Croup  on  i fit- 
north.  Fomili  Paiuer  Choup  in  the 
center,  and  Second  Kan/x-r  Group  on 
die  south,  went  around  the  outer 
flanlis  and  between  the  two  Soviei 
groupings.  Within  a  wee^  flicy  had 
encircled  six  Soviet  armies  west  of 
Vyazma  and  were  torcing  almost  the 
entire  Br^amA  Front,  three  armies,  inio 
pockets  southwest  and  nonlieast  oi 
Bryansk.  Haider  described  the  perior- 
mance  as  "dowinight  classical."'^^  The 
German  final  count  of  prisoners  from 
the  Vyazma  pocket  was  663,000  and 
from  those  near  Bryansk  about  one 
hundred  thousand.^*  But  the  results  of 
the  operations  in  the  extensive  forests 
around  Bryansk  were  not  quite  "classi- 
cal." The  fighting  tied  down  parts  of 
Second  Army  and  Second  Panzer 
Group  until  late  in  the  third  week  of 
the  nwrnth,  and  many  of  Eremenko's 
troops  eventually  either  made  their 
way  out  to  Soviet  territory  or  hid  in  the 
deep  woods  where  the  Germans  would 
later  have  to  contend  with  them  again 
as  partisans.^' 

Zhukov,  hurriedly  recalled  from 
Leningrad  where  he  had  succeeded  in 
stabilizing  the  front,  look  over  the  com- 
bined West  and  Reserve  Fronts  on  10 
October.  His  assignment  was  to  man 
the  Mozhaysk  line  with  sui^vivors  from 
the  Vyazma  pocket,  recent  conscripts, 
and  a  sprinkling  of  seasoned  troops 


*VVMV.vdl.W.p.n. 

'■UppdsUfdi,  GiBakiik.  p.       Cudefism,  Panur 
Ltader,  p.  238. 
■*Rcinhardt.MKli«<,  pp.  ^67. 


rushed  ironi  oilier  sectors  and  Siberia. 
The  Mozhaysk  line,  however,  began  to 
crumble  on  the  14th  when  Third  Pan- 
zer Group  took  Kalinin.  On  the  17th, 
the  Stavka  set  up  Kalinin  Fmnt  under 
Konev  lo  take  over  Zhukov s  right  Mank 
and  to  narrow  his  responsibility  to  only 
elie  direct  western  and  southwestern 
approaches  lo  Moscow.  Arouiul  the 
capital,  civilians,  mostly  women,  weie 
building  three  semicircular  defense 
lines,  and  in  the  city,  workers'  militia 
battalions  were  preparing  to  man  the 
lines.*"  While  the  most  intensive  Soviet 
effort  was  directed  towaid  Moscow's 
defense,  the  main  German  thrusts 
were  aimed  past  it.  On  the  north,  in  the 
second  week  of  October,  Thii  ci  Panzer 
Group  had  headed  toward  V'arcjslavl, 
and  Second  Panzer  Group  had  been 
coming  from  the  southwest  on  a  line 
taking  it  via  Orel  and  Mtsensk  (which  it 
reached  on  12  October)  toward  Tula, 
Ryazan,  and  Gorkiy.  On  12  October, 
Hider  had  given  the  same  order  for 
Moscow  he  had  given  for  Leningrad: 
German  troops  were  to  surround  the 
city  and  to  starve  it  out  of  existence.  No 
German  soldier  was  to  set  foot  in 
Moscow  until  hunger  and  disease  had 
done  their  work.*'  (Map  3.) 

The  crisis  came  in  the  second  and 
third  weeks  of  October  1941.  Loss  of 
Kalinin,  on  the  14th,  set  off  panic  and 
loodng  in  Moscow  and  gave  rise  to 
symptoms  of  disintegraUon  among  the 
troops.  On  the  19th,  the  State  Defense 
Committer'  put  Mosco\n  under  a  stale 
of  siege.  At  the  front,  Zhukov  says  with 
astringent  understatement,  "A  rigid 
order  m&  established.  . . ,  Stern  mea- 


**JVmsS,  vol,  Ji,  |m.  840-47;  Wmf,  JMi.  IV.  pp. 
97-100. 
*H)KW.  Km,  wt  I,  p.  1070. 


THE  BUTZKRIEG 


39 


sures  were  introduced  lo  prevciii 
breach  of  disci^iie."*^  Hie  dipto- 
matic  Gdtps  and  most  of  the  govern- 
ment offices  were  evacuated  to 
Kuibyshev.  Hider's  address  on  3  Og- 
tohrr  opening  the  "Wlniei  RelieP  pro- 
gram had  already  sounded  like  a 
i^ctoryspeeidt,and  on  the  9th.  Dr.  Otto 
Dietrich,  secretary  of  state  in  the  Pro- 
paganda Ministry  and  chief  press 
spoti^iStiian,  had  told  the  Berlin  foreign 
press  oorps  that  the  campaign  in  the 
East  was  "dedded."""  On  the  lOili.  the 
OKW  had  called  off  Army  of  Norway 
operations  out  of  northern  Finland  be- 
cause it  believed  the  war  was  about  over 
on  the  main  front.'*  Much  of  the 
world,  the  British  and  United  Stares 
governments  especiativ,  wanted  to  be- 
lieve otherwise,  bm  lo  do  so.  except  as  a 
desperate  act  of  faitli,  hardly  seemed 
reasonable.  The  U.S.  military  attache 
in  Moscow  had  reported  on  10  October 
that  it  seemed  "the  end  of  Russian 
resistance  is  not  far  away."^-''  The  Brit- 
ish government  had  suspected  the  end 
might  be  near  in  September,  l)e(oi(- 
Taifun  began,  when  Stalin  had  called 
urgendy  on  the  British  and  the  Amer- 
icans for  a  second  front  on  the  Con- 
tinent and,  failing  diat,  had  asked  for 
twenty- five  to  thirty  British  divisions  to 
fight  in  Russia.'*® 

Bad  as  the  Soviet  situation  looked,  it 
was,  for  the  moment,  actually  worse 
thEin  either  the  Germans  or  the  West- 
em  Allies  imagined.  Four  months  of 
war  and  territorial  losses  had  reduced 
Soviet  prodiictive  jc&padty  by  63  per- 

*>^Sbx(kmiMtimrs.  p.  331. 

**OoiitSBriis,/?itfer,  vol.  11,  pp.  )758-67- 

*'AOK  NoruregtH,  BtfthlssUiU  Bnntand.  la 
Kmgstagebudi,  }.6.4i~t3J.42,  W  On  41,  AOK  20 
55I98/I  Rle. 

""Sherwood,  itaisnnit  siu/  Hopkins,  p.  399. 

**Owyei,GmndSiFattg^  vol.  III.  pt.  I.  pp.  1S7-201. 


cent  in  coal,  (38  percent  in  iron,  58 
percent  in  steel,  and  60  percent  in 
aluminum.  In  Ociober.  after  having 
risen  during  the  summer,  Soviet  war 
production  afso  dropped  drastically, 
probably  bv  60  percent  or  more.'"  Dur- 
ing October  the  Moscow  and  DtMiets 
industrial  complexes  had  to  shut  down, 
and  to  begin  evacuating,  (llie  decline 
continued  into  November  and  De- 
cember, during  which  months  tlie 
Moscow  and  Donets  basins  did  not 
deliver  "a  single  ton"  of  coal,  the  output 
of  rolled  ferrous  metals  fell  to  a  third 
of  that  of  June  1941,  and  ball  bearing 
output  was  down  by  95  percent.)^"  W. 
Avei  ell  Harriman,  U.S.  lend-lease  ex- 
pediter, who  had  been  in  Moscow  at  the 
end  of  September,  had  accepted  a 
shopping  list  I  roin  Stalin  for  a  billi<m 
dollars  in  lend-lease  supplies,  but  their 
delivery  would  take  months. 

On  18  October.  Fourth  Panzer 
Group,  having  pushed  past  Mozhaysk 
and  Kaluga,  began  turning  to  skirt 
Moscow  on  the  north  and  to  opien  the 
way  for  Fourth  Army's  infantry  to  ex- 
ecute the  encirclement.  Fourth  Army, 
anticipating  a  similar  assist  on  its  right 
f  rom  Second  Panzer  Group,  had  issued 
the  orders  for  the  encirclement  on  the 
16th  and  had  set  tlie  line  of  the  Moscow 
belt  railroad  as  the  closest  approach  to 
the  city.^"  At  the  speeds  they  had  at- 
tained in  the  early  days  of  the  month, 
the  tanks  of  Hoepner's  Fourth  Panzer 
Group  would  have  been  less  than  two 
days'  from  Moscow  when  they  passed 
Mozhaysk,  but  they  were  not  moving  as 
fast  as  they  had  before. 


■"Plaionov,  Vioraya  Mim/ayaM6y>ia,  p.  t4Si  IVGVSS. 
vol.  II.  pp.  158-60. 

*»V«zncsen5kiy,£r<nwmjve»/  the  USSR.  p. 

**Fim  and  Second  Pan/.cr  Groups  were  elevated  ui 
faB  may  status  'on  5  Ocuiber.. 


40 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


Mud  anil  Friistmtinn 

The  Germans  were  having  their  first 
encounter  with  tjdsraipt^lsii.  The  fitst 
snow  rdl  on  the  night  of  G  October. 
From  then  on,  alternating  rain  and 
snow  the  pounding  m  msks  and 
trucks  turned  the  into  ever 

deeper  «iiagroires  of  mydL  ttv  the  end 
criF  the  tMrd  we€k  In  the  mon^,  Puufth 
Panzer  Group's  and  Second  Panzer 
Army  s  (Second  Panzer  Group  elcvatetl 
to  army  status,  5  Odiobet  1941)  spear- 
head divisions  had  beo^ine  stretched 
out  over  twenty-five  to  thirty  miles,  and 
&e  mimtry  was  sometimes  cnitiiistsoie- 
ing  die  tanks.  Third  Panzer  Grouii 
OGOtteoiplated  dismounting  the  tank 
CT&ifS  aind  going  ahi^d  'Gti  fo&t  Mid 
with  ftanjc  wagons,  the  Russian  peas- 
ants' one-horse  carts.  Meanwhile,  dis- 
mayingly strong  counterattacks  on 
Tliird  Panzer  Group  at  Kalinin  and  on 
Second  Panzer  Army  along  die  Zusha 
^ver  At  Mtsensk  had  dc»«0niier^fi@d 
ihai  t  \rn  though  aerial  reconnaissance 
reports  showed  Moscow  being  evacu- 
ated, the  %ui»ians  would  not  give  op 
the  (     without  a  fight.*" 

Because  of  the  weather,  the  Russians, 
for  almosc  the  first  dme  in  waf, 
were  able  to  meet  I  heir  enemy  on 
nearly  equal  terms.  The  Germans, 
mijving  dowly  and  confined  to  the 
roads,  could  he  confronted  head-on 
and  forced  to  fight  for  every  mile.  The 
Soviet  T^|4  isidKS,  which  had  been  too 
few  to  in|[tl©9€e  «fae  fast-moving  en- 
circlement batdes,  came  into  their  own. 
H^VJOfg:  wider  tracks  than  the  German 
tanks  made  them  more  buoyant  in  the 
mud.  Their  heavy  armament  and  ai- 

^'Guderian,  Panzer  Leader,  pp.  DA  Pam- 

phlet 20-26Ia,  pp.  79-8L 


mor  allowed  one  or  two  T-'34s  in  a 
roactolock  to  stop  an  ad\an(  c  until  the 
Qermans  could  bring  up  either  88- 
itim.  antiaircraft  guns  or  10-cm.  field 
guns,  the  only  reasonahh  mobile  artil- 
lery pieces  capable  of  cracking  the 
T-S«s  armor.  Both  weapons,  though, 
especially  the  8,Ss.  were  heavy  and 
bulky,  hence  vulnerable,  and  aggra- 
vatingly  difficult  to  move  over  rutted, 
potholed  roads. 

At  the  end  of  October,  Army  Group 
Center  wa^^ltflieaEy  at  a  sfiandi^  ima 
line  from  Kjij^td^the  Oka  Rhrerwest 
of  Tula,  its  center  Mrty-five  miles  &om 
Moscow.  Army  GroupNorthhad.in  the 
nieantimc,  given  up  on  c  losing  the  siege 
line  around  Leningrad  west  ot  Lake 
litdoga  in  SeptembCT,  after  the  Finns — 
whose  Connnander  in  Chief,  Marshal 
Mannerheim,  had  scruples  about  fur- 
dier  involving  his  troops  in  operations 
against  Leningrad  he(atise  he  had 
pledged  in  1918  not  to  use  die  border  on 
the  fsthmus  of  Karelia  to  attack  the 
city — declined  to  push  any  farther 
south.  Being  left  then  holding  an  un- 
con^ertstde  siX'iml6-wid€  "bottleneck" 
east  ol  lchhiesselhtirg.  Field  Marshal 
Leeb^  commander  of  Army  Group 
Ntrtl,  on  Hitler%  orders,  had  begun  a 
thrust  east  on  14  October  aimed  from 
Chudovo  northeast  past  Tikhvin  to  the 
Finnic  line  on  the  lower  Svir  River. 
Ttiis  di  ivc  also  had  slowed,  and  at  the 
end  of  die  mondi,  die  raspuUtsa  stopped 
it  shott  trf  Tfbhvin,  In  the  last  we^  cf 
October  Army  Group  South  managed 
U)  take  Kliarkov  and  Stalino  and  to 
bre^  fhfough  the  Berekop  Isthmus 
into  the  Crimea  before  fa^PU^tsa 
also  stopped  it.^' 

*'Sec  tarl  F.  Zifiiikc,  Tht  German  NortJieni  Theater 
Gpercaions,  1940-45  (Washington,  D.C.:  GPO.  1959), 
ppv  200-02;  Tippdskirdi.frfiiAieAtt.  pp.  202-06. 


THE  BLITZKRIEG 


41 


Moving  SuHiuiJi  in  rufi  Rainv  Season 


As  seen  from  the  Soviet  side,  the 
German  frustration,  welcome  as  it  Vk'as, 
did  not  lessen  the  mortal  threats  hang- 
ing over  the  country.  If  Army  Group 
North  reached  Tikhvin,  it  would  cut 
the  one  railline  to  the  south  shore  of 
Lake  Ladogfa  and  thereby  further  iso- 
late Leningrad.  Ai  Stalino,  Army 
Group  South  almost  had  control  of  the 
industry  and  coal  mines  of  the  Donets 
Basin.  11  u'  panzer  units  northeast  and 
south  of  Moscow  were  poised  to  devas^ 
tate  the  industrial  heart  of  central  Ru*> 
sia  and  to  leave  the  Soviet  foi  ces  from 
the  Arctic  to  the  Caucasus  hanging  at 
die  ends  df  a  disconnected  raHrdad 
system. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  7  Novem- 
ber, the  twenty-fotrrih  anniversary  of 

the  Coninumist  RcvoluUtm,  Stalin  re- 
viewed an  impromptu  parade  for  the 


occasion  from  his  accustomed  stand 
atop  the  Lenin  mausoleum.  In  his  ad- 
dress to  the  troops,  most  of  whom 
would  go  directly  from  Red  Square  to 
the  front  ,  he  called  on  them  to  emulate 
the  old  Russian  national  heroes — Al- 
exander Nevskiy  who  had  defeated  the 
Teutonic  Knights  in  the  thirteenth  cen- 
tury; Dimitry  Donskoi  who  had  de- 
feated the  Tatars  a  century  later;  and 
Alexander  Suvorov  and  Mikhail 
Kutuzov  who  had  served  the  tsars 
against  the  French  Revolution  and 
Napoleon.  In  a  s])ecdi  to  tin-  Mostnw 
Communist  Party  organization  the 
night  before,  he  bad  adopted  a  similar 
Russian  nationalist  tone.  He  had  also 
told  th?  party  leaders  about  the  recent 
bBH©a-doIIai*-Iend-lease  agreement — 
while  blaming  the  (lefcats  so  far  on  the 
absence  of  a  second  front  in  the  West. 


42 


MOSCXJW  TO  STAONGRAD 


In  both  days'  speeches  he  predicted 
Hitler's  ullimate  defeat  but  did  not 
CC«iaiiient  on  the  probable  outcome  of 
the  emrefittampaign.  Before  the  party 
audience,  he  repeatedly  spoke  of  the 
coalition  with  Biitaln  and  the  United 
States  «s  fliee  guat^t^  of  ultimate 
tory.^^ 

As  Stalin  looked  out  over  Red 
Square  oh  lihe  7th,  where  light  snow 
and  freezing  cold  signaled  the  end  of 
the  rasputitsa,  the  future  must  have 
appeared  dark  to  him.  Within  days,  the 
soldiers  marching  before  him  could  be 
trapped  in  a  pocket  with  Moscow  at  its 
cSBOttt*  He  himself  CoKilil  tsecome  a  ref- 
ugee, not  only  driven  out  of  Moscow, 
the  world  capital  of  communism,  bat 
into  the  eastern  fringe  of  European 
Russia.  Evidently,  he  regarded  these 
possibilides  as  grimly  potential  real- 
ities. "Ilife  Simka  Imd  Slas?ted  forming 
nine  teserve  armies  on  a  line  from 
Vytegra  on  the  southeastern  tip  of 
Lake  Onega  tm  Rybinsk  Reservoir 
and  from  there  east  and  south  along 
the  Volga  River.^^  If  the  Slavka  con- 
templated lia¥tttg  to  de^d  that  line, 
the  future  must  have  appeared  dark 
indeed.  When  it  was  reached,  the 
Ijeningrad  and  Moscow  industrial  re- 
gions would  have  been  occupied,  and 
the  Soviet  Union  could  be  eliminated 
as  a  niitttifiy  fmrn*  S^tia  hstd  Mmost 
said  lU^  imck  the  previous  summer  in 


■•Vvovss,  vol.  Il,pp.^2i:^  Wenfa,.aussi»£rfW&« 

pp.  2-Pi-i9. 

''■'VfA'  {Kmtkim  hl'iriml.  [i.  121;  Vl'OV.S.S.  vol.  II,  p. 
2:u  The  VOV  iKiatkayu  htniivil  iirid  IVMV  (vnl.  IV.  p. 
2M()|  iVMe  tiTyt  It'll  resfi  vf  .iimii's  uen-  liriiij^  lormed 
Hiid  iiitplv  lhai  I'irst  Sluif  k  :uv\  Tirrnlit'th  Armin  were 
aiuony  iht'iii.  IVOVSS  ii\y<.'^  <hf  liumbei  as  nine,  not 
intluding  /-VrW  S/u/ik  iind  TvmliHh  Armii'S.  and  lisls 
lliL-m  as  lentil,  rwrnty-sixth .  and  Fijty-seventh  Armh:\ 
(luinud  ill  laici  <!>ttut>ci)  and  Twrnty-nghlk,  TMrty- 
iinilli  i-ill'\-,i^rhth,  h'ijh-iiiiith.  Siylu'lh.  and  Stl^-^^ 
(formed  in  llie  firsi  half  oi  November). 


telling  HopMns,  the  U.S.  Icaad-lease  ne- 
gotiator, that  a  German  advance  of  150 
miles — to  the  east  of  Leningrad, 
Moscow,  and  Kiev — would  destroy  75 
percent  of  existing  Soviet  industrisu  ca- 
pacity.** 

ISwaitl  the  end  of  die  first  week  in 
November,  the  fiont  was  begitming  to 
Stir  again,  on  the  flanks,  though  not  yet 
in  the  center.  Army  Group  Nor^,  after 
having  been  almost  ready  to  fall  back  to 
the  Volkliov  River  the  week  before, 
raised  enough  momentmn  in  the  mud 
and  again$t  constandy  stiffening  Soviet 
resistance  lo  take  Tikhvin  on  the  8th. 
Leeb  cvbserved  that  "tLeningrad]  iis 
now  also  cut  off  from  contact  across 
Lake  Ladoga.  "^^  In  the  south,  Eleventh 
Army,  under  General  der  Infanterie 
Fritz-Erich  von  Manstein,  who  had 
taken  command  in  September  after 
Schobert  died  in  an  airplane  accident, 
cleared  the  Crimea  by  8  Ntnember 
except  for  the  Kerch  Peninsula  in  die 
east  and  the  Sevastopiol  fortress  on  the 
west.''''  At  Armv  Group  Center,  Bock 
had  issued  an  order  on  30  October  for 
Taifun  to  resume,  and  he  was  waiting 
impatiently  for  the  weather  and 
ground  conditions  to  improve.  '^ 

In  the  second  wfti^k  M  jCe^'eOiber,  as 
the  weather  began  to  clear  and  the 
ground  to  freeze,  the  armor  could 
m&m  Si^g^.  Hie  OKH  and  the  leM 
commands  contemplated  a  trou- 
blesome question  raised  by  the  lime 


'■'ShWWOod,  Hmsavit  iiiid  Hopkins,  p.  US. 

'^Wilhclm  Ritter  yon  Leeb.  Tagdnuhauf^euhnungen 
und  Lagebeurlnlurigm  aus  lu'i'i  Weltkiii'grii  (Stutj^gSit: 
Deutsche  Verlags-Anstalt,  pp.  .'5H1-S9. 

"'■DA  Painphlcl  20- 261a,  p.  81.  Sec  atsi>  Im  u  Ii  von 
Mansiein,  l.ml  Vii!orie\  (ChiLago:  Hcniv  Rfgiu-ry. 
i95H).  pp.  20.5,  220-22. 

"H.  Cr.  Mille,  la  Nr.  22i(JI41.  BeJM  Juer  die  Fi/rt- 

m. 


THE  BLI-EZiOUEG 


43 


kȣi  in  ^emsptUitsA:  where  to  stop  fbf 

the  wintcT?  Tlie  invasion  plans  and 
pr^arations  had  not  included  con- 
tinuing active  operations  iam  the 
winter,  but  all  lc\cls  of  c ommasid  had 
assumed  tiie  campaign  would  be  StlC- 
cessfuUy  completed  in  1941.  On  7 
November,  Hitler  conceded  to  Field 
Marshal  Brauchitsch,  conimander  in 
chief  of  the  army,  that  the  Q&msm 
Army  could  not  reach  such  vital  objec- 
tives in  the  Soviet  Union  as  Murmansk, 
the  V<dga  River,  and  the  Caucasus  cul 
fields  during  1041. Speaking  in 
Munich  the  next  day,  the  anniversary 
of  the  1925  Beer  HaU  Putsch,  Hider 
called  hlitzkrirg  an  "idiotic  word"  and 
declarcfl  liiiiiseli  ready  ro  carry  die  war 
into  1942  and  beyond — to  the  "last 
battalion,"  if  necessary.^^  The  dream  of 
a  single-season  victor)'  had  vanished, 
and  winter  winds  were  begittnillg  to 
blow  through  ilu-  Russian  forests  and 
across  the  steppes.  Haider  liad  told 
Gc^onel  jMioK  Heusinger,  his  chiei  u\ 
operations,  on  5  November,  that  the 
Germans  needed  some  basis  on  which 
to  dose  out  the  current  campaign;** 

What  sucli  a  basis  coidd  be  appeared 
different  to  each  of  the  principals 
iniMllved.  Leeb  had  exhausted  his  ffe* 
serves  getting  to  Tikln  in,  could  not  go 
forward,  was  not  inclined  to  go  back- 
ward, and  described  Army  Group 
North  .(s  existing  "from  hand  to 
mouth.'""'  Bock  iiad  severe  doubts 
about  how  much  further  he  doiiM  go 
but,  recalling  the  fateful  consequences 
of  the  German  decision  to  stop  on  the 
Mame  in  September  1914,  he  did  not 
mmt  If)  miss  whatever  chance  of  taking 


!h,tn.  vnl  111.  |), 
*"L)<imanis.//i//(r,  %„\  H.  pp.  1776.  1778. 
'"Haltlrt  Diaiy.  vol  111.  ji,  L'SI. 
*^Leeb.  lagelnicliauJieu:hnungm.  p.  391. 


Moscow  still  e$d$ited»  lie  cotild  not,  for 

the  inoineni.  irQS^[i|ie  anvthing  worse 
than  having  to  <^t  the  winter  just 
tfeiftp-fivie  miles  fkwn  Moscow  with  the 

Russians  in  unimjiaii  cd  control  of  (he 
city  and  the  halt-dozen  railroads  run- 
ning into  it  from  the  north,  south,  and 
east.*'^  Field  Marshal  Riindstedt,  cotn- 
mander  of  Army  Gi  oup  South,  caUed 
tSn  the  OKH  to  let  him  stop  the  army 
group  where  it  was  to  conserve  its 
remaining  sLrenglh  alter  die  long  sum- 
mer^ march  and  to  give  him  time  to 
rebuild  for  the  next  spring.  Haider  saw 
the  possibilities  as  falling  into  two  cate- 
gories: one  he  otUed  an  Efh»tIlaiiD^ 
gcdanken  in  which  conservation  of 
strength  was  the  determinant;  the 
other  a  Wirkungsgedanken  m  wMcli  e»- 
ploitation  of  the  existing  strength  to 
achieve  the  maximum  effect  in  tlie 
dme  I  t  niaiuing  would  be  the  determi- 
nant. The  two  he  maintained,  would 
have  to  be  weighed  and  balanced 
against  each  other  and  the  results 
converted  into  guidance  for  the  field 
commands,** 

jQter^  MOWeattbe*;  Haider  sent  each 
aarjnaj^  group  and  army  chiel  of  staff  a 
copy  of  an  eleven-page  top  secret  flinu- 
ment  and  a  map  with  notice  ihe 
Gentlemen  Chiefs  of  Staff  that  both 
options  would  be  tlic  subject  of  a  Gen- 
eral S^lff  conference  to  be  held  in 
about  a  week  at  Orsha.  The  inap  (of 
iMuopean  Russia)  had  two  nordi-south 
lines  drawn  on  it.  One  was  designated 
"(he  farthest  boundary  still  to  be  a!- 
tempted";  the  other  "the  minimum 


""Si'c  Alfsi-il  W.  lunics.  !}na\trr  nl  \hi\finr  (Alljil- 
<.[Lifi<HK-:  liiiivi-i>iii\  <>r  Nviv  Mfxito  Prcis,  197(1).  pp. 
l30-;-i:(  .ind  liiiUI,;  than.  vol.  HI.  p.  287. 

1.1.  Snril.  hi  \i-  2ll9n/-ll,  cm  lini  (.lie/  dei 
GeiifmUliihn  <ln  I  I'-  A,mn  -1  11. 41.  Pi.  \OK  I 
S868a  ttk;:  Halite,  Uimx  vol,  (II.  pp.  2H1, 


44 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


boundary."  The  "farthest  boundary" 
ran  from  Vologda  on  the  north  via 
Gorkiy  and  Stahngrad  to  Maykop.  It 
would  cut  Antral  Russia  off  from  rail- 
TOad  contact  witll  the  northern  ports, 
Murmansk  and  Arkhangelsk,  and  with 
the  Caucasus,  and  it  would  bring  in 
hand  the  entire  Moscow  industrial 
complex,  die  upper  and  middle  Volga, 
and  dijB  Maykop  oil  fidldil.  Whedier  this 
action  would  end  the  war  was  doubtful, 
but  it  would,  as  Haider  saw  it,  bring 
German  forces  into  an  alignment  they 
could  maintain  indefinilelv.  "in  case  the 
highest  leadership  should  decide 
against  resuming  the  attack  in  the  EasI 
later."  Tlie  "niininumi  boundary"  ter- 
minated in  the  north  on  the  middle 
Svir  River,  30  miles  east  of  EaJt^ 
Ladoga,  and  on  the  south  at  Rostov,  at 
the  mouth  of  the  Don  River;  in  the 
center,  it  passed  160  miles  east  of 
Moscow.  It  would  provide  a  secure  tie- 
in  witll  the  Finnish  Aimy  on  the  Svir, 
bring  Moscow  and  the  cluster  of  indus- 
trial cities  to  the  northeast  bet^veen 
Rybinsk  and  Yaroslavl  under  control, 
cut  all  the  railroads  running  toward 
Moscow  from  tlic  east,  and  position 
Army  Group  SouUi  for  later  advances 
to  Stalingrad  and  the  Caucasus.  But  it 
would  still  be  an  interim,  not  a  final 
boundary,  and  another  offensive 
would  be  needed  to  bring  in  Vologda,, 
Gorkiy,  Stalingrad,  and  the  oil  at  May- 
kop and  Baku.** 

Haider  and  his  branch  chiefs  face- 
operations,  organization,  intelligence, 
and  supply  arrived  at  Orsha,  in  the 
Army  Group  Center  zone  on  the  night 
of  12  November  aboard  a  special  train. 


m^gbmixwirhtit^/'  >ll^s.  Rue-indmtnm  u.  Verki:hrs!n\i.L->i 
sowie  amustrf.hi'iiiii'  Ofh'ratmtuzide,  Karte  I.  AOK.  18 
35945/1  nie.  See  also  F.ai  I  F.  Ziemke,  "Franz  H^der^t 
OT&ha,' Military  Affairs,  39(1973),  173-76. 


The  Sta^  eonference  be^in 

the  next  morning  at  1000  and  ran 
through  tlie  day  and  into  the  night. 
Haider's  owtt  lllMking,  in  which  he  said 
Hitler  had  concurred,  inclined  strongly 
toward  the  Wirkimgsgedanken.*^'''  He  liad 
given  the  chiefs  his  position  in  the 
paper  he  sent  with  the  map.  Tlie  objec- 
tive, before  closing  out  the  current 
of  fetish^,  he  had  stated,  should  at  least 
be  to  get  favorable  stalling  positions 
for  1942  while  "minimizing"  the  dan- 
orf  the  troops'  being  caught  un- 
pT^epared  by  the  winter  In  fact,  he  had 
added,  it  would  be  worthwhile  "to  lake 
risks"  before  the  onset  of  wiotet 
to  get  to  the  "farthest  boundary"  or  at 
least  the  "minimum  boundary."**** 

At  the  Orsha  meeting,  Haider  ar- 
gued that  carrying  the  offensive  at  least 
to  the  minimum  boimdary  was  neces- 
sary as  well  as  advantageous.  The  "fun- 
damental idea"  of  the  campaign,  he 
said,  had  been  to  defeat  the  Soviet 
Union  in  1941.  This  was  no  longer  "one 
hundred  percent  attainable"  for  \'ari- 
ous  reasons,  among  them  "nalural 
forces,"  but  primarily  because  of  the 
enemy's  "astonishing"  military  and  ma- 
teiial  strength.  Even  diough  the  Soviet 
tl^#n  was  weakened  "by  at  least  fifty 
percent,"  its  remaining  potential  was  so 
great  that  it  could  not  yet  be  dismissed 
^  a  military  threat  and  simply  "fe^^t 
under  observation"  as  had  been  in- 
tended. Consequendy,  the  East  would 
temain  an  active  theater  of  war  into  the 
^mX  year,  and  (hat  raised  problems. 
For  otte,  he  explained,  the  OKH  had 
been  aware  from  the  first  that  the 
forces  assembled  for  BARftARQSSA  could 


'^'Scc  Haider  Dtnri.  vol.  Ill,  p.  283. 

Chi:/  ili'i  (.fm-ridilahi-s  tin  Hivrrs.  Op,  Mt.,  IttNn 
1630/41,  7M.41,  AOK  18  35943/1  BJe. 


THE  BLITZKRIEG 


45 


not  be  sustained  beyond  the  ^tiA  6f 

1911.  which  meant  that  personnel 
losst  s  iluis  tar  could  not  be  replaced  in 
the  ( ( )m i ng  year, Bud  cutbacks  in  motor 
vehicle  allotments  would  reduce  mohiU 
ity.  The  Soviet  Union,  on  tlie  other 
hand,  still  had  enough  men  and  indus^ 
iry  to  rebuild  its  forces  b\  the  summer 
of  1942  if  it  could  survive  until  then. 
Consequently,  tfee  German  Army 
would  still  have  to  "strive  to"  inflict 
enough  datnage  on  tlie  enemy  before 
die  end  cif  1941  "so  that  the  p0c^s  will 
nor  ha\e  to  ]>ay  in  blood  nCXt  year  for 
vvliai  i.s  neglecietl  now.""^ 

The  chiefs  of  staff,  for  their  part, 
reminded  Haider  of  some  things  !u- 
alread)  knew  very  well.  German  casu- 
alties stood,  as  of  1  Wowember,  at 
686,000  men— 20  percent  of  the  3.4 
million,  including  replacements,  com- 
mitted iaxux  June,  the  equivalent  of 
one  regiment  in  every  division.  Of  half- 
a-nilUion  motor  vehicles  on  the  Eastern 
Front,  a  third  were  worn  out  or 
damaged  l)eyond  repair:  onb  a  third 
were  fully  serviceable.  I'.m/er  divisions 
were  down  to  35  perccni  ol  their  f)rig- 
inal  tank  strengths.  Tlie  OKH  itself 
rated  the  136  divisions  on  the  Eastern 
Front  as  equivalent  to  no  more  than 
83  full-strengdi  divisions.  All  of  these 
COndiUons  could  only  get  worse  if  oper- 
ations continued  —  and  one  other, 
namely,  that  of  logistics,  would  gel 
much  worse.  Every  tnile  die  armies 
moved  easiuai  <1  put  an  added  strain  on 
the  railroads.  Winter  clothing  for  the 
troops  was  already  having  to  be  left  in 
storage  because  it  could  not  lie  brought 
forward  without  cutting  off  other  sup- 
plies. German  equipment  could  not 


"7/.  Gi.  Xdiil,  Dei  Chef  ile.s  (ininalsUAes,  l&  Nt. 
769141, 2UIAI,  AOK  18  35945/1  file. 


m&  oift       Soviet  railroads  until  the 

tracks  were  relaid  to  the  standard 
gauge;  and  in  the  entire  tei  ritory  oc- 
cupied thus  far  only  500  So\  in  loco- 
motives and  21,000  cars  had  been 
caplm  ed,  bareh  a  tenth  of  what  was 
needed,"** 

The  chiefs'  estimates  of  uhar  might 
still  be  accomplished  were  ecpially 
bleak.  Generalrnajor  Kurt  Brennecke, 
Leeb's  chief  of  staff,  told  Haider  that 
Leebs  command,  Arnn'  Group  North, 
had  no  divisions  for  a  drt^'c  east  ;nid 
could  acquire  these  only  by  brst  elim- 
inating the  Soviet  I: iglitJi  Army,  wliich  it 
had  confined  in  a  pocket  west  of 
Leningrad.  Brennecke  noted  that 
Haider  did  not  mention  Vologda  again. 
Bocks  chiefs  €»elieral major  Hans  VOn 
Greil  Icnberg,  was  (old  to  a  suggestion 
f  rom  1  liilder  diat  Army  Group  Center 
not  resume  the  advance  toward 
Moscow  for  t^vo  weeks  or  so  to  let 
strength  accumulate  lor  a  deeper 
thrust.  Generalniajor  George  von 
Sodenstern,  the  Army  Group  South 
chief  of  staff,  pointed  out  that 
Rimdstedt  believed  an  advance  to  May- 
kop,  if  it  were  undertaken  after  the 
long  march  already  made,  would  re- 
move his  only  large  armored  unit,  First 
Panzer  Army,  from  acdon  for  most  of 
the  next  year."® 

After  dinner  on  the  evening  of  the 
13th,  Haider  gave  his  conception  of  the 
meeting's  results.  He  had  concluded, 
he  said,  that  the  extensive  operations 
he  had  proposed  on  7  November  and 
in  the  morning  session  could  no  longer 


""IbuL:  Hiiliifr  Diary,  toI.  III.  p.  Z6$^f>KW,  KTB,  VoL 

IV,  pp.  107 1- 7."). 

•"H.  C.r.  \.>,d.  Dn  (Jul  .h:  i..ii,<iilil/ihn,  la  .Vr. 
769/41.  2l.ll.  ll.  AOK  IN  ;iri'.»!.vi  hie.  Scc  Haider 
Ditin'.  \>.  L'«7.  H.  Gr.  Surd,  Dn  Che!  Onierd^lJm,  /a 
Nr.  2i?3/4i,  V&rfr^^gwpfe,  AOK  6  181117  file, 


46 


MOSCOW  TO  SIALINGRAD 


be  considered.  Nevertbeless,  he  be- 
lieved that  the  army  groups  would  still 
have  to  get  as  much  as  possible  from 
char  troops  until  about  mid-Deceiilber. 

Armv  Group  South  would  have  to 
push  ahead,  though  "apparendy"  not 
as  far  as  Stdingrad.  Army  Group  Cen- 
ter would  not  gain  "substantial" 
ground  beyond  Moscow,  but  it  would 
still,  at  least,  have  to  "achieve  a  strongCf 
pressure"  on  ihc  lilv.  Army  Group 
NorUi  would  be  expected  lo  resume  its 
drive  at  Tikhvin,  close  in  on 
Leningrad,  and  assist  the  Finnish 
Army  east  of  Lake  Ladoga.  Vologda, 


Gorkiy,  Stalingrad,  and  Maykop  woixld 

have  to  be  left  for  the  next  summer, 
when  "the  Russians  [would]  have  a  plus 
in  strength  and  we  a  minus."^"  On  th(6 
other  hand,  Giiderian's  chief  of  staff, 
Lt.  Col.  Kurt  von  Liebenstein,  alluding 
to  the  1940  campaign,  had  l^eadf  1^ 
minded  Haider  that  the  war  was  JIOC 
being  fought  in  France  and  the  month 
was  Bot  MayJ' 


'«H.  Cr.  Sun!.  Dcr  Chij  df^  GnuTahlalm.  In  Nr. 
212^141.  Vmlrairsiii,!,-..  AOK  li  181117  hie;  H  Cr  \^,ul. 
On  (./„■/  ,lri  (;,;,n„lsUll>,-s.  la  \i.  769141 .  21 JJ .-f  I .  AtJR 
18  :l.V.M.i,l  liif. 

Gudenan.f  onjw  Leader,  p.  247. 


CHAPTER  m 

To  Moscow 


The  Soviet  literature  describes  the 
strategic  situation  at  the  time  of  the 
November  lull  in  somewhat  contradic- 
tory terms.  The  offidai  accounts  main- 
tain that  Soviet  resistance  brought  the 
Germans  to  a  stop  west  of  Moscow  and 
dismiss  fite  effect  of  the  weather  as  a 
German  excuse  for  faihne,  perpetu- 
ated by  "falsifiers  of  history."'  On  the 
other  hand,  they  iiifliiiale  that  thg 
effect  of  tlir  Soviet  Sticcess  was  tempo- 
iai\,  and  tlie  initiative  remained  en- 
drely  the  Germans'.  The  picture,  then, 
is  one  in  which  the  Soviet  armies 
fought  the  enemy  to  a  total  standstill 
and  gained  a  brief  respite.  As  theft^- 
lar  Scimtiftr  Sketch  gives  it,  the  enemy 
needed  iwu  weeks  to  prepare  his  next 
moves,  and  the  pause  allowed  the  So- 
viet Command  to  reinforce  the  front 
and  consolidate  the  Moscow  defenses.^ 

T%e  Soviet  Cmditbn 

For  the  Soviet  Command,  as  for  the 
German,  the  crucial  strategic  consid- 
eration in  early  November,  aside  ft&BA 
the  approach  of  winter,  which  was  as 
welcome  on  the  Soviet  side  as  it  was 
unwelcome  on  the  (iernian,  wa.s  the 
relative  state  of  the  two  forces.  The 
manpower  and  material  that  had  kept 

'VOV  {Knilkow  hhin\a).  p.  fTl.  IVOVSS.  voL  H,  p. 
250:  /V'A/V;  vnt  IV.  jtp'  98-1(11. 
'See  Zhukov.  AfwnoiVi.  p.  337;  VOV.  p.  99. 


the  Soviet  Union  in  the  war  thus  far, 
despite  enormous  losses,  were  suffi- 
cient to  sustain  another  round  of  oper- 
ations.' As  of  1  Detember  the  Soviet 
armies  in  the  field  would  have  4.2 
million  men,  a  sliglit  numerical  superi- 
ority in  armor  over  the  Germans,  ap- 
proximate equality  with  them  in 
aircraft,  and  a  small  mfenofity  in  arlfl- 
lery  and  mortars.^ 

Tile  Germans  substantially  under- 
eStlatiffed  tlbe  Soviet  strength.  Esti*^ 
mates  giv^gii.  i^xbit^^a^ofm^  13 


^The  Soviet  literature  provides  virtually  im  mfor- 
mation  on  Soviet  losses  and,  except  in  the  iiiscim  t-  ol 
the  Kiev  hatile,  dismisses  the  German  counts  ,is  vastly 
exaggeraicd.  However,  if,  as  a  scattering  of  figures 
indicates,  46\  divisions  were  committed  (o  the  cam- 
paign Iwuicen  June  and  December  1 170  divisions 
were  in  the  liontier  intlilaiT  dislricts  on  2'.?  |uru'  ItM  I, 
and  divisions  wcu  t (iiniiiiEU-il  from  ihc-  Slavka 
reserves  luMui'cn  22  |iiik'  ;iml  1  December)  and  onlv 
279  ■)!  ilicsi  ilisisioiis  wtir  in  the  field  in  early 
Di  (  c'iiiIh  ]  ,  llicn  the  divisions  lost  alone  (oukl  have 
;  Hjitii  IHI',  or  39  percent.  Since  not  all  ol  the 
divisions  and  other  units  employed  in  llie  campaign 
were  either  in  place  on  22  [nne  or  de|j!o)e(l  honi 
Simihi  reserves  therealler,  lliis  number  would  li.ivc  to 
be  regarded  as  the  niiiiinuini  possible  loss.  The  itiili- 
tarv  (lisiricis,  .nul  aiiiiies  iindouhtedU  nmbi- 

li«-(.l  .1  iiutiilier  oi  other  divisions  iuul  unils  dining 
this  period.  .\dditioii,ilK.  peoples'  nnlin.i  ilivisions 
and  so-called  indepinrU  rii  icgiiueiiis  and  baitiilions. 
numbering  about  two  million  men,  were  leiriiiled  in 
the  threatened  areas.  What  became  of  them  is  impos- 
sible to  fictermine.  See  V  Zemskov,  "Nehobmyr  vopmsy 
.wniarnya  i  v,piilwvaniyn  '■tmte^cheskikh  rrteivtw,"  M. 
Kazakov,  "Si)z/Itini\ii  i  i\/ii'l2/n'aniye  itralegii lit wkilih  rfsfr- 
it):  ."  and  \'.  {iolubovit  li.  '"■\iiiilnnnfi  \lri!lrf^i hrshkii 
rezfnirt',"  \li\m>iu-:.^liin(lu:',kn'  iJiiirnai,  3(1971),  ili— 16; 
I2(1!172),  ■l5-4lt;  41(1()77),  I0- 13.  respecitivdy. 

*VOV  (Kratkaya  htonya),  p.  129. 


KV  Tank  Headed  for  the  Front  Rumsi-es  Through  Pushkin  Square,  Moscow 


November  at  the  Orsha  Conference 
put  the  totals  of  Soviet  larger  units  at 
160  <iiti®eBS  and  40  br^ijes  and  rated 
their  combat  effectiveness  at  below  50 
percent  because  more  than  half  of 
thifsc  units'  troops  and  officers  wxtv 
believed  to  be  untrained.^  The  aciiial 
numbers  as  of  1  December,  according 
to  the  Sofviet  sources,  would  be  279 
divisions  and  93  brigades.  In  part» 
these  units,  particularty  thoise  fmm^iyt 
reserves,  lacked  training  and  ^pteri<- 
ence.  Interspersed  among  them,  few*- 
ever,  v/as  a  growing  core  crf"  Seasoned 
divisions.  The  individual  principally, 
though  indirecdy,  responsible  for  this 
increase  in  readiness  was  the  Soviet 


•'//.  Gi:  ,V("v/.  IkrChefdes  Gem-rfilsl/ibesJaNr.  769141, 
■^'n-dosdirijl  lu'bfr  die  Besprechung  hem  Gh^  des  Geth 
StdH  urn  13MAI,  AOK  18  35945/1  file. 


agent,  Richard  Sorge.  He  had  appar- 
ently supplied  enough  informariott  f>n 
Japanese  plans  to  let  the  Soviet  Com- 
mand begin  shifting  some  forces  west 
even  before  22  June.®  Through  Sor^e, 
Stalin  had  undoubtedly  then  known 
about  a  Japanese  decision  of  30  June  to 
uphold  its  neutrality  treaty  of  April 
1941  with  the  Soviet  Union  and  to  risk 
war  with  the  United  States  J  By  the  fall, 
Stafin  had  ei^er  become  convinced  of 
Sorge's  reliability  or  desperate  enough 
(or  both)  to  redeploy  more  troops  from 
&e  east  to  the  west.  Some  had  ap- 
peared at  the  front  in  October,  more  m 


■^Goliibovich,  "Sozdaniya  strategiclieskikh."  p.  17;  VOV 
(Kralkaya  liloriya),  p.  69;  VOV,  vol.  I. 

'InstiLiit  fuel-  Zeitgeschichte,  fewisc/ip  Geschuhle  ieit 
dem  I'lsit'ii  Wekkri^  ^Stunsart;  W.  Kohlhanimer,  19^3), 
vol.  II,  p.  us. 


TO  MOSCOW 


49 


November.  The  Stavka  had  held  most 
troops  back  fVimi  the  front  to  stiffen 
the  reserve  .u  inici.  Ijeing  lormed.  By  1 
December  it  had  transferred  70  divi- 
sions from  the  Soviet  Far  East  and  had 
brought  another  27  divisions  out  of 
Central  Asia  and  the  Transcaucasus. 
Together  these  units  constituted  at 
least  30  percent  ol  tiie  total  strategic 
teserves  committjed  dming  the  1941 
campaign." 

Depardng  from  previous  practice, 
Stalin  did  not  commit  his  main  reserves 
when  the  German  advance  resumed. 
The  reserve  armies  were  still  being 
formed,  and  it  is  possible  that  Stalin 
had  not  yet  dedded  to  undertake  an 
all-out  stand  at  Moscow.  Nevertheless, 
in  Stalin's  view,  the  defense  of  the 
Moscow  area  would  remain  the  para- 
mount strategic  reciulrement.  (So  far 
during  die  campaign — June  through 
November — Stalin  h^d  committed  150 
divisions,  51  percent  of  the  Stavka's 
total  divisional  reserves,  in  the  West 
Front  zone.)  In  late  October,  West  Front, 
under  General  Zhtikov,  had  received  11 
rifle  divisions,  16  tank  brigades,  and  40 
artillery  regiments  from  the  r^erye 
and  from  other/ro«i*.  Then  iii  the  first 
half  of  No\cmber,  it  acquired  100,000 
troops,  300  tanks,  and  2,000  artillery 
piecfes.  Meanwhile,  workers  frorK 
Moscow  and  sinrounding  cities  had 
been  recruited  to  form  12  niiliti4  divi- 
sions and  4  liiie  rifle  divisions.  Oa  10 
November  Zhukov  took  over  Fiftieth 
Army  from  Bryansk  FrofU,  which  was 
being  deactivated,  and  a  week  later  he 
acquired  Thiyliiih  Army  fiom  Kalinin 
Proud.  These  extensions  of  Iris  flanks 


"  Zemskov,  "Nekotoriyn  vol»i>.i-i  xutilamya  i  ispolzotHOtfi/tl 
straiepcheskUtiL  rezervBV,"  p.  14.  See  also  p.  42. 


gave  liiin  control  imm  JUSt  iH^Uth  ©C 
Kahnin  to  Tula.'' 

In  mid-November,  before  the 
weather  changed  and  llie  luU'  etided, 
the  Stavka  had  incorporated  almost  all 
of  its  forces  into  the  defense  of 
Moscow.  West  Front  Vi2ts  to  hold  the 
direct  approaclies  and  to  counter  antic- 
ipated strong-armoi  ed  dirusts  west  of 
KJin  and  at  Tiila.  Kalvrmi  Front,  com- 
manded by  General  Kone\'.  and  Smith- 
west  Front,  under  Marshal  llmoshenko, 
were  to  pin  down  Army  Group  Cen- 
ter's outer  flanks  and  thus  prevent  its 
commander.  Field  Marshal  Bock,  from 
shifting  more  weight  toward  Moscow, 
Soutfi  Front,  commanded  by  General 
Polkovnik  Ya.  T  Cherevichenko,  and 
Leningrad  Front,  under  General  Leyte- 
nant  M.S.  Khozin,  had  orders  to  ready 
offensives  near  Rostov  and  at  Tikhvin, 
respectively,  to  draw  enemjr  itpServes 
away  from  the  center.'" 

The  GmmnNovmber  Offensive 

In  the  second  week  of  November, 
Army  Group  Center  retained  the  same 
general  deployment  it  had  had  at  the 
beginning  of  the  lull.  Ninth  Army,  un- 
der ^n^ral  Strauss,  held  the  line  from 
the  Noi^i-Center  boundary;  west  c£ 
Ostashkov.  to  Kalinin.  Third  Panzer 
Group,  under  Generaloberst  Haps 
Reinhardt,  wh©  had  replaced  General 
Hoth  in  October,  stood  on  the  Lama 
River,  thirty  miles  west  of  Klin,  with 
Fhtrrrih  Panzer  Group,  undar  General 
Hoepner,  on  its  right  in  a  sector  nortll 
of  the  Smolensk-Moscow  highway.  Un- 


'Kaiakov,  "Snzfliiiiiya  i  ispolxm'nuivi  ^Irutriin li,-\kiyt 
rezfTim<"  p.  -IM:  lYJl'  p.  99:  IVMW  \,,L  ;i.  |<I4.  A. 
Siiiilfi\'[i,  "/:  i\liir)i  M-ulainvi  ilnhiuviili lifkikh  ilinsU'\  i 
soyedii:eniy  Soifi'l\kiri  Annti,"  Vmnuin-Lstoricheikn  Zkw- 
Hcit.  !(;it(7:4|.  !  1-15. 

"'VOV  (Krathaya  htimya),  p. 


so 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


der  Field  Marshal  Kluge,  Fourth 
Army's  lelt  flank  straddled  the  highway 
and  its  right  tied  in  with  Second  Panzer 
Army,  under  General  Guderiafi)  €>&  the 
Oka  River,  Second  Panzer  Army's  main 
weight  of  armor  was  concentrated  in  a 
salient  projecting  eastV^ird  south  of 
Tula.  Second  Army,  commanded  by 
General  Weichs,  covered  the  south 
fiank  east  of  Orel  and  Kursk.  Against 
these,  Kalmin  Front,  West  Front,  and  the 
right  fiank  of  Southwest  Fnmt  had  twelve 
ariides> 

In  spite  of  his  doubts  about  how 
much  iartlier  he  could  go.  Bock  had 
tded  txJ  retain  his  option  for  a  deep 
thrust  past  Moscow.  He  had  drawn  his 
armor  inward  toward  Moscow  some- 
what but  still  had  it  arching  well 
around  and  to  the  east  of  the  city-  He 
aimed  Third  Panzer  Group  south  of 
tfcte  Volga  Reservoir  toward  the 
Moscow- Volga  Canal:  Fourth  Panzer 
Group,  via  Klin,  toward  the  canal;  and 
Second  Panzei-  Army,  past  Tula,  to  Ka- 
shira and  Ryazan.  Those  lines  of  ad- 
vance would  bring  Third  and  Fourth 
Panzer  Groups  out  on  the  Moscow- 
Volga  Canal  to  strike  toward  Rybinsk 
and  Yaroslavl,  give  Second  Panzer 
Army  a  choice  ol  going  north  from 
Kashira  toward  Moscow  or  east  across 
the  Oka  River  toward  Gorkiy,  and  leave 
the  dose-in  encirclement  of  the  city  to 
Fourth  Array  alone.  ^'  As  the  time  grew 
shorter,  however.  Bock's  doubts  in- 
creased, and  he  told  Haider,  chief  of 
the  Genera]  Staff,  and  the  army  com- 
manders that  he  did  not  expect  tiie 
army  group  to  have  enough  troops, 
supplies,  or  tanks  to  get  beyond  the 


Gr.  Mitte,  la  Nr.  225I}M1,  SefMfimrSt  fe*t- 

file. 


Moscow- Volga  Canal  on  the  north  and 
the  Moscow  River  on  the  south.  But  he 
let  the  armies'  original  orders  stand, 
thcrcbv,  as  Tliird  Panzer  Group  put  it, 
making  their  missions  "unclear,"'- 

On  14  November,  Zhukov  inter- 
vened—fellictantly —  in  what  so  far 
had  been  considered  by  both  sides  to 
be  an  exclusively  German  initiative. 
Forty-nmth  Army — reinforced  with  a 
cavalry  corps  (2  cavalry  divisions  of 
3,000  men  each),  a  rifle  division,  a  tank 
atid  2  tank  brigades,  hit  the 
Fourth  Army  right  flank  east  of  Ser- 
pukhov.^^ At  the  last  mintite,  because 
ZhukoV  BEpected  the  renewed  German 
offensive  any  day,  Stalin  had  insisted 
on  "counterblows,"  which  Zhukov  be- 
lieved could  accomplish  nothing  other 
than  to  complicate  the  defense.'"' 

During  the  morning  on  tlie  15di,  one 
infantry  corps  of  Ninth  Army,  which 
was  only  sup>ernunierary  in  the  offen- 
sive, jumped  off  south  of  Kalinin  and 
experienced  what  Haider  noted  as 
"something  new  in  this  war":  Soviet 
Tliirtif'fh  Army  gave  way  without  a 
fight. Although  Third  and  Fourth 
Panzer  Gi  <Mij).s  bad  less  luck  when  they 
joined  in  a  day  later,  the  Soviet  foices 
against  them  fared  badly.  A  "coun- 
terblow" by  Sixteenth  Army's  right  flank, 
reinforced  with  a  tank  division  and  five 
cavalry  divisions,  ran  head  on  into 
Fourth  Panzer  Group's  attack  east  of 
Volokolamsk  and  collapsed."'  On  the 
18th,  3^t:^nd  Pan/er  Army  began  its 
drive  scmth  of  Tula,  and  one  of  its  corps 


'-Pz.  AOK  B.IaNt.  520142,  GeftrhL%)mvhl  ftiiMlfiwI 
mi -42.  29.4.41,  Pz.  AOK  3  2i8l8/2  file;  Haldn 
Dian:  vol.  Ill,  p.  287. 

''■>'!\'OVSS.  \fA.  11,  |-..  256. 

"zhukin,  ,vj(7!wi/jA.  |).  :i:^s. 

^^Halder  Dmry,  vol.  Ill,  p.  290. 

'  "Rokosfiovsltiy,  SalSef's  Dufy,  p,  7Q;  WMSS,  II, 
p.  256. 


TO  MOSCOW 


51 


covered  nearly  twenty-five  miles  dur- 
ing the  day;  the  following  day,  Stalin 
asked  Zhukov,  "Are  you  sure  we  wUl  be 
able  tiQ  hold  Moscoiwff  It  hurts  me  to  ask 

you  that.  Answer  mc  truthfully  as  a 
communist."  Zhukov  replied  that 
Mt^cow  would  be  held  "by  all  means" 
but  said  lie  would  need  at  least  another 
two  armies  and  two  hundred  more 
fewks,^^  Stalin  agreed  to  provide  the 
two  armies,  but  not  the  tanks,  and  said 
the  armies  would  not  be  ready  untii  die 
end^tbe  month,  wMdb  left  the  situa- 
tion around  Moscow  unlikely  to  im- 
prove anytime  soon  unless  relief  came 
from  the  operations  ^sSn&m.  to  begin 
else\vhere. 

West  and  north  of  Rostov,  Ti- 
•moitftenko  had  doubled  South  Fronts 
strength  in  the  first  half  of  the  month 
by  deploying  two  fi  csh  armies,  Thirty- 
seoenth  Army  and  Fifty-nxlh  Independent 
Amyi  On  the  I7di,  flmiy-anmilh  Army 
tc^ether  with  elements  ol  Ninth  and 
Eighteenth  Armies  hii  tlic  shoulder  of 
General  Kleists  First  Pan/ei  Ai my  fifty 
mil^  nordi  of  RosUn.  Tnnoshenko  had 
tlt@ittght  to  fulfill  the  Stavktis  require* 
ment  for  a  diversion  and  to  block  the 
gateway  to  the  Caucasus,  but  the  first 
day^  results  were  discouraging:  XIV 
Panzer  Corps  stood'  fast  on  the  north 
while  111  Panzer  Corps  broke  a^vay  to 
the  southeast  toward  Rostov.^** 

Tlie  oiulook  for  an  effective  diver- 
sion at  nkhvin  appeared  even  dimmer. 
There,  General  Meretskov  look  com- 
mand of  the  shattered  Fourth  Indepen- 
dent Army  on  7  November,  just  as 
TtfeJl'Wto  was  being  lost.  Twelve  days 
lat«;  responding  to  "urgent  demands" 
from  the  Stavka.  he  went  over  to  the 


''Gitdcy]iu\.  f'/iii2j:r  Lmdn.  p.  231;  Zakli.ii  i  A,  Pmiw/, 
p.  .■ill, 

'"/VOVii-.  vol.  II,  p.  222;  IVMV,  vol.  IV.  pp.  120-21. 


offensive  at  Tikhvin  with  the  one  infkft- 
try  division  and  two  tank  battalions  of 
reinforcements  he  had  received  so  far. 
These  forces  were  actually  enough,  in 
view  of  Army  Groujj  North's  straitened 
circumstances,  to  alter  the  balance  in 
the  Soviet  favor,  but  thqr  were  not 
likely  to  prtj^uce  swift  or  devastating 
effects.'* 

B*iElt*s  armor  had  made  good  prog- 
ress in  the  first  three  days  of  the 
offensive.  Tlie  ground  was  frozen  hard 
and  dusted  with  light,  dry  snow.  The 
Germans  had  painted  their  tanks, 
trucks,  and  guns  white  to  blend  with 
the  landscape.  Shortening  days,  low- 
hanging  clouds,  and  snow  flurries  re- 
stiicted  air  support,  and  temperatures 
ten  to  twenty  degrees  bdow  freezing 
were  new  to  troops  so  far  accustomecl 
to  campaigning  in  warmer  seasons.  On 
the  Mher  Itand,  armor  emdd  move 
across  countiy  as  if  it  were  on  paved 
roads.  The  fall  mud  and  the  summers 
dust  and  mosquitoes  were  gone.  The 
scenery  was  also  improved.  The  Be- 
lorussian  forests  and  swamps  had  given 
!9mcf  to  the  Moscow  upland  dotted  with 
prosperous-looking  v  illages  dean  un- 
der tiie  new-fallen  snow. 

This,  the  Germans  were  uneasily 
aware,  was  not  the  real  Russian  winter. 
Fighting  then  would  be  altogether  dif- 
ferent. Third  Panzer  Group  had  al- 
ready told  the  OKH  that  while  infantry 
could  be  made  mobile  in  the  coldest 
weather  and  the  deepest  snow,  tanks 
and  trucks  did  not  respond  like  men 
and  could  not  be  ordered  to  master 
difficulties  they  were  not  built  to  meet. 
But  meteorological  statistics  from  as 
far  back  as  the  nineteenth  century  gave 

'■'Mei  (.-tikov.  .SfTi'iftg  llie  People,  pp.  137-70;  A'AJt^ 

vol,  IV.  p,  ijs;  J^.  Titgebuabat^tii^tme^,  pp. 
392  94. 


no  reason  to  expect  heavy  snow  and 
extreme  low  taupetattU!^  tllid- 
December,^" 

For  the  moment  the  weather  was  the 
least  of  the  troubles  that  faced  Army 
Group  Center  on  the  18th.  In  three 
days  of  fighting,  Fourth  Army  just 
barely  had  repulsed  the  Serpukhov 
"counterblow."  When  a  second  coun- 
terblow, in  which  some  Siberian  troops 
well  filled  out  for  winter  fighting,  came 
at  the  sasae  spot  on  the  18th,  Kluge 
talked  abotat  pulling  back  ten  to  fifteen 
miles  to  cover  on  the  Protva  River. 
Since  some  of  his  regiments  were  re- 
duced to  four  of  five  hundred  men  and 


'-"Fz.  AOK  .?,  la  ,\r.  ='2IIH2.  (.efirhtsherukt  Russknd 
1^1-11-12.  29.4.42.       AOK  '^  21818/2  filf;  Fi.AQKJ, 

KhinjUi\rhe  Verhai'lliiis.',!'  an  ilvr  nhereii 
Winter.  27.10.41,  Pz,  AOK  i  30839/5  ae. 


commanded  by  first  lieutenants,  his 
right  flank,  he  said,  was  unlikely  to  be 
able  to  complete  the  sdiiihern  sweep  of 
the  Moscow  encirclement. 

Bock  and  Haider  exchanged  opin- 
ions late  on  the  18th  on  "what  pros- 
pects the  whole  operation  still  had." 
They  concluded  that  both  sides  were 
close  to  the  end  of  their  strengths,  and 
the  victory  would  go  to  the  one  who 
had  the  most  will.^'  Two  days  later, 
determined  to  be  the  one  to  commit  his 
last  regiment,  Bock,  using  his  special 
train  as  a  command  post,  moved  out  to 
the  army  group  left  flank  behind  Third 
ahd  Fourth  Panzer  Groups.  From 
there,  he  revised  the  plan  again,  ordei- 
\xxg  Fourth  Pamer  Group  to  bear  east, 
ei  &a,  and  to  ^td  weight  on 

**&amr&m%  vol.  III.  p.  294. 


TO  MOSCOW 


53 


Fourth  Army%  left  flank.  He  told  Third 

Panzer  Gnnt]}  to  take  Klin  and  dip 
suudieasi  along  the  road  and  the  KJin- 
Moaicow  railroad  toward  Solnech- 
nogorsk,  Rui  when  Third  Panzer 
Group  look  Klin  on  the  23d,  Bock 
dianged  his  mind  agani.  Sburth  Panzer 
Grou[>s  icCt  Hank  units  were  already  in 
Solnecliiiogorsk,  and  Bock  responded 
to  a  proposal  from  Reinhardt  to  turn 
his  Thirfl  Pan/cr  Group  southeast  to- 
ward Mosntw  anyway  with  an  order  to 
cov^Fimrili  I'anzer  CSroup's  flank  but 
also  to.  push  due  east  "as  far  as 
pqMible."^ 

After  tl)e  23d.  as  Third  Panzer 
Group  headed  easi  awav  from  Klin,  the 
blitzkrieg  worked  surprisingly  well. 
The  Rusaam  retreated  steadily  and, 
for  once,  did  not  set  fire  to  their  vil- 
lages as  they  Icit.  whicli  the  group's 
intelligence  officers  took  to  meaa 
ther  that  they  vvere  becoming  demor- 
alized or,  though  I  hat  seemed  much 
less  likely,  thai  iliey  expected  t0 
tmn.-''  The  lead  division,  7th  Panzer, 
picked  up  a  deserter,  an  NKVD  lieu- 
tenant, who  said  ttoe'  Russians  were 
evacuating  the  area  west  of  the  Mos- 
cow-Volga Ganal  and  were  readying 
tti^ssSA  tr(jops  oil  the  panzer  group's 
open  flank  on  the  north  for  an  attack 
toward  Klin,  lalk  among  the  Soviet 
oflicei  s.  l  ie  said,  WW  that  "Klin  will  be  a 
kiin  [in  Russian,  a  wedge]  against  the 
Germans."  Ihe  interrogation  report 
did  not  find  its  way  to  panzer  group 
headquarters  until  the  second  week  of 
December.^** 

On  27  November^  7th  Vamer  Divi- 


-'■'l-z.  AOK  !.  In.-uj.  raOi^ijmm^JifkfiMm:^, 

pz.  AOK  3  mm2  hie. 

Gr.  3.  Ic,  M^eOmaHt  S6MMi      AOK  4 
169)1/36  file. 


sion  readied  the  Mostm^^Votga  Oaml. 
The  next  morning,  assuming  its  mis- 
sion would  sdll  be  to  push  east.  Third 
Panzer  Group  took  a  bridgeh«id  on 

the  east  bank  <if  the  cana!  at  Yakhroma. 
During  the  day,  t'om  th  Panzer  Group's 
spearhead,  2d  Panzer  Division,  came 
almost  to  a  standstill  tw  enty  miles  to  t  he 
south,  west  of  Krasnaya  I*olyana,  and 
twelve  miles  north  of  Moscow.  Eche- 
loned in  a  fifteen-mile  line  on  the  2d 
Panzer  Division  right.  General  Hoep- 
ner,  commander  of  Fourth  Panzer 
Grotip,  had  lllh  Panzer  Division.  .5th 
Panzer  Division.  10th  Panzer  Division, 
and  the  .SS  "Das  Reich"  Division  aH 
aimed  towai  d  Moscow  but  barely  mov- 
ing as  thev  crinithed  head-on  uito  the 
minefields  and  fiercely  defended 
earthworks  ringing  the  city.  Kluge's 
FourUi  Army  lelt  flank  was  inching 
ahead,  but  not  enough  to  keep 
Hocpner's  forces  from  having  to 
stretch  to  inainlain  contact.  Second 
Panzer  Army  had  driven  in  a  large 
bulge  south  of  Tula,  but  Soviet  Fiftieth 
Army  held  on  grimly  around  the  city, 
and  a  raid  by  one  of  Second  Panzer 
Army's  divisions  north  to  Kashira  was 
dra^ving  a  s\varm  ot  So\iet  ca\  alr\  and 
tanks  down  on  the  17lh  Panzer  Divi- 
sion. On  the  night  of  tlie  2Sth,  Bock, 
wiiiie  ciiangiug  the  plan  again,  at  least 
symbolically,  committed  his  "last  reg- 
iment." Giving  Third  Panzer  Group 
the  Lehrbrigade  900  (actually  one  bat- 
talion), tlie  only  reserve  he  had,  he 
ordered  Reinhardt  to  forget  about  the 
Yakhroma  bridgehead,  turn  south 
along  the  west  bank  of  the  canal,  and 
join  Hoepner's  push  toward  Moscow."^'' 
Meanwhile,  during  the  past  week, 
Axmy  Group  Smith  had  tpidti^iis 

"Pz,  AOK  J.  /"  .V,  72()M2.  (;,y,.rA6*mDiM  Rmsland 


54 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


some  decidedly  unpleasant  cxpei  iences 
at  Rdstm.  Tlie  SS  division  "Leibsran- 
daite  AdoU  Hitler"  had  taken  the  city 
Olt  ihe  21st.  This  was  a  notable  but 
dangerous  feat.  In  and  around  Rc)Sto\, 
III  Panzer  Corps  came  under  attack 
from  the  south  across  the  fro2e!it' Bon 
River  and  from  the  north  over  the 
open  steppe,  and  on  its  left,  elements 
of  three  Soviet  armies  battered  away  s(t 
XIV  Panzer  Cory^s.  Kleisi.  die  First 
Panzer  Army  commandei\  had  begun 
to  realize  several  days  earlier  that  this 
onslaught  was  more  than  he  had  antici- 
pated, and  on  22  November,  he  or- 
dered III  Panzer  Corps  to  evacuate 
Rostov  and  to  go  behind  the  Mius 
River.'*  He  had  to  cancel  this  order  a 
day  later,  however,  after  Field  Marshal 
Rundstedt,  commander  of  Army 
Group  South,  told  him  that  he  person- 
ally approved  of  the  evacuation,  but 
Field  Marshal  Brauchitsch,  com- 
mander in  chief  of  the  army,  had  de- 
manded diat  tlie  city  be  held  because 
giviijg  it  up  would  have  military  and 
*Kir  reaching  political  consequences."*' 
The  timing  was  indeed  inopportune 
since  Hider  was  preparing  to  stage  a 
publicity  spectacle  for  the  renewal  of 
the  1936  Anti-Comintern  Pact,  the  cor- 
nerstone of  the  Rome- Berlin-Tokyo 

With  Rostov  lost.  Leningrad  isolated, 
and  Moscow  in  imminent  danger,  the 
Soviet  strategic  posirion  looked  worsig 
than  ever.  Biit  Sialin  apparendy  be- 
lieved as  strongly  as  Bock  and  Hitler 
did  tliaf  the  contest  was  one  of 
willpower,  and  on  22  Novembei',  the 
Stavka  told  Tioaoshenko  th^t  the  loss  of 


■"Pi.  AOK  1.  !,j  AV,  ^iio.sNi.  Pi.  AmtebefM  Nr.  31, 
22.1L41.  Pz.  AOK  1  ]91'.)4/5  lile. 

"H.  Gr.  Sued.  !a  \>-  hlh  h-H.  nn  OB  jferJ.  P%.  Atpm, 
23MA1.  P?;.  AOK  1  19194/5  hie. 


Rostov  did  not  abrogate  the  counterat- 
tack against  First  Panzer  Army.  A  di- 
rective issued  two  days  later  gave 
Cherevichenkos  Smith  Front  the  mission 
of  destroying  First  Panzer  Army  and 
retaking  the  Taganrog-Rostov  area. 
However,  (  lie  rc\  ichenko,  apparently 
aware  In  then  that  he  could  not  out- 
fight the  whole  panzer  arniv,  chose  a 
satnaller  but  more  promising  Approach 
and  in  three  days  shifted  the  vveiglii  of 
his  forces  from  the  north  front  to  the 
line  at  Rostov.*® 

Tension,  no  doubt  already  enormous 
for  the  Russians,  was  also  gripping  the 
Germans  in  late  November.  Brau- 
chitsch,  not  yet  recovered  from  a  heart 
attack  earlier  in  the  month,  became 
more  and  more  querulous,  impatient 
for  successes  to  smooth  his  interviews 
with  Hitler,  Bock  developed  the  "Rus- 
sian disease,"  diarrhea.  Rundstedt 
lapsed  into  haughty  silence,  letting  his 
Chief  of  Staff,  General  Sodenstern, 
talk  to  the  OKH.  Hider  circulated  be- 
tween the  VAlfsschanze  and  Berlin  on 
business  of  state  that  had  some 
oniiiious  undertones.  On  21  Novem- 
ber, he  was  ia  Berlin  for  the  funeral  of 
Generaloberst  fTrnst  Udet,  tJie  l.i0r 
waffe^  chief  of  aircraft  development, 
whose  death,  actually  a  suidde,  wa& 
"being  attributed  to  am  airplane  acci- 
dent. On  the  25th,  Hitler  was  back  in 
Berlin  to  sign  the  Auti-Comintern  Pact 
Slid  to  welcome  m&  mew  msH  reluctant 
members,  Finland  and  Denmark.  He 
spent  the  next  two  days  in  ceremonies 
and  festivities  associated  with  the  sign- 
ing, and  on  the  28th,  he  attended  an- 
other funeral,  that  of  Germany's  top  air 
a^,  Colonel  Werner  Moelders,  who 
h^d  been  Idllied  ia  an  airplane  erasfe* 


^m'MV.  vol.  IV,  pp.  m-n  jvuvss.  vol.  ii,  p.  223. 


TO  MOSCOW 


55 


Hitler  devoted  the  rest,  of  tlVe  to 
talks  with  vidting  diplomats. 

RitmA  from  Rostov 

At  his  return  to  the  Vklfssckmat, 

carlv  on  29  November,  Hitler  found 
awaiting  him  the  rarest  kind  of  news 
thm  far  in  the  i*mr:  Gewnan  troops 
wctc  lei  icai  int;  Rv  the  28ili.  f;hf- 
re\  iclieiiko  had  brouglii  up  twenty-one 
Soviet  drvisiohs  against  III  ^mer 
Corps  at  Rostov.  Tlu-  ( orps  com- 
mander. General  der  Kavallerie  Eber- 
hard  van  Madce&s^^  reported 
sev  eral  weeks  earltelj  beifei*^  the  last 
advance  began,  that  itia  two  divisions, 
the  %gilstafidafc&''  aiid  ^c<  IBth  Vsa- 
zer,l^iRWDTn  out.  short  on  everything 
flrofil  socks  to  antifreeze,  and  do^vn  to  a 
half  to  two-thirds  their  normal 
strengiiis.  During  the  flay  on  the  28th, 
as  he  expected  to  have  to  do,  Kleist 
ordered  Mackensen  to  give  up  Ros- 
tov.^^  When  Hitler  arrived  at  the  HW/i- 
schatize.  Ill  Panzer  Corps  had  evac- 
uated Rosto*^,  m&  fhit  ^vantage  in 
position  aiifi  nnmbers  was  still  heavily 
on  the  Soviet  side. 

On  I  he  morning  of  the  30th,  as  he 
iiad  tried  to  do  a  week  earlier,  Kleist 
ordered  ins  whole  right  Hank,  includ- 
ing III  Panzer  Corps,  to  go  behind  the 
Mius  River  lortv-five  miles  west  of  Ros- 
tov.^" Tactically  Kleist  was  making  the 
righi  move.  He  had  nothing  to  gain 
militarilv  fiom  a  prolonged  stant!  in 
the  open,  and  the  short  but  relatively 
sixalglit  Mttia  G^^ed  a  §dad  waiter 


-"in  AK.  Stkbumt-Brurtalung  der  Uigt:  29.ia.-4l.  Pi. 
AOK  1  ,58682  file:  Pt.  AOK  I.  la  AV.  511'mi.  Pt. 
MmeebeffhlNr.  5.V,  2.v.//.'>i,  Pa,  AOK  J  19194/3  lik. 

■^•"Px.  AOK  I.  /';.  Anm^mm  JWf,«.  fei 
AOK.  ]  19t94y5  file. 


line.  On  the  other  hand,  a  forty-five- 
mile  German  retreat  in  a  strategically 
important  sector  at  this  stage  was 
bound  to  have  the  psychologic^  effect 
of  a  .Soviet  virtorx'.  Nftbftdv  ctnild  be 
more  sensidve  to  such  an  inipUcation 
than  Hitl^i  In  ati  afternoon  inierview^ 
with  Btauchitsch  on  the  30th.  Hitler, 
using  "accusations  and  invective," 
hmm)&SLt  Bmuchitsch  into  trying  to  get 
Rundstcdt  to  delav  executing  Kleists 
order.  When  Rundstedt  refused  and 
o^ered  his  resignation,  Hitler  dis- 
missed him  early  the  next  day  and 
named  Field  Marshal  Reichenau  to 
succeed  him  at  Army  Group  South. 
After  insisting  through  the  day  that  he 
could  bold  a  line  somewhere  ea.si  of  die 
fi^er^  Eeiidienati  finally  had  to  give  in  at 
dark  and  lei  ihe  withdrawal  to  the  Mius 
be  completed  that  night.  "  (Map  -4.) 

Before  daylight  on  the  morning  of  2 
Deceml>er,  Hider  left  East  Prussia  by 
air  for  Kleist's  headquarters  in  Ma- 
riupol on  the  Black  Sea.  He  Stopped  at 
Poltava  later  in  the  morning  to  pick  up 
Reichenau  and  change  from  his  com- 
fortable vulnerable  fsur-engtne 
"Condor"  transport  lo  a  fasterithd  bet- 
ter defended  Heinkel  1 )  I  bomber.  T  he 
weather  was  unusually  cold  for  De- 
cember in  the  Ukraine,  and  from  Ma- 
riupol cast  a  ftve-mile-wide.  ioot-iliick 
band  irfice  already  fringed  tlie  (iulf  of 
Taganrog.  At  Mariupol,  Hiik-r  and 
Reichenau,  as  Kleist  obliquely  put  it, 
"visited"  with  Kleist  and  the  command- 
ing general  of  the  "Letbstandarte."  SS 
Obergruppenfuehrer  [osef  Dietrich. 
The  visit  was  far  li  otn  njutine,  if  only 
because  Hiiler  seldom  traveled  so  near 
to  die  tiont  as  an  army  headquarters. 
It  was  also  npt  pleasant  for  the  j^rtici- 


^Halikr  Diary,  pp.  317-22. 


A£AP4 


TO  MOSCOW 


57 


pants  and  was  generally  pointless  smce 
there  was  nothing  more  to  be  decid^. 
Hitler  apparently  wanted  an  assurance 
From  Dietricli.  one  of  his  oldest  party 
cronies  and  former  bodygtiard,  that 
Rostov  could  not  have  been  hekl  and 
assurances  frtjm  all  three  generals  that 
theMius  line  would  be.  After  rcccivintr 
those,  Hider  switclied  to  lalk  aboiit 
restarting  the  offensive  in  the  new  yea  i , 
promising  KJeist  everything  from  tanks 
self-propelled  assault  guns  to  para- 
chute troops  and  fresh  divisions. 

At  the  Woifsschanze,  when  ht-  n - 
tumeii  early  on  4  December,  alter  an 
<  t\  ct  night  stop  in  Poltava  caused  by  bad 
dying  weather,  Hider  found  a  predit- 
^  mMSfther  Rostov  awaidng  him. 
fieM  Mtishal  Leeb,  commander  of 
Mmf  Oemp  North,  believed  the  Riis- 
mm  W&e€  beginning  to  see  a  chance 
notqjaly  ta  retakt  Tlkhvin  but  to  liber- 
al*! Ijemiigrad,  which  would  constitute 
a  substantial  polidcal  and  militar>  suc- 
cess for  diem.  A  German  push  noi  ih 
out  of  the  TUdivin  salient  toward  Lake 
Ladoga  had  been  stopped  on  I  De- 
cember at  Volkho\,  tliirt\-five  miles 
souUi  of  die  lake.  (Map  5.)  If  die  Rus- 
siaas  retook  iiKhvin  and  opened  the 
railroad  to  Volkhov,  they  could  readily 
sluice  the  teii^fprceinents  they  were 
bringing  up  northwest  fiar  an  attack  on 
ihe  Leningrad  bottleneck.  {German  air 
reconnaissance  had  reported  rweIlt^- 
nine  trattiiS  headed  ivest  on  the  Vologda- 
Tikhvin  line  on  2  Deccmbei. )  What  con- 
cerned Leeb  most  was  less  his  own  situa- 
tion than  that  of  Artny  Group  Center. 
As  he  saw  it,  if  a  stir.ng  thr  eai  to  Moscow 
could  not  be  maintained,  the  enemv 
would  sutiely  be  able  to  release  enough 


^Vj.  aok  J.  In  Nt.  1294141.  tm  ilie^t{mm.Kemmm- 

dietenden  Grnerale.  3.12AI.  P/..  .AOK  1  1^94^  tS,t> 


j^Fgf^te  go  after  Tikhvin  and 

"Some&mg  Does  Not  Add  Up" 

Although  it  was  not  exacdy  the 
brightest  of  days  for  Army  Gi  olij}  Cen- 
ter, 27  November  w^s  one  of  acute 
crisis  in  the  Soviet  Moscow  defense. 
Nortli  of  tlie  capital,  the  advances  <rf 
Ihird  Panzer  and  Fourth  Panzer 
Groups  past  Klin  atfd  Solnechnogorsk 
liad  opened  a  iwentv-sevt-n-mile-wide 
gap  between  Diiiiitrov,  on  die  Moscow- 
Volga  Canal,  and  Krasnaya  Polyana, 
twelve  miles  north  of  Moscow.  General 
Mayor  D.  D.  Lelyushenko,  who  had 
taken  commmdiX ThftHitk  Arm^  on  18 
November,  had  brouglii  the  army  back 
under  control  but  had  not  done  so  in 
dme  to  prevent  lite  being  pushed  iam  a: 
corner  in  the  angle  of  the  Volga  Rn«r 
and  the  Moscow-Volga  Canal.  There, 
for  the  moment,  Thirtieth  Amy  could 
ffo  nothing  to  block  German  progress 
to  the  east  and  south.^*  SixtemA  An^ 
under  General  Leytenant  Kdnstandn 
Rokossovskiy,  had,  since  thr  front  had 
broken  open  between  Klin  and  Soi- 
nechnoforsife,  been  having  to  strotch  its 
flank  east  to  cover  Moscow  and  to  take 
the  whole  shock  of  the  enemy^  sweep 
toward  &e  dty.  lim  V7ib  Tsmzet  Divr- 
sion's  thrust  toward  Ka.shira  was  bct^in- 
ning  to  Ibrm  a  deep  pocket  around 
1  ilia  and  was  putting  a  Smynd  IPmmr 
Armv  spearhead  ^vithin  sixty-five  miles 
of  Mos(  ow  on  the  south. 

Thirtit'th  Army'^  debase  imct  paid  OOe 
dividend.  It  had  given  the  Stiwka  early 


W  6r  Nprd,  l& Knegstag/diuik.  t-3  JQcc  41,  H.  Gt. 
401^0.1.  0       —3  15  . 

'■•D.  D.  Lelyuslifiiko.  Mnskj'u-Slalingrad-Berlin- 
Praga  (Moscow:  Izdatelstvo  "Nauka."  1970),  p.  73. 


MAPS 


TO  MOSCOW 


59 


Soviet  Gunners  Man  a  Machine  Gun  West  of  Moscaw 


warning  of  the  trouble  to  come,  and  so 
when  the  crisis  arrived,  means  wete 
being  assembled  to  meet  it.  Unlike 
Bock,  Stalin  was  apparently  not  pre" 
pared  to  venture  His  last  regiment  in 
the  battle  for  Moscow,  but  he  also  had 
enough  resources  to  stay  in  the  fight 
for  one  more  round.  In  late  November, 
he  gave  West  Front  9  rifle  divisions,  2 
cavalry  divisions,  8  rifle  brigades,  6 
tank  brigades,  and  10  independent 
tank  battedions.'®  Of  ^^ms^,  S  lafle  divi- 


•'"'Marshal  V.  D.  Siikolovskiv  pint-,  tlic  stiriigihs  of 
tank  brigades  al  lhal  linu"  at  1  baltaliun  ot  tourlccn 
medium  tanks,  1  baunlion  ol  light  tanks,  and  I 
tnotori/.cd  rifle  batiaJion.  He  placts  the  iii(icpendent 
tank  battaliotis  at  I  1  T-34s  and  ;l  KVs.  l-'igitres  f'or 
individual  tank  biigades  iriveii  in  Knipchenfco,  Titn- 
kinr^e  vimka,  pp.  38-44,  indicate  sl:rengthsof  thii1\  to 
sixti  tanks.  Sec  \'.  D.  Sokolmskiy,  "Die  sowjetiscke 
Ki  ii^slnin\l  i/i  ilrr  Sihliichl  vor  Moskau,"  Wehr- 
Wusensclmjiliche  Rundichtm,  1(1963),  pt.  2,  87. 


sions  went  to  Thirtieth  Army;  a  rifle 
division,  tlie  2  cavalry  divisions  formed 
into  the  /  Guards  Cax'ahy  Corps  under 
General  Mayor  P.  A.  Belov,  and  a  por- 
tion of  the  armor  went  to  the  Kasiitm 
area;  and  the  rest  went  to  Sixteenth, 
Fifth,  and  F^tieth  Armies  and  the  fmnt 
reserve.** 

Additionally,  as  the  German.s  were 
passing  Klin,  Stalin  and  the  Stavka  had 
begun  setting  up  two  reserve  armies  to 
cover  the  gap  that  would  be  developing 
farther  east.  On  23  November,  General 
Kuznetsov  took  command  of  one  of 
thcse,First  Shock  A)  jn\.  on  the  line  of  the 
Moscow-Volga  Canal  south  of  Di- 
mitrov.  The  shock  armies  were  con- 


^"V.  N .  Yevstigneyev.  ed.,  Vetikaya  bitva  pod  Mpskeoy 
(Moscow :  Voyentioye  IzdatelstVO.  JS61)„  178; 
Zhukov,  Memoirs,  p.  340, 


60 


MOSCOW  TO  SIALINGRAD 


ceived  of  as  being  particularly  heavy  in 

armor,  motorization,  artillery,  and  au- 
tomatic weapons,  but  Firsi  Shock  (and 
die  others  of  this  category  cr^^  dui^ 
ing  the  winttM  of  1941-1942)  was  not  so 
well  equipped.  VVlien  Kuznetsov  ar- 
rived in  Dimitrov  on  the  23d,  his  Gom<* 
ntand  consisted  of  a  rifle  brigade.  By 
the  end  of  the  mondi  he  had  1  rifle 
dMsaon,  9  rifle  br^ades,  10  sepiarate 
battalions,  a  regiment  of  artillery,  and  a 
contingent  of  rocket  launchers.  About 
70  percent  of  the  troops  wAfne  met 
thirty  years  old.^''^ 

The  second  of  the  two  new  reserve 
ai^es,  Tiventielh  Army,  was  tinilt  in 
what,  by  27  No\  cmijc!,  had  become  the 
most  criucal  spot  on  the  entire  front, 
the  sector  between  the  right  flank  of 
Sixteenth  Army  and  the  Moscow- Volga 
Canal.  Tliis  area  included  the  rauch- 
foughtover  village  of  Krasnaya  Pol- 
vana.  Because  of  the  subsequent  be- 
havior oi  its  commander,  General 
Leylenant  Andrei  Vlasov,  the  Soviet 
histories  are  reticent  in  dealing  with 
Twentieth  Army\  role  al  Moscow.^**  In 
late  1941,  however,  VlasoV  was  re- 
garded in  I  he  Soviet  .'\rm\  as  one  of 
tlie  most  brilliant  y<JLniger  Soviet  gen- 
eral. He  had  commanded  "flie  thirty- 
sn'eyith  Arms,  which  had  been  destroved 
in  the  Kiev  j>()ckei,  but  he  and  some  ot 
his  staff  liad  escaped.  Like  Kuznetsov, 
Vlasov  intliallv  had  jusi  odds  and  ciuls: 
he  said  later,  a  Siberian  brigade,  some 
ten  thousand  criminal  prisoners,  and 
fifteen  tanks.^*  No  <lonbt.  Twenlieth 
Army,  which  was  also  in  [)osition  to  lake 
over  seitae'0£®c«f Amiy'^  right  flank 
elements,  was  quickly  brought  up  to  a 


»»See  pL  S.itt. 

**Sven  Stct-nlitrg.  Vkiwv  (New  York:  Alfred  A. 
KnopfJ970),  pp.  16-19. 


Strength  at  ti^St  equal  to  that  of  fit^ 
Shock. 

In  the  last  week  of  November,  the 
Sketfka  also  began  bringing  five  oi"  lihe 
newly  formed  reserve  armies  forward 
from  the  line  of  the  Volga  River. 
Thmt — ^Bsef^fmsrA,  T^Mfify^skUk^  and 
Sixtieth  Armies — were  stationed  esM  of 
Moscow,  and  one,  Sixty-first  An^  be- 
hind Southwest  Fkffa^  right  flanks  The 
other.  Tenth  Army,  was  deploved  ^vest  of 
tlie  Oka  River,  downstream  Irom  Ka- 
shira in  position  to  block  Second  Pan- 
zer Army  thrusts  toward  Kolofunaand 
Ryazan,^" 

Tenth  Army,  under  General  Leytenant 
F.  I.  Oolikov,  was  very  likely  typical  of 
the  ten  reserve  armies.  Its  main  lorces 
were  seven  reserve  rifle  divisions  re- 
cruited in  the  Moscow  region.  1 1  had 
approximately  one  hundrefl  thoiisiurd 
troops.  After  receiving  its  marching 
orders  on  24  November,  T'lith  Army 
bad  to  negotiate  die  more  than  tiiree 
hundred  inil^  from  its  original  station 
at  Syzran  on  the  Volga  by  rail  and  on 
foot,  since  it  had  almost  no  motor 
vehides.*' 

Dining  the  day  on  29  November, 
Third  and  Fourth  Panzer  (iroups 
made  contact  with  elements  of  Fiarst 
Shock  antl  Twentieth  .\y»iies  at  Yakhroma 
and  west  of  Krasnaya  Polyana.  Late  in 
the  day,  after  ZblitCdv  had  assured  him 
that  the  Germans  would  not  conmiit 
any  new  large  forces  in  the  tiear  future, 
Stalin  turned  o\  er  First  Shock,  Tivmtietk, 
ancl  Tenth  Armies  to  Zhuko\  s  control  for 
a  counierallack.^-  During  the  day,  also, 


*WOVSS,  v«a.11vpt2?I:  lVi4V.  vol.  W.v.  m  Se* 

p.  42. 

ZakhiUdv,  hmiat,  [>p.  S.'^e-aS.  See  also  F.  1.  Gali- 
kov,  "Hf^ni'niivi  iinmvi  gnUn'tta^  It  lasitdtite  sloliUy," 
\i>yeiuw-i\li'if/h  \ki^  Jiunuil,  ri(  I966)j  65— 76* 
■"^Zhukov,  Mmioirs,  p.  348. 


TO  MOSCOW 


61 


Third  Panzer  Group  made  its  turn 

south,  and  Fourth  Panzer  Group  i  egia- 
tered  a  small  gain.  Talking  to  Haldei; 
Bock  said  he  was  afraid  that  if  tile 
attack  from  the  mx  ih  did  noi  suiieed 
ihe  battif  woultl  soon  degenerate  into  9 
"soulless  frontal  confrtrfit^iia*  sindlar 
to  die  World  War  I  Battle  of  Verdun.  '  ' 
On  the  night  of  die  30th,  while  his 
one  colleague,  Leeb,  worried  abbtit 
what  mi<j;ht  happen  at  Leningi  ad  om  c 
the  pressure  was  off  Moscow  and  the 
other,  Rundstedt,  was  a  few  hours  away 
from  disiTiissal  over  the  Rostov  affair. 
Bock,  musing  about  his  own  situation, 
concluded  that  "something  d<)es  not 
add  up."  During  the  dav,  while  the 
panzer  groups  were  again  reporung 
very  smsill  faifls,  Colonel  Adolf 
Heusinger,  the  operadons  branch  chief 
ill  the  OKH,  had  been  on  the  tele- 
phone to  Bock  talking  as  if  encirdi^ 
Moscow  were  only  a  preliminary  to 
thrusts  toward  Voronezh  and  Yaroslavl. 
When  Bock  later  called  Brauchitsch  to 
tell  him  that  Arm)  Group  Center  did 
not  have  enough  strength  to  encircle  at 
Moscow  much  less  to  do  anything 
more,  he  had  to  ask  se\'eral  times 
whether  Brauchitsch  was  still  li.stening. 
Early  the  next  morning,  wondering 
whether  Brauchitsch  had  listened, 
Bock  repeated  by  teletvpe  what  he  had 
said  the  day  before,  adding  that  the 
belief  in  an  impending  Soviet  collapse 
had  been  proved   a  phantasy."**  His 
troops,  he  said,  were  exhausted,  and 
the  offensive  had  therewith  lost  "all 
sense  and  purpose."  The  army  group, 
he  concluded,  was  shordy  gomgl^  be 
at  a  standstill  "before  the  gates  of 


'"Ha/eliT  Dimy.  vol.  Ill,  p 

■"Geiici,Tll>l(lni;irM.li.ill  Irdoi  voii  Buck, 
Kni-gstiigrhuih,  (hu-ii  I.  :!()  N.n  u,  CMH  (iles  MS  # 
P-aiO  (hcrealter  ciied  as.  Bock  Diary,  Osten  J). 


Moscow,"  and  it  was  unie  to  decide 
what  to  do  then^ 

In  the  morning  on  30  November, 
Zhukov  submitted  to  the  Slavkei  a  Wfe/ 
I'mit  plan  for  a  counterofferisive  north 
and  south  of  Moscow.  The  idea,  of 
course,  was  not  new.  As  Zhuk<»\  lias  put 
ii.  "Tlie  counter-offensive  had  been 
]>repared  all  through  the  defense  ac- 
tions. .  .  The  continuing  Soviet 
strategy,  since  June,  had  been  "let  the 
enemy  wear  himself  down,  bring  him 
to  a  stop,  and  create  the  conditions  for 
a  subsequent  shift  to  the  counterat- 
tack."*' Counteroffensives  had  been 
launt  bed  on  the  frontiers  in  June  and 
on  the  Dnepr-Dvina  line  in  Julv,  anrl 
the  Stavka  and  the  General  Stafl  had 
considei  ed  others  throughout  the  cam- 
paign, most  recendy,  when  the  Ger- 
mans had  been  stopped  on  the  Moscow 
approat  hes  in  early  November." 

However,  neither  the  plan  Zhukov 
sent  in  on  the  30th— in  response  to 
earlier  instructions  from  the  General 
Staff — nor  the  circumstances  under 
which  the  plan  was  expected  to  be 
executed  actually  conformed  to  pre- 
vious thinking,  which  had  envisioned  a 
counterofferisive  against  an  enemy 
who  had  been  stopped.  Tlie  plan  was 
conceived  as  a  near-tp-last  mo\e  in  a 
batde^iat  was  Mkely  to  ttirn  against  the 
Russians.  Zhukov  says  lie  told  Stalinon 
the  nkht  of  the  29di  diat  the  Germans 
were'Tbled  white'  and  gives  the  essence 
of  the  plan  as  ha\  ing  been  to  strike  past 
Klin  and  Soluechnogorsk  si^ty  miles  to 
Teryaeva  Sloboda  md  Voideoiamsk  in 

'"Zlink()\,  :\lmu)irs,  p.  347. 

"'Sok<tl(>\  skiy,  -Die  sinvjetistki^jeri^aimi,'  p.  76. 

"^VasilevslUy.£»*ii,  p.  m. 


62 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


the  north  and  up  to  the  same  distance 

past  Stalinogorsk  to  the  Upa  River  in 
the  south."*^  On  die  other  hand,  Gen- 
eral'^^siief  sidy,  acting  chief  of  die  Gw*- 
eral  Staff,  in  briefing  the  Kalinin  Fn/nl 
comiiiandei,  Konev,  who  would  liave 
two  ofhts  armies  induced  in  the  coun- 
teraitack.  said:  **\Ve  can  f>nlv  halt  the 
German  attack  toward  Moscow  and 
thereby  ...  lay  the  groundwork  for 
bci^inning  to  inflict  a  seritms  defeat  on 
the  enem^  by  active  operations  with  a 
dedsive^mm.  f  f  we  do  not  do  that  in  the 
next  few  davs.  it  w  ill  he  too  late."^''  The 
order  for  the  counterattack  Kuznetsov, 
the  Firsi  SAdfft  Am;^  commander,  re- 
ceiv  ed  on  the  morning  of  2  December 
was  to  have  the  Zakharov  croup  attack 
tamfA  BedneV^O  and  Fedorovka  and 
"in  the  longer  run"  strike  toward 
Klin."'"  Dednevo  and  Fedorovka  were 
villages  direcUy  opposite  the  army's  left 
flank,  and  the  Zakharov  gt  fuip.  jjarts  of 
three  divisions  and  a  tank  brigade  tm- 
der  G^f^  Mayor  F.  D,  Zakharw,  ted 
been  fihe  rear  giKird  at  Klin  and  were 
^nned  down  west  ot  the  Moscow- 
Volga  Canal  by  Third  PaoSaer  CSfOlif^i 
spearhead.-'' 

Zhukov's  chiei  of  staff  at  the  time. 
General  Leytenant  V.  D.  Sokolcn  skiy. 
wrote  later,  "The  main  objecti\  e  of  oiu' 
counieraiiack  was  to  break  up  the  en- 
efny%  attack  condiasively  and  give  him 
no  opportunity  to  regroup  and  dig  in 
close  lo  our  capital."'*-  ^hukov  also 
qualifies  his  statement  of  the  objectives 
by  saying  the  "initial  task'  was  to  be 
"removing  the  immediate  threat  to 


^'Zhukov.Aremns.  p.  348. 

"•Vasilcvskiv.  Dcfo,  p.  164.  See  also        p.  110. 

'■"ZMvdiw,  Pmval,  p.  283. 

''Ubid..  pp.  278-81;  Yevstignevev,  Velikaya  tntvn.  pp. 
144  -47. 

"Sokolov«luy,  "Die  soutjetisckr  Krkg^nsl,"  p.  92. 


Moscow*  and  *we  ^uld  need  more 

forces  to  assign  further-going  and 
more  categorical  missions."*'  However, 
^t^ln,  who  had  been  willing  during  the 
summer  lo  (r)mmit  reserve  armies  into 
counterattacks  as  fast  as  they  could  be 
foirmed.  was  betttg^  remarkably  par- 
simonious in  dealing  ibem  outfor  this 
counterattack,  rhe  reserve  armies  sta- 
tioned east  cdT  Moscow  we-e  ^urmarked 
to  be  used  "in  tlic  defense,  if  necessary, 
or,  if  I  hey  were  not  reqMxnSidf  in  de- 
veloping a  couiit«pofffetiave.*Bi3i  Ihe 
decisions  as  to  how  and  whert  llii^  ar- 
mies would  be  committed  were  re- 
served to  the  Stavka,  which  meant  to 
Stalin,  and  he  had  not  yet  made  up  his 
naind.** 

In  the  first  two  days  of  December,  it 

looked  as  though  Bock  might  have 
been  too  pessimisuc,  and  the  Soviet 

late.  To  the  Germans'  surprise  as  much 
as  the  Russians',  Fourth  Army's  258Ui 
Infantry  Kvision  broke  l^miglt  the 
SoWet  line  sondi  of  the  Mt^aow^licH 
lensk  highway  on  the  Isi.  Nofilieast  of 
"^fe,  tKe  Mest  dayi  Secsoi^  Panzer 
Army  began  a  liook  to  fewest  which, 
if  it  su(  t  ecdecl  in  pinching  off  the  city, 
could  Iiavc  brought  the  Foiu-th  Army 
right  Hank  into  motion.  Bock  at  Army 
Group  Center  had  reverted  lo  hghting 
what  he  assumed  to  be  the  battle  of  the 
last  regiments,  vacillating  |-)enveen  des- 
perate hope  and  gloomy  apprehen- 
fflon.  Early  on  the  Id,  he  told  Klu^^ 
Reinhardt.  anrl  TTocpner  thai  the  en- 
emy was  close  to  l)reaking.  Talking  to 
Haider  later  in  the  day.  however,  he 
said  that  owing  to  declining  strength, 
cold,  and  stiffening  lesistance,  "doubts 


"Zhukm.Memoift,  p,  MS. 

"vov,  p.  no. 


TO  MOSCOW 


63 


of  success  are  beginning  to  take  deft- 

On  tile  3d,  despite  e\'en  more  rea- 
sons for  doub»,  Bock's  deterroinaiion 
increased  slighil\.  In  the  morning, 
when  KJuge  proposed  givitig  up 
Fourth  Anny%  attack  bet^se  k  vf&am 
not  get  through  to  Moscow,  Bo(k 
opted  to  wait  two  or  tliree  days  to  see 
what  rflfedt  Hiird  I^nzer  Group  could 
have.  Bv  late  afternoon,  2r)KtIi  Inf'antrv 
Division  was  fighting  its  way  westward 
<Mit  of  an  encircleinent?  Fonitfrl'SaifiiBer- 
Group  had  reported  its  offensive 
strength  "in  the  main  exJiausted";  and 
Third  Panzer  Group  was  embroiled 
w  iih  Firs!  Sfiock  Army  at  Yakhroma.  Sec- 
ond Panzer  Army  was  still  advancing 
northeast  of  Tula  but  #ii<^ti^  w  h^ 
zard  that  was  jiiling  up  snow  all  along 
the  army  gr  oup  trout.  Bock  told  Gen- 
eral jbdl,  MMerk  operaoom  duef  in 
the  OKW,  that  although  his  troop 
strength  was  almost  at  an  end,  he 
would  stay  on  ^he  attack.  The  reason 
he  was  holding  on  "with  tooth  and 
claw,"  Bock  added,  was  because  keep- 
ing the  initialise  was  prefetabte  to 
going  o\  er  to  the  defensive  with  weak- 
ened f  orces  in  exposed  positions.*" 

During  the  previous  two  weeks  the 
weatlier  had  been  getting  colder,  with 
temperatures  ranging  between  0°  F. 
and  20°  F,  On  the  morning  of  4  De- 
cember, after  hca\  y  snowfalls  the  day 
before,  the  temperature  stood  at  —4°  F. 
In  his  diary.  Bock  observed  in  passing 
that  it  was  "icy  cold."  During  that  day. 
Fourth  Army  went  over  to  the  defen- 


■'■'■//,  Gr.  Mittt.Ja  K>ii'ir\t(iKrliiiifi.  Dfu-mber  l9-il.  1  and 
2  Dec  41,  H-  Gr.  Mine  26!)74/C)  fiU-;  liwk  Dinn.  Ostm 
I,  1  and  2  Dec  41;  Guderum.Pmiur  Leadfr.  p.  2.57. 

Or.  M^te,  la  Kru-gslagtbtuh,  De-~eml/rr  1941,  3 
Dec  41 .  H.  Gr.  MBitt  26974/6  file:  Bo$k  mm,  Oxten  1, 3 
Dec  41. 


sive,  its  front  quiet.  Fbtirth  Panzer 

Group  repelled  several  tank-led  .Soviet 
counterattacks  soutiiwest  of  Krasnaya 
Polyana  but  declared  itself  unable  to 
advance  until  Thiid  Panzer  Group 
came  fully  abreast.  Third  Pan/er 
Group,  meanwhile,  while  trving  to 
bring  three  panzer  div  isions  to  bear 
soutiiwest  ot  Yakliroma,  was  getting 
pressure  on  its  front  northwtsft  m 
Yakhroma  tVom  So\  icf  rcinforccnicnts, 
some  of  which  Reinhardt,  its  com- 
mander, believed  were  Siberian  troops. 
And  Second  Panzer  Arm\  vsas  re- 
grouping to  try  again  to  pinch  oil  lula. 
Agam  mtck  had  decided  to  stay  on  the 
offet^fe.  Mildly  disturbed  by  a  re- 
^oried  half-dozen  new  enemy  divisions 
in  the  front  northwest  of  Moscow,  all 
well  provided  with  tanks  and  rocket 
laimchers,  he  concluded  that  they  were 
probably  not  new  strength  but  units 
shitted  froni  nearby  quiet  sectors.  A 
counteroftensive,  he  stated  in  his  last 
report  of  the  day  to  the  OKH,  was 
unlikely:  the  enemy  did  not  have 
enough  forces.*^ 

Stalin,  the  Bsfmtar  SdmHfie  Sketch 
savs,  kept  in  close  cOBftilittnications  with 
Zhukov  in  the  hrst  days  of  December, 
calling  him  several  dines  a  day  to  in- 
quire about  the  progress  of  the  fight- 
ing. "In  the  complicated  situation  .  .  .  ^ 
it  was  very  important  to  time  the  shift 
from  the  defense  to  the  counteroffen- 
sive  coiTecily.  I  he  most  tavorable  mo- 
ment for  the  shift  to  the  counteroffen- 
sive  presented  itself  when  the  enemy 
was  forced  to  stop  his  attack  but  could 
imt  yet  ^oti  the  ddF^iisive  because  his 
troops  were  not  yet  properly  re- 


"H.  Gr.  Mitte.  la  Knt^lagebusk.  Doemb^  1941.  4 
Dec  41,  H.  Gr.  Mitte  26mm  file;  Sodt  Oktij,  Ostm  I, 
4  Dfx- 41. 


64 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


Crew  ok  German  s.F.H.  18,  150-mm.  Howitzer,  Blndled-Up  Aoainsi  ihe  Qjlu 


grouped,  no  reserves  had  been  cre- 
ated, sdad  the  defense  Knes  were  not 

prepared."''*  While  most  Soviet  ac- 
counts do  not  specify  a  day,  according 
to  Sokolovskiy,  the  Sedston  was  made 
u>  s  It  il  l  to  the  counterattack  on  4  De- 
cember. On  that  day,  he  says,  the  West 
Emt  troops  had  brought  Ae  enemy 
near  Mns((n\  to  a  standstill,  and  it  then 
became  "urgently  necessary"  to  go  over 
to  the  countetoifensive  "H^^tfeout  any 
pause."  Va.sik'v,ski\  savs  liie  Stavka  set 
the  date  for  the  counterattack  as  5  and 
6  Itecember 

Vasilevski)  \\  cm  to  ilic  KaM^  Front 
headquarters  on  the  night  of  lii0  4th  to 
deliver  the  directive  ir^zn  the  General 


Staff  to  start  the  counteroiiensive — 
and,  possibly,  to  make  certain  it  began 

on  ihf  .")th.  KotK'v,  claiming  he  had 
neither  the  tanks  nor  the  infantry  to 
Mtack,  had  oppesed  a  cmintetattaGk 
when  Vasilevskiy  had  talked  to  liim 
about  it  tliree  days  earlier."*"  Kalmin 
^mi^  mission  was  to  hit  Ae  German 
Ninth  Arm\  front  southeast  of  Kalinin 
with  the  'Iwmty-mnlfi  and  Thirty-Jmt  Ar- 
«jeis  and  to  b^t  sotith  and  west  *in  the 
general  direction  of  Minkulino- 
Gorodishche,"  twenty-five  miles  east  of 
Klfn  .**  Vas0evs4tiy  indicates  that  hetold 
Konc\  on  1  Dcccinbcr  to  !ia\  c  Kalmin 
Front  ready  to  start  "in  two  or  three 
diays.*'*  Tlnjoshenko,  at  Sm^mt  flma. 


"'^'OV,  p.  IIL 

■■"Solcolovskiv,  "Dif  sourjetisehe  Kntg^n^.'  p. 
Vasilevskiy,  Dei),  pp.  164-65. 


'^"\asilc\skiv,Df/(),  pp.  164-65. 
92;  \V'\sii(rnevev,  Velikov  hitva.  p.  177. 

"'^Vasilevskiy.iJs/o,  p.' 163. 


TO  MOSCOW 


65 


received  orders  on  4  Decfrmber  to 
strikt-  against  Gcrniati  Second  Aiinv 
on  Uie  6lh  witli  the  I'htrd  and  ThtrteenUi 
Amai$s  atid  to  aim  fbr  Ifefreraov  and 
past  ^lets  lowcU  rl  Li\  nv.*'^  Yefieniov 
was  just  behind  liie  t  runt  on  the  Sec- 
imd  Atmy  mait  jQaiik,  ax^  IMeXs,  £ti 
the  tiexitefj  ivis  then  still  in  Soviet 
hands. 

Vasilevskiy^  account  Indicates  that 
the  Slfifkri's  orders  lo  bi-^in  [}\v  coiui- 
lert)liensive  on  5  and  6  December  ap- 
plied to  as  well  as  Ktilinin  and 
Sitiithn't'sl  Front''. HfiA\e\'er.  Zhukov  de- 
scribes his  telephone  conversation  widi 
$taHn1atetm4I}eeeinbeFihwhich  they 
talked  about  air  and  armor  reinf()r(  t- 
ments  for  Wesl  Fronl  and  which  Stalin 
dosed  hf  mninding  Zhnkov  i&  *re- 
member"  that  Kalinin  Front  W^fl  be 
going  over  to  the  counteroffiett^ve  on 
me  5di,  wa&  Southwest  Pma  mt^lol- 
\o\\  on  the  6th.*''^ 

During  tile  night  oi  4  December,  the 
temperawfe  trapped  to  ^WB.  One 
German  regiment  on  a  night  inarch 
had  over  three  hundred  frostbite  casu- 

nen 

froze  to  death.  The  next  morning, 
tanks  would  not  start;  machine  guns 
ami  artillery  would  not  fire  because 
dieir  lubricants  anrl  tlie  oil  in  their 
recoil  mechanisms  had  congealed;  and 
all  the  armies  reported  nami&rous 
frostbite  cases.  In  the  paralyzing  morn- 
ing cold,  die  Soviet  TweiUy-ninUi  Army 
Stacked  across  the  ice<avered  Volga 
west  of  Kalinin  and  broke  into  the 
Nintli  Army  line  about  a  mile  before 
bdi^  stopped.^*  ReinharcltatiiA  Hoep- 


"■'Vcvsiigneyev',  Velikir^  hitva,  p.  177. 
"■"Vasilevskiy.  OW«.  jj.  1G6, 
"^Zhukov.Meintnn,  p.  349. 
"Yevstigneyev.  bitvtt,  p.  183;  tVWSS,  vol 

II.  p.  277. 


net  both  reported  more  fresh  Soviet 
Hoops  on  their  fronts  and  their  own 
offensive  capabilities  evaporating, 
Reinhardt's  TTiird  Panzer  Group  tried 
to  push  a  weflge  south  between  the  left 
Hank  of  Hoepncr's  Fourth  Panzer 
Group  at  Krasnaya  Polyana  and  the 
Moscow- Volga  Canal,  but  his  automatic 
weapons  did  not  work;  tlie  cold  quickly 
dramed  the  troops'  energy;  and  the 
attack  had  barely  begun  before  it  had 
to  be  called  back.  In  the  morning, 
Gtiderian  thought  Second  Panzer 
.^rmy  could  still  uike  Tula,  but  bv  eve- 
ning his  conhdence  had  faded,  and  he 
proposed  a  gradual  withdrawal  from 
the  whole  bulge  cast  of  Tula  to  the  Don 
and  Shat  rivers,  ilis  tanks,  he  com- 
plained, were  breaking  down  in  the 
cold,  while  So\  iet  tanks  kept  nmning."^ 
Zhukov's  order  to  begin  the  coun- 
teroffensive  on  6  December  went  to 
West  Front's  armies  on  the  .^th."*'  The 
Germans  later  believed  that  the  drastic 
tempefatai^  drop  on  the  night  tsf  the 
4th  had  nin(  h  lo  do  with  Zhukov's 
timing.  Eai  h  in  1*:)42,  too  late  lo  be  of 
lise\  German  intelligence  circulated  to 
the  commands  in  the  East  a  partial 
transcript  of  statements  limosiieiiko 
and  Za*Uk©V  allied ly  had  made  at  a 
Moscow  conference  in  late  November 
urging  a  counterolfensive  at  Moscow, 
llie  imotinmdoh  tivaS  d^sm  as  hav- 
ing come  from  a  very  good  soiuce. 
Timoshenko,  whose  Southwest  Front 
forces  were  at  the  time  €jf  lite  con- 
ference building  toward  victory  at  Ros- 


G?;  4,  la,  Lageheurteilung,  5J2.-II.  AOK  t 
137();l/7  Hit:  Pz.  Or.  J,  le  Mnrgenmeldung,  h.l2.4l.  \'t.. 
AOK  3  l(i9n«0  lilc:  //.  Gr.  MitU,  la  KriegMagi'lm, h . 
[),-z,-mh,;  19-f!.  5  tie.  11.  H.  Gr.  Mitte  26974/6  file; 
tiiut f  rial  1. /-"oncer  Lnititr,  pp.  258—59. 
""Zakharov.PfDwti,  p.  284. 


66 


MOSCOW  TO  SmLlNGRAD 


tm,  i^^mxrteEided  ^ving  priority  to 
Zhukov%  West  Rm^,  jitatang: 

Tlic  picat  clangs'  for  the  German  Ccmii- 
mand  is  that  me  first  big  cliange  in  liie 
weather  will  knock  out  all  of  their 
motorized  equiptnent.  We  tnnst  hoki  out  as 
long  as  in  Saif  ■way  jjDssiljk  but  imme- 
diately go  over  to  the  attack  when  the  first 
few  days  of  cold  have  broken  the  back  of 
the  Cci  inan  forces.  Tliis  Ijackboiic  consists 
o[  ttie  tanks  and  motorized  artillery  that 
will  l^ecome  useless  whm tilt  seuiperaMre 
hiis  2(f  [F.]  below  zero. 

Zhukov  supposedly  added  l^ba£  he  pro- 
posed ter  let  ^(g  '^istot  and  file  cotrrsettf 

the  offensive  ^  i^etermined  b\  the 
weather"  and  expected  its  success  to  be 
in  proportion  to  die  "freezing  off"  of 
die  Gcimaii  cqtiipment.*''' 

The  Soviet  accounts,  however,  totally 
ignore  the  possibihty  of  the  wea^rfet^ 
having  had  any  part  in  the  timing  of 
the  couuteroifensive.  They  respond  to 
German  and  other  contentions  that  it 
worked  to  the  Soviet  advantage  by 
pointing  out  that  both  sides  had  to 
cope  with  cold  aiid  snow  and  that  tem- 
peratures in  December  1941  were  not 
actually  as  low  (-25°  to  —50°  F.)  as  was 
dalmed.  Cjto^  Soviet  work  asserting 

these  two'  pOUlts  does  gi\i  tlie  De- 
cember m^aa  temperature  as  recorded 
hy  SoVifet  -wiesatheff  sftlatitftis  arotmd 
Moscow  as  -28.6°  C.  (-19.3°  F.)— 
which  was,  after  all,  quite  coldJ"  The 
retetiomhip  between  the  weather  and 
the  counteroffensive  appears  coinci- 
dental up  to  4  December.  After  tlien, 
hewevfeir,  the  probability  of  Ite  ItStSfing 
infiiicnccd  the  um'in^  ^  West  Bmt's 
operadons  increases. 
As  ©f  3  De&KXilte^  ieexnsd'  Wsimet 


""Fi.  AOK  3.  Gefechtsbenchl  Rmsknd,  1941^2,  Pj. 
AOK  3  21818/2  «le. 
'"Debprijj  and  lelpukhovsldy,  /*jgi  i  moM,  p.  125)^ 


Army  and  lliifd  aiofd  Botiuls  I^aizer 
Groups  were  at  a  standil^;,  enforced 
by  the  cold,  re^rdless  Viliedier  So- 
viet resi^tati^  eoald  have  achieved  tile 
same  effect.  For  the  cotmteroffensive. 
West  Frmt  was  to  aim  "blows"  toward 
Klin,  Sotefechnogorsk,  artd  Istra  m 
"smash"  the  enemy  on  ihc  right  flank, 
and  to  deliver  "blows  in  ilie  flatiks  and 
rear  tfte  tJaderian'  ^^cm^  | Second 
Pan/cr  Army]"  to  V3^m^&  and 
Bogoroditsk  "to  smash^e  ei*KHay  on 
\kt  teff  flA'iik."'fi  The  final  dtrfer 
Kuznetsov'sFin/  Shock  Army  received  on 
5  December  instructed  it  again  to  clear 
the  Dedttev«a^Fedorovka  area  aad  "tti 
the  longer  i  tm"  to  advance  in  "the 
direction  of  Klin."'^^ 

Soviet  postwar  accounts  treat  the 
strengths  of  liotii  sides'  forces  on  the 
eve  of  the  counterattack  as  a  matter  of 
outstanding  hlstOTtesl  sigiiificaiiee. 
Tliev  emphasize  that,  as  of  5  De- 
cember, German  forces  outnumbered 
Seni^etin  the  Moscow  sector.  However, 
the  figines  tliey  employ  \  ary  and  in  the 
aggregate  do  not  substantiate  tlie  exis- 
tenee^  dF  as  'stetft^  S«3f^et  ®iMn«3cal 

inferiority.  Tlie  latest,  hence  presum- 
ably most  authoritadve  figures,  those 
given  !a  the  History  of  Af  Seemd  IferSi 
War,  are  1,708,000  German  and 
1,100,000  Soviet  troops  on  the  ap- 
proaches to  MoscowJ^  The  numbers 
used  in  earlier  Soviet  works  were 
800,000  or  "more  dian  800,000"  Ger- 
man and  between  7Wfim  mA  760*000 
Soviet  troops. The  German  strength 
as  it  appears  in  the  Htstoij  of  the  Second 


"/VMK  vei.  IV.  p.  281;  i&vsG^u^m^^iii^Mm 
p.  177. 

"Zakhiinn'.  Pwviil.  p.  284. 
"/V'MV,  vol,  IV,  p.  283, 

'■•VOV  (Kratkaw  htori^^  WB^  Va%  |>.  llOj 
Zakbatw.50  ki,  295. 


TO  MOSCOW 


67 


Vibrld  War  comprises  all  personnel  as- 
signed to  Army  Group  Center  includ- 
ing air  force  troops.^''  The  Soviet 
strength  is  that  of  the  forces  assigned 
to  the  coLinteiattiK  k.'"  Tlie  sirengtlis 
mven  in  the  other  works  are  said  to  be 
those  of  the  dMsions  and  ba%%cied  in 
Army  Group  Cenler  and  those  of  the 
Soviet  frpnts,  in  other  words,  die  coni- 
1^  strengths  for  the  two  sides. ^'  None 
of  the  Soviet  strengths  given  include 
the  eight  armies  still  in  the  Stavka  re- 
serve, a  total  6F  about  eight  htmdred 
thousand  men. 

It  is  clear  ilial,  even  without  the 
reserve  armies,  the  Scmet  fcjrt^s  op- 
posing Army  Group  Center  were  rela- 
tively stronger  on  5  December  than 
they  had  befell  in  Oictctoer  when  Opem-^ 
tioii  r.MFUX  began.  Wliile  Arniv  C^Ti^iip 
Cenler  had  not  been  able  to  replace  its 
has&  in  tiVKips  and  e||i4pineht,  the 
Seslfiet armies  in  tlic  MOSGOW  sector  had 
acquired  a  thud  more  liSe  divisions, 
five  times  more  cavahry  dfvifflons,  twice 
as  many  artillery  regiments,  and  two- 
and-a-half  times  as  many  tank  brigades 
by  5  December  than  they  had  had  on  2 
Oclober.'** 

Along  the  front  around  Mosctjw  al 
daybreak  bri  6  Deeember,  the  tem- 
pftatine  dropped  as  low  as  —38°  F. 
During  tlie  night.  Bock  at  Army  Group 


^'Antiy  Graup  Centers  loul  complement^  wMdi 
ibchicted  »  very  large  rear  echelon  ibat  tt^  wfttif 
group  was  having  to  maintain  to  support  !ia  ^erSH 
tions  and  to  control  and  lo  administer  the  Soviet 
lerriiory  ii  occupied,  was  about  1.7  milfion  men, 
Rcinluirrli,  Afo,iA(!H,  pp.  57.  315. 

^*JViW.  vol.  IV.  p.  28S. 

""The  flOO.OOO  troop."*  appear  [n  be  about  the  max- 
imum  Arni\  Group  Cenler  could  have  had  in  the  Hrst 
vneek  ol  l)c<.cirit)er  Kiiisidcriiig  thai  its  seventy-eight 
(Iivtsioii.<i  then  had  207.000  unrepl^cetj  losaev 
Zakharov,  50 /rt.  p.  25t5;  Rcitihardl.  Aloiiteni,  P*S7m 

"Y«vnigncyev.  VtWiaya  bitm,  p.  178. 


Center  had  approved  Guderian*s  pro- 
posed withdrawal  of  Second  Panzer 
Army,  and  he  had  told  Reinhardt  and 
Hoepner  to  "adjust"  their  plans  for 
Third  and  Fourth  Panzer  Groups  l() 
pullbacks  from  Yakhroraa  and 
Krasnaya  Polyawa  t&  a  Iwie  covering 
Klin.  He  hatt  also  cillefl  General  der 
Panzertruppen  Rudolf  Schmidt  at  Sec- 
ond Army,  which  had  been  drifnng 
slowlv  easiwat*<l  tow.iifl  \'eleis  for  (lie 
past  several  days,  and  had  told  him  he 
Had  better  eome  to  a  stop;  otherwise, 
his  army  woiild  soon  hncl  itself  stand- 
ing farther  east  than  any  of  the 
others.** 

The  Soviet  armies,  entei  ing  the  hrst 
day  of  the  full  counteroffeusive,  gave 
vatToiisty  executed  solo  pevfbnnaflees. 

Tfiirty-fh'st  Arms  joined  in  witli  tlie 
stalled  Tweniy-Hmth  Army  aiKalmmfnjnt 
feiit  Hilled  to  get  across  the  Volga  south 
of  Kalinin,  Thniicth  Ann\  niadt-  the 
day's  best  —  and,  for  the  Germans, 
most  dangerous — showing  by  break- 
ing into  the  Third  Panzer  Group  dee)> 
flank  northeast  of  Klin  to  a  depdi  of 
eight  miles.  First  Shock  and  Twentieth 
Afniic\  hit  Tliii'd  and  Foiu'th  Panzer 
Groups  from  Yakhroma  to  west  of 
Krasnaya  Polyana,  but  «>n1y  Thm^th 
Army  made  a  gain,  a  small  (ttie,  on  ihe 
southern  edge  ot  Krasnaya  Polvana. 
TinM  Art^  ma&t  of  ^hich  was  stiU  on 
ttie  nianil  ftom  Sv/ran,  began  its  at- 
tack on  MiJchaylov,  on  die  eastern  rim 
of  &tt  Tijla  bulge,  wifh  one  tifle  divi- 
sion and  two  motorized  infantr\  reg- 
iments.**" During  the  day  Second 
Arm^  mck  IMe^  while  Smi^fsfMmfi 


'W.  Or.  MiUf,  la  Kiiegslagrburh,  Detmbff  JW.  6 
Dec  41,  H.  Gr.  Mitie  26974/6  Kle. 

««Vf>V,  pp.  112-13;  Zakhatiw,  AiKidt.  pp.  13^.  S6D: 
tVOVSS,  w>l.n,  p.  280. 


68 

3%«#e»^  %vas  shiftjftg  to  the  of- 
fensive there.^' 

Befoi-e  noon  on  ihe  6th,  Reinhardt 
told  Bock  ^bm  HrfSfd  Pamef  Gwstip 

would  ha\'e  to:^taJt  pulling  away  on  tlie 
soutla  during ^bei^ht  toprovide some 
armor  to  put  agamst  fmt^^  4™^ 
Tliat  meant  Fourth  Panzer  ^fSrOup, 
Third  Panzer's  neighbor  on  ifaeiSotith, 
also  WQwIdt  ihaSfie  to  stait  bade  s6®h.  Tht 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 

Soviet  pressure  subsided  everywbene 

that  afternoon,  and  Kkige  talked  to 
Bock  about  keephig  the  pace  of  the 
withAiawals  slew  to  evacuate  aD  tiie 
ecjuipmciit  and  supplies."^  Nev- 
ertheless, in  die  bitter  night  that  fol- 
lowed, tb-e  battle  tut-ned.  From 
Tikhvin,  to  Moscow,  to  the  Mius  River, 
the  Barbarossa  campaign  had  run  its 
course. 


"H.  Gr.  MUte,  la  Knegslagebuclt,  Dezember  1941,  6         "^bid.,  6  Dec  41. 


CHAPTER  IV 

The  Counteroffensive:  First  Phase 


Hitler  and  General  Haider,  chief  of 
the  German  General  Staff,  talked 
about  a  directive  for  the  winter  cam- 
paign at  Fuehrer  Headquarters  on  the 
afternoon  of  6  December.  Neither  of 
them  had,  until  recently,  anticipated 
having  to  devote  miuh  thought  to  the 
subject.  Before  the  October  rains  had 
set  in.  they  had  expected  German 
troops  to  be  home  by  Christmas  except 
for  those  infantry  divisions  left  behind 
to  watch  over  the  remains  of  the  Soviet 
Army.  Since  early  November,  recogniz- 
ing by  then  that  victory  was  not  so 
close,  the  Germans  had  been  trying  to 
wring  profit  from  what  was  left  of  the 
1941  canipaign  and  to  delay  decisions 
cai^lii^,  where,  or  whether  to  stop  for 

The  ^tback  at  Rostov  and  onu&ous 
reports  firotii  Artny  Groiifis  Center  and 
North  had  ap|>aii'iilly  at  last  moved 
Haider  to  send  Hitler  a  statement  Qn 
German  strength,  whidi  was  d&wti  25 
percent,  and  to  ask  for  a  cletisioii. 
Hider  made  the  decision  on  the  al'ter- 
noon  of  flie  6th.  Ntimbers,  he  said, 
meant  nothing.  Tlic  Russians  had  lost 
at  least  ten  times  as  many  men  as  he 
had.  Supposing  they  had  fljree  trnies  as 
many  to  start  with,  that  still  meaut  ih(  \ 
were  worse  off.  Single  German  divi- 
sions might  be  holding  fif%tieo«imle 
fronts  (as  Haider  apparently  daimed). 


but  that  was  more  an  indication  of  the 
enemy's  weakness  than  their  own. 
Army  Group  North  should  hold 
Tikhvin  and  be  ready  to  advance  to 
ttiake  contact  with  the  Firms  when  it 
received  tank  and  troop  reinforce- 
ments. Army  Group  Center  should  re- 
member that  "the  Russians  never  gave 
up  anything  of  tlieir  own  accord  and 
neither  should  we."  The  weather  per- 
mitting and  with  some  reinforcements. 
Army  Group  South  ought  to  be  able  lo 
retake  Rostov,  po^ibly  also  the  entire 
Donets  Basin.' 

Hider,  as  he  must  have  tei^wii^  £iad 
not  made  a  decision  but  had  evaded 
one.  He  did  so  again  the  next  day. 
Having  received  a  request  dm  iiii;  ilie 
night  of  the  6th  to  approve  1  bird  and 
Fourth  Panzer  Groupis?"  and  Second 
Panzer  Anna's  withdrawals  then  in 
projH'ess,  he  agreed  on  the  morning  of 
thefth  to  tot  Third  and^nrtJt  Panzer 
Groups  Itraighieti  llieir  lines  hut  said 
nothing  dbc»ut  Second  Panzer  Army  or 
the  Artny  Group  Center  sttusrtSon  in 
general.  In  schoolinasterh'  tones,  he 
pointed  out  to  the  OKH  that  since  the 
pressure  on  Moscow  vtas  released,  the 
Ru-ssians  could  he  cxpet  It-f!  to  [i  \  lo 
relieve  Leningrad.  Since  Army  Ciroup 
North  woidd  need  all  of  its  strength  to 
keep  its  hold  on  f  t  niugrad,  it  could 
not  attack  past  iikiivin  and  oiight  lo  be 


'Haider  J)im%  vol.  m,  pp.  338-30. 


70 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


penaitted  to  shorten  its  front  ritet* 
somewbat  but  not  enough  lo  put  the 
east-iMie$t  l^ad  and  railroad  through 
Hkfavin  out  of  Germans  artillery 
range.* 

Sunday,  f  Decemfeer,  dsfwrted  dear 

and  cold  ;ii  tlie  front.  F.;irly  morning 
Lujtwajje  reconnaissance  flights 
brought  back  reports  of  eontipiing 
hcaw  rail  frafTit  louard  M<»^Q^  and 
toward  Iiklrvin.  At  groumj  level* 
plumes  of  blowing  snow  testrieted 
ibilit%.  and  rf)ads  drifted  shut.  During 
die  nigh  I,  the  roads  running  east  and 
southeast  firom  KBii  iiad  filt|4 
Third  Pan/er  Crrfuip  rear  4^cbelon 
trucks  and  wagons  all  heaifii^  west. 
Row  fkr  w^t  nobody  knew.  Iflie  front 
had  begun  to  pull  back  from  the 
Moscow-Vulga  Canal.  First  Shock  Army 
ms  following  hesitantly  behind  the 
panzer  group  which  because  of  the 
weather  had  already  abandoned  fif  teen 
tanks,  three  heavy  howiClers,  a  half- 
dozen  anliair(  l  aft  guns,  and  dozens  of 
trucks  and  passenger  cars — more  ma- 
terial than  would  cn^lkiaijly  be  lost  in  a 
weeks  bea\  \  fighting.  Tioops  could  not 
tow  the  gLuis  out  of  their  emplace- 
ments. The  motors  of  some  vehicles 
would  not  start;  the  grease  on  bearings 
and  in  transmissions  in  others  froze 
while  they  were  running.  The  1st  Pan- 
zer Division,  which  liad  been  headed 
tt)ward  Krasnaya  Polyana,  had  turned 
around  during  the  ni^t  with  orders  to 
bloc  k  liie  Soviet  thrust  toward  Klin.  In 
tlie  morning,  it  was  extended  over 


'OKH,  OmStdH,  Op.  Mt.  Nr.  320JM1.  av  OKW. 
WFSt.  6A2.4i  and  OKH,  QmStdH,  Op.  Abu  Nr. 
41957141.  OKW  an  ObMM,,  7.12.41.  H.  Or.  Mitte 
26974/6  file. 


forty  miles,  bucking  snowndbrlftt  on 
jatniiifd  roads,  with  its  tanks  low  oh 
fuel.^  (Map  6.) 
Wfesf  Frenft  strongest  array,  Stc§eenA, 

under  General  Rokc«sovskiy,  joined 
the  counteroflensive  on  die  7di  along 
its  ff*ont  west  of  ISiasnafa  Potyai^w  But 
the  most  dangerous  threat  continued 
to  come  from  Thirtieth  Army,  which  had 
deepened  its  thrust  toward  Klin  during 
the  night.'  Arnn  Group  Center  put 
out  a  call  Icji  teinforcements  to  Third 
Panzer  Groups  neighbors,  "even  for 
the  last  bicyclist.""  Twenty- ninth  and 
Tfmty-ftrst  Armies  hammered  at  Ninth 
Attaf  #est  and  southeast  of  Kalinin 
but  as  yet  had  nothing  to  ■ihow  foi  it. 
First  Shock  and  Twentieth  Armies,  joined 
by  Svettinth  Army,  kept  Third  and 
Fourth  Panzer  Gioups  under  fiontal 
pressure  without  acquiring  an  (niii  ight 
tactical  advantage  anywhere.  Tent  It 
Aitny  occupied  Mikhavlo\^  after  a  skii- 
mish  with  the  German  rear  guard."  At 
IPbwih  and  Second  Armies  fk>nt 
was  quiet. 

Although  the  counterofTensi\e  was 
forming  slowly,  tension  wa.s  inc  re  asing 
on  the  German  side  of  the  TOO-inile 
front  from  ITkhvin  to  the  Army  Group 
€enter  right  flank  e^^t  of  Wmk.  The 
arm\  group  was  being  subjected  to  a 
prolonged  shock  as  successive  Soviet 
units  cittercd  the  %fatiiig  and  broke 

radio  silence.  German  radio  monitors 
picked  up  signals  from  two  dozen 
more  enemy  brigades  and  divisions  on 

tlie  artn\'  group  front  on  7  December 
than  had  been  theie  on  15  November. 


mnv^a  nie. 

"^'tvsiiniioev,  Vflikaya  hitva,  pp.  188-90. 
■'II.  (,>.  MiUe.  Ill  Kii,  t;slag(l>ueh,  Detember  1941,  7  Dec 
•11,  H,  Gr.  Miiu  2ii')7  Vt>file. 
"Zakbsrov,  Fmml,  p.  26Z. 


THE  COUNTERQFFENSrVE;  FIRST  PHASE 


71 


Hau-Track  Ai-rmpiii  To  Haul  a  150-mm.  Howitzer 


Tlie  army  jOfioiip  intelligence  had  be- 
lieved, as  had  Field  Marshal  Bock,  the 
army  group  commander,  that  the  Rus- 
sians could  not  introduce  significant 
new  forces  and  were  compelled  to  strip 
ilie  front  in  some  places  lo  suppiv  the 
batde  elscuiiere.  Field  Marshal  Led) 
had  seen  the  consequences  he  teared 
for  his  command,  Army  Group  N(jrth, 
as  inevitable  after  Fourth  Army's  ad- 
vance on  Moscow  co!la|)scd  on  4  De- 
cember. And  these  conse(|uences  were 
soon  felt.  Ciencral  Meretskov  had  re- 
grouped Foiirtli  Indi'pi'iidetil  Army  and 
had  assimilated  enough  reinforee"' 
ments  by  5  December  to  bear  in  on 
Tikhvin  from  three  sides/ 


'W.  Cr.  M<lt,-,  In  .Vf.  27^9111.  ,in  I'.  (,:  4.  7  12.41,  Pz. 
AOK  i  2l'  I^i7/H  lilt-;  Leeb,  Ihf^ihiuhiinf-.fhliniii^m,.'^. 
404;  %ie:\-e\iiko\\!imnng  tlie  People,  p.  171. 


At  Tikhvin,  on  the  7lh,  in  a  bliz/ard 
that  also  spread  o\er  the  Moscow  re- 
gion in  the  afternoon,  the  Army  Group 
North  speai  head  was  almost  encirded. 
The  Russians  liad  brought  in  twenty- 
seven  trainloads  of  troops  in  the  piast 
tilt  cr  davs.  and  the  Ciermans  were  otu- 
numbered  two  to  one.  Hitler  had 
promised  about  a  hundred  tanks  and 
twenty-fwo  thousand  troops  in  a  week 
or  two,  but  for  the  present,  all  l.eeb 
had  in  Tikhvin  were  some  half-frozen 
infantry  and  five  tanks,  four  of  which 
were  not  operable  because  of  the  cold. 
In  the  afternoon,  Leeb  ga«fe  ttoe  order 
to  evacuate  the  town,^ 

On  tlie  8th,  when  the  Russians 


"W.  Gr.  Nard,  la  KriegslagchHch.  l.tZ.-MJ2m,  T  Dec 
41,  H.  Gr.  Nord  75128^4  file. 


MAP  6 


THE  GOUNTEROFFENSIVE:  FIRST  PHASE 


73 


passed  westward  across  the  Klin-Ka- 

liiiin  railiinc  and  bore  down  to  within 
two  or  tiaree  miles  of  the  Klin  road 
junctibii  that  was  crowded  with  tniles- 
lon^  columns  of  Third  Panzer  Group 
vehicles,  Bock  began  trying  to  scrape 
reserves  out  of  the  ^tmt.  All  he  cotud 
get  for  Third  Panzer  Group  was  a 
single  infantry  battalion.  OKH  told 
him  not  to  expset  ttpAsasement  bat- 
talions bcfoK.'  tnid-Januarv  because  the 
railroads  could  not  handle  them  until 
thtfen.  When  he  asked  Haider  for 
trained  divisions  not  replacements, 
Haider  replied  tiiat  OKlrl  did  not  have 
any.  Smh  ^vkit^smiuld  haveto  cotne 

from  die  Western  Tlieater  that  was 
und^  the  OKW,  Desperate  to  do 
sotRtething,  Bock  put  Third  I^nzer 

Group  under  Fourth  i'an/er  Group 
tliat  was  itsell  under  Fourth  Aimy. 
Third  Panzer  Group  saw  this  acdon  as 
an  abdication  of  the  arrnv  groups  re- 
sponsibiUty  for  the  panzer  group;  Bock 
i^M  he  #iought  it  woubl  make  General 
Hoepner.  Fourth  Panaer  Group  com- 
mander, and  Field  Marshal  Kiuge, 
Fourth  Anfly%  commander,  more  in- 
clined to  htAp  Third  Punzei/'  Ninth 
Army,  Third  Panzer  Groups  neigiibor 
on  the  north,  was  having  more  Uian 
enough  trouble  of  its  own  as  Thirty-first 
and  Twenty-timlh  Armies  pressed  their 
attack  ottt  Kalinin.  Hovr  tnuch  help 
Ffjurth  Panzer  Group  oi*  Fourth  Army 
would  be  or  could  be  was  problemat- 
ical. The  faster  General  Reinhardt  ex- 
tricated Tliird  Panzer  from  the  Irap 
east  of  Khn  tiie  sof»ner  Hoepner's  ar- 
mor would  have  to  cmbai  k  on  tlic  same 
kind  of  ucsiward  trek,  and  once  the 
two  panzei  groups  were  out,  Kluges 


■■•Ibut..  8De(.  41, 


front  would  he  eKpo^ed.  He  would 
then  have  tO  dadde  Whether  to  risk 
being  overwhttoied  whei^  he  was  or  to 
takie  ftnirth  Army  out  of  its  fdatively 
W^~huilt  line  into  the  snow  aofl  cold. 
IMitlUuxlt,  with  die  Russians  before 
him.  was  hi  a  hurry.  Hoepner  did  not 
wani  lo  be  rushed.  KJuge  would  have 
preferred  not  to  have  to  make  a 
oedsion. 

Bock  did  not  know  it  vet  on  the  8th, 
but  he  was  about  to  liave  greater  trou- 
ble on  his  south  flank.  General 
Guderian's  SccoikI  Piuizer  Ai  niv  harl 
started  the  complicated  job  of  reducing 
the  bulge  east  M*Kil* ,  whidb  in  just  twtj 
days  cost  Second  Panzer  Ai-m\  many 
vehicles  and  guns  diat  liad  to  be  aban- 
doned. Om  corps  aibae  had  1,500 

frostbite  cases,  350  rec]uiring  ainputa- 
Uons.  Supplies  were  not  getting  to  tiie 
p^izer  army's  railhead  at  Orel  because, 
as  was  happening  all  up  and  down  the 
front,  only  the  insulated  Soviet-built 
locomotives  could  hold  steam  in  the 
below-zero  cold.  The  army  group  had 
promised  to  fly  in  diesel  oil  and  gas- 
diite-  <in  the  Mi  but  had  to  divert  the 
airplanes  to  Third  Panzer  Group. 
Moreover,  at  Mikhaylov,  Tenlh  Army  was 
throwing  trainloads  of  troops  into  flje 
front  a.s  fast  as  thev  arrived.  German 
air  reconnaissance  on  the  8di  reported 
fifty  trains  headed  in  each  dtre^on 
between  Ryazan  and  Mikhaylov.  0\cr 
die  telephone,  on  the  8th  and  again  on 
the  9th,  the  usually  ebullient  Gudetiati 
told  Bock  that  a  serious  crisis  in  con- 
fidence had  broken  oin  among  the 
t3%»G^  and  the  N(X)s.  He  refused  to 
say  against  whom  and  declined  Bocks 
suggestion  to  report  in  pei  son  tf)  Hitler 
but  asked,  as  Bock  said,  "for  the  !iun- 
dredth  dme"  whether  the  OKI!  an<l 
the  OKW  were  being  given  a  clear 


74 


MOSCOW  TO  &1MJNGRAD 


picture  of  what  was  happening  at  the 
front." 

Second  Array,  Second  Panzer  Army's 
neighbor  on  the  south,  held  a  front  of 
180  miles,  vvhicli  uas  longer  than  that 
held  by  any  other  army  in  the  east.  It 
had  iseveft  divisions  t*Mi  twenty-five 
miles  of  ff<0(l!it  For  each,  nearly  two 
miles  for  every  company  On  the  offen- 
sive, its  mission  had  been  to  fill  ftt 
between  Second  Panzer  .■Xrmy  and 
Sixth  Army,  which  had  been  easy  as 
long  as  Soviet  ateendcHdtiit^  :l^liteii^  on 

Moscow  and  the  ^ai^^Bmx^lSS&!$  had 

no  time  to  worry  about  open  space  and 
a  scattering  of  stnall  provincial  towns 

like  M'lets.  IJvny,  and  Novosil.  On  the 
defensive,  though,  Second  Ax&ky  with 
its  one  division  per  twenty-fiVe  nules  trf" 
front  became  all  that  was  standing  be- 
fore Kursk,  its  cJiief  (and  only)  rail- 
head, and  Orel,  Second  Panzer  Army^ 
chief  (and  only)  railhead.  On  7  De- 
cember, Second  Arnry  stopped  after 
taking  Yelets,  the  last  town  t»  any  con- 
se(|nence  within  fiflv  miles.  Tlie  army's 
commander,  General  Rudolf  Schmidt, 
IJToposed  in  ^e  tiext  m^etsil  dis^^ 

(l(  \a.st:ite  a  ten-mile  strip  parallel  to  Ms 
entire  line  and  then  pull  back  behilid 
that  ready-made  no-tnanVlafid  sei- 
tie  in  for  the  \\  inter. 

The  next  clay,  even  more  suddenly 
than  it  had  dropped,  tile  teaipei^re 
rose  to  abo\  e  freezing  along  the  whole 
Army  Group  Center  front.  At  the  Sec- 
ond Army  center  south  of  Yelets,  in 
snow  anfl  r;iin  that  froze  when  it  hit  the 
stone-cold  ground,  hall-a-dozen  Soviet 
tanks  mated  a  hole  betw*^  W&x 
and  95th  Infantry  Divisions,  and  a  So^ 


2B0-61. 


Viet  cavalry  division  galloped  through. 
The  two  German  divisions  self-pro- 
pelled assault  guns  could  barely  negoti- 
ate the  ice,  and  by  the  next  morning 
after  bea\  v  (Vesh  snow  had  fallen  and 
blown  into  drifts  during  the  night,  they 
could  not  move  at  all,  wiichr  was  almost 
immaierial  since  both  divisions  had  In 
then  also  run  out  of  motor  fuel.  In 
another  day,  two  more  cavalry  divisions 
and  a  ride  division  bad  opened  the  gap 
to  sixteen  miles  and  had  driven  a  fifty- 
ini!fr-dee|)  wedge  northwest  toward 
Novosil  and  Orel.  The  95th  Division 
had  lost  half  its  strength.  The  45th  had 
ldK>iateirer'f?obody  knew  how  much. 
Bollxillere  out  of  motor  fuel  and  short 
onaiiWiunition  and  rations.  Air  supply 
was  promised^  tnit  the  airplanes  could 
not  Fly  in  tite  SOow  and  rain.  Schmidt 
told  Bock  that  Second  Army  was  about 
to  be  oiit  in  two  and  drivett^adtc  on 
Km^&^id  Or  el  leaving  8&>iiule  gap 
in  between." 

On  8  December,  Hider  Issued  in^at 
purported  to  be  a  directive  for  the 
winter  campaign.  Because  the  cold 
#efailie^  had  coime  early,  he  an- 
nounced, all  "largei-  offensi\e  opera- 
^OQs"  were  to  cease — which  they 
sir^dy  had  done;  Biit  tb&te  would  be 

no  withdrawals  except  to  iirtqKiierl 
positions.  Ignoring  the  events  dien  lak- 
uig  place  al  ti^  front,  he  orderal  ibt 
OKH  to  sesPt  Recalling  the  panzer  and 
motorized  divi^ons  to  Germany  for 
totting." 

'Tin-  Wnst  Crisi<!  in  Turn  Vibrld  Wars" 
Inetfectiveness  was  something  the 

1  ^AOK  Z.  la.  ^ji^eaist^  Rmi^  Hit  Jtt^ 

^KW,  WFSt.  Ak,  L  (1  op.)  Nr.  4410m*l,  W&WW 
Nr.  t9, 8.12.41,  German  High  Level  Direetivm,  CSm 
files. 


THl  COUNTEROFFENSIVK:  FIRST  PHASE 


75 


Germm  tommands  had  not  so  far  eu^ 

pcriencefl.  Thc\  had  perfected  tlic  art 
oi  directing  military  operations.  Break- 
throughs like  those  at  KHn  and  Yelets 
were  nuisaiucs  tliat  thev  were  sup- 
posed to  liquidate  without  luss.  The 
first  two  <Mr  Miree  days  would  reveal  the 
measure  of  an  enem\  s  effort,  and  by 
then  the  German  divisions  on  die  scene 
would  ettber  be  ba£k  in  eontrol,  or  ^e 
corps,  army,  and  arnn  group  staffs 
would  have  begun  dispeusmg  rein- 
fbfcisments,  artillery,  tanks,  and  air 
support.  Somewhere  die  enemy  might 
prevail  no  matter  what,  but  he  would 
have  to  possess  more  of  the  militaryait 
than  the  Russians  did.  The  gentlemeti 
of  ihe  General  Staff  wouici  ordinarily 
thrashed  out  the  problems  that 
liad  arisen  al  Klin  and  Yelets  in  the 
e\  enings  over  cognac  and  cigars  and 
would  bave  dire^ed  these  mmaii  by 
telephone  and  telet^jjc  the  next  morn- 
ing. Meanwhile  the  commanding  gen- 
erals, if  neccs.sar) ,  wouM  have  gone  out 
to  have  a  look  for  thcnrselves  and  to 
pass  out  encouragement  or  repri- 
mands, whfchever  seemed  likely  to  do 
the  most  good,  .'\fter  all.  everybody 
knew  what  he  had  lo  do.  Corps  and 
army  SfsHi  eoniM  take  some  battalions 
here,  a  regiment  there,  a  scattering  of 
companies  someplace  else,  and  a  divi- 
sion or  two,  if  necessaryt  and  ilien  get 
I  he  troops  on  ihe  march  to  where  tliey 
were  needed  wirhoiii  stirring  from 
their  des)».  Ad  arnn  group  would 
have  reserves  Of  could  make  some  by 
taking  divisions  Olit  qf  the  line  I'sually 
a  division  or  two  vms  an  the  l  aihoad 
going  somewhere  up  or  down  the 
froiit.  Withdrawals  like  those  Third 
Panzer  Group  and  Second  Panzer 
Army  had  slaricd  were  still  novel  for 
both  troops  and  suilts,  but  the  opera- 


tions ("la")  officers  and  chiefs  of  staff 

knew  how  to  mt>ve  anything  fmin  a 
division  to  a  whole  army  hve  or  ten 
ftules  in  a  night,  and  the  troops  were 
seasoned  enough  to  leave  the  enemy 
small  satisfaction  no  matter  what  direc- 
tbii  they  were  going. 

All  of  this  the  German  .-Xmiy  could 
do — but  not  in  December  1941.  The 
1st  iPanzer  Division  should  have 
blocked  the  Russian  drive  to  Klin,  but 
how  could  it  when  it  could  not  get  to 
the  Rus.«ian5?  Third  Panzer  Groupi 
and  Second  Panzer  Army's  witliflrawals 
were,  considering  die  complicatit>ns, 
DaSnor  masterpieGes  ^  military  art.  But 
every wlu-rc  the  troops  pulled  back  they 
left  equipment  standing.  Guns,  tanks, 
and  trucks  drat  would  not  soon  be 
replaced  would  make  each  successive 
move  more  difficult  and  more  dan- 
gerous mS  ^tmsM  in  flife  meantime 
silently  encourage  the  enemy.  Soviet 
attacks  were  still  mostly  extempo- 
raneous. Yet  worse  wotild  come  when 
the  Russians  became  certain  of  ilu  ir 
advantage,  which  diey  could  casil)  de- 
duce from  the  abandoned  equipment 
All  the  German  ai  rnios  needed  fresh 
troops,  but  Bock  had  none  lo  give.  To 
cicate  resei^es  out<(tf  whathe  had  was 
hopeless:  no  artnv  commander  was 
going  lo  lelinquish  even  a  battalion 
when  he  might  need  it  despet^ltc^ 
himself  very  soon. 

On  liie  morning  of  the  9th,  lesum- 
ing  a  telephone  conference  liegun  the 
night  beiore.  Bock  told  HaUier  lliat 
Army  Gr(jup  Center  had  to  have  rein- 
forcements because  it  could  not  stand 
off  a  determined  attack  anywhere  on 
its  whole  front.  He  .said  he  was  already 
COttVerdng  every  kind  of  specialist  ex- 
cept tank  drivers  into  !nfantr\.  Haider 
speculated  that  the  Russians  wei  e  using 


76 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


A  German  Cbi-cMfi  Staixed  m  rm  Snow 


cadres  and  untrained  troops  that  diey 
really  wanted  to  save  for  the  coming 
spring,  ati(3^tMngsic^tiljd[%^e£f»eeiied 
to  become  quieter  "by  the  middle  or 
the  end  ot  the  month."  From  there  on 
the  exehaage  tr^ifled  trfF  fti^Kty, 
Bock  respdaded,  "By  then  the  army 
group  wUhehapuU  [smashed]."  Haider 
replied,  'The  German  soldier  Som  flot 
go  kaputlV  Bock  said  he  did  not  want  to 
"whine  and  complain,"  but  he  wanted 
*ieset^,  Haider  replied  that  iJie  army 
group  would  "certainly  get  whatever 
small  reserves  [could]  be  scraped 
together.*** 

After  that  Bock  instructed  the  army 
commands  to  plan  to  take  the  entire 


'■'H.  Gi.  Mine,  III  Kni'gyliigfinif.h,  Dezeniber  1941,  8 
and  9  Dec  41.  H.  Gr.  Mine  26974/6  file. 


army  group  back  sixty  to  ninety  miles 
to  the  Rzhev-Gzhatsk-Orel-Kursk  line. 
Bmt  be  did  tiiot  bdSe^  libat  woiM  help 
either  because  it  would  take  weeks  to 
prepare  the  new  hne  and  to  start  back 
oefiOape  theti  ^wscsuld  be  sscair^ti 
into  nowhere."  Furthermore,  the 
etjuipment  losses  sustained  in  the  small 
ivitJidl^wals  undertaken  so  far  would 
be  multiplied  by  the  hunch  eds.  At  best, 
the  potential  relief  would  probably  be 
negligible.  As  Kluge  pointed  out,  the 
Russians  could  be  hammering  at  the 
new  line  within  three  days.  To  KJuge, 
Bock  confessed,  T  ana  at  the  poiht  or 
sending  the  Pm^r&r  a  personal  tele- 
gram telling  him  I  am  confronted  with 
dectsioiis  here  go  fat  bej^ond  Ac 
military."  What  those  might  be  he  did 
not  say.  A  general  retreat,  possibly  of 


THE  COUNTEROFFENSIVE;  FIRST  PHASE 


77 


Hapcdeonic  proportions,  appears  the 
most  likeh."  On  the  lOlli.  an  OKH 
promise  of  luo  or  three  tresh  divisions 
gave  Bock  a  slim  excuse  for  def  erring 
the  talk  of  retreat.  However,  these  divi- 
sions would  not  start  leaving  the  West- 
ern Hunter  until  the  16th  and  could 
not  be  otpected  on  the  Eastern  Front 
for  at  least  a  month. 

Although  Ik-  would  scarcely  liave 
imagined  it.  Bocks  situation  could  !ia\  e 
been  much  worse.  Soviet  tactical  per- 
formance in  the  first  fom-  d^s  of  the 
counteroffensive  had  been  disappoint- 
ing. A  West  Front  directive  issued  on  9 
Btomibet  read: 

Some  of  our  units  are  pirshing  the  enemy 
back  frontally  instead  of  going  around  him 
and  encircling  him.  InsteatTof  breaking 
through  the  enemy's  fortifications,  they 
stand  liefore  them  and  complain  about 
problems  and  heaiT  losses.  These  negative 
modes  of  operations  give  tlie  enemy  the 
chance  to  re(le])loy  to  new  lines,  regtotip, 
and  organize  resistance  anew.'^ 

Zhiikov  ordered  the  Wesl  Front  armies 
10  set  lip  mcAnle  groups  with  tanks, 
cavalry,  and  infantry  armed  with  auto- 
matic weapons  to  strike  behind  the 
enemy,  particularly  against  his  motor 
fuel  dumps  and  artillery  positions. 

On  die  10th,  the  Russians  cut  the 
road  out  of  Klin,  Utird  Vomer  Groups 
single  route  to  (he  wesi.  Third  Pan/.cr 
Group  described  the  scene  on  the  road 
east  of  Klin: 

. . .  disdpline  is  breaking  down.  More  and 

innre  soVlii'is  aic  headitif;  west  fin  loot 
vviihoul  ueapiiiis,  leading  .1  talf  tin  a  lone 
or  piiiliniT  a  sird  loaded  wiifi  potatoes.  TIk- 
road  is  under  constant  air  attack,  fhose 
killed  by  the  bombs  are  no  longer  being 
buried.  All  the  hangers-on  (corps  troops. 


"lhi,l.,  loDecO. 
"■V  ov;  p.  114. 


Luftwaffe,  supply  trains)  are  pourinjg  to 
the  rear  in  full' flight.  Without  rauons, 
freezing,  irrationally  tiiey  are  pushing 
back.  Vehicle  crews  that  do  hot  want  to  wait 
out  the  traffic  jams  in  the  open  are  drifting 
off  the  roads  anfl  into  ttie  villages.  Ice, 
inclines,  and  bridges  (leate  boircndons 
blockages.  Tiiilfk  control  is  uoikmi;  day 
and  night  and  bareh  maintaining  some 
movement.  Tlie  pan/ci  group  has  rrached 
its  most  dismal  hour.'" 

Ciudei  iaii  charactcri/f  d  his  Second 
Panzer  Army  as  a  st  adered  assemblage 
of  armed  ba^age  trains  slowly  wend- 
ing their  way  to  the  rear.  Second  Army 
could  not  mount  a  counterattack 
a^tinst  the  fast- moving  but  vulnerable 
Soviet  cavalry  because  it  had  no  motor 
fuel  and  its  troops  were  exhausted.  In 
another  dubious  command  shuffle. 
Bock  put  Second  Array  under 
Guderian.  He  admitted  that  Guderian's 
recent  emotional  outbursts  raised  a 
question  as  to  his  Htness  to  command 
two  armies,  but  he  said,  "At  least  he  has 
energy." ' ' 

For  Bock  everything  was  going 
wrong.  Ice  and  snow  were  tearing 
down  the  telephotie  lines  in  all  direc- 
tions. He  had  transferred  a  .security 
division  of  overage  and  limited  service 
troops  from  railroad  guard  duty  to 
Second  Army  where  they  were  unlikely 
to  be  of  much  use,  and  the  Soviet 
partisans  had  blown  up  abridge  on  the 
army  group's  main  line.  At  Vyazma, 
two  trains  crashed  head  on  and 
blocked  the  track.  A  train  of  tank  cars 
carrying  motor  fuel  reached  Fourth 
Panzer  Group  empty.  On  the  12th, 
during  an  intei  val  when  the  telephones 
were  working,  Haider  heard  some  of 


"fi.  AOK  5.  Gffecht^eAld  Rus^Md  1941^^  Pi. 

AOK  3  die. 

'7/.  Mill,-.  In  Kri,n-^l(i);i'hur/i,  Dezmber  1941,  XSt 
Dec  41,  H.  Gr,  Mitic  26y74/()  lile. 


78 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


the  army  groups  troubles  and,  chang- 
ing his  opinion  of  two  days  before, 
pronounced  the  si(uati(jn  "the  worst 
crisis  in  the  two  worlfl  wars."'*^ 

Hitler,  meanwhilf,  bad  spent  tliree 
days  in  Berlin  on  an  errand  he  found 
as  handy  at  the  moment  as  it  wmild  be 
problematical  in  its  longer  range  im- 
plications. Recently  be  had  been  le^s 
well  informed  than  Stalin  about  the 
plans  of  his  ally  Japan,  and  the  attack 
on  Pearl  Harbor  on  7  December  iiad 
surprised  him  aboin  as  much  as  it  had 
most  f)f  the  world.  Hiilei  uould  proba- 
bly have  welcomed  more  a  Japanese 
attack  on  die  Soviet  Union,  but  he  bad 
known  since  midsummer  that  the  Jap- 
anese would  not  lommit  themselves 
against  the  Soviets  in  tast  Asia  except 
to  reap  what  they  could  from  a  Ger- 
man victory.  Also,  be  would  have 
viewed  a  continuing  Jai)anese  threat  to 
the  United  States  in  tlie  Pacific  as  more 
useful  than  an  outright  war  since  his 
policy  thus  far  had  been  to  keep  the 
United  States  out  of  die  conflict.  On 
the  odier  band.  Pear!  Harbor  came 
when  he  needed  something  to  turn 
attention  from  the  Eastern  Front  and 
when  he  had  convinced  himself  that 
the  United  States  was  going  to  be  an 
annoying  but  not  decisive  opponent  in 
or  out  of  the  war.  On  the  11th,  in  a 
speech  before  the  Reichstag,  he  ^e- 
dared  war  on  the  United  States. 

Brwuckitsdi  of  the  Fhmt 

Desperate,  the  army  commanders, 
especially  Guderian  and  Kluge,  clam- 
ored for  Field  Marshal  Brauchitsch  to 
come  to  the  front  a\u\  see  their  plight 
for  himself.  They  did  not  believe  that 
the  top  leadership  was  getdng  accurate 


informadon  about  their  situation.  Bock 
denied  any  fault  on  his  part  fur  the 
poor  comnumications  but  more  than 
halt  agreed  with  them  otherwise.  Wtiat 
substantive  help  ihev  could  have  ex- 
pected from  ISrauchitsch  is  difiiciili  to 
discern.  In  best  times,  Ms  authority 
had  not  been  commensurate  with  his 
post  as  commander  in  chief,  army. 
Since  October,  he  bad  been  loi  am^ 
bulatory  catcliac  patient.  Lately,  HiUer 
had  ignored  him  and  used  him,  as 
Haider  put  it,  "as  little  more  than  a 
letter  earner" liiauchitsch  had  al- 
ready decided  to  l  esign  and  was  preoc- 
t  u]>ied  mostly  with  bow  to  do  so  since 
he  ielt  obligated  t*t  Hitler  for  bis  ap- 
pointment and,  a|jpaTcntly,  for  more 
personal  favcjrs,*" 

On  10  Decembei,  Brauc!iits(  h  liad 
tried  to  keep  biniseli  aloof  frum  Army 
Group  Centei  s  trouliles  by  sending 
telegrams  to  liock  and  each  army  com- 
mander telling  them  that  he  and  Hider 
were  "aware  of  the  difficult  situation  on 
the  front  in  the  battle  with  the  enemy 
and  with  nature."''  VMien  this  effort  to 
reassure  them  failed,  Brauchitsch  ap- 
peared shorth  after  1200  on  the  13th  at 
Bock's  headquarters  in  Smolensk.  By 
then  Bock  and  the  army  commanders 
had  agreed  that  they  had  to  take  the 
army  group  back  to  the  Rzhev- 
Gzhatsk-Orel-Kur.sk  line.  Kluge,  who 
had  objected  to  the  wididrawal  when 
the  army  gt oup  had  proposed  it  three 
days  before,  now  said  he  had  changed 
his  mind.  His  troops,  he  warned,  es- 
pecially TTiird  and  Fourth  Panzer 


2°See  Harold  ^,  Deulsch,  HiUtr  md  Mk  GtMrak 
(Minneapulis:  tJia^Wetsl^ «{  Mitinesocs  Press,  1974>, 

pp.  22(l-;<(l. 

-'H.  (•!-  Mill,'  In  Kriii^irt/'flmfk.  Dmmber  I94J,  10 
Dct  41,  H.  Or.  .Vliut  26974/6  tiJe. 


THE  COUNTEROFFENSIVE:  FIRST  PHASE 


79 


tinRMAN  Mortar  Squad  on  the  March 


Groups,  would  be  destroyed  in  another 
eight  or  ten  days  the  way  things  were 
going,  and  it  was  necessary,  therefore, 
to  sacrifice  the  equipment  to  save  the 
men.  General  Adolf  Strauss,  who  also 
had  believed  earlier  that  he  could  hold 
his  position,  said  Ninth  Army  would 
have  to  give  up  Kalinin,  the  northern 
comet  post  of  the  smaof  group  front. 
In  his  First  conversation  with  Brau- 
chitsch,  Bock  said  the  question  was 
whether  the  army  group  should  stand 
and  fight  and  risk  "being  smashed  to 
pieces"  or  withdraw  and  take  substan- 
tial losses  in  material.-* 

Early  on  die  14th,  Brauchitsch  went 
to  Roslavl  to  confer  with  Kluge  and 
Guderian,  and  GeneraliB^or  Rudolf 


^■'Ibid..  13  Dec  41, 


Schmundt,  Hitler's  chief  adjuiaiii, 
arrived  in  Smolensk.  Aliiiougii 
Schmundt  held  a  reladvely  low  rank, 
he  was  a  member  of  Hitlers  inner 
circle,  which  Brauchitsch  was  not.  Most 
likely  Hider  sent  Schmimdt  to  show  the 
Fuehrers  concern  and  to  protect  his 
interests  in  any  decisions  Braiichiisch 
might  make.  Braiichits*^  neturned  to 
Smolensk  late  thai  afternoon.  He  had 
learned  that  Guderians  front  west  oi 
Tula  was  also  beginning  to  t^r,  and  he 
agreed  that  the  army  group  would 
have  to  pull  back  to  Bocks  proposed 
line.  Foi  an  hour  or  so  it  looked  as  if 
they  had  at  last  achieved  a  consensus. 
Schmundt  called  General  Jodl  at  the 
OKW  Operations  Staff  to  get  a  quick 
decision  from  Hider  who  answered 
with  a  prompt  but  apparendy  qualified 


80 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


"no."  Hitler  said  Ninth  Army  and 
Tliird  Panzer  Group  could  draw  west 
from  Kalinin  and  Klin  enough  to 
"straighten"  their  lines.  Second  Panzer 
Army  could  do  the  same  around  Tula. 
Otherwise,  he  lorbade  "giving  up  an\ 
place  or  taking  any  evasive  action"  until 
"something"  was  done  to  readv  a  line  in 
the  rear.  Neither  Braiichitsch  nor  Bock 
talked  to  Jodl,  who  had  relayed  HM@t% 
decision.  Both  assumed  'some"  prepa- 
ration would  satisfy  Hitler,  and  Bock 
ordered  the  armies  to  get  ready  to  go 
back  and  to  prepare  the  Rzhev- 
Gzhatsk-Qrel-Kursk  line  "to  the  extent 

A  Hme  for  Decisions 

The  morning  of  the  15th  saw 
BraucMlSCh  &&  hfe  Way  back  to  East 
Prussia  as  another  cold  wave  numbed 
the  Eastern  Front.  During  die  night 
the  temperalLU  e  liad  dropped  to  —33° 
F.  at  Tikhvin.  In  t!ie  morning,  Leeb 
telephoned  Hitler,  something  his  col- 
league Bock  had  thus  far  avoided,  and 
he  told  the  Fuehrer  that  the  time  had 
come  to  give  up  the  idea  of  holding 
dose  to  Tikhvin.  lb  Hitler's  familiar 
protest  that  giving  up  their  last  hand- 
hold at  Tikhvin  wotild  expose  the 
Leningrad  bottleneck,  Leeb  replied 
that  the  troops  had  to  have  some  shel- 
ter and  rest;  therefore,  they  had  to  take 
them  forl^'-five  miles  west  to  the  Vol- 
kliov  River  line.  Wlien  Hider  failed  to 
give  a  clear  decision  either  way,  Leeb 
assumed  the  choice  was  his  and,  at  1200, 
issued  the  order  to  start  for  the  Volkhov. 
Seven  hours  later  Field  Marshal  Keitel, 
chief  of  the  OKW,  called  and  asked 
Leeb  to  stop  because  Hitler  could  still 


-Hbid..  14  Dec  41. 


not  decide.  Leeb  thereupon  chosig  £0 
visit  xhc  Fiirhrrr  Head(|iiarters.'-  ' 

At  Army  Group  Center  dial  day, 
Nindi  Army  was  ready  to  evacuate 
linin.  having  set  dcinolirion  charges 
tin  (jughout  the  city  and  particularly  on 
the  Volga  River  Bridge.  Thiwd  ajod 
Fourth  Panzer  Groups  were  retreating 
in  — 15°  F.  weather  and  snow  that 
Hoepner  predicted  would  cost  Foiu  th 
Panzer  Group  most  of  its  artillery.  Bock 
urged  him  to  "consider  every  step  back 
a  hundred  times."  Guderian  had  a  ten- 
mile-wide  gap  in  Second  Panzer  Army^ 
front  west  of  Tula,  and  Schmidt  re- 
ported that  Second  Army  could  only 
hold  forward  of  the  Orel-Kursk  rail- 
road if  the  enemy  made  bad  mistakes, 
which  he  showed  no  signs  of  doing.  At 
noon  on  the  15th,  the  OKH  operations 
branch  chief,  Colonel  Heusinger,  tele- 
phoned advance  notice  of  a  Fuehrer 
order  he  said  would  follow.  Under  it, 
he  said.  Ninth  Army  and  Third  and 
Fourth  Panzer  Groups  could  withdraw 
thirty  to  forty  miles  to  Staricsa  and  the 
line  of  the  Lama  and  Ruza  rivers.  The 
army  grou[),  Heusinger  added,  would 
gJso  he  free  to  withdraw  'graduaJOiy"  to 

The  Fkiehrer  Takes  Gotmmnd 

Hitler's  "Yes"  and  "Nu" 

The  I6th  was  a  day  of  decisions  at 
Fuehrer  Headquarters.  Hider  had  re* 
ttn  ned  there  the  night  before  after  he 
had  prolonged  his  stay  in  Berlin  for 
some  minor  diplomatic  affairs.  His  ab- 
sence from  the  W^sse!mm,  however. 


'"H.  Gr.  iW/rrf.  In  Knrgil/igrhurh.  I.I2.-31.12A!.  \b 
ISec  41.  H.  Gr.  NortI  Tfj  128/4  lik-, 

2.  la  Knt'gstagilmfh  Russirnid.  Tal  II.  1.5  Dec 
41,  AOK  2  16690/2  tile;  H  Gr.  MUU\  In  Km-^stnqctni,h, 
Dezember  i941,  15  Oct  41,  H.  Gr.  Mitte  26974/6  tile. 


THE  COUNTEROFFENSIVE:  FIRST  PHASE 


81 


did  mean  he  wa§  out  of  touch  w'nh 
wliat  uas  going  on  at  the  front.  Evcr%- 
thing  tic  nct'cled  or  wanted  to  know 
was  availaMc  lo  him  by  telephone  or 
lliroxigh  the  army's  communications 
center  at  Zosscu.  t\veni\  miles  south  of 
Beiiin.  But  he  was  out  ot  personal 
contact  with  liie  militai  \  chiefs,  w  liicii 
may  have  suited  him  sine  e  he  tended  to 
vaoUate  near  lethargv  while  making 
crucial  decisions.  On  (lie  14th.  he  hafi 
given  Bock  and  Bi  auctiiistii  a  "no"  tliat 
sound«i  Mtee  a  "yes."  On  the  15th,  he- 
had  been  unable  to  decide  about 
likhvin  iillci  more  than  seven  hours 
Imt  bad  apparandy  agreed  to  a  far 
more  extensive  wididrawal  for  Arnu 
Group  Center.  A  d^y  later,  tliough,  tliis 
tMnking  too  would  dbantge. 

In  a  morning  interview  with  Leel)  on 
the  16th.  Hitler,  harelv  protesting, 
agreed  in  h  (  .Ai  my  Group  North  give 
up  the  likh\in  salient.  With 
Braiichitsch  ]}resent.  he  blamed  the 
current  pt edicament  on  bad  advice 
from  the  OKIi.  He  had  ahvays  known, 
he  declared,  thai  Army  (iioup  Ncjrtli 
was  too  weak.  If  the  OKH  had  given 
Thirfl  Pan/er  Croup  lo  Army  Group 
North  in  August  as  he  had  wanted  it  to, 
Leningrad  would  have  been  com- 
pletely surrounded,  contact  would 
have  been  matle  with  the  Finns,  and 
there  would  be  no  problem.** 

Having  made  his  decision  on 
likiiviii.  Hitler  considered  the  (jues- 
lions  pertaining  to  Army  Group  Cen- 
ter. At  1200,  Haider  telephoned 
Hitler's  decisions  to  Bock.  Army  Group 
Center,  he  said,  would  receive  an  oi di  i 
allowing  Ninth  Army  antl  Third  and 
Fourth  Panzer  Groups  to  complete 
their  withdrawals,  "if  no  {Hber  (imtx 

-"n.  (ri.  /„  Ktux^i^:«ii,u,h.  OtwaAer  1941.  15 
Utt  41.  H.  Gi.  NortI  75128/4  file. 


existed."  The  other  armies  wi  >uld  close 
the  gaps  in  their  lines  and  stand  fast. 
Haider  had  not  attended  the  morning's 
meeting  and  was  transmitting  what  he 
had  heard  from  Jodl.  The  order,  as 
HiUer  was  having  those  in  the  OKW 
Operations  Branch  write  it.  was  imiiidb 
stronger  than  Hakier  knew.  I  hev  were 
making  a  stiategic  decision  e<|ual  to 
aajfliius  far  in  the  war,  and  the  CJKH 
was  out  of  the  picture,  primarily  he- 
cause  Brauciiitsch  had  ceased  to  func- 
1iOfi>e;^^a  '^tett@r  carrier."  After  the 
morning  conference,  Schmundi  told 
Bocks  chief  of  staff.  General  Gt  eillen- 
[)erg.  that  Hitler  had  "sidetracked" 
Brauchitscli  as  far  as  die  fliscussions  of 
the  current  situatiiju  were  concerned. 
For  now  Sdimundt  said  he  would  tse 
the  aitny^^up's  point  of  contact  at 
Fuehrer  Headquarters  because  Hitler 
'was  uking  everything  into  his  own 
hands," 

VVlien  Bock  asked  later  whether 
Brauchitsch  had  reported  how  close 
the  armv  group  was  to  being  "smashed 
to  pieces,"  Schmundt  said  he  hatl  not. 
Implying  that  Hiilei  had  not  been  told 
how  serious  Bock's  situation  was, 
Schmundt  added  that  Hider  had  said 
he  "could  not  send  everything  out  into 
the  winter  just  because  Army  Group 
Center  had  a  few  gaps  in  its  front, "  Still 
unwilling  to  talk  to  Hitler  in  person, 
Bock  recapitulated  his  trotibles  to 
Schmundt  and  asked  him  to  relay  Uiem 
to  Hitler  l^rmely  he  added  that  it  was 
really  impossible  to  tell  which  was  tnore 
dangerous,  to  hold  or  to  retreat,  liither 
way  the  army  group  was  like])'  to  be 
destroyed.  At  midnight,  Hider  called 
Bock.  Schmundt  had  reported  their 
earlier  conversation,  Hitler  said,  and 
there  was  only  (jne  correct  decision, 
"not  to  go  a  step  back,  to  dose  the  gaps 


82 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


and  hold."  He assured  Bock  that  infaA'? 
try  reinforcements  and  air  transpqat 
were  in  a  state  of  readiness,  aird  lie  was 
supervising  their  deploynient  liimself  . 
Wlien  Bock,  trying  to  turn  tlie  talk  lo 
what  might  happen  before  the  rein- 
forcements came,  remarked  that  the 
front  "could  rip  open  an\  hotu,"  Hitler 
cut  him  off  with  a  curt,  "  I  will  have  to 
take  that  chance  into  the  bai^ifti"  SU3id; 
htmg  iip.^' 

If  Hitler  prided  himself  on  one  thing 
above  all,  it  was  his  ability  lo  handle  a 
crisis.  He  liked  to  describe  himself  as 
beset  by  crises  thrcjughout  his  life, 
many  of  which  he  mastered  against 
seemingly  hopeless  odds.  On  that 
score,  in  fact,  he  tlid  not  have  to  boast; 
his  tiecofd  spoke  for  him.  He  had  not 
only  mastered  crises;  he  had  prohted 
from  them.  Some  he  had  even  con- 
trived. The  cjne  on  the  Eastern  Fi  out  in 
Decemljer  1941  was  a  crisis  he  did  not 
want,  but  when  he  knew  he  could  not 
evade  it,  he  did  what  he  had  done  with 
all  of  the  others.  He  set  out  to  resolve  it 
on  the  terms  most  satisfactory  to  him- 
self, terms  of  power,  his  power  which, 
whatever  qualms  he  might  have  begun 
to  have  about  the  futtire,  he  judged 
would  be  more  than  enough  to  bring 
him  through  that  winter  in  Russia. 
What  the  army  could  not  do  in  its  own 
fashion  it  would  have  to  do  in  his.  He 
could  not  control  the  weather  or  the 
Russians,  but  he  could  maniptdate  the 
German  Ann|; 

ffe«f  Itg  i(f¥«ild  do  that  began  to 
em^r^  Oia  the  morning  of  the  18th 
l^iieii  ^  mder  announced  two  days 


■■H.  Ci.  Mill::  ill  Kiir!:~iii,!::i>:uh^ptiiBmber  i€ 
Dec  41.  H.  Gr,  Mine  213974/6  tile. 


h^&m  imaB  over  the  teler^e  to  Army 
Gmm^  Qm^E.  l^readi 

The  BiiCitoeflsaS  ordered:  Larger  evasive 
movetnetlts  cannot  he  made.  They  will  lead 
to  a  total  Kiss  of  y  weapons  and  et|uip- 
ment.  Commaiicling  generals,  comman- 
ders, aTid  oititei  ';  arc  lo  intervene  in  per- 
son to  compel  the  troops  lo  fanatical 
resistance  in  their  positions  vviihoui  regard 
to  i^uemy  brtjken  throiigt  isk]  on  the 
i3aft!ks  cut m  ihe  fear  Tras  n  the  only  way  to 
gain  the  ihim  necessary  to  bring  up  the 
reinforcements  from  Germany  and  the 
West  dial  I  have  ordered.  Onb'  il  resei"ves 
have  moved  into  rearward  positions  can 
ilmugin  be  given  to  withdrawing  to  those 
positions.'* 

Within  the  army  group  the  reaction 
ranged  from  resignation  to  outrage. 
Kluge  predicted  that  no  matter  what 
the  orders  the  army  group  could  not 
hold  the  line.  Reinhardt  and  Hoepnef 
doubted  that  they  could  bring  the 
Third  and  Fourth  Panzer  Groups'  divi- 
sions to  even  a  temporary  stop  ori  the 
l^uaa-Ruza  line.  Bock  passed  the  order 
on  without  protest  and  told  Hoepner 
to  "hold  your  fist  In  the  backs  of  flbese 
people."  Guderian  asked  for  an  air- 
plane to  take  hkgi  to  Hitler.  Over  tfee 
telephone  M  toM^emny  group  iiMeS 
of  staff: 

The  sitiKition  is  iiiorc  scsioits  dian  out 
could  imagine.  If  stjnieihing  does  not  hap- 
pen S&Qt!,  things  will  oCdUr  tiiiat  die^@eE« 
man  armed  forces  have  never  hi^^re 
experienced.  I  wHl  take  these  ordet*  aQ4 
file  them.  I  vM  not  pass  them  on  even 
under  threat  gf  court-martial.  I  want  at 
least  to  give  career  a  respecmble 
ending,*^ 


^'DiT  Fuflitn  Hmt  Obmte  Bejekhhiibfr  dn  W'fhimmht, 
WFSt.  Ahl.  L.  il  Oj>.)  ,Vr.  4-i2!S2.  iri.12.4!.  OKW  2018 
file;  OKH,  GmSldH.  Op.  .Mn.  S>.  TI7(H-H.  an  H.  Gr. 
Mitle.  1S.I2.J1.  H.Gr.  Mitte  Ir'^nO.V/  liie. 

G)   MiUe.  la  Kii.-gsUigdnir/i.  Dexeinter  1941, 
17- ly  Dec  41,  H.  Gr.  Miue  26974/6  hie. 


THE  COUNTEROFFENSIVE:  FIRST  PHASE 


83 


Wifh  the  otiier  t&  stand  fm,  Hider 

took  all  conimaiid  initialise  out  of  ihe 
generals'  hands.  Later  some  would  say 
It  was  prtibably  the  best  that  tsmald  have 
been  done  under  the  circumslances. 
but  that  was  later.  At  tlie  iiionicnt, 
had  M€$dlesily  saddled  an  en- 
tire army  group  with  a  sure  idc  mission. 
Ruleless  compulsion  now  replaced 
leader«litp  anid  tmisfeniied  Army 
Group  Center  into  a  mere  for 
HiUcr's  will. 

■Wliatthe  order  would  acconi]jlish  on 
the  snovvficlds  of  Russia  remained  a 
question.  U  did  abolish  the  last  pre- 
tense of  army  autonomy  within  the 
Nazi  state  with  remarkable  ease.  lalk- 
ing  lo  Schmundl  on  the  l(jth  and  aware 
then  that  he  was  about  to  be  given  an 
order  tlial  would  very  likely  put  him  in 
tlte  ptisition  oi  ]ii  esiding  o\  er  his  army 
groups  destruction ,  Bock  had  re- 
marked about  his  own  shakv  health, 
which  he  said  was  "hanging  by  a 
thread "  and  had  added  that  Hitler 
loight  need  "fresh  strength"  in  the 
army  group  command.  He  did  not 
mean.  Bock  hastencfl  to  assure 
Schmundt,  to  implv  any  kind  of  a 
threat  but  was  merely  stating  tact. 
^Vfeitever  his  intent  had  been,  he  was 
not  prepared  for  the  response  he  re- 
ceived the  next  day  when  Biauchitsch 
called  and  told  him  Rider  wanted  iifan 
to  submit  a  retjuest  for  leave.  Tliis  now 
struck.  Bock  as  "somewhat  sudden," 
and  from  then  on  he  became  more 
rniKernefl  with  learning  whether  "the 
Fuehrer  Itas  a  repi  oach  to  l  aise  against 
me  on  any  ground"  than  with  the  fate 
of  the  armv  group.  On  the  19th,  having 
pi ompdy  received  leave  until  his  health 
was  "fully  restored,"  he  turned  (jver 
comtiiand  to  Kluge  and  parted  from 
his  staff  witli  a  limp  assertion  that  the 


«ctid  tif  the  cBit  period"  msia  %hL*» 

Brauchitsch  Rpsigtis 

In  the  mcaniinie.  alter  having  been 
cut  out  oi"  the  decisions  on  the  16lh, 
Brauchitsch  had  finally  submitted  his 
own  resignation.  Hitler  accepted  it  on 
the  19th  and  immediately  (^^j^Cdied 
the  following  prockiuation: 

Soldiers  of  the  .^rmy  and  the  Waffen  SSI 
Our  stniggle  for  nadonal  liberation  is  ap- 
proaching its  cllinax!  Decisions  ol  woiul 
impoitance  are  aboiii  to  be  iii;iciel  Ihe 
Arnn  hear  s  tlie  (jiiiiiar\  i  (  spdiisibility  for 
baide!  i  have  iheretore  as  of  this  day 
myself  taken  command  of  the  Army!  As  a 
soldier  who  foucbt  in  many  World  War 
batdes  I  am  dbse^  tied  to  you  in  the  will  to 
victory.'^ 

Brauchitsch's  going  wiis  no  great  sur- 
prise, and  he,  no  doubt  to  Hitler's 
satis^eion,  made  itas  banal  and  point- 
less  an  event  as  a  commander  in  chiefs 
departure  at  the  height  of  battle  could 
possibly  be. 

Hitlers  taking  command  ctf  tlie  anuv, 
on  the  other  hand,  had  die  effect  ol  an 
administrafit^  earthquake.  In  th«;  tsm- 
gle  of  agencies  with  overlapping  func- 
tions Hider  used  to  run  the  war — in 
particular  OKW,  OKH,  SS,  Ihfe  Muni- 
tions Ministry,  and  the  Transport  Min- 
istiy — a  commander  in  chief,  army, 
evfitt  <^  m  vtmk  as  Brauchitsch,  at 
least  ga\  e  the  army  an  identit\.  Without 
its  own  commander  in  cliief,  the  army 
lay  open  to  disMembertQent;  tJuK  of- 
fices ^^hich  assumed  its  funcdoilR  lisere 
clusters  of  power  cut  adrift*  One  such 
-was  Ihc^  Office  of  the  Chiefs  Army 
Armament  and  the  Replacement  Army 


'"/W,.  K)  Dci  11:  linri:  Dmn.  Ihim  I,  ijp.  30U-04. 
Dec  41,  H.  Gr.  Miite  26974/6  die. 


84 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


tinder  Generalcfeerst  Wedrieh  Fromm 

aiifl  nnntlier  was  the  Office  of  the  Chief 
of  Array  Personnel  under  Generalnia- 
jot  Bodwin  Kcitel.  Gontit»Mng  atmy 
pl  ot  iircmcnl  and  production  and 
commanding  all  army  troops  iiiside 
Germany,  Fromm  hSM  enough  pov^ 
at  his  disposal  to  control  the  German 
state.  Keitei,  younger  brother  to 
Wilhelm  Kdtd,  the  oM.  OKW,  kept 
tilt'  officer  personnel  files  atnd  coulrl 
iniluence  promotions  and  appoint- 
ments in  all  ranks.  I-Yomm  and  Kdtel 
were  directly  subordinate  to  the  com- 
mander in  chief,  army.  HiUer,  hovve\  er, 
had  no  time  for  what  he  called  "minis- 
terial" functions  and  put  both  their 
offices,  nominally  at  least,  under  Keilcl, 
the  chief,  OKW.  The  OKW,  having 
failed  to  establish  itself  as  a  true  joint 
command  over  the  three  services,  liad 
for  several  years  been  acting  as  a  kind 
of  second  army  command,  superior  in 
its  t  loser  relationship  to  Hitler  but  un- 
able to  reach  past  the  commandl^  iil 
chief,  army,  direclly  into  army  c<in- 
cerns.  How  much  capital  die  OK.VV 
could  make  out  of  the  army  personnel 
office  and  the  replacement  trainins;  wns 
perhaps  a  question,  but  in  armameni 
production,  the  OKW  and  the  OKH 
were  hard-bitten  rivals. 

For  the  heart  of  OKH,  the  Ainiy 
General  Staff,  the  position  was  even 
more  ciilical.  jodl's  Armed  Forces  Op- 
erations Staff,  aside  from  counseling 

Hiilei  on  strategy,  was  already  the  gen^ 

eial  staff  for  all  ihe:i(crs  except  the 
East.  VVlien  Hitler  named  himseU  ctmi- 
imnder  in  chief  ,  army,  if  dtfaer  OK.W 
or  OKH  did  not  become  superfluous, 
certainly  either  the  Armed  Forces  Op- 
erations Staff  or  tlie  Aimy  General 
Staff  did.  Hitler,  who  seldom  objected 
lo  having  two  agencies  douig  one  job  as 


teng  a«  he  ccMlcmHied  hioth,  loM  Hald^ 
on  the  afternoon  of  the  19th  to  carry 
on  activities  in  OKH  as  usual;  but 
^tfaln  hours  word  had  li^l«id  ftom 

Fuehrer  Head(|iiarters  that  JodI  SOOII 
would  replace  Haider  as  chief  of  the 
Army  GOTcral  Staff,  and  Genei  al  Man- 
siein  would  move  from  Ele\enth  Ai  iny 
Lo  replace  Jodl.  According  to  the 
rtiin6v,  the  changes  would  occur  as 
soon  as  Manstein  finished  his  opera- 
lions  in  the  Crimea,  which  were  then 
expected  to  last  only  a  few  more 
weeks.''-  Manstein  stood  well  witli 
Hitler,  who  liatl  prolited  fiom  his  stra- 
tegic ideas  particularly  in  the  1940  cam- 
paign in  the  West,  and  not  well  at  all 
with  die  General  Staff  who  had  long 
viewed  him  as  too  importimate  for 
llaldcrs  post.  Jodl  and  Manstein  could 
lia\  e  spelled  ilic  end  for  die  OKH  as  it 
had  existed  under  Brauchitsch  and 
Haider. 

If  Hitler  had  deprived  the  field  com- 
mam&s  of  their  iniiiaiive,  he  fiad  done 
even  more  to  OKI  I.  In  the  prevailing 
atmosphere  of  chant^e  charged  with 
apprehension  and  amliition,  he  could 
df>  exactlv  as  lie  ]>leased.  \o  one  was 
going  to  oj^pose  him.  On  the  20tlt,  lie 
gave  Haider  orders  on  how  he  wanted 
the  war  in  (lie  f^ast  conducted.  A  "fa- 
natical will  to  light'  would  have  to  be 
instilled  in  the  troops  by  "all,  even  the 
most  severe,  means."  Soldiers  had  no 
"contiacts"  lestricting  them  to  specific 
duties.  Those  in  support  positions, 
such  as  bakei  s,  t ould  defend  their  own 
positions,  and  all  troops  would  have  to 
l^n  to  "tolerate  breakthroughs."  Rifle 
piQ  were  to  be  dug  by  blasting  holes  in 


"Of!  CVir/'  fin  Hei-mruntUHg  u»d  BejehUmbn  dti 
llniit-Jwnn.  Dn  Chef  dts  Stoits,  Tigektdt,  19  Dec  41, 
CMH  X-124  flic. 


the  p^oiind  or  l)v  blo\v  iiig  ihem  in  with 
artiilei^  fire.  The  Germans  could  take 
wMter  dbthing  from  Soviet  civilians; 
ihe  army  was  solch  obligated  to  take 
care  of  its  own  tniops.  And,  he  de- 
manded. "Every  man  must  defend 
himself  where  he  is."''''  Haider  trans- 
mitted a  simimary  of  these  orders  to 
the  army  groups  as  an  "eluddation"  of 
the  standfast  order.^* 

Qadenan  at  Ae  Btekrer  0eaiqimtm 

On  the  morning  of  the  20th,  also, 
Guderian  set  out  for  the  Fuehrer  Head- 
quajters  by  airplane — witboKt  stop- 
ping at  the  army  group  headquarters 


"Haider Di(in.  v<il.  III.  pp.  S66-60. 
"OKll.  G,-nSt,lll.  Dp.  M,!.  S'r.  UOSIUl,  an  H.  Or. 
MiUe.  21.12AI.  H.  Gi.  Mitie  05003/7  lile. 


as  protocol  would  ordinarily  have  re- 
quired. Wliile  Guderian's  Second  Pan- 
zer Army  was  in  Hight,  Kliige  was  oc- 
cuj>ied  will)  telegrams  from  his  other 
army  commanders,  fourth  Army 
reported: 

Enemy  attacking  in  the  army's  deep  Sat^ 
aiming  toward  Kaluga.  Axxay  iias  no  tttott 
forces  at  its  dispos^.  Cottsljat  i5t»engt3i  sinjt- 
ing.  Holding  present  positioiis  not  possible 
in  the  long  i  iiii 

From  Hoepner  at  Fourth  Panzer 
Group  Khige  h^  heard  that: 

The  Cointiianding  Generals  of  XXXXVI 
and  V  Corp*  have  reported  thq'  tsmn&t 
hdld.  Heaver  losses  of  trucks  and  weapc»i$ 
in  ireipent  days.  They  had  to  be  destroyed 


^'H.  Ci.  Mill,',  III.  an  OKI  I.  GenStdH,  Op.  Alt., 
20.12.-IJ.  11.  Gv.  Mitte  (i500.V7  file. 


86 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


fdt  of  gasoline.  W^pons  now  SS-^ 
percent  of  reqiuraneiits.  Only  course  to 
give  orders  to  hoW  lo  the  last  man.  The 
troops  will  then  begiXie^K^tb^willljea 

hole  in  ihe  fVonl.'* 

Aiui  from  Slr;!iiss  at  Ninth  Army: 

Prtsoiil  battle  aica  wooded  and  has  poor 
visibility.  If  il  has  to  hold  there  the  arni) 
is  Ukely  to  be  broken  through  and 

lb  Haider  at  OKH  with  whom  he  was 
in  telephone  contact  throughout  the 
day,  Kluge  presented  various  proposals 
for  withdrawals.  All  of  thetn  Haider 
lejected,  ddng  Hitler's  diverse  stric- 
tures ag^nst  giving  up  positiotis. 

After  nightfall,  Kkige  was  back  on 
ilie  telephone  lo  Haider  telling  him 
tliat  Guderians  courage  had  waned, 
and  he  did  not  intend  to  hold  his  line. 
On  (hrtkinj;  Second  Panzer  Army's 
reports  and  dispositiom,  Kluge  said,  he 
bad  discovered  that  Guderian  had 
inwed  one  regiment  fVoni  eacli  of  the 
army^s  divisions  back  forty  miles  to  tlie 
Oka  River,  which  could  only  mm^  he 
was  goin^  to  retreat.  Guderian  had  by 
dien  arrived  at  ilie  Fuehreir  li^dquar- 
t»S  sotd  was  iirith  tfitler  wtieri  Haider 
pli^lKgd  in  the  in  lor  mat  ion  from 
Ktu^..  In  a  stormy  interview,  which 
Reitei.  diM  ©f  file  OKW,  witnessed 
in  d\sm^,  Hifler  accused  Guderian 
of  hHVitl^  eoncocted  "an  insane 
scheme."**^  Afterward,  Haider  called 
Klugr  airrl  lold  him  that  Hitler  liad 
"straightened  out"  Guderian  and  given 


Isanti  a  direct  order  to  hold  Ms  front 

jgxacily  w  here  it  stood, 

Having  exposed  Guderians  plan, 
Kluge  returned  to  his  own  proposals 
for  withdrawals.  Tlie  trouble  with  what 
Guderian  wanted  to  do,  he  said,  was 
that  it  woiald  have  been  a  "full-blown 
ret) cat."  not  a  step-by-step  withdrawal. 
Haltler,  who  did  not  want  to  have  to 
discuss  either  alternative  with  Hitler, 
tried  the  next  morning  to  inflnenre 
Kluge,  through  General  Brenneeke, 
his  diief  of  st^F,  lo  hold  at  all  posidons 
ff)i  another  two  weeks.  He  predicted 
die  crisis  \vould  pass  by  dien,  and  he 
said  the  army  group  would  be  sorry  if  it 
pulled  ba<  k  loo  soon,^" 

Finall\.  on  tlie  morning  of  the  22d, 
Bock,  w  iio  had  matle  the  trip  by  stages 
in  a  sedan,  arrived  at  vh<^  Fuflirrr  Head- 
quarters. He  was  much  relie\  ed  by  the 
friendly  way  Hitter  raseived  him  that 
aluniooii.  and  they  proceeded  to  talk 
about  \nn\  Group  Center  in  general 
terms.  Rock  apparently  was  saiislied 
when  Hitler  assurcfl  hiin  that  he  knew 
how  sei  inus  llie  arnu  groiijj's  situation 
was.  Alter  1  liller  also  assured  him 
that  he  could  report  l>ack  when  he 
\^'as  recovered.  Bock  took  liis  leave. 
.Sto|)ping  only  long  enough  td  Sisk 
.S(liinundt  again  whether  ther^e  were 
an)  're]*!  oaches"  against  him,  he  re- 
stimed  iiis  winter's  drive,  this  time 
toward  Berlin." 

As  tonHuander  in  chief,  army,  Hitler 
was  no  ntDre  moved  by  tlie  troubles  of 
an\  one  group  than  lie  ever  had  been. 
He  hated  lo  lose  ground,  but  human 


(,r.  Mint-  il'jIKI"!  7  lik-. 

■■■  uih  In  S :  i7l4I,mft,Gr.M^  i9JlS;:41.  H. 
(..r.  .\!i!U-  (jr>()U3/7  file. 

'%ienmil  Haider's  tk^  Netts,  vol.  1, 20  Dec  41,  ElW^ 
21-g-l6/4/q  file. 


(.r.  Millt;  In  Kurgstiifi^fbufh.  [hirmlir,  l</ll,  20 
DcL  41,  H.  V,\.  MilLf  2m~AH\  tile.  Sec  Avy  tuKli'ilan, 
Paiiwr  t ■t/uli'i:  ])[).  'i()'l-fiS. 

*"H  (.1.  Mittr.  1,1  Ki'^-^'.iitgelmch,  Deiember  19^1,  21 
Oct  tl,  Il.<>r.  Mint- 2(>'.l74/6  file. 

*'Bo€k  Diary,  Often  1.  p.  ^04. 


THE  COUNTERQFFENSIVE:  FIRST  PHASE 


87 


misery  did  not  touch  him.  In  one  of  the 
late-night  monologues  he  cleUvererl  to 
liis  secretaries  and  selected  guests,  he 
observed: 

Luduly  noiliing  hists  torcver — and  that  is 
a  ccmsoiing^  thought.  Even  inra^u^wi^ta; 
one  toiows  that  spring  will  folfow.  And  if. 

at  this  inonient.  men  ai  r  being  turned  into 
Ijloiks  (if  ice.  that  won't  prevent  the  April 
sLiii  (roiii  shining  and  restoring  Me  to 
lliese  flesolale  places.''^ 

In  fact,  his  thoughts  shifted  readily 
away  fitwn  htmian  suffering  to  othetr 
toniiTHs.  He  worried  about  a  loss  of 
prestige  al  Leningrad  and  discussed 
with  Haider  the  possibility  of  using 
poison  gas  to  end  the  resistance  in  the 
city  fast.*^ 

On  ii»e  2Sd,  HMef  caBed  Twmm  in 
from  Berlin  to  repoi  t  on  manpowei 
and  armaments.  (Fromm  appreciated 
this  call  m  a  significant  triumph  over 
his  recently  de.signated  chief,  Keite!. 
who  liad  tried  to  make  iiimself  die 
dwmnel  fbr  sm^  rejports.)  IBSmt  tsSked 
to  Fromm  for  hours  about  S^uikling 
the  army  for  a  1942  offensive  and 
about  a  "Hector  of  the  future,"  which 
would  use  far  less  raw  material  than 
would  trucks.  He  said  Dr.  Ferdinand 
Pors^ihe,  tfie  Volkswagen  designer, 
would  have  a  pTOKSlypc  reach  "in  a  few 
days. "  As  far  at  Eastern  Front  was 
tonceimed,  he  expected  to  he  "over  the 

hump"  in  ten  davs  to  I\y<i  weeks  He 
said  "there  had  been  a  hole  near  iula, " 
but  elsavherei  the  firont  would  hold.^ 


*'Hil!vr\  SiTTi'l  Cvm>n\iiliiins  lNl<nv  Vdik:  J'arr.'ir, 
Sli;iiise&  Wilms,  \\K^^\.  |i  I Kl 

"(.,m-wl  IhiliW-.  Duih  A.-r-  v,  vol.  I,  23  Dec  41.  I'.AP 
21- IIVl  (I  file. 

"th  r  <  hrj  itrr  Heeresrufituug  utid  Bejehiittaber  del 
Ervifji,-n,-..  Uri  Chrfda  Slaba,  Tipbu^,  23  Dec  41, 
CMH  \-m  file. 


After  the  first  few  days,  the  generals 
found  having  Hitler  in  direct  com- 
mand, if  ominous,  also  somewhat  stim- 
ulating. For  a  long  rime  none  of  them 
had  kno%vn  what  went  cm  between 
Biaitcliitsch  and  HiUer,  if  anything; 
and  in  recent  iNtieelES,  Bimuchitsch  had 
x  irtuallv  not  communicated  with  Hitler 
or  his  own  subordinates.  From  19  De- 
cember on,  Haider  and  two  or  three  of 
his  branch  chiefs  saw  Hitler  every  day. 
hue,  he  lectured  to  tliem  more  than 
he  eawsulted  them,  but  they  were  at  the 
center  and  no  longer  getting  their  in- 
structions secotid  or  third  liand 
through  Reitel,  Jodl,  or  Schmundt. 
Frc^mm  was  even  encouraged.  Me 
wrote  to  his  military  district  comman- 
ders, "The  Ftiehrei 's  taking  command 
is  an  honor  for  the  Army.  The  Army's 
work  will  becotne  easier,  not  moi  e  diffi- 
cult."*® After  his  conference  with 
Hider  on  the  23d,  he  believed  that 
either  the  OKH  or  the  OKW  would 
"disappear,"  hut  he  had  enough  con- 
fidence in  the  OKH  s  ]irospect  for  sur- 
vival to  instruct  his  staif  to  "march  with 
all  energy"  in  the  cause  of  the  OKH.'" 
Khige  was  cnmmanding  an  army 
group  m  clesper.iie  peril,  but  he  was,  al 
last,  holding  a  command  conuuensu- 
rate  witij  bis  held  marshal's  rank.  When 
Bock  mrived  in  Berlin,  howevei.  he 
lei^eii— 'itfl^  a!Qgi:ushi--{hat  hv  was. 
not  iJte  emmsming  general.  Army 
Group  Center,  on  lea\  e,  but  had  been 
put  along  with  Rundsiedi,  ex-com- 
manding general.  Army  Group  South^ 
in  the  command  reserve  pool.*' 


"Vftw/..  22  Dc(  11. 
**lbul..  23  Det  ir 
*'fiof  A  Diary,  (hini  I.  p.  3(Jti. 


CHAPTER  V 

The  Gounteroffensive;  Second  Phase 


The  Soviet  Imtiatwe 

*ptie  ftret  phase  €hfe  cmmterofifehi 
jsive  ended  on  16  December  wndi  the 
German  spearheads,  which  had  been 
aimed  it  mmxm,  dis^Me^i  anad 

HHjoiity  of  the  original  Soviet  ob(etti\  es 
taken.  Twentieth  Army  iiad  entered  Sol- 
nechnogorsk  on  the  12th,  and  ThiA  Arrn^ 
was  in  Stalinogorsk  the  next  day.  A 
mobile  group  set  up  by  Thirtieth  Army 
took  Khii  5h  ihe  W&i,  Thirfy^first 
Army  troops  marched  into  Kalinin  on  ihc 
16di.  The  armies  had  advanced  over 
thirty  miles  on  the  north  flank  and  bet- 
ter than  fift)'  miles  on  the  soulh.  No  new 
aitriies  had  been  deployed  dungi^  the 
first  phase;  however,  mt  ttiuriber 
troops  conimitletl  hat!  probably  grown 
substantially  during  llie  ten-day  period. 
Gen^eral  Lelyushei5iLO>  at  Thirtieth  Arn^i 
had  been  awaiting  the  aixival  of  the 
larger  part  of  a  halMozen  Sibeiian  and 
Uiate  divisiom  when  the  jSuniferiSffen- 
sive  began/ 

General  Zbukov  had  issued  an  initial 
second  direc^e  to  his  right  flatik 
armies  on  13  Decemljer.  In  it,  he  or- 
dered dicm  to  advance  to  "an  average 
distance  of  130  cb  160  kiioimeters  [78  to 
96  miles]  west  and  northivest  of 
Moscow."-  Zlinkov  believed  that  die  ob- 


'/I'jVfV:  \f)!.  IV.  [),  tm-.  VOV,  p.  IIS;  Yevsdgncfev. 
Velikeiya  hilvn.  p.  IH4:  Lfl\  ushenko,  AfosAufl,  p;.  90, 
-Lclyushciiku,  MM^i'a,  p.  UO. 


jeeSve  fori&e  rest  of  iSie  winter  shottld 

be  to  drive  l^e entire  Arnu  C.ioiip  Cen- 
ter back  ISO'  mUes  to  tlie  line  east  of 
•Sifiolensk  from  whidt  it  had  feotHiied 
Taifi  n  in  early  October.  T<i  do  so,  be 
estimated,  would  require  resupply  and 
tepfec^eiiiS  for  the  armies  ^dready  in 
action  and  four  fresh  armies  from  the 
SUwka  reserves.  Zhukov%  thought  was  tQ 
keep  the  advance  essentiaDy  frontal 
while  using  mobile  groups,  which  were 
being  fomied  in  all  the  araiies  (typically 
out  of  a  cavalry  division,  a  tank  brigade, 
and  a  rifle  lirigade),  to  strike  at  targets  of 
opportunity  aJiead  of  the  main  forces.'^ 
StaUn  and  the  SAJwiSi  !towBr«?  "were 
beginning  to  think  in  less  consen  ative 
terms.  They  allowed  West  Fmnt  to  go  into 
ifeiB  second  phase  as  Zhttfejv  proposed 
but  without  the  four  armies  as  reinforce- 
ments. Zliukov  made  diis  diange,  bring- 
mg  his  (^ter,  v^'hicli  mti^<bA  c£  S^, 
Thirfy-lhird,  Forty-third,  and  Foiiy-nifith  Ar- 
mies, into  tile  couiiteroffensive  on  18 
Dei^Kfb&R  K^ehts  of  Hf^  Am^,  in- 
cluding a  mobile  group  imder  General 
Mayor  L.  M.  Dovatoi',  liad  been  in  action 
#eiee  the  lltJi,  mid  j^f^^t^ftfil  Avrnf^  left 
flank  had  been  enraticd  losrcthei  with 
Fiftieth  Army  in  the  Tula  sector  since  die 
I4tli.  Thiriy-th&d  SG'^.^rty-third  Armies 
took  a  week  to  move  out  of  their  starting 
positions.'^  (Map  7.) 

=Vluik(iv,  Affffw/f.s,  p.  3S1.  SeeFOK  p.  115. 

wovss,  \<>\.  u,  pp.  ^m^xJVMv^  vol.  rv,  pp. 

289-9J;  VOV,  p.  118. 


MAP  7 


90 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


The  reinforcements  went  to  the  outer 
flanks  of  the  offensive,  which  were  noi 
under  Zhukov's  control.  Thirtieth  Army, 
from  West  Front,  and  Thirty-mnlh  Army, 
from  xhc  Stoi'ka  resen  es,  went  to iitaiinm 
Fnmt,  and  General  Konev's  orders  as  of 
18  December  were  to  employ  those  and 
his  Tu'enty-seaiitd.  Twi  nly-ninth,  and  Thirty- 
first  Ai-jmes  in  a  drive  west  and  southwest 
behind  the  Army  Group  Center  left 
flank  loRzhev.  On  du- somh.  between  18 
and  24  December,  the  Ulavha  reactivated 
the  Bryansk  Front  under  General  Che- 
rivichenko,  gi\ing  it  Third  and  Thir- 
teenth Armies  and  Sixty-Jirst  Army  from 
the  reserve.*  Cherivichenko  had  orders 
to  break  through  Second  Army  and 
strike  northwest  behind  the  Army 
Group  Center  right  flank  to  Mesenslt. 

Tlie  SVm'/w.  at  thai  i>oint,  had  nothings 
less  ill  mind  than  to  encircle  Army 
"Group  Center  by  having  Kalimn  BorU 
head  south  past  R/lie\  to  Vyazma  while 
Biyamk  Ftvnl  came  west  and  northwes,^ 
Vyazma  and  Bryant.*  Ambitic^ 
high  in  Moscow. 

In  nrid^I^scember,  'omm  the  front  on 
the  German  side,  new  Soviet  units  were 
still  being  identified  in  such  numbers 
that  the  OKM  almost  did  not  want  to 
ix-ar  the  repoi  ts.  (  k  neral  Haider  sent  an 
advisoi7  letter  Unough  General  Stai'f 
channdis  m  wlridi  he  said,  "The  large 
numliei  of  encniv  units  identified  lias 
sometimes  had  a  paralyzing  effect  on 
otir  leadership. . . .  The  leaclet#d|>  must 
not  be  allowed  to  fall  into  a  niunbers 


'/vol  ss  vul.  n,  pp.  28S,  Wi~m,WfiiVMV,  vol 

IV,  |)|).  L'H'.I.  2;il. 

*tV<)\  s\.  u,I.  11.  p.  2m:  IVMV.  vol.  IV.  p.  2^1.  Sec 
iiKn  \  I)  SokoUHskiy,  v^A.,Ra^imnmttA>fas)mtlM 
iunk  jMul  Muakvoy  (Moscow:  Voyennoye  tzdatelstvo, 
IJJ64J,  p.  270. 


psychosis.  Intelligence  officers  must  be 
trained  to  be  flist  i  itninatiuL;,"'  Hie  So- 
viet troops,  as  Haider  meant  to  imply, 
were  in  fact  often  short  on  quality.  Many 
were  l:>o\s  m  middle-aged  men.  half- 
Qained  and  thrown  into  battle  some- 
times vMi<s&t  liand  w^p«m$v  ctften  with 
inadec]nate  ai  iillet  y  andsttitQaaiajic  weap- 
ons support,  always  witfl  a  ruthless  dis- 
regard for  losses.  In  Tenth  Army,  75 
percent  of  the  ti  oops  wei  e  in  tlie  lhirt\- 
to  forty-year  age  bracket  or  older;  in 
i%s#  SM±  Amy,  60  to  70  percent  *  The 
same  was  prolxibh  true  of  the  odier 
reserve  armies.  But  the  uoops  were 
warmly  dressed  and  their  levels  of  sup- 
plies and  eciuipnietit  appeared  to  i)e 
rising.  Moreover,  in  dieii  seeming  al)ility 
to  endure  cold,  they  appeared  almost 
Silperhuniaii.  T\u-  (k-i  nians  maiTcled  at 
tiie  Soviet  inxjps'  ability  to  l  eniain  in  die 
open  at  temperatures  far  below  zero  for 
days  in  succession.  Some  dirl  freeze,  but 
most  survived  and  kept  on  fighung.'-' 
'  iiifee  #16  §ef#i  mocifx^  me  Stjs^et  T-B4 
tank  was  also  proving  itself  in  the  \\  inter. 
Its  con^ressecl  air  starter  could  turn  ius 
et^me  over  in  tJie  coMe^t  weather,  and 
its  liroad  tracks  could  earn  the  T  'M 
across  ditdies  and  hollows  holding  live 
feet  of  snow. 

Field  Marshal  Bock  had  remarked 
earlier  in  die  mondi,  "In  these  situations, 
when  some  thnngs  start  to  go  wrong 
everything  does."  By  the  middle  of  the 
inondi,  die  aphorism,  as  fai-  as  it  applied 
to  Anny  Group  Center,  hseA  become  a 
statement  of  fad.  In  the  midst  of  winter 
and  under  constant  enemy  pressure,  the 
annies  were  beset  with  troubles.  Nor- 


^Om.  GenSidH.  Ch-f  Gnirrabtabes  Nr.  10142, 
Beuntilungdfr  h'nuilnni-.  IT. 1.42,  H  3/2  file. 

"Zakliiin.v, 2.57,278. 

•7';.  AOk.  I,  ln,tr^h,,i-.hnnhl  Sr.  3, 12. 8. it -30.} ,42. 
16  Dec  41,  P/..  AOK  3  16911/32  file. 


THE  COUNTEROFFENSIVE:  SECOND  PHASE 


91 


mally  each  had  enough  transport  to 
move  between  2,500  and  3,000  tons  of 
supplies  a  day.  Because  of  snow,  tSM^ 
breakdowns,  and  losses.  Second  Panzer 
Army  could  manage  no  more  than  360 
tons  a  f  lav,  and  the  oth^i^^re  no  better 
off  Winter  clothing,  except  for  items 
overlooked  m  planning  months  before, 
saSi  &r  pg^Ms  and  felt  boots,  was  in 
the  army  depots  at  the  railheads.  So  f  ai 
the  Germans  had  not  yet  issued  a  liiird 
of  the  clothing  to  the  troops  because 
they  could  not  deliver  these  items  to  the 
firont  Movement  of  iiniuiuuition,  gas- 
fiJiOte,  and  rations  had  to  receive  an  iron 
priority.'**  Trucks,  tanks,  and  t)ther  vehi- 
cles, run  down  iiftei  six  inondis  in  die 


"7^:.  AOK  2,  O.  Qit.,  Bi-urWihing  der  Verstirffm^ia^, 
19.12.41,  Pz.  AOK  2  25034/t34  file. 


field,  could  not  take  the  strain  of  being 
driven  through  snow  and  o\er  ice.  The 
©EasBHam  W^ere  having  to  abandon  soltte 
everv  daA',  anrl  others  were  simpiv  worn 
out  or  had  vitiU  parts  bujken  by  die  cold. 
Lubricants  froze  in  a  ankcases,  cda.  hmt" 
ings,  in  artillerv  recoil  mechanisms,  even 
in  die  lighdy  oiled  works  of  machine 
guns.  Second  Panzer  Army  had  70  tanks 
in  running  order  and  another  168  in 
repaii"  out  of  970  tanks  which  it  had  or 
had  received  since  June.  Tliird  Panzer 
(iroup  would,  by  die  time  it  reached  (he 
Lama  River,  have  destroyed  or  abau- 
dt^oed  289  tanks.  Hitler  had  oi  dci  ed  26 
new  tanks  and  2b  self-propelled  assault 
guns  driven  from  Army  Group  South  to 
Second  Panzer  Army  CM  tte  fe«t  60» 
mile  lap,  from  Dnepropetrovsk  to 
Kiasnogiad,  8  tanks  and  1  assault  gun 


92 


MOSCOW  TO  SmiNGRAD 


Trying  On  Win  i  tR  Ghak.  VV  hu  h  Was  Tcxj 
Sixm  m  Commc 

hiid  Iji  oken  down,  and  Lhe  rest  still  had 
300  rallies  to  go — canymg  ikSr  mm 
tiiel  because  tlie  truck  column  transport- 
ing die  fuel  vras  stuck  in  mud  soudi  ot 
Krasnograd." 

Against  the  Soviet  tanks,  the  armies 
wei  c  liaving  to  l  eiy  more  and  more  on 
their  field  artillery,  most  of  which  was 
not  mobile  enf>ugh  or  pfiwerful  enough 
to  cope  with  the  r-34s.  In  die  fail,  die 
Germans  hatl  lesied  what  they  called 
Ruthtl)!  ("redhead")  ammunition,  a  hol- 
low-charge ariillcr\  shell  diat  could  pen- 
etrate the  So\iei  armor.  Ixit  Hider  had 
recalled  die  shells  in  \n\i-niher.  The 
tliought  had  struck  hiin  dial  li  die  Rus- 
sians learned  the  secret,  the  hoUow- 
di^e  would  be  vastly  more  effective 


against  his  own  lightly  armored  tanks. 
Almost  daily  pleading  by  the  army 
group  and  the  armies  had  not  per- 
suaded him  to  release  the  Rothof^ 
ammunitiott. 

The  crisis  on  the  Army  Group  Center 
left  flank  imexpectedly  eased  in  the 
week  after  15  December.  Ninth  Anny, 
iifter  giving  up  Kalinin,  was  falling  back 
toward  Staritsa  with  Twenty-senDid, 
Twenty-ninth,  TldHy-fmt,  and  ThirHetti  Ar- 
mies dose  behind,  but  Thirfy-mniOi  Army 
was  slc>\\'  in  piepaiing  to  move,  and 
konev  woiold  be  unable  to  bring  it  to 
bear  until  late  in  the  month."  Despite 
earlier  bleak  foret  iisis.  by  Generals  Rein- 
hardt  and  Hoepner,  Third  and  Fourth 
'^teer  i^Poiips  came  to  a  complete  stop 
along  the  Lama  and  Ruza  ri\ci  s  li\  ihe 
19th,  After  evacuating  Kiin  and  Sol- 
neebnogOTislE,  they  had  thoved  Sast 
enough  to  bicak  contact  with  ihc  Rus- 
sians and  reach  the  rivers  aliead  of  diem. 
The  troops^  tiMSi  had  tattie  to  settle  into 
thcwBagesandcwgani/e  them  as  strong- 
points,  get  ^  oig^t  or  two  of  sleep,  and 
eat  a  fe«r  hotiH^is.  Theiifiifeuatry;  Which 
had  serv'ed  as  the  rear  guard,  saw  for  the 
lirst  time  how  few  tanks  and  how  little 
heavy  equipment  had'  Swrvf^^,  Nev- 
ertheless tlicir  morale  rec()\ci'cd  — 
somewhat  to  die  commands'  surprise.'* 

The  Ko^biis  betame  ss/mee  mat  the 
|.nirsuit  had  ended  on  the  19th  when 
Dovator,  the  commander  oi  Ftjth  Army\ 
mobile  group,  tl  Gmrds  €m)alry  Corps, 
was  killed  on  the  Ruza  River  tning  to 
force  a  crossing  with  dismounted  cos- 


'7'::,  M>K  2.  Pamer-Lagt.  19.12.41.  Vz.  ASSR,  i 
25034/154  rUc;  Pz.  AOK  3,  Panzerkampfwagmlage, 
19.1.42,  Pz.  AOK  3  16911/8  Btes  AOK  6,  la  Mr.  2938141, 
anPi.  A0K2. 19.12.41.  ft.  AOK  2  25034/154  Bk. 


m'OVSS.  Mil.  tt,p,28S. 

AOK  J.  (.^tchtsberielu  Hmkmd ml-^2>  Pz. 
AOK  5  21818/2  Hie. 


sack  cavalry.'^  As  would  be  true  lor 
many  of  fas  cmmo^npea  iri  sooDeeding 
(!a\s,  Dovalot  s  saGtiSbe  had  gone  (or 
nolliing.  Five  Soviet  armies,  Thirliclh, 
Fkst  Sfmck,  WenMe^,  SMmih, 
(from  north  to  souili),  dosed  to  the 
tivets  and  were  stopped. 

Third  Panzer  Grotip  was  ready  to  sit 
tlic  winter  out  on  ihv  I  .una.  and  (lie 
command  believed  it  could  il  its  neigh- 
bors were  to  m  solMly.*^  Ferutth 
Patter  Group,  however,  was  weak  on  its 
north  flank  west  of  Volokolamsk  where 
tfte  MosfXnw^Rzlte^  raiDine  rsm  through  a 
ten-mile  g;ip  benveen  I  lie  i  i\  ers.  Tliei  e 
V  Panzer  Corps,  also  weak  because  it 
had  been  dosest  to  Momm  and  iiad 


'^Vcvsiignevev.  Velik^b^,  p,  197. 
'■'Pi.  AOK     GefeMmkkt  Russhnd  1941-42,  P2. 
AOK  3  21818/2  file. 


made  tlie  longest  retreat,  vravered  luider 
Ftrst  Shock  Amy'k  attacks  and  by  the  I50^ 
was  heginiiirig  to  drain  Strength  from 
both  panzer  groups. 

On  the  north  at  Nintii  Army,  General 
Strauss'  situation  was  less  acute  but  in  the 
longer  run  more  dangerous.  Strauss 
went  tack  sTowiy  from  K^dinin,  a  few 
miles  a  (la\.  \\lii<  h  enabled  him  lo  linld 
liis  front  togetlier  but  gave  his  troops  no 
ejpptJTttmity  to  br^k  contact  ^th  tiie 
Russians,  get  some  1  est,  and  dig  in  rts  th^- 
two  panzer  groups  had  done.  Moreover, 
he  had  no  river  line  on  which  to  feB 
back.  Between  Kalinin  and  Rzhe\',  Ninth 
Aimy  would  be  moving  parallel  to  die 
Vbiga.  Staritsa,  Mitlerti  dioice  as  Kinth 
Armvs  stopping  point,  was  notliing 
more  dian  a  spot  on  die  map  and  on  die 
grotiikd  c^y  a  in  the  wikl^~ 


94 


MOSCOW  TX>  STALINGRAD 


ness  of  foi  tst  and  swamp  Banking  ihe 
Volga  from  Rzhev  to  Kalinin. 

On  the  morning  of  the  2ist,  when  his 
Ninth  Army  was  alx»Lit  iialfway  between 
Kalinin  and  Siatiisa.  Strauss  flew  to 
Army  (.r<)U]>  (  emer  headquarters  in 
Srnf)lensl^.  uhere  he  tried  to  persuade 
Field  Marslial  Kliigc,  its  romrnanrlcr.  tfj 
let  the  \\iilKliav\aI  continiif  by  small 
stages,  as  it  was  rioing.  past  Staritsa  to 
the  K-Linc  (KOENlf;SHKRG  Line). 
The  K-Line  was  the  Rzhev-Gzhatsk- 
Orel-Kursk  line  that  M&ek  had  pro- 
posed and  that  the  armies  com  inn ed  l  o 
talk  about  as  the  "winter  line."  Some 
work  iiad  been  done  to  prepare  the  K- 
Line,  Strauss  explained,  while  none  had 
been  or  could  be  done  at  Staritsa. 
Kiuge,  in  reply,  cited  Hitler  s  Ylt  hnitive" 
order  to  the  army  to  hold  when  it 
reached  Staritsa  that  he  said  he  was 
determined  to  execute. 

As  far  as  Kluge  was  concerned.  Ninth 
Army  was  still  in  one  of  die  best  posi- 
lions  of"  any  of  his  anniies.  It  bail  Hi 
continuous  front  and  some  room  tf) 
maneuver  forward  of  Staritsa.  But 
whedier  it  would  have  eiiin  i  oneftMidl 
Jonger  was  doubtful.  Wliiie  Si 
in  Sxioiensk  on  the  2 1st.  Gcnei  al  I.c\  te- 
nant I.  I.  Maslennikov,  Ojmnianding 
General,  Thirty-rmih  Army,  was  deploying 
two  divisions  between  fwenty-semnd.  and 
"Eumtj^mnth  Annies  in  the  line  east  of 
Staritsa  to  Join  the  strike  toward  Ryhe\. 
They  ^/tt^e  a  bare  beginning.  Maslen- 
nikov hatl  aiiotlier  sL\  divisions  eche- 
loned to  die  rear,  and  they  were  Ix-ing 
brought  to  fijfl  readiness  at  top  speed.'' 
Wlii'ii  the  six  di\isi<ins  came  into  play 
they  would  count  for  a  great  deal  more 


'•General  clei  Iniai.terie  a.  D.  Rudolf  Mofmann. 
MS  P-114b.  Lhr  FMiu^  gfgen  Sou^ettmioit  m 
Mittflahichiull  der  Osijumt.  vol.  Ul,  tji  IS&,  CMH  Rlesi 

"IVOVSS.  vol.  II,  p.  289. 


than  Hitler's  order  or  Kluge's  detenmna- 
liun  in  det  idin^  where  or  when  Ninth 
Army's  retreat  would  end. 

General  GttderimUmNa  Obey 

Wiile  the  .'Vrmy  Group  Center  left 
flank  appeared  alter  15  December  lo 
fune  pa.ssed  the  first  crisis,  the  same 
crmld  hardly  be  said  for  the  right  flank, 
fheie  Second  Panzer  and  Second  Ar- 
mies, now  loosely  joined  in  the  so-called 
Arnieesiruppc  (kulerian,  were  lieset  by 
five  Soviet  armies,  l>y  the  winter,  and  by 
rigidity  in  the  higher  headquarters  that 
denied  thetn  t'\en  die  litde  leeway  to 
maneuver  iJiat  Uie  left  flank  armies  had. 
In  his  decisions  culminating  in  the  stand- 
(asi  otder,  Millet  had  demanded  that 
.\rmeegruppe  Gudciian  dose  die  gaps 
in  its  front  west  of  Tula  and  nordi  of 
Ijvny  and  hold  the  line  Aleksin-Dubna- 
Livny,i«  When  he  issued  die  order  on 
the  lift,  the  Second  Ritteer  Army  north 
flank  w-as  alread\  se\xral  miles  west 
Aleksin.  Dubna  was  in  die  center  of  the 
ten-4«fle-wide  gap  west  of  Tula,  and 
Liym,  at  the  southern  end  of  a  fifteen- 
mile  gap  in  tbe  Second  Army  center,  was 
half  su!rr*3ftinded. 

Second  Army,  holding  the  Ar- 
meegruppe  Guderians  south  fkokand 
covering  h&th  its  own  and  Secoiid  fsLti- 
zer  Army's  main  bases.  Kursk  and  Orel, 
had  succeeded  in  screening  Novosii 
and  Livny  after  tiie  Soviet  break- 
through at  Velets.  But  to  defend 
miles  of  front  from  Livny  to  northed 
of  Novosii,  wMdb  Mdudied  the  fifteen- 
mile  gap  north  df  Eivm  Siecond  i^mv^ 
commander,  Genem  ScbiiaMt,  bad 
only  three  di^ons.  tlie  known  gbviet 
forces  opposing  them  were  6  lifle  divi- 


'H}KH.  GenSuiH,  Op.  Ml.  Nr.  S17mi,  m  K  i^. 
Afitt*.  J9J2.4I,  H.  Gn  Mine  6S005/7  Sk. 


THE  COUNTEROFFENSIVE:  SECOND  PHASE 


95 


sions,  S  tnotorijsed  divisions,  1  tank 

brigade,  ;uid  2  ravalry  divisions.  Two 
German  divisions,  the  45iJi  and  lS4lii 
Infaniry  Divisions,  after  being  trapped 
in  the  S(>\  iei  1  >i l  akihrough,  wcrv  H  y- 
ing to  batde  theii  way  west  between 
Yelets  and  livny.  In  a  few  days  th«r 
fight  would  be  finished,  ^\'hat  the  Rus- 
sians did  not  claim  tlie  cold  and  snow 
■wotzld.  The  rest  of  die  army  was  ncSt 
much  belle!  off.  Fiom  ra|>tured  Soviet 
resupply  orders.  Second  Array  intel- 
ligence predicted  tiial  (ibe  dii^e 
to  die  west,  to^vard  £014  Novosil. 

M  hich  iiad  slackened  on  the  15^  would 
resume  in  stli^eased  strength  On  the 
18th.  Wlien  ibc  drive  did  not  piric  up 
again,  the  anny  was  far  trora  reas- 
sured. Air  reeonnais^ince  reported  Sq^ 
viet  1  einforcenients  marching  west.pMt 
Yciets  in  diree  columns  abreast.'* 

On  the  morning  trf" the  I@th,  Schmidt 
asked  Army  Ciroup  Center  for  two 
moi%  divisions  because  die  Russians 
were  forty  miles  6Fom  the  Kursk-Orel 
raihoad,  he  said,  andj^divisioil$lV«% 
needed  l)ecause: 

Second  Ai  iny's  fate  liangs  on  holcBng  the 
railroad,  hi  the  pathless,  scoured  lana  west 
of  the  railroad  the  troops  am  neither  stand 
nor  retreat  because  they  cannot  be  sup- 
plied. If  the  railroad  cannot  be  held  difiO^ 
what  happens  to  Second  Army  will  undier- 
luine  ihc  entire  Eastern  Front  and  e\c)"v- 
Uiing  will  be  set  lu  rolling  iu  the  midst  uf 
winter." 

Tiiat  night  Schmidt  went  to  Orel  to 
depudze  for  Guderian  while  the  lattei 
was  at  the  Fvchrrr  Headquarters  atid  to 
ask  him  for  leiulorcemeivls  fumi  Sec- 
ond Panzer  Array  which,  alter  the 


'  «AOK  2.  la  Knfgstagtlmek,  mill,  17-19  D«41.  Pi. 
AOK  2  i6e9l)/3  file, 

-"AOK  2.  la  Nr.  690/41,  m  ti.Gr.  Mflr,  H. 
Cr.  Mitte  65005/7  file. 


ivithdrawal  from  the  bulge  ^st  of  Tula, 

had  a  from  only  half  as  long  as  Second 
Army's.  But  instead,  Guderian  told  him 
to  start  work  on  a  retreat  Older  and  to 
move  his  headquarters  and  supplies 
back  to  Bryansk.  Guderian,  "the  great 
opttm^t,"  Schmidt  saud,  appeared  to 
have  reached  "the  end  of  his  hoiies."^' 

Second  Panzer  Army  had  received 
Bock%  pefmission  on  5  December  to 
withdraw  east  of  Tula  to  lite  line  of  the 
Shat  and  Don  rivers.  Hider  neither 
itpproved  nm  specifically  disapproved 
the  withdrawal.  Before  the  army 
reached  the  rivers,  Guderian  came  to 
believe  he  could  am  siop  tliere,  acMi  on 
the  12ih,  while  giving  him  command 
also  oi  Second  Army,  Bock  authorized 
Itim  10  take  hts  center  and  right  flank 
aether  fift\  miles  west  to  iTie  Plava 
Rivet:  By  dien  he  had  two  gaps  in  the 
front  to  contend  with  as  weH:  the  one  at 
Yelets  in  Second  Army's  center  that  he 
was  expected  to  help  close  by  supplying 
r^nforcements  for  Second  Army  and 
the  one  west  of  Tula  that  steadily  wid- 
ened as  his  left  flank  corps,  XXXXlll 
Corps,  holding  j^ertto  the  Fourth  Army 
flank,  fell  back  westward  and  slightly 
northward  toward  Aleksin  and  Kaluga 
while  XXlVFafflSser  C<n  p,s  on  the  soU'&k 
side  of  lite  gap  witlidrew  soiithw^<S^ 
ward  along  the  Orel-  lula  road. 

For  his  pail,  Guderian,  by  the  12th, 
had  apparently  considered  it  jjointless 
to  try  either  to  close  the  from  or  to  stop 
east  of  the  Oka  and  Zusha  rivers  along 
which  Secontl  Panzer  Armv  had  built 
some  Held  lortihcations  in  October  be- 
fore launching  the  attack  past  Tula. 
Goitig  to  the  Oka  and  the  Zusha  would 
have  added  approximately  forty  miles 
to  the  total  distance     Second  Panzer 

"AOK  2,  la  K^^a^^ia^  Mm,  19 13ec4i,  Xt}K 


96 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


Army^  retreat.  Both  fivers  were  in- 

(  luded  in  the  R/lic\ -Gzhatsk-Orel- 
Kursk  liuf,  the  winter  or  K-Line,  dial 
Bock  |>i opo.sed  on  14  tlNgcemli!^;  md 
Giidc-riaii  maintained  in  m^^IUjixs 
that  Field  Marshal  firanddf]^  pete 
Mia  permission  to  go  to  die  Oka  and 
llir  ZusIki  during  their  niecdng  in 
Roslavl  on  die  i4th.^^  However,  Hider's 
decisions  cuIminating^  In'  stanetfaM 
Didt  i  on  the  !8th  made  ii  extremely 
uncertain  whether  Guderian  could  be 
allowed  to  continue  his  -wlthdfawat 
e\  cn  to  the  Plava.  Tlie  imcertainty  ^^as 
particularlyacute  in  die  mind  ol  Bock's 
sfuecessor,  Klti^,  who  personally  fee^ 
lieved  a  icttfat  was  neccssarv  but  as 
commanding  general,  Army  Group 
C^ter,  conumtted  liiittself  to  f^tecar- 
ing  Hitlers  orde  rs. 

On  the  18di,  Guderian  had  had  most 
of  four  Second  Panzer  Aroay  divisions 
strung  oul  along  die  Orel-Tula  road 
and  had  headed  west.  Gangs  oi  dratted 
dt^an&  kept  the  imow  shoveled  off  the 
road,  but  motor  fuel  was  shoi  t,  and  the 
speed  of  the  traffic  depended  less  on 
die  condition  of  die  rmd  tfepi<  &a  ik€ 

interval  between  refuelingSi  The  front 
was  still  five  to  ten  miles  of  the 
Plava.  During  the  day  Nider  i^led 
GiuU  rian  dirccth  and  urged  him  to  do 
sometlung  about  dosing  the  gap  on  his 
left  flank  west  of  Tiila^  @tiderkn  m~ 
plied  that  lo  close  the  gap  from  the 
soudi  was  impossible.  Second  Panzer 
Army,  he  said,  had  conducted  mt&ne- 
sive  reconnaissance  and  had  fonnfi  the 
whole  area  impassible  owing  lo  poor 
roads  and  deep  snow.^^ 

What,  if  anything,  Guderian  woidd 
do  to  assist  Second  Army  was  equally 


doubtfb!  even  thc^g^  his  Second  &n- 

/ci  irot>]}s  on  tbe  Cfrel-Tula  road  were 
moving  souihwestward  toward  the  Sec- 
ond Army  Hank.  Guderian  was  obli- 

gatcfl  morallv  to  help  Sccmd  Army 
since  ii  was  also  protecting  his  own 
headcjuarters  and  inajfl  "base  Orel,  but 
in  liis  (  (in li lining  argumrni  with 
Schmidt  over  where  and  when  to  send 
fdnfiarcements,  Gudifrian  insisted  that 

Second  Pan/cr  Army  was  worsr  nil 
dian  Second  Army  and  so  far  liad 
refttsed  te  send  a  single  man.** 

During  lh<'  night  on  the  ISth,  Army 
Group  Center  had  transleiTed  XXXXIll 
'G^l^ps  from  Second  Panzer  to  Fourth 
Atmv  and  thcrebv  had  converted  what 
had  been  a  gap  in  the  Second  Panzer 
^ferafty'liioBt  to  one  Ijetween  thtf  two  ar- 
niies.  Henceforth  there  would  be  fewer 
prospects  for  closing  the  front  dian  be- 
fore. Kitige,  whose  repiaceinent  had 
trot  yet  arrived,  was  still  commanding 
Fourth  Army  as  well  as  the  army 
group,  and  relations  between  Fourtn 
Arniv  and  Second  Panzer  Army  and 
their  commanding  generals  were  any- 
thing feiit  cordial,  second  Panzer  Afiay 
had  been  subf>rdinated  to  Fourtn 
Army  in  die  early  months  of  die  Rus- 
siian  catapaignt  which  Guderian  re- 
sented, and  Guderian  had  received 
more  pubMcity  and  attention  from 
MidfeTj  wMdl  Kluge  resented.  Obsessed 
with  his  avte  a^m^  s  troitblcs  and  with 
his  center  <jlf  gravity  lying  to  the  south 
and  tJte  vtesi,  Guderian  was  not  likely 
to  exert  himself  for  the  benefit  of  Iiis 
neighbor  on  die  north,  parucularly 
since  Fourth  Army  had  stifar  had  the 
advantage  of  fighting  on  a  stable  front 
in  positions  built  before  winter  set  in. 


^'Giitlt'i  l;in,  I'amrr  Lmtlri,  p.  262. 
"Hofraann.  MS  P-J14b,  vol.  lU,  p.  m. 


-WOK  2.  la  Kriegsl^ebuA,  Ml  tn,  17  Dec  41.  Pa. 
AOK  2  16690/3  file. 


THE  COUNTEROFFENSIVE:  SECOND  PHASE 


97 


Even  after  it  took  control  of  XXXXI II 
Corps,  Fourth  Army  would  still  be  un- 
able to  do  anything  about  the  gap  west 
of  Tula.  During  the  day  on  the  18th. 
complying  with  the  Stavka  orders  for 
the.  second  phase  of  the  counteroffen- 
sive,  Thirty-third,  Jvarty-third,  and  Forty- 
fdnA  Armies  hit  the  whole  length  of  the 
Fourth  Army  front.  Fourth  Army's  line 
of  trenches  and  dugouts  on  the  Nara 
River  stopped  the  Thirty-third  and  Forty- 
third  Armies,  but  Forty-ninth  Army  drove 
Xlll  Corps,  XXXXIII  Corps'  neighbor 
on  the  north,  back  on  both  sides  of  Ta- 
llisa  wMle  Fiftieth  Army  began  working 
its  way  around  and  t^hind  XXXmU 
Corps'  open  flank." 

While  GudCTfan  was  at  the  Fuehrer 
Headquarters  on  ilic  L'Oih,  and  Kluge 
was  unhappily  analyzing  Guderian's 
dispositions.  General  Ley  tenant  I.  V. 
Boldin,  C'omniaiKling  General,  Fiftieth 
Anm  was  unleashing  nasty  stirprises  for 
both  Germart  generals.  After  having 
w;ji(li(  rl  the  gap  in  the  German  front 
widen  for  almost  two  weeks  to  a  width 
of  almost  thirty  tniles  by  the  18th, 
Boldin  had  decided  to  exploit  it.  He 
assembled  a  motnle  fetrce  of  a  tank,  a 
cavalry,  and  a  rifle  division  tinder  his 
deputy  army  commander.  General 
Mayor  V.  S.  Popov,  and  sent  it  that 
night  around  the  'XXXXIII  Corps' 
open  flank  in  a  sneak  attack  on  Kaluga, 
Fourth  Army's  railhead  and  supply 
base.  At  the^me  time  he  reinforeed  / 
Guards  Cavalry  Corps  with  a  rifle  divi- 
sion for  a  strike  forty  miles  due  west  to 
Chekatliti  on  dteOkaBiver.  By  nightfall 
on  the  20th,  Popoi^ffit^up  was  fighting 
soudi  of  Kaluga,  and  I  Guards  Cavalry 
Corps  had  covered  half  the  distance  to 
Chekalin.  On  Boldin's  left,  several  Thi^ 


**1V0VSS,  vol.  II.  p.  292. 


Army  diviisiditis  had  ciDitie  through 
the  gap  and  were  driving  tow^ard  Belev 
on  tlie  Oka,  iihcen  miles  south  of 
C;hekalin.^* 

When  Gudeiian  returned  to  Orel  on 
the  21st  he  found  awaiting  him.  in  ad- 
dition to  the  order  Hitler  had  already 
given  him  orally  to  hold  his  line  exactly 
where  it  stood,  a  second  order  from 
Hitler  shifting  the  Second  Panzer- 
FourUi  Army  Ijoundary  north  to  make 
Second  Panzei  Ai  tny  responsible  for 
defending  the  Oka  River  to  Peremyshl, 
twelve  miles  north  of  Chekalin.  The 
night  before  Soviet  tanks  had  broken 
into  Kaluga,  and  Kluge  and  his  chief  of 
staff  talked  to  Hider  and  Haider  by 
telephone  several  times  during  the  day 
about  taking  Fourth  Army  back  and 
about  letting  Second  Army,  which  was 
getting  into  deeper  trouble,  give  up 
Li\  n\.  Hitler  promised  "everv  a\  .iihihle 
aircraft  on  the  whole  Eastern  Front" 
for  the  defense  of  Kaluga;  arid  l^der, 
re\erting  to  what  was  becoming  his 
standard  response,  opined  again  that  it 
vtrould  be  a  mistake  to  gi\  e  up  anything 
liecause  the  crisis  would  pass  in  two 
weeks  and  then  the  army  group  would 
be  sorry.'' 

The  next  twn  davs  were  des[ierate 
ones  lor  Fourth  Army.  On  the  22d,  in  a 
driving  snowstorm,  Soviet  F^f^nhtth 
Army  broke  through  the  Fourth  Army 
front  at  Tarusa,  splitting  XXXXI  11 
Corps  off  from  die  main  body. 
Tliis  action  put  the  Russians  in  position 
to  disrupt  FourUi  Army^  center  and  si- 
multaneously encircle  XXXXIII  Corps 
which  alreadv  had  the  Popov  group 
standing  behind  it  at  Kaluga.  Kluge 
tc^d  Mdi^-  that  he  had  giveia  oMers  to 

"/few.,  p,  293. 

•W.  Gr.  Mint,  la  Knegstagebiich.  DettnAtT  194 f,  21 
Dec  41.  H.  Gr.  Mitte  26974/6  file. 


98 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAJP 


Staild  fast  bill  lielieved  that  "tom()rt(>\\ 
we  could  be  confronted  with  a  big 
decision."*" 

In  the  afternoon  on  the  23d,  he  told 
Hider,  "We  must  now  answer  the  ques- 
tion whether  we  are  to  stand  and  let 
ourselves  be  killed  or  take  the  front 
back  and  sacrifice  a  certain  amount  of 
material  but  save  the  rest."  After  asking 
in  detail  about  how  inuch  would  be  lost 
and  how  much  saved,  Hider  replied, 
"If  there  is  no  other  way,  I  give  you 
liberty  to  issue  the  order  to  withdraw," 
Kiuge  assured  him  he  would  only  use 
the  authority  "if  I  see  no  other  way  out 
of  the  dilemma"  and  in  any  event  not  in 
less  than  twenty-four  hours.  Later 
Haider  came  on  the  telephone  to  re- 
mark liiai  tlie  ;ih  fonc  had  reported 
that  the  enemy  which  had  broken 
through  between  XXXXIII  and  XIII 
Corps  was  "only  several  ski  units"  and 
"history  ought  not  to  record  that 
Fourth  Army  had  given  an  order  for  its 
left  flank  and  center  to  retreat  because 
of  a  few  skiers."  The  army  group  chief' 
of  staff.  General  Greittfenberg,  an- 
swered that  the  corps  had  orders  to 
stand  fast  for  the  present^  but  when 
Haider  catted  Iback  an  hour  later, 
C.reiffenl)ci  g  told  him  that  the  corps 
had  orders  to  retreat.^" 

At  Chekalin  on  the  2fd,  German 
<  (instruction  troops,  the  only  Germans 
nearby,  had  sighted  several  small  Soviet 
sled  columns  apprcaching  the  town.  A 
third  of  a  German  division,  appt  ox- 
imately  a  regiment,  was  somewhere  on 
its  way  to  GhekaliR^  hat  emM  not  jret 
there  throuf^li  the  snow  in  less  than 
forty-eight  lo  sevcniy-Lwo  hours. 
Gudendn  was  at  the  frmtt  aitt  at 
LIII  Panzer  Corps.  One  of  its  divisions, 


296th  Infantry  Division,  had  been  bro- 
ken through  in  several  places;  and 
after  he  returned  to  Orel  shordy  be- 
fore midnight,  Guderian  told  Kluge 
diat  in  order  to  follow  Hider^  orders, 
he  would  have  to  sacrifice  the  divi- 
sion.'" On  the  23d,  296th  Inlanii  N  Di- 
vision fell  back  to  the  Oka  River  at 
Belev  after  its  neighbor,  the  167th  In- 
fantry Division,  was  almost  totally  de- 
stroyed. Second  Panzer  Army  then 
reported  that  it  would  have  to  take  its 
enure  front  behind  ttie  Oka  and  Zusha 
rivers  within  the  next  two  or  three 
days.  The  army  group  jiointed  out  that 
the  296th's  withdrawal  that  d:u  liad  not 
had  Hitlers  approval,  and  that  one  to 
the  Oka  and  Zusha  could  not  be  made 
"under  any  circumstances"  unless  he 
agreed.*' 

In  the  morning  on  the  24th,  Kiuge 
told  Haider  that  Guderian  had  let 
296Ui  Iniantry  Division  go  back  far- 
ther the  day  betofe  rihan  had  been  re- 
ported, had  also  laken  XXXXV'II 
Panzer  Corps,  liis  riglit  flank  corps, 
back  without  prior  authorization,  and 
had  not  been  getting  troops  to  the  Oka 
River  between  Belev  and  Chekalin  and 
to  the  north  of  them  on  time.  Haider 
thereupon  declared  that  Guderian 
should  be  court-martialed.  Kluge, 
howevier,  couM  aot  make  up  his  mind. 
After  all.  h^^ld^^SHtdW  had  drilled 
badly  on  the  mutes  to  ildev  and  north, 
assd  ^^arid  Panzer  Army  had  ex- 
eeaieditS  WE^drawals  "under  the  com- 
poision  of  circumstances."^^  The  OKH 


'"(.imii-i  inn  iiiuiiu:iiiu'(l  >ii  liis  nicmoiis  lluil  iln- 
pur))c).sc  (>l  his  I  l  ip  wus  u  n  x])l;iin  Hillt'i  's  i  ii  tli-i  •>.  This 
expbii.iMinr.  Iioiii/^ci.  l^  iri<  orisisifiit  uitli  liis  .lUitiide 
as  cx|ii  csst  (1  Iff  ihf  aims  L;nnij>.  St-t-  C'liclcri;!!!.  f'ltnirf 
trader,  p.  liliM 

"W.  Cr  \l,(t.  .  la  Kntgilagtl/iuk.  Dnembn  IV-ll,  23 
Dec  n,  \[.C.v.  Mine  26974/6 file. 

^VbKl..      Uet  41. 


THE  COUNTEROFFENSIVE:  SECOND  PHASE 


99 


ViiiAGERS  Greet  the  Crew  of  a  Soviet  T-60  Tank 


then  tried  sending  a  direct  order  to 
Gtidertan  in  Hitler's  name  again  for- 
biclcliiig  ;iny  withdrawals,  directing  him 
to  dispatch  a  division  to  Belev,  and  re- 
qtttFmg  him  to  report  his  disposi^ns 
directly  to  the  OKH  before  midnight 
that  night-** 

Whether  6tidertan  coidd  he  made  to 
stop  or  not.  Second  Armv,  \vhicli  was 
tied  in  on  his  right  flank,  had  to  inove 
along  with  ft.  During  the  afternoon  of 
the  21l!i.  Sc'duul  Army's  Schmidt  tolcl 
the  army  group  that  he  was  issuing 
orders:  to  give  up  Novosil  and  liroy 
and  to  ,tr<)  In  the  winter  linej^  atfid 
could  not  wait  tor  approval.  Be^UQife  Sl^ 
low  'mbili^  in  hlot^g^  stjumi  he  did 


not  know  where  Guderian's  flank  was 
or  where  the  Russians  were,  but  in 
another  day  he  would  be  unable  to 
make  any  kind  of  orderly  retreat  and 
liHi^lie  no  retreat  at  all  from  Livny, 
which  ^vas  aluiosl  ctuirLlcd.^^ 

During  that  day  and  much  of  the 
night  Ktuge  wa!S  aftemately  on  the  tele* 
phone  to  Gudcri;in  and  Haider,  warn- 
ing Guderian  against  any  further 
Withdi^^K^Is  without  Hitler's  explicit 
appr^QvaJ  and  telling  Haider  that 
Ghekaiiii  was  in  Hames,  the  Russians 
had  crossed  the  Oimi  ss&d  the  £alugii 
defense  \va.s  cnim^i^.  B^OS^e  mid- 
niglu  he  called  HaMer  Mkce  more, 
apologizing  for  "llistlirMng  your 


'■mw.  C'nStdH.  op.  Abt.  \k  32096141.  an  H.  Gh  "  UA  2.  In  Kfie^tagebuch,  Mm,  24  Dec  41.  Pz. 
Mitte,  24.12.41,  H.  Gr,  Miltc  65005/7  file.  AOK  2  l<)690/3  file. 


iOO 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


Christmas  spirit  which  probably  was 
not  very  rosy  anyway,"  to  tell  him 
Guderian  had  asked  to  be  relieved  and 
coiirt-mardaled,  and  the  whole  Oka 
line  from  Belev  to  Kaluga  in 
danger.'* 

Ctu  isiiTiaS,  HaUloi  l  etorded,  was  "a 
difiicult  day,"  Schmidt  reported  Soviet 
tanks  across  the  Hm  River,  whi^if'fiad 
been  part  of  the  winter  line,  and  called 
for  88-mm.  guns  and  RotkopJ  ammuni- 
tion. The  guns  and  ammunidon  his 
troops  had  were  useless  against  these 
tanks.  Haider  and  his  chief  of  opera- 
tions. Colonel  Heusinger,  and  Kluge 
,i!;mnil  uith  (iiiderian  over  how  to 
defend  Chekalin  and  Belev.  Guderian 
had  the  3d  and  4th  Panzer  Divisions 
free  near  Orel,  but  he  said  he  iict-ded 
3d  Panzer  Division  to  support  Second 
Army.  After  nightfall,  he  reported 
some  4th  Panzt-r  Division  troops  at 
Belev  but  the  roads  from  there  north 
impassable  eaccept  t&  sleds.  In  the 
meantime,  Hitkr  feini  iiitervefte^  with 
an  order  to  put  the  Bclev-Qiekalin- 
Peremyshl  sector  under  Headquarters 
XXIV  Panzer  Corps,  whif  h  had  ( t»m- 
manded  3d  and  4tb  Pander  Divisions 
but  currently  hacf  wo  units  of  its  own. 

Not  until  later  in  the  night  did  Kluge 
look  at  the  day's  situation  reports. 
I^en  he  dSd,  he  dlstwered  ijhat  Sec- 
ond Pan/er  Armv  had.  In  the  past 
twenty-four  hours,  retreated  almost  to 
the  Oka-'2;ii$l@  line.  Calling  Guderian, 
Kluge  atXttS^d  him  of  ha\  ing'  deliber- 
ately given  orders  opposite  lu  diose  he 
had  rffsdved^to  wMch  Guderian  re- 
plied, "la  these  unusual  eircumslantes 
I  lead  my  army  in  a  manner  1  tan 


"W.  Gt.  Milte.  la  Krifgstageimth,  UZ.-3L12,41.  2 J 
Dec41.  H.  Gr.  Milte  26974/6  file; ftrt^gW^wdSr  GJ^M. 
V.  Klugg-Gm.  ObsL  Hokin  24  Dec  41,  H.  Or,  Mitte 
65005l'7  Hie, 


justify  to  my  conscience."  Kluge  then 
complained  to  Haider,  "I  have  the 
gi'eatest  respect  for  General  Guderian. 
He  is  a  lantastic  commander.  But  he 
does  not  obey,  and  I  can  only  transmit 
and  execute  the  Fuehrer's  orders  if  I  can 
rely  on  ai  iny  commanders."  .Mways 
the  Hamiet,  Kluge  added,  "1  am 
basically  entirely  on  Guderian's  side; 
one  cannot  simply  let  himself  be 
slaughtered,  but  he  must  obey  and, 
keep  me  oriented."  Within  the  hour 
Hitler  called  to  tell  Kluge  he  would  "do 
what  is  necessary  with  regard  to  Gene- 
raloberst  Guderian,"  and  in  the  mom- 
ing  an  order  arrived  r<die\in!4 
Guderian  of  his  command  and  trans- 
ferring him  to  the  command  reserve.^* 
A  few  hout  s  later,  as  an  afterthought, 
Hider  forbade  Guderian  to  issue  any 
farewell  order  to  his  troops. 

Till'  (Jiirsfion  (if  (I  Retreat 
Klligr  Taki:^  I'linc  la  I'hnik 

During  die  iiight  ol  the  25th,  a  cold 
wave  swept  the-  fetetem  Front  white 

wind  and  a  heavy  snowfall  added  to  the 
drifts  already  left  by  the  previous  days' 
storms.  In  tne  morning  Schmidt  mok 
conunanrl  of  ilir  .\rtii(  L'i,nTip[)t-  Gude- 
rian, now  Armeegruppe  Schmidt,  and 
GtwttsA  def  I5iebirgstruppe  ILudwig 
Kuehler,  jusi  arrived  from  Berlin,  set 
out  from  Smolensk  into  the  snow  to 


^'H.  C.r.  Milk.  In  Kiief^sltigrlm,!,.  I.i2.--3U2.4l,  25 
t}«  41,  H.  Ci.  .Mine  2697  l/fi  (lU-. 

'■'■(uHirdl  !liil4rr\  Daily  Notes,  Historical  Division. 
l  SiiucK  Army,  Europe.  EAP  21-g- lf)/4/ll.  vol.  I, 
26  Dec  41.  On  28  DecenihHSr,  Hitler  issued  irL-itmciions 
through  the  Army  Personnel  Office  stating,  "The 
weather  and  battles  have  woni  the  nerves  of  soitie  nf 
the  liesi  commanders,  and  thev  will  have  lo  he  rc- 
lifvt-ft.  VMteii  they  are  relit  vtd.  ihey  are  iioi  to  issue 
any  IVii  ewcll  orders  to  subortlinatf  units."  H.  Or,  Nord, 
la  Kritgstagt'hiii-h,  I.I2.-31J2.41,  28  Dec  41,  H.  Gr; 
Nord  75128/4  lile. 


THE  GOUNTEROFFENSIVE:  SECOND  PHASE 


101 


make  Ms  way  efast  130  mites  to 
Yukhnov  and  take  command  of  Fourth 
Army.  HiUer  lold  iiim  by  telephone 
beftE»«  he  left  to  maifee  im  asmf  stand 
fast  and  niM  i^ive  up  "a  Step"  except 
under  compulsion. 

Up  and  down  the  front,  roads  were 
drifted  shut,  and  on  the  raillines  loco- 
motives were  freezing.  Frostbite  casu- 
alties esceeded  available  replacements 
or  those  sthfdulcd  to  come.  Schniidl 
was  expecting  an  attack  througJi  tlic 
winter  fine  toward  Kursk;  a  deep  So- 
viet thrust  across  the  Oka  between 
Belev  and  Kaluga  was  clearly  in  the 
making;  Hoepner  did  not  think  Fourth 
Panzer  Group  could  hold  much  longer 
west  of  Volokolamsk;  and  Strauss  was 
expecting  a  heav^  attack  on  Ninth 
Army's  IdFt  flank  west  of  Staritsa  any 
day. 

Elttge  was  ni^F^biu  true  to  his 

nature  not  tjuiie  at — the  point  of  forc- 
ing a  decision.  In  a  long,  rambling 
telephone  conversation  he  told  Haider 
that  "the  time  has  come  to  consider 
whether  it  is  necessary  lo  take  the  en- 
tire east  front  of  the  army  group  back." 
Lateral  movement,  he  said,  had  be- 
come impossible.  Everything  was 
snowed  ill.  Reinhardt  had  tried  to  take 
ovt  t  iMiinth  Armv  before  Rueliler  ar- 
rived aiici  liad  not  been  able  to  gel 
Uiere  by  automobile,  airplane,  or  sled. 
Roads  were  being  drifted  shut  as  fast  as 
they  were  shoveled  clear  Tlie  troops 
could  not  get  anything  to  eat,  and  if 
they  did  not  eat  they  could  not  fight.  If 
the  Russians  made  a  strike  at  his  lines 
of  communieation,  he  could  not  move 
troops  fast  enough  to  counter  it.  "  i'he 
Fuehrer,"  lie  said,  "must  now  come  oui 
of  his  castle  in  the  cloudS  and  be  set 
wiili  both  (cet  on  the  ground."  Haider 
repeated  Hitlers  standard  objection  lo 


a  retreat:  onee  it  began  it  could  proba-- 

bly  not  be  stopped.  And  a(  the  end 
Kluge  admitted  that  he  did  not  know 
lirhat  line  he  would  want  to  go  back  to 
and  would  have  to  "think  abf)Ut  it."''" 

On  27  December,  noting  tem- 
peratures of  - 1 5°  F.  in  the  daytime  and 
—  23°  F.  at  night,  the  Army  Group 
Center  journal  entry  for  the  day 
opened  wifih  ttee  iNiowing  gene^^ 
remarks: 

All  m()\  enieiiis  hm  clened  b\  tl\e  emit  tiious 
sno\v(liif  ts.  R;iil  traiis])orl  is  stiilled  lor  I  he 
same  reason,  and  the  loss  of  lot i imi jtivcs 
owing  to  iVeezing  increases  the  pioliU  in. 
The  sliilriiig  ot  the  few  a\'ailable  i  oservcs  is 
stopped  by  the  snow.  For  the  above  reasons 
all  time  sdieetoles  are  meaningless.  The 
Russians  mustecuiiend  with  the  same  diffi- 
ctllties,  but  thetr  ttloTbile,  well-equipped 
cavalry,  ski,  and  sled  uniis  (the  biier  used 
to  bring  lations  and  lodclei"  (o  tin-  t.ivalry 
and  to  Mans[)ori  inlaiury)  gi\»-'  liu'iti  Tac- 
tical nrhaniagcs  thai,  together  with  larger 
inanpowt.  t  l  eserves,  they  are  now  Qryiilg  to 
exploit  operationally.^" 

The  armies'  reports  were  alarming. 
Second  Army  had  its  back  to  Orel  and 
Kursk  and  was  not  certain  of  holding 
either  one.  The  OKH  promised  a  divi- 
sion from  the  west  for  Kursk,  but  no 
WSJ/tis  than  a  battalion  or  two  could 
arrive  before  the  end  of  the  month.  At 
Second  Panzer  Arnu,  elements  of  the 
4th  Panzer  Divisiuii  heading  north 
along  the  Oka  from  Belev  were 
stopped  by  snow  and  had  to  turn  back, 
leaving  the  Oka  open  to  Soviet  TetOk 
and  Fiftieth  Armies,  and  they  were  be- 
ginning to  push  west  another  forty 
miles  to  Yukhnov  and  the  Sukhinichi 
railroad  junction.  Fourth  Army,  be- 
sides its  other  trouljles,  had  to  deter- 


dr.  Miltf.  Knegstagiburh,  Dezember  J9^^1,  26  Dec 
41.  H.  V.i.  Mitif  26974/61116. 
^'•ihid.,  27  Dec  4i. 


102 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


mine  where  to  get  troops  and  how  to 
get  them  to  Yukhnov  and  Sukhinichl  to 
defend  those  critical  points  on  its  sup- 
ply and  communications  lines.  Hoep- 
ner's  V  Pan/ei  C^orjjs  was  barely 
surviving  west  of  Volokolamsk,  and  he 
had  to  throw  in  a  replacement  battalion 
newly  arrived  by  air  from  Germany 
armed  with  pistols  and  wearing  laced 
shoes.  Soviet  Thirty-ninth  Army  finally 
got  all  of  its  divisions  into  action  against 
Ninth  Army  during  the  day.  Ninth 
Army  repelled  the  developing  thrust 
lovvard  Rzhev,  and  at  the  end  oi  the  day 
Strauss  reported,  "I  will  resume  the 
battle  tomoTTOW,  btit  If  tftis  mode  eI" 
fighting  is  continued,  the  army  will 
bleed  to  death. "^^ 

Army  Group  Center  was  disintegrat- 
ing. On  ihe  28th  all  ihc  armies  re- 
ported shaipW  declining  strengths 
crwll^  to  tdf&M^^sualties  and  frost- 
biie.  Schmidt  said  Setond  Arnn  was 
*bBlid"  because  its  aerial  reconnais- 
sance had  failed  completely.  The  Luff- 
u'ltjjr  planes  could  not  start  at  low 
temperatures,  and  they  were  not 
equipped  te  tdke  off  or  land  in  deep 
snow.**  Kuebler  at  Fourth  Army  was 
having  to  conader  how  to  defend  his 
mm  he£id<{iitiir|eis.  Soviet  tsmhy  had 
(  t  ossed  the Sukhinichi- Kaluga  railioad 
and  were  comllig  toward  Yukhnov  with 
nothing'  itt  between  to  stop  them. 
Hoepncr  said  his  troops,  particularly  If 
Corps,  could  not  go  on  beating  off 
Soviet  attacks  ma^  loiager;  lliey  wer? 
exhausted  after  ^j^^g  for  weeks  ill 
the  snow  and  cold  without  relief.'** 

Ttt#  mmi  Ms^rxtiing  report  eaiife 


"AOK  2.  ta  Kriegmgehuek,  7^  £^  S0  Ocx  41,  I^; 
AOK  2  1669D/3  file, 

"H.  Gr.  Mine,  la  Kriesstagebuck  Ltg.-JlMM,  ^ 
Dec  41.  H.  Gr.  Miue  26974/6  file. 


from  Ninth  Army's  6th  and  26th  In- 
fantry Divisions  which  were  defending 
the  front  northwest  of  Staritsa  against 
the  Soviet  Thirty-ninth  Army.  The  com- 
manding general,  6tfa  Infantry  Divi^ 
sion  said: 

Today  1  was  in  Novaya  [sic]  with  the  coun- 
terattack regiment  all  day.  I  saw  the  men.  I 

can  only  say  they  are  ptusicaliv  and  psy- 
chologically (inislied.  Tixlay  I  s,iw  men 
whose  l«>()ls  were  (ro/eii  lo  theif  IVozen 
(eet.  These  men  would  rather  let  Uiem- 
selv  es  l>e  beaten  to  death  than  attack  in  this 
condition.''' 

The  commanding  general,  26tii  intfan- 
try  Division  stated: 

Infaiiiiv  Re^nnieiii  78  fonc  of  26ih  Divi- 
sion's regiments]  tan  no  longer  hi-  (oiisid- 
ered  a  regiment.  It  has  only  200  men.  The 
Russians  nave  cut  its  communications.  Its 
radios  are  frozen  and  its  machine  guns  are 
frozen;  and  the  machine  gun  c&iVS  are 
dead  aloiigside  their  vwapons.^^ 

Having  mulled  over  his  pt  cdieament 
for  three  days,  Kiuge  phoned  Hitler  in 
the  aftemocjn  ©n  me  Hoping  to 
make  a  partial  retreat  palatalile  to 
Hidei",  he  proposed  giving  up  Kaluga, 
letting  Strauss  at  Ninth  Army  go  into 
the  K-IJne  "gradually,"  and  takint>  the 
whole  Fourdi  Army  Ironl  back  ten  to 
fifteen  miles  to  shorten  the  line  and 
release  three  divisions  to  defend 
Yukhnov  and  Sukhinichi.  All  fourth 
Anay  then  had  at  Yufehnov,  he  said, 
were  a  replacement  battalion  and  an  SS 
battalion,  and  Fourth  Army's  suppUes 
depended  on  these  two  supply  points. 
Hider,  after  long  Iiesitation  and  re- 
peated t]uestions  as  to  how  much  mate- 
rial and  supplies  ^v^uld  be  lost,  agreed 


THE  GOUNTEROFFENSIVE:  SECOND  PHASE 


103 


too  Ifet  JbUrfh  j^^y  mdmsifs  Kaluga, 
which  in  fact  was  iJI  but  losi  already. 
He  forbade  an^  d&er  mthdrawah,  and 

sions  to  the  armies-** 
7^  "Wee  ifGaMMemm" 

Iwenty-^^tir  Howts  later  Kluge  tried 
ag^n  to  secure  permission  for  Fourth 
Army  to  withdraw.  The  Russians  had 
in  the  meantime  smashed  and  broken 
through  two  of  Fourth  Army's  divisions 
in  the  cenieff  cif  its  front.  Hitler  re- 
liiarited  that  i(4tMrawals  always  "per- 
petuated" themselves,  and  once  they 
started  "one  might  as  well  head  for  the 
Dnepr  tSSver]  or  the  Polish  border 
right  aw  ay."  It  was  time  for  "the  voice  of 
cold  reason  to  be  heard,"  be  said.  W^at 
sfen^-^wds  there  in  goin'g  fttjin  oiieilae 
to  another  that  was  not  any  better?  In 
World  War  1,  he  had  experienced  "ten- 
day  barrages  often,"  and  the  troops 
had  held  their  positions  c\en  uiicii  no 
more  than  10  percent  survived.  Wlien 

was  foa^t  in  Bance  wibere  the  tem- 
peiatures  were  not  —  1S°  F.  or  -  20°  F. 
and  that  Fourth  Army^s  troops  ivefe 
mentally  and  physically  exhausted, 
Hitler  replied,  "If  that  is  so  then  it  is 
the  end  of  the  Gertnan  Army,"  and 
hung  up.  Half  an  hour  later  he  called 
to  ask  whether  die  proposed  new  Une 
was  fortified.  Kluge  said  it  was  not,  imt 
the  Protva  River  offered  some  nalursd 
protection.  In  that  case,  Hider  re- 
sponded, Foufth  Afifiy  Would  ham  m 
slay  where  it  was  until  a  new  line  was 
built  "which  the  troops  can  claw  them- 
selves into  and  really  Mold 


Gi:  Miiic.  krii-ffstiigebmh,  Oetmbirr  mi,  29  Dec 
41,  H.  Cr.  Miiie  2697  J/6ae. 
^HIM.,  30  Dec  41, 


Kluge  had  tdiStect  to  Hitler  in  the 
middle  of  tlie  on  the  30th,  before 
the  armies  reported  to  him.  When  they 
did,  there  was  more  bad  news.  At 
Ninth  Army,  Stariisa  was  almost  en- 
circled, and  Thir^-ninth  Army  was  bear- 
ing d^n^  on  Stranss  s$&A  his 
army  'was  close  to  collapse,  and  that 
could  spell  doom  for  the  whole  army 
group  if  the  Russians  were  then  tO 
pour  south  deep  into  its  Hank  and  rear. 
The  most  Ninth  Army  could  still  dO;,  be 
thought,  was  fight  a  delaying  actiolt'f^ 
cover  the  flank  while  the  army  gttJUp 
fell  back  to  escape  the  trap. 

The  next  day  Kluge  was  on  the  tele- 
phonc  repeatedly  with  Strauss, 
Kuebler,  Hoepner,  Reinhardt,  and 
dfflitaririy  fasfniti^ttdet^  only 
Bj|^s£^£^  .^poke  against  going  back. 
INBsljilia  on  the  Lama  River  was  solid, 
and  his  equipment  Was  so  tightly 
snowed  and  frozen  in  that  he  difl  not 
think  he  could  move  any  of  it.  If  Tliird 
Panzer  Group  had  to  move,  Reinhardt 
said,  the  troops  could  do  so  onlv  witli 
rifles  on  their  shoulders.  They  would 
have  te  leave' everything  else  sending. 
Haider's  chief  eoncem  was  to  avoid 
having  to  take  any  proposals  to  Hider. 
"Hie  Fieskr&r,  he  protested,  wotiM  nievef 
appro\'e  any  withdrawal  to  a  predeter- 
mined line  and  would  certaiolf  never 
order  oJic.  FMly  Klugfe  t&U  Hald^ef 
that  Strauss  had  already  ordered  VI 
Ckirps  at  Staritsa  to  fall  back  gradually 
%t  three  or  fbtip"  days  to  the  K-Line. 

Half  an  hoin^  before  midnight  Kluge 
talked  to  Hider.  Without  telling  him 
vfimt  he  had  told  Haider,  he  asked  for 
authority  to  wfithdraw  Ninth  and 
Fourth  Armies andpart of  Fourdi  Pan- 
zer Groupie  So^mecff  lihei^idh^i^  weiif 
as  follows: 


104 


MOSCOW  TO  STTALINGRAD 


Kluge:  I  request  freedom  of  action.  You 
miisi  believe  that  I  will  do  whal  is  right. 
OilKMwise  I  cannot  (unction.  We  do  nol 
oiiK  v\';iiu  what  is  liesi  for  Germany  we 
waiu  whal  is  best  tor  you- 
Hitler:  Fine.  How  long  estt  you  hold  the 
new  line? 

Kliige:  That  t  eanaot  say. 

Hitler:  Enemy  pressut^  wiJU  also  famt  fm 

out  of  the  new  line. 

Kluge:  We  are  unfler  <  ompiilsion.  One  can 
turn  and  twist  as  niucli  as  he  pleases;  we 
must  get  f3ii£  of  this  dtmaii^ 

Hitler  then  said  he  would  have  to  con- 
fer with  his  "gentlernt  ti.  "  An  h(Htr  later 
he  I  ailed  again.  He  and  all  his  "gen- 
tlemen," including  particularly  Genefat 
Haltier,  he  said,  had  come  to  one  con- 
clusion: no  major  witlidrawals  could  be 
made.  Tbo  much  maeeiial  wotlld  be 


lost.  When  Kluge  then  told  him  that 
ilie  oi  der  to  VI  Corps  had  hvt-n  given, 
he  replied  coldly,  "It  is  impossible  to 
initiate  an  operative  movement  without 
the  appro\al  oF  the  Supieme  Com- 
mand. The  troops  will  have  to  stop 
right  v^ere  thef  afe'*"'^  I^p^  ^[tere^ 
upon  sent  i  h e  f oUovnr^  teletype  mes- 
sage to  Strauss: 

The  Fuehrer  has  categorically  lorbiddeu 
any  retrograde  movement  lo  the 
KOENIGSBERG  Position.  Only  local  eva- 
sive movements  under  direct  enemy  pres- 
sure will  be  allo^verl.  All  i  c serves  are  to  be 
sent  to  the  front,  and  [you  are]  oxxlered  to 
hold  every  locality  and  support  poiiU,^' 


"Ibid.,  .^1  Dec  41. 

*'H.  Gr.  MiUe.  la  Nr.  7142,  mAOK  <i,  l.l.tZ.  H.  Gi; 


CHAPTER  VI 

Cnsis  in  ^6  atom 


^t^ea  iwinter  broke  over  the  Eastern 
Front  in  the  first  week  of  December 
1941,  Army  Group  South  was  relatively 
the  best  off  of  the  three  Cennan  ^rtHj 
groups.  It  had  completed  the  retJieat 
from  Rostov  and  occupied  a  defensible 
front  on  the  Mius  and  Donets  rivers 
from  Taganrog  to  the  boundary  with 
Army  Group  Center  forty  miles  east  of 
Kursk.  On  the  left  flank,  Sixth  Army 
held  Kharkov,  Belgorod,  and  Oboyan. 
Seventeenth  Army,  in  the  center,  and 
First  Panzer  Army,  on  the  right  along 
the  Mius,  covered  the  western  half  of 
the  Donets  Basin  coal  and  industrial 
area.  Eleventh  Army  occupied  the 
Crimea  except  for  the  Sevastopol  For- 
tress on  the  soutliwestern  tip  of  the 
peninsula.  Hitler's  directive  of  8  De- 
cember that  closed  down  the  offensive 
for  the  winter  everywhere  else  on  the 
Eastern  Front  gave  Army  Group  South 
two  residual  missions:  to  occupy  the 
wit0le  Boaets  and  retake  Rostov, 
"in  favorable  weather,"  and  to  capture 
Sevastopol. ' 

In  conjundfJon  Hrltti  the  operations  at 
Rostov,  Tikhvin,  and  Moscow,  the 
Siavka  had  decided  to  expand  the 
counteroffensive  to  include  the  Trans- 
mucasus  Front  and  the  Black  Sm  Fleet. 
On  7  December,  it  instructed  the  Trans- 
cmcasus  Frmt  to  prepare  and  execute 


'OKW.  WFSi,  Abt.  L  (/  ()p,)  Nr.  442(J^fl,  msung 
Nr.  39,  SJZAh  Gennian  High  Level  TMfci^jej^  CMB 
files. 


widiin  two  weeks  an  amphibious  attadk 
on  tlie  Kerch  Peninsula.  Tlie  objective 
was  to  encircle  and  to  destroy  the  en- 
emy on  the  peninsula  by  simul- 
taneously landing  troops  of  the  Fifty- 
first  and  Farty-fourth  Annies  near  Kerch 
and  in  the  harbor  at  Feodosiya.  The 
Stavka  anticipated  subsequently  ex- 
panding the  operation  to  relieve 
Sevastopol  and  to  liberate  the  entire 
Crimea.  The  landings  were  put  under 
the  control  of  the  Commanding  Admi- 
ral, Blach  Sea  Fleet,  Vitse  Admiral  F.  S. 
Oktyabrskiy,  and  the  operations  on 
land  under  General  Leytenant  D.  T. 
Kozlov,  the  Commanding  Geaeral* 
"Bamcmmsus  Fnmt.  ^ 

Army  Group  South's  second  residual 
mission,  to  capture  Sevastopol,  was  the 
only  one  of  the  two  it  actumly  pursued 
after  8  December.  Sevastopol,  wliich 
had  been  a  fortress  even  under  the 
tsarist  regime,  was  the  Soviet  Union^ 
main  naval  base  and  naval  shipyard  on 
the  Black  Sea.  It  had  some  fortifica- 
tions dating  back  to  the  Crimean  War 
(1854-1856)  and  others  built  more  re- 
cendy,  in  particular  twelve  naval  gun 
batteries  (forty-two  guns  in  calibers 
from  132^  to  J05-miB.)  in  armOTed 


HVm,  vol.  IV.  p>  295. 


106 


MOSCOW  TO  5TAUNGRAD 


turrets  and  concrete  emplacements 
and  about  two  hundred  antiaircraft 
weapons  ranging  from  85-mm.  guns  to 
miilfipil&motixited  machine  guiis.  In 
the  last  two  weeks  of  October,  ships  of 
the  Black  Sea  Fleet  had  brought  in  as 
oiudl  of  the  Indepmebnt  Maiitime  Amf^  • 
as  they  could  evacuate  from  Odessa, 
about  thirty  thousand  troops.  With 
Ute^e,  plus  some  t»»8myi*a¥o  thousand 
naval  and  other  troops,  and  fire  and 
supply  support  from  naval  vessels,  the 
commander  of  the  Mari^m  itwajj*  Ge- 
neral Leytenant  I.  E.  Petro\',  prevented 
General  Mansteins  Eleventh  Army 
from  oVetTUnning  the  fortress  during 
the  pursuit  in  early  November.^  Man- 
stein  had  an  organized  assault  almost 
ready  to  start  at  the  end  of  November, 
but  then  heavy  rain  set  ioi  and  forced  a 
three-week  delay.^ 

As  time  passed,  however,  taking  the 
fortress  had  become  more  difficult.  By 
late  Novel nlier,  Oktyabrskiy,  vvlio  liad 
also  assumed  command  of  the 
Sevastopol  D/fiwi'  Region,  had  brought 
to  completion  three  defense  lines  on 
the  landward  side:  ftoe  "Outer 
meter,"  twenty-seven  miles  long,  run- 
ning from  three  miles  north  of  the 
Kacha  River  to  three  miles  east  of  Ba- 
laklava;  the  "Main  Line,"  twenty-three 
miles  long,  from  the  mouth  of  the 
Kacha  to  Balaklava;  and  the  "Rear 
Une,"  eighteen  miles  long,  just  for- 
ward on  an  antitank  ditch  around  the 
fortress  proper.  Behind  all  of  the  lines, 
artilliery  and  machine  guns  had  been 
dug-in' — most  densely  behind  the  anti- 
Lank  ditch,  which  actually  constituted 
the  fourth  and  poteotia^y  stFppgest 


'•G,  I,  VaiifeyCV,  et  .il.,  ('•rrmrhtskma  (ihiinnia 
Si-rinliipolya,  1941-1942  (Moscow:  Vojennoye 
l/di!iclsivo.  19691,  pp.  50-67. 

'Manstein,  Lw*  Victoriw,  p.  223. 


line.  Oktyabrskiy  had  also  created  an- 
other eight  armored  batteries  ai  die 
fortress  by  emplacing  the  guns  and 
turrets  off  two  disabled  dxiiserS.  Only 
the  antiaircraft  defense  was  weaker, 
reduced  to  about  one  himdred  guns  by 
mthdf^als  aS  Ijatteries  to  protect 
ports  on  the  eastern  coast.  Petrov  had  5 
rifle  divisions,  I  cavalry  division,  2 
naval  infantry  brigades,  and  "seveestl* 
independent  regiments.  Soviet  ac- 
counts do  not  give  a  total  numerical 
strength,  but  they  indicate  it  must  have 
been  at  least  ten  thousand  aj^V^^tib^ 
early  November  number.^ 

Wliile  Oktyabrskiy  was  strengthen- 
ing the  Sevastopol  defenses.  Eleventh 
Army's  position  on  the  Crimea  was 
becoming  less  secure.  Although  the 
peninsula  generalh  did  Tint  s^et  as  cold 
as  the  mainland,  it  did  experience  sud- 
den, drastic  ups  and  down  in  tern* 
perature  and  fre(|uent,  violent  rain  or 
snowstorms,  f he  likelihood  of  the  lat- 
ter, because  of  the  effect  the)'  would 
have  on  the  roads,  restricted  the  lines 
ot  attack  on  Sevastopol  to  the  north 
and  northeast.  There,  besides  the  So- 
viet lines,  the  Germans  faced  tliree 
east- west  river  lines  to  be  crossed — the 
Chernaya,  the  Kacha,  and  the  Belbek. 
The  Chernaya  emptied  into  the  Sever- 
naya  Bay,  which  shielded  the  heart  of 
i  he  fortress  on  the  north.  Bad  weather 
of  any  kind,  on  die  otiier  hand,  bene- 
fited Xhe  Black  Sea  Fleet  by  providing  its 
ships,  never  more  than  half-a-day*s 
running  time  from  their  base  at 
Novorossiysk,  with  the  cover  from  Ger- 
man air  attack  they  needed  to  approach 
the  coast  safely  anywhere  between 
Sevastopol  and  Kerch.  (Map  8.)  More- 


■'VaiH'vev,  (jcniiilmkinn  nhmmn.  pp.  Jt)9,  138—40, 
144;;raV'iS,  vol.  II,  pp.  304-06, 


CRISIS  IN  THE  CRIMEA 


107 


MAPS 


over,  the  strait  between  the  Keix  li  and 
the  Taman  peninsulas,  al  places  onh' 
two  miles  wide,  froze  (.ner  in  wniter 
and  &3Md  he  crossed  on  f  oot.  Ood^ 
these  condiiions,  tlevenlh  Army's 
stvtn  divisions,  all  at  least  25  peixent 
understrength,  could  not  mount  an 
attack  on  Sevastopol  and  guard  tire 
coast  adetjuately  at  die  same  time. 

The  Attach 

When  the  weather  improved  in  the 
second  week  of  December,  Manstein 
decided  to  go  ahead  with  the  attack. 
had  ordci's  to  do  so;  he  liad  a  reputa- 
tion as  a  skiUlul  and  daring  tactician  to 
defend  and  enhance;  and  he  was  enjoy- 
ing his  first  army  connnand.  Besides, 
the  whole  German  position  on  the 
Griniea  woidd  be  precations  as:  long  as 


the  Soviet  Army  and  Navy  held  a 
fooiliold  at  Sevastopol.  On  the  other 
hand,  even  if  he  could  not  reduce  the 
fertress,  he  could  weaken  ii  decisively, 
possibly  in  a  lew  days,  b\'  driving  a 
wedge  approximately  six  miles  deep 
through  the  northeastern  perimeter. 
With  that,  his  artillery  could  sweeiJ  the 
Severna\a  Bay  and  cul  off  ilie  naval 
lifeline  supporting  the  fortress,  lo 
stage  the  effort,  however,  he  had  to  use 
two  of  his  three  corps  headciuarters 
and  six  of  his  seven  divisions,  leaving 
onl\  ihicc  Rumanian  brigafles  and 
I  leadc|uarters,  XXXXll  Corps  with 
some  corps  tsroops  and  the  46th  Infan- 
ti  y  Division  to  cover  170  miles  of  coast 
and  poi  ts  at  Kercii,  Feodosiya,  Alushta, 
and  Yalta. 

Eleventh  Army  Intelligence  ob- 
served steady  Soviet  ship  trallic  to  and 


lOS 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


from  Se^mstdpcd  whicii  «genied  td  hme 

two  purposes:  to  evacuate  niachineiv 
and  naval  supplies  lhal  would  be  lost  il 
the  fortress  suddenly  collapsed  and  lo 
brintr  in  reinforcements  for  the  land- 
uaid  detenses,  Bv  mid-December,  liie 
Soviet  resurgence  along  the  front  on 
the  mainland  and  die  troops  pouring 
into  the  Taman  Peninsula  by  shi|>  and 
truck  countered  any  assumption  that 
tlie  Russians  would  not  stubbornly  de- 
lend  Sevastopol  but  raised  forebodings 
of  possibly  even  less  convemeni:  <te- 
velopments  to  come.* 

Eleventh  Army's  assault  at  Sevastopol 
began  on  the  morning  of  17  December 
along  the  entire  27-mile-long  Outer 
Perimeter,  the  first  of  the  three  defense 
lines.  Inside  still  lay  the  Main  Line,  the 
Rear  Line,  and  thickets  of  forts,  pill- 
boxes, and  antitank  obstacles.  The  LI  V 
Corps,  on  the  north,  carried  the  main 
effort  because  il  was  closest  to  Sever- 
naya  Bay,  and  heavy  artillery  in  calibers 
up  to  300-mm.  could  support  its  attack. 
On  tlie  south,  XXX  Corps  could  do  no 
more  than  tie  down  the  Soviet  Outer 
Perimeter  defense  since  it  had  to  bring 
Its  supplies  across  the  rugged  and  vir- 
tually roadless  Krymskiye  Gory. 

('eiiain  tliai  llie  Russians,  ulio  bad 
partisans  and  agents  in  nearby  moun- 
taimsa^  <fee  does,  knew  how  ihort  he 
was  on  strength  as  well  as  he  did, 
Manstein  gambled  on  surprise — and 
very  nearly  won.  Oktyabi^l^^  was  away 
at  Novorossiysk  planning  the  landings 
the  Stavht  had  ordered  at  Kercli  and 
Feodosiya  when  the  attack  began  on 
the  I7th.  By  the  end  of  the  day.  the 
German  22d  Infantry  Division  was 
throtigh^ie  Oilier  l^enmeten  and  dur- 


ing the  next  two  clays,  it  pushed  along 
the  valley  ol  the  Belbek  River  m  the 
Mktin  Line.  Bui  the  Slavka  reacted  iast 
and  on  the  20th — as  the  22d  Infantry 
Division  n-as  beginning  to  crack  the 
Main  Line — put  the  fortress  under  the 
Transcaucasus  Front,  The  next  day, 
Ko/lov.  the  front's  commander,  sent  by 
ship  a  rifle  division,  a  naval  infantry 
brigade,  and  '^,000  replacements,  and 
ibc  Black  Sen  FIri't  brought  a  battleship, 
a  cruiser,  and  2  destroyers  into  action 
as  artilleiy  support,  'fhe  22d  Infantry 
Division,  having  broken  the  Main  Line, 
was  into  the  Rear  Line  and  approach- 
ing Mekenzlyevy  Gory  almost  within 
sight  of  Severnaya  Bay  on  22  De- 
cember, but  its  thrust  was  weakening, 
and  by  nightfall  the  newly  arrived 
345th  R^e  Dkrision  and  79th  Naval  tn^ 
Jantry  Brigade,  with  supporting  fire 
from  the  warships,  had  entangled  it  in 
a  desperate  battle  that  would  run  on 
long  enough  for  events  elsewhere  to 
takeeifect/ 

mi  JPmdmya 

Oktyabrskiy  and  Kozlov  initially  had 
proposed  to  put  42,000  troops  with 
artillery  and  tanks  ashore  simul- 
taneously on  the  peninsula  at  a  number 
of  beachheads  s]>read  hom  txtrthcasL 
of  Kerch  to  Feodosiya.  The  landings  on 
the  northeastern  and  eastern  coasts 
were  to  be  made  by  Fifty-finl  Arm^, 
imder  General  Leytenant  V.  H,  Lvov; 
those  on  the  south  coast,  at  Feodosiya 
and  Cape  Opuk,  by  Fnily  /durth  Amy. 
under  General  Ley  tenant  A.  N.  Per- 
vushin.  As  it  did  for  Manstein,  the 
weather  raised  problems  for  Ok- 
tyabrskiy and  Kozlov,  slowing  the  as- 


"AOK  I  I.  IcIAU,  Knrg'.Uigebtuh.  22.6Al-3l.3A2.  7\  Ors.S,  vol.  II.  30.-)-08; /rAn'.  vol.  IV.p.SOO; 
1-13  U«  41,  AOK  1 1  22409/1  file.  Viiiicyev,  GemicheiJutyi  ubomm.  pp.  14;i-tt3, 


seiTiiilv  of  troops  aiul  air  units  on  the 
liiiiiaii  Peninsula  and  restricting  tlie 
enipl(>\  nient  of  smaller  iia\al  vessels. 
The  final  objective  of  ilic  landings  was 
to  destroy  tiie  Germans  on  the  Kerch 
PeninsLila  by  forcing  them  west  against 
a  line  Forty-fourth  Army  would  builfl 
across  the  Isthmus  ol  Parpach  north  ol 
Feodosiya. 

Origiiiallv  sehedule<l  lor  21  Decem- 
ber, the  landings  had  to  be  postponed 
after  Manstein  attacked  Sevastopol  on 
the  I7lh,  and  Ko/Jov  had  !c»  send  rein- 
fort  enienis  there,  lb  support  the 
Sevasto[;>ol  attack,  men  and  ships  had 
to  be  div  erted  Ironi  llie  landing  forces, 
panic ularly  from  the  heodosiya  forte. 
During  the  delay  of  more  than  a  week, 
the  landings  on  the  eastern  end  of  the 
peninsula  were  set  to  be  made  sepa- 


ratclv  several  days  before  the  one  at 

i'eodosiva.** 

German  agent  and  Russian  deserter 
reports  had  alcricil  Kleventh  .Armv 
and  46lh  Inlanir)  Division  to  expect 
landings  on  ihe  Kefeb  Peninsula,  but 
this  knowledge  was  not  partit ularly 
helpful  sinte  there  were  lai  more  po- 
tential landing  sites  than  the  cUvision 
could  co\'er.  Ilie  Russians  coidd  easih' 
bring  forces  out  of  the  ports  on  the 
lanian  Peninsula  and  put  them  ashore 
under  the  cover  of  a  single  night's 
darkness.^ 

7 he  Landings 

In  the  early  morning  darkness  on  26 

'IVMV.        IV.  2(H;-<p7. 
•'MIK  11.  itiM).  Knrir.uif,ih,i,h.  22.6.41-31.3.42,  16 
and  19  Dec  41.  AOK  II  22409/1  tile. 


no 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


HccmibeF  amd  in  gacle-^iite  winds,  the 
Azov Ntwal Fhtilla  began  pulling  troops 
sishore  an  the  beachlieads  at  liie  easi- 
eit!  end  of  the  Kerch  Peniiistila.  Hav^ 

ing  no  pioper  landing  craft,  the  troops 
had  to  wade  to  the  beaches  from  the 
boats  and  ships  that  had  brought  them 
in  and  had  to  do  without  vehicles  or 
artillery.  Because  ot  the  weather  and 
rough  s&i,  smat  knd'mp  t^mti^g  in 
the  wrong  places  and  others,  Mcluding 
a  strong  one  which  was  to  have  been 
made  at  Cape  Opuk,  were  not  made  at 
all.  Instead  of  requiring  one  or  two 
days,  nearly  five  were  needed  to  get 
20»000  troops  to  the  beaches,  and 
many  heavv  \veapf)ns  were  lost.'*' 

Tlie  weather  and  the  Russians  com- 
plicatetl  scheme  of  operations  that  in- 
volved merging  the  beachheads  tor 
drives  hrsi  on  Kerch  and  then  west- 
ward  toward  the  neck  of  the  pen&iin:^ 
proved  advantageous  to  the  Germani* 
The  beachheads  were  peppered  over 
forty  miks  of  ooasdihe;  iione  held 
stronglv  enough  to  roiisiiuite  a  criu  ial 
tlueat.  Ihe  Germans  tould  seal  all  of 
them  dBf  dose  lo  the  coast,  and  in  some 
instances  ihe\  could  also  cut  off  parlies 
that  had  advanced  inland  from  the 
beaches.  The  forces  in  the  beachheads 
and  the  ships  offshore  appeared  much 
of  the  time  not  to  know  what  to  do 
next.  The  46ili  Inlantr\  DivMolt,  on 
the  other  hand,  did  iioi  have  strength 
enough  to  counterattack  e\ei\\\iieie. 
By  die  29th,  it  had  all  but  wipe<l  out 
two  of  the  smaller  beachheads  and  was 
preparing  to  go  after  the  others 
tysteiiiatically." 


^WSm,  «ol.  H.  m  308-10;  ivm  VOL  IV.  p. 

297. 

"-(6.  DiviMon.  Knmmandmr.aiiiXXX}aiAJC..  W.1.42. 
AOK  U  28634/13  file. 


lb  sustain  the  counterattaciy  on  the 

beachheads,  4r)[li  Infantjy  Division 
had  brought  east  an  infantry  hattalion 
It  had  originally  stationed  at  Feodosiya 

on  the  south  coasl  at  the  vvestetlteiad  of 
the  istlimus  of  Parpach.  Shordy  before 
dark  on  #ie  tMt,  an  engineer  bat- 
talion, also  going  east,  arrived  in 
Feodosiya  and  took  up  quarters  there 
(m  the  night.  Although  the  batt£tIio9i 
commander  merely  made  a  casual  deci- 
sion to  stay  ladier  than  to  continue  east 
in  the  dark  over  an  unfamiliar  road, 
the  engineers  became  the  main  ele- 
ment in  die  Feodosiya  garrist)n  that 
night.  The  rest  consisted  of  two  con- 
struction companies,  a  battery  of  artil- 
lery, and  an  antitank  gun  company. 
The  engineers  bedded  down  one  street 
away  from  the  waterfront  without 
knowing  wliat  kiml  of  an  alei  t  was  in 
effect. 

At  0400  on  tite  29th.  the  engineers 
were  roused  by  the  noise  of  machine 
gun  and  rifle  fire  coming  from  die 
direction  of  the  port,  As  the  Germans 
learned  later,  ten  naval  cutters  had 
landed  j^rtles  of  sailors  on  the  harbor 
breakwater.  If  a  defense  liatl  been 
ready,  the  patties  might  easily  liave 
been  driven  back  t&sea  because  at  firsfc 
the  onl\  reinforcement  the)'  got  was 
brought  in  by  the  small  boats  sliutUing 
back  and  forth  to  naval  vessels  lying' 
outside  the  harbor.  After  about  an 
hour,  however,  three  destroyers, 
S  haumyan  ,  N  cz  a  »i  o  z  h  ti  i  k  ,  a  tl-d 
Zhelfzt)\ahov.  tied  up  at  tlie  breakwater 
and  began  landing  troops  and  heavy 
weapons.  In  the  next  hour  the  cruisers 
Krasniy  Krim  and  Krasiiiy  Km'kai  also 
diew  u|j  to  the  breakwater,  bringing 
the  total  number  of  troops  pltta^oi^ 
bv  the  end  of  the  second  hour  to  just 
under  5,000.  By  then  some  ol  the 


CRISIS  IN  THE  CRIMEA 


ill 


t 


Soviet  Troops  Landing  on  the  Kerch  Peninsula 


German  coast  artillery  was  in  action 
and  had  scored  a  hit  on  the  Krasniy 

Before  the  engineers,  ;vho  until  then 
did  not  know  that  they  were  practi^y 
the  only  German  troops  in  the  ( ity.  had 
sorted  themselves  out^  the  Russians 
were  holding  the  vralerfronl  and  prov- 
ing al()nj4  ilie  slrct'ts  running  inland. 
At  an  impromptu  council  of  war  in  tlie 
town  ttiayort  quarters,  the  Eleventh 
Aiiin  chifl"  of  fngiiK-t-rs.  a  Colonel 
Boehringer — who  also  by  accident  had 
happened  to  spend  that  night  in 
Fcodosiva  —  look  command.  At  day- 
light, Boehringer  ordered  the  engineer 
battaHcm  and:  me  oi&er  smaller  units  to 


'*AOK  11.  la  Vr.  JUI42.  242.42,  AOK  II 22279/19 
fae:/VOV5i.  vol.  II,  p.  312. 


assemble  half-a-mile  inland  at  the  junc- 
tion of  the  roads  to  Simferopol  and 
Kerch.  One  of  the  construction  com- 
panies was  already  iii<ere  as^  were  ^laam 
truck,  aitiUery,  and  antitaiik  gun  crews. 
For  an  hour  or  SO  quadruple-moimted 
macliine  guns  on  one  of  the  trucks  kept 
tfie  Russians  off  the  roads,  but  they 
could  slill  fire  doun  on  the  Germans 
f  rom  the  upper  stories  of  buildings  and 
fcom  rooftops.  Later  in  thi&  day 
BiOi^Kpinger  took  the  line  back  to  a  hill 
Ikifiiki&d  by  an  antitank  ditch  on  tJie 
western  outskirts  of  liie  £@mu  From  the 
hill  the  Germans  g^M  #Ee  the  two 
cruisers  and  the  de^fo^fei^  m  the  har- 
bor and  a  transport  docked  at  the 
breakwater.  Since  the  Germans  had 
pulled  away  to  the  west  along  the  Sim- 
feropol rmd,  ^€  Riisslatts  had  the 


112 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


ISerCfi  ttjai!  open  to  fiiem.  but  they  ap- 
peared in  no  hum  to  push  out  of  Feo- 
dosiya either  lo  che  east  or  to  the  west. 

Uuring  the  night  the  RunumiaB;  4Jtb 
Cavah  y  Brigade  arriv  ed  at  the  antitank 
ditch,  aiid  llie  Germans  plaQBed  ^ 
eounteratmeK  ihe  tiext  mornmg.  When 
thcv  told  the  Rumanian  commander, 
however,  he  insisted  that  he  was  due  to 
be  relieved  and  therefore  cotild  not 
give  the  order  to  attack  becasuse  it  could 
only  be  given  by  his  replaeement  who 
had  not  yet  arrived.  At  0900  on  the 
30th  the  Germans  attacked  alone  un- 
der die  cover  of  a  sudden  heavy  snow- 
storm driven  by  a  strong  vsfesl  -wind- 
But  the  attack  ended  almost  as  soon  as 
it  began  when  nine  Soviet  tanks  sud- 
denly appeared  out  of  Feodosiya,  and 
the  Germans  could  not  fire  their  anti- 
tank guns  because  of  ice  in  their  breech 
niethanisms.  The  Rumanians,  seeing 
the  Germans  drop  back,  mounted  and 
decamped  into  the  Krymskiye  Gory 
leaving  their  baggage  behind  on  the 
Simferopol  road.  When  the  Russians, 
who  had  been  maneuvering  cautiously 
until  then,  obserii^  tfee- lUtoanians' 
headlong  departure,  their  tanks  ad- 
vanced and  pushed  the  Germans  back 
in  the  succeeding  several  hours  lo  a 
hastily  formed  screening"  line  ai'oimcl 
Staryy  Kryni,  five  miles  west  of 
Feodosiya.'^  By  then  the  number  of 
Forty- fourth  Arm-^  troopS  at  feodosiya 
was  Hearing  20,000.** 

Spomch's  Hetrea^. 

Generalleutnant  Graf  Hans  von  Spo- 
liecki  Commanding  General  XXXXIl 


'^Piiiniei-Biili:illnii  Ih,  t  iiisatz  da  Fi.  Bn.  4b  in  tier  ial 
vmi,  2S.!2.-ll).i2  !2    \(  >K  II  S2279/19EIfr, 

'vvuvss,  vol.  II,  jj.  au. 


Corps,  had  his  headquarters  on  the 

Kerch  Peninsula  about  halfway  be- 
tween Feodosiya  and  Kerch.  When 
w&rd  tii  ttoe  femding^  on  tSth  aC 
Feodosiya  reached  him.  about  an  hour 
JS^ter  the  first  Russians  went  ashore,  he 
^ect^ed  to  seal  f0  the  beachhead  as 
units  under  his  commanfl  had  done 
with  the  beachheads  ai  ound  Kerch.  He 
ordered  the  Rumanian  4th  'Cavalry 
Brigade  in  from  the  west  and  dis- 
patched the  Rumanian  8th  Cavalry 
Brigade,  which  he  had  stationed  near 
Kerch,  to  seal  off  the  beachhead  from 
the  east.  At  about  daylight  on  the  29tli 
lie  <^ffltiged  his  mind  after  receiving  a 
report  (that  later  proved  false)  of  an- 
other strong  landing  northeast  of 
Feodosiya  in  position  to  cut  the  ten- 
mile-wide  Isthmus  of  Parpach.  Appar- 
endy  believing  the  Russians  \vere  about 
to  trap  XXXXn  Corps,  he  ordered 
46th  Infantry  Division  to  do  an  imme- 
diate about-face  and  evacuate  the 
peninsula. 

Having  given  the  order.  Sponcck  de- 
parted willi  some  of  his  staf  f  by  car  it) 
set  up  a  new  cdoaaia^id  post  at 
Vhiflislavovka  seven  miles  nortli  of 
Feodosiya.  Although  the  trip  was 
hardly  more  than  twenty  miles,  motor 
trouble  and  air  attacks  kept  him  oui  tsf 
contact  with  his  corps  and  with  Fle\- 
€9nt&  Army  until  midaflernoon.  In  the 
meantime,  Manstein  liad  learned  of 
the  order  tliiougb  routine  l  atlio  chan- 
nels and  tried  to  comitermand  it,  but 
XXXXIl  Corps  radio  harl  also  dosed 
down.  By  noon,  46th  Division's  regi- 
H^ltts  were  tumii^  and  be^iM^g  to 


'N,,;!.  hih  WXXII  A.k.  hi  Krhx-l'i^ihiih  Xr.  I.  211 
Dt'.  -II.  XXXXIl  A.K,.  19649/1  file;  AOK  II.  Iti, 
(Stnh  wnii  h  Genr  U.  Qnf  SpDntdi),  30.12.41,  AOK  11 
28(jj4/;i  aie. 


CRISIS  IN  THE  CRIMEA 


On  the  »<jrtIi€Tri  face  of  tfte 

Sfvaslopol  perimelcr  siiDnt;  aiuntenu- 
lacks,  apparently  limed  lo  coincide 
with  liie  Feodosiya  landing,  forced  LIV 
Corps  lo  shift  to  tlic  flffensivc  on  the 
29tii.  Cuiisequeiul^  ii  would  not  be 
able  Co  take  me  initiative  again  lor  at 
least  a  dav  or  two,  which  iinder  the 
existing  circumsiaiu  es  made  die  future 
of  the  Sevastopol  offensive  totally  un>- 
certain.  From  Vladislavovka  at  1500, 
Spoticrk  lepoitcd  dial  46di  Infantry 
Div  ision  would  be  a  third  of  the  way  oflF 
the  Kt'icli  Peninsula  ai  the  end  of  the 
day.  Maiisrein  dec  ided  lo  let  LIV  Corp.s 
try  lo  gel  its  attack  going  again  and 
ordered  Genei  alk  iilnant  Franz  Malcii 
klolt,  wh(.>  commanded  XXX  Corp.s.  to 
take  over  XXXXII  Corps  iiom  Spo- 
neck.  He  shifted  Sponeck  "lor  the  time 
being"  to  die  quiet  XXX  Corp.s  from.'" 
He  then  sent  an  order  to  the  Kiili 
lnlan!r\  Division  to  get  into  the  Isih- 
miis  ol  I'aipach  a.s  quickly  as  possible.' ' 
By  the  end  of  the  day.  46th  lnlamr\ 
Division  had  orders  from  XXXXII 
Coi  ps  and  Eleventh  Army  to  clear  ihe 
Kerch  Peninsula  quickly.  But  by  this 
stage  of  the  cam  pa  iff  n  tlie  infantrv  divi- 
sion was  no  longer  mobile.  In  a  con- 
didon  report  of  a  week  earlier,  the 
division  had  ratefl  its  motor  vehicles  as 
2(J  percent  serviceable,  I  liose  thai 
were  running  were  iisitiL;  captured 
Russian  gasolint-.  v\hiih  \\a^  low  in  m- 
lanc  and  high  in  w.ncr  (onienl.  Ha\  ing 
been  fed  mostiv  hav  and  not  o\'erl\ 
much  of  that,  ihe  burses  did  not  have 
the  strengUi  to  ]>uli  lieaw  loads  long 
distances.  On  the  morning  of  the  29th, 
the  division  actually  had  only  250  of  Its 


"AOK  II.  <:h,i  CninalslabtM,  Bur  K.TB., 
39.12.42,  AOK  W  2227tWly  lilt. 

'MOA'  //,  la  Xr.  472mUArmtb4iM,^U2AJ,  AOK 
II  2227a/ 19  file. 


1 ,400  motor  vehicles  in  working  order, 

with  most  of  the  rest  either  dis- 
assembled in  the  shops  or  awaiting 
ipeplacement  i^MS.*^*  Tiie  distance  the 
division  had  lo  t;o,  on  the  other  hand, 
was  not  extcssive,  onU  about  si\t\ 
miles.  Moreover,  Sponecks  order  au- 
thorized deslrnction  of  immobile 
equipment,  and  he  knew  as  well  as 
antyCMie  die  division's  condition.  The 
division  commander,  Gencralin.ijot 
Kurt  Hiraer,  therefore,  assumed  iliai 
}m  nation  was  to  get  his  men  out 
regardless  of  the  cost.  And  during  the 
day  and  through  the  night  of  the  2'.)ih 
Himer  did  this  brilliantly.  \Miat  c  (luld 
be  moved  was  and  wiiai  could  not  be 
mo\ed  was  I'endered  useless  to  the 
enemy.  The  tioops  disengaged  from 
the  bridgeheads  anrl  weie  miles  to  the 
west,  apparently  before  the  Russians 
knew  they  were  gcjue.  By  keeping  on 
the  move  through  the  night  they  would 
be  alile  to  pass  tlie  Isthmus  of  Parpach 
in  another  day  and  a  half. 

All  day  and  all  tiighl  on  the  29di  (he 
division  marched  through  rain  mixed 
widi  occasional  snow  in  temperatures 
just  above  freezing.  Two  hours  after 
daylight  the  snowstorm  thai  liad 
provided  momentary  assistance  to  the 
engineers'  < onntevattack  west  of 
Feodosiya  hii  the  division  liead-on.  In 
btuiding^  driving  sleet  and  snow  the 
temperature  dropped  below  zero.  Wet 
Lmilorms  and  shoes  froze.  I  he  watery 
captured  gasoline  plugged  cai  burelors 
with  ice  crvstals.  Twcd  guns  and  vehi- 
cles skidded  into  ditches  and  could  not 
he  pulled  out.  Althtnigli  the  divisitm 
was  not  under  attack  either  from  the 


^*Ehnlli.  11  All.,  all  den  Knvtmanilifiriuti'ti  fir- 
wivl.ln  X.VWII  A.K.  2>  I  12.  .\OK  11  22271"/ 1 '.1  (ilc; 
i)hi'islll.  .AsMfift/tn,  Hiit'hi  iifhi'i  lit'n  Riii-rk'^ti^  ihi  /6. 
DwiiUin  auj  der  Halbui^d  Kribi  h,  AOK  Jl  22279/19  tilc. 


114 


MOSCOW  TO  STAIJNGRAD 


east&v  ilte  west;  Hiaiei' still  Ixdiieifled  Ms 
inission  was  to  save  the  troops;  and  the 
division  moved  on,  leaving  a  trail  of 
abdincloned  equipment.^® 

By  midmorning  Manstein  knew  the 
attempt  to  contain  the  beachhead  at 
Feodosiya  had  foiled.  He  then  told 
Sponeck.  who  was  still  nominal  I  v  in 
command  ;it  XXXXII  Corps,  to  have 
the  48th  Iiifan(i\  Division  add  speed 
and  attack  tlirongh  the  Isthmus  of  Par- 
pach  toward  Feodosiya.^"  \VIien  the 
order  reached  Himer,  his  itucks  and 
artillery,  what  was  left  of  them,  liad 
already  passed  through  the  isthmus 
and  were  h^^ed  not^fl^iesl  away  from 
Feodosiya  over  narrow,  snow-covered 
roads  on  which  they  could  barely  ad- 
vaiM^,  much  less  l^ifiQ  wmam&i^  The 
infantry,  which  was  just  coming  onto 
the  isthmus,  exhausted  and  freezing, 
Himer  dutifully  redirected  OP  an 

oblique  march  to.thesoutbwssjti  toivarii 

Feodosiya. 

Forty-fourth  ind  Fifty- first  Annies  had 
more  than  fortv  thcjusand  men  ashore 
on  the  Kerch  Peninsula  b\  the  29th. 
Possession  of  Feodosiya  and  Kerch  en- 
abled them  also  to  land  several  dozen 
tanks,  over  two  hundred  cannon  and 
mortars,  and  better  than  three  hun- 
dred motor  vehicles."'  Rain  and  snow 
helped  by  hindering  C>erman  inter- 
ference from  the  air  but  also  forced 
Fifty-first  Army  to  abanclon  a  landing  on 
the  nordi  side  of  the  Isthmus  of  Par- 
pacb  which,  had  it  residted  as  planned 
m  the  capture  of  the  Ak-Monay 
Heights,  could  have  turned  the  46th 


iHfantry  Division^  march  into  more  of 

a  shambles  than  it  alrearU'  was.  Tlie 
weather  and  Uie  Germans'  uiisadven- 
tureSi  Itewisrer,  were  not  enough  to 
comp^tilate  for  the  two  Soviet  army 
commatlds'  inexperience.  Forty-fourtli 
Army  bore  northwest  oat  ctf  Feodosiya. 
A  cjuick  thiiisr  to  the  northeast,  tiow- 
ever,  could  have  put  it  astride  the  isth- 
mus in  hours.  Instead  of  pursuing  the 
46th  Infantry  Division.  Fifty-first  Army 
sorted  itself  out  at  the  eastern  end  of 
the  peninsula,  (ktinan  air  reconnais- 
sance observcci  tanks  moving  into  for- 
mation on  the  30di,  but  the  lieads  of 
two  columns  bearing  west  had  only 
moved  to  within  ten  miles  of  Kerch  by 
the  iif  ternoon  of  the  31st.-^ 

After  a  short  rest  in  the  mormng*  tbae 
46th  Infantry  Division  began  its  attack 
northeast  of  Vladislavovka  during  the 
afternoon  of  the  31st.  Without  ardllery 
support,  the  exhausted  iid\mtr\  barely 
made  an  effort.  For  reasons  be  later 
fcfund  very  difficult  to  explain,  Ilimer 
appeared  at  the  front  only  briefly  and 
then  went  off  to  set  up  a  commantl  post 
outside  the  isthmus.  After  dark,  feai- 
ing  they  would  yet  be  cut  off,  the 
division's  regiment  commanders  con- 
tinued the  march  through  the  isthmus 
and  set  up  a  line  west  of  Vladislavovka 
facing  easl.^^  The  divisions  one  success 
of  the  day  had  been  to  wipe  6ut  a 
hundred  Soviet  parachute  troops  who 
had  jumped  into  die  path  ot  one  of  its 


'*^6.  Dh'nii>:i.  Kdi-,  ID!  iltn  tlrnn  Kiimminiihert'iuini 
General  dfs  XXXXII  A.K  .  10.1-12,  AOK.  U  28654/13 

^"AOK  U.  C.hej  lU--  (.nirmlstabes,  Fuer  K.T.B., 
30.12.-H.  .\C)K  M  22279/I'.)  Hie. 
'WOViS,  vol.  H.  p.  312. 


h.  la  tagajitetdui^  3U2.4i.  AOS  11 

22279/19  file. 

-HJbmlll.  i.e.  A.wmanntBmdtlliebin-  den  Riitrlaiig  tier 
46.  Divmim  luif  ,in  HnlltimoJ  Kertsch,  6-1.42.  AOK  U 
28654/13  file;  dni.  Kiin  XXXXII  A.K..  la  K negsUtgibueh 
Nr.  4,  31  Dec  41.  XXXXU  A,K.  19649/1  We. 


CRISIS  IN  THE  CRIMEA 


115 


The  Trap  Does  Not  Close 
"Bim^  m  Boi^  Sidess 

Manstein,  meanwhile,  had  stopped 
tlu'  atlack  on  St'\  aMopol  four  houis 
betore  ihe  46Lh  Inlaniry  IHvi^n  at- 
tack began,  and  he  had  begiin  taJdn^ 
the  132d  lufaim  v  Division  oui  of  the 
Sevastopol  perimeter.  The  decision  to 
move  mis  dmston,  which  was  fnkisdEly  a 
precaution,  soon  a|)pt'ared  to  have 
been  made  barely  in  time,  if  ngt  actu- 
ally too  late.  tVwen  all  of  the  4eth 
Infantry  Division  uas  off  tlic  Kt-rch 
Peninsula,  it  |)roved  incapable  of  any- 
thing but  a  hitiit^  defensive  mhsion. 
It  had  sacrificed  four-f1!tIis  of  its 
trucks,  half  of  its  communications 
cfjuipment,  and  nearly  all  of  its  engi- 
neer equipment,  not  to  mention  two 
dozen  ardlJery  pieces  and  sundry  ma- 
chine gims  and  mortars.  Enong^h  of  its 
lr(»ops  had  vanished  into  ihe  interior 
of  dre  Crimea  for  Manstein  to  issue 
an  tirder  threatening  ^  those  who  did 
not  rejoin  their  tinits  l>v  nightfall 
on  2  January  With  execution  for 
cowardice.** 

For  a  period  of  at  least  a  week,  if  tlTC 
Forty-Jourth  and  Fiftj-Jir&t  Army  com- 
mands had  bad  enterpriising  lead- 
ership thev  could  have  i  i  eaiefi  sex  ere 
problems  for  tlevenUi  Army,  and  some 
daring  on  their  part  could  feve  endan^ 
gercd  the  wliolc  German  po^^on  on 
the  Crimea,  ihe  Russians  ccAiId  very 
easily  trap  Eleventh  Army  tjn  the 
Crimea,  Manstein  pointed  out  to  Arm\ 
Group  South.  The  enemy  already  held 


-'AOK  I!.  (  hrj  G,„,-mlslahr^.  Fiit-r  k  i  lt.. 
11.12 Jl.  AOK  i!  L^2:^7H''I!■)  li!r;  II  f.f.  SiW,  hi  .\>. 
■f'Jrl2.  V(,rh,iifii;r  .MMiiiig  iirhf'  /u-~lin,ii  4f,.  Pn.. 
h.1.42.  H  (.1  Sii.il  2\H\m9^e:AOKii,laNT.6t42. 
(ill  Ki'imiiiiiiilii  >fitih-ii  General  XXX^UT  AilC,  i.t)4it 
AOK  11  22279/19  tile. 


three  of  the  five  ports — Sevastopol, 
Kerch,  and  Fcodosiva  —  and  ilie  Ger- 
mans were  not  protecting  die  remain- 
ing two — Yalta,  on  the  soutb  coast,  and 
Yevpaloi  iva,  tiorth  of  Sevastopol.  What 
Manstein  did  not  know  was  that  the 
Russians  were  for  the  moment  having 
troubles  enough  of  iheir  own:  the  told 
weather  had  blocked  Uie  port  ai  Kerch 
witJi  ite,  and  liie  rmdstead  at  Feo- 
dosi\a  was  littered  with  wrecks — the 
work  of  German  Stuki  dive-bombers — 
which  made  it  almost  unusable.*' 

Wlialcver  else  the  events  on  the 
Crimea  might  lead  to,  they  were  an 
instantaneous  and  monumental  embar- 
rassment to  the  Germans.  Sponeck  of 
XXXXII  Corps  had  ilagrandy  dis- 
regarded the  standfast  order,  and 
Hitler  had  him  recalled  to  Germany  to 
face  a  coui  t-martial.*'  The  46ih  Inlan- 
ttf  Di\  ision  Had  been  reduced  to  a 
wreck  without  actually  having  had  con- 
tact with  the  enemy.  Manstein  opened 
an  inquiry  into  the  divisions  losses  of 
ei(|inj^ent  and  weapons  and  tlie  be- 
li^^r  of  the  officers.  Without  waiting 
for  the  results,  Field  life*sfaal  Reidie- 
nau.  the  commanding  general  of  .Xrniy 
Group  South,  deciaied.  "...  the  divi- 
sion' has  lc)st  its  honor.  Until  it  has 
restored  its  honor  lin  (  (imbat]  no  deco- 
rauons  or  ^roni<iLions  will  be  allowed 
111  the  dlnsion."^^  Hitler  cieniaiided  tso 


-H}.B.  iln  II.  .■\imn;  Utge  dn  II.  Amee,  4.1.42,  H.  Or. 
Sued  aSiOH/^K  hie;  Chtf  dtr  UtftflMi  4,  5.J.42,  H,  Gr- 
Suefl  232(l></2^t  tilo. 

'"A  tourl  silting  under  CocrinK  scnlentcd  SptJiiet  k 
lodcatli.  llu-  sfiiiencc  w;«%  iioi  (.iirietl  uiii.  hom-vfr, 
until  tfl-n  wlifti  tlie  SS  fxoi  iilfcl  tiiiTi.  Ijiih  yrm 
Manstein,  Vnlnmir  Sirgr  (Buiin:  Alliciiiifum  V'erliig, 
1955),  p.  '2  ir>. 

"H.  Gr.  Sued,  lu  \i.  47)42.  iiit  tleti  O.B.  dn  II.  .•\rm,'e. 
1.6.42.  H.  Clr.  Sued  23208/29  file.  The  ci.iiiin.indiiifi 
general.  Killi  tnfanlry  Diviiiiun,  Himcr,  died  in  cuni- 
hni  hdiirc  iIh'  dimpUnary  proceedings  against  hitn 
were  uMnpteled. 


116 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


have  the  "situation  on  the  Crimea 
solved  off  ensively"  by  smashing  the  So- 
viet concentrations  at  Feodosiya  and  on 
the  Kerch  Peninsula,  and  wanted 
Manstein  to  do  it  without  weakening 
the  grip  on  Sevastopol.'^* 

Manstein  s  Counterattack 

Manstein's  own  liist  tliought  was  to 
attack  towar  d  Feodosiya  and  Kerch  as 
the  alternative  to  a  precarious  defense 
on  two  fronts,  one  in  the  east  and  one 
in  the  west.  Without  more  troops  and 
amrauiajlSofti,  neither  of  which  he  was 
likely  to  get  din  ing  the  winter,  he  could 
not  take  Sevastopol,  but  on  the  defen- 
sive there  he  could  spare  two  divisions 
and  some  artiiler\  fn  im  tlie  Sevastopol 
perimeter  foi^  an  aiiempt  against  the 
less  solidly  dug-in  Russians  on  the  east. 
One  division,  the  132d  Infantry  Divi- 
sion, would  have  to  go  east  under  any 
circumstances  tr»  siijjport  tlie  46th  In- 
fantrv  Division  and  the  Rumanians. 

Belore  dark  on  4  January,  the  lead 
t^ggiment  of  the  132d  Infantry  Division 
reached  Simferopol  on  the  march  to- 
ward Feodosiya.  Din  ing  the  night  So- 
viet troops  landed  in  Yevpatoriya, 
thirt)  miles  farther  to  the  northeast, 
this  time  w  ith  the  support  of  parachute 
t3?oops>  and  a  pai^satt  uprising  in  the 
town,  and  the  next  morning  die  Ger- 
mans were  forced  to  divert  tlie  regi- 
ment to  Yevpatoriya.  I  he  fighting  went 
on  there  for  anotlier  three  da\  s  accom- 
panied bv  attempted  Soviet  landings 
along  the  fronts  ai  Sevastopol  and 
Feodfjsiva.  Fhese  had  been  a  failure 
from  die  first,  however,  since  the  Ger- 
ama  coast  artillery  had  heard  the  Rus- 
sian ships  coiiamg  in,  had  sunk  one  of 


-"//.  Gt.  Si:,,l.  1,1  \i.  19/42,  ttn  AOK  11,  1J.4Z.  H. 
th;  Suetl  232(JS/ay  liit--- 


two  escort  destroyers,  and  had  driven 
off  two  large  troop  transports. 

As  soon  as  he  knew  he  bad  Yev- 
patoriya under  control,  Manstein 
pushed  aliead  with  readying  the  attack 
at  Feodosiya,  which  he  set  for  die  llth. 
Every  delay  there  was  working  to  ihc 
Russians'  advantage  because  the  Kercli 
Strait  had  frozen  over  and  tlie  Forty- 
/oMj#  afid  J§%^/S*!@f  A?7hjVj  were  bring- 
ing troops  across  on  the  ice.  But  the 
Crimean  weadier  in  winter  is  fickle.  On 
the  8th  and  9tii,  EtS  SOddenlv  as  it  liad 
dropjied  below  zero  a  week  befV)re,  the 
temperature  rose  to  well  above  freez- 
ing, which  was  not  helpftjl  to  the  Rus- 
sians but  uas  even  less  so  lor  the 
Germans.  In  tfie  thaw  die  Crimean  clay 
turned  to  oozing  mud  and  left  Man- 
stein no  choice  but  to  for  another 
cold  spell 

Oiuc  more  the  leather  did  not 
oblige,  it  stayed  warm  witli  beaiititul 
springlike  days  and  only  an  (xt  asional 
touch  of  frost,  and  the  mud  slaved. 
Thf  Russians  helped  most.  Although 
Forty-fourth  Army  had  at  least  tin  ee  and 
more  likely  four  divisions  and  some 
tanks  ashore  it  did  not  attempt  to  break 
oiu  of  the  seven-  to  ten-milc-deep 
beachhead  it  had  estabiislted  around 
Feodosiya  at  the  end  of  December,  and 
the  Fifty-first  Army  units  opposite  46th 
Infantry  Division  busied  themselves 
with  digging  in  on  the  isthmus.  How 
long  the  Russians  would  remain  pas- 
sive Manstein  could  not  know.  Since  air 
reconnaissance  reported  a  continuing 
How  of  reinforcements  from  the  main- 
land, he  had  to  assume  it  would  not  be 
very  long.  Therefore,  when  he  had 


-'■'AOK  //,  la  Nr.  I7il-f2,  Uni.trsucktmg_  ffwpaW*ya, 
II. 1. 12.  AOK  II  22279/19  file. 

'■'"Gm.  Kdo.  XXX  A.K„  to  l^emd&nig,  I0.L4Z, 
AOK  11  22279/19. 


CRISIS  IN  THE  CRIMEA 


117 


assembled  the  maximum  force  he 
could  muster — ihree  German  divisions 
(46th,  132cl.  and  I70lh  Inlaniry  Divi- 
siom),  the  Rumanian  I8ih  Division, 
and  two  Rumanian  brigades — he  let 
tlie  atuick  begin  on  15  January  re- 
gardless of  die  mud. 

Although  Forty- fourth  Aimy  had  held 
Feodosiva  loi-  nearly  three  weeks,  it 
seemed  only  perfuneterSf  detmUHled 
lo  delciul  it.  The  stron<;cst  resistance 
existed  around  V  ladislavovka  and  ihat 
was  apparentiy  aimed  at  holding  the 
retreat  route  open  into  the  isthnuis.  In 
the  first  two  days,  mud  slowed  die 
Germans.  Duifeg  the  &esA  two,  trosi 
set  in,  and  they  moved  faster.  On  the 
night  of  the  18th  the  Fiirty-faiirlh  and 
^^r^mt Armies  withdrew  into  the  isth- 
tmis  to  a  line  of  trendies  left  from 
hghtinj^  in  the  fall  of  1941. 

The  timeieeaied  ^ht  to  Manstein 
to  keep  the  pressure  on  and  to  d!'i\e 
through  lo  Kerdi.  Army  Group  South 
conlribiaed  Pan^r  Betia^^nienl  60 
which,  with  seventv-five  tanks,  had 
about  one-Uiird  die  suength  in  armor 
a£ Si  pmm:4x9mm.  Iws&mrsfyd  sink- 
ing temperatures,  the  tanks  worked 


^amt  way  into  position  while  the  infan- 
try regrouped  for  the  breakthrough 
across  the  isthmus.  Both  were  i  eady  at 
nightfall  on  the  23d,  except  tlie  Panzer 
Detachment  60,  newly  arrived  from 
Germany,  was  waiting  to  draw  side- 
aims  and  other  incidentals  fi^^  Elev- 
entli  Army,  'Hie  schedule  was  set:  in 
one  uiglu's  marcii  on  the  25th  tlie  tanks 
would  come  up  to  the  front  line  arriv* 
intf  just  alter  dawn;  the  infantry  by 
then  would  be  cutting  a  path  for  them 
dirough  the  Sowbt  trenches.  But  that 
ftna!  march  was  not  going  to  be  made. 
Army  Group  South  needed  the  tanks 
more  elsewhei  e  and  recalled  them  on 
the  24th.  riiereafler  Eleventh  Army 
had  to  resign  itself  to  a  winter  ol  de- 
fense on  two  fronts — if  no  worse. 
Meanwhile,  the  Kerch  Strait  had 
frozen  over  solidly  and  I'hrty-Jourih  and 
Fifiy-Jtnt  Amies  were  bt^^zjig  tmcj^s 
and  tanks  as  well  as  infantry  ^ia»39S  the 
ice.»' 


"Gen,  Kdo.  XXXXIl  AJC.,  la  Kriegstagfbuch  Nr.  4, 
10-24  Jan  42,  XXXXRiiUfc,  196«/lfite:  A£3!K  «. /«' 
AO  Kriegstagtbuch.  23M.Mli'-SiS,4Z,  10^84  Jatj 
AOK  11  file. 


CHAPTER  VII 

Hitter  wad  StaMn 


After  2400  on  N«w  Yearns  Eve,  Radio 
Bfilin  broadcasted  the  sounds  of  bells 
from  German  cathedrals.  Few  on  the 
Easiem  Vmnx  had  tile  ditte  to  l^n, 
and  to  those  \\  ho  did  they  brouglate^ 
clieet;  Among  the  latter  was  the  Fourth 
Fanzet  Gfoup  who  saw  the  new  year  m 
whileusating  Ibr  an  order  to  withdraw. 
The  army  gioup  had  told  the  staff 
member^  eariier  m  the  night  that  they, 
along  mth  Ninth  and  Fourth  Armies, 
could  expect  it  soon.  After  2400,  Gen- 
eral Hoepner,  Fourth  Panzer  (j^tip% 
commander,  attempted  to  do  what  was 
expected  of  a  panzer  general  aiid 
spoke  briefly  about  the  past  y  ear^  mt-^ 
ecsscs.  In  lioiiest\,  ho\\e\'ei",  he  could 
not  avoid  expressing  what  he  and  the 
others  present  most  deeply  ifeJ t,  diat  at 
the  turn  o(  llie  vear  the  forces  in  the 
east  lay  under  "a  deep  shadow."  The 
shadow  deepened  an  hour  later  when 
he  and  his  staff  read  off  the  pale  violet 
print  ou  the  teletype  tape  that  the 
Fuehrer  had  forbidden  al!  wi^diawak.* 

At  dawn  on  New  Year's  Day  the  tem- 
perature stood  al  —23°  F.,  and  the 
moisture  in  the  air  had  fit^en  to  Sdmb 
a  cold  white  fotr.The  waist-deep  snow 
blanketing  cenu  al  Russia  was  cut  only 


'P:.  AOK  -I,  la  Krifg^t^Oiuh.  Ttil  III.  3JJ2.4J,  Vi, 
AOK  4  22457/35  fUe, 


by  a  thin  network  of  roads  cleared 
enough  to  take  slow-moving,  single- 
kne  traffic,  Soldiers  and  Russian  civil- 
tarn,  men  and  women  of  all  ages,  shov- 
eled, wiflening  the  lanes  and  openiiitr 
new  ones  to  keep  the  front  from  stran- 
gling. When  and  if  the  order  to  retreat 
came,  whole  armies  would  liave  to 
march  westward  along  these  narrow 
tracks  that  could  be  drifted  shut  again 
in  an  hour  oi  two.  On  tlie  roads,  the 
armies  calculated  that  infantry  could 
cover  six  to  eight  tfiHes  a  day,  trucks 
sixteen  oi  tweiily  miles.  Sliiftiny;  an 
infantry  battalion  a  distance  of  twelve 
tnile*  frOfiti  one  point  on  the  front  to 
another  could  take  as  mucii  as  four 
days,  lanks  could  do  the  same  distance 
in  two  days,  but  as  many  as  half  eould 
beexperU'd  to  break  down  before  thev 
reached  the  destinadon.  In  the  cold, 
machine  guns  jammed,  and  tank  tur- 
rets would  noi  turn.  Ti^uck  and  tank 
motors  liad  to  be  kept  running  contin- 
uottsly.  Consequently,  v^des  that  did 
not  move  al  all  burned  one  normal 
days  load  of  fuel  every  forty-eight 
hours.* 

On  New  Year's  Day,  no  doulil  io  raise 
Uieir  morale,  the  Third  and  Fourth 
Panzer  Groups  were  ele^i'ated  to  army 
status.  The  c&iJimanding  generals 
would  henceforth  be  addressed  as 


-7';.  M)K  4,  la  JVr.  5&I42,  Notmn  ueber  jeHigf 
l'ii,'lninif;.<.-ii.  tQm^^fmdk^f^  5JA2.  Ft.  AOK  4 
22457/39  file. 


HITLER  AND  STALIN 


119 


"Ohcrbefchlshabei "  instead  of  "Bf- 
tehlshaber,"  but  the  advancement. 
General  Reinhardt  chsetved,  came  at  a 
time  when  Third  Pan/n  Army's  actual 
strength  was  more  nearly  that  of  a 
corps  than  an  army. 

In  the  Nazi  party  newspaper,  the 
\belkische  Beobachter,  Hitler  gave  a  New 
Year's  prodamatton  to  ttte  German 
people,  and  he  sent  an  order  of  the  dav 
to  the  troops  through  Wehrmaclit  chan- 
nels. In  l>oth  he  talked  jAjotit  the  past 
years  victories  and  promised  more  lo 
come,  and  he  portrayed  hiraselt  as  a 
man  of  peace  who  had  «raar  ^rced 
upon  him.^  His  private  inoodwa^dom- 
inated  by  the  previous  oight^  ex- 
changes with  Field  MazshaJ  Kluge^ 


commander  of  Arffliy  Group  Center, 
rhe  generals  were  coming  close  to  dis- 
puting his  authority.  General  Strauss, 
commander  of  N'inth  Army,  had  actu- 
ally attempted  to  issue  an  order  that 
contradicted  bddi  the  wo^^d  aiid  the 
spirit  of  his  instruc  tions.  The  Army  was 
being  "parliameiitarized."* 

Dttfmg  the  day.  Hitler  undmotA  to 
make  his  will  finiklly  and  unmistakal>ly 
clear.  To  Kluge  atQd  the  army  comman- 
der he  wrote  that  the  Soviet  lead- 
ership was  using  ihe  last  of  its  resources 
in  men  and  material  to  exploit  the  "icy" 
winter  mA  defeat  &e  Gemaan  forces. 
If  the  Eastern  Front  S&SOd  S^^JlSt  ?his 
assattlt,  it  would  assure  die  fingsl  victory 
in  ^e  sutntner  of  19€l.  Therefore,  the 


"HoToant&^HUkr,  vol.  II,  pp. 


*Halder  Diary,  vol.  11.  p.  372. 


12Q 


MOSCOW  TO  s-miHG&iyj 


existing  Knes  were  to  be  held  "even  if 

thevappent  to  iliose  ot  t  up\ ing  them  to 
have  been  outflanked."  Gaps  in  the 
frojnt  were  to  be  filled  by  divisions 
coming"  fiotii  Germany  and  the  West, 
and  columns  ot  trudks  mth  supplies 
and  replacement  battalions  were  on  the 
way.  'In  the  meaniime."  lie  concluded, 
"to  hold  every  village,  not  give  way  a 
step,  and  fight  to  me  last  bullet  and 
grenade  is  the  order  of  the  hour. 
Whefe  single  localities  no  longer  can  be 
held,  the  flames  blazing  from  every  h«t 
must  tell  the  neighboring  units  and  (he 
Lujhoajje  Uiat  here  courageous  troops 
have  done  their  duty  to  the  last  shot."' 
Wlien  Hitler  talked  afioiit  new  divi- 
sions to  plug  the  gaps,  he  was,  froiTi  his 
point  m  view,  nm  merely  trying  to 
create  an  llhision.  Help  for  Army 
Group  Center  was  on  the  way.  When  it 
would  anive  was  another  question. 
Tlie  OKH  had  autliot  it\  to  mobili/e  a 
half-a-million  trained  men  ior  the  East- 
mm  Fircmt  By  the  end  of  April  and  had 
two  programs,  code  named  W.\i  Ki'i-  Rt 
and  Rh£1Ngold,  underway.  The  Urst 
would  produce  four  divisions  from 
troops  in  I  he  Replacement  Army  that 
could  possibly  be  ready  by  late  January 
or  ^ily  Februaty.  The  secona  would 
draw  pre%  iously  deferred  men  I  n  mi 
industry  to  make  up  six  divisions,  and 
i^<me  would  take  longer  to  outfit  and 
train,  WALKutRE,  Rhkin(;old,  and  the? 
additional  men  to  round  out  tlie  half 
nullion  would  cut  Into  the  German 
work  force  and  would  thereby  milignte 
one  shortage,  while  aggravating 
aneihen* 


'H.  Gr.  Mitlr.  Ill  Xi.  IIH2,  tiige  iinil  Kaml/fliu-lnviii; 
m  Often.  I. IJ2.P/.  AOK4  22457m  Me. 
^Der  Chrf  iSet  Hternnusltmg  Uftd  Btfehlshaier  tUa  Er- 


The  OKH  did  not  know  where  it 

could  find  the  weapons,  panicularly 
artillery,  mortars,  and  machine  guiis,  to 
equip  the  WAtKVWKS.  and  RHEiNdOta 
divisions.  Curreiu  production  of  these 
was  insufficient  lo  cover  the  recent 
losses  on  the  Eastern  Front.  The  OKH 
also  had  two  movements  going,  Ele- 
FANi  and  Christophorus,  ihc  first  to 
provide  1,900  trtieks  and  the  second  to 
supply  6,000  vehicles  c)f  other  kinds  for 
Army  Group  Center;  and  the  iieidisposl 
was  assembling  500  buses  to  transport 
troops  intc^  Russia.  Bur  the  \ehicles 
were  having  to  be  collected  li  om  all 
over  Germany  and  as  far  away  as  Paris 
and  driven  easi,  and  most  would  prob- 
ably need  repairs  by  the  time  they 
reached  Warsaw.  All  across  Germany, 
under  Propaganda  Minister  Joseph 
Goebbels  sponsorship,  Nazi  party  of- 
fices were  collecting  furs  and  woolen 
garments,  and  Goebbels  was  ahout  to 
open  a  drive  to  requisition  restaurant 
teblecloths  for  use  m  making  cainoiB* 
flage  snow  panis  and  jackets.  The 
OKH,  however,  seeing  a  public  rela- 
tions coup  for  the  party  in  the  making, 
insisted  that  the  lighting  tn)<)]>s  liad 
adequate  cloUiing  and  consigned  the 
collected  good*  to  stora^  until  they 
could  he  issued  lu  i  eplacements  going 
out  later  in  the  winter.' 

A  Tkmsi  ^mt  Sukfdniebi 

The  S()\  iet  second  phase  objectiv  e,  to 
encircle  the  Array  Group  Center  oiain 
Ibrc^,  was  only  oeconnng  faintly  dis- 
cernible to  the  Germans  at  the  begin- 
ning of  1942.  The  first  indication,  not 


■Ohll,  („  Ti\i,lH.  Dig.  Abt.  Kriegstig^Ht^  1-5,  6-9 
pu  41!.  1 1  l/'ii:t  file:  Dri  Cliff  der  Hignsnmttag  untl  §§- 

I  Jail  42,  CMH  X- 124  file. 


FROWJ  VoJaa 

39th  28tfi 


Moscow-Volga 


■  y 


NINTH 
ARMY 


,  VtAhtoma 

^  /if 

=1st  Shock.   KNtmnna  fiotrana 
'ANZER^   -'s  //?  \     20th  -^^__5iJ7^'"M05COi^ 
ffi*ft*v*rf^(  ARMY  V  Ifi*^ 

^.^W|T^33d;  \  FRONT 


WEST 


FdURTft 


PANZBB'ARMY   %     „     l^^^~r~^.    43d     V        ^■^'U  ,,, 


122 


MOSCX>W  TO  STALINGRAD 


yet  actually  tatefi  f&T  what  it  was,  'had 
come  oil  Christmas  Day  when  tlie  Truth 
and  Fiftieth  Armies'  thrusts  that  had 
been  dimfted' toward  Belev  and  Kaluga 
in  ilu'  t>ap  heiwccii  Foiirib  and  Secontl 
Panzer  Armies  began  to  bear  westerly 
and  north-weseerly  towardi  Sukhtmehi 
and  Yiikhnov."  The  Sftond,  Thirly-iiintli 
Armey's  southward  drive  toward  Rzliev 
thaft  had  begun  in  Full  amfngiii  on  27 
Dt'ccmber,  was  still  obscured  four  daw 
later  by  wild  fighting  along  the  entire 
Ninth  Awfly  front.  (Mi^  9.T 

On  Armv  Gnmp  Center's  light 
Hank,  circumstances  were  changing  the 
Soviet  plan.  ZhukovTi  left  flank  armies, 
Tnith  and  Fiftirtli.  were  mo\ing  faster 
and  in  better  position  to  pursue  an 
envelopUK^t  fmm  the  sout&  ^t&Bt  was 
Bmni\k  Front.  Of  ilic  hitter's  three  aj^ 
niies,  only  Sixly-Jinl  Army,  by  liditlg  CHl 
Ten/A  Ani^%  flanks  att^al  scMet  t&b^ 
inentiini.  Third  and  Th/rlrenlh  Arnuc.s 
were  becoming  "exhausted"  by  the  end 
of  Deceiaiheft*  GonaseqtieMiy,  Army 
Group  Center's  qght  fiank  was  being 
left  outside  the  sot^ern  arm  of  the 
projected  enctrdeiiient,  ivhHib  ni&aSA 
bring  quick  changes  for  Armeegrtippe' 
Schmidt  and  its  two  armies.  Second 
and  Second  Pamen 

In  late  December,  Second  Army  was 
straining  to  hold  oiilo  its  "new  winter 
line*  on  the  and  Tim  rivers, 

^onie  miles  behind  the  niiginal  winter 
line  aldiough  still  tliiriy  to  tliirty-fi\'e 
miles  west  of  the  Kitrsk^Ord  railrmd. 
General  Schmidt  ga\e  Kluge  notice  on 
30  December  that  Second  Army  could 
have  to  give  up  both  Kursk  and  Orel 
and  the  raih  oad  in-between.  If  it  did,  it 
would  have  to  split  in  two  parts  to 

'H.  Gr.  Milh.  la  Kmpta^Uth.  Dtigmbtr  mi,  25 
Dtt  41.  H.  Gr.  Mitte  26974/6  file. 
«VOK  p.  120. 


follow  faittoadk  west.  Doihg  m 
would  open  a  sixl v-inile-u  ide  hole  in 
the  front,  but  tlie  army  could  not  sur- 
vive in  the  snow-covered  wilderness 
awav  from  the  railroads.'"  T\\c  Hrvnisk 
Front,  however,  cuuld  not  accomplish  a 
break^rougfi  to  force  Se^nd  Army 
into  another  retreat,  and  bv  tiie  end  of 
tlie  first  week  in  January  all  of  its 
armiea  ^ere  stopped.  Bryansk  jRwii% 
part  Ml  the  tounteroffensive  ended  at 
the  Tim  and  the  Zusha,  leaving 
Mtsensk*  K^rsk,  and  0«I  sn  Gentnan 
hands."  By  mid-January,  the  new 
winter  line  was  solid,  and  to  reduce 
Klttge^  ispan  of  control  Hitler  then 
transferred  Second  Army  to  Army 
Group  South.  General  Weichs,  who 
had  commanded  the  army  in  the  sum- 
mer and  fall  anri  had  been  on  sick  leave 
iince  early  November,  resumed  his 
command;  and  Schiindt  moved  from 
Kursk  to  Orel  to  het  ome  commanding 
general  of  die  Second  Panzer  Army, 

During  the  first  week  in  January, 
Second  Panzer  Army  's  front  facing  east 
also  stabilized.  Bui  at  the  same  time  the 
wmy  was  acquiring  a  long  and  ^acittely 
^Iti^table  north  fVfjnt.  Tlie  gap  between 
Fourth  Army  and  Second  Panzer 
Army  was  Bfty  miles  wide  and  had 
become  &e  mouth  of  a  great  bulge 
ballooning  westward  past  Sukliinichi 
and  arching  northwestward  almost  to 
Yiikhnov  aufl  souiliwestward  toward 
Bryansk.  Second  Panzer  Army  was 
having  to  sti^tcll  its  I^tSaiik  west  from 
Rclev  across  seventy  and  more  miles  of 
nnidless  c(juinry.  Headquarters,  XXIV 
Panzer  Corps,  wjiijih  hiid!  been  as- 
signed— without  troops — to  defend 


"•AOK  2.  la  Nr.  709/41.  Veherkpingm  furf  Hm 
Zunin  kgelini  det  2,  Armrr  vim  Ktirsk-Oref  nrttli  tlVv/cii. 
3i.l2Al,Yi.  Gr.  Mine  (i.ilK15/7  file. 

'Worn  vol.  11.  pp.  294.  295,  320;  VOV,  p.  120. 


HITLER  AND  ^AUN 


123 


the  Oka  River  north  of  Belev,  was  shift- 
ing eighty  milt  s  west  to  Brvansk.  still 
wilhoul  Hoops,  lo  11  y  to  stop  the  Soviet 
drive  past  Sukhiniclii.  It  acquired  a 
second  mission  on  3  jamiary  when 
Soviet  Truth  .\)7//v  Happed  4,000  Cer- 
man  troo|is  m  Sukhinichi.  Hitlt-i  re- 
fused to  le(  the  gaiTisf)n  break  out  ami 
demanded  that  die  town  be  defended 
to  the  last  man  "as  the  Alcazai  liad 
be  en  held  durillg  the  Spaxiish  Civil 
VVar;'>2 

When  Headquarters,  XXIV  I'aiizer 
Corps  arrived  in  Bryansk  on  ilie  4th.  it 
had  command  of  a  clutch  ot  odds  and 
ends,  2  infantry  battafioits,  1  @nghieer 
battalion,  assorted  construction  troops 
that  liati  been  sladoned  in  die  towns 
aroLinti  Sukhinichi,  and  an  armored 
train.  The  latter  had  been  in\()lvefl  in 
the  fighung  at  Sukhinichi  antl  had  only 
its  locomotive  and  one  car  srill  sei-vice- 
able.  An  infantry  division  and  a  se- 
curity division  were  coming  into 
Bryansk  by  rail  from  the  west,  but 
Armv  Gron]i  Center  had  already  rli- 
verted  a  rr<j,inu  iii  Irom  each,  and  the 
infantry  division  had  left  its  motoirire^ 
hides  in  Poland.  At  Brvansk  every- 
thing going  to  the  front  liad  to  be 
unloaded  and  reloaded  fipom  GenUan 
to  Soviet-gauge  trains. 

Meanwhile.  Tnith  Armys  cavalry,  as- 
sisted by  pariisans  nui  some  Soviet 
soldiers  who  had  hidden  in  the  forests 
since  the  October  1941  battles,  were 
fanning  out  lapidh  wi  si  and  south  of 
Bryansk.  On  the  7tli.  alter  air  recon- 
naissance reported  two  Soviet  divisions 
headed  southwest  away  from  Sukhi- 
nichi, Scirmidt.  to  protect  the  army's 
lifeline,  the  railroad  through  Bryansk, 


Holiiiujiii.  MS  P-1  Hh,  vol.  Ill,  Pi  45. 


Stripped  the  Armeegruppe^  front  on 

the  east  of  its  last  reserves,  the  4th  and 
18th  Panzer  Divisions,  and  sent  them  to 
XXIV  Panzer  Corps.  Having  done 
that,  he  tried  for  the  next  several  days 
lo  secure  Hitler's  permission  to  bend 
the  east  front  back  slightly  and  thus 
acquire  some  reserves.  Instead,  Hitler, 
on  the  13th,  oideied  him  to  keep  the 
€ast  $r&cA  where  it  was,  take  more 
troops  out  of  it  if  possible,  and  use  the 
troops  XXIV  Panzer  Corps  had  and 
was  getting  to  mount  a  counterattack 
toward  Su kb i n ii  li i .  Occasional  air- 
drops ol  aniiiiunition  and  food  inter- 
^petsed  with  messages  of  encourage- 
ment from  Hitler  were  keeping  the 
Sukhinichi  garristjn  fighting. 

A  break(jut  fi  om  Sukhinichi  had  be- 
come impossible  after  9  January  when 
'ii'nili  Aritf\  reat  bed  Kirov,  forty  miles  to 
the  west,  and  Zhizdra,  thirty-five  HaH^ 
to  the  soul  liwesi .  Ha\  ing  such  distances 
lo  go,  a  l  eliel  also  appeared  impossible, 
particularly  shice  XXIV  P^uaa^  Corps' 
infantry  were  mostly  recent  arrivals  not 
hardened  either  to  the  weather  or  the 
hghting  in  the  Sen«iet  lil^QS.  On  the 
15th.  XXIV  Panzer  Corps  je3i;pee|ed  to 
sun  t  llic  attack  in  another  four dayS— 
"at  the  earliest,"'-^  Whedier  XXIV  Pan- 
zer Corps  would  be  dri\'ing  toward  Su- 
khinichi in  four  more  da\s  or  fighting 
to  hold  Bryansk  was  actually  still  open. 
For  more  than  a  week,  the  Stavka  had 
been  shifting  troops  into  the  gap  from 
the  stalled  Bijamk  Front,  and  on  the 
13th  it  had  moved  the  Headquarters, 
Sixty-first  Army  more  closely  in  on  Tenth 
Amp  left'* 


'  7'i.  \i>k  2.  Ill  Kiiiii-.lii^,l'iirh.  AlKi/niilt  b.  I-  L'l  J.iii 
Vl.  tV.  A<  >K  2'i0:l  l; Ki'J  iilc;  AOK  -t,  la  Kiie^tugrlmih 
W,  //.  It  ]iin  r>.  AOR  4  l7:W0/l'Stex 

•WWi'S,  vol.  II.  p.  326. 


The  Grmd  Envebpment 

By  cotnpatisdn  with  tibe  cetiter  aM 
left  flank  armies,  Armv  Group  Center's 
right  flank  armies,  Second  and  Second 
Panzer  Armies,  were,  nevertheless,  in  a 
vinually  ideal  situation.  The  storm  of 
the  Soviet  offensive  was  passing  away 
from  Second  and  Second  Panz©*  Af* 
mies  as  it  mounted  assaults  of  greater 
intensity  against  Fourth  and  Fourth 
Panzer  Armies  in  the  center  and  Ifinih 
Army  and  Third  Panzer  Army  on  the 
iett.  While  the  armies  on  die  right 
faced  threats,  those  of  the  center  and 
left  confronted  oulrighl  destruction, 
both  piecemeal  and  en  masse.  At  the 
beginning  of  tlie  year,  mtM  one  tb© 
foui'  had  good  reason  to  assume  that 
given  its  circumstances  and  the  orders 


it  was  receiving,  it  was  on  an  accelerat- 
ing descent  into  oblivion.  Their  peril 
was  in  fact  so  great  and  appeared  so 
imminent  that  it  obscured  for  a  time 
the  graad  Soviet  de^n  to  encircle  and 
destrof  tbsm  all.  Consequently,  the 
conflict  assumed  a  dual  chai  acter  as  the 
German  armies,  on  Hitlers  orders, 
each  fought  for  survival  of  its  own  area 
while  the  Soviet  Kalinin  and  West  Fronts 
concentrated  on  a  second  objective, 
Vyazma. 

Vyazma,  a  small  city  on  the  Moscow- 
Smolensk  road  and  railroad,  was  125 
miles  west  of  Moscow  and  90  miles  east 
of  Smolensk.  It  was  a  railroad  junction 
from  which  hoes  ran  due  north  and 
south  to  Rzliev  and  Bryansk,  northeast 
to  Moscow,  and  s,0iitheast  to  Kaluga 
and  Tula.  The  line  to  Rzhev  carried  all 


HITLER  AND  STALIN 


125 


of  the  supplies  for  Third  Panzer  Army 
and  most  of  tliose  f  or  Nintli  Army.  Tlie 
Vyazma-Moscow  line  and  road  sus- 
tained Fourth  Panzer  Army,  and 
Fourtli  A I  III  \  depended  on  the 
Vyaxma-Kaluga  line  ior  its  supplies. 
The  railroad  to  Bryansk  had  provided 
an  alternate  route  for  Fourth  Army, 
but  lost  much  of  its  usefuhiess  when 
the  Russians  passed  to  the  west  of  Sii- 
khinichi.  At  the  turn  of  tlie  vear,  AV 
lin/n  Fmnrs  right  flank  armies  were  90 
miles  from  Vyazma.  West  Front's  left 
flank  opetatitig  in  the  gap  between 
Fourth  and  Second  Panzer  Armies  had 
.iljoui  55  miles  leli  to  get  there  via 
Vukliuov.  f  he  lanhesi  easterly  exten- 
sions ol  FouriJi  and  Iburth  Panzer 
Arimes'  fronts  wem  90  miles  fVom 
Vyazma.  Except  possibly  at  Kiev,  the 
Germans  themselves  had  not  at- 
tempted an  envelopment  Oin  sudi  a 
scale. 

The  Soviet  ef iort  also  dillered  mark- 
edly froHl  the  (ierman  in  its  combining 
of  maneuver  and  liruie  t^oi  ce.  The  Cier- 
mans  had  desij^ned  the  so-called  pin- 
cers movement  to  be  accomplished 
with  minimum  ef  fort:  not  so  the  move- 
ments of  the  Soviet  forces,  Zhukov,  ft)r 
one.  appeal  s  to  liave  had  greater  con- 
fidence in  the  frontal  assaults  that  had 
served  well  enough  on  the  approaches 
to  Moscow  than  in  the  more  elegant 
but  also  more  demanding  envelop- 
ment.'' Kegardless  of  the  cnxclopnu  iii 
being  attempted,  his  command,  the 
WesI  Fmiil.  tif\('r  ceased  battering  the 
whole  lengih  i>l  the  Fourth,  Fourdi 
Panzer,  and  Third  Panzer  Armiea* 
lines.  Konev  s  A.V///f;/»  Finn/  did  the  same 
against  Niiidi  Army,  lb  the  German 
conuaaoids,  riveted  ia  plws  bf  Hitler^ 


"Zhukm.  Memiin.  jj.  li.illf. 


orders,  the  weight  of  the  Rnsi^aii  fcif^es 

bearing  in  on  them  from  tlie  east, 
therefore,  made  the  envelopment  al- 
most an  acadeniiceoncem. 

In  the  toe-to-toe  contest  that  had 

gone  on  along  nearly  the  whole  trout, 
bth  .sides  had  had  a  month's  expeii'!- 
ence  in  winter  warfare,  and  patterns 
had  emerged.  I  he  Germans  clung,  to 
the  villages.  The  peasant  cottages,  vcr- 
minous  as  they  invariably  were, 
provided  shelter  where  no  other  ex- 
isted. In  ground  frozen  like  rock  six  to 
eight  feet  deep,  to  dig  or  to  build  was 
impossible.  I  he  izhas,  the  collages, 
'mht  no  small  asset,  and  to  deny  their 
C^Jdttf^rt  to  the  Russians,  the  Germans 
destroyed  any  left  standing  wiien  tliey 
retreated.  Consequendy,  the  Russians 
usualh  bafi  to  stay  in  the  open  which, 
although  liiey  were  mt>re  accustomed 
to  and  l>e(icj  prepared  for  the  winter, 
was  onK  idaiivelv  less  hazardous  for 
them  tluin  lor  the  Gei'mans,  par- 
ticularly when  the  temperature 
reached  -  30°  F.  (.r  -40°  F.  The  villages 
the  Germans  held,  on  the  other  hand, 
were  islands  in  a  sea  of  snow,  stationary 
and  frecjtientiv  jammed  with  ili-as- 
sorted  lro(jps  whose  presence  in  them 
Avas  dictated  by  the  elements  rather 
than  by  anv  tactical  purpose.  The  \il- 
lages  had  tlie  addilional  disadvantage 
of  bdng  wetsbdf  vulneTahk,  a&  the  Rtis- 

si;nis  were  fjuick  t»i  ap|)recipite,  to  stnn- 
dardi/ed  assault  patlet us.  .A  single  man 
who  knew  ilie  lav  of  the  land  could 
dii  et  t  hre  from  the  back  of  a  tank  and 
smash  a  village  from  a  distance  with 
high  explosives.  At  night,  in  snow- 
storm.s,  or  in  fog,  one  or  two  tanks  with 
infantry  could  drive  straight  into  a 
village,  blasting  the  buildings  one  by 
one.  If  the  defenders  came  out  into  the 
open,  the  S(jviet  infantry  occupied  lo- 


126 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


Gemm  ImAmKV  Enter  a  Village 


cal  Iiouscs.  IFthcv  stayed  indoors,  tlieir 
posiliuii  was  ctjuaily  liazardous  since 
thaicked  roofs  and  woofiten  con- 
struction offered  little  protection 
against  76-mm.  shells.  The  Gtiman  88- 
mm.  guns  and  field  howitzers  w  iili  Rat- 
kopf  ho!l(i\\-<  Iiarge  ammuniiion,  whic  h 
Hitler  had  i  cU  ased  in  December,  could 
knock  out  Soviet  T-34  tanks.  A  (Sifeet 
hit  with  a  RolhipJ  shell  could  generally 
be  counted  on  to  kill  the  whole  tank 
crew  and  an\  inlantTj?  fjdiiig:  on  tibe 
vehicle.  Bui  the  Germans  guns  were 
not  maneuverable  and  were  vulnerable 
t0  the  tanks'  cannon  and,  at  close 
range,  to  the  weapons  of  the  Soviet 
infantry  as  well.  The  88s,  nicknamed 
"elephants,"  had  a  particularly  high 
profile.  In  using  field  artillerv  as  anti- 
tank guns,  die  Germans  had  to  con- 


tend with  a  loss  ratio  of  close  to  one  for 
one  and  a  consequent  decline  in  iheir 
artillery  sti;@ifigill^ 

The  German  troops,  particular  ly  the 
infantry  and  artillery,  had  not  been 
accustomed  in  tikt  Vfset  thus  £tr  to  ac- 
cepting losses  equal  to  those  of  their 
opponents,  and  they  had  not  even 
imagined  anything  like  the  apparent 
Soviet  disdain  for  life  evidenced  in  a 
seeming  unconcern  for  casualties  ei- 
ther from  CJOld  or  from  enemy  fire. 
Soviet  forces  could  take  the  \  illages  but 
not  usually  cheaply,  antl  their  tonm lan- 
ders allstays.  seemed  willing  to  |)av  the 
price  nf)  matter  how  higli  it  might  be. 
The  Russian  "iramplcrs,"  for  instance, 
were  unarmed  men  \\  hose  sole  f  mic- 
tion was  to  trample  paths  thiough  the 
snow  to  German  positions.  By  tlie  lime 


HITLER.  AND  STALIN 


127 


an  attack  began,  the  field  was  often 
littered  with  the  bodies  of  these  hum- 
ble contributors  to  its  success.'* 

Geimal  Hoepner  Does  Not  O/xy 

At  the  turn  of  the  year,  Army  Group 
GenterV  newest  crisis  was  at  Fourth 
Army  where  on  2  January  the  Soviei 
Forty-lhird  Army,  after  punching  at  the 
5CX  Corps-LVII  Panzer  Corps  bound- 
ary for  several  days,  opened  a  tenoll]il& 
gap  between  Borov^k  and  Maloyaro- 
slavets. Therewith.  Fourth  Army,  ha\- 
ing  already  lost  toiitacl  with  Second 
Panzer  Army,  was  pracdcally  cut  adrift. 
Fourth  Panzer  Army  was  hardly  any 
belter  off:  V  Pan/er  Corps'  hold  was 
steadily  weakening  west  of  Voloko- 
km$k,  and  as  the  armies  on  their  outer 
flanks  were  driven  back.  Foui  th  Panzer 
and  Third  Panzer  Armies"  fronts  were 
being  Ifefll  on  flbe  eastern  face  of  a 
dangerotis  outward  bulge.  When 
Hoi^pxier  ai]t«d  ftie  army  group,  on  the 
aHemoon  of  2  Jmitiary,  to  review  the 
latest  standfast  order  in  light  of  these 
conditions,  he  teoeived  an  expression 
<£  "Hut  E^ehcBr%  greatest  trust  in  the 
Fourth  Panzer  Amiv  and  its  IcuU-r- 
ship,"  a  "eaiegoiical"  refusal  to  per- 
mit any  kind  ^  withdrawai.  and  an 
Older  to  transit  two  inf;inii\  regi- 
ments and  an  artillery  battalion  to  help 
XX  Corps*  Kluge  then  also  gave 
Hoepner  command  of  XX  Corps.*' 

In  placing  XX  Corps  under  Hoep- 
ner, Khkge:  eonvetted  what  had  been  a 
gap  in  an  army  front  into  one  between 
two  armies.  Technically  the  decision 
was  absolQtely  mnmL  The  corps  had 
mmm  n^  Uo^pamf&  Fourth  Panzer 

'Vi.  tHv,  III  Bmcht  ueber  russhrke  iind  deuttt^t 
Mm0fsmiif.  30.1.42,  Ft.  AOK  3  21818/7  file. 


Army  and  m  longer  had  any  with 

Kuebler's  Fourth  Armv.  Therefore, 
Hoepner  could  give  it  support,  and 
Kuebler  could  not.-  On  the  omer  hand, 
as  had  iiappened  west  of  Tula,  the  gap 
now  became  the  concern  of  two  com- 
mands both  of  Whi«^  %ad  equally  se- 
rious problems  elsewhere.  On  the  3d, 
Kluge  ordered  Hoepner  to.  stage  an 
attack  from  his  Md©  to  csfosC  #e 
between  Barovsk  and  Malo\  arosIa\  ets. 
To  do  so  Hoepner  liad  to  move  one  of 
his  divisions  out  to  the  XX  Corps  right 
Hank.  Tlial  took  two  days,  atiti  on  the 
morning  of  the  6th,  when  tlie  division 
was  in  place  and  ready.  Foui^  Mfmf 
reported  that  its  Hank  had  been 
pushed  back  during  the  night  dius 
ojiening  the  gap  to  eighteen  miles  but 
leaving  the  point  at  which  Hoepnci  s 
attack  was  aimed  Luider  Russian  con- 
trol.^^  Also  during  the  night,  t%l%e 
So\  ieT  divisions  had  tin  tied  north  be- 
hind the  XX  Cot  ps  Hank,  in  the  morn- 
ing, Hoepner  proposed  bending  his 
Hank  back,  which  Kltige,  bccniise  of 
Hiders  orders,  insiandy  lorbade,  coun- 
tering with  an  order  to  begin  the  attack 
anvway,  Fourth  Army,  he  said,  would 
iielp  from  its  side — with  one  Inutalion. 

For  two  days  Hoepner's  one  division 
on  the  XX  Corps  right  fJank  attacked 
south  while  the  Soviet  division  pushed 
north  behind  it  and  XX  Corps,  until 
finaU)!  on  the  morning  of  the  8th  Ge- 
neral der  Infanterie  Friedrich  Materna, 
commanding  XX  Corps,  told  Hoepner 
he  could  no  longer  be  respf)iisible  for 
the  corps  situation.  T^ie  Russians,  he 
said,  had  cut  his  one  cleared  read  to 
the  west.  He  could  no  longer  get  any 
supplies  in,  and  if  diey  iasiened  their 


'V:.  ^o/v  /.     \,.  72l42.mH.Qt.Mmt,6.IA2.  Ft 

AUh  4  224j7;3y  file. 


128 


MOSCOW  TO  SmUNGRAD 


hold  tighter,  he  would  never  gel  the 
corps  out.  Hoepner  then  told  Kliige 
that  XX  Corps  would  "go  to  tlie  Devil" 
in  a  short  time  if  it  were  not  aUowed  to 
pull  back.  Kliige  insisted  the  corps  was 
"still  a  long  way  from  going  to  the 
Devil,"  but  said  he  WQidct  call  General 
Haider.  Two  hours  later,  at  1 200,  Kluge 
said  he  had  "categorically"  demanded  a 
decision  on  XX  Corps  and  Hald^  l^J^s 
on  his  way  to  Hitler  to  get  it.  Hoepner 
was  to  alert  the  corps  because  liie  order 
could  cotaie  al  ilE^  minute.  An  hour 
and  three-quarters  later,  after  having 
tried  several  times  and  failed  to  reacli 
Haider  directly,  Hoepner,  on  his  own 
responsibility,  issued  the  ordcar  fpr  the 
corps  to  [jiill  back. 

After  nightfall,  having  been  cnit  cf 
touch  with  Hoepner's  armv  foi"  seven 
hours,  IsJuge,  who  apparently  had 
learned  of  the  ord^»  called  and  con- 
firmed that  Hoepner  had  given  it. 
Kluge  then  said  an  order  to  retreat  was 
"impossible" — ^not  because  it  was 
wrong  but  because  it  went  against 
Hitler's  orders.  Kluge  saw  tltis  case  as 
being  the  same  as  the  one  involving 
Guflerian.  and  he  Iiastened  to  dissoci- 
ate biniself  irom  responsibility  for  it  by 
pointing  out  that  at  1200  he  had  specif- 
ically used  the  word  "prepare"  and  not 
the  word  "order."  Kluge  called  again  at 
2330.  Hitler,  he  told  Ho^er,  had 
disapproved  the  order  given  to  XX 
Corps  in  the  afternoon  and  had  re- 
lieved Hoepner  as  commanding  gen- 
eral, Fourth  Panzer  Axmft  effective 
immediately.^® 


'»Pz.  AOk  4.  Ill  Kricgsliiiirhufh,  Tfil  III.  6-8  Jan  42, 
Pz.  AOK.  4  I :i7/:'.3  Hlr:  K.  :\()K  -I.  In.  Be.-.l»iT)umgi- 
rwtni-n.  f5-«  )aii  (2,  t'?.  AOK  4  •J24.'.7/-l.%  lile.  Hiller 
al^tj  ordcrcel  Oi.a  Hoepner  be  expt'llcd  Ihjhi  ilie^niiv 
wiili  lii.ss  i>f'  pay,  pension,  and  the  r  ights  lit  wear  UK- 
uniform  and  decorations.  The  military  courts. 


After  ICX  Corj^s  passed  from  Foordi 
Army  to  Foinlh  Panzer  Army,  foin  ol 
Fourth  Army's  five  remaining  corps, 
otttfianked  on  the  north  and  the  south, 
were  caught  in  a  detached  loojj  ol  the 
front  touching  the  Oka  River  west  of 
Kaluga  and  tmcim'g  norlh  lharty-five 
miles  not  quite  to  Maloyaroslavets, 
whicli  the  Soviet  Forty-third  Army  had 
taken  on  2  January,  What  might  befall 
the  four  corps  from  tlie  north  de- 
pended entirely  on  the  Russians  and 
Qtt  Pbaf#  "fiaegSer  Aritty.  The  ndrth- 
ernmost  corps,  LVII  Panzer  Corps, 
barely  had  the  strengdi  to  cover  the 
flank.  The  saaSe  was  true  of  XXXXm 
Coqis  on  the  south.  The  danger  was 
greater  at  dre  moment  on  ll^e  south 
befi^se  Mftieth  Army's  spearheads 
northwest  of  Sukhinichi  were  forty 
miles  behind  the  eastern  face  of  the 
loop  and  less  than  ten  wMes  fe>IQ  ^he 
RoUhahn,  the  highway  used  by  Fouith 
Army  as  its  one  good  road,^" 

By  the  S^Jii  Fourth  Army  had  mus- 
tered enough  strength  at  Yukhno\  lo 
deflect  the  Russians  die  Rollbahn 

there,  but  wmt  the  road  ran  across 
rather  than  away  from  the  Russian  line 
of  advance,  drey  had  merely  to  shift 
their  attack  on  the  higb'«®y  sottthward 
a  few  miles  to  ciU  it.  The  Fourth  Army 
chief  of  stalf  told  Hitler's  adjutant, 
©eaeral  Sehraundt,  "If  the  Rossian 


however,  upheld  Hoepner's  cimtenliiiii  lliiil  lif  could 
noi  he  (iepi  ivod  (il  diosc  rifjlits  and  bt-Meliis  witlitmt  a 
couri  iiiyi ual;  and  Ik-  iimiinucd  im  inaitive  stains 
with  rant;  and  lull  pa\  tintil  lie  was  ,iiiesled  and 
stibsef[tifrid\  iiit-d  ami  cm-i  iiit-d  as  a  mc-iiiix-i  nl  the 
20  Julv  l;t)4  (jIoI  .igaiiist  Hiilfts  hie. 

-"^Kutirrli  Rnl!l)uhii  (iIk-  (.it.-i  mans  also  iiscrl 

die  term  tn|-  olliei  thnnigh  roadsl  was  llu*  Mustnu- 
Waisavv  Highway,  one  (>£  the  best  in  the  Soviet  Union 
,iiid  •>ne  nf  the  few  ^-weath^r  rQp4!i  ill  tfaie  Qcciipi^ 
territoiy. 


HITLER  AND  STALIN 


129 


thrust  gels  ihi ough.  it  will  be  deadly."*' 
All  the  artny  had  on  the  whole  western 
rim  of  the  Sukhhiiehi'  bulge  was  the 
Headquarters,  XXXX  Panzer  Corps, 
with  parts  of  two  divisions  and  several 
Luftimffe  constmctioTi  battalfotisi. 

On  the  night  of  the  5tii,  General  tier 
lafaniei  ie  Ciotthard  Heinrici,  the  com- 
manding general  of  the  XXXXIIT 
Corps,  called  the  Fourth  Arniv  Lhief  of 
staff  and  asked  whetlier  tlie  array  was 
beitig  deltbetately  sacrificed  artd 
whether  il  was  lieiiig  treated  the 
the  Soviet  Command  had  treated  its 
troops  dnr&ig  ilie  summer  endrdifr- 
nients.  His  men  and  officers.  Heinrici 
added,  were  well  aware  that  the  Riis- 
sians  wete  rtiany  miles  behind  therfi  oft 
iItc  south,  and  diev  woidd  have  to  be 
told  what  was  in  store  for  them.  Wlien 
the  report  on  what  Heinrici  had  said 
reathed  army  grouj)  heatltjiianers. 
which  il  did  less  tlian  ten  minutes  alter 
Heinrici  stopped  talking,  KJuge  came 
on  till-  telephone  to  athnonisli  tlie 
whole  Fourlli  Army  to  keep  its  nerves 
under  control.  He  would  ftot  leave  hi» 
old  army  in  the  lurch,  he  insisted,  but 
thills  had  not  gone  that  far  yet.  If  the 
army  stood  fast,  he  believed  a  "state  of 
bakiiue"  coidd  be  achieved.^'  If  it 
"marched  off  the  field,"  the  con- 
sequences would  be  tnmlculabte. 

Two  davs  later,  on  the  alternoSft  df 
the  7th,  XXXX  Panzer  Coips  reported 
that  with  the  forces  it  had,  it  could  not 
keep  the  Russians  ui'i  iheRoUbaliu  any- 
where along  the  fifty-mile  stretch 
southwest  ot  Vulthitofv.  0ving  up  on 
achie\iiig  a  "state  of  balance,"  Kluge 
then  ii  ied  to  persuade  Hitler  to  allow 
Fourth  Arffiy%  east  front  to  go  bjtdc 


^*A0K4,  la  Knegstageburh  ,Vr.  //,  5  Jan  42.  AOK  4 

mm\  file. 


thirty  miles  or  so  to  the  \idnity  of 
Yukhnov,  which  would  shorten  the 
front  and  release  troops  to  defend  tJie 
Rollhaliti.  A  III]  ,i  loitg  relephoiie  con- 
versation kle  in  die  mghl,  Kluge  be- 
lieved Hiller%  "mind  Was  no  longer 
closed  to  the  reasons  for  such  a  willi- 
drawal."^^  But  in  llie  morning  Hitler 
was  full  of  ideas  for  small  shlHs  feat  he 

insisted  could  solve  the  problem  onthe 
Rollbaltn  by  themselves. 

Throughout  the  day.  Hitler  engaged 
Kluge  and  llaldci  in  a  tug-of-war.  re- 
fusing time  alter  time  to  be  pinned 
down  to  a  decision  while  the  reports 
from  Fourth  Aiivn  became  \>u< 
gressively  dsrHer.  At  12U0,  tlie  Fourtii 
Army  chief  of  staff  told  Kluge  iJiat 
Soviet  columns  wwr  l)ehind  both 
flanks  of  the  four  corps  in  the  east,  and 
the  corps  could  no  longer  just  witfi- 
draw;  they  wotdd  have  to  fight  their 
way  back.  Kluge  lold  him  he  was  ex- 
pecting a  "big  derision"  from  Hitler 
soon.  Six  htnus  later  the  decision  had 
not  come,  and  the  army's  chief  of  stall 
told  him  the  time  wasdibse  when  Kluge 
would  ha\e  to  give  the  order  hiinsell, 
which  Kluge  had  earlier  said  he  would 
do  if  necessary  to  save  Fourth  Army. 
Finally  at  2200  tkiicral  Jodl.  chief  oi 
the  OKW  Operations  Staff,  called 
Malderi  and  Haider  called  Kliige. 
Hitler  harl  agreed  to  let  Fourth  Army's 
foui  corps  on  the  east  go  back  ten  miles 
in  stages  and  not  tilic  thirty  mile*  die 
army  and  army  group  had  proposed 

In  ifee  mdev  put  out  im  Hew  feu^ 
Day,  Kider  had  attempted  to  rivet 


"I Intl..  7-H  '12. 

8  Jan  42;  HMn  Di/iiy.  vol.  11,  p.  377. 


130 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


Army  Group  Center's  left  flank  tight 
where  it  stood:  Tliird  Panzer  Army 
facing  east  on  ilie  Lama  River  and 
Niitth  Army  in  a  120-miIe-long  line 
running  aliiiost  due  west  past  Rzhev 
along  the  upper  reaches  of  the  Volga 
River  to  the  junction  with  Array  GxtSUp 
North  south  of  Ostashk(>\.  R/hev  was 
Army  Group  Center's  northern 
comerpost.  Lying  tsai  the  Volga  at  the 
junction  of  a  north-south  and  east -west 
railroad,  it  gave  the  army  group  left 
flank  something  lo  hang  oiuo  in  whal 
wa&  otherwise  a  wilderness  of  forest 
afld  swamp  in  all  directions  for  many 
miles. 

The  sector  nordi  and  east  of  Rzhev 
was  the  most  threatened  spot  on  the 
left  Hank.  Tlieie,  VI  Corps  was  being 
battered  by  the  Soviet  Thirty-ninth, 
Twenty-ninlh,  and  Thirty-first  Armies  and 
being  made  an  example  of  by  Hider. 
On  29  December,  after  some  airplane 
pilots  had  drawn  a  much  more  favor- 
able piiUne  of  the  situation  around 
Stariisa  than  had  VI  Corps'  reports,, 
Hider  had  dismissed  the  corps  com- 
mander and  appointed  in  his  place  lor 
several  days  General  der  Flieger  Wolf- 
gang von  Richthofen,  who  was  also 
commanding  general  of  the  VIII  Air 
Corps,  Army  Group  Center's  air  sup- 
port commanid.** 

During  the  night  on  1  January  Hitler 
forbade  any  except  "local  evasive  move- 
ifients,*ana  in  the  morning  he  ordered 
the  words  "KOENIGSBKRG  Position" 
abolished  because  they  represented  a 
"dangerous  myth  *  'I!l^ty--four  hours 
laic],  Ik-  commanded  Ninth  A^rm^- — 
VI  Corps  and  its  neighbor  on  the  left, 


-W.  f.r  Miiif.  In  Kmgti^iuek.  Dmsmbn  1941,  29 
Dec  41.  H.  Gr.  MiLle  26974/Bfac. 


TOCIil  Corps,  in  pariicufef— *Hot  to  i  c - 
treat  a  "single  step"  for  any  reason.''* 

Having  been  told  that  HiUer  was 
h^hly  anno>  ed  by  his  attempt  t0  Qtdiar 
a  retreat  and  having  also  been  prom- 
ised 300  JU-52  transports  to  fly  in 
reinforcements  for  Ninth  Army.  Gen- 
eral Strauss  passed  on  Hider's  order  to 
Vi  and  XXI II  Corps  with  his  own 
emphatic  endorsemcnl.  Privately,  he 
and  his  staff  believed  Ninth  Army  was 
"on  the  razor's  edge"  and  that  it  could 
not  stand  where  it  was  more  than  a  few 
days.  Generalleutnant  Eccard  von  Ga- 
blenz,  commanding  general  of  the 
XXVII  Corps  that  held  an  exposed 
sector  between  VI  Corps  and  the  Third 
Panzer  Army  left  flank,  was  even  less 
confident.  Fearful  that  VI  Corps  would 
collapse  no  matter  what  orders  it  was 
given  and  that  his  own  corps  would 
follow,  Gablenz  repeatedly  asked 
Strauss  on  the  2d  to  disregard  Hider's 
order.  The  troops,  he  insisted,  knew 
their  position  was  hopeless,  and  he 
"could  not  pul.  a  policeman  behind 
every  soldier.***  After  his  corps  and  Vl 
Corps  lost  more  ground  during  the 
day,  and  Strauss  ordered  him  again  to 
hold,  Gablenz  sent  a  radio  message  that 
re;jd.  "I  cannot  carrv  the  resp()nsibilil\' 
for  my  command  any  longer  a,nd 
fhcrefow  ask  to  be  relieved  of  my 
post,"  Strauss  ordered  him  in  relin- 
quish his  command  immediaiei)  and  to 
proceed  by  air  tiS  thearmy  group  h^€l- 
quartet  s  in  Smolensk  at  daylight  the 
nettt  morning.^* 

BiefoFe  nightfall  on  the  2d,  a  gap  had 


*\M>K  Kn,i,'.tagebiith,  U-$i  3A2,  1-2  Jan  42, 
AOK  ') :.' I  "rii I,  I  liK-, 

M'lK     In  Krk^^lmth  Nr.  2.  2 ^4Sk  fn. 
AOK  :5  MWll/l  (ik-. 

^'liii,.  .■nil  (iiihlrni.  an  dm  Herm  OM.  der  9>  Armtt, 
Z.L-12,  AOK  y  21520/M  fite. 


HITLER  AND  STALIN 


131 


opened  northwest  of  Rzhev  between 
XXIII  Corps  and  VI  Corps,  but  when 
it  did  not  widen  the  next  day,  the  Ninth 
Army  staff  took  heart.  In  -40°  F. 
weather  and  snow  the  troops  were 
fighting  well;  Richthofen's  fighters  and 
fli\e-bonibers  were  flying;  and  a  bat- 
talion of  reinforcements  arrived  in 
Rzhev  by  air  during  the  day.  The  army 
also  congratulated  itself  on  having 
overcome  the  worst  of  the  deficiendes 
it  had  experienced  during  the  winter 
warfare.  Frostbite  casualties  were  still 
but  the  troops  were  outfitted  with 
ftilRS  B&A  felt  feoois  retfui^oned  from 
the  Russian  civilians,  and  they  had  de- 
vised ways  of  keeping  their  machine 
guns  and  other  automatic  weapons 
working  in  low  temperatures. 

■W^eo  Thirty-ninth  Army  widened  the 
fereadh  tiorthwest  of  fehev  to  several 
miles  on  tlie  !rli,  Strauss  thought  he 
could  dose  it  by  attacks  from  tlie  east 
and  the  west.  Ite  Itsd  s  iseserve  of  sorts, 
the  SS  Cavalry  Brigade,  Stationed  be- 
hind XXIIl  Corps  on  ^(pigpty  dutj. 
ThfeSS  Cavalry  Brigade  m^  fm&i^^ 
thy  on  two  counts:  it  was  one  of  onlv 
two  active  cavalry  units  in  the  Wehr- 
mackt,  and  ft  was  eommanded  by  Bri- 
gadefuehrct  ("Bri<iadier  General")  Otto 
Hermann  Fegelein,  who  was  married 
to  Hitler's Ttiybt«ssfsisftter.  As  a  regiment 
and  later  a  bi  igarlc,  it  had  been  in  the 
Eastern  Front  since  early  in  the  cam- 
paign as  an  anachroxi^ic  slitp>v^^^ 
for  the  SS.  Its  commatnid*s^  iwas aft ia- 
passioned  horseman  wtib  joi^tll^a^ 
tary  qualificatJofiS.  IS  it,  Stt«ttSS  US* 
signer!  the  mission  of  attacking  from 
the  west  while  VI  Corps  created  an 
infantry  assault  group  to  malce  th6 
effort  from  the  east. 

So  flimsy  a  German  elfort  could 
hardly  have  been  expecteii  tfy  sticceed 


without  more  cooperation  from  the 
enemy  than  the  Soviet  commands  were 
likely  to  give.  Three  Soviet  armies  were 
bearing  in  on  Rzhev,  and  air  reconnais- 
sance had  for  several  days  been  report- 
ing a  new  Soviet  buildvip  on  the  XXIII 
Corps  left  flank  south  of  Ostashkov. 
Early  in  the  day  on  the  5th,  Thirty-niiiSh 
Army  opened  the  gap  northwest  of 
Rzhev  to  eight  miles  and  began  "pour- 
ing" troops  through  to  the  south. 
Strauss  could  not  have  the  SS  Cavalry 
Brigade  inio  ])osilion  letr  anothef  day, 
and  tiie  mood  at  the  army  group  and 
in  the  OKH  was  close  to  being  hys- 
terical. Kliige  ordered  Strauss  to  "tell 
every  commander  that  Rzhev  must  be 
held."  Haider  pronounced  Rzhev  to  be 
"the  most  decisive  spot  on  tlie  Eastern 
front"  and  added,  "There  must  be  a 
man  who  can  put  things  to  rights  there, 
if  not  the  division  commander  then 
some  colonel  and  if  not  he  dien  a  major 
who  has  the  necessary  energy  and 
determination 

Concurrendy,  Strauss  and  Reinhardt 
fell  to  arguing  over  a  div^on  sector. 
On  I  he  3d,  lo  lei  Hoepners  Fourth 
Panzer  Army  concentrate  on  the  Bo- 
rOvsk-Maloyaroslavets  breakthrough, 
Hitler  and  Kluge  had  transferred 
Tlurd  Panzer  Army  f  rom  Kluge's  com- 
mand and!  V  ^ttzea*  Corps  fwin 
Hoepner's  to  Strauss'  Ninth  Army  tom- 
mand.  To  Reinliardts  huge  annoyance, 
Strauss  had  refused  to  gfve  him  com- 
tOand  of  V  Panzer  Corps  because  Ce- 
.tieral  der  Infanterie  Richard  Ruoff,  the 
corps?  t^^Otnanding  general,  was  Sotife- 
what  Reinhardt  s  senior.  (Tlie  senie>rity 
question  was  resolved  ten  days  later 
when  ^%ifi££  i%p}a#i^  Hcsepnet-  at 
Fourth  Panzer  Mgm^  4ind  V  Panzer 

■■'.4f  )A  9,  iVff«B!«a  ikf  Ati.  is,  5  Jaji  4g,  A0K  9 
21520/14  lile. 


132 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


Corps  then  passed  to  Third  Panzer 

Annv.)  Partly  o(  pi(|ue  but  also 
partly  witli  icason,  Reiniiaixlt  then 
claimed  tliat  his  Timd  ftmzer  AttOf, 
sandwiched  between  two  Ninth  Army 
corps,  was  going  to  be  robbed  of 
strength  through  IkhH  Hanks,  and  he 
refused  an  order  from  Strauss  to  take 
over  a  division  sector  from  XXVII 
(:<jrps  on  Third  Panzer  Armyli  left 
flank.  Kluge  Hnallv  broke  into  the  quar- 
rel, threatened  Reinhardt  with  a  court- 
martial  if  he  «M  mt  Cfbef^orders.  and 
for  gof)d  measui^  extended  the  threat 
lo  all  commanding  generals  under 
Niiiih  Aiinv.'"' 

The  SS  CavalrN  Brigade  and  \'I 
Corps  atiac  keti  at  Rzbev  on  the  7th  and 
were  forced  to  a  stop  by  the  afternoon 
of  the  8ih.  Tlie  next  day  two  Soviet  di- 
visions rolled  over  the  diinline  south  ot 
Ostashkov  opening  a  gap  &n  tim  mmy 
group  boundat  y,  and  the  gap  west  of 
Rzhev  widened  by  several  miles  be- 
cause theSS  Cavalrv  Brigade  ran  out  of 
ammunition  and  bad  to  pull  back.  Four 
Soviet  divisions  were  ranging  south 
parallel  lo  ibe  Vyazma-Rzhev  railroad 
with  nothing  between  them  and  it. 
Strauss  told  Kluge  and  the  OKH.  "The 
Fomth  Army,  Fourth  Panzer  Army, 
Third  Panzer  Ann\  and  Nindi  Arm\ 
are  double-enveloped.  The  absolutely 
last  possibility  to  prevent  their  destruc- 
tion is  to  take  them  into  the  Gzhatsk- 
Volga  Position  [the  KOENIGSBERC; 
Line  that  Hitler  had  declared  nonexis- 
tent] which  may  free  enough  strength 
to  eliminate  the  northern  arm  of  tlie 
envelopment  west  of  Rzhev."  Strauss 
added,  "Xl  is  the  last  mioute."^'  Kluge 


'■"•Ikd.:  Pz.  AOK  3,  la  Knegskt^^h  NT.  2,  ^^  42^, 
Pz.  AOK  3  16911/1  hie. 

"AOK  9.  la  Wr.  62142,  9.1.42,  ft.  AOK  3  16911/8 
hie. 


agreed  but  would  not  give  ati  otderim- 

less  Hiilet  approved  it.^-  Haider  and 
KJuge  talked  to  Hitler,  but  Hider  insis- 
ted bit  seeing  Kluge  in  person  firat. 

"A  Sigh  of  Rrliff 

During  tlie  night  on  the  9th,  a  bliz- 
zard blew  down  on  Army  Group  Cen- 
irr  and  For  twenty-four  boms  all  but 
slopped  die  war.  Kluge's  airplane  could 
not  get  off  the  grotiiad  the  nextmofn- 
ing  for  bis  n\^J,]^\  lo  Fnrlnn  Headquar- 
ters, and  noilung  changed  at  the  front 
during  the  day  because  even  the  Rus- 
sians (ouid  not  tnove.  From  Smolensk 
east,  trains  on  die  railroads  and  trucks 
<  )n  the  roads  were  buried  in  snowdrifts. 
When  Kluge  finally  arrived  at  the 
Fiielmr  Headquarters  on  die  Uth,  he 
found  Hitler,  who  apparently  had 
drawn  encouragement  from  the  lon- 
ptjiary  paralysis  caused  by  the  weather, 
eager  to  talk  about  anything  buta  with- 
drawal—  snowshoe  battalions,  the 
method  ot  getting  more  men  into  a 
Ersdn,  iQidthe  coming  spring  and  sum- 
mer campaigns.  And  Hitler  insisted 
that  as  far  as  withdrawal  was  con- 
cerned, "every  day,  every  hour"  it  could 
be  jnit  off  was  a  gain,  and  if  the  front 
could  be  made  to  stand,  "all  the  ac- 
claim" would  fall  lo  Kluge.^'' 

Kluge  arrived  back  in  Smolensk  on 
the  ai  tei  iiooti  of  the  12di.  A  few  liours 
latei;  iollowing  a  procedure  he  had  re- 
cently established  to  eliminate  any  mis- 
luidctsiaiidings.  Hitler  reinforced  his 
[)revious  days  remarks  via  teletype  to 
Army  (irou[)  Genter  under  the  super- 
scription, "  file  Fuehrer  and  Supreme 


'Kiemral  Haider's  Ooflj  Water,  vol.  U  li  Jto  42.  EAP 
2I-g- 16/4/0. 


HITLER  ANO  STAUN 


133 


Commander  of  the  Wh/nimht  his  trf- 

dered."  "Everv  dav  of  continued  stnl)- 
born  resistancCj"  the  message  read,  "is 
decisive.  It  provides  the  possibility  of 
bringing  reinforcements  into  action  to 
buttress  the  front.  Therefore  the 
lw©ak-Ms  HMisfr  fee  elitfliiaai&di:'*^  As  if 
thefe  were  no  other  caiiseS-iar  Concern 
tba^  the  wide-open  gaps  i^jisSt  Kzhev 
aad  betweeft  ^tn-ch  faiisrfef  ahd 
Fourth  Armies,  the  message  went  on  to 
order  diat  Gerinan  forces  close  diem. 
IBawrfh  Itewzer  Army  would  be-sdiowed 
to  lake  its  front  back  about  ten  miles  on 
the  condition  that  in  doing  so  it  re- 
leased en&ogh  tlhits  m  f^One=  cOAtdct 
with  Foiirtli  Armv.  Ninth  Army  would 
have  to  strip  the  rest  of  its  front  to  get 
lltiops  to  counterat^k  .and  dic^  the- 
P^pZt  Rzhev.'** 

Rider's  effort  to  uphold  the  stand- 
fast doctrine  was  now  hopelessiv  at 
odds  with  reality.  The  ordet  to  Fourth 
Panzer  Army  only  permitted  it  to  com- 
plfete  ttee  m«rveine«it  Ifoepner  had 
started  four  days  earlier.  During  those 
days  the  troops  had  been  fighting  in 
the  &pm  m  hdlow^^em  weadier  iand 
snow,  unable  to  go  forward  and  forbid- 
den to  go  backward.  Tliey  were  dis- 
couraged, confused,  aufl  exhausted. 
Starprise  had  been  lost.  The  Russians 
knew  what  was  afoot  and  would  be  on 
the  army's  heels  all  the  imf.  Math 
Army  did  not  nierelv  have  one  gap  to 
conientl  with  as  Hitler  pretended. 
XXIII  Corps  had  breakthroughs  on 
both  iis  Hanks,  and  Ninth  Army  did  not 
know  f  or  cer  tain  wiiat  was  happening 
to  this  corps  because  all  the  telephone 
and  telegraph  lines  were  out.  On  the 
Third  Panzer  Army  right  flank,  V 


^*M,  Or,  Mm:  lu  A'r.  msm,  tts  AOK  9,  iM,42. 
AOK  9  21520/11  Me. 


t>>rps  was  cmmhliMg^  a*  Soviet  ^aumt 

and  infantry  chewed  through  its  front, 
village  by  village.  Reinhardt  at  Third 
^B&n^  Army  was  ftmniog  out  d£  am- 
miuiition,  rations, atxd  motor  fuel,  and 
he  threatened,  because  of  this  and  V 
CSerps'  trouble,  to  give  the  order  to 
treat  himself.^'*  Snow  stalled  traffic  OU 
th^  railroad  north  of  Vyazma*  anij  the 
fiusdau;  raifftmd  ffie©"wfed  ^efated 
the  t^'aios  had  disappeared. 

Oo  the  12th,  as  they  had  for  several 
days,  Soviet  airplanes  bombed  Sy- 
chevka  on  the  railroad  halfway  be- 
tween Vyazma  and  Rzhev.  During  the 
intervals  when  bombers  were  not  over* 
head  and  at  night,  Stratiss  and  his  staff 
at  the  Ninth  Army  headquarters  in 
%iChevkt  aa^d  hear  lhe  noise  of  battle 
coming  from  the  northwest.  After 
nightfall  on  the  12th,  it  grew  louder 
and  more  distinct  every  hour.^* 

In  the  early  morning  hours  of  the 
13th  the  Fuehrer  order,  dutifully  for- 
warded by  Army  Group  Gfenter** 
reached  the  armies.  Its  tenor  was  al- 
ready known  to  them,  and  die  dismay 
it  occasioned^^  overshadowed  within 
hours  by  die  eV^gJlS  6f  the  day.  In  the 
morning,  the  Soviet  /  Guards  Cavalry 
O&rps  pressing  north  toward  Vyazma 
crossed  ihe  Roll  bah  n  on  Fotuth  Army's 
right  flank.  By  nightfall  the  army  was 
having  to  evacuate  Medyn,  its  anchor 
on  the  left  and  Fom  th  Panzer  Army's 
intended  target  tor  its  attempt  to  close 
the  gap.  l')uring  the  afternoon,  StrallS8 
and  the  Ninth  Ai  niy  staff  could  see  as 
well  as  hear  the  battle  then  being 
fought  in  ttoe  Sychevka  railroad  yards. 
One  last  m^lf  traiii  for  Nin^  md 

'-'Pz.  AOK  J.  laMfUf^la^rfi»!hM  ^  IS^a  42,  ftt. 
AOK  3  16911/1  file. 

mOK  9,  In  Kriegsla^X^  TltMM. 
AOK.  9  21520/1  file. 


MOSCOWTO  STALINGRAD 


TTiurd  Panzer  Armies,  however,  did  es- 
cape noi  th  toward  Rzlicv.  Wfien  the 
Ximl  one  would  get  dirough  nobody 
eouM  ti^.  Strmiss  sent  part  of  his  stafiF 
sOQtfa  to  Vyazma  before  1200  but 
stayed  in  Sychevka  with  his  chief 
csf  warn  late  in  die  aft©mocHi  to 
l^eep  csOntact  with  V  Panzer  Corps  and 
X5lili  Corps,  both  of  which  reported 
themselves  near  colkjpse 

The  OKH  wrote  up  two  "solutions" 
to  the  Vyazma-Rzhev  problem  for 
Hitler.  The  one,  to  have  Army  Group 
Center  stand  fast  as  il  had  been  doing, 
could  still  produce  about  a  division  and 
a  half  in  ten  days  or  so  for  another  try 
at  closing  the  Rzhev  gap.  But  if  it  failed 
in  this  ef  fort,  the  Russians  would  also 
g€t  Vyazma.  The  other,  to  order  the 
retreat  to  the  KOENIGSBERG  Line, 
would  give  Jburth  Army  and  Fourth 
Panzer  Army  a  chance  to  eliminate  the 
gap  between  them  anfl  yield  three  divi- 
sions for  a  counterattack  at  Rzhev.^** 

Rluge  struggled  ^crough  the  day  on 
the  13th,  trying  to  convince  the  army 
commands  in  Army  Group  Center  that 
the  listeft  HMer  oM@r  vm  w^^lsle 
and  relaying  his  moaBiJilJ|f. troaMes  to 
the  OKfi  in  a  succession  of  desperate 
telephone  calls.  For  the  next  two  days 
he  did  the  same,  making  himself  the 
instrument  for  imposing  the  Fuehrer's 
will  on  the  armies  while  trying  to  ex- 
tract small  concessions  from  Hitler.  On 
the  aiternoon  of  the  14th,  he  talked  at 
length  to  Hitler  abotit  tfie  neces^ty  for 
holding  Rzhev  as  the  army  group's 
northern  bastion  to  pievent  a  lateral 
Coliiapse  of  the  front.  Hitler  said  he 
wanted  to  wait  another  day.  Later,  after 


■'■AOK  -/,  la  KiwgKtdgdmdi  AV,  //.  13  J.ui  4'2.  AOK  4 
17380/1  fill-  AOK  III  Kii^g.s(figfhuck  1.L-3L3.4Z,  13 
Jan  42.  AOK  9  HiriiJO/l  file. 

'^'H^lder  Dmiy,  vol.  HI,  p.  383. 


the  day's  situation  confereace,  Haider 
observed  that  Hitler  knew  a  retreat  was 
necessary  but  simply  could  not  bring 
himseSf  to  make  the  decision.^^  What 
came  finally,  transmitted  by  Haider 
twenty-four  hours  later,  was  a  grudging 
"a^eement  in  principle"  to  a  general 
retreat  to  die  KOENIGSBERG  Line.^" 
As  the  Third  Panzer  Army  war  diary 
put  itf*A  sigh  of  relief  ^ept  the  whole 
front.'"'^  Hitler's  own  found  its 

way  into  die  conhrmio^  oMer  Issued 

the  first  time  in  ^y$.lA^r  that  I  have 
issued  an  order  for  a  major  widi- 
draStaL***  It  was  imdoubtedly  for  him 
the  m#sfe<4i£Bcitlt  order  he  had  yet 

given. 

SlaJhi  Pmjerts  a  General  Offensive 
The  Look  of  the  New  Year 

Hie  war  had  taken  on  a  new  aspect 
for  the  Soviet  Union  by  I  January  1942. 
From  the  Arctic  Ocean  to  the  BIac£l§^ 
the  Russians  had  stopped  the  enemy. 
At  Rostov,  at  Tikhvin,  above  all.  at 
Moscow,  the  Germans  had  been  driven 
back.  In  the  dead  cold  of  winter,  the 
enemy  v\as  not  likely  to  advance  again 
soon.  Japan  had  ttti^cted  £iway  into  the 
Pacific.  Turkey,  an  old  opponent  and 
doubtful  neutral,  would  not  move,  nor 
would  the  Finnish  Arm^i?  experienced 
though  it  wa.s  in  winter  warfare  and 
standing  on  the  doorstep  of 
Leningrad.  Life  had  reituril4<i  t& 
Moscow  in  December  as  govertunent 


""Ihid..  p.  385^ 

'"AOK  -I.  la  m^i^u/^m itt-  Ujm^f  A/^* 

msw\  iiif. 

"P:.  AOK  J,  la  KfJ^liiSlgtkHA  M  t.  IM^Mi  Vz. 
AOK  :4  I (.19 11/ 1  file. 

'~H.  Gr.  Milk,  la  Nr.  423m,  m  AOK  9,  16.1.42. 
AOK  9  21520/1  file. 


HITLER  AND  STAUN 


155 


agertdies  reopened,  and  the  German 
retreat  from  T!kll^^n  hud  \asilv  im- 
proved Leningrad's  chances  for  sur- 
vival. Stalin  mnl&  reccke  British 
Fore^^  Secretary  Anthony  Eden  in 
Dee&td^  and  not  only  talk  about  a 
second  front  in  i«^tem  Europe,  whicli 
he  had  been  doing  since  summer,  but 
begin  to  lay  down  his  terras  for  the 
postVi^  sctdement,  which,  to  Edtett% 
dismay,  included  Soviet  retention  of 
die  Baltic  States,  Bessarabia,  aad  ter- 
ntocy  taken  from  Poland  and  MnlMad 
before  1941  and  certain  territorial 
chaciges  in  Germany.  For  the  last  five 
days  of  the  old  ymr,  the  Soviet  Infor- 
mation Bureau  claimed  tifce  c^jd^e  of 
60  German  tanks,  11  armored,  cars,  28*7 
artiilerf  pieces^  461  machine  guns, 
2,211  rifles,  a  trainload  of  ammu£iiti0ii, 
and  a  trainload  of  dothing-** 

In  its  1^^^%  ti&f  editotis^  iks 
government  newspaper,  PmvS^  pt&r 
dieted  victory  in  \9A2.Pravda  sa^lfjbat 
Soviet  forces  had  reached  the  turning 
point  of  the  war.  and  with  their  own 
"inexhaustible  reserves"  as  well  as  tanks 
and  atircr^  fitoflt  Britsdto  afld  America, 
they  would  accomplish  rbe  "complete 
ddSgat  of  Hitlerite  Germany  "  during 
tfeeyear.  The  editorial  also  pointed  out, 
as  would  all  future  Soviet  writing  on 
the  war  during  Stalin's  lifetime,  diat 
Stalin  had  correcdy  obsefrod  the  true 
basis  for  a  successful  strateg)',  namely, 
the  "permanent  operating  factors," 
which  were  stability,  morale,  afflil quan- 
tity and  quality  of  manpower  and 
equipment.  These,  according  to  the 
newspaper^  far  otitweighed  me  "tem- 


^■^Vinstoii  S.  Ch\irdn\\.,The  Grand  AUiiiiii  I  (Bosiun: 
H..ughron  Mifflin,  1950),  pp,  328-32;  Embassy  of  ihe 
USSR.  Waib&i^n.  ti.C,,Il^imaliBnBuaeti.n  No.  1,  t 
Jan  42. 


porarv  factOfs,'  *tic|i  £t$  suiprise,  oil 
which  I  lie  Germans  l^£.teSe&a** 

The  counteroffeusiwes  brought  to  an 
end  tfie  etracuadon  of  industries,  made 
il  p()ssil)le  rc)  coaoenlrate  on  develop- 
mg  the  war  economy,  and  in  places, 
WeA,  ?S  the  Moscow  region  and  the 
EkjOfitl  Basin,  made  it  possible  to  re- 
SaUOig  l^foduction  in  areas  tliat  had 
be^Bft  evatuated.  Weapons  and  am- 
munition production  thereby  in- 
creased during  the  first  quarter  of 
1942.  On  the  other  hand,  these  suc- 
cesses of  the  new  year  retrieved  very 
little  of  what  had  been  lost.  Moscow's 
gross  industrial  output  in  January  1942 
was  two-thirds  less  than  it  liad  been  in 
Jime  1941.  The  Moscow  Basin  coalfield 
east  of  Tula,  which  before  the  war  had 
yielded  35,000  lon.s  of  coal  a  da),  in 
January  1942  yielded  less  than  600  tons 
a  day.  An  equally  draMc  deeliiiae  oe- 
i^irrcd  in  the  Donets  Basin.  In  com- 
parison wiih  the  first  six  montlis  of 
1941,  electricity  output  from  January  to 
June  1942  would  be  down  by  nearly 
half,  coal  by  nearly  two-thirds,  and  pig 
iron  and  steel  by  closie  tfy  fttirie©- 
quarters."''' 

At  Leningrad,  in  the  dead  dSnikaWtt 
one  of  the  war's  bitterest  tragedies  had 
begun.  Two  million  civilians — men, 
women,  and  children — and  tlie  troops 
t£  two  armies  were  trapped  between 
the  Fimiish  frf)nt,  ten  mUes  to  the 
north,  and  the  German  front,  some- 
what closer  on  tfee  south.  New  "i&ar^ 
Day  was  the  123d  day  of  this  siege. 
Trucks  had  l>egun  to  Ci  avel  across  tiie 

**P,m'!l(i,  Janiini)  1.  l'-)4ii.  Sec  alsi.  F.  Alek- 
saiidvov.  el  a!.,  Iiisif  VissitrmiHiTH li  ^liiliii.  Kriilka\ii  hm- 
gmfiv'i.  iir!  eft  (Mtisctnv:  I?flateLsi\<i  Poliiicheskuy  Li- 
lei-auuy.  U)4tl),  p.  \9h. 

*HVMVt  vol.  IV,  p.  326;  Voznesciiakiy,£flWKiB)ju/^tAff 

369. 


136 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


:m»THiiini.Ki 

I',  BRHH-BBC 

ifiTr.RHH  Hi 


Before  a  Sion  RpAniNf;.  "Defend  Moscow!  mm  llmatmumi  Ams&it  the  Whole 
Soviet  Pkople,"  Vibmen  Wirk  m  ArHUety  SheUs 


ice  on  Lake  Ladoga  on  22  November, 
but  in  the  first  weeks  it  was  a  perilous 
trip.  A  two-ton  truck  could  not  carry 
more  than  two  or  three  hundred 
pounds  added  weight,  and  many  broke 
through  the  ice.  Moreover,  as  long  as 
till.-  (ic  rmans  held  the  railroad  through 
Tikhvin,  all  the  suj^lies  going  across 
the  l^e  had  to  tmm  a  long,  rouod- 
(hout,  overlaid  trip  by  truck  from  the 
imerior. 

The  Dieeeffliber  vklory  at  Tikhvin 

had  saved  Leningrad,  ^Ut  it  came  loi> 
late  to  prevent  a  winter  of  misery,  star- 
vation, and  death.  The  riaufdld 
through  Tikhvin  was  single-tl'ack, 
much  of  which,  along  with  several 
bridges,  had  been  destroyed  during 
the  fighting.  When  ihe  first  train 
passed  tlirough  to  Volkhov  and  Voibo- 


kalo  Station  on  1  January,  its  ixMiefit 
was  mostly  psychological.  The  freight 
still  had  to  be  hauled  thirty  miles  to  the 
lake  shore  ijy  irurk  o\er  a  snow-cov- 
ered, makeshift  road  and  then  across 
the  ice,  and  the  traffic  control  was  ttot 
organized.  The  Ctty^  food  stocks,  in- 
cluding such  marginal  substances  as  oil 
cake,  bran,  and  flour  mill  dust,  had 
been  exhausted  in  mid-December,  and 
the  population  thereafter  subsisted  on 
the  supplies  that  came  across  the  lake 
each  day.  Tlie  daily  minimum  freight 
requirement  was  1,000  tons  of  pro\d- 
sions,  not  incltiding  gasoline,  amniutiii^ 
tion,  and  other  military  supplies.  A 
good  days  haul  in  December  after  the 
raibt)ad  was  opened  was  TQlQ  to  800 
tons,  ne\er  1.000,  and  it  aliva^  in- 
cluded one-third  or  more  inedible  sup- 


HITLER  AND  STALIN 


137 


plies.  At  the  tin  ti  of  the  fm.r,  die 
civilians  particularly  were  not  just 
going  hungry;  they  were  starving  anil 
dying  in  rapidly  growing  niaidNaniJ and 
a  third  of  the  work  force  was  too  weak 
to  work.** 

The  Soviet  Union  had  gained  a  re- 
prieve, not  a  release.  Prom  destruction. 
The  enemy  had  clearly  underestimated 
the  Soviet  capacity  to  absorb  pimish- 
ment  and  lo  keep  on  hghling.  and  he 
had  compounded  his  error  by  drifting 
intt>  a  WHiter  campaign  for  which  he 
was  tOtallv  imprcparcfl.  He  was 
trapped  in  a  law  struggle  widi  die 
elements  that  drained  his  strength  and 
neutralized  his  advantages  in  military 
skill  and  experience.  For  die  fiist  time 
in  the  war,  the  inida^ve,  iJle  precious 
ahiliiv  to  make  an  opponent  fight  on 
one's  own  terms,  had  slipped  from  his 
grasp.  To  the  Soviet  Ihiion  it  was  a  gift 
beyond  price.  It  could  not  be  refused, 
bill  it  tlid  not  come  free.  It  exacted  a 
mortgage  on  the  fiilure:  next  year's 
armies  with  next  years  etjnipment  were 
marching  into  the  winlei  s  snow,  and 
wSnier,  though  povnn^,  was  a  tempo 
ran'  ally.  In  four  months  the  snow 
would  melt  and  the  ground  woidd 
I  haw.  Then  a  balance  would  be  cast. 
How  ii  woLild  icafl  woukl  depend  on 
liow  die  intervening  four  months  had 
been  used.  That  was  the  Soviet  strate- 
^  problem. 

Stalin's  Siraiegy 

On  U  DeceinlH  i  1941.  the  Sttwka 
instructed  Marsiial  Timoshenko,  as 
Southwestern  Theater  commanding  gen- 


^•Diiiiiiri  pLivldV.  i-i>inijrrml  S'Jil  (CliiLaj;<i;  I'liiM-i- 
Sit\- i)f  C:i)u;i;.;o  Piess,  l',Mv"»).  pp.  Hairisoii  E. 

Salj-.l)un,  The  9()U  Daf>  (N'l-iv  Vol  k:  Harper  &  Row, 
lt»6yj.  pp.  'ili-lbJVOVSS,  vtA.  11,  p. 


eral,  to  plan  a  winter  operation  by 

Smilhwi'st  and  Soiilh  Fronts  that  would 
smash  the  Army  Group  South  right 
flank  and  restore  the  enure  Donets 
Basin  to  Soviet  control.  On  the  follow- 
ing day,  in  Moscow.  Stalin  and  Marshal 
Shaposhnikov,  chief  of  the  Cienoi  al 
.Staff,  instructed  General  Men  tskov 
and  Genera]  Leyienanl  M.  S.  Kho/in, 
the  commanding  general  of  Leningrad 
Front,  also  to  prepare  a  winter  offensive 
on  the  north  flank.  Meretskm  was  ap- 
pointed to  command  a  newly  created 
X'hlkhov  Fniiit.  wliith,  vviih  Faurth,  Fifty- 
seivnd.  Fifly-niiilJi,  and  Siroiul  Sfiock  Ar- 
mes,  would  occupy  a  line  from  Kirishi 
on  the  Volkhov  River  tliirtv-fivc  miles 
souili  of  Lake  Lad<jga  to  Lake  llmen. 
Meretskov  and  Khozin  were  lo  employ 
iheir  forces  to  destroA^  the  Germans 
besieging  Leningrad  and  to  liberate  ilie 
city.^^ 

During  ihe  night  of  5  January  1942, 
the  Politburo  met  with  members  oi  the 
Stavka  to  consider  a  projected  general 
offensive.  It  \ras  ^^^  consist  of  a  con- 
tinuing and  expamled  drive  in  the  cen- 
ter and  offensives  to  liberate  Lenin- 
grad, the  Donets  Basin,  and  the 
Crimea.  Two  of  the  offensives,  in  the 
center  and  on  the  Crimea,  were  al- 
ready in  progress;  and  the  Stax'tm 
scheduled  the  other  two  to  begin  in  two 
days  (on  the  north  flank)  and  within 
two  weeks  (on  the  south  flank).  '**  Stalin, 
who,  as  always,  presided,  said,  "  The 
Germans  are  in  confusion  as  a  result  of 
their  setback  at  Moscow.  They  are 


■"A.  .X.  (Irediko.  Crw/v  iir^m  (Mosiou-:  Vnvfiinnyc 
l2dalt-l%tvu.  H>7(il.  p  Mfi;  K,  A,  Mcrciskm.  '.V,/  ml- 
khci'sklkh    ni>:i-'Jiilhli \i<\i  llriii-islMI  II  hi'\)<l\   /./itll  liill.  I 

(1965), 

'"Mert-iskuv.  A'-;  ,i,IUun:\kikJi  rubezJuMi,"  p.  184;  I, 
Kh.  B.isji^iiiu.iii.  lilt:  Ml  my  A  pobnk  (MOSCOW:  VofCB* 
ju>yc  lzdalelslo\,  1977),  p.  10. 


138 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


badly  prepaired  winter.  Nmr  is  the 
best  moment  over  to  the  general 

otfensive."*'  General  Zhukov  spoke 
against  the  general  otteiisive,  arguing 
that  the  eiiliie  etfort  should  concen- 
trate in  the  tenter  where  the  Germans 
were  off-balance  and  should  not  divert 
to  the  flanks  where  ihev  nere  soliflly 
diig-in.  Nikolai  Voznesenskiy,  a  mem- 
ber of  the  State  Defense  Committee 
and  the  chief  of  war  production.  acUlid 
that  there  would  not  be  entnigh  weap- 
ons and  ammunition  to  sustain  ofTen- 
sives  on  all  fronts.  Finally,  Stalin 
observed.  "Wc  must  pound  the  Ger- 
mans to  pieces  as  soon  as  possible  jM> 
they  won't  be  able  to  moimt  an  offen- 
sive in  the  spring";  and  when  n()  one 
else  asked  to  speak,  he  afljourned  die 
meeting.  Afterward,  Shaposlmikov 
told  Zhukov  he  should  not  have  argiietl 
because  "the  supreme  commander  had 
that  question  setded."  VMien  Zhukcn 
asked  why  then  had  his  opinion  been 
sought,  Shaposhnikov  replied,  "That, 
my  dear  fellow,  1  do  not  know."*" 

Soviet  postwar  assessments  of  the 
idea  of  the  general  offensive  vai). 
Zhukov  regards  it  as  a  mistake  brought 
on  by  tiie  optimism  that  the  success  at 
Moscow  had  generated  in  Stalin's 
mind.^'  At  the  Twentieth  Party  Con- 
gress, Zhukov  cited  the  general  offen- 
sive as  evidence  of  Stalin's  obsession 
with  "ceaseless  frontal  attacks  and  the 
capture  of  localities  one  after  the 
other."^^  One  account  treats  it  as  an 
accident  that  occurred  in  late  De- 
cember 1941  Wbea  ti^  Moscow  couti*^ 
teroffensive  "tratisformed  itself  into  a 


«2hukov,  Mnnnns,  ],.        IVXfV.  val.  tV,  p.  306. 
'*Zhllk()V,  Mi  tiii'ii  y  pjJ. 
=  7i!>ff/.    |>.  VM' 

'^CortgrmurHul  Record,  4  Jun  5t),  p.  9395. 


general  offensive.*'  The  history  ^  $a 

Tile  Sfnift  Siipretiie  High  Coita&SUld  cal- 
ciilaifti  ih.ii  ihe  (k'lcai  which  had  been 
inftit  ted  <im  llu-  ( in  tnan-I-'asi  isi  iKiops  in 
the  iDiii  se  of  iIk-  <  i>imici()tf(  nsi\r  luid 
creaied  liie  iieces.sai  \  [)rerec]iiisiu's  tm  line 
Red  Army's  fulfillment  of  this  task.  The 
Soviet  Command's  certainty  of  success  was 
based  an  fhe  high  m^paie  .of  the  Soviet 
people  ana  the  ireiii  AtM'^ft^tfie  uninter- 
ruptedly growing  possibtnties  of  the  Soviet 
economy,  atid  on  liie  Steady  rise  of  the 
liirengih  and  tnilt^ry  naa^tery  of  the  Soviet 

troops.^'' 

The  History  of  tiie  Second  Wbrld  War 

hedges  its  edmi£t^t  as  fb^aws: 

The  Soviet  leadership^  certainty  of  success 
in  tiie  j^ciiL-ral  ortensi\e  was  based  on  ilie 
high  nunale  of  ilie  troops,  on  the  en- 
liancefl  jiossibiliiies  ol  (he  Soviet  vvat  econ- 
oinv.  and  on  tlie  iniieased  miinbers  and 
milliai)  skill  of  ihi-  rroops.  As  suhsf(|Lienl 
events  demonstrated,  however,  to  support 
simultaneous  offensives  by  aQ  tliejTOnj? 
fully,  larger  reserves  imi  naere  armament 
were  required  than  1^  So(*fel  Union  pos- 
sessed at  ^i^'t^sne.'* 

Tlie  Popular  Srinttif'H  Sketch  says  that 
"the  planning  of  such  grandiose  nm- 
sions"  did  «0't  cdnforaj  *'to  the  ea- 
pabUities  of  the  Soviet  Army  and  Navy 
at  that  time.'^® 

Soviet  sources  attribute  the  flaw  ii» 
the  conc^tof  the  general  offensive tq6 
the  absence  of  a  significant  Soviet  Bte* 
ineriieal'advantage.  By  the  Soviet  count, 
the  tfOOp  strengths  (4.2  million  men, 
Sowet,  and  3.9  million,  German  and 
Al&ed>  were  almost  e^u^.  tiie  i^m-- 


'"'^Y.  \.  /Iiiiin.  t-d..  \iniin\h-\ntjirint-:i-\  ViHht\  f  hril- 
WW""V  \<i\ii\  iMoMdiv:  V'uifiinoye  Izdalelsivij,  1956). 
p.  142. 

"■"IVUV.SS.  vol.  It,  p.  3 J 7. 

'^ivm.  vol.  IV.  p.  S06. 

'«VOV;  p.  122. 


HITLER  AND  STALIN 


139 


rage  in  mortars  and  artillery  pieces 
(33.000  to  27,000)  while  the  Soviet 
forces  had  an  advantagpein  tanks  (1.784 
to  1,500)  and  in  reserves  (14  divisions 
and  7  brigades  to  8  divisions  and  6 
brigades).  According  to  the  Hisfiwy  ^ 
the  Second  World  Wai\  the  Russians  were 
counting  mostly  on  an  increase  in  their 
strength  and^.dediis&iii  the  Germans' 
as  tlie  offensive  progressed.  These  fig- 
ures, however,  do  not  reflect  the  whole 
Soviet  status,  particularly  concerning 
reserves.  At  the  beginning  of  the 
1941-1942  winter  campaign,  which  in- 
cludes the  Moscow  counteroffenMVfi 
(and  perhaps  also  tlie  efforts  at  Rostov 
and  ilklivin),  the  Stavka  had  total  re- 
serves of  123  divisions,  31  brigades,  and 
16  independent  regiments.  During  the 
campaign  it  created  or  rebuilt  128  divi- 
sions, 158  brigades,  anfl  209  indepen- 
dent regiments.  Of  the  total  of  665 
units  (251  divisions,  189  brigades,  and 
225  mii€tpendent  regiments),  the 
Stavka  (^niinitted  only  181  (99  divi- 
sions, 82  brigades,  and  no  indepen- 
i^mt  regiments)  during  tile  winter 
campaign,®^ 

The  Missions 

The  general  offensive  would  set  in 
motion  nine  of  the  ten  Soviet  fronts, 
that  is,  all  of  tliose  betiveen  the  Gulf  of 
Finland  and  the  Sea  of  Azo\.  The  one 
not  included  was  Kaidmu  Fmtil,  which 
was  holding  tlie  Ime  from  Lake  Onega 
north  to  the  Barents  Sea.  Four  massive 
encirclements  were  to  be  ac  roinplislicrl 
initially:  one  soudieast  of  Leningrad  on 
a  nortit*S0ii*ih  si^&i  ctf      milesy  sne 


''■/I'A/V.  vol.  p,  Golabovich,  "&H4n«i^  siTH- 
tepclmhkh,"  p.  17. 


KveSt  of  Moscow  spanning  over  200 
miles,  and  one  reaching  west  120  miles 
irom  the  Donets  River  near  Izymn  to 
Dnepropetrovsk  and  thence  south, 
ahcjut  again  as  far,  to  the  vicinity  of  Me- 
litopol. Liberation  of  the  Crimea,  al- 
i^ady  begun,  constituted  the  four^ 
mission. 

The  main  force  for  the  offensive  in 
the  north  arcjund  Leningrad  was  the 
Volklwv  Front.  It  had  two  new  armies, 
Fifty-ninth,  which  was  brought  forward 
from  the  Sttwka.  reserve,  and  Second 
Shock,  which  was  the  Twenty-sixth  Army 
renamed  and  shifted  from  the  reserve 
in  the  Moscow  area.  Meretskov's  other 
two  armies.  Fourth  and  Fifty-second^  had 
been  engaged  at  Tikhvin  and  stayed  in 
action  there  until  late  December 
against  the  Germans  retreating  to  the 
Volkhov  Riven  Leningrad  Front  would 
be  able  to  take  to  die  offensive  only 
with  one  army,  Fifty-fourth,  which  was 
on  the  east  face  of  the  botdeneck,  be- 
tween Lake  Ladoga  and  Kirishi. 

The  tactical  plan,  and  apparently  al- 
most all  other  segments  of  the  general 
offensive  were  worked  out  by  the  Gen- 
eral Staff  under  Stalin's  supervision 
and  given  to  die  fnmts  for  execution. 
Meretskov's  assignment  was  to  cross  the 
Volkhov  with  Second  S/mk  and  Fifty- 
second  and,  after  they  had  broken 
rhnmoh  die  German  front,  to  send 
Second  Si&ck  Art^  xm  a  wide  sweep 

north  toward  Leftiffgfad  Wfefle  Fifty- 
second  Army  pushed  south  to  Novgorod 
and  then  turned  west  to  Luga.  Fifty^ 
fourth  Army  was  tiS  bear  in  toward 
Leningrad  south  of  Lake  Ladoga. 
The  nuost  unusual  role  in  die  general 


'■Meretskuv.  Sftviiig  llie  Pmple.  p.  180:  IVMV,  wl, 
IV,  p.  M4i  MeiEtslcAy^  "Na  v^kkmMMt  mbtihtikh,"  p. 
55. 


140 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAB 


offensive  went  to  General  Kurochkin's 
Northwest  Front.  Prior  to  the  offensive, 
Kurochkin  had  three  armies,  Eleimth, 
Twenly-snienth,  and  Thirty- fourth .  During 
the  past  fall  their  fimction  had  been  to 
tie  together  the  Leningrad -Tikhvin 
and  Moscow  sectors  of  the  front  by 
holding  a  line  across  the  almost  road- 
less stretch  of  svramp  and  forest  from 
tlie  southeastern  tip  of  Lake  Ilmen  to 
Ostashkov.  For  the  general  offensive, 
Kurochkin  was  given  the  newly  acti- 
vated Third  Shock  Army,  and  his  Twenty- 
seven^  Army  was  rebuilt  with  units  from 
the  reserves  and  renamed  Four^  Shock 
Army,  and  his  fnmt  was  given  three 
missions.  On  the  north,  Eleventh  Army 
was  to  drive  west  along  the  south  shore 
of  Lake  Ilmen  iuul  past  Staraya  Russa 
to  Dno,  then  turn  north  and  join  Fifty- 
seixmd  Army's  advance  on  Luga.  On  the 
south.  Third  and  Fiunth  Shock  Armies 
were  to  break  dirough  near  Ostashkov 
and  make  two.  long,  parallel  thrusts  to 
(lie  west  and  south,  Thhd  Shock  going 
via  Kholm  to  VeUkiye  Luki  and  Fowrth 
Sheik  past  Tbropets  and  Velizh  to  Rud- 
nya.  At  Rudnya,  fourth  Shock  Anri\ 
wouM  have  Army  Group  Center  halt- 
encht3<^  aiid'  would  staild  about  tfiirtf- 
five  miles  northwesl  ol  Bocks  headquar- 
ters in  Smolensk.  Between  the  l,wo 
thrusits  wotild  tie  Mt  what  reniairted  of 
the  German  Sixteenth  Army's  main 
force,  which  Thirty-Jimrtk  Army  was  to 
"pin  down*'  at  Its  center  around 
Demyansk,^' 

The  "western  direction,"  that  is,  west 
of  Moscow  and  opposite  Army  Group 
("cnler,  was  the  designated  area  of  liie 
main  effort  in  the  general  offensive. 


"V.  ZlielaiiLn,  upitu  //<'ir«\  oftinHsii  lui 

okruthftnft."  \'nyeniiO'isl<irirlii-\lii\  /Inniml.  iL'ii'.ifi  li. 
20-22;  IVOVSS.  vol.  IJ,  p.  33 1 ;  iVMV.  vol.  IW  p.  ;5  N. 


What  the  Stavka  proposed  was  to 
cciite  two  envelopments,  an  outer  one 
aimed  at  Smolensk  and  an  inner  one 
that  would  close  at  Vyazma.  The  inner 
envelopment  would  be  accomplished 
by  die  operations  Kalinin  Front  and  West 
Front  already  had  under  way,  tlic  for- 
me j  going  via  Rzhev  and  Sychevka  to 
Vyazma  and  the  latter,  from  Kaluga 
past  Yukhnov  to  Vyazma.  In  addition 
to  those,  the  Stavka  projected  a  vertical 
envelopment  to  be  carried  out  by  the 
IV  Airborne  Corps,  which  would  be 
landed  soudiwest  of"  Vyazma  in  posi- 
tion to  cut  the  Smolensk- Vyazma  rail- 
road."" The  outer  envelopment  would 
trap  whatever  was  left  of  the  Ninth, 
Third  Panzer,  Fourth  Panzer,  and 
Fourth  Armies  and  would  push  the 
front  at  least  another  seventy- five  miles 
aw!^  from  Moscow,  if  not  all  the  way  to 
the  JJnepr-Dvina  line. 

WkM&  Fburth  Shock  Army  ojuld  be  ex- 
pected to  provide  the  north^n  sweep 
of  an  outer  envelopment,  what  was  to 
be  done  on  the  souUi  was,  apparently, 
much  less  certeiin.  The  History  of  the 
Cri'fi!  Palnotif  IVf/r  states  that  originally 
Bryansk Fnmi  was  to  carry  out  "the  deep 
^vdiopfnient  <tf  die  enemy  . . .  which 
was  operating  before  Moscow"  by 
reaching  a  line  from  Bryansk  to  Sevsk 
and  sending  a  force  to  Siimy.  That 
would  have  turned  Bryansk  Front  to  the 
soutliwesL,  behind  Second  Panzer  and 
Second  Aitniei,  rather  than  the  north* 
west,,  hut,  according  to  the  History. 
"more  moderate  tasks  had  to  be  as- 
signed" to  ihe  fnmt  because  the  Stavka 
could  not  siipph  it  with  the  reinforce- 
ments it  would  have  required.  There- 
fore, J§ty®n*ft  ftam  was  ordered  to 
coUahoiate  with  the  two  tight  flanlt  ar- 


••/VA»V,wl.tV.p.8(17, 


HITLER  AND  STALIN 


141 


mie.s  (.)f  S(>}ithic/'st  Front.  Forticlh  and 
Tweniy-Jirst  Armies,  to  capture  Orel  and 
Kursk.^^  The  Hwfery  of  the  Second  Wrld 
Vibr  gives  Biyansk  Fmid's  mission  as  hav- 
ing been  to  cover  West  Front  on  the 
sonth  by  active  operatiom  toward  Ore! 
and  Bryansk.''"  Moskalenko  says 
Bryansk  Front,  together  with  Fortieth 
Army,  was  to  advance  to  Bi7ansk,  Orel, 
Se\sk.  and  Snniy  and,  thereattei,  "de- 
pending on  conditions,  operate  toward 
Smolensk  and  westward."^^  What  ap- 
pears to  have  hajjpened  is  that  Bnnntk 
Front,  like  JSorthuiesi  Fronts  was  given 
^fedons  tti  two  dii*ecttons,  one  toward 
Smolensk  and  the  other  touaid  Orel, 
Sevsk,  and  Sumy,  and  not  given  tiie  as- 
sured strength  to  complete  either  one. 
Bryansk  Front's  being  under  the  South- 
mstem  Theater,  however,  added  a  com- 
pKeatton  for  ¥SntaShe»4kd  wh©  ako  had 
a  second  mission  in  another  direction. 

The  Flislaiy  of  the  Great  Patriotic  War 
gives  the  original  objectives  Ott  the 
south  flank,  for  the  Snultra'cslrrti  Thmler 
forces,  as  having  been  to  retake  the  Do- 
fitts  teasin  aiwi  advaiice  to  the  lihe  of 
the  Dnepr  River.  These  plans,  it  savs, 
also  had  to  be  "moderated"  and,  con- 
sequently, were  changed  to  an  assign- 
ment to  SoiUh'a'csl  Franl,  under  General 
Ley  tenant  F,  Ya,  Kosienko,  to  take 
Kharltcw  acfwl  xjm  to  B&itt,  itndfer 
General  Leytenant  R.  Ya,  Malin()\ski\, 
lo  advance  from  the  Donets  near 
Izyum  to  Dnepropetrovsk  and  Zapo- 
rozhye on  the  Dnepr,^^  Bagramyan, 
Grediko^  and  Moskalenko^  however, 
descrifee  iajfl^«6iaeiMiv^|Qiig*tife^  mis- 


"'IVOVSS.  vol.  [I.  p.  339. 
^m'MV.  vol.  IV.  p.  3(17. 

"•■•MoskalenkOi  Ml  jit^gnHta/faafBem  napraademt  p. 

VM. 

"WOVSS.  vd.  II.  pp.  S39-4a.  See  aisomiK  volw 
IV.  p.  387. 


sions.  Bagramyan  says  $&y£^  R&nt  was 
to  have  encircled  First  Panzer  Army, 
and  parts  of  Seventeenth  Army,  in  the 
Donets  Basin  by  dri\irig  lo  iht-  Sea  of 
Azov  and  cutting  off  their  retreat 
rbtites  to  the  west.  Moskalenko  says  ilie 
advance  was  to  have  gone  south  past 
Zaporozliye  to  Melitopol  and  that  the 
plans  krcltided  a  late  vwnter  push  to  the 
lower  Dnepr  and  a  spring  campaign 
across  the  river  to  take  Nikopol,  Krivoy 
Rog,  and  Nikolayev.®^  Grechko  states 
the  intent  ;is  having  been  "to  improve 
the  operational-strategic  position  of 
ont  fortes  in  the  entire  Smtkwest&m 
Theatcy,  to  force  the  enemy  to  give  up 
the  Crimea  and  tlie  territory  east  of  the 
lower  Dnepr  River,  and  to  make  it  pos- 
sible for  Our  troops  to  cross  the  Dnepr 
and  to  ^rry  their  later  operatiom  in 
the  .(liresEtions  of  Mev  and  CMa^ssa,*** 

TraHsmrtf  asiis  Front,  having  ^eia 
chaf^^d  with  liberating  the  entire 
Crimea  in  December,  submitted  a  plan 
on  2  January.  In  it,  Kozlov  projected 
thrusts  from  tlie  vicinity  of  Feodosiya 
to  Perekop  and  Simferopol  and  land- 
ings at  Ahislila,  Yalta,  Yevpatoriya,  and 
Perekop.  The  I ndependent  Maritime 
Army  had  orders  to  attaf^tiff  liieKOfth- 
cast  out  of  the  north  face  of  the 
Sevastopol  perimeter.®^ 

In  stfflra,  the  Sttmhi,  indeed',  pilaffiied 
a  general  offcnsiN  C.  It  ap]5ears  to  have 
been  designed  specifically  not  to  leave  a 
single  German  army  untouched.  Its  ex- 
ecution  would  also  involve  practically 
all  of  tlie  Soviet  Jmnt  and  army  com- 
mands, most  of  whit^h  Md  Btde  <$t-  fid 
estperience  in  conducting  offensiveis. 


'■"'B.iifi  ;iiiiv;iri.  Ihk  shli  my  k  fKibede,  p.  8;  Moskalenko, 
Nil  ynffj-wfmrliit'iii  wi/ii/itIi'iiH.  p. 
""C-retliko.  frw/v  rri-ffv.  )i.  St). 

'"fVOVSS,  V..I."  11,' p|).  :W3-'l4i  fVMV,  vol,  IV.  p. 
3'JO;  Vaiieycv,  Gemuheskaya  ulmmim,  [i.  204. 


142 


MOStJQWTO  STALINGRAD 


Oft  10  January,  the  Stmka  sent  all  /rants 

and  armies  a  dirc<  ti\  e  on  ihe  principles 
of  offensive  operations,  lu  part,  it 
read; 

Ii  is  necessary  tliat  our  forces  learn  how 
to  break  ttoough  the  enemy's  defense  line, 
learn  how  to  break  through  the  full  depth 
of  the  enemy's  defenses  and  open  routes  of 
advance  foi"  onr  iiifaiiiry.  our  tanks,  and 
our  cavalry.  The  Germans  do  not  have  a 
single  defense  line;  they  have  and  can 

?|uickly  build  two  and  three  lines.  If  our 
orces  do  not  learn  quickly  and  thorou^ihf 
how  lo  break  enemy  defense  lines  ctarKSr- 
ward  advance  will  be  impossible. 

What  is  necessary  to  ^arantee  breaking 
through  the  en^y  defense  tines  in  t^eir 
full  depth? 

To  do  that  two  conditions  are  necessary 
above  all:  first,  it  is  necessary  for  our  ar- 
mies, fronts,  and  divisions  ...  to  adopt  the 
pi  actice  of  conccntradng  in  a  single  direc- 
tion, and,  second,  it  is  necessary  to  convert 
the  so-called  artillery  preparation  into  an 
artiHery  offensive. 

An  offensive  will  have  the  best  effect  if 
we  concentrate  the  larger  part  of  our 
forces  ae;ainst  those  of  the  enemy  on  one 
sector  o\  the  front.  To  do  lliat  it  is  neces- 
sary for  each  army  to  undertake  to  break 
through  the  enemy  defenses,  to  set  up  a 
l^biOcKgl^up  of  three  to  four  divisions,  and 
tc)  mmeais^  the  ats^  on  a  soeofic  pautt 

This  was  good  advice  but,  mi  li^^ce. 
somewhat  elementerf  for  senior  c»m- 


'Grechko,  Cody  vuyny,  pp.  91-92. 


mafids  embarking  on  a  major  offen- 

sive.  At  tually.  however,  ftir  most  ()f  the 
commands  that  received  it,  it  was  iar 
fifOiM  being  redandkat,  Vasilevskiy  says 
the  General  Staff  regarded  the  instruc- 
tions, which  were  Stalin's  idea,  as  "ex- 
^meij^  teportaiiti*  although  in  some 
respects  "insuffiCfc^tt."*®  The  Hislirry  of 
the  Great  Patriae  sta,tps  that  the 
gtiidaiiicit  was  based  on  the  expettence 
of  the  1941  coiinternffcnsi\  c.s  and  was 
intended  to  correct  "serious  opera- 
^nal  and  tactical  defidendcs  in  (QPOC^ 
operations."'"  Grechko  says  that 
"owing  to  lack  of  strength  and  of  expe- 
rience in  directing  offensive  opera- 
tions, ottr  commands  did  not  always 
mass  sti  engtii  and  effort  at  the  point  of 
breakthrough  and,  consequently,  did 
not  fulfill  their  assignments.  Many 
conunanders  attempted  to  organize  si- 
multaneous attacks  in  several  direc- 
tions. Tliis  dispersed  the  strength  and 
effort  along  tlie  front  and  did  not  pro- 
duce die  recjuired  superioiity  over  the 
enemy  in  the  direction  of  die  main 
blow.""'  In  the  general  offensive,  then, 
the  commands  were  going  to  be  ex- 
pected to  apply  a  body  of  operational 
doctrine  many  of  them  had  not  yet 


■'"Vasilevski)-,  Deh,  p.  169. 
■"A'OV'S.S,  vol.  11.  p.  ai8. 
■"Grechko,  Gody  iJffjinjt,  p.  91. 


CHAPTER  VIII 


The  Genar 

tke  Atmj  Grm^  North  Bont 

Armv  G  roup  North  finislicci  the  re- 
treat from  likhvin  on  the  day  after 
Christnias.  On  the  situation  maps  its 
tiont  ap]jeared  as  a  rough  right  angle 
with  the  transverse  on  the  north  run- 
ning east  and  west  and  the  vertical  on 
the  east  aiifl  ni  it-nlcd  north  and  south. 
Eighteenlli  Army  held  die  front  on  the 
north.  West  of  Schluesselburg  on  Lake 
Ladoga  at  the  head  ol  ilie  Neva  River 
the  front  had  not  changed  since  Sep- 
|eiill}$rj  jan  arc  around  Leningrad 
touched  tfe&  Gtdlf  of  Finland  3  miles 
sotldij^  the  cl^j  and  a  second  around 
Ortnienbaum  terminated  on  the  coast 
50  miles  v\fst  of  Leningrad.  East  of 
Schluesselburg  the  so-called  bot- 
^eneck,  which  had  almost  been  elimi- 
nated during  the  drive  to  Tikhvin,  had 
reappeared  in  the  retreat.  From  a  10- 
mile-^de  hold  on  Lake  Ladoga  the 
from  rh*op|R'(i  oil  Li|)t]\  south  for  10 
miles  and  then  veered  soudieastward  to 
Volkhov  River  and  the  junction 
with  Sixteenth  Armv  on  the  river  near 
Kirishi.  (Map  JO.)  Under  his  Head- 
quanerB,  Eighteenth  Army,  Gen- 
eral Kuetliler  IkkI  s<,\ (.nicfi)  isioiis. 
Sixteenth  Array's  2UU-mile-long  front 
facing  due  east  tied  in  on  the  w>IMiov 
south  of  Kiri.shi  and  followed  the  rivei 
to  Lake  Umeu,  faking  up  again  south 
cf  the  iakitf  It  bulged  eastward  to  &m 


V'altlai  Hills  east  oClSemyaiisk  and  then 
foUowctl  a  chain  of  lakes  south  to  the 
army  group  boundary  near  Ostashkov. 
The  Sixiei'tith  Arin\  (  oniniander,  Gen- 
eral Busch,  had  eleven  divisions,  five 
north  of  Lake  Ilmen  and  six  south  of  iu 
For  Army  Group  North  on  the  de- 
fensive, Lake  Ilmen  was  a  far  more 
significant  reference  point  than  the 
boundan  isetween  the  two  armies.  The 
25-miIe-wide  lake  divided  the  army 
groups  front  on  the  east  almost  exacdy 
in  two.  Novgoiod,  at  the  lake's  north- 
ern dp  and  just  barely  inside  the  Ger- 
man line,  controlled  lateral  roads  arrd 
railroads  running  north  all  the  to 
the  bottleneck.  Tactically  the  front 
ndfth  'of  tht  h&t  temsmd  the  rear  of 
the  line  aixlimd  Leningrad  and  tlie 
Oranienbaum  pocket.  It  did  that  at  a 
distance  of  10  miles  at  the  botdeheck 
and  fiO  miles  midvsav  on  the  Volkhov 
River.  At  die  south  end  of  the  lake, 
Smmysi  ftassa,  10  m^es  behind  the 
fronts  straddled  the  sole  t  ailroad  and 
the  nl^ici  road  servicing  the  south 
flank.  Frofn  the  lake  to  the  army  group 
boundarv  and  beyond  and  from  the 
front  in  the  Valdai  Hills  west  for  130 
mifes  Str«td»ed  an  expanse  of  tangled 
rivers,  swamps,  and  forest  in  which  the 
most  important  points  were  the  road 
jfunctlons  at  Demyansk,  Kholtn,  and 
Toropels,  each  50  or  more  miles  distant 
trom  one  anotiier  and  from  Staraya 


Rnnf^ 
ForcesX 
GULF  r 


THE  SOVIET 
GENERAL  OFFENSIVE 

NORTH  FLANK 
6  January  -  22  February  1942 

•^**~-~  Front  line,  6  Jan 
Doos.o.o  p„,„,        22  Feb 

Soviat  attack 

SO  Witas 


MAP  10 


THE  GENERAL  OFFENSIVE 


145 


After  the  new  year,  in  paralyzing 

(otd.  Sovit't  bids  to  squff/f  a  last  ad- 
vantage out  of  the  drive  from  Tikhvin 
by  probing  across  the  %1Mmsv  River 
declined  and  then  stopped  completely 
on  4  January.  Field  Marslial  Leeb, 
Army  Group  North  commander,  re- 
ported a  quiet  day  on  the  4th  along  his 
whole  front,  the  first  such  in  many 
v^edcB,  but  lie  hsirdly  expeeted  ibe  re- 
spite to  last  lonif.  For  scneral  days  the 
army  group's  monitors  liad  been  pick- 
ing up  radio  traffic  new  to  them — 
from  Si'cond  Shock  Army.  The  only  real 
question,  as  Leeb  saw  it,  was  whether 
the  Russians  would  try  again  on  the 
Volkhov  or  regroup  to  the  north  and 
attempt  to  lake  the  shorter  route  to 
Ij^iih)^pi:ad  acr«»s  the  1)otd!^e»d^  they 
would  certainly  do  one  or  the  other.' 

On  the  Soviet  side,  of  course,  the 
dec^ion  had  aheady  been  made  on  a 
larger  scale  than  Leeb  suspected,  and 
the  Stavka  liad  sent  L.  Z.  Mekhlis,  the 
army's  chief  conunissar,  to  Wkhov  Enmt 
to  make  certain  that  General  \feretsko\ 
got  an  early  start.  Meretsko\  had,  by 
6  January,  deptoyisd  Fifty -ninth  and 
Fourth  Armies  on  the  V(jlkho\  between 
the  Leningrad- Moscow  railroad  and 
Kirishi  and  Second  Shock  and  Fifty- 
second  Amur south  of  the  railroad.  SVr- 
fmd  Shock  Army,  under  Cieneral  Levle- 
nant  N.  K.  Klykov,  was  to  break 
through  across  the  Volkhov  and  ad- 
vance nortlnvesl  toward  Lyuban  uiili 
Fifty^ninth  and  Fourth  Armies  giving  it 
support  on  the  right  and  Fifty-seamd 
Army  widening  the  breach  on  its  left 
and  taldng^  Novgorod.  F|^;)^j&»i#4f^, 


'H.  r„  .v,,r4.  Iti  KnriT,/tjgfl>ii(li.  1.-18.1.42,  1-4 Jan 
41'.  H.  (.1  N..1.!  -r,]2H/i->  file;  Lceh.  Td- 
gebuchaujzeichnungeu.  pp.  42H-2y. 


which  belonged  to  Fmirigrad  Front,  and 
the  right  flank  elements  lA' Fourth  Arm\\ 
.starting  from  the  area  around  Ririslii, 
were  to  surround  and  wipe  out  the 
Germans  in  the  boiili-ncck.- 

On  the  whole  norili  flank,  that  is, 
including  Northwest  and  Leningrad 
Fronts,  the  Russians  liad  cotiil orlable 
numerital  supei  iorilies:  1.5:1  iti  irtK^jJs, 
1.6:1  in  artillery  and  mortars,  and  1.3:1 
in  aircTaft.  \hlkhov  Front  had  received 
new  troops  and  supplies,  but  in  the  hist 
week  of  [anuaiy,  Meretskov  did  not  yet 
ha\  e  ctiough  of  either  to  start  an  offen- 
sive. Fijty-ninth  Army,  with  apparently  at 
least  eight  rifle  and  two  cavalry  divi- 
sions, was  his  strongest.  Man\  u[  Smmd 
Shock  Army's  units,  (jn  the  otlier  hand, 
had  not  yet  arrived,  and,  according  to 
Meretskov,  its  one  rifle  division  and 
seven  rifle  brigades  gave  it  only  the 
strength  of  an  infantry  corps.  The  ar- 
mies' reserves  of  ratif)ns  and  iodder 
were  small,  and  they  had  only  aljout  a 
quarter  of  tlieir  required  ammunition 
stocks.  In  these  respects,  Second  Shock 
and  Fijty-nmlh  Armies  were  the  worst  off 
because  Sl^>plies  were  distributed  I  l  om 
the  rear  separately  to  each  individual 
army,  not  through  the/rani,  and  these 
armies  were  just  establishing  their 
lines.^ 

Nevertlieless,  on  the  7tb,  the  front 
north  of  Lake  Ilinen  came  to  life,  and 
the  offensive  started — in  a  somewhat 
loose  order.  Fourth  and  Fifty-second  Ar- 
mies led  off,  and  Fifty-ninth  and  Second 
Shock  Armies  joined  in  at  intervals  dur- 
ing the  next  several  days.*  For  five  days, 
the  Germans  st-ood  off  flurries  of  at- 


"MeJetskdV,  .SVnuM^  (/((' /'fti/(/f,  ])p.  !SO-H(i. 
HVWSS,  v.il.  II.  p.  Ti'ii  Mcreiskuv,  ifTwrtg' A# 
fet^.  pp.  IH,-.  IH7  Sec  also  IVMV,  vtri.  IV,  map  10. 
mMV.  vol.  IV,  p.  315. 


146 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


Soviet  152-mm.  (SuN-HowmHi  Fhong  North  of  Lake  Imm 


tacks  conducted  without  mitch  deter- 
mination or,  as  far  as  they  could  tell, 
purpose.  Tlie  danger  was  that  one  or 
another  of  the  Soxiet  ai-niies  would 
strike  a  weak  spot,  ol  which  there  were 
several.  On  the  morning  of  the  ISth^ 
that  happened  when  Second  Shock  Army, 
making  its  first  real  effort,  brought 
down  a  licavv  artillery  barrage  and 
then  hit  the  boundai  y  of  the  126th  and 
215Ui  Infantry  Divisions  soutli  of  die 
raBroad.  Boundaries  were  ahwa^l&ffi- 
eult  to  defend,  and  this  one  was  m©!Pe 
difficult  because  the  126th  Infantry  Di- 
'vision  was  a  recent  arfiK^  t@  the  East- 
ern Front.  In  a  day.  a  gap  four  miles 
wide  opened  between  the  two  divisions. 
Seco7id  Sk^^^iTmy  had  almost  @c€cUte<l 
the  first  stage  of  its  assignment,  btit, 
during  two  more  days  of  fighting,  it 


was  unalilc  to  open  the  gap  wider,^ 
Sometlung,  much  in  fact,  was  going 
wrong  on  the  Soviet  side.  On  the  15th, 
Fourth  Army  and  Fifty-second  Army 
stopped  and  went  over  to  the  defen- 
sive. T!beHito5;:^l!lfee  Great  Patriotic  War 
says,  "There  were  serious  defects  in  the 
organization  ol  the  offensive,  such  as 
the  dispersion  of  the  forces  in  many 
directions.  .  .  ."'^  On  the  16th,  Me- 
retskov  stopped  to  regroup. 

South  of  Lake  Ilmen 

As  the  Germans  watched  Volkhov 
Front  get  olf  to  a  ragged  start,  they 
began  to  believe  the  aerial  SoirieE  imin 


*W.  Gt.  Nmit,  1,1  Krir^stagcbuck.  I.-IH.IAI,  13-16 
|nn  A'l,  H.  tir.  Niinl  7ril28/5  SliE. 
"/VOV'iS.  vol.  II,  p.  335. 


THE  GENERAL  OFFENSIVE 


147 


effort  was  going  to  be  south  of  Lake 
Ilmen,  where  General  Kurochkin's 
Northwest  Fmnt  also  began  die  offensive 
on  7  January.  Late  in  the  day  on  the 
7th,  Sixieenth  Anii\  (>iii|K>.sts  on  ilu- 
south  sliore  of  die  lake  saw  Soviet 
motor  ctrnvof^  and  ski  troops  v^&i 
sleds  coming  souihwesfafcross  the  lake. 
In  the  wilderness  soil^  of  tlie  lake,  in 
fact  over  most  of  the  distance  to  the 
ann\  group  boundary,  Sixteen^  Army 
had  only  established  a  Une  of  Strong- 
points,  not  a  sofid  fVont.  B^^  da)^Hght 

the  next  day,  two  Soviet  divisioOU  ftcre 
across  the  lake  and  begmning  SO  ptfsh 
south  teft  iSB^m  b<^intt  tfte  frtinc.  d4i 

tlie  9th.  while  Sixtcenlh  Army  scraped 
together  a  few  battalions  lo  screen  Sta- 
raya  Russa,  Russians  on  skis  and  pull- 
ing sleds  moved  south  along  the  frozen 
course  of  the  Lovat  River  to  the  Staraya 
Russa— Demyansk  road. 

FJmenth  Army  was  beginning  to  rat  rv 
out  its  share  in  the  counteroflensive, 
and  Leeb  and  Busch  saw  at  otie&  that 
the  army  could  be  dangerous.  StSpTa^ 
Russa,  close  behind  the  f  ront,  "was  the 
railhead  and  main  supply  base  for  all  of 
Sixteenth  Army's  line  south  of  Lake 
Ilmen  and  an  Eln'cnlh  Army  thioist  past 
Staraya  Russa  to  Dno,  t  ighty  miles  to 
the  west,  could  (rijiplc  ihe  Gennan 
ialeial  lailroad  aiul  load  communica 
lions  all  the  way  north  to  Leningrad.' 

West  of  Ostashkov,  on  Sixteenth 
Army's  extreme  i  iglu  Hank,  Third  and 
Fourth  Shock  Armit's  went  over  to  the 
offensive  on  the  9th.  Their  attack  hit 
twf>  regiments  of  tlie  123d  Infantry 
Division  which  were  holding  a  thirty- 
milc-loug  line  of  widclv  spaced  strong- 
points  running  norlli  from  the  army 
grottp  boundary.  Many  of  the  strotlg- 


'Leeb,  lagebuduti^inchntaipn,  p.  431. 


points  vmst  so  far  apart  that  the  first 

Soviet  iWSV-es  siinply  marched  west  be- 
tween them.  In  three  days  all  of  the 
strongpoinls  were  wiped  out  and  a 
tliirt\-inile-wide  gap  had  been  created, 

Ihe  breakthrough  on  the  south 
raised  iht  inamiediate  prospect  criT  an 
encirclement  that  seemed  to  be  the 
onl^  worthwhile  purpose  the  Soviet  ini- 
tiative cmM.  sei^e.*  Kurochkin  had,  in 
fact,  "amended"  his  instructions  from 
the  Stavka  and  ordered  Thirty-Jourlh 
Arti^  m  become  *more  actiw*  toward 
ilic  west"  and  Elrvrutli  Anny  and  Third 
i>lu/ck  Anny  to  dispatch  forces  off  dieir 
iaAl^  to  Mbek  me  line  ^  tk^  Lovat 
River  against  a  C.erman  retreat.''  Six- 
teenth Army  was  managing  to  ct)ver 
Siaia^  ^ii^  by  bringingm  police  and 
security  troops  from  the  rear  area,  but 
there  were  no  reserves  to  be  had  for 
the  south  flank.  On  the  afternoon  of 
die  12th,  Lceh  oKlt  i  rd  Busch  to  have 
II  Corps,  liis  soutlicrnmost  corps  and 
the  one  standing  fariliesi  east,  to  get 
ready  to  pull  hack.  Then  he  called 
Hider  and  proposed  to  begui  taking 
the  whole  front  south  of  Lake  Ilmen 
back  gradually  to  the  Lovat.  Hitler 
replied  that  he  liad  to  consider  the 
e{^Ct:Otl-ihe  \\  h()le  fiont  and  told'Leeb; 
tt>  come  to  the  Fiiclircr  Head<|uartcrs 
the  next  morning  when  they  would 
"discuss  the  matter  in  its  full  context."*" 

The  "discussion"  was  brief  and  one- 
sided. Hider  ordered  Leeb  to  iujld  the 
line  south  of  Lake  Ilme»i  where  it  i^ 
and  to  scavenge  enough  str^tl^^  QUt 
of  tlie  existing  front  to  couttlerattaelt 
and  close  the  ga|j  on  the  south.  A 
withdrawal  he  said  would  expose  the 


"SCT  llllll 

"Zlnvl.unn.  7;  iiftxin."  |».  'i.'l. 

"7-/,  t„.  Xm,l.  i„  K,„x^t,ij;,-hHi-h,  I.-18J.4S,  12  Jan 
42,  H,  Gr,  Nord  75128/5  file. 


148 


MOSCX)W  TO  imUNGRAD 


Army  Group  Centei  Hank  .dul  thai  Thf  "Jhau'l" 
would  be  intoIeraMe.  Hie  oitifi-  had 

been  deai  ed  to  go  oul  o\  er  the  ielct\Tie  Hitler  the  lines  were  drawn.  The 

before  Leeb  arrived  at  rHrlnrr  Head-  'W^M^er'ij  battles  Oh  the  north  flianfe 

quarters,  and  after  his  departure.  Field  ^^'^^'icS  ht-  f"iit;lii  toe-to-loe  wh©t^er 

Marshal  Keitel,  chief  of  the  OKVV,  occurred.  Hitler  had  madte  Ms 

called  ahead  to  the  Army  Group  Not  tli  dedsiort.  Army  ©rmip  North  wotrli 

COtmnand  post  in  Pskov  to  Jea\e  tlic  ^^^"^  ^^^t- 

message  that  the  Fuehrer  "would  be  ""^'^  bemg,  Hiders  insliact 
pleased"  if  Leeb,  on  his  return.  ^umU\  t*®**^  Leeb's  professional 
personally  impress  on  Busch  "the  uu-  ji'clgmenr.  The  encirclement  Ix-eb  had 
conditional  necessity  for  holdin-.  the  'relieved  imminent  did  not  develop- 
south  flank  Whatever  the  necess.tv .  ""^  y^*-  ^tevm^i  Aiwy  had  a  foothoM 
Leeh  didiiot  believe  it  was  possible  to  ''^^^  Siaraya  Russa- Deniyansk  roa<l 
hold  the  flank,  either  before  he  talked  ""^  ^^"'''^  ^"^  ^^^^^ 
to  Hitler  or  afterJ^  Armies  were  bent  on  executing  the  op- 
Wien  Leeb  returned  to  Pskov,  Thml  ^''^tion  laid  out  for  them  in  Dec  emlxt. 
Shock  Army  was  approaching  the  "-'"i^ly,  to  drive  a  wedge  between 
Khohn-0emyansk  road.  On  the  15th,  Groups  North  and  Center,  but 
the  Russians  were  fanning  oiii  across  '"'^'^  ^^^'^  advaiiiing  in  two  diieitions 
the  roadL  Believing  the  wiiole  (rom  *"  ^"^^  iheir  -suengths  were  not 
south  of  Lake  Tlmen  would  hencelonli  '^uffif  lent  for«&«*  assignments.*"  Like 
have  to  be  drawn  in  tou  arti  Staraya  Shock  A  mix.  rliey  w  ere  not  the 
Russa,  Leeb  asked  eiihei  iliat  he  be  Pf>werful  aggregations  of  combuied 
relieved  or  that  he  be  allowed  to  oider  ^'  "^^  ^^^^  ^^^^  designations  implied, 
the  retreat  while  he  siill  had  some  Eremenko,  wlif)  had  been 
room  for  maneuver.  A  chie  to  \s  hat  the  mounded  in  October  1941  while  com- 
answer  would  be  came  throH^h  t;en-  i"andmg  Bryansk  Pimt  and  had  takfeft 
eral  Haider,  chief  of  the  General  Staff  '^""'^^  '^''^'^^  '^""^  'it' 
who  called  Leeb's  chief  of  staff ,  General  ["'"^^1  f^o'"  'lie  hospital  in  December, 
Brennecke,  and  told  him  to  "put  all  of  ^'"""^  officer*  and 
the  powers  of  the  General  Staff  in  20,000  ciihsted  nun  \\hen  tlic  ollen- 
motion  ...  and  ettirpate  this  mania  for  ^^^^^^\-  His  table  ol  organization 
operating.  The  attny  group  has  a  clear  '^''^ '  P'  'wided  for  three  t^kandi«n  ski 
order  to  hold,"  Haider  added,  "and  the  '^-'"'ilx^'is.  One  of  the  tank  battalions 
highest  command  will  assume  all  the  ''^^  battalions  had  then  not 
risk."'*  On  the  I7th.  Hitler  relieved  frnved.  Eremenko  had  been  relatively 
Leeb  "r<n  reas.ms  of"  health"  and  ap-  ''^'"^  '^'^  0)llea<;ne  at  Third 
pointed  Kuethler  to  command  the  "^''^'^  "^""^  ^^t^'i^^'^^  Ley  tenant  M.  A. 


l/JSEifc,  ia  Jan  42. 
"JtfeiirlKMji  vol.  tn.  p.  383. 

Wflfrf,  ta  Knegitagfburh,  1.-18.1A2,  16  Jan 
42.  H.  Gr.  Nord  7SI28/5  file. 


army  group. 


Purkayev,  because  FmiirSt  Shoik  hsd  the 
former  Tjvenly-^n<nilh  Arm^  as  a  basis  on 
whidi  to  build.  Third  Shock  Army  was 
new  from  die  ground  up  and  coutd 


THE  GENERAL  OFFENSIVE 


149 


only  be  made  teacly  at  the  last  tnhiute 

l)y  riansfers  of  personnel  from  Fourth 
shock  Army,  which  also  had  to  share  its 
supplies:  On  tfte  (tef  the  offensive  be^ 
gan,  bolh  armies  had  been  ( Idsc  to  the 
edge  in  rations  and  ammunition,  and 
the  imfy  ^gisoVtaeMmi^  S^tA  Army  had 
v\as  that  which  was  in  its  vehicles' 
tanks.** 

On  tl  January,  mtr0t  SAocft  Army 
took  *KMroprts.  and  a  day  later  Third 
SAedl  encircled  Khcte.  The  distances 
were  impressive,  sixty  miles  to 
Tbropets,  ririy-fi\e  to  Klutlm,  but  llie 
substantive  accomplish  met  its  were  less 
m.  Bddi  armies  had  ittfi  out  of  sup- 
]i!ies,  and  a  scattering  offkM  nian  iniit.s 
was  still  able  to  hold  Kholra.  Fourth 
^ho(k  Arw^  eaptttred  enough  Germafi 
stores  at  Tbropets  to  keep  on  the  move, 
but  the  Slavka's  plan  now  required 
Eipemenko  to  head  due  south  out  of  the 
Army  Group  North  area  into  the  rear 
of  Army  Group  Center.  On  22  January, 
Third  and  Fourth  Shock  An^s  were 
shifted  to  the  control  ai  Kalinin  Front. 
which  reduced  KuTOchkin's  problems 
but  iiiereas^  those  of  the  /ronf's  com- 
mander, General  Koncv. Vo  the  Ger- 
mans, although  it  further  endangered 
Army  Group  Center,  Eremenko%  turn 
south  was  almost  a  relief.  Haider  re- 
marked that  it  was  better  dian  if  die 
turn  had  been  to  the  north  because 
then  holding  Leningrad  would  have 
become  impossible.*'' 

Seen  from  the  German  side,  one  erf' 
the  most  flisconcerting  feaiui  es  of  the 
oilensi\e  against  Army  Group  Nordi 
thus  far  was     er^ti<?  acecutssm  His 


GcNERAL  A.  L  limm^- 


tactical  sensibilides  olFcnded,  Haider 
was  even  moved  to  coinplaiii  that  the 
whole  war  appeared  to  be  "degenerat- 
ing into  a  brawl,"  Tlir  i!t  i\c  h\  (he  two 
shock  armies  was  "senseless, "  lie  said, 

becstei«e  it  could  tm^  m  the  long  imo 

accomplish  anything  decisive  agaiast 
either  of  the  two  l&ermau  army 
gtwips,**  tTnaMe  to  conc^e  that  the 

Stavka  would  deliberately  fritter  away 
strength  in  secondary  attacks,  Hider, 
liaid^i  and  Kuechler  coftduded  that 
the  main  hlou-  was  \et  to  conic  and 
would  be  aimed  at  die  Leningrad  bot- 
tleneck, idiere  a  tem-tntle  advaijuse 
could  break  the  siege.  The\  were 
wrong.  1  he  "brawl"  was  going  6d 
contiuue. 


"Erenieiiko,  I'  natiitile,  pp.  403-07. 
"Ibid.,  pp.  441-45;  IVOVSS.  vol.  ILp.  S22. 
^''Haider  Diary,  vol.  Ill,  p,  389. 


'Ibid.,  p,  S94. 


150 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


In  the  week  alter  %tkhm  Bmt'&  at- 
tacks had  bogged  dov\'n  north  of  Lake 
Ilmen,  Meretskov  had  reassessed  his 
prospects  and  had  regrouped  to  ex- 
ploit a  weak  spot  Second  Sliack  Aimy  had 
found  on  the  V'olkliox.  Tlie  Germans 
had  managed  Lu  screen  the  gap  but 
in  doing  so  had  had  to  leave  the  Rus- 
sians holding  a  three-by-five-mile 
bridgehead.  On  21  January,  Second 
Shock  Army,  flanked  on  tlie  left  hy  Fifty- 
second  Army  and  on  the  right  by  Fifty- 
ninth  Army,  began  battering  the  western 
£ace  of  the  bridgehead.  The  flanking 
armies  were  drawn  in  close  to  roll  up 
the  enemy  front  to  the  south  and  to  the 
north  when  the  breakthrough  was 
made.'*'  In  the  meantime,  the  offensive 
had  changed  from  a  grand,  five-army 
effort  to  chop  up  die  whole  front  be- 
tween Lake  Ladoga  and  Lake  Ilmen 
into  essentially  a  single  thrust  by  S?rion</ 
Shock  Army  that  was  still  seventy  miles 
from  the  siege  line  at  Leningrad. 

Second  Shock  Army  did  well  in  the  first 
five  days  of  the  second  attempt,  getting 
through  the  front  to  a  distance  of  al- 
most twenty-five  miles,  but  in  doing  so, 
it  did  not  put  itself  within  l  ange  of  any 
su^ni&canjC  objectiv^.  The  territory  in 
which  it  was  operating  was  flte  head- 
waters country the  Luga  and  Tigoda 
rivers,  a  vast,  almost  imsettled  stretch 
of  swamps  and  peat  bogs,  that  ims 
mostly  imdenvater  except  in  winter. 
Having  a  Soviet  army  roving  behind 
their  front  was.  of  course,  distfoncert- 
iii;^  to  ihc  Germans,  biil  the  gttater 
immediate  danger  was  that  the  flank- 
ing armies  wotiM  wMeo  the  hr&ak^ 
through.  Fify^iatk  Army,  particularly, 


by  pushing  north  as  far  as  Chudovo  on 
the  Moscow-Leningrad  railroad,  could 
ha\  e  opened  a  25-raile  gap  and  a  clear 
a[3i)roach  along  the  railroad  to 
Leiitiii^i  ad.  Rni  the  Genii.ms  kept  a 
tiglit  grip  on  Spaskaya  Tolist,  twenty 
nules  south  of  Chudcivo,  and  by  also 
lying  Fifty-st'ODi/l  Army  rlown  limited  the 
breacli  to  six  miles  and  forced  Sfcond 
Sha^k  Army  to  operate  in  a  poefcet,*" 

A  Muliiai  Fi  itsti  fi/ioii 

Volkhov  and  Northwest  Fronts  were,  in 
the  Seift^iet  postwar  view,  un£^^  lagi  <b»- 
ploit  their  numerical  superioditl^feS  CO 
the  fullest  because  of  three  problems: 
dilKcult  terrain,  weaknesses  in  support, 
and  inexperienced  commands.  Since 
tlie  first  affected  both  sides  about 
equally,  the  latter  two  were  the  most 
significant.  Supplies  had  been  short  in 
all  the  armies,  but  Meretskov  experi- 
eneed  some  improvement  at  WhAso 
FmnI  after  late  januarv  when  A.  V. 
Krulev,  who  was  the  deputy  deiense 
comnmsai-  in  duti^e  of  logistics,  ar- 
rived In  expedite  the  shipments.  The 
inexperience  of  the  commands  was, 
according  to  ibm  Mhtory  of  the 
Patrwtir  Won  the  mt)sl  persistent  ptob- 
lem.  Meretskov  had  already  removed 
one  eoiBmanding  general  of  Second 
Shcjck  Army  a  day  or  two  before  I  he 
offensive  began,  and  later  he  wrote  his 
account  of  me  army%  operations  that 
reads  in  places  like  a  rostei  of  failed 
stall  othcers.  Eremenko,  wi  iting  irom 
tl^  point  of  view  of  an  army  com- 
mander, sees  his  <n\u  and  Iiis  subordi- 
nate siaits  as  confident  and  competent, 

cautious  oh  the  one  hand  and  car 


"Merctskin-tSnvtag  lhePa^U!,  p.  195. 


"Sec  ibid. 


THE  GENERAL  OFFENSIVE 


151 


pridoixs  cm  the  ofiher.^  l^e  '^jemans 

became  aware  as  llic  fighting  went  on 
that  Uie  commands  ot  the  lower  eche- 
lons vfere  having  troubles.  Army 
Group  North's  radio  monitors  inter- 
cepted messages  from  army  NKVD 
O.O.  sections  iSivisiQn  and  brigade 
sections  calling  attention  lO  a  large  in- 
crease in  "nontulhllment  of  comtaat  as- 
signmenfjf  anil  oadeiing  the  sections 
to  intervene  to  TeestabUsb  pmper 
order  among  the  units."** 

As  January  ended,  tlic  (ighfing  on 
the  north  flank  ajipcared  to  be  settling 
into  a  Slate  ot  slow  modon.  Snow  over 
three  feet  deep  covered  the  growoA 
and  below-zero  temperatures  per- 
sisted, but  these  wwv  not  the  reasons 
for  the  slowdown.  Mutual  uncertatety 
had  sinrply  brought  into  iieing  a  near- 
deadlock.  The  Germans"  position  was 
precarious,  and  they  could  do  nothing 
to  change  il.  The  Russians  had  the 
initiative,  but  they  could  not  exploit  it. 
South  of  Lake  Ilmen,  two  German 
corps,  II  Corps  and  X  Corps,  were 
holaing  an  eastwaid  projecting  salient 
around  Demyansk.  The  Smb&^immM 
Army  had  driven  a  twentv-niile-fleep 
wedge  into  the  corps'  north  liank  cast 
of  Staraya  Russa  diat  cut  their  best 
supply  routes  and  made  a  substantial 
stai  I  loward  enveloping  the  salient.  On 
the  south  flank,  II  Corps  had  Third 
Shark  Army  standing  at  Kholm  fifty 
miles  to  its  rear  and  Thirty-Jourtii  Army 
ptobii^  northward  into  the  mostly  va- 
cant space  in-l>etvvcen. 

Having  no  more  than  a  scattering  of 
jreserviiSv  Sixteenth  Army  had  to  thin 


"tVOVSS.  vd.  II.  p.  33»:  Mcreiskov.  Scmrig  the 
Pivph:  pp.  196,  199-S05.  See  Etenienko,  V  naethak, 

pp.  -t  (15-20. 

-=//.  (.r.  X.ml.  In  Kf  iepln^rbadi,  !S.1-12.2A2^  S  Feb 
42,  H.  Gr.  Nord  7512»/6  liic. 


the  front  on  the  east  to  screen  the 

corps'  Hanks.  Its  commander.  Busdi. 
disgruntled  at  having  been  passed  over 
'fijT  command  of  the  army  gi  oup  and, 
as  Leeb  had  been,  fearful  of  an  en- 
circlement, wanted  to  strengthen  the 
stnith  flank  against  an  enveloping 
thrust  Itom  that  direction.  Kuechler, 
irked  by  Busch's  clinging  to  the  idea  of 
a  potential  threat  on  the  .south  flank 
that  bad  alrcadv  cost  Leeb  bis  com- 
mand, agreed  with  Haider  that  the 
greater  danger  was  on  the  north. 
Haider  insisted  that  as  an  old  solrlier  be 
had  "a  certain  nose  lor  such  things." 
and  it  told  him  the  thi  eat  was  not  from 
the  south  but  in  tlie  north,  ".pt  ( ifically 
at  Staraya  Russa  which  was  the  key  to 
the  entire  German  position  south  of 
Lake  Ilmen. 

WTiile  the  argument  at  the  top  ran 
on,  the  troops  that  II  and  X  Coi  ps 
were  able  to  free  w-ere  just  barelv 
enough,  as  long  as  the  enemy  moved 
slowly,  to  keep  the  Russians  from 
swinging  in  behind  the  corps.  On  the 
Volkhov  the  situation  was  similar.  Eigh- 
'feenth  Army,  w  liidi  bad  taken is^irefr the 
area  of  the  iireakthrough,  was  con- 
(kIliii  it  could  deal  widi  Second  Shock 
Ai  niy  alter  it  closed  the  gap  in  the  front, 
but  all  the  lrot(ps  it  could  spare  were 
ha\  ing  lo  be  used  jusi  to  keep  the  gap 
from  widening.-' 

'limaid  the  enti  of  the  first  week  in 
February,  Army  (iroup  Nortii  lor  sev- 
eral days  COllld  rcpoit  "nothing  par- 
ticularly wrong."-''  riie  S(  i\  iet  offensive 
seemed  to  be  decaying  into  a  succession 
of  uncoordinated  attacks,  some  locally 
dstngerous,  but  none  likely  to  alter  the 


"/W.,  27  |.in  •i2. 
''NImi..  8  Feb  42. 


152 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


situntion  drasiii;ill\.  Fui  ihc  inomt'iit 
Arniv  Group  Noilli  was  alniosl  less 
concerned  about  the  Russians  than 
about  how  its  mb^ds  were  i-unnin^. 
T!if  pmhlem  wns  not  ;i  new  one  al- 
tliough  ihe  snow  and  cold  had  made  il 
worse.  Il  could  be  traced  all  the  way 
back  to  the  planning  for  Barbarossx 
that  had  left  the  opeiating  of  the  rail- 
roads in  the  occupictl  ai  eas  as  well  as  in 
Germany  under  civilian  control.  Work- 
ing on  the  Eastern  Front  was  the  least 
pOpe^  of  the  railroad  mens  assi^S^ 
nieiltS«  and  ilu-re  ilic  Arin\  (iroup 
North  zone  was  apparcntU  the  most 
undesirable.  The  army  group  believed 
its  raillines  were  beint;  run  liv  tlie  culls 
of  the  whole  system.  Haider  suggested 
arresting  a  few  and  turning  them  over 
to  the  GesU^  as  an  object  lesson  for  the 
oiliers,^* 

In  Leningrad,  time  and  the  weather 
appeared  to  be  working  for  the  (ier- 
mans.  Prisoner-of-war  and  deserter 
interrogations  indicated  that  Lenin- 
grad was  in  catastrophic  condition 
owing  to  hunger  and  to  cold.  Hitler 
U^ed  the  army  group  several  tiisies  id 
consider  taking  advantage  of  the  rela- 
tive quiet  on  the  front  and  to  push  in 
closer  toward  Leningrad,  but  Kuechler 
.  refused  because  he  could  not  spare 
enough  troops  to  take  the  city,  and  any 
Ulie  closer  than  the  one  Eighteenth 
Army  then  held  would  l>e  unclerwater 
when  the  spring  thaw  began.  The  ap- 
proaching thaw,  which  could  come  in 
five  or  six  weeks,  also  gave  rise  to  sf>ec- 
iilation  that  the  Soviet  winter  offensive 
iiiiL;lit  he  ncaring  its  end.  Haider 
thought  the  Russians  WQuldnotattempt 
anything  big  so  late-    dt6  s€moB.*' 


In  the  miflst  of  what  almost  ap- 
peared to  be  an  impending  calm.  Six- 
teenth Armv  itientified  two  new  Soviet 
units.  /  and  //  Cuards  B^ls  (kfpSt  OR  6 
Febriuirv,  I  he  two  corps  were  de- 
ployed back  lo  back  m  tlie  wedge  Elev- 
enth Army  had  driven  in  east  of  Stamya 
Russa.  From  this  position,  the  Corps 
could  splii  the  (.ierman  front  in  several 
directions,  bin  for  the  moment  iheir 
actions  dkl  not  disclose  anv  pariieular 
purpose,  and  ihey  could  themselves 
be  trapped  h\  an  attack  across  the  base 
of  the  weflgc.  Ckneral  Biemiecke.  the 
Army  Group  North  ciiief  oi  stall,  saw 
the  deployment  of  the  two  Russian 
corps  as  the  Ijcginning  of  a  final  at- 
tempt to  cut  ofi  1 1  and  X  Goi  ps  ai  oimd 
Demyansk.  Haider,  on  the  other  hand, 
was  puzzled  as  to  what  the  Russians 
might  do.  Ihe  .Soviet  commanders 
were  so  browbeaten,  he  believed,  that 
they  would  try  almost  anything  just  to 
have  a  tactical  success  to  show.  Rather 
than  to  wait  and  see  what  they  would 
do.  Sixteenth  Army  decided  to  strike 
east  behind  the  two  Scniet  corps  with 
the  5th  Light  Division.  The  division  al- 
though fresh  fiom  Germanv  was 
forced  lo  attat  k  dir  ecllv  off  the  trains 
that  bi  ouglii  il  ill,  and  half  of  it  was  still 
scattered  along  the  railroad  as  far  back 
as  Riga.  ILie  result  of  the  attack  was 
almost  instantaneous  failine,  and  the 
few  parties  that  had  advanced  had  to 
be  brought  back  under  the  cover  of 
darkness  on  the  night  of  the  lOih.-*' 

The  Germans'  uncertainty  had  been 
more  than  matched  by  complications 
on  the  Soviet  side  of  the  front.  In  the 
tliii  d  week  of  January,  Kurochkin  had 
proposed  concentrating  first  on  encir- 
cling attd  then  destroying  II  and  X 


"im.,  9-  to  Feb  42. 


to  Feb  42, 


THE  GENERAL  OFFENSIVB 


Corps  mst  of  the  lovat,  feut  the  Stavka 
had  not  been  willing  to  delay  the  pro- 
jected advance  past  Staraya  Russa  to- 
ward Dno  and  Luga.  By  then  it  had 
also  begun  (hinking  about  turning 
Third  Shock  Army  northwest  after  it 
r^ched  Khdtaa  for  a  B.€tp  limist  t6 
Pskov.  Late  in  tlie  month  the  Stavka 
bad  given  Kurochkin  the  /  and  II 
i&umk  Rifle  Corps  atfd  the  Fhi^  See* 
Army  with  orders  to  do  both  the  thftJ^ 
tp  the  west  and  the  encirclement, 
SMM  Amy,  vMdn  had  Ixeii  shipped 
north  froin  the  front  \\est  of  Moscow 
without  a  rest,  was  to  spearhead  the 
attack  past  Staraya  Riissa.  "The  two  ftSe 
corps  were  to  be  used  ai^ainsi  II  and  X 
C^^,  aijdi  tiie  area  to  be  encn  cled  was 
fiinm^ihct§^.'11l^B%ockArrny,  in  the 
meantime  transferred  to  Kalinin  Front, 
would  act  as  tlie  southern  anni  and  // 
iSmrds  Mfie  C&jf r  ivotild  dosfe  dlefing 
from  the  not  th  bv  a  long  drive  west  of 
the  Loval  to  KJiohn  where  it  would  join 
Tldlrd'^iteii  Army  And  subsequendy  take 
part  in  the  advance  to  Pskov.  Although 
it  would  be  starting  deep  in  Ku- 
^jdNian%  lerdtery,  ff  Oiaw^Jlp'  Gmfps 
was  subordinated  to  Kalinin  Front. 

North  of  Lake  Ilmen,  in  tlie  second 
weelc  ^bmaty,  iiiiie  was  getting 
short.  Leningrad  was  star^ffl|^^nd  an- 
other four  to  six  weeks  c^BM'Iffing  the 
mud  and  {ltsx^&  of  tlie  sprifig  iSiaw. 
Volkhov  Front  had  widened  the  gap 
enough  at  least  to  put  Second  Slwck 
Atsfty%  supply  line  oof  of  enemy  rifle 
and  machine  gun  range,  but  the  Ger- 
mans held  Light  at  Spaskaya  Polist  on 

the  cnicisl  north  shoulder.  Under 

fierce  pressure  from  the  SiavkS'  tQ  ae* 
compUsh  somethmg  towaid 
Jjm^ip^s^^  M&eb^m  cried  ^  (^See-^ 


md  Shock  Am^  gteted  toward  Lyuban, 
whicli  would  ;|»ttt  it-  abotft  lialfway  to 
Leningrad.  S^nA  Slwck  Army,  however, 
petslsied  ^  pwshing  due'  west  where 
the  GfePSOftafesistance  was  lighter.  Nei- 
ther illSpresiMice  at  thejmu  headquar- 
ters of  Marsh  a'i  ¥6l=oshfi©v  m  a 
reprcsentati\ e  of  the  Stavka  nor  the 
relief  ol  Second  Sliock  Am)is  diief  of 
and  Its  Toipeieittfcwis  -^/im 
epough  to  ^ct  the  armay  h^ded  ha  l&e 
t^ht  direction.'** 

Ew^ideDnmi  atDemyansk 

Lyuban  and  Staraya  Russa  were 
going  to  stay  in  German  hands  for  a 
long  time,  the  latter  long  enough  to 
become  a  legend  on  the  Eastern  Ffottt, 
The  winter,  and  Hider,  hq^vever,  tiverf 
going  to  give  the  S^et  fortes  thear 
first  opportunity  in  the  war  to  exef  Lite 
a  major  encirclement.  It  was  one  that, 
once  Hitler  had  tied  the  11  and  X 
Cor]>s  down  around  Deinyansk.  the 
Russiairs  could  hardly  have  helped 
achieving.  The  pocket  had  begun 
forming  in  the  first  days  of  the  offen- 
sive, and  from  dren  on  it  vms  almost  a 
eoU^i&oifatf^e  between  die  Soviet 
commands  and  Hitler 

As  Eievenlli  and  Thirty-Jourth  Arnues 
tuf lied'  iif  behind  Demytftsic  iri  J^itu^ 
arv,  II  and  X  Corps,  whicli  had  been 
forbidden  to  maneuver,  wrapped  dieir 
lines  arownd  to  die  west.  Cite  tJie  souths 
II  Corps  lield  Molvotitsy  as  a  corner- 
post.  The  290lli  Infantry  Division  es- 
tablished a  ftOrdiem  comerpost  fifteen 
miles  due  east  of  Staraya  Rus.sa.  By 
retainmg  the  5th  Light  Division  at  Sta- 
Etissa,  ifeteeftdi  Artny  kept  alive 
a  hope  that  it  cotild  sttike  across  the 


**  Zb^anov,  "&  o^jito."  pp.  26-2S. 


^'Meretsikjav,Sm>ing  ihe^Pmptei  pp.  196-98. 


154 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


gap  to  the  290th  Infantry  Division  and 
turn  the  tables  on  the  enemy,  but  the 
chances  of  doing  that  dwindled  alter/ 
and  //  Guards  Rfte  Corps  and  First  Shock 
Amy  put  in  their  appearances.  One  of 
the  first  effects  of  the  Soviet  reinforce- 
ment was  to  compress  theSSOth  Infen- 
trv  Divi.sions  front  into  a  narrow,  I'ln- 
gerlike  projection  off  the  main  line  of 
me  Demyaiislt  pocket,  which  was 
pushed  awav  to  the  sonlli. 

/  and//  Guards R^e  Corps  had  Uiejob 
of  completing  the  endrasiaent,  and 

the\  iuxl  instrurtions  on  how  to  do  it 
direcdy  from  Stalin,  who  told  their 
«Miiinanders,  C5efteM  Mayor  A.  S. 
Gryazno\'  anfl  General  M;uot  A.  I, 
Lizyukov,  "Move  in  stiong  groupings, 
and  do  not  «tr^^  out  It  yon  hecorne 
extended,  voiiiaiuiMtnove  fast.  Main- 
tain your  groi]^ii^$^4^d  do  not  divide 
regimeilts  and  battai[iort&.  Do  not  lose 
contact  with  ,id\aiice  deiachmcnls.'"^' 
The  instrucuons  were  good,  but,  ''as  a 
prae^ed  maften"  ihr^'eaaseedingly  long 
distant  es"  the  corps^had  to  cover  made 
them  "unfulfillabl©"*'' 
Since  the  Germaits Could  ti6tpi«veM 

it  and  did  not  piopose  to  attempt  to 
escape  trom  it,  completing  the  encdrde- 
ment  beestme  ^most  a  temmcaHty.  ilie 
//  Guards  Rifle  Car^  EUt  the  last  Ger- 
man overland  sito^y  Mne  on  9  Febru- 
ary, and  thei^ealW  tl  Corps,  tinder 
Geiieralleutnant  Graf  Walter  von 
Brockdorff-Alileteldt,  became  respon- 
sible for  the  six  divfsionstin  the  pocket, 
since  Headquarters.  X  Corps,  uas  lo- 
cated outside,  at  Staraya  Russa.  A  sup- 
ply airlift  began  three  days-  later,  and 
BrockdorfT  leportcd  on  the  16iii  that 
he  had  95,000  men  in  the  pocket  and 


''Zhdanov,  "h  opyta'  p.  29. 


needed  it  least  200  tons  of  supplies  a 
da\  !o  survive.  He  was  then  gebing  SO 
to  90  tons  a  day.^^ 

The//  Guards  Rifle  Corps  tompleted 
an  outer  ring  on  I.^>  February  when  il 
made  contact  with  elements  oi  Third 
nordieast  of  Kholm.**  In 
fat  t.  the  outer  ring  iiad  little  more  than 
token  significance,  since  there  were  no 
Germans  within  miles  of  ft  over  most  of 
its  length.  A  inueh  more  dismaying 
event  for  the  Germans  came  on  the 
1 8ih,  when  the  290th  Infantry  Division 

had  to  withdraw  into  the  main  line  of 
the  pocket.  Until  then  the  OKH  and 
the  army  group  had  been  able  to  talk 
aboutteunching  the  5th  Light  Division 
ea$t*ifi  afew  days."  '**  Losing  the  north- 
em  ctJWierpost  was  also  more  impor- 
tant to  the  Germans  than  the  dosing  ol 
tlie  inner  ring,  whicli  they  were  not 
aware  of  when  it  happenea';  Soviet  ac- 
ctjimts  gi\  e  two  dales.  T\\c  Hislon'  of  the 
Great  PatrioUi  War  gives  20  February,  at 
Za3lichye,  Just  outride  the  pO#et  4fid 
due  east  ol  Dcmvansk.'"'  Zhelaill$^says 
the  inner  encirclement  "adV^eed 
sfowiy  and  was  not  cmifipleted  tmiSl  S5 
Fel')ruar\.  \\hen  I  Guards  Rifle  Corps 
made  contact  at  Zalucliye  with  a  Third 
Shfdk  AfWf  tiflfe  brigad<&  eomitig  Worn 
\hc  south. ^' 

On  22  February,  Hitler  designated 
the  Demyatisk  podtet  a  "fortress."  Thie 
next  such  fortress  would  he  .Stalingrad, 
and  after  it  there  would  be  many  more, 
but  k  the^ttfinf^  of  I^H  le^  w^ 
new.  It  imj^ed  p^cmanence.  A  Kesset 


*»AOK  J6,  la  Kriegstagfhuth  Band  U,  9  Feb  42,  AOK 
Ifi  23468/3  file;  H.  Gr.  h!m-d.  la  ^gsk^iM,  WJ.^ 
12.2.42.  16  Feb  42.  H.  Gr.  Nord  75128/6  file. 

•"Zhelanov,     njt^in."  p.  29. 

'*W.  Gr.  Surd,  la  Kiiegstageimdi,  I3,2.~JZJ.42, 
13-18  Feb  42.  H.  Gr.  Nord  75128/7  file. 
"WaVSS,  vol.  II,  p.  337. 


THE  GENERAL  OFFENSIVE 


155 


»(*eneirded  poeketf)  was  an  acdderatof 

war.  A  fortress  was  a  deliberate  crea- 
tion and,  in  Hitler's  conception,  a  pur- 
poseful tactical  device.  On  tfeef  IStn  he 
had  already  talked  about  staging  a 
thrust  from  Deinyansk  south  to  close 
the  eighty-mite- wide  gap  to  Army 
Group  Center.  Bv  the  22d  he  and  the 
OKH  were  mulling  over  several  plans 
foT  restoring  contact  with  the  fortress. 
And  the  war  was  gi\ing  them  time:  a 
sudden  quiet  was  f  alling  over  the  w  hole 
Eastern  Front,  which  was  remarkable 
by  itself  because  23  February  was  the 
Day  of  the  Red  Army  and  attacks  to 
mnimemorate  it  had  been  expected. 
Aroimd  Demvansk  the  perimeter  of 
the  pocket  stabilized,  1  he  gap  bciv\een 
k  it^iha  m^fti<!^MBSATaya  Russa 
was  twenty  miles  and  somewhat  less 
farther  south  on  the  Polisl  Riven 

On  the  South  Flarik 
Bock  Goes  to  Poltava 

On  the  morning  of  16  January,  Field 
Marshal  Bock,  his  intestinal  ailment 
abated,  was  getting  ready  to  follow  his 
doctors'  advice  and  take  several  weeks' 
rest  in  the  Austrian  mountains  when 
an  officer  telephoned  from  the  army 
personnel  office  to  ask  whether  Bock 
would  be  willing  to  take  immediate 
^tMtUJOtQd^  Army  Group  South.  The 
army  group  commander.  Field  Marshal 
Reichenau,  the  caller  explained,  had 
sul  lered  a  stroke  and  was  not  expected 
to  live.  The  next  day,  Bock  was  aboard 
a  dirty,  unheated  sleeping  car  on  a 
train  to  East  Prussia  that  was  late.  He 
stopped  on  the  morning  of  the  18th  at 
the  OKH  command  post  in  Anger- 
burg,  where  he  learned  that  Reichenau 
had  died,  and  then  went  on  to  a  late 
breakfast  with  Hitler  in  the  W)lfsschame 


compound.  At  the  table  Bo^  com- 
plained about  the  decrepit  state  of  the 
railroads.  Hitler  agreed  but  added  that 
he  had  recendy  put  all  the  systems 
under  the  railroad  mitiister  and  with 
that  seemed  to  imply  tliat  he  had  done 
what  was  needed. 

Afterward.  Genera!  Schnumflt, 
Hitlers  chief  adjutant,  told  Buck  that 
the  cunngat  KJpfe  of  concern  at  Furlirer 
Headquarters  was  the  exodus  of  the 
generals,  not  the  condition  of  the  rail- 
roads. First  there  had  been  Field  Mar* 
shals  Runstedt  and  Brauchitsch, 
Srhmundt  said,  then  Generals 
( iiidci  ian  and  FIf>cpner,  and  in  the  last 
few  days,  Strauss,  Leeb,  and  Reichenau 
had  followed.  It  was  causing  talk  in 
Germany  and  abroad,  lb  counteract 
the  talk,  Schmundt  disclosed.  Hitler 
had  sent  Brauchitsch,  who  had  l  ecencly 
undergone  a  heart  operation,  a  warm 
telegram,  which  was  being  released  to 
the  news  services.  Rundstedt  was  being 
asked  to  represent  the  Fuelnn  at 
Reichennus  funeral,  anfl,  Sthmiuidt 
added  as  an  aside  that  Hitler  wanted  to 
have  some  pictures  taken  with  Bock 
before  Jie  departed  to  Army  doiifi 
South. 

Bock's  main  qualification  at  the  mo- 
ment appeared  to  be  his  publicity 
value.  His  mission,  as  Hitler  explained 
it,  hardly  seemed  to  justify  his  recall. 
The  Army  Group  South  front.  Hitler 
said,  was  "secure";  a  little  "cleaning  up" 
needed  to  he  done.  But  all  he  reaUy 
expected  Army  Group  South  to  do  was 
sit  tight  through  the  winter.^^ 

Wlien  he  alighted  at  the  Poltava  air- 
field on  the  morning  of  the  i9th.  Bock 
found  General  Hoth  there  to  meet 
him.  M^th»  mh&  had  commanded 


'Buck  Diary,  Oslvn  11.  I  (i- 1 K  Jan  42. 


156 


MOSCOW  TO  SrmLlNGKAD 


Tiuxd  Paruser  Grottp  in  the  summer  of 
1941,  was  currently  a>mniandiiijr  Sev- 
enteenth Army,  and  lor  tlie  p;ist  se%- 
eral  days,  had  been  actint^  Loiiimartder 
of  Army  Group  South.  I  lotli's  presence 
was  a  modest  courtesy.  In  better  times 
and  a  belter  season — the  tanperaiui  e 
was  several  fle<4i  ees  below  zero — a  field 
marshal  could  have  expected  moie.  On 
the  quiel.  secure  ftGSClt  to  which  Bock 
had  been  told  he  was  going,  he  could 
have  expected  a  more  ceremonious 
Ht^dfitmeemi  in  StK^  weather,  but  the 
front  was  no  longer  quiet,  and  it  was 
far  from  secure.  On  the  ride  to  Poliava, 
Hoth  lok\  Bock  that  the  Russian.s  had 
broken  tiirough  at  I/\u!ii  tlie  dav  be- 
fore and  wcie  sneaiiung  westward 
practically  unimpeded.  The  army 
group.  Bock  also  then  learned,  had  n(» 
reserves.  A  Rumanian  division  anil  two 
Cerioan  divisions  were  coming  in,  l>ut 
the  railroads  in  Russia  were  infinitely 
worse  than  what  Bock  liad  experienced 
in  Cjeimany.  and  moving  the  divisions 
would  tgke  weeks.^^ 

ThelzytmBid^ 

Iz\^un  was  an  insignificant  town  on 
the  Donets  River.  The  lav  of  tlie  front 
and  the  objectives  of  die  general  offen- 
sive had  temporarily  made  it  a  focal 
point  of  Soviet  strategy.  It  was  closer 
than  any  (Jther  locality  on  the  front  to 
the  main  southern  cro.ssings  of  the 
Dnepr  River,  Dnepropetrovsk  and 
Zaporozhye.  It  was  the  key,  as  well,  to 
the  southern  approaches  to  Kharkov 
and  a  good  springboard  for  a  thrust 
into  the  rear  of  Seventeenth  and  First 
Fanzer  Armies.  (Map  1  i.) 

In  accordance  with  the  Stavka  plan. 


Marshal  TimoshentGO»  commander  of 

Soiillnfc.'ifrni  Thmtn:  on  IS  january, 
launched  two  related  but  separate 
^irmts  across  the  Donets  in  the  l/yum 
area.  In  one.  to  be  conducted  by  Saiith- 
ivest  hunt,  Sixtli  Army  and  VI  Cavalry 
Co»]^  would  Strike  northwest  to  meet  a 
ihitisi  coming  west  off  Thhiy-riglitli 
Army's  right  flank  and  vv(juld  envelop 
Khatkov,  In  the  Other,  Sou^  B&m^ 
Fifly-snif'iilh  Army  would  advance  west 
to  DnepropelroN  sk  and  Zaporozhye 
and  then  south  in  the  direction  of 
Melitopol.  Timoshenko  held  iWirith 
Army  as  SuutJiu'cstrrn  Theater  reserve 
and  stationed  /  and  V  Cavalry  Corps 
behind  Fifty-sn'fnth  Army  as  General 
Malinovskiy's  Soiilli  i-nml  resei-\'es.  Ma- 
linovskiy  and  Timoshenko  expected 
Geiieial  Levtenant  I>.  I.  Rvabvshev,  the 
Fifly-srx'ritlh  Army  t:onnnander,  to  reach 
Bolshoy  Tokmak,  just  north  of 
Melitopol,  in  twenty-two  to  twenty-four 
days.^« 

The  of  fensive  on  ihe  south  flank  was 
siinpltlied  somewhat  l>v  tfie  early  elim- 
ination of  the  other  parts  of  tlie  gen- 
eral offensive  originally  scheduled  in 
the  Sinilhwnt-ern  Theater,  Its  prospects  of 
succeeding,  however,  were  probably 
also  reduced,  Mryansk  Fivnt  and  the 
right  flank  armies  o£ Southwest  Front  had 
begun  their  attacks  toward  Orel  and 
Kursk  in  the  first  week  of  January,  had 
not  made  worthwhile  gains,  and  were 
winding  down  to  a  stop  by  the  middle 
of  the  month.  General  Manstein's 
counterattack  on  the  Crimea  turned 
the  tables  there  after  15  January.  The 
Crimean  Fmnt  (Traiiscaurasus  Frmil  re- 
named) was  created  at  the  end  ol  the 


•"Ibid..  i9Jaii  42. 


MAP  11 


158 


MOSCOW  TO  SIALINGRAD 


moifith  and  given  ord^ts  to  rts^ 
offensive,  but  it  would  not  be  ready 
until  the  last  of  February.*" 

Seventeenth  Army's  left  Wmk  cov^ 
fired  Izyum  and  tlie  loop  of  the  Donets 
tied  in  with  Sixth  Army  at  Ba- 
laisleya  twenty-fitif  mSeis  to  tJie  iiorth- 
>^^^L  On  the  morning  of  ihe  18th,  tlie 
SoVifet.  F^ty-seventh  and  Sixth  Armies 
o^enetl  the  attaclt  oft  a  sixty-aoile  firofit 
flanking  Izyimi  on  bodi  sides  from 
Slavyansk.  to  Balakleya.  Although  the 
ground  in  Ukraine  was  more  open 
than  that  of  the  northern  forest  zone, 
the  weather  and  their  shortage  of 
troops  baH  fbreed  the  Qeftmm  to 
sort  to  a  strongpoint  line  there  as  well. 
Bypassing  some  of  the  strongpoiuis 
and  wew^nning  others,  the  lEilssia3ft» 
had  penetrated  the  front  in  a  number 
ot  places  beiore  nightfall,  and  Seven- 
teenth Army  was  beginning  to  evacuate 
hospitals  and  supply  dumps  close  to 
the  line.  Before  1200  the  next  day  the 
army  had  comrtiittedi  Jls 'fest- reserves, 
and  by  aflernoon,  one  Soviet 
spearhead  supported  by  a  brigade  of 
fjidtks  was  heading  toward  Barvetikovoi, 
twentv  miles  southwest  of  Izyum  on  the 
army's  main  supply  Une,  the  railroad 
from  Dnepropeanivsk  to  Slavyansk. 
Seventeenth  Army  was  being  pushed 
away  to  the  east  into  a  pocket  on  the 
riv  er  thai  cotild  become  a  trap  for  both 
it  and  First  Panzer  Army  if  the  Soviet 
drive  carried  through  to  the  Dnepr 
crossings.^'- 

By  the  22d,  Seventeenth  Army's  en- 
tire flank  n<jrth  of  Slavyansk  was  torn 
^K^y,  and  Southumt  Fnnit  iniils  were 
Ctttning  behind  Sixth  Army.  General 


"IVOVSS,  vol.  II.  i>.  340.  3A4. 
18-21  Jan  42,  AOK  17  14499/85  file. 


der  -ftaseeiijiili^^  Friairich  Paulas, 
-who  h^d  tS^&t  command  of  Sixth 
Army  Just  om  week  before,  had  to 
e&aftmtt  all  of  lus  reserves  around  Alek- 
seyevskoye.  forty-five  miles  northwest 
of  Izyum,  to  cover  the  southern  ap- 
pTOtch  m  EIsai4tt5V.  In  t«d  mifwe  day  * 
the  offensive  secured  an  unanticipated 
dividend;  during  the  night  of  the  24th, 
Motk  decfded  m  bdiig  Panzer  Ifetacft- 
ment  60  north  out  of  the  Crimea  that 
meant  the  end  of  Mansteins  attempt  to 
retake  lihe  IC€a«h  P€trflistila.^ 

Between  22  and  24  January,  Ma- 
iinovskiy  committed  the  /  and  V  Cavalry 
"Qm^  St  left  fbnk  of  F^fy-seventh 
ArW^  Istst  of  Slavyansk.'**  By  the  end  of 
the  day  on  the  25th,  after  one  week  on 
fhe  offensive»^e  Russians  had  chewed 
a  3,600-square-mile  chtmk  out  of  ilse 
German  front  and  had  covered  better 
than  half  the  distance  fr^ti9  '^l^WcSli  W 
Dnepropetrovsk.  The  next  morning 
Hoth  proposed  that  Seventeenth 
Arniy%  naission  henceforth  be  to  cover 
Dnepro]3etrovsk.  Late  in  the  day  he 
told  Bock  tfiat  there  were  only  two 
possibilities  left  dther  a  "despei-ate" 
attack  to  the  west  across  the  line  of  the 
Soviet  advance  toward  Dnepropetrovsk 
or  "quick"  action  to  organize  counter- 
measures  with  resources  from  else- 
where.*^ Especially  after  he  heard  that 
one  or  two  of  the  eorps  commanders 
were  talking  about  sacrificing  their 
equipment  to  save  the  tioops,  Bock 
believed  that  Hoth  was  on  the  verge  of 
tijming  the  whole  army  around  eind 


*'A()K  6.  Fit<'li!iingn)lilfili(iig.  Kni'g^tiigi'tiuili  Nr.  10, 
22  I;in  42.  AOK  ti  17244  tile;"  finvk  Diary,  Oilen  U,  22 
Jan  42. 

^^Gret  tiki!.  Gw/v  iioynw  p.  99. 

"'AOK  17.  /■'iiilining\iil>tfiliirig.  Kmgstagtbuch  Nr. 
26  Jan  42,  AOK.  17  16719/1  Klc. 


THE  GENERAL  OFFENSIVE 


159 


heading  west.  Alarmed  at  this  pros- 
[>t'(t.  Bock  the  next  morning  orclercd 
Hoth  to  hold  die  army  where  it  stood 
under  all  circumstances  until  reserves 
could  be  brought  up.  Bock  also  had  tlie 
feeling  that  Hoih  and  iiis  staff  were 
"overtired  Ironi  die  siraiii  of  last 
days"  and  decided  to  put  Seventeenlh 
Army  tnider  General  Kleist,  the  "enter- 
prising" commandei-  of  First  Panzer 
.\rmy.  Creating  siu  h  ad  hoc  commands 
had  been  a  favorite,  and  not  unitormi) 
suceessiul.  device  of  Bock's  while  he 
commanded  Army  Group  Center,  He 
believed  it  v\f)uld  spur  Kleist  to  give 
more  and  faster  help  to  his  neighbor, 
.Seventeenth  Army,  and  Hoth,  less  a 
prima  donna  than  many  German  arm) 
commanders,  agreed,'" 

Early  in  its  second  week,  the  battle  in 
die  Izyum  bulge  was  also  reaching  a 
dimax  for  the  Soviet  commands — and 
producing  some  disappointments  f(H 
Uieni.  The  sharpest  of  these  was  their 
failure  to  expand  the  opening  in  the 
front.  The  Germans  held  light  to  Sla- 
vyansk  and  Balakie)a,  which  kept  their 
lines  north  and  south  of  those  places 
firmly  anchored  and  stable.  Channeled 
into  a  ifti\  inilc-\\'idc  corridor,  the  So- 
viet armies  tended  to  lose  momen- 
tum— and  conrKleni  e.  Sixth  Army  hesi- 
tated to  make  the  turn  noidi  toward 
Khai  kcn'  while  its  no^lior  on  the 
fight,  'I'hirty-righth  Antiy.  was  stuck  at 
Balakleya.  Thiity-.\n'rnth  Aimy,  which 
was  to  have  pindied  off  Slavyansk  and 
to  have  accompanied  Fifty-seventh  Army 
on  its  push  south,  did  not  do  that,  and 
Fifty-seventh  Army  and  the  two  cavalry 
corps,  as  they  bore  south,  entered 
a  region  heavily  dotted  with  towns 


'bock  Dwry,  Oili-ti  //.  26-28  Jan  42. 


which  the  Gemmm  could  m.^^&k  m 
strongpoints. 

Consequently,  as  the  Histoiy  oj  tlie 
Great  PatnoUe  Vhr  puts  it,  the  Stavka 

"refined"  the  missions  of  Southuwl  atid 
South  Fronts.  On  26  January,  li- 
moshenko  committed  Ninth  Army 
alongside  Fifh-srvmlh  Army,  and  be- 
I  ween  then  and  the  end  of  the  month 
the  Stavka  gave  Southwest  Front  315 
tanks,  4  rifle  divisions,  and  4  rifle  bri- 
gades. Fifty-sevi'iith  and  Ninth  Armies 
and  the  ca\ali\  corps  were  to  htaA 
south  to  "coax"  Se\  enteenth  Armv  out 
of  its  line  on  the  east  and  into  battle  in 
the  open  and  to  reach  the  coast  be- 
t^veen  Mariupol  ant!  Melitopol,  Sixth 
Army,  apparently  putting  its  thrust  to- 
ward Wa^k&v  in  al)eyance,  was  to 
flrive  w^est  toward  llu-  niiepr.-*" 

In  refilling  the  niissiuiis,  the  Stavka 
and  the  Southwestern  Theater  seemed  in 
actuality  to  have  converted  the  offen- 
sive into  a  clutch  of  lank-supported, 
deep  cavalry  raids.  Seventeenth  Army 
captured  ,So\iet  ordcis  of  2b  January 
assigning  llic  thiusls  lo  the  west  and 
south  to  the  thiee  cavalry  corps.  The 
V7  Cavalry  Corps,  .still  attached  to  Sixth 
Army,  was  to  drive  west  via  Lozovaya 
toward  the  Dnepr,  and  /  and  V  Cavalry 
Corps  were  to  push  south  ahead  oi  Fifty- 
seventh  and  Ninth  Armies.*^  Against 
these,  Kleist  was  moving  in  from  the 
south  the  "von  Mackensen"  Grrmp — 
14th  Panzer  Di\isi<jn.  lUOd-i  Light  Divi- 
sion, and  Panzer  Detachment  60  under 
General  von  Mackensen — and  from 
tlie  west  XI  Coips,  which  at  first  had 
only  temimiU  m  two  divisions  but  was 


''H'Ol'Sa,  vol-  II.  pp.  339-42;  Grechko. G<«i!j  tioyity, 
pp.  106-13;  Bagrsmyan,  Hk  shS  my  k  pobtdt,  pp. 

35-42. 

"ftKH.  GaiStJ/l.  I  no.  Wnenttkht  MtrkmoU  dlT 
tmultagf  am27.l.-l2.  II  3/l'J7  file. 


160 


MOSCOW  TO  SnmNGRAD 


SLEB-MocrsTED  German  Antitanh  Gtfw 


getting  afl  inf  anlt  y  divMon  and  several 
regiments  via  Dnepropetrovsk.  Gen- 
eral von  Mackensen.  who  was  com- 
manding general.  III  Panzer  Corps, 
brought  his  staff  with  him  from  its 
sector  on  die  First  Panzer  Army  light 
Sank,  i^ulm,  M  Sixth  Army,  had  al- 
ready set  lip  two  groups  of  mixed 
regimenis  {the  Groups  "Dosder"  and 
"Fricdrich")  to  covfer  ihe  north  face  of 
the  bulge. 

For  three  days,  in  snowstorms  that 
closed  the  roads  to  everything  but 
tanks  and  horse-drawn  sleds,  Kleisis 
units  maneuvered  into  posidon  to  meet 
the  iiKjre  mobile  Soviet  cavalry  and 
tanks.  On  the  31st,  the  advance  ele- 
ments of  Panzer  Detachment  60  and 
Htli  Panzer  Division  came  up  against 
the  I  and  V  Cavalry  Corps'  spearheads 


forty  miles  south  of  Barvenfcovo,  and 
the  Soviet  (  avalrv,  having  outdistanced 
dieir  own  tanks,  faltered  and  turned 
back. 

Obser\  ing  lliat  the  Soviet  forces  ",ire 
split  into  three  groups  and  ha\L-  gi\en 
way  under  localized  counterattacks," 
Bock  theu  ordered  tlie  "von  Mac- 
kensen"' (iroup.  XI  Corps,  and  the 
"Dosiler"  and  "Friediieh"  Groups  to 
attack  f  rom  tlic  south,  west,  and  nf)i"th 
"with  ilie  aim  of  destroying  the  en- 
emy."''* After  a  week  and  a  half  of 
fighting  in  zero-degree  weather,  high 
winds,  and  drifting  snow,  the  "von 
Mackensen"  Group  pushed  north  to 
within  ten  miles  of  Barvenkovo  by  11 


*m.  Ot,  Sued,  la  Nr.  210142,  an  AOK  6.  Ami^in^ 
von  Klash  31.1. 42.  H.  Gr.  Sued  23208/30  file. 


THE  GENERAL  OFFENSIVE 


161 


February.  Hie  XI  Corps  and  the  "Dost- 
ler*  and  "Fricclritli"  Groups  did  not 
succeed  in  driving  the  Russians  back 
more  than  a  few  miles,  bnt,  togetlier 
with  Sen  cirtccnth  Armv  and  the  "von 
Mackenscn"  Group,  they  had  drawn  a 
reasonably  lighl  liiie  around  the  ljulge 
by  llic  Ilth,  one  Uiat  would  stand  up 
during  the  weeks  before  the  thaw  set  in 
a$  a  deterrent  to  repeated  Soviet  at 
ternpts  to  break  away  to  the  west  and 
soum. 

In  thf  Crntcr 

The  retreat  tf)  die  KOF.NIGSBERC; 
line,  according  to  Hitler  s  order  ot  15 
January,  was  to  be  made  "in  small  steps" 
and  accomplished  "in  a  form  worth\  of 
the  German  Army."  The  gap  at  Ninth 
Army  west  erf  Rzhev  was  to  be  closed  as 
was  tlie  one  l)eivveen  Fourth  and 
Fourth  I'an/er  Armies  west  of  Ma- 
loyaroslavets, and  Yukhnov  was  to  be 
held  "under  all  circumstances."  Tlie 
troops  to  carry  out  these  missions  were 
to  be  ac(|uii  e(i  by  thinning  the  front  as 
il  came  bark."'"  lo  ensure  execution  as 
Hitler  bad  s])eciited.  Field  Marshal 
Kluge,  Armv  (Iroup  Center  com** 
mander,  told  Third  and  Fourth  Panzer 
Armies,  both  of  which  had  thirty  to 
forty  miles  \ct  to  go,  that  tlie  with- 
dra\s'al  would  not  begin  imtil  he  gave 
the  order,  and  when  it  did  begin,  he 
would  contiol  ilie  movements  day  by 
f[a\.''  for  I'outlh  Armv  he  made  an 
exception,  allowing  it  to  begin  "as  of 


"W.  Cr.  MilU,  III  N>.  421M2.  „>i  AOK  V.  Ifi  Jan  4^, 

AOK  uai.'iao/n  iiu-. 

=  .40A'  /«  K) t, ■!;■.(„ !i,hu,/i  .\,  2.  l(j  42,  P?,. 
AOK  S  ili9M/l  (lie. 

Gr.  Mitle.  la  Sr.  -126142,  Zwsaetze  der  H.  Gk  sttr 
rm-lm-rwmtmg  MM*  ISJ.42.  16.1.42,  AOK  9  2X52W11 
file. 


Fourth  Army  was  an  island,  <he  re- 
mains of  four  corps  jammefl  into  a 
25-by-iiU-mile  space  east  of  Yukhtiov 
with  a  fifth  corps  struggling  to  bold 
open  40  miles  of  the  Rnllbahn  west  of 
Yukhnov.  The  gap  between  Fourth 
Army  and  its  neighbor  on  the  north, 
Fourlli  I'an/er  Armv,  was  15  miles  wide 
at  the  mouUi  and  ballooned  westward 
behind  both  armies  to  an  unknown 
extent.  The  light  St/irrh  reconnaissanie 
planes  that  ocatsionally  flew  over  parts 
of  the  area  brou^t  back  conflictiiig 
re]5orts,  theii  pilots  being  understand- 
ably reluctant  lo  linger  over  a  hostile, 
frozen  wIMiemess  where  being  downed 
meant  c  ei  tain  death.  After  having  been 
cut  on  the  13tb,  the  Rollbalin  was  open 
again  on  the  15ih,  but  the  situation 
maps  showed  the  front  almost  on  the 
road,  and  in  places  on  die  ground  the 
Russians  were  only  an  easy  rifle  shot  of 
400  yards  away.  Kluge's  permission  ff)i- 
Fourth  Army  to  go  back  brought  no 
sense  of  relief,  Thir*nny  ^iief  w  staff 
told  the  OKH  ihai  (he  army  was  fight- 
ing for  its  "naked  existence"  and  all 
decisions  were  too  t%tm^  6eti6fal 
Heim  ic  i,  XXXXllT  Corps  commander 
and  llie  senior  officer  at  the  front 
(army  lieadc}uarlers  was  at  Spas-De- 
mensk.  ()0  miles  southwest  of 
\  iikhnov),  said  the  troops'  conlnlence 
in  their  leadership  was  collapsing.  Or- 
ders lo  hold  at  all  cost  had  been  read  to 
them  oiily  a  day  before,  and  now  they 
were  being  told  to  pick  up  and  laowe,-®' 

To  save  itself.  Fourth  Armv  would 
have  to  keep  \he  RoUhakn  open  and,  in 
ctt^jltl^        str^t^  im  Stmt  uori^  to 


"■'AOK  4.  Ill  Kmgile^atuA  Nr. JI,  tSaud  16>n42. 
AOK  4  17380/i  file. 


MAP  12 


THE  GENERAL  Of  EENSIVE 


m 


meet  Fourth  Panzer  Army  and  close 
the  gap.  Doing  so  meant  shifting  al- 
most the  whole  army  obliquely  to  the 
nordiwesl  a  distance  of  some  filt60ii 
miles.  That  maneuver  became  vastly 
more  complicated  on  the  18th  when  a 
Soviet  force  drove  toward  the  Rollbahn 
from  the  north  and  another  unit  of 
Russian  cavalry  coming  from  the  south 
cut  the  road  in  two  places.  The  noose 
was  closing,  Soviet  divisions  were  in 
front  of  and  behind  the  army.  Shuttle 
flights  of  twenty  to  twenty-five  planes 
were  delivering  troops  and  supplies 
every  night  deep  at  the  rear  of  the 
army.  In  the  vast  forested  triangle  lie- 
tweeji  Vyazma,  Spas-Demensk.  and 
Yukhnov,  partisan  detachments  were 
conscripting  men  from  farms  and  ex- 
ecuting village  elders  who  bad  worked 
for  the  Germans. 

On  the  morning  of  19  Jamtarv,  Gen- 
eral Kuebler  went  to  Xh^  Fuehrer  Head- 
quarters to  report  himself  isick  and  to 
give  up  command  of  Fotttth  Army. 
Kuebler,  who  was  not  one  of  the  better 
known  generals,  departed  quietly  on 
the  21st,  and  Heinrici  look  command 
of  the  army,  also  quiedy.  Nevertheless, 
the  day  brought  a  change  of  mood  to 
the  armv.  Heinrici,  as  lommandine 
general,  XXXXill  Corps,  had  been  a 
prophet  of  talastrophe  but  had  never 
vet  failed  to  bring  his  corps  out  of  the 
dghtest  spot.  The  staffs  and  troops 
obviously  hoped  he  could  do  the  same 
for  the  whole  armv.  And  the  army  did 
seem  once  to  get  a  new  start,  if  a 
ce^ciiicntal  tmt.  On  the  SM,  tetn- 
|»eraturc  was  40°  F.  all  day,  and  the 
fighting  stopped.  The  next  day,  in 
weather  F.,  OTl  Goi-l^  t*Jt>k  the 
Russians  by  surprise  and  reduced  the 

tap  to  Fourth  Panzer  Army  to  about 
fMm.  Ailef  3£>>d*i^  Corp^  afeo 


cleared  the  Rollbahn  and  kept  it  open 
for  twenty-four  hours,  Heinrici  told 
KJuge  the  situation  was  "beginning  to 
turn";  although  the  gap  on  the  north 
was  not  closed  yet,  "something"  was 
beginning  to  happen.^* 

In  knee-deep  snow  and  tempera- 
tures ranging  as  low  as  —40°  F.,  both 
sides  had  to  prepare  and  time  every 
tIIOT€i  precisely.  Frostbite  and  exhaus- 
tion could  claim  as  many  casualties  as 
the  enemy's  fire.  Soviet  soldiers  fre- 
quently fell  dead  of  exhaustion  min- 
utes after  being  captured.  No  one 
knew  how  often  the  Kime  thing  hap- 
pened to  the  troops  in  batde. 

Heinriq  opened  another  attack  to 
the  north  on  the  morning  of  the  25th 
widi  "enough  arlillerv  to  cover  the 
whole  gap,"  but  a  fresh  Soviet  division 
had  moved  in,  and  the  temperature 
was  down  to  -40°  F.  again.  One  regi- 
ment advanced  three  miles,  saw  no  sign 
of  XX  Corps,  which  was  to  have 
pushed  south  off  Fourth  Panzer 
Army's  flank,  and  fell  back.  Heinrici 
then  proposed  shifting  the  line  of  at- 
tack west  to  the  Yukhnov-Gzhatsk 
road,  but  Kluge  thought  that  alsQ 
might  fail  because  i^e  fctfiees 
behintl  Fourih  Army  "imyhe  Stroflgier 
tlian  we  suspect."^^ 

Kluge  was",  iti  fectj  slightly  presdent. 
Within  llie  next  few  days,  Soviet 
strength  beliind  Fourth  Army  would 
be  greatly  increased.  On  the  nights  of 
the  26th  and  27th,  /  Guards  Cavalry 
Corps,  iinder  General  Belov,  a  mus- 
taoiioeti  vtmtsn  eavalryifiaii,  crossed 
the  Rollbahn  and  headed  north.  The 
cavalry  corps,  5  cavalry  divisions,  2  rifle 


164 


MOSCOW  I O  STALINGRAD 


was  ffiiih  Army\  mobile  group.  Belov 
was  looking  to  gather  up  partisan  de- 
tachments as  he  went  and  to  makf 
Contact  with  IV  Airborne  Corps,  \\  hi(  h 
was  landing  southwest  ot"  Vyazma.  He 
and  General  Mayor  A.  F,  Levashev,  the 
airborne  commander,  were  to  coordi- 
nate their  operations  with  Headquar- 
ters, Thirty-third  Army,  under  General 
Leytenant  M.  G.  Yefremov,  which  was 
setting  up  inside  the  gap  between 
Fourth  and  Fourth  Panzer  Armies.  Be- 
lov also  iiad  orders  to  link  up  with  X/ 
Cavalry  Corps,  which  was  bearing  in  on 
Vyazma  from  the  northwest/*  Fourth 
Army's  position  would  liave  been  even 
worse  had  the  Soviet  commands  not 
been  directing  their  efforts  primarily 
toward  Vyazma. 

Qontact  M  SviMnichi 

In  the  midst  of  its  own  flight  for 
sin"vi\al,  Fourtli  ,\ini\  teiei\ed  and 
recorded  occasional  i  adio  reports  from 
Sukhinichi.  It  could  do  nothing  else  for 
its  4,000  ir(i(>[)s  isol  iit  d  there.  When 
the  weather  peniiiLLeti,  the  Luftwaffe 
dropped  in  enougii  supplies  to  enable 
Generalinajoi  WViiut  \i>n  Gilsa,  tlic 
commander  of  the  garrison  in  Sukhi- 
nichi ,  to-widiS«2iflid  siege  that  was  being 
( oiulucled  more  liiaii  a  bit  lamely.  But 
time  was  on  the  Soviet  side.  It  hardly 
appeared  possible  fhaf  fotir  battalions 

(  oiild  survi\  e  longii!  the  dt'ad  o^^villlt:'^ 
or  that  Second  Pan/.er  Army  could  mus- 
ter enough  strength  on  its  slretdi  of  the 
Sukhinichi  perimeter  lo  stage  a  relief. 

On  16  January,  however,  as  XXIV 
Panzer  Corps  was  being  assembled 
around  Zhizdra  to  altenipr  to  rclic\e 
Sukhinichi,  one  battalion  of  tlie  18th 


Panzer  IKivision — the  only  one  there  at 
the  time — made  a  sudden  easy  jimip  to 
the  northeast.  When  it  learned  that  the 
battalion  had  only  met  rear  elements  ol 
Soviet  divisions  standing  north  of 
Zhizdra,  the  coj  jis  ordered  18th  Panzer 
Division  and  ilie  2()Sih  Infantry  Divi- 
sion to  push  ahead  toward  Sukliinichi. 
By  the  I9th,  the  day  the  attack  had 
originally  been  scheduled  to  begin, 
they  were  nearly  halfway  there,  but  the 
Russians  were  hanging  on  their  heels 
and  closing  in  behind  them.  Expecting 
not  to  have  (be  inomentum  to  reach 
Suldl^ni^i,  X^^^V"  Panzer  Corps  told 
ihe  !^Cf^m  ^Bt!&e  to  get  ready  to  bi  t  ak 
out,  to  &e  army  group  also  picked  up 
the  radioed  message,  and  Kluge 
shai  ply  warned  Gilsa  that  Hitler  had 
not  lilted  the  order  to  hold  the  towp, 
^i\i^ieti  the  garrison  passed  to  titee  e?on- 
trol  of  Second  Pan/er  Army  on  tiu 
20th,  General  Schmidt  took  the  oppor- 
tunity to  ask  Hitler  whether  the  ofder 
was  still  in  fortx-  and  l  eceived  the  reply 
that  it  inost  deliniteiy  was.  After  an- 
other day,  in  -413*  F.  weather  and 
against  at  least  one  fresh  .Soviet  divi- 
sion, the  Stavka  had  rushed  in  from  die 
Moscow  area.  XXIV  ?aiixer  Corps 
could  no  !onj.;vr  sustain  thrusts  by  both 
of  its  divisions,  and  18th  Panzer  Divi- 
sion: had  to  attempt  to  go  the  last 
miles  alone.  On  the  afternoon  of  the 
24th,  with  just  two  battalions  stiil  in 
motioia^  18m  Patnzer  liis^^mmiiR  tibe 
contact** 

%  0te  K-Une 

Detemrftied  to  retreat  to  the  K-Iine 

(KOFNIGSBFRG  Unj^  in  as  "wot  thy" 
a  manner  as  Hitler  de$ued,  Kluge  held 


■■'■Si  rl*  lUln.  PviiiinmaAnma  ktria  V  lyiavn^,'  "Fi  AOK  2.  la  KufK-uijirhudi  27 .nAl-iUAZ, 
V;,y;-ii>uHiloncheslay  Z/iurWil  S(1962],  55-60,  13-24  Jan  '12.      AOK  2  25031/162  tile. 


THE  GENERAL  OFFENSIVE 


165 


German  Swrxsfjoit  the  Ruza  RivtR  Line 


Third  and  Fourth  Fap^^  Argpifs  j^k 
for  three  days.  He  waited  untH  a^ef 
1200  on  the  18th  before  giving  their 
commanders.  Generals  Reinhardt  and 
Ruoff,  permission  to  start  the  with- 
drawal, and  llitn  lie  stipulated  that  it 
was  to  be  done  in  four  stages  of  five  to 
eight  miles  with  a  day%  pause  at  each 
phase  line.  I  hc  main  forces  were  to 
move  at  night,  the  rear  guards  in  the 
daytime.  With  the  iFitlai  line  to  be 
rcat  hcfl  <m  llie  niorning  of  the  24ch  bv 
Llie  main  forces  and  "if  possible"  not 
before  the  morning  oFthe  2Stft  by  the 
rear  guards.^**  Again,  as  they  had  on 
their  march  to  the  Lama  and  Ruza 
rk&n  ia  I>ecanber»  the  aii^iiis  woukA 


■^Ti.  AOK  1.  In.  l-.rnsjmch  imn  H.  Gr.  J3J0 
Uhr,  18.1.42.  Pi.  AOK  4  22457/36  file. 


have  to  fight  their  way  back  without 
breaking  contact  with  the  enemy  and  in 
tlie  o[)cti  ill  below-zero  weather. 

The  hrst  night  and  day  of  the  w«h- 
dfawal  showed  tikt  whdt  was  a  tactical 
masterpiece  on  paper  was  w^M^l^g  out 
as  a  near  disaster.  The  Soviet  infantry 
followed  their  every  step,  and  it  had 
tanks,  T-34s.  and  some  of  the  52-ton 
KVs.  Field  howitzers  with  RotkM  hol- 
low-charge ammunition  and  88-mm. 
guns  could  handle  llie  tanks,  hut  thev 
had  to  stay  on  die  roads,  and  without 
protection  they  were  not  only  vulnera- 
ble to  (lit  eel  hits,  as  were  the  tanks,  but 
to  near  and  sometimes  not  so  near  mis- 
ses. Among  the  infantry,  matny  of 
whom  were  replacements  or  men 
combed  out  of  the  rear  ecbeions,  the 
sight  Gr  sound  of  tanks  was  often 


166 


MOSCOW  TO  SIAUNGRAB 


enougli  to  raise  a  panic.  But  the  tanks 
were  not  the  troops'  most  pervasive  en- 
eniy;  the  cold  was.  The  eartji,  a  foot 
soldier's  first  and  last  refuge,  became  a 
menace.  Frozen  hard  as  iron,  it  drew 
heat  from  a  raan^  body  faster  than  the 
did.  The  soldiicsr  vfno  remained  up- 
right still  did  not  have  <is  gi  Kx  l  a  chance 
of  surviving  as  one  who  did  not,  but 
most  had  seen  too  many  others  nev<fr 
rise  again  to  believe  it.  The  cold  de- 
stroyed the  will  tQ  survive.  Officers  fre- 
quently had  to  dt^e  their  troops  with 
pistols  and  clubs.  The  soldier.s  did  not 
become  cowards;  they  became  apa- 
thetic, indifferent  to  what  was  going  on 
around  them  and  to  tlieir  own  fate. 
Growing  losses  in  men  aud  ef^mpment 
attfl  #€TejEpmsed  cdfia&ra  tJPmearmy 
commanders  that  the  troops  would  be 
too  few  and  too  exhausted  to  hold  the 
fipal  line  vi^ieti  titey  reaefte^  it  -p^r- 
suaded  Kluge  at  last  to  let  the  retreat 
be  completed  on  the  night  of  the  22d, 
two  days  earlier  than  he  had  originally 
ordere<l.''^ 

Unknown  to  theiiij,  the  two  panzer 
armies,  as  they  drew  into  the  K-Line, 
were  the  pos.sible  recipients  of  a  tactical 
"gift"  from  Stalin  and  the  Stmika.  The 
w^kest  point  oH  the  Lama-Sus!^  fine 
had  been  tlie  wedge  driv  en  in  at  V  Pan- 
zer Corps  west  of  Volokolamsk.  Pushed 
fkttfeet*- West  pastOzhatsk,  it  eeraM  have 
cut  Ninth  and  Third  Panzer  Armies 
adrift  and  left  Fourth  Panzer  standing 
with  fedth  ftanks  exj>osed.  On  19  Janu- 
ajy,  however.  General  Zhukov  received 
©rclers  to  take  first  Shock  Army  out  of 

tfae  %fcllQiy^lfc  meim  tmasStw  it 
to  the  Si&vka  reserve.  Two  days  latex; 


**jS.  Panzer  Division,  la,  Bericht  ui'bn  RmsLtcke  und 
Deutsche  Kamjifweise,  3t>,lA2.  2^.  AOK  3  21B18/7  fij^. 
Fz.  A0K3,  la  Krii^i^i^^Mr.'^f^Jm  42,  H.  ASK 
1 16911/1  file. 


Headquarters,  Sixteenth  Army  also  was 
pulled  out.""  According  to  Zhukov,  los- 
ing First  Shock  Army  in  particular  weak- 
ened his  offensive  at  exactlv  the  crucial 
moment.  The Histoiy if  ilir  Cirtii  Pithiatic 
War  concurs  that  the  two  shifts  "brought 

On  die  oilier  hand,  the  "gift"  to  the 
Germans  may  not  have  amounted  to  all 
tiiatmuch.  First  Shock  Army  was  in  poor 
shape  when  it  reappeared  in  anion 
south  of  Lake  Ilmen  late  in  the  month, 
and  General  Rokossovskiy,  who  com- 
manded Sixteenth  Army,  states  in  his 
memoirs  that  his  army  had  virtually 
evaporated  by  the  time  the  headquar- 
ters was  taken  oiit.**^  The  wear  and  tear 
on  the  Soviet  units  was  certainly  no  less 
than  that  on  the  German.  They  had 
been  on  the  offensive  without  a  pause 
for  nearly  a  month  and  a  J^alf,  and  the 
*fMrd  and  fburtli  Baii?Kr  feaai 
put  up  a  imnderous  defense  on  the 
Lama-Ruza  line. 

Model  Closes  the  Rzhev  Gap 

Two  davs  Ix-'fore  Hitler  gave  his  eon- 
sent,  Kluge  had  established  die  release 
of  enough  strength  to  ddse  the  ^p  in 
the  Ninth  Arnn  front  as  the  fii  si  objec- 
tive of  the  withdrawal  to  die  K-Liiie. 
On  the  i4th,  he  had  eartftecrfeed  Mead- 
qtiarters,  XXXVI  Panzer  Corps  and  SS 
Division  "Das  Reich"  from  Fourth  Pan- 
zer Army  and  a  reinforced  infantry 
regiment  fnjni  TTiiid  Panzer  Armv  for 
transfer  to  Strauss'  Ninth  Army  as  soon 
as  tlie  iiidveiaent  td  &e  ^I^e  begaii. 
Word  of  Hitlers  appi-ovaltfcyS  Sext  day 
spread  "great  relief"  ill  "tfee  Ninth 
Army  staff,  reHef  that  tunied  to  %m- 


"Zbwkov.  Mpffwm,  p.  355;  /VfJKSi.  vol.  II.  p.  3^. 
vol.  II.  p. 


THE  GENERAL  OFFENSIVE 


167 


bitterment"  two  hours  later  when  the 
army  k  at  nccl  Kluge  had  given  XXIII 
Corps  permission  to  fall  b^k  about  ten 
miles  but  ordered  it  not  to  shorten  its 
front  that  then  slixiclied  about  forly 
miles  from  the  west  side  of  the  Rzhev 
gap  into  the  wilderness  east  of 
Toiopcis.  Siiauss.  as  Kluge  no  doubt 
knew,  wanted  to  shorten  the  XXIII 
Corps  front  on  the  west  and  use  the 
troops  in  the  attack  into  the  gap.  Kluge 
apparently  suspected,  probably  not 
mistakenly,  that  Strauss  was  also  At^ 
tempting  to  give  the  corps  a  better 
cliance  to  save  itself  in  case  the  attack 
failed.  That  was  part  of  the  cause  for 
einhiiteniient,  but  only  part.  Khigcs 
order  to  XXIII  Corps  also  constituted 
hineirAgfthkn  ("issuing  orders  ovet  liie 
bead  of  the  respoiiNible  comniancr"). 
something  even  Hitler,  much  as  he 
M:ed  to  interfere  in  the  wdfkmp  at  iffe 
lower  levels,  did  not  pierniit  himself. 
Kluge's  act  could  only  be  tQt^preted  in 
two  ways:  as  grossly  Dad  fbrm — which 
Kluge  was  too  much  a  stickler  for 
punctilio  to  commit — or  as  a  deliberate 
expression  of  n©  confideilce:  When 
Klni^c  refused  to  change  the  order. 
Strauss  asked  to  be  put  on  sick  leave."^ 
The  reply  Artfey  Gtotap  Center 
stated,  "$pice  Gencraloberst  Strauss 
has  ask^  be  relieved  of  his  post, . . . 
General  MoBd  will  assurne  cotofnand 
of  Ninth  .\rm\  without  delay."^  Ge- 
neral der  Panzertruppen  Walter  Model 
had  been  the  ^tnmanding  general, 
XXXXl  Panzer  Corps.  Third  Panzer 
Army,  until  the  afternoon  ot  14  Janu- 
ary ivhen  he  had  been  summoijed  to 


'^AOK  Fufhrungsabli'ilung  Kiteg^iUij^eimth,  1,1.— 
JIJ.42,  13-15 Jan  42.  AOK  9  21520/1  file. 

"Annif  Obtntt  Laudu.  M.  &v,  16.1.42,  AOK  9 
21530/11  file. 


the  army  group  headquarters  "to  re- 
cei\  c  d  new  assignment."®® 

In  appearance  the  picture  of  a  pre- 
World  War  I  Prussian  officer  even  to 
the  monocle  tliai  lie  uoie  on  all  octa- 
sions  and  in  demeanor  outrageously 
self-assured.  Model  also  had  a  solid 
reputation  as  an  energetic  commander 
and  brilliant  tactician.  After  a  fast  trip 
to  the  Fuehrer  Headquarters  to  receive 
his  ciiarge  from  Hitler,  Model  arri\ed 
at  Ninth  Army  headquarters  in 
Vyazma  on  th«  iStfe,  stopped  long 
enough  to  issue  a  characteristic  order 
of  the  day  expressing  his  "unshakable 
confidence  and  determination  to  with- 
stand this  crisis  shoulder  to  shoulfter 
with  my  troops,"  and  headed  north  to 
Rjsftev  to  take  personal  charge  of  the 
attack  prcparalii ms.'"' 

I  he  breach  west  ui  Rzhev  was  two 
weeks  old,  and  three  large  Soviet  for- 
mations. Thirty- ninth  Armw  Tu'cntx-ninth 
Arrny,  and  the  XI  Cavalry  Corps,  had  al- 
ready passed  through  .  TMny^tntk 
Army  was  engaged  at  Syche\'ka,  .Y/  Cm'- 
aby  Corps  was  aiming  tor  Vyazma,  and 
iweniy'minth  Army  was  inside  fhe  gap, 
southwest  of  R/hev."^  Fortunately  for 
the  Germans,  the  Soviet  commands 
were,  as  the  Ninth  Army  staff  ob- 
served, "almost  lamentably  slow"  in  ex- 
ploiting the  breakthrough/"  They 
appeared  to  be  having  supply  troubles 
<gUtla'i(ea\'v  casualties  from  the  cold  and 
to  beshort  on  initialive  and  experience 

all  levels.  Although  the  Russians 
were  within  four  to  six  miles  of  the 


"■■■f;,  AOK  J.  hi  Knri;',l,ifi.lw,l,  \',.  2.  I  !  12,  IV. 
AOK  3  1691  I/I  tile. 

*''AOK  9,  Fufbruiiftuihteiliiiig  Knegstagtbuch,  l.l.- 
31,3.42.  18  Jan  42,  ,A()K  9  215200  file. 

"IVOVSS.  vol.  11,  p.  32-2. 

"'AOK  f.  Fiiehning'iihlnliiiif;  Knegsttigi'bueh,  i,/.- 
3J.3.42.  18Jaii42,AOK9  2132U/lttie. 


16S 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


German  Maoone  Gonniss  Dig  In  West  of  SvcHEvitA 


Vyaznia-Rzhev  railroad  over  the  whole 
stretch  fk>m  Sychevka  to  Rzliev,  Lhey 
did  less  fo  stop  traffic  on  the  line  than 
the  siKuv  and  cold  did.  At  Sychevka,  1st 
I'.in/er  Division,  brought  in  from 
lliircl  Panzer  Armv,  acquired  enough 
clbou  room  in  two  days  to  raise  the  pos- 
sibilitv  ol  a  subsidiary  thrust  northwest 
to  XXIII  Corps.  At  1030  on  the  21st 
die  temperature  uas  -42°  F.  Ihe  VI 
Corps,  wfiic  h  \vas  to  begin  the  attack 
west  from  R/hev  the  next  dav,  asked 
for  a  24-hour  postponement  because 
of  the  weather  and  because  the  unit 
from  which  it  expected  the  most,  the 
SS  Division  "Das  Reich, "  still  had  pai  ts 
scattered  all  the  way  back  into  the 
Fourth  Panzer  Ainiv  area.  The  army 
stall  was  disposed  to  take  the  request 
"under  serious  consideration,"  but 
Model  decided  to  hold  to  the  schedule 


and  later  in  the  day  also  turned  down  a 
})ropoi$al  liQ  reduce  the  objectives.  At 
the  start  the  next  morning  he  was  in 
Rzhcv  until  lull  daylight  and  Ironi  then 
on  bedgeli(»pped  along  the  front  in  a 
light  plane,  landing  at  command  posts 
and  looking  for  "hot  spots  w  liere  he 
made  it  a  pQmt  t®  appear  in  person  to 
lend  encouragement  "in  word  and 
deed."«» 

laking  the  etieniy  by  surprise,  the  at- 
tack got  off  to  a  fast  start  in  clear 
weatlter  witli  well-directed  air  support 
laid  with  some  tanks,  and  m&Pt  Self- 
propelled  assault  guns,  whose  cfews 
managed  to  keep  tlicir  machines  run- 
ning in  s[}ite  ol  the  cold.  The  short 
winter's  day  ended  before  the  XXIII 


*nm.,  21-22  JM  42. 


THE  GENERAL  OFFENSIVE 


169 


Corp$  and  VI  Coi  ps  spearheads  push- 
13^  alonig  the  Volga  River  were  in  sight 

company  of  the  189th  Sdf-propelled 
Assault  Gun  Battalion  shiii'its  way 
across  the  tttwiaining  sevei^  iiai3e»  t» 
make  the  contact  shortly  after  12O0!i 
and  Ninth  Army  had  a  continuoua 
front  ag^.**  ISonev  femirttered,  hem- 
ever,  by  ordering  General  Eremenko  to 
speed  up  Fourth  Shock  Army  's  drive  south 

In  the  K  Line 

The  closing  of  the  Rzhev  gap  was  the 
brigfafiesfieverit  thws  feriti  Atmy  Group 
Center's  disma!  winter,  and  it  would 
bring  Model  a  promotion  to  Gene- 
ml^mt^  mS[  an  oak-leal'eltistef  lb  his 
Knight's  Cross  of  the  Iron  Cross.  But  it 
was  for  the  moment  also  the  only  as- 
iaaeteA  am)ifif>lisfiMent  the  fets^  to 
the  K-Line.  Off  the  Ninth  Army  left 
flank,  where  no  front  existed  at  all  over 
a  hundred-mile  stretch  on  either  side 
of  the  Army  Group  Center-Army 
Group  North  boundary.  Fourth  Shodc 
Army  was  pushing  smi^  iroiif '^^tO]!^ 
toward  Velizli  sixty  miles  north  of 
Smolensk.  Closer  in  on  the  Ninth 
Army  Hank,  Twenty-second  Army  was 
bearing  toward  Belyy  behind  XXIII 
Corps.  Between  Fourth  Panzer  Army 
and  Fcwirffa  Ariny,  SdVtet  units  were 
potning  through  the  gap  and  disap- 
pearing into  the  wide  expanse  of  forest 
soath  and  of  Vyazma.  Four  ®f 
Fourth  Army's  five  corps  were 
squeezed  into  a  twenly-by-lwenty-mile 
pocket  around  Yukhnov.  The^^^akn 
was  closed  more  than  it  was  open,  and 
when  it  was  open,  which  was  usually  no 


more  than  an  hour  or  two  at  a  time,  the 
Russians  could  bring  it  under  machine 
gun  attd  momt  lire.  t/^n^h&m 
lines  were  out  between  &C  Wrf&f  iiead- 
quarters  in  Spas-Deoif^k  0e 
^0Clc^i  ah^  to  keep  tile  GOtamaxd 
fiinctioning,  Heinrici  and  his  opera- 
tions officer  commuted  by  aiiplane  to 
YttldiftOK  Wm  and  south  of  Spas'Be^ 

mensk  the  army's  front  was  paper-thin 
and  shot  through  with  holes,  the 
largest  irf  wMcti  'was  the  twenty-mile- 
wide  Kirov  gap  on  the  boundary  wrtli 
Second  Panzer  Army. 

Hmong  reached  Sukhinichi,  Second 
Panzer  Army  was  embroiled  in  an  ex- 
posed salient  and  in  an  argument  with 
higher  headt]uarters  over  what  to  do 
next.  The  army  wanted  to  evacuate  the 
garrison  and  fall  back,  Hider  de- 
manded that  the  town  be  held.  Haider 
lamented  that  after  "so  great  a  moral 
success,"  giving  up  Sukhinichi,  "al- 
though tacdcally  correct,"  would  be  "a 
great  loss."  Kluge  argued  the  army's 
point  of  view  with  Hider  and  Hitler's 
point  of  view  with  the  army.  Finally, 
after  being  told  that  in  accordance  with 
earlier  orders  Gilsa  had  destroyed  so 
much  of  the  town  that  it  could  not  be 
reoccupied  in  full  strength.  Hitler  con- 
sented to  let  the  garrison  be  evacuated 
but  ordered  the  army  to  keep  within 
artillery  range. 

The  Nintli  Army  stall,  at  Vyazma, 
was  a  helpless  and  unhappy  witness  to  a 
remarkable  piece  of  tactical  in- 
congruity. On  the  map,  Vyazma  was 
forty  miles  behind  the  ftoftt,  yet,  much 
closer  by,  .Scjviet  forces  were  boxing  it 
in  from  three  directions,  Geneial  Be- 

l&^U  ^um^  ^&me^  Qstfs  vm  mttm^ 


AQK^  Ut  JlOmamMi.  27JZA1-3L3.42. 


170 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


north  after  having  brought  all  of  iti 
elements  across  the  Rollbahn.  Parachute 
troops  were  in  the  woods  on  the  south, 
and  Yefremovs  Thirty-ifiird  Army  was 
massing  its  infantry  on  the  east.  Most 
dangerous  of  all  for  the  moment,  was 
XI  Cavalry  Corps Its  scouts  wcie  on 
the  Moscow-Warsaw  highway  tUteen 
miles  west  of  Vyazma  on  the  morning 
of  the  26th.  The  guards  and  drivers  of 
the  truck  convoys  on  the  road  were 
able  to  drive  them  off,  but  during  the 
night  a  strong  detachment  of  the  18th 
Cmaky  Diyisim  settled  in  astride  the 
viss  the  main  supply  and 
ipiimnwiiteations  artery  for  Ninth, 
TTiird  Panzer,  and  Fourtli  Panzer  Ar- 
mies. Hie  railroad  running  parallel  to 
the  road  a  few  miles  to  the  south  was 
still  open,  but  practically  no  traf  fic  was 
moving  on  it  because  of  snow,  cold,  and 
a  lack  of  train  crews,  locoxooci^te9»  ^fl 
cars*" 

The  Rusdaim  Aeenied  W  fee  ev^y- 

where,  and  atl  C0Rl^ei#tlg  <ta  "V^SlSS^ 
They  were  p$i^0ttm  m  fee^ 
briefly  ott^etailnitd  fiv$  m^es  nori^^ 
east  of  tht  t^mit.'l^'h^kwciffe  sighted 
SL  long  cohij^  tBsmos  in  from  the 
^titheast,  anid  Fourth  Army  6bsefved 
dozens  of  transport  planes  crossing  its 
front  and  landing  in  the  area  south  of 
Vyazm?i  boto  at  night  and  <a»r«%  &m 
dayJ* 

Zkukao  in  Ommmd 

H*e  encirclement  of  Army  Group 
Center  was  within  an  a^  of  being  com- 


^'See  /VOm,  vol.  II,  p.  323  and  Belov, 
'1*yatim«sffaehftaya  baiia^p.  5$. 

''*AOK  9,  Futknm^ahlrilung  KrifgsiagtbHeh,  Lli.^ 
3UA2.  26-30  Jan  42.  AOK  9  21520/1  file. 

"^AQK  i,  H  Kntgstagetnuh  Nr.  N.  27  Jan  42.  AOK  4 

mm  me. 


pleted,  and  ^heStavka  liadalmost  read- 
ied its  two  final  moves.  Rmrtfi  Shock 
Army,  on  reaching  Velizh  and  Rudnya, 
would  be  in  position  to  cut  the  Moscow- 
Warsaw  highway  west  of  Smolensk  and 
take  control  of  the  land  bridge  between 
the  Dnepr  and  Dvina  rivers.  Belov, 
Levashev,  and  Colonel  S.  V.  Sokolov. 
the  commander  of  XI  Cavalry  Corps, 
had  orders  to  make  firm  contact  with 
each  other  and  lay  a  soUd  block  across 
the  road  and  railroad  west  of  Vyazma. 
On  1  February,  the  Stavka  reactivated 
the  Headquarters,  Western  Theater,  giv- 
ing Zhukov  control  of  all  operations 
against  Army  Group  Center.'^" 

Victory  may  indeed  have  been  close, 
but  the  two  plays  designed  to  achieve  it 
had  been  easier  to  conceive  than  they 
would  be  to  carry  out.  Of  the  /V  Air- 
borne Corps,  only  one  brigade  (out  of 
tinee),  2,000  men,  ct)uld  be  delivered. 
Zhukov  says  llie  Russians  did  not  have 
Oiough  transport  planes  to  carry  the 
men.'''  Unless  the  Stavka  miscalculated 
in  the  first  place,  the  likely  reason  for  <| 
shortage  of  planes  was  a  suddeti  d&. 
niantl  for  air  supply  elsewhere.  Nitlt]l 
Arow  observed  tb^t  three  days  aHef 
fkm  Kztiev  gap  was  dosed  Tl^OPi^^nm^ 
Afms  was  having  to  be  provisioned  by 

j^wm  SSfec*  Arnry  headed  south  but 
of  Toropets  without  cover  on  its  flanks 
smd  running  on  captured  supplies.^" 
At  Brst,  as  tar  as  the  fighting  \\as  con^ 
terned,  the  going  was  relatively  easy  in 
a  roadless  wilderness  that  the  Germans 


^*5ec  EremcHko.  V  nathalt,  pp.  445-^5.  Belov, 
'PSa^atsyarhnaya  horlm.' p.  60;  IVOVSS.  voL  II,  p.  327. 
^%s3o\;  'Pyatimesyadinaya  borlm.'  p.  60n;  Zhukov, 

S!;  Puihntligtttiitetliing  I\negilagfl>ucft, 
I.I<-JfJ.?.^f,IBr^^A0K  9  21320/1  fiJe. 
^*Seb  f^fcmmtB,  Vmihile,  pp.  449-54. 


THE  GENERAL  OFFENSIVE 


171 


had,  in  fad,  never  thoroughly  oc- 
cupied; but  Army  Group  Center  was 
receiving  reinforcements  that  it  would 
rather  liave  used  farther  east  but  which 
it  could  divert  to  occupy  Velizh,  Demi- 
dov,  Dufehovslicfaina,  and  Belyy.  For 
iht.'  t  fforl  at  Veli/h,  I  lie  army  group 
depiuyed  a  security  division  and  two 
inrantry  divisions.  Gtoe  <^ latter  was 
the  330th  Infkotty  Sl&vi^on,  a  Wal- 
KUERE  division  Haiidl;^  pvi  t^ether 
frcwn  owi^Jg^  officei^  and  afid 
recent  recruits  i]i  the  Replaceinenl 
Army,  but  the  three  divisions  were 
enough  to  foree  Eremenko  to  carry  out 
several  exhausting  siet^t-s  in  the-  dead  of 
willler  in  whicb  the  besieged,  having 
sheiten  had  the  Lii^pcr  Kaiid  in  the 
constant,  deadly  contesi  with  the  ele- 
ments. On  1  February,  Headquarters, 
Third  Panzer  Army,  was  shifted  west^ — ■ 
h\  .tir  Iiecause  all  roatis  wfie  blocked  — 
lo  Lake  command  ol  ilie  sector  from 
Velikiye  Luki  to  Belyy  and  to  engage 
Fimrth  Shock  Army  in  a  duel  that  Wf^V^^ 
last  tlie  rest  of  the  winter.^" 

If  the  Russians  were  going  todesftroy 
.'Viiin  Gioiip  Center,  Zhukoy's  main 
forces  would  have  to  do  it.  But  they 
were  weakened  by,  as  he  points  out,  the 
\o8&of  F'nsi  Shiff  l;  Army  and  more  bv  tlie 
dodng  oi  tlie  Rzliev  gap  behind  Jwenty- 
«inl^  and  ^f^M^itdt  Afwdes.  Then  on 
30  January  Ninlh  Army's  XXXXVI 
Panzer  Corps,  bucking  snowstorms 
ami  di^fk  but  ^Kdng  an  enemy  whose 
confidence  was  shaken,  ^fQke  away 
quickly  from  Syclievka.  In  six  days  it 
covered  thirty  miles,  making  cotitact 
with  XXII!  (  "i  jis  on  5  February  and 
sealing  'Iwenly-innlh  Army  in  a  tight 
fKdek^  soixlAic^  Rzhev. 


On  the  soutli  Zluiko\'s  p(»ition  was 
Stronger.  From  26  to  30  January 
fburm  Army's  RolB^tn  was  closed 

compIetel\.  and  ilie  arin\,  v^hidl  had 
tor  a  long  time  not  been  getting 
enough  suppHes,  began  rapidly  to  sink 
into  starvation.  On  the  other  Iiand.  ihe 
Russians  were  not  altogether  better 
off;  their  radio  tf$iSat  indicated  that 
sfime  of  the  iniits  behiaid  Fourth  At  tny 
were  actuaUv  starving*  At  the  end  of 
the"  month,  Heinrici^  FoiBrdi  Ariny  and 
Ruoffs  Fourth  Panzei"  Army  mounted 
a  desperate  push  north  and  south 
along  the  Yukhnov-Gzhatsk  road,  lb 
get  the  troops,  lleinrici  had,  after 
much  arguing  with  Kluge  and  HiUer, 
taken  his  ftont  Back  to  where  it  barely 
still  covered  Yukhnov.  On  the  morning 
of  3  February,  XU  Corps  going  nordi 
and  ^0th  Panzer  r^isaon  connng  south 
"bridged  tlie  gai).""'  A  bridge  was  ail  it 
was.  Thirty-third  Army  stood  on  the  west 
and  Ibrty-thirdArmy  on  the  east;  the  two 
in  places  were  no  more  Ihan  thtee  or 
four  miles  apart. 

In  &e  meantime,  other  bridges  had 
been  opened,  and  con\  oys  were  mov- 
ing again  on  ^eRellbaim — and  on  iJie 
highway  west  of  Vyaznia.  For  the  mo- 
iiieiu  the  most  dangerous  gaps  were 
closed,  and  Army  Group  Center's  vital 
arteries  were  ftmctioning.  I%r  Ihmtf- 
ninth.  Thirt\-!rhith,  and  Thiily-thirtI  Ar- 
inicA  and  the  two  cavalry  corps  it  was 
beginning  to  look  Kfce  the  entrapment 
was  becoming  a  trap. 

On  12  February,  Kkige  submitted  his 
first  iKttjatidn  estimate  in  two  mofctChsih 
which  he  had  no  imminent  disasters  to 
report.  Dangers  existed  aplenty,  but 
the  armies       ba£k  on  their  fe<^  and 


^A0kS,  fe.  CdvAtAencht  vm  1 2,^54.42.  Pi,  ''AGK  4,  Krimt<^ek  m  U.  28  >«-3  Feb  48, 
AO&.-tSl«l£»9  file.  A0K4 17S«yi  Oe. 


172 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


the  Soviet  effort  was  becoming  dis- 
persed. It  was  not  the  end,  but  Kluge 
«cpected  the  next  round  to  be  fought 
on  better  terms.^'  A  week  later,  talcuig 


"H.  Gr.  Mille.  la  Nr.  1160142,  Beurteilung  der 
FeindlagevorU.Gr.jaU^&Jl.'fZ.  Pz.  AOK4  22457/36 
File. 


the  larger  view,  Hider  told  the  army 
group  commanders  that  his  first  objec- 
tive for  the  winter  was  accomplished: 
the  "danger  of  a  panic  in  the  1812 
sense"  was  "elurunated."*^ 

"■■'/y.  I.,.  1,1  Kriegsiagfbuch,  13.2.-123.42.  1& 

Feb  42.  H.  Gi.  N.nd  75128/Y  file. 


CHAPTER  IX 

The  Qinch 


Every  day,  cartogrjl|ihers  in  the  Op- 
erations Branch  of  the  OKH  drew  and 
printed  on  a  scale  of  1:1,000,000  the 
Lagc  Ost,  a  map  depicting  ihe  Eastern 
Front  as  it  appeared  from  the  latest 
situation  reports.  Classified  Geheime 
Komm(ntil<Miilir.  Cliff  Saifw  ("top  secret 
controlled"),  copies  of  the  seven-by- 
Ifiw^Sdiot  mas^  mmm^,  in  blue,  the 
front  and  all  German  units  down  to  the 
diviiUOfial  level  and,  in  red,  the  known 
Soviet  tinits,  went  to  Hicler  an<i  tlte 
serwce  high  commands.  They  were 
psed  the  situation  conferences  at  the 
Biekivr  Headqtiarters,  siSKSittimes  with 
baneful  results  because  Iteere  \vas  no 
way  of  making  a  line  m  Si  ISa^p  convey 
the  actual  strength  of  the  pti^Mons  it 
repri'sented. 

Of  those  Lage  Ost  maps  tliat  survived 
die  twar,  the  most  remairtcabte  are  those 

for  the  ntoiilli  of  Feliruarv  1942.  Tiiev 
look  like  Uic  work  of  an  operations 
corporal  gone  tnSd.  ■Prom  me  Bladi 
Sea  coast  norili  to  tlic  boundary  be- 
tween Army  Groups  South  and  Center, 
evert  with  thre  deep,  s(|uare-cottiered 
chunk  (arved  oui  west  of  Izvum.  the 
from  appears  conveniioiial  enough.  At 
Belev,  W  mileS  north  *tf  the  South- 
Center  boundarv,  Iiowcver,  it  veers 
west,  then  soutli,  then  north  nearly  to 
Sukhinichi  and  then  west  again  to  a 

h;nr|>in  loop  south  fif  Kirov  80  miles 
west  of  Belev.  (Mujj  J  3.)  To  the  north  of 


Kirov  it  becomes  a  train  of  intermittent 
squiggles  bending  50  miles  noi  th  and 
east  along  the  Fourth  Army's  Rollbahn 
to  Yukhnov.  Between  Yukhnov  and 
Rzht  v,  Nitiili,  Fourtli  Panzer,  and 
Fourtli  Armies  stand  back  to  back  and 
in  places  face  to  face  in  a  welter  of 
IVouts  ^oing  in  all  directions  that  loitk 
frQm  a  litde  distance  like  a  specimen  in 
i  tbrsch^ti  test.  Beyond  Hjatli  Army^ 
north  fkink,  whidi  is  also  Its^  ci^nfcer 
because  the  army  has  anq^^r  fixnit 
facing  west,  a  void  Bisected  by  the 
Army  Cioup  CciUei-Army  Group 
North  boundary  extends  north  to  the 
edge  of  the  Demyansk  pock^  and  west 
130  miles.  Wliat  passes  for  a  Third 
Panzer  Army  front  are  blue  circles  and 
feooics  aroarrd  %IIHye  I^nki,  "^Mih^ 
aofl  Demido\,  North  of  the  army 
group  lx)undary,  Sixteendi  Army  is 
represented  by  a  scattered  tracery  of 
iur\es  and  dashes  around  Kbolm.  tlie 
same  marks  covering  a  broader  area 
tmm^  Demyamtc,  and  a  ^hort  tail 
halting  ofl  ilu  southern  tip  of  l^ke 
Hmen.  1  he  Ligliteenth  Army  front  on 
the  Volkhov  wver  lias  only  o«e  gap, 

about  5  miles  ai  ross,  but  behind  it  red 
numerals  denoting  Soviet  units  range 
40  miles  to  the  tttjith  and  west.  Behind 
all  of  the  armies  (he  word  Parlisanm 
("partisans")  appears  printed  in  red, 
apd  red  question  tnark^  indicate  the 
probable  iitesence  f)f  some  kind  of 
enemy  fortes,  fhe  maps  more  than 


MAP  13 


THE  CLINCH 


175 


Germans  Puc-JU<:  Fo^  S^Homsp^^SmtMr  Tanks  m  the  Distance 


bear  out  the  words  of  the  officer  who 
noted  in  Ninth  Armyls  war  diary,  "i^im 
is  the  strangest  front  the  army  ever 
had."' 

The  front  was  also  extraordinary  in 

another  way.  Convciluud  as  it  was,  the 
Soviet  forces  were  in  a  sense  as  dan- 
gerously snared  in  ivs  coiTs  as  the  Ger' 
mans  wwc.  At  I  he  (ritieal  ])oints  they 
were  still  operating  through  gaps  that 
were  potentially  subject  to  enemy  con- 
trol. A  German  a(l\  aiu  e  of  Rve  miles  or 
less  would  dose  the  front  on  the  Vol- 
khov behind  Second  Shtx^  Afwy.  Ro#ter 
south  lo  achievf  similar  effects  the 
patches  would  have  to  be  bigger; 
nineQr  siii^  of  turn  ftmit  h^em  Sta- 


ra^a  Russa  and  Rzhev  and  sixty-five 
miles  between  Yukhnov  and  Bebv.  But 
fhese  wci  c  distances  the  ^tmaOS  had 
at  other  times  often  negotiated  emUf, 
and  sticcess^  in  alt  three  places  could 
potentially  diecide  the  war  since  a 
clo/en  or  mqf^  Soviet  armies  might  be 
trapjjed,  and  the  Germans  cotiM  then 
restore  a  solid  Iront  ninety  miles  west 
of  Moscow.  In  the  worst  of  the  winter, 
liider  had  ati  eye  on  those  possibilities. 
When  he  authorized  the  retreat  to  the 
KOENIGSBERG  Line  on  15  January, 
he  ordered  Second  Panzer  Array  to 
narrow  and  eventually  "lie  off  "  dieSu* 
khinichi  bulge  east  of  the  Yukhne^- 
iUtHiMtlii  imd,*  Two  da)%  after  Hinth 


313.42.  27 Jan  42.  AOK  9  2152a'l  file.  Pk,  AOK  2  SBO^file. 


176 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


Army  closed  its  from  west  of  Rzhev,  he 
was  asking  Ninth  and  Sixteenth  Armies 
for  estimates  as  to  how  soon  they  could 
repair  the  breach  between  rheHi  by 
making  thrusts  to  Ostashkov.^ 

As  Hitlier  was  beginning  to  see  the 
germ  of  a  victory,  llic  Soviet  commands 
were  becoming  desperate  for  the  vic- 
tory that  was  abaost  in  their  hands. 

Th€^Hismp^^iQin0Palru>tif  Uv/r  says 
a  '^ampmsiSiSd  ^tiiadl^n  had  formed," 
and  tim  catised  "^erfous  alarm"  in  the 

Stai'kfi.^  The  Hislot-y  i>f  Ihe  Scumd  Whtlfl 
War  says,  "The  situation  of  tlie  Soviet 
troops  in  the  western  direction  became 
(lecidedly  worse.  WVakenerl  \y\  ex- 
tended battles,  they  lost  their  offensive 
capabilities."^  As  had  happened  to  the 
( H  I  mans  in  December,  suddenly  the 
RLLssians  had  no  goQ4  ^^^9^  what 
to  do  next  %  g&  'Smeaiff^ouId  proba- 
be  futile,  anfl  i(»  slop  inigln  well  he 
disastrous.  Army  Group  Centers  re- 
treat had  ifiideel^  "Bamty^mih  and 
Thirty-ihiM  Amies  were  cut  off.  Thhiy- 
ninth  Avt^^  W&  cavalry  corps,  and  sun- 
dry mAi^tne  nmts  were  In  tr^blb. 

On  iIr-  othci"  hanrl,  ilic  German.s  still 
appeared  to  be  in  relatively  much 
poorer  shape,  and  the  Sfisv^'s  appetite 
for  victorN  was  sirong.  On  16  February, 
it  directed  General  Zhukov  "to  mobilize 
all  the  strength  of  Ka^in  and 
Fmuts  for  the  hnal  flt'simution  of  Annv 
Group  Center.  "  He  was  to  smash  the 
enemy  in  tihe  Rzhev^V^pasma-Yufchnov 
area  and  drive  west  another  sixt\  miles 
by  b  March  to  tlxe  line  of  Olenino,  die 
Dnepr  River,  atid  Ydnya.  The  armfea 
of  his  left  flank  were  to  "liquidate"  the 


WOK  '■>.  Fiii'hrungsaMlung  Kritp^a^iiuA,  i./.- 
Jl.J.12.  7  Feb  42.  AOK  9  2i52<yi  Bte. 

wen  ss  vol.  II.  p,  Ti«. 
•IVMV.  u,L  IV.  p.  nil. 


enemy  in  the  Bolkhov-Zhizdr*- 
Bryansk  area  and  take  Bryansk.* 

Zhukov^  implementing  order  was 
less  categorical  as  to  objectives  and  time 
but,  in  essence*  only  slighdy  less  am- 
bitious. He  ordered  Kalinin  Prmt  to 
siiia.sh  the  Ninlli  Army  flank  wesi  of 
Rzhev;  Forty-third,  Forth-ninth,  and 
Fiftieth  Armies  to  break  through  at 
Yukhnov;  and  Sixlcrv/h  and  Six/y-firsi 
Arinii's  to  advance  toward  Bryansk.  Fol- 
low ing  these  assaults,  Kalinin  Fhmt  and 
Wi'sl  Fmiil  would  iJtotfcd  to  snriouiul 
and  destroy  Ninth,  Fourdi  Panzer,  and 
Fourth  Armies  in  the  Rzhev-Vyazma 
area." 

Any  fresh  eiiort  was  going  to  de- 
mand new  muscle,  and  both  sides  were 
at  the  poiiii  wliere  every  move  was 
alrea^j^^  .eijLerdoiL  The  Stavha  again 
reameet'tiito  Its  ■reserves.  K^hK^ri  Fmni 
got  a  guards  rifle  corps,  7  rifle  divi- 
sions, and  some  air  units.  Weil  Fmut  was 
gfveft  66,000  replacements,  a  guards 
rifle  corjjs,  5  tide  divisions,  2  aiiixunc 
brigades,  and  200  tatiks.*  Ihe  rein- 
forcements probably  did  not  add 
strength  commensurate  with  thtii 
numbers.  The  quality  of  the  Soviet 
tiestttm^,  which  had  not  been  high  in 
December,  had  declined  progressi\ 1 1\ 
during  the  winter.  They  would  alst>  be 
feeing  an  enemy  whose  moralte  was 
picking  n|)  simply  because  he  had  sur- 
vived thus  far. 

Mitlter  had  been  engaged  sinee  early 
J.'inuarv  with  vat  ioiis  programs  for  re- 
inforcing tlie  Eastern  From,  Me  had 
tilireiiei  OKH  lo  supply  ri()0;000' 
i  i'[)lacem!entS»  but  these  were  lo  he  de- 
terred mmi:  Wh©  would  have  lo  be 
TmaSkd  t&  ^c^Svt  dnty  and  given  some 


Vbid. 

worn,  vol.  n,  p.  328. 
'ibid. 


THE  CLINCH 


177 


trainuKgi^  In  February,  Army  Group 

Center  received  nearlv  70.(100  i  t  place- 
ments,  three  and  <inc-hall  limes  as 
many  as  in  the  previous  month,  bin  die 
number  was  slill  40.0(H)  siiort  of  lhf>sc 
needed  lo  ant  r  tlic  nionlh's  losses,  and 
die  army  grouf)  was  lelt  with  a  total 
deiitii  of  227.0(K)  men  Ini  die  period 
.since  December.  The  ai  uiies  had  re- 
ceived new  men  and  returnees  innfi 
hospitals  as  replacements  for  about  One 
in  four  of  their  casuaities." 

Burifig  ^^xxary  and  February  the 
army  group  also  was  given  nine  infan- 
try divisions.  Three  were  Walkuere 
divisions.  The  others  came  fi-<mi  oc- 
cupauon  duty  in  Fiance  atul  the  Low 
Countries,  and  all  were  untrained  for 
winter  warfare.  Most  had  to  be  com- 
mitted piecemeal  by  battalions  and  reg- 
iments as  they  arrived,  and  tlieir  artil- 
lery and  other  noninlaniry  Compo- 
nents were  left  to  make  rhcir  u-ay 
forward  "on  foot,"  whith  meant  by 
whatever  means  they  could  devise 
other  than  on  the  already  swamped 
and  all  but  paialyzed  railroads.  The 
Elefant  and  Christophorus  pro- 
grams that  were  sui>posed  to  have 
brought  in  lh(»iisands  ol  ii  ncks  and 
odici  vehicles  fiom  all  over  Europe 
had  been  completed,  but  only  about  25 
out  of  every  100  vehicles  reached  the 
from."  The  other  three-quarters  had 
broken  down  and  were  awaiting  re- 
[jairs  or  had  become  snowed  or  frozen 
ill  on  the  roads  back  to  Poland. 

With  the  winters  end  approaching. 


J1J.-I2.  2\  [.<ii  I-'.  \<)K  5l21:V-'()/l  hii-. 

"'(  1  iiinlt-ii  in  lilt-  llls^t.■^  weii'  rl ic  I SfisifijiQ-  cisr',  .itiii 
ilii  ilr.nl.  uciuiiik-il.  iiiissiiiy.  .inil  mi  k.  .\(lk  •!  In 
k,i,j-i,:srhiii/i.\r.  ll.2'  I  t'b41'.  \()K  !  18710  hk-. 

"  \(iK  ').  Fiifhruugsalilt'iliiiijj  hiif^r^ing^mek,  l.L- 
31.3 A2,  21  Jan  42,  AOK.  9  21320/1  hit. 


plans,  no  matter  w  hose,  were  subject 
to  a  ]viinie\al  force  ol  nature,  the 
raspulilMi.  1  he  Germans  had  had  a  taste 
of  it  in  October  1941 — hat  only  a  taste, 
as  thev  learned  from  talking  to  the 
inhabitanls.  During  the  fall,  heavy  pro- 
longed rain  made  the  mud.  How  much 
depended  on  the  amount  of  rainfall 
and  oil  when  the  fieeze  came.  Ihe 
Spsing  rasputitsa  was  something  else:  it 
was  as  inevirable  as  the  change  of  sea- 
sons and  varied  litde  from  year  to  year. 
During  the  winter  the  ground  frozeto 
depths  of  eight  or  nine  feet  locking  in 
much  of  the  previous  fall  s  rain.  Several 
feet  of  snow  and  ice  acciunulated  on 
ilie  surface.  The  spring  thaw  worked 
from  the  top  do^vnward,  first  turning 
the  snow  and  it  c  lo  water  over  t!ie  s^ 
frozen  ground,  tlien  creating  a  pro- 
gressively deepening  layer  of  watery 
mud  above  the  fro/en  subsoil.  In  the 
generally  flat  and  ai  best  poorly 
drained  lerrain,  the  water  had  no  piace 
to  go  unii!  the  thaw  broke  completely 
through  the  frost.  The  process  usually 
took  five  or  six  weeks  and  included 
>tll£%e  weeks  or  more  in  \\  hicli  die  mud 
was  too  deep  for  any  kind  of  velii*  ular 
traffic  other  than  peasant  cans.  I  he 
Panje  wagons  high  wheels  and  light 
weight  enabled  it  to  plow  through  mud 
several  feet  deep  while  riding  on  the 
frozen  stratum  beneath,  and  its 
wooden  construction  allowed  it  to  be 
used  almost  as  a  boat.  Exceptionally 
heavy  snow  and  low  \sinter  temper- 
atures assured  a  full-blown  rmputiUa 
for  1942  bin  also  made  its  onset  diffi- 
cult lo  predict.  In  normal  years  the 
thaw  could  be  depended  upon  to  begin 
in  about  the  third  week  of  March  at  me 
latitiKle  of  Moscow,  a  week  or  two 
earher  in  the  Ukraine,  and  at  least  a 
week  later  in  the  north. 


178 


MOSCOW  TO  S'mLINGRAD 


Army  Gmip  CerOer 
Second  PamerArwf's  "Small  SohUum" 

As  Hider  had  anticipated  in  the  15 
Jaiuiarv  dii  ccli\t ,  ilu-  Sukliinichi  bulge 
afforded  tlie  first  practicable  oppor- 
tiitiity  for  a  couftterstwke.  Tn  spite  of 
the  Kirov  gap  and  Fourth  Armvs  trou- 
bles along  the  Rollbahn  and  ai  Yuklinov, 
it  had  a  cftmparaiavely  stable  configura- 
tion and  ai  least  theoretically  manage- 
able distances.  Second  Panzer  Army's 
unexpectefif  success  at  the  start  df  the 
Sukhiiiichi  relief  operation  fueled 
Hitlei  s  iniaginadon^  and  on  21  January 
he  tried  to  get  p^n^^  $<:Kmidt,  the 
army's  c  oinraaaflde^  130  collV^  the  re- 
lief into  a  drive  past  Sukhioichi  to  the 
northeast  and  to  have  General 
Heillrici,  Fourth  Army  commander, 
stage  a  quick  thrust  south  out  of 
Yukhnov.  The  meeting  of  i^^^h' 
foi  ces  would  iiave  dosed  the  northern 
two-diirds  of  the  butee,  eliminated  the 
pioblerete  of  the  Kiffov  gap  an^  the 
Rullhahn,  and  trapped  three  Soviet  ar- 
mies. But  XXIV  Panzer  Corps  did  not 
have  the  strength  to  go  past  Sttkhi- 
iiichi,  and  Heinriei  r!e( iared  that  Fourth 
Army  could  not  begin  an  attack  south 
i>efafe  the  ^ec^nd  week  in  Rabruarw  it 
then. 

After  XXIV  Paiucr  Corps  reached 
Sukhintchi;  three  potenial  *solutioQ^ 
[presented  themselves.  Hitler  con- 
tinued 10  want  a  "big"  one,  a  push  t© 
Yukhnov,  and,  therefore,  insisted  on 

keeping  a  foothold  elose  to  Sukhinichi. 
Field  Marshal  KJuge,  comroander  of 
Army  Group  Center,  att^  SehmMt 
tried  to  substitute  as  an  intermediate 
solution  an  attempt  to  extend  the  lelt 
sideoifXXIV  Panzer  Corps'  line  north 
to  the  Spas-Dcmensk-Sukhinichi  road, 
whicli  would  reduce  the  bulge  by  about 


half  and  close  dFF  the  SLmsv  gap.  The 

third  sdlntion  was  to  close  the  Kirov 
gap.  It  was  talked  about  as  "small" 
because  either  of  tfie  other  two  would 
acconiijlish  as  miuli  automatically,  but 
it  was  the  most  feasible  in  terms  of 
means  availafde  to  achieve  a  solution^ 
In  the  hist  two  weeks  of  February, 
XXIV  Panzer  Corps  received  a  succes- 
sion of  otders  to  prepare  liar  or  to 
caiK  cl  one  or  the  other  of  the  three 
movements,  and  at  last  the  corps'  chief 
of  staff  was  moved  to  coannent  on  the 
absnrditv  of  the  situation  bv  acknowl- 
edging one  transmission  with  the 
words.  "Difficile  est,  satiram  hob 
("The  dil  ltc  ulty  is  not  to  write  satire.")'" 
Because  partisans  who  were  being 
supplied  through  the  gap  were  endan- 
gering Fourth  Army's  Rollhaliri.  Second 
Panzer  Army,  at  Kluge's  insistence,  be- 
^  an  attack  to^rd  Kirov  ofl  16  Feb- 
ruarv.  The  succeeding  days  exposed 
the  Gcrman.s'  quandary.  The  drive  to- 
ward Yukhnov  and  the  "intermediate 
solution,"  attractive  as  they  might  be, 
could  not  be  attempted  wiUiout  rein- 
forcements- lllM  wHs  mmhem  ift  anght. 
The  army  was  flown  to  for^ilvie  tanks 
that  were  operational,  about  a  quarter 
<jf  one  panzer  divisions  normal  com- 
plement. At  I  he  same  time,  XXIV  Pan- 
zer Corps,  because  it  was  having  to 
hold  tile  exposed  .salient  teaching  to- 
Wai  d  Siikliinii  hi,  could  not  bring 
enough  St  l  ength  to  bear  toward  Kirov, 
atid  the  attack  there  wavered  and 
limped,  aud  al  die  end  of  the  month, 
w  hile  still  nominally  in  progr  ess,  was  all 
but  forgotten.  As  l&ng  as  the  three 
solutions  were  kept  on  the  dotket, 
none  of  them  would  be  executed.  On 


"■/':,  AOK  2.  Ill  knr^'<tiii;>-hw  li.  27.12  JI-31J.42,  21 
Jan- If)  Feb  42,  Vz.  AOK  2  25034/162  tile. 


THE  CLINCH 


179 


the  other  hand,  however.  Second  Pan- 
zer Army's  situation  may  have  been 
better  thian  it  knew  since  the  Soviet 
advance  toward  Bryansk  also  did  not 
materialize.  The  Russians'  activity 
stepped  up  after  the  adtddte  ti  the 
nioiuh,  but  as  long  as  the  Germans 
were  standit^  dDse  to  Siikfiinichi  and 
pushing  to^rd  ^jasm  ^^^met  com- 
mands were  not  dispoSed  to  aticnt])l 
any  sweeping  tamewmi^  of  their  own. 
At  the  ttim    the  month  the  raspu- 

tUsa  was  possiblv  nf)  more  tlian  a  few 
weeks  away,  and  time  was  running 
short.  In  a  conference  at  the  T^^WW" 
Headquarlrrs  on  1  March,  Stlimidt 
persuaded  Hitler  that  an  attadt  from 
Suldiinidii  tovrard  ^^dmav  tsfsfM  tm. 
start  until  af'icT  tht  n^xttitsa.  Hitler 
also  agreed  to  let  Schmidt  prepare  to 
move  back  d»e  frtjut  projecting  toward 
Bclcv  since  the  possibilily  of  a  thiiisi 
from  there  to^Jcd  Yukhnov  had  be- 

&mm  e^w  mor*  remote;^ 

On  the  9th.  Kliige,  who  liad  avoided 
personal  contact  with  Second  Panzer 
Army  ssuse  the  Guderi^  i^afr  in  D#- 
ccinber,  met  with  Schmidt  and  his 
corps  coBMnanders  at  the  army  head- 
quarteiis  in  <5rcl.**  In  ati  hoars4ong 
discussion  (he  srenerals  concluded  thai 
the  "small  solution"  at  Kirov  was  the 
only  one  that  ^uld  succeed  and  tiiere- 
[ore  the  Siikhinichi  and  Belev  salients 
were  worUiless.  Kiuge  said  he  would 
take  the  matter  up  with  Hider.  Three 
days  later  he  told  Schmidt  that  Hitler 
"diti  not  attacli  as  inticb  value  as  be- 
fore" to  the  Sukhintclu  salient  and 


'W.  1  lifer  42* 

^'Kti^sa^  doiing  dtetd^uii^  he  "regreued 
the  loss  qT m  outstanding  ati  araiy.oatitfi^uideii''  and 
he  itn^ed  diat  the  reasnai  fer  'Gttdei4ati%  A^KnAtp^X 
WOT  tOQ  sensitive  a  matter  to  be  discussed  0Kf.,  9 


would  not  object  to  the  afm\'s  [Hilling 
back  from  Sukhhiichi  and  Belev  as 
soofi  as  adequate  lines  were  built  to  the 

rear.''' 

In  the  meantime  the  a.ttempt  to  dose 
the  Kirov  gap  had  cointiititted  spo-- 
radically.  On  20  March,  Khige  told 
Schmidt  that  Kirov  would  "have  to  be 
deaned  up  defirritii»ely"  before  the 
raspntitui,  whitli  meant  \siihin  the  next 
two  or  tliree  weeks  at  most;  but  on  that 
same  day  he  told  Heinrid  not  to 
mit  any  Fourth  Army  forces  to  l^e 
Kirov  operation  until  alter  the  Roiltn^^n 
and  the  army's  rear  area  were  secure.** 
In  another  week  the  daytime  tem- 
peratures were  above  freezing;  tlie 
sadw  -and  ice  were  meitiiig;  tfie  two 
salients  were  being  evacuated:  and  the 
Kirov  operadon  was  still  m  progress 
mainly  because  no  ooe  ha€  haa  asf^od' 
a  reason  to  stop  it  ^  the  weather  would 
soon  provide. 

Fmr^  and  fourth  Panzer  Arvms 

Fourth  Army^  and  Fourth  Panzer 
Anmyii  prosj>ects  for  the  future  looked 
somewhat  brighter  arfiter  they  bridged 

the  gap  between  them  on  3  Fehniarv 
even  though  the  bridge  was  l^arrow, 
and  the  enemy  was  behmd  as  well  as  in 
front  of  them.  Thev  now  had  a  contin- 
uous front  ior  the  first  time  in  weeks, 
which  was  a  relief  for  tliera  aitd  appar- 
endv  a  tlis( oncerting  surprise  in  ilie 
Russians.  Soviet  ladio  traffic  disclosed 
that  TMrfy-Mtd  Army  and  the  airborne 
units  and  cavahv  behind  the  two  ar- 
mies had  believed  iheii  mission  was  to 
block  a  demorsiK^ed  Germsto'  t^cat. 
They  had  not  expected  to  have  to  deal 


20Mar  45,  AO«4 17886/1  fife 


180 


MOSCOW  ro  STALINGRAD 


with  determined  opposition,  and  they 
sh<)vved  it.  Thirty-third  Army  stopped 
and  seemed  at  a  loss  about  what  to  do 
next.  The  airborne  troops,  yoiitldiil 
but  undertrained,  stayed  scattered  and 
became  preoccupied  with  their  supply 
shortages.  Some  who  were  caplined 
said  that  they  were  of  ten  not  aware  ot 
their  actual  situation.'^  Encouraged, 
Fourth  Panzer  Army  first  shifted  the 
5ih  Panzer  Division  in  position  to  set 
up  a  perimeter  defense  around 
Vyazma  and  then  brought  ill  the 
Headquarters,  V  Panzer  Corps. 

At  midmonth,  having  lemporarily 
acquired  elements  of"  another  panzer 
division  atui  two  inlaiiln  divisions,  V 
Panzer  Corps  was  getting  ready  to  en- 
circle and  drive  inward  on  Thirl\'third 
Army  which  was  standing  sdll  southeast 
of  Vyazma;  but  by  then  the  Stmika  had 
issiicd  its  order  lo  ix'nc\\  llic  olli  nsivi.-. 
forty-third  Army  thereafter  tried  des- 
perately day  after  day  to  break  down 
the  Ccnnan  bridge  lK-ti\een  il  aiul 
Thirty-third  Army,  forty-ninth  and  fifiteUi 
Armies  batteried  ^buftli  Amy  auroand 
Yuklini  A  and  a)ot]^#eJRdllei^' and 
waves  oi  ti:aiiS|>ot^,  flying  day  and 
Mght — In  -weather  the  'Lnftwaffc  con- 
sidered loo  (langt'!"(>uv  lot  l!\ijig — and 
frequendy  landing  within  sight  of  the 
GermaufS.  delrvered  more  airborne 

troops  behind  die  front.  Estimating 
twenty  men  to  a  plane  and  counting 
the  planes.  Fourth  Pa-nzer  Army  fig- 
ured at  least  3.000  tinops  were  landed 
south  of  Vyazma  in  l,wu  days,  19  and  2U 
Febrtiary.*"  Fbrtunately  fbr  the  two 
German  armies  the  Soviet  units  inside 
tlie  iroiU  were  not  as  aggressive  as 


those  outside.  The  V  Panzer  Corps  was 
reduced  again  to  defendijig  V  yazma, 
but  it  could  do  lliat  since  the  new  Soviet 
arrivals  appeared  to  have  much  the 
same  uncertainty  about  their  mission  as 
the  forces  already  there  had. 

The  decision  hinged  on  the  outer 
front  where  a  Soviet  breakthrough 
anywhere  could  be  deadly.  Fourth 
Arniy  was  the  more  vulnerable:  both  its 
flanks  were  weak,  and  its  center  was 
jammed  into  a  roimd-nosed  bulge 
ground  Yukhnov.  Beset  everywhere 
and  enmeshed  in  a  constant  battle  for 
the  RoUhahn,  Heinrici  on  18  February 
proposed  giving  up  Yukhnov  in  favor 
of  a  shorter  Une  beliind  the  Ugra  River 
ten  miles  to  the  west.  Any  attempt  to 
close  the  Sukhinichi  hiil^  hi-,  i  hief  of 
staff  added,  was  going  icj  be  made 
farther  west  anyway,  and  the  Yukhnov- 
G/hatsk  road,  uiiii  li  had  been  ihe  orig- 
inal reason  for  holding  Vuklinov,  was 
"a  fiction."*"  However,  nobody  was  ea- 
ger to  pass  the  idea  onto  a  higher  level. 
JtljJge^  operations  officer  said  permis- 
aon  was  gom^  to  hie  dJffktilt  to  get 
because  tlie  YiikIino\ -Czliai sk  road 
was  shown  as  a  major  tlioroughfare  on 
the  maps  and  vmiM,  therefore,  appear 

valnal)le  to  Hiji^. 

Some  days  iateti  the  OKH  gingerly 
agi  eed  to  let  Ferarth  Araiv  start  Ifuild- 
ing  a  line  on  the  Ugra,afUlafter  several 
more  days,  Kiuge  tmdp  aft  appoint- 
ment Hemrid  to  see  Hitfer  At  ^e 
futhfef  Headquarters  on  1  Maicli.  no 
dovtbt  to  Heiuricis  considerable  as- 
tonishment. Hitler  g^e  his  approval  at 
onte,  explaiiiint;  that  betbie  he  had 
been  "deliberately  obstinate"  but  now 
whether  the  ^tw^  went;  fiy^  mil^  fbr- 


"Pz.  AOK  4,  ta  Km&la&ibMi>  Nr.  8,  S  Fth  42,  Ft.   

AOK  4  24932/17  tile.  **AOK  4,  la  KriegsU^i^ueh  NY.  11  >  IS  Feb  42,  AOK  4 

>*/W-.  20  M  42.  18711)  ftlc. 


J  HE  CJLINCH 


181 


ward  or  backward  was  no  longer  im- 
portant lo  liini,'^"  The  decision  liaviiig 
been  made.  Klwge  adiied  a  itsnriws. 
ment  of  his  own:  to  "rescue"  a  par- 
ticularly old  and  vaUialjle  icon  of  the 
"Virglji  Mary  from  riie  Sloboda  monas- 
tery near  Yukhnov.-'  The  latter  done. 
Fourth  Army  evacuated  Yukhnov  on  3 
March  and  went  behind  the  Ugra  on 
the  6th,  wliich  did  not  solve  its  prob- 
lems but  raised  its  prospects  of  at  least 
sumvhig^  after  the  onset  of  the  rmpu-' 
Htsa. 

WluJe  Fourth  Army  withdrew  to  the 
Ufra — widehabo  shcatened  its  bri^gB 
Wfith  Fourth  l^aii^r  Army — 5th  Patter 


"m.  2  Mar  42. 


l^ivisiou  was  mopping  up  part  of  1 
Guards  Cavahy  Corps  in  a  pocket  south 
Vyazma.  Looking  to  hdiM  on  that 
success,  V  Panzer  Corps  was  again  be- 
ginning to  lay  an  encirclement  around 
the  Tliirty-third  Army.  The  5th  Panzer 
Division  finished  its  movement  on  the 
10th  in  the  midst  of  a  snowstorm  and 
started  to  turn  to  move  in  on  Thirty- 
third  Army  from  the  west.  Although 
snow  was  nt)l  a  noveit\  by  then,  this  late 
winter  downfall  was  an  event  not  even 
the  local  people  had  ever  seen  before. 
It  began  <jn  the  10th  and  by  1200  on 
the  12th  reached  sa^  aa  aoSPS^^  that 
every  kind  of  movement  stopped. 
Drifts  piled  up  in  minutes  and  made 
plowing  and  shoveling  totally  useless. 
The  5th  Panzer  Division  was  buried  in 
its  tracks.  The  Fourth  Panzer  Army 


182 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


staff  could  barely  keep  contact  between 
its  secdons  which  were  housed  in  sepa- 
rate buildings  along  the  village  street  in 
Boznya,  eight  miles  east  of  Vyazma. 
Drifts  covered  the  street  and  the  build- 
ings to  beyond  the  tops  of  the  doors 

The  storm  at  last  subsided  enough 
for  the  digging  out  to  begin  on  the 
16th.  Kiglit  days  later,  when  the  roads 
were  about  cleared,  the  thaw  set  in. 
Under  warm  sunshine  the  snow 
melted.  The  roads  became  torrolte  ai 
water,  their  surfaces  broken  by  pot- 
holes as  much  as  several  feet  deep  that 
ffGtc  kt  flight  into  sheets  of  slick  ice. 
Corpses  oi'  nu  n.  animal  cadavers,  gar- 
bage, and  liLuiian  waste  that  had  been 
frozen  for  weeks  and  could  not  have 
hern  finried  in  any  case  began  to  thaw 
thus  adding  to  the  troops'  discomfort 
and  raismg^  the  threat  of  an  epidemic, 

Sinee  ihc  fiill-bloun  rnspulitsa  eoukl 
not  be  long  in  coming  it  appeared  that 
the  acdve  phase  of  the  winter^  opera- 
tions was  over.  especialK  alier  Arnn 
Group  Center  ordered  5th  Panzer  Di- 
vision to  begin  assembling^  at  YyaLtom 
on  the  24th  for  transfer  to  Nintli 
Army.  But  as  nielung  snow  and  ice 
filled  the  low  areas,  of  which  there  were 
many,  with  waisi-deep  water,  th^^g^U>- 
ing  fiai  ed  up  once  more.*^ 

On  20  Mardt,  the  Sf&vhi  gave 
Zhnkov  a  new  directive.  He  was  or- 
dered to  stay  on  die  offensive  for  an- 
other thirty  days  and,  in  that  oine, 
drive  r<jurl!i,  Fourth  Panzer,  and 
NinUi  Armies  back  to  a  line  about 
halfway  between  Vyazma  and  Smo- 
lensk. Zhukov  proposed  to  use  Forty- 
ihird,  forty-ninlh,  and  FiJUetli  Armiea  to 


break  through  again  from  the  east  and 
to  concentrate  /  Guards  Cavalry  Corps, 
rV  Airhome  Corps,  and  Thirty-third  Army 
south  and  west  of  Vyazma.  To  General 
Belov,  /  Guards  Cavalry  Corps  com- 
mander, who,  having  the  most  mobile 
lorce,  was  to  maintain  contact  between 
die  airborne  troops,  the  partisans,  and 
Thirty-third  Army\  infantry,  the  Inspec- 
tor of  Cavalry,  General  Polko\  iiik  O.  I. 
Gorodovikov,  sent  Belov  a  message 
4oe>ilgratulating  the  /  Guards  Cavalry 
onitasice^mplishnienls  tluis  far.-^ 
lhe  28tfa,  Aimy  Group  Center 
decided  to  leave  5di  Panzer  Division  at 
Fourth  Panzer  Army  to  resioi  e  control 
over  the  rc^  W©St  oC  Vyazmft.  which 
was  again  ^reateried  by  the  renewed 
Soviet  offensive,  and,  after  that,  to 
complete  die  long-projected  encircle- 
ment of  Thirty-third  Army.  Contrary, 
prol)alil\.  to  original  .Soviet  and  (ier- 
uiau  expectations,  die  hghtiug  roiled 
on  as  the  thaw  continued  into  the 
la^juililsn ,  and  willi  the  warming  nights, 
die  ground  turned  rapidly  Co  mud  dur-^ 
ing  the  second  week  m  April.  The 
So\iei  attacks,  (xmiing  as  they  did  at 
places  that  had  already  been  held  un- 
der the  extreme  winter  conditions  that 
had  been  less  favorable  for  a  defense, 
aidded  to  die  general  misery  of  the 
season  fbr  the  Germam  and  delayed 
dicir  long  overdue  test  and  rclitling 
but  odierwise  served  only  to  mark  die 
deftititive  end  of  the  campaign. 

The  V  Pan/er  Corps,  on  the  (Oilier 
hand,  managed  at  the  last  minute  to 
bring  5th  Panzer  Divisi©*!  to  bear 
against  Thirty-lhird  Army  on  10  A|iril. 
During  die  next  live  days  in  rapidly 


14  M.lr  42. 
"/4i(f.,  lti-22  Mar  42. 


-worn,  vol.  II,  p.  331;  Belov.  TpOmt^lmi^ 

hurba,"  p.  65- 


THE  CLINCH 


183 


Meltinc  Snow  Has  Tusto©  Rmos  Ini©  Wems 


deepening  mud,  the  army  was 

squeezed  out  of  existence.  At  the  end, 
on  the  15di,  an  estimated  five  hundred 
to  a  thousand  Wtmps,  among  them 
Yefieni()\',  the  commandinfij  SJ^enerah 
escaped  troni  tlie  pocket  into  the 
v\'()<_)ds  along  ihe  Ugm-  IQ^eti  Several 
days  later,  the  Germans  saw  a  single 
plane  with  a  fioluer  escort  attempt  a 
landing,  possil:>i\  to  pick  up  Yefremov, 
but  it  tailed  to  do  so.-'  WTien  the  last  ot 
his  command  was  trapped  and  de- 
stroyed before  it  could  make  its  way 
through  the  front  to  Forty-thir4  Army, 
Yefremov  committed  suicide.^* 


■"Pz.  AOK  -I.  Ill  Kriesrslagdmch  Nr.  8,  15  Apr  4i!,  Pz. 
AOK  4  LM932/17  file. 

'"Zhukov,  Memoirs,  p.  358. 


iVin/Sft  Amy'^s  Bridge  to  Ostaskk&v 

Of  the  late-winter  possihilities  W  re- 
coup his  fortunes,  the  Oslashko^  S^ef?* 
alion  was  the  one  diat  most  hrinly  n^d 
fiSifei^  attenn'ofl!,  and  it  coiiUJ,  tj^d^e^l, 
have  been  the  mo.st  profitalte,.  ite. 
code  name  BrueckenschuS^s  "(^feiiigf 
ing"  )  suggested,  its  first  objecrive  was  to 
bridge  the  gap  between  Armv  Groups 
Center  and  North-  If  Nindi  Army  and 
Sfe^eetitk  A^msy  mtM  iSm.  dSat  they 
would  entra^,l^|E,  ^iie$^l^|'ie^en,  Soviet 
armies  and  dt^Dcr^  Russians  of  a 
good  third  of'wl  tfie  territory  they  had 
reon  npiecl  in  the  winter  offensive. 
Geneial  Model,  the  new  Nindi  Army 
commander,  was  the  mafi  t&  attempt 
the  65-mile  drive  lo  Ostashkov  if  any- 
one was.  NeverUieless,  die  army's  first 


184 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUKGRAD 


Gepsman  OmwsT  Line  Wmrm  Rzhev 


response  to  Hitler's  7  February  request 
for  an  opinion  on  the  operation  was 
noncommittal:  the  army  would  be  oc- 
cupied foi  some  lime  lo  come  with  the 
encircied  Twenty-ninth  Army  and  with 
ttoe  feroctotis  attempts  Kafydn  Prant  vra.'S 
making  to  reopen  ihe  Rzhev  ga[3,  On 
the  12th,  Kluge  and  Model  and  their 
chiefs  of  staff  concluded  tJiat  Ninth 
Army's  next  concern  after  Finishing 
with  Twenty-ninth  Army  and  stabilising 
ifis  itorfh  fit)nt  would  nave  to  be  TMfty- 
ninth  Army  that  was  "twisting  and  turn- 
ing in  the  army's  bowels"  west  of  Sy- 
chevka.  Then,  they  agreed,  it  would  be 
loo  late  to  start  toward  Ostashkov  be- 
fore the  ra^puUtsa.  Futtheniiore,  the 

have  to  be  retiaiied  to  the  standard 


gauge  to  accommodate  German  loco- 
motives because  the  Soviet-built  loco- 
motives on  the  line  were  nearly  all 
broken  down.  The  time  required  to 
make  this  change  would  delay  the  lo- 
gtstieaabuildtip.^^ 

After  several  desperate  attempts  to 
break  out,  Twenty-ninth  Army  collapsed 
on  20  February,  but  by  then  Kalinin 
Front,  under  Stavka  orders  to  renew*  the 
Qffensive,  was  hammering  at  the  curve 
of  the  ftDTit  around  Oleritno  trying  to 
gei  fliretl  contact  with  Thirty-ninth  Army 
for  the  drive  to  Vyazma.  Hitler 
postponed  a  decision  <m  the  GfeEsiShkot 
operation  while  making  it  clear, 


"AOK  9,  Fuehmngialileilung  Kriegitagehuth.  J.J.- 
3IJ,42. 2,  7, 12  Seb  42,  AOK,  9  2152m  file. 


THE  CUNCH 


185 


however,  that  preparations  for  it  were 
to  be  carried  oiil  ai  the  highest  jjossible 
priority.  Meanwhile,  6lh  Pan/er  Divi- 
sion had  begun  pushing  Thirty-ninth 
Army  away  from  the  Vyazma-Sychevka 
section  of  the  railroad  by  what  it  called 
a  *snail  offensive,"  namely*  by  (CKSaapy- 
ing  villages  one  by  one  at  random 
along  a  25-mile  from  wherever  doing 
so  was  easiest.  The  6th  Panzer  Division 
found  that  it  could  advance  a  mile  or 
two  a  day  without  much  effort,  and 
Tkiny^nmkt  Mrmy  appeasfed  f©  life 
coming  progressively  more  nervous 
and  inicertain.  After  almost  daily  ex- 
changes between  the  army,  army 
group,  OKH.  and  Hitler,  ICIiige  and 
Hitler  gave  Nintli  Army  a  "basic  order" 
on  1  Maich  to  encircle  and  destroy 
Thirly-mntli  Army,  but  Hitler  stipulated 
that  the  preparations  for  the  Os- 
tashkov  attack  £9  €0jl£inue  and 

both  operations  weM  t0  be  feiX^leted 
before  the  raspuiitsa,^* 

Ninth  Army  sent  orders  for  the  at- 
tack on  Thiriy-7iinth  Ai-my  to  the  corps 
on  the  1st,  but  becatise  Kalinin  Front 
redoubled  its  effort  to  smash  the 
Olenino  bulge,  the  orders  could  not 
begin  to  have  any  ef  fect  for  another 
week.  By  then  time  was  getting  per- 
ilously short;  the  army  group  had  set 
die  20th  as  the  latest  date  before  the 
fOSputitm  on  which  active  operations 
could  continue.  On  the  8th  the  pres- 
sure on  the  hulge  eased,  but  two  days 
later  the  great  snowstorm  began.  In 
the  midst  of  deepening  snow,  Model 
managed  to  secure  a  flight  to  the 
f^ehr^r  Headquarters  on  the  11th. 
There  the  next  day,  while  reports  froiq 
the  front  were  describing  the  snowfall 


''Ond.,  21Fcfe^IMar42. 


as  "a  caiastrop}i6'«f  fiature,"  he  prom- 
ised Hiilt-r  to  pursue  the  Ostaslikov 
preparations  "with  force,"  which, 
chatmtf^t^ic^^^  Im  did  fiim  finding 

another  bm         IQ  ^  lltS 

army. 

In  spite  of  the  snow  and  the  rapid 
thaw  that  followed,  Model  had  as- 
sembled 56,000  troops  and  200  tanks 
for  Brl  I  (  :k[  xscHLAG  by  the  fourth 
week  in  March,  In  the  meantime, 
iiowe\er,  the  StmiJm  had  issued  the  20 
March  diiective  to  Zhukov  that  in- 
cluded orders  for  Kalinin  Front.  Gen- 
eral Konev  was  to  cut  off  Olenino  and 
take  Rzhev  and  Belyy.  He  was  not,  in 
fact,  going  to  be  able  to  do  an)'  of  those, 
but  he  had  been  given  reinforcements 
in  infantry  and  tanks,  and  those  did 
make  their  presence  felt.-" 

Finally,  on  the  27Lh,  frustrated  by 
"two  imponderables,  the  enemy  and 
the  weather,"  Model  had  to  concede 
that  Brueckenschu^g  was  not  possible. 
Hitler  rejected  a  subsdtuted  plan  for  a 
truncated  version  of  the  operation  that 
Model  and  Kluge  had  proposed  and 
called  them  to  the  Fuehrer  Headcjuar- 
ters  on  the  29th.  By  then,  as  elsewhere 
along  the  front,  the  roads  became 
rivers  during  the  day  and  were  only 
passable  at  night  and  for  a  few  hours  in 
the  early  morning,  and  Bruecken- 
si  HLAi  .  had  become  too  daring  even 
lor  HiUer.  He  shifted  the  objective  of 
the  German  assault  to  Thirfy-nintk  Army, 
but  that  could  only  mean  prolonging 
the  snail  offensive  for  a  week  or  so  until 
the  weather  completely  overtook  it  as 
well.^" 


v«l  n.  p.  331. 

^^£1^  ^,  MuehrmgsaiiteiliMg  Kmpk^ut^^ 
30,6.42. 1  Apr  ■la.  AOK  9  28504  file 


186 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


Army  Gm^  Nodk 
The  Stavka  Faces  the  Baspiditsa 

In  the  hst  vimk  ©f  February,  the 

Soviet  (oinniaads  opposite  Army 
Group  Nonh  facet}  the  unpleasant 
possibility  tiiat  m  d  matti^'  m  vfeeks 
they  might  liave  no  more  in  show  for 
their  winters  efforts  ilian  some  Uiou- 
sands  of  square  miles  of  l&r«st  and 
swamp.  Northwest  and  Kaliuhi  Fronts  had 
corn  the  Army  Group  North  right 
flfeuik  Completely  loose  from  its  niooi^ 
ings  vvcsi  of  Ostashkov,  encircled 
Kholm,  and  trapped  one  German 
plus  half  m  laik^&t  ^twrnd. 
DeaiJ^ansk;  but  the  key  point  south  of 
Lake  Ilmen,  Staraya  Russa,  stayed  in 
German  hands.  North  of  tlie  fekej  Sm- 
ond  Shock  Arrrrf  had  cut  deep  belli nd 
Haghteentii  Army's  line  on  the  Volkliov 
River  n^ilhout  irffeciting  thus  far  the 
German  grip  on  Leningrad.  Tlie  gen- 
eral offensive  was  swnnming  in  suc- 
cesses on  the  one  hand  and  promising 
little  evidence  of  durable  accomplish- 
ment on  the  oUier.  (Aia^  H.) 

The  Si<r,'lm\  prciiilenis,  aside  I^N>m 
the  escalating  pressure  of  time,  were 
two:  tlie  wide  dispersion  of  command 
effort  inheteitttin  the  general  offensive 
from  the  start  and  the  local  offensive 
efforts  occasioned  by  the  operating 
methods  of  the  field  commands.  The 
hrsi,  if  it  were  perceived,  which  is  by  no 
means  certain,  was  past  ihc  stage  at 
li^diU  could  be  reversed.  The  second, 
apparenih.  (  oiild  not  be  eliminated,  but 
it  could  be  mkigaied.  and  to  do  that,  die 
Stmvka  applied  what  had  become  its 
standard  correctiv  es,  f  resh  orders,  eJt- 
hortations,  and  remtorcements.'* 


"See/l  A/i;  vol.  IV,  p.  327. 


On  tB  February,  the  Stavka  put  all  of 

the  units  operating  against  the  Dciii- 
yansk  pocket  under  Headquarters, 
Noifffhiiest  Pimi.  It  then  also  gave  Gen- 
eral Kurochkin,  the/ra??/s  commander, 
an  order  to  "squeeze"  the  pocket  out  of 
^^ElMence  *ln  four  or  five  day's  time* 
and  get  on  with  the  di  i\  e  pasl  .Staraya 
Russa. A  week  later,  it  gave  him  five 
artillery  regiments,  three  taortar  reg- 
iments,  and  air  reinforcements  and 
then  loilowed  witli  orders  to  intensify 
the  olfensive  and  not  only  "squeeze 
the  pocket  but  also  "crush  the  enemy  in 
the  directions  of  ^  main  effort."** 

"i^fhm  I^mt,  n^ich  had,  by  the  liasc 
week  in  February,  not  yet  managed  to 
get  Second  Siiock  Anny  turned  nortii  to- 
iward  Lyuban  in  spile  of  repeated  ad- 
monishments to  do  that,  was  an  eveij 
moie  difficuli  problem  for  the  Stavka. 
Unless  the  Russians  could  cut  the 
Leningrad-Lyuban-C:hudovo  railroad, 
their  prospects  ot  accomplishing  any- 
thing toward  the  relief  of  Leningrad 
were  small.  After  sending  Marshal 
VoKJshilov  to  act  as  its  representative 
&n  the  spot,  theStavka,  on  SSFehmary, 
ordei  t'd  General  Meretskov,  com- 
mander of  VolMmv  I'wnt,  to  get  an  attack 
toward  Lyuban  goii^  ntndiout,  as  he 
proposed,  a  pause  to  regroup.  It  also 
ordei  eti  Geneial  Khozin,  at  Lvniiigrad 
Front,  tf)  set  Fifty-fourth  Army  in  motion 
towaif!  L)'nban  from  the  northeast  and 
piomised  strong  air  support  for  both 
ctf  die  thrusts.^* 

Fnm  Fuehrer  Headquarters 
In  the  last  week  of  February,  3,500 


"Ehelanov.  "/^o/iifw,"  p.  m). 
"mid.,  p.  31;  /VoVsi.  vol.  ll.p.  337t. 
""ivovss.  vol.  II,  p.  S35;  Memskov,  Strvmg  the 
Ptepit,  p.  199. 


188 


Ma^SOW  TO  StAUNGRAD 


troops,  commanded  by  Generalmajor 
Theodor  Schcrer  were  beginning  their 
second  month  under  siege  in  Kholm, 
and  the  perimeter  that  they  held 
around  the  town  iiad  shrunk  to  the 
point  at  vyhich  supplying  them  by  air 
became  difiRailt  and  ejsceedingly  dan- 
gerous. On  25  Feiiruary,  four  out  of 
ten  pknes  flying  to  Kholm  were  shot 
down,  bringfing  the  Lufhvaffe's  losses  of 
iri-iiioior  1(1  JU-52  transports  during 
the  airlift  to  fifty.  After  the  25th,  only 
gliders  could  land  and  then  only  on  a 
Llenifd  snip  (»l  ice  on  the  Lovat  River. 
Henceforth,  planes  making  airdrops 
to  come  in  at  very  low  altitudes  to 
hit  idfce  target  and  in  doing  so  were 
exposed  to  grouad  fire  fro.pi  ail 
directions.'* 

In  ihe  Deinyansk  ])o(kel.  II  Corps 
needed  300  tons  of  suppUes  a  day 
which  required  a  ittfl-scsufc,  ististaified 
airlifl,  llie  firsl  such  in  aviation  history. 
To  mount  die  airlilt  the  Luftwa^e  had 
to  divert  almost  M  of  tht  transports  as- 
signed to  Army  Group  Center  and  half 
of  those  stationed  in  the  Army  Group 
South  area.  The  slow  JU-Sgs  fed  to  fly 
in  ,ni(ui|}s  of  i\\ciH\  to  forty  with 
fighter  covei;  and  Soviet  bombing  of 
the  ^^trtps  In  fsodket  ^msam&eA 
the  flighl  srhedulcs  and  gneStied  S^tdt- 
tional  hazards  for  the  jil^^S  and 
crews.  Tbtat  deliveries  tip  to  S9  Idbru' 

ar\  were  short  In  1,900  tons,  about 
one-half  of  tlie  requirement.^® 

German  I  Corps,  holding  the  uoYth- 
eastem  face  of  the  Volkhov  pocket,  was 


•"H.  Gr,  Niml.  hi  Kneg.'iliigehiidi.  I3.2.-I2J.-I2.  '2b 
Feb  42.  H.  Gr.  Nm  d  7.-,12«/7  tile. 

^"Hermann  Plutlu-i;  Thi'  Crnnun  Air  Fom  Versus 
RU5.WI.  19-i2,  USAF  Hisloriial  Division,  USAF  Hisloi- 
ical  .Stiitlies.  njo.  154,  pp.  78-81;  H.  Gr.  Nord,  la 
Kru'Siiagflmck.  iS^^JAZ,  28  F«b  42,  Gr.  Nord 
75128/7  fije. 


sdiaken  on  25  February  when  Soviet  ski 
troops  puslied  north  through  frcjzen 
swamps  along  the  Tigod*  River  to 
widain  five  miles  of  Lyuban,  The  army 
group'k  intelligence  had  known  for  sev- 
eral days  that  tlie  327th  Rifle  Divisim 
was  on  tlie  march  northward  from 
near  Spaskaya  Polist.  Also  knowing 
how  deliberately  the  Soviet  commands 
generally  operated,  Army  ^rotip 
North  had  expected  an  attack,  but  not 
so  soon.^^  What  it  had  not  known  was 
that  Meretskov  and  Second  Shock  Army 
wei  e  then  under  "categorical  instruc- 
tions" from  the  Staoka  .to  get  an  attack 
going  without  delay.** 

Nevertheless,  when  Kj:fi^  lOgt  with 
General  Kueciiler,  the  Attttf  tjtoup 
North  tdittmaitder;  €he  mmmmMng 
generals  of  .Sixteenth  and  Eig^tetgndl 
Aj-mies;  and  die  I,  II,  X,  and  xSi^III 
Corps  commanders  at  the  Pwekref 
Hea(l(|uariers  on  2  March,  he  s]V)ke 
about  initiatives  widi  some  confidence. 
Although  Army  Group  Nordic  situa^ 
tion  had  not  improved,  it  had  for  more 
th^  two  weeks  balanced  on  the  ed^e 
lif  dS^tst^'VjIi^bput  going  over,  t^hich  in 
ftS^i;^we:i^a6QUragement  to  Hitler. 

Oi?  the  'Othfer  hand,  the  conference 
disdbsed  that  iio  strtistaiiti^  knpitwe- 
ineni  in  (he  army  groups  position  had 
yet  occurred.  At  Kholm.  half  of  the 
ori|final  g^arrison  were  dead  or 
wounded.  Replacements  could  he 
brought  in  by  glider,  and  enough  to 
make  up  for  about  half  the  los^  were, 
btu  each  of  these  men  reduced  liie 
space  available  for  carrying  supplies 
and  increased  -consumption  of  those 
supplies  ^ansported  in  the  remaining 


"//.  Gr.  Nord,  la  Kriegs/agrburl, .  1 3 .2.-123 .42,  25 
Feb  12,  H.  tit.  Nord  75128/7  file. 
""Meretskov,  jiem'ngl^;  Pm4ile,  p.  199. 


THE  CONCH 


189 


space.  A  rdief  ftrtsce  <rf  half-a-dozen 
mLxed  battalions  under  Generalmajor 
Horst  von  Uckermann  had  cut 
tftrmigh  from  the  sootibwest  aUnjost  to 
witliin  sight  of  Khohn,  but  it  was  stalled 
ill  deep  snow  and  practicaUy  encircled, 
deaeral  vim  BTO<jkdorfif;  the  mm» 
mander  of  II  Corps  in  the  Demyansk 
pocket,  told  Hitler  that  his  force  de- 
peaided  completely  on  each  d^ryk  sap^ 
ply  flights.  Foi"  the  Scherer  and  Ucker- 
mann gioups  at  KJiolni  and  11  Corps  at 
Demyadfisfe,  tlife  margin  of  siirvival  ^ivsi* 
thin.  South  of  Lyuban,  I  Ccirps  was 
having  an  expected ly  easy  success. 
Goadi^  by  the  Stavka,  Mereiskov  had 
hastily  pushed  the  80th  Cavaln  and 
327th  Omtskm  into  the  breach  die 
ski  troops  had  opened  on  25  February, 
and  I  Cor[>s  had  tlien  closed  the  gap  in 
its  front,  trapping  about  6,000  Soviet 
troops.'*  Btit  if  ^tmd  Mosk  A^my  &ti 
die  south  and  Fifty-fourth  Army  in  the 
northeast  one  day  made  good  their 
MMs  t0  i%aeih  Lyiibaii,  I  Corps  would  be 
locked  in  a  pqpl^  esms^Ly  Eke  the  one 
at  Demyansk. 

Ilider  feceiv^ed  the  generals*  glooniy 
reports  with  sympathetic  detachment. 
He  promised  a  regiment  of  reinibrce- 
mmm  to  get  Ucfcetfrnarmfe  reli^rf  tmm 

back  in  motion,  and  he  gave  instruc- 
tions to  liave  an  order  of  tlie  day  writ- 
ten honoring  the  Kholm  gai^isbri.  Y& 
von  Brockdorff,  he  made  the  limp  ob- 
servation that  the  hardships  11  Corps 
vim  hp?mg^  m  endat«  resulted  ftma 
}m&t^'&>  defend  the  Demyansk  pocket 
as  if  it  were  a  fortress  even  though  it 
was  not.  'On  the  ^th^fr  hand,  he 
added,  this  imposed  a  moral  ob%a^on 


on  the  troops  oufeide  the  p«K3eet  to 
come  to  the  crtrps  aid. 

When  the  conference  tttrned  to  its 
main  concerns,  plaas  fcE^  ^elose  die  Vol' 
kho\  River  line  bebsd(d  Second  Shock 
Army  and  to  restore  contact  with  II 
Corps,  H5tler%  tone  changed.  After 
General  Busch,  commander  of  Six- 
teenth Army,  and  General  der  Xa- 
vallerie  Gecwg  Ifntletasffitt'  hmm- 
mander  of  Eighteenth  Army,  '^j^^pgll 
tentative  proposals  for  counteta1S^(^ii^ 
tcwatd  Bemyansk  and  at  the  VoUtKiSV 
gap,  he  set  approximate  starting  dates 
for  both — 7  to  12  March  for  the  Vol- 
khov operation  and  13  to  16  Marcfi  ¥or 
the  one  toward  Demyansk.  coni]^cn- 
sate  for  shortages  of  ground  f  orces,  he 
said  ih^-  Luftwaffe  would  employ  air- 
craft as  "escort  artillerv,"  using  the 
heaviest  demoUtion  bombs  it  had  tq 
Mast  the  bunker  systems  the  Russians 
had  built  in  the  forests.  Tlie  Demyansk 
operation,  he  indicated,  would  also 
have  to  be  coordinated  with  Ninth 
Army's  proposed  thrtist  fxium  the  south 
toward  Ostashkov.** 

"One  item  in  the  disctissidn  took  the 
generals  completely  by  surprise.  In  the 
midst  of  talkmg  about  the  Demyansk 
and  Volkhov  opeKitions,  ICMer  lad 
offhandedly  given  the  arnn  group  a 
new  mission.  With  spring  coming,  lie 
had  observed,  it  would  btSneeesSaty  to 
tighten  the  siege  of  Leningrad  and. 
mrucularly,  to  keep  the  Soviet  Baltic 
Fbud  {torn  steaming  out  in^  the  Baltic 
after  the  ice  had  melted.  To  do  that, 
Arm^  Group  Nordi  would  have  to 
prwide  troops  to  take  and  occupy  a 
group  of  islands  at  tlie  eastern  end  of 
the  Gulf  of  Finland.  The  islands,  Suur- 


Or.  Smd,  la  Km  .^i-lagehuck,  I3.^MM,  1  Mar   

42.  H.  Gr.  Nord  75128/8  hie.  -^im..  2  Mar  42;  HaUkr  Ditay,  vol,  lU.  p.  408. 


190 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


saari,  Lavansaari,  Seiskari,  and  Tytar- 
saaii,  liad  Soviel  garrisons  on  them, 
\vhiclT  presumably  were  small,  but  the 
( .rrmaiis  could  not  be  certain  of  that.*' 

Raul/tier 

The  iwmv  yroup  and  nrm\  siaffs, 
working  against  time,  the  enemy,  and  a 
littt^  &i  uncertaintieis,  were  given  be- 
tween five  and  ten  days  to  get  the 
Volkhov  operation,  code-named  Raub- 
TCER  ("beast  of  prey"),  going.  The  thaw 
was  beginning  in  the  Crimea,  and  it 
would  spread  northward  in  the  coming 
weeks.  It  had  to  be  taken  into  account. 
On  the  other  hand,  air  support  could 
only  be  effective  if  it  went  one  place  at 
a  time:  therefore,  Volkli<)\  had  to  come 
before  Demyansk,  and  a  delay  with  the 
former  operation  could  cripple  the  lat- 
ter. Hitlers  talk  about  taking  the  islands 
in  the  Gulf  of  Finland  added  a  com- 
plication. That  mission  \vould  also  re- 
quire troops  and  air  support.  No  date 
had  been  set  for  it,  and  the  army  group 
regarded  it  as  a  waste  of  time.  The 
OKH  insisted,  however,  that  Hitler 
took  it  most  seriously  because  he  be- 
lieved he  would  be  made  a  "laughing 
stock"  if  the  Soviet  warships  steamed 
out  into  the  Baltic  after  the  ice 
melted.** 

That  the  Russians  were  not  goi  ng  to 
allow  the  Germans  to  carry  out  their 
plans  without  opposition  went  without 
saying.  In  lin  Hist  week  of  March, 
Mitbum  and  State  Defense  Committee 
member  G.  M.  Malenkov  joined  Ifem- 
shilov  ai  Volkhov  Front  headquarters, 
and  the  Stavka  sent  General  Vlasov, 


who  as  commander  of  Twentieth  Army 
had  been  one  of  the  heroes  (jf  the 
Moscow  counteroffensive,  to  be  Me- 
retskov's  deputy.  Before  the  week's  end. 
Second  Shwh  Army  was  regrouping  for 
another  push  toward  Lyuban,  and 
Fifty-fourth  Army  was  hammering  at 
Pogostyc,  twenty  miles  northeast  of 
Lyuban.^"*  At  Kholm,  the  Russians 
were  using  tanks.  One  52-toiiiaier 
stopped  the  Uckermann  relief  force 
for  a  day  until  it  could  bring  up  an  88- 
mm.  gun,  and  the  Soviet  T-34s  were 
dueling  with  the  strt^ngpoints  on  the 
perimeter  of  the  pocket. 

Eighteenth  Army  was  ready  tSie 
7th  to  start  Raibiii  r  two  days  later  if 
the  air  support  HiUer  had  prescribed 
could  be  given  by  then.  The  "if"  wais 
substantial.  The  Luftwaffe  was  engaged 
at  Kholm,  trj^ing  to  help  the  Ucker- 
ttiaiw  force  across  the  last  few  miles  to 
the  pot  ket  at  Kholm  before  it  was 
overrun  by  Soviet  tanks.  At  the  mo- 
ment, t^e  air  support  was  keeping  the 
pocket  in  existence  but  was  doing  less 
to  carry  the  Uckermann  group  for- 
ward. German  pfe*fe^  cttura  pin  the 

Russians  down  when  they  were  in  the 
open,  but  thej'  were  not  effective 
against  the  $0^t  pt  eparcd  defetises, 
whidi  ^vere  (poiicealed  under  the  snow. 
On  the  7  th  and  fear  the  next  several 
days,  Hider  tt>uld  not  bring  himself  to 
withdraw  the  air  support  for  Kln)lm  in 
part  because  he  was  afraid  the  pocket 
would  collapse  if  he  did  and  "part 
laecausr  lie  was  easliiiir  about  lor  a 
replacement  for  Uckermann  whom  a 
Luftioaffe  liaison  oEficef  had  accused  of 
lacking  confidence.  By  the  11th.  the 
Luftwaffe,  also,  was  demanding 


*^  ]iileret$kiv;  Suniim  Ai  Ptofde,  pp.  200^;  Mi&- 


THE  CUNCH 


191 


postponements  because  the  weather 
was  causing  icing  conditions  on  planes 
that  made  it  too  dangerous  for  the 
German  Stuka  dive-ljombers  to  carry 
the  extra  heavy  bombs  they  were  sup- 
posed to  use. 

Meanwhile,  Soviet  Fifly-fotnih  Army 
was  beginning  a  drive  f  rom  die  north- 
east toward  Lyuban  that  could  cut  oifl 
Corps  completely  if,  as  one  army  group 
report  put  it,  "Raubtier  remained  a 
rubber  lion."  Kuechler  and  Lindemann 
were  ready  to  go  ahead  on  the  12th, 
withwiC  air  support,  but  Hider  would 
not  stgree  to  tnis  action  because  he 
feared  the  losses  would  be  too  high.  R) 
then,  the  delays  in  Raubtier  were  be- 
ginning to  cut  intothi&dme  allotted  for 
the  Demyansk  operation  and  to 
direaten  the  prt^jected  attacks  on  the 
islancb  ia  the  Gulf  of  iFMand.  Inter- 
nally the  army  group  staff  now  re- 
^trded  the  latter  assaults  as  "insane," 
btit  tesisted  they  had  to  be  car- 
ried out  while  the  ire  was  stilt  thick 
enou|^  tC>  fee  crossed.  The  Finns,  who 
were  m  join  in  ftvMii  thenr  ^de  of  the 
gulf,  had  said  that  thc\  would  be  ready 
to  attack  on  the  20th.  Fog  and  low- 
hanging  clouds  forcc?d  another 
postponement  on  the  1 3th.  biH  the 
LuftwaJJe  reported  that  it  expected  tlie 
wea^elSr  m  hesr  by  the  next  morning, 

and  ihea.  its  planes  could  start  some- 
time betwei&n  0900  and  1200."  During 
the  night,  however;  the  tetfipersttiire 
lei!  to  -30°  F.  Autii  ipating  having  !to 
clioose  between  tlae  eiiects  of  letnilg 
the  troops  stand  in  the  dpen  white 
waiting  for  the  planes  in  such  ferocious 
coltl  oi  letting  die  attack  start  before 
the  planes  arrived  and  having  the 

'«N.  &.M)ftf.  ia  m^gaoMh  B.SJSAZ.  5-M 


bombs  possif>ly  drop  on  his  own  men, 
Kuechler  decided  to  wait  another 
ds^. 

The  mouth  of  the  Volkhov  pocket 
as  it  had  been  since  January,  about 
six  miles  wide.  The  Novgorod- 
Chudovo  road  and  railroad  crossed  ihe 
|»ocket  from  nordi  to  south,  bui  Uiere 
were  no  east-west  roads.  Approx- 
imately at  its  center,  about  a  mile  apart, 
the  Russians  had  cut  two  100-foot- wide 
lanes  running  east  to  west  through  the 
trees  and  underbrush.  Inside  the  lanes, 
they  had  laid  down  several  feet  of  com- 
pacted snow,  enough  to  cover  the  tops 
of  the  tiee  stumps,  and  these  had 
served  as  Secmd  Shock  Arwtjf's  supply 
and  communications  line?,  lb  dis- 
tinguish Ix'twoen  ihi-se  lanes,  llu  Ckr- 
iQans  named  die  northern  one  Lrika 
andii^«Kmdi^tivinl>sra.  At  nightfall 
on  14  not  abated, 

but  l|ie  £.i^u^«  was  0eftain  its  planes 
coiiM  make  their  first  striKes  at 
daylight  the  next  morning,  and  Kigh- 
teenth  Army  had  tents  and  stoves 
ready  to  be  moved  along  with  the 
troops.  Because  of  the  cold,  the  risks 
were  still  extraordinarily  high.  In  such 
weather,  weapons,  machttte  gtins  ea- 
IH'cialh,  jammed,  and  men  lost  the  will 
to  fight.  But  Kuechler  decided  tliat 
Rj^i^'TiER  could  not  he  delayed  again. 

At  0730  the  next  morning,  the 
planes  aiiived  over  die  f  ront.  After  die 
SimJm  had  hit  their  tafg^,  XXXV^ 
GOrps  and  I  Ttu  ps  troops  pusl^  lOtO 
l!ie  gap  from  the  south  and  UtOTtll. 
©uring  the  day,  263  planes  ftew  vrm- 
sions  for  RAt'ivni-R,  and.  by  dark, 
XXXVIII  Corps  had  gained  a  half  mile 
and  I  Coi  ps  slighdy  more  liian  two 
miles.  In  the  next  two  days,  Rai  b  i  ikr 
went  ahead  but  witliout  gaining  the 
distsmct  it  had  on  the  first  day.  Tlie 


192 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


planes  were  not  living  up  to  Hitler's 
ecpectation  in  their  role  as  escort  artil- 
lery: when  they  laid  their  barrages 
close  to  the  line  ol  advance  some  of 
their  hDinbs  generally  fell  among  their 
own  troops;  when  they  allowed  a  safe 
margin,  the  Russians  nsiially  had  time 
to  recover  before  the  Germans,  who 
were  moving  through  clecj>  snow,  could 
reach  them. 

The  Russians,  on  the  other  hand, 
were  defending  static  strongpoints. 
and  each  one  iliai  fell  narrowed  the 
mouth  of  the  pocket  somewhat.  On  the 
18th,  I  Corps  crossed  the  Erika  Lane, 
and  ilic  following  day  both  corps 
reached  the  Dora  Lane  where  their 
spearheads  made  contact  late  in  the 
day.^^  Second  Shock  Army,  which  IkkI  IkmI 
trouble  enough  keeping  the  L)  uban 
operation  going,  now  was  going  to 
iiavc  to  hght  for  survival.  On  the  21st. 
Vlasov  went  into  the  pocket  to  take 
eoinmaiid  trf  the  atmy. 

Bruet  kcn  schJag  al  f)i-mynmk 

In  tlie  meantime,  Sixteenth  Army's 
attack  toward  the  Demyansk  pocket 
had  fallen  fi\c  days  behind  the  date 
originally  set  for  its  latest  possible  be- 
ginning. Although,  owing  to  iheir  ex- 
periences at  Kholtn  and  in  R,AUBTn:R, 
the  field  commands  had  concluded 
that  it  was  not  wcftlhni«!ifle  to  sacrifice 
time,  which  was  becoming  precious,  for 
the  sake  of  air  support,  Hider  had 
insisted  on  keeping  aB  available  planes 
committed  to  Rvi'ivniR  until  thai  (>]jci- 
ation  was  finished  and  on  holding  die 
BemyaMk  operaitm  in  abeyance-  umil 
he  could  shift  ftiH  air  support  to  it.  At 


">A(>K  I.S.  In  Kyt,-gsl<iii,-hwh.  lUimlll.  14-15  Mar  42. 
\(.)K  IH  I'Kilii'li  li!t  :.'U>/\  I'l  Knigslagfhuek.  Baad 
III.  16-20  Mar  42.  AOK  IH  l9(i01/7  file. 


the  same  time,  he  had  also  insisted  that 
I  he  effort  at  Demyansk  be  part  of  the 
grand  design  to  close  the  Ostashkov 
gap  that  had  been  given  the  code  name 
BRUECitENJSCHLAc,  the  same  name 
which  had  been  assigned  to  Ninth 
Ai  inv's  projected  drive  to  Ostashkov, 
fhe  rode  name  again  was  not  inap- 
propriate because  Sixteenth  Army's 
share  of  this  larger  Brliec;kf.nschi.ag 
effort  was  in  fact  also  to  build  a 
bridge — across  the  twenty  miles  be- 
tween X  Corps'  (ronl  south  of  Siaraya 
Russa  and  the  western  faj^e  of  the  pero" 
yansk  pocket. 

The  plan,  as  approved  during  the  2 
March  conference  at  Fuehrer  Head- 
quarters, was  to  have  five  more-or-less 
full-strength  divisions  strike  east  from 
the  X  Corps  line  to  the  Lovai  Riven 
When  they  reached  the  Lovat.  the  dis- 
tance to  the  [joc  kel  would  be  sonu  u  lial 
under  Jive  miles,  and  at  that  point  11 
Corps  *si3t:il4jofn  in  with  a  push  ftom 

its  side^ Burin g  du-  tonlertMu c,  I  ialdei- 
had  concluded  that  Busch  and  the  11 
and  X  Corps  comm^ders  were  *not 
sufficiently  firm  per.sonalities."  and  af- 
terward he  prevailed  on  Kuechler  to 
:^uft  €4i^ti«ft  trf"  BRUtsCKENSCHU^G  away 
ftiQia  i^teenth  Armv  by  consliluting 
^elbl^C^  for  this  operation  as  separate 
tombat  teams  vdtn  anthorfxation  to 
communicate  direcllv  to  the  antu 
gronp  and  tiie  OKH  outside  die  nor- 
mal channels.  Cotmrnaad  of  the 
fnix  f  ueni  lu  t  '.ciu  ralm^r  Walter  von 
Seydlitz-Kurzbach  and  msit  of  the  sec- 
ondary force  in  the  pocket  to  Genei^ 
almajor  H.  Zoru,  Ixilh  of  whom  were 
senior  division  commanders. 

Seydfitii,  working  tindei-  the  eye  of 
the  OKH,  c\cr(  iscd  his  troo[)'>  in  loose- 
order  infiltration  tactics  modeled  on 
tadics  the  Sluiiish  Army  had  used  dur- 


THE  CLINCH 


193 


ing  the  Winter  War  of  1939-1940.  To 
ex]>l()it  these  tactics,  he  laid  the  line  f»f 
advance  llirough  woods  and  swamp 
south  of  the  Staraya  Russa-Demyamk 
road.  The  questions  were  whether  the 
Germans  could  be  as  effective  hghting 
in  the  forest  as  the  Finns  [i£td  been, 
whether  th('\  rould  beat  the  oncoming 
tliaw,  and  how  much  longer  ihe  pocket 
could  survive/11iea»st««eisfia  ;t^l|it£s^ 
two  became  critical  as  soon  as Jttil^TiER 
began  consuming  the  time  ^6tCed  to 
Brueckensc:hlag. 

On  the  16th,  Kuechler  made  a  some- 
what hazardous  flight  into  the  pocket 
to  reassure  Brockdorff,  who  was  talk- 
ing about  staging  a  breakout.  During 
the  flights  in  and  out,  Kuechler  had  the 
opportunity  to  observe  firsthand  what 
would  be  a  positive  circumstance  for 
Brueckenschlag:  from  an  altitude  of 
about  4,000  feet  in  dear  weather  he 
CQuld  see  no  evidence  of  combat  be- 
tween the  pocket  and  the  X  Corps 
front.  The  Russians,  by  being  set  on 
breaking  the  pocket  open  from  the 
north  and  south,  at  which  they  might 
well  succeed,  were  thereby  allowing  the 
Germans  to  have  a  stable  basis  from 
which  to  launch  Brueckenschlag.*" 

Ill  midafternoon  on  the  19th,  after 
he  knew  the  Dora  Lane  was  cut  and  the 
Volkhov  gap  -was  feeing  dosed,  HSrier 
gave  the  order  for  the  hnal  deploy- 
ment fpr  BauEGKjtNstajiLAG,  The  l-t^ 
mffie  would  iMlt  ite  iai  fdree  soatfe  ii^ 
next  mmmgtmd  S^dKtz  would  have 
one  day  to  bring  has  nmts,  which  were 
dispersed  behind  the  X  Corps  front, 
up  to  their  line  <jf  departure. 

When  the  advance  began  at  davliglii 
on  the  morning  of  the  21st,  the  objec- 


tives were  a  succession  of  dinaMtitSve 
villages,  some  with  imposing  names — 
Ivanovskoye,  Noshevalovo,  and  Va- 
-siEeimficMm,  all  otherwise  insignihcani 
except  as  reference  points  in  the  wil- 
derncss  of  trees  and  snow.  1  he  Rus- 
sians responded  with  determination 
and  confusion,  holding  fanatically  to 
some  places  and  giving  wa)  in  others. 
Ji0m  two  days,  die  temperature  rose 
above  freezing.  On  the  fourth  day.  sev- 
eral regiments  reached  the  Redya 
River,  halfway  lo  die  Lovat.  By  then, 
too,  the  three  feet  of  snow  on  the 
ground  had  turned  to  slush,  and  aerial 
reconnaissance  had  reported  Soviet  re- 
inforcements moving  along  the  valleys 
of  the  Redya  and  Lovat  from  the  north 
and  the  south.  Two  Soviet  parachute 
brigades  had  landed  inside  the  pocket 
not  far  from  Demyansk  and  die  air- 
field. Like  the  paratroops  who  had 
landed  behind  Army  Group  Center, 
however,  once  on  the  ground  they  ap- 
peared imcertain  as  to  what  to  do  next. 

East  of  the  Redya,  Seydlitz's  advance 
slowed  almost  to  a  stop.  Ahead,  all  the 
way  lo  the  Lovat  the  forest  was  dense, 
unbroken  by  roads  or  settlements,  and 
matted  with  underbrush.  Against  the 
Soviet  troops  dug-in  there  the  German 
Spukas  were  useless:  they  could  not  spot 
the  enemy  positions  through  the  trees 
and  brush.  By  the  26th,  a  foot  and  a 
half  of  water  covered  the  ice  on  the 
Iledya,  and  if  the  filaw  cdiih'rtiied  the 
entire  stretch  between  the  i  ivci  s  would 
soon  be  swamp.  On  the  30di,  Seydlitz 
told  Kuechler  that  he  was  going  to 
slop,  regroup,  and  shift  his  line  of 
attack  north  to  the  Staraya  Rnssa— 
Demyansk  road.""^ 


*'^H.  Gr.  N„r(!.  ht  KriegstagdtuiA,  U.-^t.3.42,  S-t6  *^AOK  M,  /a  Rrie^sgebaeh,  Band  III,  tt-3(J  Mar 
Mar  42,  H.  Gr.  Nord  75 128/8  fife.  42,  A0K  16  89*68/4  file. 


194 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


At  ihe  end  of  the  month,  the  Stavka 
also  was  engaged  in  jilanning  a  iresh 
Start,  It  had,  for  two  weeks,  had  Foiit' 
hm  t&ttah^  K.  A.  Bulganin  as  its 

representative  at  Northwest  Front,  but 
Bulganins  competence  in  militar)  at- 
faiit  1^  "smalls*  and  his  presence  had 

done  more  to  complicate  than  to  fat  ili- 
tate  the  fronts  conduct  of  operations. 
On  29  March,  #6  Skisi^  mm- 
mand  ol  all  troops  on  liie  perimeter  of 
the  pocket  to  General  Leyteiiant  N.  F. 
Vatutin,  who  had,  until  then,  been  the 
fronts  chid  ol  staff,  anti  made  Kurot  h- 
kin,  the /ro/i/s  commander,  solely  re- 
spunsible  for  the  defense  against 
Seydlitz's  relief  operation.  At  the  same 
lime,  it  gave  Kurochkin  live  regiments 
ot  anlilauk  guns  and  "'lour  div^lOQsS^i^ 
light  antiaircraftarliUery.''^ 

A  Month  (f  Mud  and  Crim 

For  both  contestants,  the  Germans 
and  the  Russians,  iln;  iitial  lap  in  the 
race  with  tlie  rasputilMi  was  on.  The 
stakes  were  high.  If  BRUKcKFNSt  iii  At. 
failed,  the  Germans  would  not  be  able 
to  hold  the  Demyansk  pocket  through 
tbc  spi  ing  nor  would  Seamd  Shock  Army 
be  able  to  survive  if  its  lines  to  the  rear 
remained  cut.  The  rasputitsa  could  save 
the  German  effort  at  Kholm  and  it 
might  be  all  that  could  save  I  Corps 
from  being  cut  off  die  way  II  Corps 
already  was.  While  the  rasputitsa  was 
certain  to  have  an  effect,  what  that 
niiglu  be  at  an)  one  place  was  entirely 
uncertain.  From  KhcdlHi  for  instance, 
where  the  Soviet  lines  were  long  and 
the  roads  poor  at  best.  Scherer  re- 
ported SHSt  S&  March  tliat  some  th€ 
Russians  appeared  to  be  withdrawing. 


His  own  position,  however,  was  getting 
worse.  TIic  sudden  and  rapid  tli,i\i  had 
(pompleiely  melted  the  snowbanks  that 
liad  given  his  troops  conGeEdment;  the 
entreiK  hments  had  become  mudholcs 
halt-lilled  with  water;  and  the  felt 
boots,  indispensable  as  protection 
against  the  cold,  were  useless  to  the 
troops  who  now  spent  dieir  days  sub- 
merged lo  the  hips  in  mud  and  melted 
snow.  One  half-\va\  determined  Soviet 
attack  with  artillery  and  tanks,  lie  pre- 
dicted, could  well  be  enough  to  finish 
off  the  pocket.*^ 

Eiglueenth  Army's  f^rip  on  the  Vol- 
khov pocket  was  desperate  but  uncer- 
tain. Fifly-fointh  Anii\  had  piisbed  a 
wedge  ]>ast  Pogosiye  lo  within  five 
miles  of  l.yuban  on  ihe  noiKfeeast,  and 
Second  Shock  Army  had  no  more  than 
seven  or  eight  miles  to  go  to  reach 
Lyuban  from  the  south,  which  it  ap- 
peared determined  ro  do  even  after  the 
ILm/bi  U  K  operation  had  closed  the 
mouth  of  the  pocket.  On  23  Msd;^, die 
day  the  thaw  began,  the  armv  group 
chief  of  staff  told  tlie  OKH  chief  Ol  op- 
erations that  it  was  "gi  adualK  "  Ijccom- 
ing  impossible  for  Kighleenili  Ai  my  to 
keep  the  Russians  f  rom  taking  ly  uban 
because  the  arm\  did  noi  have  enough 
men  to  do  it.  The  liiaw  slowed  die  Rus- 
sians as  it  did  the  Germans,  ijui  they 
were  clearU  not  going  to  let  it  stop 
them.  \\\  keeping  lanks  in  position  lo 
rake  tlie  linka  Lane  wiUi  hie,  the)  had 
m^anaged  to  prevent  the  Germans  from 
actually  taking  possession  of  it  anrl  to 
convert  the  lane  inio  a  no-m.m's-land. 
On  iIr  l'7th,  the  tanks,  with  infantry 
behind  them,  drove  through  the  lane 
and  reopened  it  as  a  suppl)  road  for 


42.  H.  Ol,  N<iid  73128/8  lile. 


THE  CLINCH 


195 


Second  Shock  Army.  At  the  end  of  the 
month.  Eigiiicfinh  Army  did  get  one 
small  bit  of  relief:  Finnish  troops,  with 
some  Estonian  auxiharies  supplied  by 
Eighieenth  Army  took  the  islands 
Suursaari,  Lavansaari,  and  Tytarsaari, 
thus  ending  the  army's  worry  that  it 
would  Iiave  to  divert  men  of  i£S:.OI^  Si 
those  enterprises. 

Brueckenschlag  resumed  on  4 
April.  S<.vcllit/  had  regrouped  his 
force,  and  his  Soviet  opposition  had 
been  regi  oiiped  and  reinforced.  Soviet 
infantry  were  not  only  dug  in  on  the 
ground  but  were  firing  from  the  tree- 
tops.  Airplanes,  mostly  slow,  single-en- 
gine biplanes,  cruised  over  the  German 
bivouac  areas  all  night  long  dropping 
tjonibs  ftotti  nl^maes  of  from  one  to 
tuo  hundred  feet.  On  the  softening 
ground,  Soviet  tanks  were  sigain  sbow- 
ing  their  superiority,  arid  the  tank 
trews  had  disi  <  ctl  ihat  the  trees  and 
underbrusii  gJive  Uiem  excellent  pro- 
tecti^l^  be€3US6  tlle  Rotkopf  hoHow- 
{^£trg,ls  flMltIS!  frequently  exploded 
Wfeea '^ey  .Struck  branches.  The  Ger- 
WSSem  were  using  a  new  weapon,  the 
Pamerschycck.  Ii  fired  a  rocket-pro- 
pelled, hollow-charge  grenade  and 
eoudfd  ttnoelt  dut  a  *T~M,  hm.  Seydlitz 
obscr\t'fl  that  manning  it  required 
nerve  "and  a  generous  endowment  of 
luck"  because  it  was  not  effective  at 
ranges  o\cr  ^i^r^  \ar(Is.^1fite  night- 
lime  temperatures  were  n^^efm&  above 
freezing,  and  the  roads,  indlidmg 
those  the  Russians  had  sin  faced  with 
layers  of  packed  snow  and  sawdust, 
w<^  flawing.  Maneuvering  out  of 
the  q  u  e  s  I  i  o  n  .  The  only  w  a  v 
BatJECKENscHLAG  could  succeed  was  by 


punching  through  to  the  Lovat  Idv  the 
most  direct  rcnite. 

The  six-mile  distance  to  the  Lovat 
was  an  ordinary  two-hour  walk.  It  took 
vSeydlitz's  iioops  eiglir  fhn  s  \o  get  within 
500  yards  of  the  river  and  to  begin  a 
slow  turn  upstream  toward  Rattiti- 
shevo.  The  II  (^orps  force  under  /orn 
began  its  attack  out  of  the  pocket  on 
the  14th.  It  was  a  gamble.  Zorn  was  not 
supposed  to  liavc  begun  moving  until 
Seydlitz  had  Ramushevo,  but  Seydlitz 
had  over  ten  thousand  casualties,  and 
by  the  time  he  reached  Ramushevo — ^if 
he  did — the  rasputitsa  wa$  certain  to  be 
in  full  swing. 

April  was  a  month  of  mud  and  crises; 
Army  Group  North  and  the  OKH  con- 
sidered having  11  Corps  attempt  a 
breakout.  Since  Army  Group  Center 
was  giving  up  on  its  share  of 
Brueckenschlag,  the  Demyansk 
pocket  was  at  best  a  (hnibtful  tactical 
asset,  but  no  one  wanted  to  argue  that 
point  with  Hitler.  Kuechler  did  tell 
Hitler  that  with  three  more  divisions  be 
couid  wipe  out  the  Vglkhov  pocket. 
Hitler  responded  that  henceforth 
Artnv  Gi  oups  Xorth  and  Center  would 
be  on  their  own  tiecause  all  troops  and 
material  itdt  already  t^asiAitted  mnM 

lie  going  intti  <the  SltOittier  (iftcnsive. 
Kuediler  tlleoi;  scf^pedl  togetlier  five 
battalions  that  he  could  have  used  to 
pump  SI  l  ength  into  BRt  F.CKtNSt  Hi  .\(; 
but  that  he  had  to  put  into  the  Kiiohn 
relief  "becSttse  htntJanfty  arid  com- 
radeship make  it  unthinkable  to  aban- 
don the  Scherer  Group."''  The 
Luftwaffe  had  a  battalion  efparaQ'oops 
to  land  in  Kholm.  To  drop  them  there, 
however,  would  necessitate  divertii^ 
transpojrU  from  tflie  Beta^piisk  airM 


H,  Gr.  Nord  ISVSm  file.  12- 14  Apr  42. 


196 


uosam  TO  stm^ingrad 


MMSJtM'Gufi  NfeSr  0N  twE  Volkhov  f^oNT 


wMfih  would  probably  res^ult  in  sub- 
stantial losses.  The  army  group  pre- 
dicted d(nnlv  that  il  the  drop  were 
attempted  liall  the  men  would  land 
amonef  the  Russians  and  the  others 
would  "bleak  all  the  bones  in  their 
bodies"  cotning  down  among  the  biriM- 
ings  in  the  town,^^ 

Tire  Luftwaffe,  discontented  with  its 
support  role,  wanted  to  withdraw  th© 
Sluka.s  from  Bri'fckfnschi  AG  for  oper- 
ations against  the  Soviet  naval  vessels  at 
Leningrad  to  assuage  Hider's  concern 
about  the  ships.  To  capture  Hitlei  s  in- 
terest and  circumvent  the  army  gioup's 
objections  to  this  action,  the  Lujtxvaffe 
raised  the  project's  status  to  that  of  an 


14  Apr  43. 


air  offensive  under  the  grandiloquent 
code  name  Goetz  vox  Beri.ici[ingi-"N. 
The  first  raid,  on  the  24th,  scored  hits 
on  the  battleship  October  Reiiolutiun  and 
tine  cruisers  Maxim  Gorkiy  and  Marty 
and  drew  down  heavily  on  the  am- 
IHunidon  for  Eighteenth  Army's  long- 
range  ardllerv  tlien  emp]o\ed  in  sup- 
pressing Soviet  antiaircraft  hre.  Subse- 
quent raids,  continuing  into  the  first 
week  in  May  with  reduced  artillery  sup- 
port, met  more  intensive  antiaircraft 
fire  than  the  pilots  had  experieOcetJ  be* 
fore,  even  in  the  London  blitz. 

In  and  around  the  VtjUdiov  pocket  a 
disaster  was  almost  certaitdy  develop- 
ing. The  only  real  qiMStitm  was,  for 
whom?  After  tfee  Russians  hmle  opefl 
the  Erika  Lane,  Kuechler  relieved  the 
XXXVlll  Corps  commander.  At  the 


THE  CLINCH 


197 


Fuehrer  Headquarters,  the  feeling  was 

that  the  fiSth  Infantry  Division  com- 
mander,  in  whose  sector  the  mishap 
fiad  occurred,  should  aifm  be  relieved 
because  lie  was  "more  a  professor  than 
a  soldier."  While  Kuechler  protested  in 
vain  foi'  two  days  that  being  'edtitated 
and  well-read"  did  not  necessarily 
make  an  officer  ineffectual,  the  Rus- 
sians also  retook  the  Dora  Lane.** 

The  hencdl  the  Russians  gained 
from  retaking  tlie  two  lanes,  however, 
did  not  quite  equal  the  pain  the  loss 
ottasioned  lor  ilie  Germans.  The 
XXXV lU  Corps  and  1  Coi-ps  held  the 
«)tridor  fonned  by  the  lanes  toa  width 
of  less  than  two  miles,  and,  by  mid- 
April,  the  thaw  and  constant  air  and 
arallery  bombardment  Had  ttfmed  the 
lanes  into  cratered  ribbons  < >!  iiuid.  SVr- 
ond  SliocA  Army  was  not  stian^led  but  it 
"tm  Poking.  Eighteenth  Array,  for  its 
part,  reported  that  its  continuing  hold 
on  Lyuban  owed  entirely  to  "luck  and 
entirdy  unfounded  opfiimsiri*  both  of 
which  could  be  dispersed  at  any  time 
by  Soviet  infantir  "and  a  few  tanks."*'' 

AH  of  Army  Group  Sfortfi  was  in- 
deed, as  it  put  it  to  Hitler  and  tbe 
OKH,  "living  from  hand  to  raouth  and 
on  an  almost  md^nsihle  optfrnism.*** 
On  the  other  hand,  the  rasj^ulitsa,  at 
least,  was  nobody's  ally.  It  was  impai  tial. 
The  idhter  had  n&t  been;  It  had  given 
the  Russian^Che  iniiialive;  liiit  that  was 
inexorably  md[ting  away  with  snow  and 
ice.  Sgeond  Shoek  Army  and  Fifty-fourth 
Artny  held  low  groimd,  swamp,  and 
bottomland.  The  Germans  expected 
the  Riissl^  Co  know  how  So  dieal  itnth 


m  ^  Nord.  la  KrupUigOHeA,  l^MiiZ.  SSl  Ik&r 
42,  H.  Gr.  Nord  75128/9  file. 
16  Apr  42. 


the  re^putitsa  better  than  their  own 
commands  did,  and  the  Soviet  armies, 
no  doubt,  did  know  how  to  deaJ  with 
the  inevitable  thaw  as  well  as  anyone. 

Stalin,  liowever,  wanted  more.  Tlie 
Leningrad  Front  commander.  General 
Kho%m«  had  declared  that  if  he  were 
t^isen  ftffl  command,  he  could  still 
bring  off  a  victory  despite  the  raspulitsa. 
Marshal  Shaposhnikov,  chief  of  the 
General  .Staff,  did  not  believe  Khozin 
was  capable  of  conti  olling  operations 
by  ten  armies  and  several  independent 
corps,  but  Stalin  was  for  giving  him  a 
chance.  On  23  April,  the  Stavka  re- 
lieved Meretskov  and  abolished  WkJuro 
Front,  turning  it  over  as  an  operational 
group  to  Head«juarte.rs,  Leningrad 
Phnt.  Khozin  then  was  ^en  orders  to 
step  llie  offensive  and  bieak  (lie 
Leningrad  siege. The  job  that  had 
been  too  big  for  Meretskov  and  Rhtwin 
together  was  not  likely  to  be  mastered 
by  one  of  them  alone,  and  the  time  was 
poor  for  experimenting  wifft' ad  hbe 
commands — the  Volkov  River  had  an 
open  channel  down  its  center;  the 
Erika  and  Dbri  limes  mere  under.^ 

water;  and  Strond  Shoek  Awty'^  perim- 
eter in  the  pocket  was  starting  to 
shiinuk. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  29th, 
Kuechler  talked  by  telephone  to 
Btfwkdof ff  in  the  Demyansk  pocket. 
Se\dlii/'s  .ni<i  /orn's  troops  standing 
opposite  eacli  otiier  on  the  Lovat  had 
stnmg  a  telephone  liitteaiQ'OSS  the  fiver. 
Nniilniwi  Fnini  would  be  denied  its  final 
victory  over  11  Corp& 

At  RhoJm,  l%ird  SM^  Amy  mnsr- 
tered  artillery  and  tanks  and  broke  into 
the  pocket  from  the  south  on  1  May, 


^Vaiulcvskiy,  I84i  W^nai^,  Swiiing  But 

FeopUi  p.  207. 


198 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


the  ninety-sixth  day  of  the  siege.  The 
relief  force  under  Generalmajor 
Werner  Huehner,  Uckermann's  suc- 
cessor, was  stalled  a  mile  to  the  west 
where  it  stayed  for  three  more  days 
while  the  infantry  probed  for  an  open- 
ing and  the  Stukas  rained  bombs  on  the 
Russians.  Hitler  claimed  that  more 
bombs  were  dropped  during  this  attack 
than  in  all  of  World  War  I.  During  the 
morning  of  tlie  5th,  a  predawn  tank 
and  infantry  attack  reached  the  west- 
em  edge  of  the  pocket  at  daylight.''^ 


"H.  Gr.  Nonl,  la  KriegsUtgebu^  l.~3UAl,  I~5  May 
42.  H.  Gr.  Nord  75128/10  file. 


The  winter  had  ended.  The  occa- 
sional sfiow  that  continued  to  fall  was 
heavy  and  wet.  The  mud  on  the  roads 
was  a  yard  or  more  deep,  and  horses 
sometimes  drowned  in  the  potholes. 
Every  guUy  and  dip  was  filled  with 
water.  The  woods  were  submerged, 
and  in  them  and  the  swamps,  wliit  h 
during  this  season  were  actually  shal- 
low lakes,  populations  of  vipers  were 
coming  to  life.  As  if  in  competition  lor 
a  doubtful  honor,  Sixteenth  and  Eigh- 
teenth Army  units  lavished  craftsman- 
ship and  some  artistry  on  signs 
asserting,  ""Jl^e  pjrse  of  the  wprid  be- 
gins here." 


CHAPTER  X 

Tlie  War  Behind  the  Front 


The  Fi^itism  Mm&mnt,  Be^/nrnm^ 
Orgamza&n 

The  Germans  assumed  throughout 
the  war  in  the  East  that  the  Soviet 
leadership  had  prepared  intensively 
for  a  partisan  campaign  well  before  the 
war  broke  out.  Partisan  warfare,  after 
all,  had  been  important  in  earlier  Rus- 
siiui  wars,  and  Soviet  literatuie  had 
highlighted  the  activities  of  the  Red 
partisans  in  the  1918-1920  civil  war. 
German  analyses  of  the  partisan  move- 
ment made  during  the  war  look  prior 
preparation  for  granted,  as  is  shown  in 
die  following  statements  from  the  first 
"Bulletin  on  Partisan  Warfare"  piit  out 
bjr  liie  Eastern  Braiif^  AfaBaf 'lii^ 
Ugeii^  and  fi  om  a  sfenilar  Air  Korce 
Intelligence  series: 

The  use  of  partisans  is  a  well  known  and 
t^fgd  means  of  warfare  in  the  internal  and 
external  conflicts  of  the  Russian  peoglig.  Jt 
is,  therefore,  not  surprising  that  the  SiJviet 
Government  prepared  for  partisan  war- 
fare before  the  outbicak.  of  the  war 
tlirougli  tlie  use  of  the  NKVD.  creatidn  <if 
apian  ol  organization,  retruimient  ol  foi- 
mer  pardsans,  secret  courses  of  instruc- 
don,  instructions  for  the  responsible  of- 
ficers (  if  all  palitieal  ot^gaifeations,  and  so 
forth.' 

The  Soviet  authoriues  very  carefully 


'OKH.  Gi-nSulll.  hllQ^liaelmcktmtteimBattdmkmg 
Nr.  I.  1.5.43,  H3t73S. 


the  war,  within  tlie  framework  of  the  secret 
state  police  of  the  Soviet  Union  [NKVD].^ 

The  German  documents,  however, 
do  not  contain  any  direct  evidence  to 
support  their  conclusions.  Erickson 
states  that  Stalin  stopped  "experimen- 
tation and  HrillcM'^  ^iffiigency  plan- 
nuig  c^)nnected  with  possible  partisan 
operations  on  Soviet  territiory"  after 
In  addWort,  the  tnmt  com- 
prehensive German  postwar  study 
states.  "Before  the  war,  Stalin  repeat- 
edly expressed  the  conviction  that  the 
Soviet  Ai  tiiy  was  prepared  to  vrard  off 
any  attack  on  its  ten  itory.  . .  .  Because 
of  this  conception,  preparations  for 
popular  resistance  were  not  under- 
taken. . .  ."*  As  Eiickson  indicates,  the 
theory  of  "carrying  the  Msrr  to  enemy 
territory"  and  the  possible  tiniowartl 
effects  of  fostering  insurgency  would, 
very  likely,  have  kept  the  Soviet  govrnt'* 
ment  from  preparing  for  partis^  wr- 
fare  beforehand,^ 

Wererth^es§,  when  0te  'vm  atsated, 

the  Soviet  government  iniSBediately 
undertook  to  call  a  pardsan  movement 
to  im.  Omt&^vm  mih  the  Coundl 
Peopled  CjafBOJ^sars  and  the  Central 


-OKL,  Ic,  FLO,  EinzeinackHchlen  desleJHeiiS^Oit  dir 

Lujiioafje.  Nr.  29.  2.H.  I2.  OKL/2r)4. 

''liiiLksi in.  Iti'tid     Slalni^iii/I.  p.  24il 

'Ellch  Hl-SSi:,  Drt  •.ini'jHi  ii.ssiMlir  Pin  tl\ilni'nkrifg,  1941 
l>!.'.19.li  (t,(H-iiiiii;<-ii:  MiislcischiJiidt.,  l969Sl,|>,4J. 

'Erickson.  Ruiid  li/  UluliH^nd,  p.  2401. 


200 


MOSCOW  TO  STAWNGRAD 


Committee  of  the  Communist  Party  or- 
dered all  party  and  government  organs 
in  the  frontier  areas  to  create  partisan 
detachments  and  to  "kindle  partisan 
tvsaiare  all  over  and  everywhere."  "For 
ihe  enemy  and  his  accomplices,"  the 
order  read,  "unbearable  conditions 
must  be  created  in  the  occupied  ter- 
ritories. They  must  be  pursued  at  every 
step  and  destroyed,  and  their  measures 
must  be  frustrated.""  In  Belorussia^ 
where  the  Germans  were  making  theiT 
deepest  advances,  the  republic  central 
committee,  on  30  June,  issued  its  "Di- 
fccfive  No.  1  on  the  Transition  of  Party 
Organizations  to  Underground  Work 
in  Enemy  Occupation."  The  directive 
ordered  party  organizations  to  employ 
partisan  clct;uhments  "to  combat  units 
of  the  enemy  armies,  to  kindle  partisan 
warfare  everywhere,  to  destroy  bridges 
and  roads  and  telephone  and  tele- 
graph lines  and  set  fix^  tq  sup.piy 
dumps. .  . 

On  18  July,  (lie  All-tiiiion  (national) 
Central  Committee  issued  an  order  to 
all  party  Committees  in  which  it  "ex- 
panded and  concretized  [sn  J"  tlie  29 
June  directive.**  The  order  informed 
the  committees  that  they  would  "re- 
ceive in  every  town  and  also  in  every 
village  willing  support  from  hundreds, 
ei^ii  .fjbousahds  of  onr  brotliers  and' 
fifea^^and  "demanded"  tliat  the  com- 
mittees assign  "reUable,  leading  Pai  ty, 
Soviet,  and  Komsomol  activists"  to  lead 
and  spread  partisan  activity.  It  called  to 
the  committee^  notice  also  that  "there 


WAn;  vol.  IV,  p.  52. 

'.A.  A.  Kuzny;jev.  Ridpohiw  partiynjr  iiri;<iiiy  kompiirtii 
beU>rm\n  v  gocly  velihn'  I'tfrlii'sh'fiinin'  iv/wii'  (MimtL' 
Izdatelsivo  '"Bf!;irii>."  197"i).  y  <>. 

"V.  .■Xndriaiiov,  "Riikovoihtm  kirmmuniitichtskey  partn 

Zlmrml,  10  (1977),  61.' 


are  still  cases  in  which  the  leaders  of  the 
Party  and  Soviet  organizations  of  the 
rayons  [counties]  threatened  by  the  Fas- 
cists shamelessly  leave  their  combat 
posts  and  retreat  deep  into  the  rear 
area  to  safe  positions"  and  that  "the 
Party  and  the  Government  will  not  hes- 
itate to  take  the  most  severe  measures 
in  regard  to  those  slackers  and 
deserters."* 

The  central  committee  order,  al- 
though it  designated  partisan  warfare 
as  a  party  function,  was  supplemented 
by  army  instructions  on  organization, 
objectives,  and  tactics,'**  T^ese  spec- 
ified that  the  detachments  were  to  i.on- 
sist  of  75  to  150  men,  organized  into 
two  or  three  companies,  with  the  com- 
panies divided  into  two  or  three  pla- 
toons. Operations,  which  were  to  take 
the  form  of  "attacks  on  columns  and 
concentrations  of  motoiized  infantry, 
on  dumps  and  ammunition  trai:isports, 
en  airfields,  and  on  railr<5ad  trans- 
ports," were  to  be  conducted  primarily 
in  company  and  platoon  strengths  and 
"carried  out,  as  a  rule,  at  night  or  from 
ambush."  The  detachments  would 
have  to  locate  in  areas  with  enough  for- 
est to  provide  cOver,  but  each  rayon 
ought  to  have  at  least  one  detachment. 
The  instructions  went  on  to  describe 
methods  of  laying  ambushes,  destroy- 
ing dinnps  and  bridges,  and  wrecking 
trains  and  the  precautions  to  be  ob- 


"  the  IS  July  order  is  nCK-n  cilctl  In  Soviet  piiblica- 
UDti.s,  but  ils  amtem  is  ii"!  given.  Ttie  full  lexi  of  a 
liiiiri<l  ill  ticiiiiiin  If  .  nuts  is  prinleti  ill  John  A. 
ArisisliiiiiiJ,  I-rl..  I'h,-  S,i7'i,-I  l'<i)li<.an\  in  W)rlfl  Wiir  II 
(Madison:  I'liivi-isiU'  ot  V\'lsoinsin  Pre^s,  lOrvi),  pp. 
053  ^.5,5. 

'"Tlif  "liistiiiiMon  Cfnifi'siilng  iIk-  ;,.;iiiii/aLii.in 
.siul  A(.Li\itv  o[  Pinlisan  Dflik hnifiils  :iii<i  l)i\ci- 
iiionist  Groups"  Issued  by  Northlvesl.  FrmU  on  20  July 
1941  is  prtated  m  An&stfong,  Smnet  Pwtuaiw,  f^p, 
655-62. 


THE  WAR  BEHIND  THE  FRONT 


201 


Poster  Rf  \ns,  "Partisans!  AypiGE 
WuHou  r  Mi£Ri;y!" 


seized  on  l3te  march,  in  camp,  and  un- 
der pursuit." 

Under  the  instructions,  a  first  sta^ge 
in  preparing  for  partisan  waffefe 

would  be  to  set  up  "destruction  bat- 
talions."' These,  each  consisting  of 

of  or  fer  other  reasons,  were  not 
eligiMe  for  regular  mihtary  service, 
were  to  be  or^raked  in  threatened 
areas  by  the  local  party  and  NKVD  of- 
fices. Their  tasks  initially  would  be  to 
fight  against  enemy  parachutislS,  arrest 
deserters,  hunt  down  "counierrevolu- 
Uonaries"  and  enemy  agents,  and  to 
gitipilc^  riie  m&tm0mn 

fife  against  enemy  aircraft.  When  oe- 


pp.  656-61. 


cupdtimi  'became'  rorminent,  the  *best- 
trained,  most  i  oin  ageous,  and  most  ex- 
perienced lighters"  were  to  be  detailed 
to  fight  as  partisans.** 

The  party  invoKement  broiiglit  a 
massive  apparatus  to  bear  on  the  or- 
ganization of  ifie  pardsaii  ttromnent. 
One  line  ran  from  the  Central  Com- 
mittee of  the  All-Union  Communist 
Party  thiough  file  eetttPSl 
of  the  republics  to  flo/ens  of  provincial 
(oblast)  and  hundreds  of  ra^m,  party 
committees.  At  each  levd,  a  sedttofi 
(Roman  "10"),  also  designated  "P«r- 
tizanskiye  Otryady"  ("partisan  detach- 
ments*), 'W^S  responsible  for  creating 
and  directing  partisan  units.  A  second 
line  branched  off  below  the  All-Union 
Central  Committee  to  the  Msfe- Ad- 
ministration of  Political  Propaganda  of 
die  Army,  which  also  created  a  chain  of 
^^•SI^S^Mf  estesnding  limm  to  the 
fronts  and  armies.  Alongside  these,  the 
NKVD,  which  had  networks  of  offices 
in  both  the  civilian  and  military  sectors, 
projected  ilself  into  the  partisan  move- 
ment dirough  its  functions  related  to 
the  destruction  battalii(i*is.  Wbili&  the 
party  committees  were  the  designated 
command  channel  for  the  partisans* 
the  operatieatal  and  tactiea!  diriectives 
on  partisan  warfare  came  mainly  froin 
L.  Z.  Mckhlis,  the  chief  political  com- 
missar aha  hmA  &i  the  Main  Admin* 
istraiion  of  Political  Propaganda  of  the 
Army,  and  the  NKVD,  through  the  de- 

^troetion  haatralteris,  p^ably  supplied 

the  largest  sl^e  Of  reacmts  to 

the  early  partisan  aiiidp^:®6iftt.^ 

"Earl  Zierake,  The  Smiel  jR)*iJja®>iSfeai«aB  h,  imi 
i%lshingtoa,  D.C.:  Air  KfeS^!Fi9^  9!}ii  Pe«^Et^»E(teitrt 
Command,  1954)»  p.  11* 

"md..  pp.  n-is.^^Qfmij6m&^,  ti0^ 

AH-  K'Verw.,  "Erfahna^^  U0h^  At^haa,  Atifgalim, 
At^iretm  umi  Bekampfii^  der  Paftisanmtlbtdiatigen" 
15  Jan  43,  Wi/W  file, 


202 


MOSCOW  TO  SlAtlNGRAD 


liiree  of  the  orgaairing  agendes^ 
worked  on  the  Soviet  side  of  the  front, 
setting  up  destruction  battaUons  and 
partisan  detadtm^^tiiii  alue^  M  the 

German  advancet  flifar  accom- 

pjished  from  jpl^i*  lo  cdjEnp^  ^'^l^ded 
ott  tihe  speed  with  wBieh  the  ti-ofit 
moved,  how  much  central  direction 
could  be  given  under  often  chaotic 
condidom,  and  how  sach  drre^on-was 
interpreted  and  applied  at  the  local  lev- 
els. The  organizers,  except  for  some 
wh©  ^bsequendy  h&^ant  iti^t*ers 
underground  parly  committees,  were, 
for  the  most  part,  not  themselves  par- 
ticipants ftt  the  i»€)pre!insi*tT  coa- 
sequeatly,  when  the  front  passed  over 
an  area,  the  partisans,  who  were  often 
recruited  tjir  drafted  only  days  before 
from  factories  and  collective  farms, 
were  left  to  learn  from  experience,  if 
they  eotrld.  M  a  fesult,  die  effort,  no 
doubt,  was  more  impressive  on  the  So- 
viet side  of  the  front  ttxatft  its  effects 
tvere  otr  die  CEmnan  sliie/ 

At  its  inception,  the  partisan  move- 
ment was  what  the  Germans  termed 
Oi^sansm^,  that  is,  the  detactei^ts 
operated  out  of  fixed  bases  and  over 
relatively  short  distances.  In  mmt  in- 
stances, a  detachment  was  tdentt^ed 
with  onef^sp^  which  was  also  its  pri- 
mary operating  area.'^  This  remained 
a  predominant  characteristic  of  the 
World  War  II  ,S()\iet  jiarfisan  move- 
ment throughout  its  existence.'"'  Geog- 
ra^^j  m&re  tliaii  anySiing  Smi,  mmc 


'^See^tmxyeLf^v^fiidpolnye,  which  gives  the  partisan 
unit^i  associated  Wkh  the  r&ptii-  of  Belomssia.  See  p. 
215. 

'^The  Soviet  accounts  also  describe  lovmg  ami 
raiding  t\pes  of  partisan  units.  Outside  of  Karelia, 
however,  where  the  partisan  l);iscs  were  located  on  the 
.Sijviei  side  nf  the  front,  those  did  not  come  into 
existtnre  liiitil  ihe  siiniitier  of  1942.  Even  then,  expe- 
ditions by  roving  detachments,  such  as  those  of  S.  A. 


\t  possible  for  fixed  dettrdhMents  to  de- 

\  elop  and  survive.  Tlie  pardsan  move- 
ment grew  up  and  always  was  sti'ongest 
^ast  isf  the  Dnepr-Dvina  line,  in  eastern 
Belorussia  and  the  western  RSFSR 
(Russian  Soviet  Federated  Socialist  Re- 
ptiblic).  There  an  almost  ilftbroken 
stretch  of  forest  and  swamp,  reaching 
from  the  Pripyat  Marshes  to  north  of 
Lake  Ilmen,  aiforded  ^ceflfent  cover> 
and  the  German  troops,  by  preference 
as  well  as  necessity,  stayed  close  to  the 
roads  and  railroads.  Familiarity  witib 
the  terrain  and  contac  ts  with  the  inhab- 
itants gave  added  protecUon. 

TheSlm^mi  Oiryad 

The  Shmyrev  Otryad  ("detachment"), 
while  not  typical,  affords  the  most  sub- 
stantial existing  example  of  an  early 
partisan  unit.  Wliile  much  of  what  hap- 
pened to  it  was  characteristic  of  the 
whole  movement,  it  was  not  typical  be- 
cause it  was,  in  all  likelihood,  much 
more  active,  better  led,  and  effective 
thaa  M  but  a  very  few  of  #ie  origiftti 
detachments.  From  it  would  cxoh  e  (in 
1942)  the  ist  Beiorusaian  Partisan  Bn- 
gede,  ©fie  of  the  premier  partisan  units 
of  the  \var.  Its  first  commander.  Mihay 
Filipovich  Shmyrev,  would  be  given  the 
highest  Soi^et  aeifcarajMSWi  Hero  of  the 
St)viet  Union,  and  ISEtd!^  bis  mm  tic 
guerre,  "Batya  ['paipa']  Mihay,"  would 
become  a  legendary  figure  in  the 
movement.  Im[>()rtant  at  the  outset  was 
that  Shmyrev  had  some  actual  previous 


Ktjvpak  and  A.  N-  Saburov,  were  apparently  staged 
priinai  ilv  to  cultivate  local  partisan  activity  in  areas  in 
Hhitli  it  hfid  hitherto  been  weak  or  nonexistent,  the 
likiainc.  in  particular.  See  Armstrong,  Soidet  Par- 
iLyau,.  pp.  114-16:  IVMV.  vol.  V,  p.  292;  and  A. 
Ill  vtikli.inov,  "Gfrinrfmkaya  batba  S9]iSlshifA  pt^ixttoi  V 

Zhurnat.  3iU>65). 


THE  WAR  BEHIND  THE  FRONT 


203 


experience  in  partisan  warfare.  In  the 
literature  of  tlie  movement,  he  is  said 
to  have  been  a  partisaft  dtiJing  the  dvH 
war."*  Actually,  his  experience  appar- 
ently came  from  fighting  anti-Soviel 
partisans,  whom  the  Soviet  authorities 
called  "bandits,"  as  the  Germans  later 
referred  to  the  Soviet  partisans.^'  What 
nakm  ^Mfitym  Cf^iyiiet  a  tisefiil  ex- 
ample is  that  it  achieved  sufficient 
prominence  to  be  given  more  than 
ordinary  treatment  in  the  Soviet  liter- 
ature, and  the  Germans,  as  well,  accu- 
mulated considerable  information  on 
its  operations  j  primafily  fmad  W^^il^ 
tured  diaries  that  hadtie^lS^t^M-- 
ficers  in  theotryad.^^ 

The  Shmyrm  Oiryai  was  fottmed  in- 
Surazh  rayon,  thirty  miles  northeast  of 
Vitebsk,  in  eastern  Belorussia,  Its  first 
tt&diriiiits  were  file  eifiployals  of  a  sniall 
cardboard  factorv  in  the  'tillage  of 
Pudoti.  Tsanava  states  that  the  detacli- 
BieM.  was  '^iiit^ed  on  9  July  whea 
Shmvrev  called  a  meeting  of  the  worfe^ 
ers  and  j^roposed  that  they  form  a  paP- 
tisan  linit,**  Hie  t!i$^>#aries  indicate 
that  the  process  ^  organization  had 
Started  on  5  July  wheii  the  secretary  ot 
^aempn  party  committee  and  the  head 
of  the  rayon  NKVD  office  "suggested" 
to  Shmyrev  that  he  start  a  partisan 
iMMt.*"  However,  their  backing  gCDpped 


Bdorussii  jirutiv  jaihislskM  xahlivafhmtmv  (Minsk:  G0- 
^;iBdar„164»-ld$i;^  wl,  I,  p.  168. 
^^BeiSBiMimSmtskaifa  Entsiklopediya,  Si.«tLi  19^. 

Bil&r  Air  %£si!»ccb  Bt^tselt^pmcnt  Cemam^, 
I9B4),  p.  2. 

"Tsanava,  Vsewmdmya  partimtisliaya  i^oym,  p.  169. 
Awff  M,  W&t>  SS.  I.  and  II.  SS  KaR  Regis.. 


with  cliat.  and  tefiisec]  Shmyrev's 
lequest  for  wea^pdtljl;,  possibly  because 
they  did  notha^  aiiy, 

ShInyre^'  becaii^uie  commander  of 
die  detachment,  apparendy,  because 
he  1^  the  director  of  the  factory,  not 
because  of  his  carlici  experience  in 
partisan  warfare.  His  cormnissar  was 
doe  R.  V.  Shferedo,  who  had  been  the 
party  secretary  at  the  factory.  At  the 
outset,  the  detachment  consisted  of 
twenty-fhre©  jnen,  all  employees  of  the 
factory.  Frofflt  9  to  13  July,  the  men 
worked  at  jpifi&paring  a  camp  in  the 
^<36dSj  ai^d  «>n  the  ttight  of  the  13th, 
they  acquired  weapons,  including  a 
machine  gun^  and  ammunition  from 
rgtx'eating  Soviet  troops^  t>«ho  ako  told 
them  the  Germans  were  close.  The 
next  day,  German  troops  entered  Su- 
i^Slh  Ih*!  M3>«w»  fcfeiiter  lea  nnles  fo  the 
lOPlhieasr.  Fiom  then  on,  the  detach- 
ment was  behind  the  enemy  front  and, 
technically  at  least,  in  acdon.  During 
litic  day,  eight  Soviet  Army  stragglers 
?Etid  two  local  men  joined  the  detach- 
ment. However,  there  was  no  prospect 
of  acquiiing  large  niiinhei  s  (if  rec  ruits 
since  all  the  men  fit  lor  regular  military 
service  had  been  drafted  and  seat  to 
Vitebsk  during  the  first  week  of  July. 
On  17  July,  eleven  men  did  show  up 
d&aoft  a  destrucdon  battalion  that  had 
been  organized  in  Surazh  and  had  bi'o- 
ken  up,  and  on  the  18th,  six  local  po- 
licemen joined,  setting  of!  a  dispute 
Offer  who  slioiild  have  their  revoKers, 
they  or  the  more  senior  men  in  the 
tieiacliirienl,'^' 

Ihe  detachment  saw  its  first  action 
on  25  July  when  Slimyrev  and  ten  men 
surprisecl  a  party  of  German  cavalry 
bathing  ill.  a  river  and  claimed  twenty- 


204 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


five  to  thirty  casualties  witii  no  harm  to 
themsel\es.  The  nexi  clay,  for  tliree- 
and-a-lialt  hours,  twenty  of  the  par- 
lisans  watched  a  German  column  move 
through  Pudoti.  They  fired  on  the  last 
four  trucks,  destroying  one  and 
damaging  others."  After  these  ven- 
tures, prohahly  because  no  more  Ger- 
mans were  passing  through  Pudod,  the 
detachment,  for  a  month,  engaged  in 
looking  for  enemy  collaborators  aiul 
marauding  Soviet  stragglers.  The  Popu- 
lar Scientific  Sketch  credits  the  Shmyrev 
Otryad  with  having  carried  out  twenty^ 
seven  raids  in  August  and  September 
in  which  ii  killed  200  "fascists,"  de- 
stroyed tourteen  enemy  motor  vehi- 
cles, and  set  eighteen  tank  trucks  on 
fire.*^  Neither  the  diaries  nor  the  Ger- 
man records  give  evidence  of  activity 
on  such  a  scale. 

In  the  iirst  week  of  Septembei,  a 
dozen  Soviet  Ai-my  men  arrived  in  the 
camp  from  the  Soviet  side  of  the  front. 
At  the  same  time,  the  detachment  re- 
ceived 4  heavy  machine  guns  with 
15,000  rounds  of  ammunition,  a  heavy 
mortar,  and  a  light  mortar.  With  these, 
the  partisans  and  the  soldiers  attacked 
Surazh  on  13  September,  killing  several 
Germans  and  collaborators.^'*  Re- 
marlKablyv  die  Soviet  Information  Bu- 
reau in  Moscow  Istmed  a  pms  w^b^ase 
on  the  attack  almost  as  it  Vim  Ijiriag 
made,^* 

"Tbe  Centian  eBTotts  to  get  rid  of  the 
detachment  had  been  5u£Rdently  bap- 

'-'■/hid..  L'.")  Jill  Vl:  "P/trliMimn  Iii^ilmrh  ,Vi,  /"  ,in(i 
"\r.  2."  26  jiii  -12,  WaOcn  SS,  I.;in<l'  1 1.  SS  K;u.  Ri'KIv.. 
7H()'17/I96  file.  See  alsu  Tiaiiava,  \'ie?mtmimiyii  par- 
tiiiiiLskava  voyna,  p.  169. 

-H'OV.  p.  329. 

-'"I'aitisaiiinTngrfntfh  Nr.  I."  :i  I  .-Xiig  Jnd  I,  13- l-J 
Sep  42,  Walfrii  SS,  I.  :iikI  11.  SS  Kav.  RfRls.. 
78037/J96  hlc. 

'^Tsmi^vd,  Vstruinidiuiya  fMiUiximkaya  in/yna,  p.  170. 


liazi^d  to  build  the  parlisSffli^  con- 
fidence. .\i  first,  tlic  Germans  appar- 
ently had  taken  ihem  lor  army 
stragglers  who  afraid  u*  sur- 

renclci'.  Dining  tlie  Iirst  week  oi  Au- 
gust, they  had  foiuid  a  peasant  who 
had  offered  to  lead  them  to  ilu-  c  amp, 
but  tlie  partisans  had  gone  bef  ore  ihey 
arrived.  They  had  tried  also  to  spread  a 
rumor  that  ShmylW  had  been  shot. 
Their  assumption,  not  always  incor- 
rect, had  been  thai  the  partisan  rank 
and  file  would  disperse  if  they  believed 
the  leaders  were  out  of  the  way.  In. 
August,  also,  a  small  German  detach- 
ment had  taken  up  quarters  in  Pudoti 
for  a  time,  and  light  aircraft  had 
scouted — unsuccessfully — over  the 
forest.  The  Germans  made  their  big- 
gest effort  on  17  September,  after  the 
Surazh  raid,  when  200  troops  came 
into  Pudoti,  but  they  only  fired  into  the 
woods  and  d^P^I*^  same 
day.2«  ■ 

Tlie  Shmyrev  Otryad  had  been  one  of 
the  most — possibly  the  most^ — actitfe 
and  succe.ssful  original  partisan  detadh" 
menis  in  Belorussia,  hul  the  course  of 
its  development  in  194  i,  as  far  as  that  is 
known,  had  not  indicated'  a  safge  oF 
resistance  to  the  occupation.  Although 
it  was  situated  at  the  beart  of  poten- 
tially idea!  territory  for  psrt^n  war- 
fare, the  detachment  only  had  contacts 
with  three  other,  much  smaller  and 
apparently  less  active,  bandis.  Otit  of  its 
own  original  memliership,  fourteen 
men  had  deserted  by  the  end  of  July. 
By  the  last  week  in  August,  the  detach- 
nienl  had  increased  to  sixty-eight  men, 
but  by  tlien  diirty-eight  others  had 


'^"PartiMnen-Tii^ebutk  Nr.  2,"  5,  13,  20  Aug  and  17 
Sep  42,  WalTcii  SS,  I.  and  11.  SS  Jtav.  R^„ 

78037/196  tile. 


1  HE  WAR  BEHIND  THE  FRONT 


205 


deserted  or  been  expelled  for  cowar- 
dicas,  aad  one  had  is^eft  shtsti  On  t3te 
last  day  of  September,  the  latest  time 
for  wliich  either  of  die  diaries  gives  a 
figttre,  the  strength  wiS  i^^tf 
probably  still  inciuditig  the  twelve  from 
the  regular  army.*^ 

Strength  in  1941 

The  Sliort  History  stales.  "All  Sn\icl 
people  mounted  a  niouolithic  lesis- 
tance  to  the  enemy  forces.  At  tiie  f^oat 
and  in  the  rear  and  hi  the  areas  ot- 
tupied  l)y  the  fascist  oppressors,  ihev 
did  not  spare  themselves  in  fighting  f  oi^ 
the  honojr,  fi^e^dom,  and  independence 


'^'"^ammen-Tagcbuch  m  f  aaa  "m  2,"  29  Jvil-^SS 
Sep  42,  Waffen  SS.  L  afid  IL  SS  Eav.  R«gts., 
78037/196  file. 


of  their  socialist  country."^**  What  this 
Mmat  in  terms  of  the  strength  of  the 

partisan  movement,  ho^vever,  is  uncer- 
tain. The  SIml  History  gives  the  number 
of  partisan  units  fewed  m 
4i0O/9  The  History  if  ike  Scmml  Whrld 
Wn/r  states  that  "more  than  iw  o  thou- 
sand* were  in  existence  by  the  end  of 
the  year.''^"  The  Great  Sovirt  Encyclopedia 
(third  edition)  gives  the  partisan 
strengths  by  monSis,  but  only  for  the 
period  after  1  January  1942,  for  which 
il  gi\cs  a  figure  of  9U,0(){)  men.  Ihe 
/I is/or)  of  tM  Smond  Wrrld  War  gives 
about  ilie  same  overall  number  and  a 
breakdown  by  areas  which  yields  fig- 


^^f^W  f&ii^ma  hUrnyit),  p.  113. 
*!ffiBi.,  p.  110. 
^^mmSS,  vol.  IV,  p.  127. 


206 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


ures  of  20,000  parfisans  behind  Army 
Group  Hcttth,  40,000  behind  Center, 
anil  St,00^  hefamA  South.  However, 
these  luimbers  are  basefl  on  Commu- 
nist party  records,  which  even  lor  later 
peridds  when  doser  contrel  ^id  mate 

accurate  counts  were  possible,  give 
numbers  up  to  and  over  twice  as  hig!i 
as  those  of  the  Central  Staff  of  the 
Partisan  Movement.'"  Mosi  likely,  what 
party  lecords  show  are  numbers  of 
partisans  recruited.  Since  no  systematic 
contrri!  n!  the  movement  as  it  func- 
tioned bebuid  the  German  lines  had 
existed  in  1941,  the  numbers  in  apem* 
tion  would  have  been  unknown. 

1%^  Und^gmmd 

Fattisan  detachments  required  space 
and  covei ;  hence,  they  could  not  func- 
tion in  urban  areas.  Their  targets  were 
the  I  emote  StreCdles  road  and  rail- 
road, the  out-of-the-\\ay  yjlaces.  Ihe 
enemy  would  orditiai  ily  lie  too  strong 
and  tbo  much  on  his  guard  in  or  near 
towns  and  cities.  There  the  resistance 
would  have  to  take  another  forin. 

Consequently,  the  directives  of  June 
and  July  1941  chat  e.stal)lis]ied  tlie 
guidelines  for  the  early  partisan  move- 
ment also  called  for  an  "underground" 
(piiflpohfi)  of  "diversion i St"  groups. 
These  would  consist  ol  thirt)  to  litty 
mesa  each  and  would  carry  out  their 
operations  in  smaller  groups  of  three 
to  hve,  or  at  most  ten,  men.  Tlie  mem- 
bers of  one  group  would  usiialK  not 
kn()\\  ihnsc  of  any  other,  and  the  or- 
gaiuzalion  would  exist  only  to  receive 
and  transmit  instructions  and  carry  oiit 
recruitment.  Whereas  the  partisans 


*^Bekha^  Smfttsjiaw  fyttsHdoped^,  3d  ed..  1976, 
vol.  19,  p.  235;  IVMV.  «>L  IV.  p.  127.  See  p.  217. 


would  have  a  combat  capability,  the 
diversionists  would  do  dieir  work  by 
sCesldi.  Otherwise,  the  objectives  of  the 
t\vo  were  much  the  same:  to  destroy 
telegraph  and  telephone  lines,  railroad 
lines,  supply  dumps,  and  trucks  and 
other  \  ehicle.s.  TTie  diversionists  would 
also  kill  indi^'ldual  enemy  officers  and 
spread  rumors  designed  to  create 
panic  among  the  enemy.^^  The  par- 
ticular advantages  of  die  diversionists 
would  be  that  they  could  operate  in 
places  where  the  enemy  was  strong, 
stay  close  to  him,  and  strike  from 
within  his  midst. 

A  spec  ially  of  the  diversionist  groups 
was  railroad  sabotage,  since  die  rail- 
roads were  the  largest  still  functioning 
industr)  in  the  occupied  territory  and 
the  most  vital  to  the  Germans.  Two 
diversionists  reportedly  put  the  entire 
Minsk  railroad  water  system  out  of 
commission  for  nearly  a  month  in  De- 
cembei  1941.^''  A  group  operating  fO 
the  railroad  yards  at  Orsha,  under  one 
K.  S.  Zaslonov,  is  said  to  have  derailed 
100  military  trains  and  crippled  "al- 
most"  200  locomotives  in  die  months 
December  1941  through  February 
1942.^*  Other  groups  were  organized 
in  power  plants,  fat  tories,  and  among 
workers  in  metlianical  trades.  In 
Vitebsk,  fifty  groups,  numbering  more 
than  se\eti  hundred  persons,  are  said 
to  have  been  recruited.  The  diver- 
iiomst  activity  probably  took  its  most 
unusual  foT  m  in  ()fles,sa,  where  exten- 
sive catacombs  beneath  the  city  made 
partisan  warfare  practicable  in  an  ur- 
ban setting.  The  outstanding  success 


i**V.  Ife.  SysOiiiVf  ed.,  &«a^  jM^ff^  (Moscow: 
IzdJatlstvo  Potitiefaesfefjy  littMUUfj,  1970),  p.  58f. 
**VOV.  p.  336. 


THE  WAR  BEHIND  THE  FRONT 


207 


attributed  to  diversionists  in  1941  had 
been  the  destruction  in  one  week,  be- 
ginning on  19  September,  eff  the  Kiev 
railroad  freight  station,  the  shops  of 
the  Kiev  loeoiiiotive  workSf  ^nd  two 
factories.^^ 

Under  the  earh  directives,  control 
and  coordination  ol  botli  tlie  partisan 
detachments  and  the  diversionist 
groups  were  to  be  vested  in  another 
kind  of  underground  organization,  the 
"illegal"  party  committees.  These,  com- 
posed ol'  .several  particularly  trustwor- 
thy party  men  and  established  on  the 
same  territorial  basis  as  the  legal  com- 
mittees, would  stay  beliind  in  die  oc- 
l^piqii  ireas  and  assume  a  leadership 
Tofe.**  Reponedly,  the  sections  "X* 
each  had  a  member  assigiiefl  lo  ilieiii 
whose  identity  was  kept  secret  and  who 
would  take  over  as  pat  tv  secretary  dur- 
ing the  occupation,'*'  I  he  Histoiy  of  the 
Great  Patriotic  War  states  that  in  the  first 
months  of  the  war,  in  the  Ukraine 
alone,  23  oWiM/  ("district")  conmritrees, 
67  urbajft  r<6tya.»  committees,  564  rural 
rayon  ccMnmittees,  and  4,SI6  lessef 
party  committees,  with  membership  to- 
taling 26,300  people,  had  been 
formed.  However,  other  figures  indi- 
cate that  in  Belorussia,  where  partisan 
and  uiadergrotuid  activUy  had  been 
much  more  wdespread  than'  in  the 
Ukraine,  particularly  in  the  early 
period  of  the  war,  these  illegal  party 
committees  had  existed  in  only  2  out  of 
10  ohla.sts  antl  15  out  of  (  ACf  170  urban 
and  rural  rayons  as  ol  December  1941.'* 


^^Bystrov.  Gemi  podprihn.  pp.  7:1-75.  297-303; 
fVMV,  vol,  IV.  p.  126. 

""See  Arni.strong,  Sm'irt  Partisum,  p.  654. 

''GFP  Gi.  72 1.  "Pf/rdsmm  £!/«ft«B|lgsil(Hfefi4" 
22.1.42,  H.  Glib.  30910/37  file. 

*WOVSS.  vol  VL  p.  27Si  Kmnyaev,  Jb(^/ny«,  p. 
243. 


Qmmn  Rear  Arm  S  mmfy 

The  Getmacts  liad  eacp^ed  ttie  So- 
viet regime  tO  resort  to  partisan  war- 
fare, and  Hitter  had  even  aiiticipalcd  it 
with  a  degree  of  satisfaction.  On  16 
July  1941,  he  said,  "The  Russians  have 
now  ordered  partisan  warfare  behind 
our  front.  This  also  has  its  advatiteges: 
it  gives  us  the  opportunity  to  • .  .  exter- 
minate ...  all  who  oppose  us.*^®  Two 
weeks  later  he  embodied  this  thought 
in  an  cu  tler  to  the  forces  on  the  Eastern 
Front  stating,  "The  troops  a\  ailable  ior 
security  in  the  conquered  territories 
will  not  be  sufficient  if  offenders  are 
dealt  widr  by  legal  means,  but  [will  be 
suffident]  only  if  the  occupation  force 
inspires  sufficient  terror  among  the 
population  to  stamp  out  the  will  to 
resist."*"  In  an  infamous  "Order  Ck>il- 
cerning  Military  Justice  in  the  Barba- 
ROSSA  Area,"  issued  before  the 
invasion,  he  had  already  given  the 
troops  immunity  from  prosecution  for 
atrocities  committed  during  the  cam- 
paign.** For  him,  partisan  warfare  was 
less  a  provocation  than  an  excuse  and 
pretext  for  the  ruthlessness  with  wliich 
he  proposed  ta  conduct  the  war  in  the 
Soviet  Union, 

Although  Hider  was  perfecdy  willing 
to  be  merciless  in  stamping  out  any 
kind  of  resistance  in  the  Soviet  Union, 
he  was  actually  not  ready  to  do  so  in  the 
fast  areas  occupied  during  1941  except 
on  a  hit-or-miss  basis.  Anticipating  a 


'^Rfichsteili-t  BtyfimuDi.  Aklenvenni'rk  iti'hrr  I'lnr  Bf- 
\f)mlmng  mil  Rdilnleilft  lioM-iilic/g,  Rarhwiinisli  j  I  nm- 
mm,  FeldmarsthnU  Kntt-I.  umt  mil  dnn  Ri  iiJi'-imiiM  h:ill 
Gaaing.  I6J-4J.  NM  !  '221-L/l.!S.A-.vi  I  t  hli-. 

'"OA'VV.  IVFSl/L  (I  Oj).}.  EiiJn,'nz:iH^  -in  Wcivmii;  ?7, 
23.7.4!.  N  MT  C-32/C.B--lKr.  lilc. 

'■'Dn  Fiii-hrer.  Eiitiss  iieher  die  KnegsgiTuhtilmrkeil  im 
Gebiel  "BuHxirmsa'  mid  iidier  hemtdere  Massmkmen  der 
Truppf,  0.5.41,  NM  1  C-50  file. 


208 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


qiaick  vieloiyt  he  expected  to  be  in  ehe 
raopping-up  phase  before  rear  ai^a 
security  could  become  a  significant  mil- 
itary problem.  For  thai  reason,  and 
because  he  disliked  giving  the  military 
what  he  considered  to  be  political  au- 
thority and  also  to  save  on  manpower 
and  equipment,  the  Barbarossa  forces 
went  into  the  Soviet  Union  with  a 
strictly  limited  capacity  for  mi^mMx^ 
the  occupied  territory. 

The  territory  the  army  administered 
was  restricted  to  the  "opei  ations  zone," 
which  was  adjacent  to  the  front  and 
ftfhich  moved  with  it.  The  operations 
zone  could  be  extensive — that  of  Army 
Group  Center,  for  instance,  in  De- 
cember 1941  extended  150  miles  west 
of  Smolensk  and  m-ai  K  lo  Mosion. 
which  was  over  200  miles  to  the  east — 
but  it  was  always  temporary  and  pri- 
marily a  maneuver  and  staging  ateii. 
Within  tlie  operations  zone  a  slice, 
often  over  100-miIes  deep,  directly 
liind  the  Ironr  eame  iimler  the  cunirol 
of  the  armies,  each  ol  which  had  ap- 
pointed a  Kameck  (Kommandmi  Rneck- 
xmertiges  Armeegebiet),  the  commaiidam 
of  an  army  rear  area.  The  remainder 
of  the  operations  zone  became  the 
.iiniv  group  rear  area.  As  the  froiil 
moved  east,  the  army  group  rear  area 
commanders  and  the  K&rutch  became 
the  military  governors  of  broad 
stretches  of  Soviet  teiritory.^^  The 
Kdfnecks  and  the  army  group  rear  are^ 
<  ommanders  were  subordinate  to  their 
respective  army  and  army  group  cofn*- 
ttiattdfers,  but  tnfey  took  trieir  directidn 
for  the  most  [>art  from  ih<- i  hiersii])|»lv 
and  administration  oit'icev  (Generai- 
quariermekter}  in  tJie  OKM .  Before  tbe 


iixvasion,  the  OKH  had  set  up  nine 
security  divisions,  composed  mostly  of 
officers  and  men  in  the  upper-age 
brackets  and  equipped  with  captured 
French  and  Czech  weapons  and  vehi- 
cles. Each  army  group  rear  area  corti- 
mand  was  assigned  three  of  the 
security  divisions. 

On  1  September  1941,  what  was  ap- 
proximately the  western  two-thirds  of 
tlie  enure  German  operations  zone  had 
passed  to  two  civilian  Reich  com- 
missariats, the  Reichshommissariat  Ost- 
land  (the  Baldc  States  and  Belorussia) 
and  the  Retchskommissariat  Ukraine.  In 
the  Rrich  commissariats,  militai\  se- 
curity was  in  die  hands  of  an  armed 
forces  commander  who  came  under 
the  OKVV  and,  hence,  functioned  out- 
side normal  OKH  Eastern  Front  com- 
mand channels. 

1  he  SS.  wliieh  exercised  boll t  |Jo!i(e 
and  miiiury  functions,  also  operated  iu 
the  occupied  territory,  where  it  in- 
stalled  "higlier"  SS  and  police  comman- 
ders [Hoeherer  SS-utid  fbliziefuehrer)  who 
were  loosely  affiliated  with,  but  neither 
attached  nor  subordinate  to.  ihe  Reich 
commissariats  and  the  army  group 
rear  arsea  cOinmands.  TTie  SS  and  po- 
lice CQBunanders  had  at  theii  disposal 
vatioilS  kinds  of  police  ranging  from 
secret  state  police  fG^5to/wJ  to  the  SS 
intelligence  service  {Sicherhcit^diriist, 
SD)  to  German  dvU  police  and  police 
auxiliaries  femiited  in  the  Baltic 

SUtes.^'* 

In  a  categoi*y  by  themselves  were  the 
SS  iSmsritzgrupjxm  {"task  gi-oups").  They 
were  neither  police  nor  ti(K)|)s,  al- 
though their  personnel  were  drawn 


"AOK  -4.  (I.qii.,  Bcvn„l,-u-  \,u>l-ii)lunirrH  juti  ^-'H.-jh.  d.  Kliriku.  /-/.  (,.■!:  Mill,.  I'l  n,:,li,r,i  w  lind 

das  Opemtioiiigt'biel,BA/fJt  AtJk  -1  lll'j:Vy  Ijlt.  Pulizi'ijui-hrer.  Sluiid  wm  I.S.-I2,  \\.  Gcb.  l-il(i«-i/2  lilc. 


THE  WAR  BEHIND  THE  FRONT 


209 


ing,  pure  and  ^ttiple.  The^  consiisced  ^ 

just  four  groups,  designated  bv  tht 
letters  "A"  through  "D,"  and  iheh"  com- 
bined strength  was  barely  dver  i^stBt 
thousand.  But  where  they  went,  atl^ 
they  went  nearly  everywhere  in  the 
ocoipied  territory,  thousands  died. 
Tlie  Jews  were  their  primar\  target, 
but  Uiey  also  did  away  with  communists 
or  any  others  who  might  threaten  or  in- 
Ojnveniencc  the  < yccupation.*'*  The  lat- 
ter aspect  of  their  op^:^ons  may  have 
significandy  redueeo  the  number  of  po- 
tential recruits  for  the  underground. 

In  general,  from  the  German  point 
of  view,  control  of  the  occupied  ter- 
ritory bad  been  adeqiKiielv  organi/cfl 
in  1941.  Its  main  purposes  were  to  sub- 
jugate and  exploit  a  conquered  popula- 
tion and  to  keep  the  front  commands" 
Unes  of  coramunicauons  open,  and 
those  -were  being  aiscoicitpBshed.  Con- 
scquentlv.  the  army  group  rear  aiea 
conmianders,  Awrut'tfa,  and  SS  and  po- 
lice GOTnlfiaadef&  4id  not  stage  exten- 
sive atlt^Sf&an  campaigns.  Dining 
tfa^ra<piaildV!uice,  their  other  missions 
"W&it  tttC^  Ui^Btlti  Hieflla^^saifiS  were 
seen  as  a  t^^ilErary  annoyance  thai 
could  be  eiadiisdied,  in  its  turn,  with 
mitamvm  f^mt,  l^e  OKW  ad^vised, 
"The  appropriate  rf>mmanders  are  re- 
sponsible for  keeping  order  in  their 
areas  with  the  troops  assigned  to  them. 
Commanders  must  find  means  for  pre- 
serving order,  not  by  demanding  moi  e 
secnmty  t£«>o|>s,  b»icby  i?BSOtting  to  the 
necessary  Draconian  measures,"** 


Army  (.roup  Center  believed  it  eouM 
eliiniiKLie  ilie  [iartisans  in  its  area  after 
the  f J  ont  settled  down  for  the  winter  by 
fiiavlng  each  corps  provide  one 
BidtCffisced  company  to  hunt  do^vn  the 
pardsjms  in  the  army  areas  and  by  de- 
mching  one  ^vision  to  do  the  same  m 
the  army  greni^  rear  area.** 

Wi^Mei^SmMmmeiiU,  EsU^Hshed 

S&^Bnim  Resurgeni 

The  winter  of  1941-1942  was  bound 
to  have  been  decisive  for  the  partisan 
movement  one  way  or  the  other.  If  die 
Germans  had  kept  the  initiative,  the 
movement  would  prt>bably  have  with- 
ered. If  tlie  Germans  had  held  their 
own,  they  could  also  have  kept  the 
partisans  in  check.  But  when  they 
could  not  do  either,  their  latent  vul- 
nerability betsams'  outright  weakness. 
Geneial  Lcytenant  Sokolovski\,  chief 
of  staff  of  the  West  Front,  saw  the  Ger- 
man predicament  in  the  late  summer 
when  he  remarked,  "The  enemy 
strong-points  are  separated  bv  gteat 
siri-Kiu-s  of  territory.  Many  districts  in 
bis  rear  haw  not  vel  been  brought 
under  his  conli  ol,  and  his  defenses  are 
thus  subject  to  the  blows  of  our 
tisans." The  .Army  Group  Center  rear 
ai  ea  commander  saw  ilie  danger  in  the 
first  week  of  die  Moscow  countfiTOffen- 
si\e  and  voiced  his  alarm  on  14 
December: 

As  the  Russians  have  become  more  active 
the  front,  parttsan  adivity  lias  iai- 


'^Stt  Kfiul  HiUh'il;.  I ht-  th:struftntu  oj  tfif  Eufvlfrttri 
(Chui-..  i.hi;irl  till  mil-  H'x.kv  I'Kilt.  pp.  1B2-90 
and  i.r.M-i  II  Siriii,  I  h,  Willi, i:  ilthao^  N.Vl: 
dunicli  I  iiiM;i  sit\  I'u-ss,  i'-KiCi).  p.  263, 

^H)K\V.  WrStIL  (1  Of,.).  lirgammngtufyi^^Ullg33. 
23.7.41.  NM I  C-52/GB-485  fUe. 


ntiifi  nil 

WtnUr  xind  Besonderlifilrn  des  Wwlerkriegi-f  m  Hinslmid, 
I0J1.4I.  IV.  AOK  :i  IMI5/4'J  \\.\v:.V)K9.  hiV).  (J.(Ju. 
2.  P>trli!.antnbehu,-ml,l,iiig.  l.'iM,4J,  AOK.  9  14008/9  file, 
'■.40*;  16,  It.  ui.  iniidnaekrielitaitle^  Ht.  SI, 
ii.6Al,  AOK  J6  73873  file. 


210 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


hrnxmrno  Armored  Train  on  Patrol  Against  Partisans 


creased.  The  troops  left  to  this  command 
are  just  sufficient  to  protect  die  tOOSt  im- 
portani  installiitiuns  and,  lo  a  CQTISUi  ex- 
tent, the  railroads  and  highways,  for  active 
anti-partisan  operations  there  are  no 
longer  any  troojis  on  hand.  Therefore,  it  is 
ejipected  that  soon  the  partisans  will  join 
t€^ther  into  larger  bands  and  carry  out 
attacks  on  oui"  guard  posts.  Thi'ir  iii- 
oreised  freedom  of  movement  will  also 
lead  to  the  partisans'  spreading  terror 
among  the  penpl(^^  iviip  will  be  fon  ed  to 
stop  supporting  us  attdwlil  llien  no  longer 
carry  out  the  (ji  ders  of  the  military  govern- 
ment authorities.** 

The  Moscow  couiiicroiiensive  and 
the  general  (pensive  ptimped  ncfwlfe 
into  the  partisan  mo\ciiicnt  and  ac? 
complished  a  physical  and  psychology* 


cal  nans  formation  so  complete  as  to 
conslituie  virtually  a  whole  new  begin- 
ning. The  History  of  the  Seamd  V%irld  Tfer 
concedes  as  much  when  it  states,  "Tlie 
winter  of  1942  initiated  the  mass  par- 
ticipation of  Soviet  patriots  in  partiscin 
ac  tivity."''"  On  the  scene  at  the  time,  the 
Germans  observed  the  phenomenon 
and  ascnbed  it  to  influences  other  than 
patriotism.  Fourth  Army's  Korueck 
lepoited: 

The  situation  in  the  army  rear  area  has 
undergone  a  fundamental  change.  As  long 
as  we  were  victorious,  the  area  could  be 
dt^jcribed  as  nearly  pacified  and  almost 
of  partisana,  and  the  pogtilatips  m^- 
out  wosptsem  tsb^od  on  ottr  side.  Nim  ikc 
peo|de  are  no  longer  as  convinced  ais  they 


*^BeJh,  d.  Rueckw.  H.  Geh.  MiHr.  hi,  Zitfiwhntng 
weilenrr  SkherungskraeJU,  14.12.41,  H.  Geb.  H684/fUe. 


*HVmy  vol.  IV.,  p.  347. 


MAP  15 


212 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


were  before  of  our  power  and  strength. 
Kew  partisan  bands  nave  made  their  way 
into  our  territory;  and  parachutists  have 
been  sent  in  who  assume  the  tcadeisliip  of 
bands,  assemble  the  ci\  iiiaiis  suitable  for 
service  along  with  ilit-  partisans  who  up  (o 
now  had  not  been  active,  the  escaped  pris- 
oners of  war,  and  the  Soviet  solciiers  who 
have  been  released  from  the  military 
ho&pitais.^ 

The  Fourth  Army  Korueck  was  in  a 
good,  though,  in  that  winter.  Iiai(ll\ 
unique,  position  to  watch  llie  partisan 
upsurge.  Situated  on  the  northern  arc 
ol  the  Sukhinichi  Inilge,  with  tlie  Kirov- 
gap  on  its  right  flank,  Soviet  cavalry 
and  parachute  troops  behind  its  front, 
ami  its  rear  s\\c'[.)i  clean  of  securilv 
troops  that  had  long  ago  been  ilirown 
into  tfte  front,  Foiirffi  Army  was  a 
prime  laroi  i  tm  [lai  lisan  activity.  Wliat 
tlie  Korueck  beUeved  it  saw  was  not  a 
mass  patriotic  uprising  but  Soviet 
power  reaching  into  the  occupied  ter- 
ritory to  bring  the  population  back 
und4  its  contml.  Thm^gti  the  KiW 

U"ainecl  partisan  caches,  under 
army  and  NKVD  olhcers,  were  rang- 
ing deep  behind  the  front,  drafting  the 
men  to  fill  out  their  ranks.  Their  do- 
main covered  the  entire  Smolensk, 
Rf»kvl,  Ifyazma  triangle,  more  tfiaii 
five  thousand  square  miles. (Map  15.) 

lb  the  south,  around  Bryansk, 
where  the  forest  still  harbored  sur- 
vivors of  the  Soviet  units  destroved 
there  during  tlie  fall,  another  parusan 
center  bad  sprung  up.  From  the  great 

\«J&^1%M2axAFiiuith  Sluirk  Armirs  oc- 
cupied aronnd  Ibrupets,  partisan 
organizes?  "^^re  fannic^  oiit  M  adi  <Ji- 
reetions.  Since  virtually  no  front  ex- 


isted therej^  aems  was  open  to  the  deep 
rear  areas  AsWtJ  Groups  North  aiu! 
Center  and  mta  tne  Rekhshommissarial 
OMmd  west  to  the  Polish  border.  In 
February  1942,  Field  Marshal  Kluge. 
dieu  the  commander  of  Army  Group 
Ceat£»\  lold  General  ^a^er  tfhief  of 
^  Generai  StgEf): 

The  steady  increase  lit  11^  i3,«£^)CS«  of 
enemy  troops  behind  our  front  and  the 
(.oncomiiani  growdi  of  the  partisan  move- 
ment in  the  entire  rear  area  are  taking 
such  a  threatening  turn  that  I  am  impelled 
to  point  out  this  danger  in  all  seriousness. 

while  formerly  the  partisans  limited 
themselves  to  disruption  of  communica- 
tions lines  and  attacks  on  individual  vehi- 
cles and  small  installations,  now.  under  the 
Icadershij^  of  resolitie  Soviet  officers  with 
plenty  of  weapons  and  good  organization, 
they  are  altemjjling  to  brint^  certain  dis- 
tricts under  their  control  ancl  to  use  iliose 
districts  as  bases  from  which  to  laimch 
combat  operadons  on  a  large  scale.  Witli 
this  the  imdative  has  passed  mto  theiiaiuls 
of  the  enemy  in  many  places  he  al- 

ready controls  lar  gc  areas  and  denies  diese 
areas  to  die  German  administration  and 
German  ecfmoiiik  exploitation.^^ 

While  the  German  and  S<j\  iei  ac- 
counts agree,  in  tfcneral,  on  wliat  hap- 
pened to  tlie  partisan  movement  in  the 

fyinter  trf  1941-1942,  they  diveffe 
widely  as  to  why  and  how.  Concerning 
the  impetus  tor  the  partisans,  the  His- 
taryiof  iteGmiPmiisitk  asserts: 

The  %  ictot  \  of  the  Soviet  troops  before 
Moscov^  had  an  excepdonal  significance 
for  die  strengthening  of  the  morm-p<jfitical 
feeling  of  the  Soviet  people  whQ  were 
struggling  in  the  enem)%  rear  and  for  the 
development  of  ibe  partisan  niovemenl. 
News  of  the  destnttUon  of  the  Hitlerite 
armi»  on  the  approaches  to  the  capital 


^'^Komeck  559,  AbL  Qu„  Lage  iia  nudai/aerttgen  Ar-  _  

meegebiet.  KmueA  WZS&S  SSe.  "OA.  d.H.  i,r.  Milte.  an  dm  Hen  n  thej  tin  Ge- 

^Hbid.  wrahUibes  dei  Httrts,  24.2.42,  Ft.  AOK  3  20736/6  Gle. 


THE  WAR  BKHINO  THE  FRONT 


213 


quickly  spread  in  the  towns  and  \  illa^es  of 
the  occupied  territory.  This  notalile  victorv 
of  the  Red  Army  inspired  die  population 
k£  the  0CCU|H$4  areas  to  a  still  more  active 
istrug^e  wfth  tfie  enemy.  The  Soviet  |jeo- 
ple,  who  had  siifft-n-'l  unflcr  (he  enemy 
yoke,  strove  to  aid  ihv  Rt  il  Ai  nu  in  every 
way  possible  in  order  to  expt  (1  ihe  ag- 
gressors more  cjuicklyf  ioni  tlie  boundaries 
of  our  Motherland,  They  left  their  homes 
and  went  to  the  partisans.  .  .  .'^ 

Tlie  Histoty  describes  t!ie  Soviet  inler- 
veiition  as  follows:  "Dunng  the  winter, 
the  detachments  and  formations  re- 
ceived new  and  qualifietl  re|>lacements 
from  the  rest  of  the  nation.  In  the 
enemy's  rear,  via  the  gaps  that  had 
formed  in  the  enemy's  front  and  from 
the  air,  came  radiomen,  mine  planters, 
&ai.  also  pa3^  and  komsomot  msrheim 
i\  ho  were  specially  trained  for  carryiiig 
(Hil  pai  tisan  warfare."®* 

The  Partuans  oj  Kardyuwvo 

As  was  to  be  expected,  the  Germans 
seldom  managed  to  penetrate  the  in- 
ner structure  of  the  partisan  network. 
One  of  the  few  instances  in  which  they 
did  occurred  in  March  1942  when  the 
lOdi  Panzer  Division  unojvered  a  par- 
tisan detachment  that  was  being 
organized  near  Smolensk.  Tlie  detach- 
ment was  distributed  among  several 
villages  clustered  around  the  railroad 
fifteen  miles  east  of  Smolensk.  What 
was  unique  was  that  the  Germans  were 
able  to  caj^ture  and  interrogate  not 
only  rank  and  hie  partisans  but  nearly 
all  of  the  leaders,  a  total  of  fifty-five 
men  and  women. 

The  action  began  when  a  civilian  in 
one  of  the  villages,  Motlokovcf,  reported 


-"/V'Or.s.s.  vol.  n,  pi  365, 
''Hind.,  p.  349. 


one  of  his  neighbors  as  a  partisan.  The 
investigation  led  to  the  nearby  village  of 
Sokolovo  and  the  arrest  of  a  section 
leader,  his  commissar,  2  platoon  leadtefs, 
4  liaisoti  men,  .ind  7  partisatis.  Rigorous 
interrogations  of  lliese  people  over  a 
three wteksf  p^od  turned  up  leatis  to 
some  weapons  caches,  most  of  witiih 
liad  already  been  emptied,  and  to  other 
^edldosis  of  the  detachment. 

One  trail  led  to  Shadiibv  and  the 
arrest  of  another  section  leader,  who 
admitted  to  being  an  NKV'D  man  who 
had  been  sent  through  the  lines  to 
organize  partisans  but  who  hanged 
hiii^elf  in  his  cell  before  more  infor- 
matioil  could  be  extracted  from  him.  A 
second  trail  ended  ai  Kard\nu)vo, 
wMeb  prOVixi  fa  have  been  the  com- 
mand center  for  the  whole  detach- 
ment, and  tliere  the  10th  Pan/.er 
IKvinon  captured  the  conunander,  the 
commissar,  and  38  partisans.  The  Kar- 
dymovo  headquarters  had  consisted  of 
a  commander,  a  commissar,  a  deputy 
commissar,  4  liaison  persons  (women), 
8  section  leaders  (each  assigned  a  vil- 
lage in  which  !u-  (htected  the  partisan 
activity),  and  a  number  of  persons  who 
carried  out  special  assignments. 

The  commander  was  a  Major  Gas- 
paryan,  a  regular  army  officer  detailed 
to  command  the  partisans  by  the 
Head([tiarters,  West  Front.  He  had  kept 
his  subordinates  in  hand  with  utter 
ruthlessness,  and  those  who  were  cap- 
tured with  him  shook  with  iear  even 
when  they  faced  him  in  jail.  From  hira 
the  Germans  learned  nothing,  and  he 
was  beaten  to  death  during  the  inter- 
rogation. The  commissar,  who  inspired 
almost  as  much  fear  as  the  O&mmander, 
did  disclose  that  he  had  come  tlirough 
the  front  several  months  earliei;  after 
having  been  trained  as  a  partisiadQ 


214 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


org^mz)^,  and  that  lie  had  worked 
IQ  Smoleitsk.  as  a  locomotive  engineer 
before  joining  Gasparyan  at 
Kardymc3W3." 

Based  on  intemo^tions  of  all  the 
prisoners,  among  vmom  were  twelve 
^Nm^ti,  the  10th  famex  Wmmm  re- 
peat concluded: 

Terror  was  the  most  important  motivaiion. 
Betrayal,  hcsitatitm  to  |>arii(  i|)aie,  or 
failure  to  fullitl  missions  ucu  tiri  hired  lo 
be  punishable  by  death.  At  the  very  least,  a 
'certain  and  horrible'  death  was  promised 
after  the  return  of  the  Seniet  forces.  It  is 
itnpoi  lant  lor  the  sovereignty  of  the  Ger- 
man adtninisiratioa  that  the  Russian  fears, 
his  own  'Red'  comrades  far  more  than  lie 
fears  the  Gciman  authorities.  For  exam- 
ple, it  a  peas.iiil  has  a  caifit-  of  ueapons  iti 
Ills  hiHisL',  Ik-  will  iiDt  ie\eai  it  to  the 
Germans  out  ul  tear  of  the  vengeance  of 
hia  comrades  even  though  he  is  at  tlu  same 
time  threatened  with  death  by  the 
Germans.*" 

The  Maveimni  RemdeUd 

In  late  Julv  19-11,  the  ilieii  ('nityal 
Ermt  set  up  a  school  to  train  partisan 
conunandier»,  ^eiinDti^afs,  Bcnne  and 
demoliticm  specialists,  and  agents  and 
radio  operators.  Taken  over  later  by 
West  Front,  the  sdld@]  turned  out  over 
four  thousand  persons  in  the  last  four 
months  of  tlie  year.  Similar  schools, 
apparently  also  under  military  aus- 
pices, were  run  in  Kiev.  Kharko\,  Pol- 
lava,  and  other  cities.  On  orders  of  the 
Central  Committee  of  the  Soviet  Com- 
munist Partv.  three  schools  were  estab- 
lished in  January  1942:  one  to  insU-uct 
partf^  and  kmsoml  members  in  vtnder- 


^'10.  Pi.  Div.,  7  Pi.  Kgl..  Pz.  Vi'aksbilUmmptintt, 
PiiTtisnvnibtkami^ia^  113A2,  IQ  Si.  Div.  S3S45  Gle. 


ground  and  f^ir^an  a^dvitf;  one  to 

produce  partisan  learlcrship  person- 
nel, and  the  third  to  train  radiouaen.*' 
By  March  1942,  sooDed  operative 
groups  were  formed  to  work  with  and 
work  under  army  commands,  par- 
ticularly in  sectors  where  die  lay  <»f 
front,  or  absence  of  it.  gave  readv  ac- 
€3ess  to  the  enemy  rear.  Headed  usually 
by  a  party  ftmefelonary,  they  were  com- 
posed of  parr\.  at  nn,  and  NKVD  per- 
sonnel who  had  some  form  of 
competeirusiereladve  to  partisMa^vity. 
Their  functions  were  to  recruit, 
organize,  equip,  and  control  tlie  par- 
tuians  aeai^  die  front  and  nai^t  dliisiiti 
in  effect,  an  adjunct  of  the  army  fo 
which  the  operative  group  was 
attached. 

Among  the  first  and  most  effective 
of  die  operative  groups  was  tlic  one 
with  Fourth  S/wck  Army  i|i  ihie  Ibroijcts 
ljulge.  where  the  front  pracdcally  had 
dissoKe<l  in  January  1942.  Tliere  a 
Iwenty-inilc-wide  gap  on  the  western 
rim  of  the  bulge,  sometimes  called  the 
Vitebsk  Corridor  and  other  times  the 
"Surazh  Gate,"  sfmnned  Ute  itrhole  of 
the  Usvyaty  and  Sura/h  niYrm,  north- 
east of  Vitebsk,  rhrough  the  gap,  men 
and  horse  and  wagon  cohnnnsfe^pt  ttp 
steady  traffic  in  both  directions,  earn- 
ing in  weapons  and  ammunition  ioi 
the  partisans  atid  taking  out  -SlipitlieS 
for  Fourtli  Shock  Ann-^.  The  partisan 
units,  the  ioi  mev  Shmym  Otryad  which, 
as  a  brigade,  was  the  most  prominent 
of  them,  report edlv  passed  thousands 
oi  tons  ol  grain.  ha\,  and  potatoes  and 
several  tliousand  head  of  cattle 
through  the  .Soviet  side.  Thev  are  said 
also  to  have  mobilized  and  delivered 


*'/VAn',  vol.  V,  p.  4181. 


THE  WAR  BEHIND  THE  FRONT 


215 


25,000  recmhs  for  the  %6met  Army.** 

Before  the  end  of  March  1942,  the 
operative  grottp  with  fourth  S/wck  Army 
haiA  brou^t  the  ^strength  cdf  <tie  par- 
tisan units  in  its  area  froXB-  500  lo 
almost  7,500,  a  hiteenfold  inerease.^" 
As  <jf  December  1941,  apparently, 
few  partisan  detachments  had  had 
strengths  of  more  than  fif  ty,  the  pre- 
scribe iQinimum.  By  February  1942, 
the  average  for  both  old  and  new  de- 
taehments  had  been  between  two  and 
three  htiiidred,  and  by  April,  some 
were  a  thousand.  I'nder  the  in- 

creasing atiay  inllueuce,  those  in  the 
rai^m  one  to  three  thouKiad  tiieni« 
bers  were  beginning  to  be  called  regi- 
meais  and  bri^ules  and  to  adopt  the 
organizational  features  of  regular  mili- 
tary imits.  The  1st  StmilcrLsk  Partisan 
Dwiyum,  which  operated  tor  a  rime  in 
conjunction  with  Belov's  /  Guar^  Cav- 
alry Corp\,  claimed  a  sti"«'nij;ih  of  over 
five  dK)usaiid.  The  operative  group 
W&kThird  Shock  Army,  on  the  northern 
arc  of  the  Toropets  bulge,  united  7 
bri^des  and  3  otiyads  lo  form  die  / 
E^emtm  Partisan  Corps.  The  oipmklam 
group  w'illi  Fourth  Shock  Anny  trans- 
tormed  wliat  had  been  14  average 
Otryads  into  7  brigades,  2  regiments, 
and  7  independent  utryads.  I  he  shift  to 
large  units  also  bujught  into  existence 
the  part^a  Arav  {a  stretch  of  territory, 
sometimes  a  whole  rnvni.  in  which  a 
brigade  or  several  brigades  held  uii- 

"AJthdugli  it  appeai-i  Ui  have  been  Soviet  practice 
to  do  more  detailed  i|iiaiuiiauve  btMikkeeping  rm  the 
achievemci  1  ts  of  the  p;irii!>ans  and  the  undcrgimind 
than  on  almost  uin  otht-r  iispett  of  the  war,  the  rigiires 
im  these  .Rii\  iiie>  lend  (i>  vai">  from  pUice  to  plaie.  See 
A.  I.  Zalesski%.  Onwfheihiy  jmding  miihunuv  i-  />/ii  vraga 
(Minsk:  I/datelstvo "Belanis. "  197(1),  p.  HI  and  P.  Ver- 
shigora.  t,tutli  j  fhnim  sovestyu  (Moicow;  Sovetskiy 
pisatel.  I '.I'll),  p.  ;«H. 

=WMV,  vol.  IV,  p.  346. 


challenged  sway).  Reportedly,  4  of 
those  were  estalilished  in  Beloriissia  in 
the  spring  ot  1942,  and  4  in  the  Smo- 
lensk Ofito  of  the  RSFSR** 

Tlie  shift  toward  tlie  brigade  and 
territorial  forms  was  accomplished  by 
cGihlniiing  unitias  well  as  by  expanded 
rerruitmeni.  As  a  result,  the  indepen- 
dent detachments,  sudi  as  the  Shmyrev 
Ottyad,  had  aH  but  disappeared.  There 
were  advantages  to  ctmsolidation  both 
for  the  partisans  and  tor  the  Soviet 
authorities:  for  the  partisans,  more  se- 
ciniiv  and  ret'ognition,  and,  on  the 
Soviet  side,  more  ei  tettive  control  and 
$iirv4iiliNlce«  During  diie  shift,  ako,  the 

ptr^^  liiovfnient  became  tied  to  the 
army  and  ceased  to  be  more  than  a 
token  party  activity.  The  regiment  aosd 
brigade  commanders  were  often  still 
party  men,  but  they  had  military  ad- 
visers at  their  sides,  and  their  orders 
came  through  military  channels.  The 
units  were  organized  im  the  regular 
army  model,  including  the  O.O.  seifi* 
tions  of  the  NK\T)  to  keep  all  person- 
nel under  political  police  scrutiny. 

From  the  Soviet  itaitdpietat,  the  par- 
tisan movement  was  a  iveapon  to  be 
exploited  with  caution  as  well  as 
enihusiasm,  VVlien  arms  WSteplaC^in 
the  hands  of  the  citizenry  at  large, 
there  was  no  telling  how  they  might 
uUiniately  Ix  used.  The  winter^  re- 
cruits, in  the  niajoiitN  peasants  and 
soldici  s  whcj  had  been  hiding  out  since 
the  last  Slimmer,  were,  in  Scmet  terms, 
far  short  of  beitig  ihc  most  reliable 
elements.  And  the  peasants,  who  com- 
prised the  largest  and  least  voluntary 
contingent  of  the  partisan  rank  and 
file,  harbored  memories  of  the  forced 


^"IVOVHS.  vol.  II,p,S5l;iVAfV.  viA.V,^Ml\im.,. 
vol.  IV,  p.  353. 


216 


MOSCX)W  TO  STAUNCmA0 


coilectivization  of  the  1930s.  One  €3t* 
ample,  perhaps  from  many,  of  the 
mixed  loyalties  of  the  Soviet  population 
that  did  not  escap>e  the  attention  of 
Soviet  auihoriiics  oimired  in  the 
Lokot  rayon,  soutli  of  Bryansk.  There, 
in  tihe  h^ait  of  partisan  terrfttny,  an 
anti-Soviet  Riissiaii  engirucr  of  I'nlisii 
extraction,  Bronislav  Kaminski,  had 
organized  A  ifesrce  ^  nearly  fifteen- 
hundred  volunteers  who  had  fVnighi 
the  Soviet  paTtisans  throughout  the 
winter  tindfef  i3ie  tsarist  etihrolem,  (he 
Si.  Georges  Cross.  The  Kaminski  ot- 
ganiiiation  also  grew  and  reached  a 
^tfengd^  of  9,000  by  late  spring.  In  iStm 
e'dvU  snnimcr,  llie  ('.(.-i mans,  who 
diemseives  were  able  to  do  litde  against 
the  patftisans  in  this  area,  turned  the 
enlifc  >fi\(iii  over  to  Kaminski  as  the 
SelbstverwaUungsbt'zirk  ("autonomous 
district")  trfSkot.  The  History  of  the  Second 
Wfvh!  War  Hsts  the  task  of  convincing 
die  peojjle^  boycott  such  autonomous 
areas  as  being  amiong  Uie  priority  mis- 
sions of  the  party  undergroLiiid.'*' 

Wliile  the  remodeling  and  expansion 
of  the  paiiisan  movement  iCtereaSed 
Soviei  conirol  of  the  movement,  the 
effort  and  material  expended  were 
probably  not  repaid  in  operadng  effee- 
li\  (.  ness.  ThsHhtory  of  the  Second  Wbrld 
War  maintains  that  it  was  "necessary"  to 
eombhie  the  smallef  ufiits,  and  the 

brigafle  was  tlic  "most  appropriate" 
form  muj  which  diey  could  be  com- 
bined.«*Tlie  History  of  the  Qfmt  PatrMc 
Wai,  on  the  other  !iand,  says,  "...  it  was 
not  expedient  to  develop  large  pardsan 


•'Edgar  M.  Ho«^,  JS#  Stmet  Partisan  Movement, 
mi-i944  (Washington,  D.C.:  GFa  1956}.  p.  89; 
iVMV,  vd.  IV,  p.  354. 

•WA«V|;v(»LV,p.286. 


fijtiMidons."*'  The  big  units  lost  mo- 
bility and  tended  to  become  preoc- 
cupied with  self-defense,  naturally 
enough,  since  concealment  became 
more  fliiiuuh.  riie\  vst.re  also  neitlier 
heavily  enough  armed  nor  suKiciendy 
prbficietit  tacdcally  to  challenge  the 
Germans  in  open  combat,  and  ihcv 
were  too  conspicuous  to  operate 
covertly  against  really  vital  targets. 
rhL\  could  establish  territoi  ial 
hegemony,  but  usually  only  in  areas  in 
whfdh  German  control  would  have 
1)ccn  superficial  an\vsa\,  P.  K. 
Ponomarenko,  who  as  hrst  secretary  of 
^  Belorussian  Communist  Party  and 
dlief  <rf  the  Central  Staff  of"  the  Par- 
tisan Movement  was  closely  associated 
with  the  partisan  activity  throughout 
the  wai.  has  said  that  the  trend  toward 
larger  units  actually  played  into  die 
hands  of  the  Germans'^ 

In  Pononiarenkos  view,  the  root  of 
the  problem  had  been  in  the  absence  of 
central  direction  during  1941  and  early 
1942,  which  resulted  in  "a  variety  of  ill- 
conceived  experiments  and  an  out- 
bfK^  cff^iitfi^  tendendes.*"*  iFfeeHir- 
ton'  of  the  Great  Patriotic  \\br  and  the 
Short  History  also  mention  "errors"  and 
*iiiaM*ect  . . .  amdl  tnetltods"  in 
the  organization  of  the  movetnent."" 
The  History  of  the  Second  Wjrld  \Mtr 
States,  'Absence     a  sittgle  iiiresciing 

organ  freqiicntlv  resulted  in  duplica- 
tion and  occasionally  also  led  to  divest" 

Committees  had  been,  appchnted  in  the 


«/V0KS5,  wjLII. p. 361. 

**Sce  Poaoniamnk^,  'Bofiamieislioff)  mn^vt^ 
vmga. "  Wymno-iiAinfiM^  4(1^K  3S.. 

'yWrf,,  p,  35. 

'^IVOVSS.  vol.  II,  p.  349i  vaV{il*aaiml3tBnfo),  p. 
84. 

"iViaV.  vol.  V,  p.  284. 


THE  WAR  BEHIND  THE  FRONT 


217 


summep  of  l&4i  to  guide  and'  organize 
the  partisan  activity  at  the  republic  and 
lower  levels.^**  Ponomarenko  says  a  de- 
cision had  been  made  ia  Jtily  IMl 
establish  a  national  "commission"  with 
him,  Meklilis,  "and  others"  as  mem- 
bers^ but  it  b^  "stayed  on  papers*  In 
November.  Stalin  had  charged 
Ponomarenko  with  setting  up  a  central 
staiP  tliat  had  not  materiali2ed,  aeeeid- 
ing  to  Ponomarenko,  because  Lavrenti 
Beria,  the  NKVD  cliief,  had  insisted  he 
Gould  manage  Woe  movement  by  l^liH 
self,  "without  a  special  staff."^" 

Finally,  on  30  May  1942,  Beria  had 
lost  his  bid  for  coti0dl,  flie  State 
Defense  Committee  had  established 
the  Central  Staff  of  the  Partisan  Move^ 
ment,  with  ^namamsixhs  as  its  chief. 
The  State  Defense  Committee  decision 
also,  Ponomarenko  indicates,  made  the 
izentral  staff  a  coinAfiaiid  f<^  &m  par- 
tisan movement,  not  merely  an  organ 
working  under  party  direction.  Al- 
though Ponomarenko  aiad'the'cfeiefs  of 
his  subordinate  staffs  were  partv  men, 
the  directive  setung  up  the  central  staff 

shifted  the  patti^  mmemim  dos^ 

to  the  military.  Ponomarenko  and  his 
Staff  were  attached  to  the  Headt]uar- 
ters  of  the  Supreme  Oommandci .  Sta- 
lin, and  staffs  were  ordered  to  be 
created  and  attached  to  Headquarters, 
Southiveslem  Theater,  and  the  Bryansk, 
\\i:st  Kedinint.  l^gmn^^,  and  KureUan 

The  establishment  cjf"  die  central 
Staff  also  brought  about  a  revision  in 
the  estimated  strength  of  the  partisan 
movem^E^  Tlaie  Qreai  Soviet,  Encydope- 
dia  gives  a  |Mttty  figufe  of  125,000 


""Andrianov,  ~Riikm'iiikh'o."  p.  61. 
''*Horioiiiarcnko.  "Bntim,"  p.  34. 

p.  Ui-.IVMV,  vol.  V.  p.  284. 


persotts  Sn  ^  f&m&tfttit  tiit  30  June 
1942  and  a  separate  central  staff  figme 
of  60,Q00.^'  The  History  oj  the  Second 
VMi  ^  gtves  a  total  of  72,000  for 
"the  spring  id"  1942,"  distributed  as 
follows:  6,000  behind  Army  Group 
It^m&t  md  m  Karelia,  56,000  behind 
Army  Group  Center,  and  10,000  be- 
hind Army  Group  South,  While  it  is 
said  that^  ^ee^  ngtu^es  are  based  on 
incomplete  records,  it  seems  apparent 
that  the  numbers  given  above  for  the 
end  of  1941  need  to  be  revised  down- 
"Mard."'^  Bv  hnw  much,  may  be  roughly 
indicated  by  ilie  factor  of  fifteen  wliich 
the  History  of  tiie  Second  M&r&i  Wir  iadi*- 
cates  applied  in  the  area  under  the 
Fourth  Shock  Army  operative  groups 

Arroinpiues  Agani\f  the  Bol.shn'ik  System? 

The  Soviet  successes  in  die  winter 
made  it  certain  that  the  war  would  last 
through  another  simimer  —  \  erv  likely, 
much  longer — and  the  partisan  move- 
ment woidd  be  a  genuine  dialtestge  to 
the  Germans'  hold  on  the  occtipied 
territory.  Certainly  a  German  victory 
was  not  going  to  come  easily,  if  at  all. 
Concentration  and  economv  of  effort, 
always  woi  thwhile,  had  become  abso- 
lute necessiti^,  laad  ferces  diverted  to 
ami  partisan  op^fatioas  would  be 
wasted  as  far  as  progress  In  the  war  was 
concerned.  An  alternative,  the  only 
one  in  fact  available  to  the  Germans, 
was  to  create  an  indigenous  counter- 
resistance.  The  obstacle  was  Hiderk 
avowed  determination  not  to  allow 
natives  of  the  occupied  territory  in  the 


vol.  19,  p.  235. 
w/VMV,  vol  V,  pt  M2. 


218 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


Woman  Par  i  isan  H^kNGED  From 
Lenin  Statb^  m  ^^i^mmm 


Soviet  L'liion  to  serve  in  any  inilitary  or 
police  (Tipacity. 

Dui  iiig  the  worst  of  tlie  winter.  Army 
Group  Center  did,  finally,  get  permis- 
sion, to  esqseriment  with  some  local 
police,  who  were  called  Ordnungsdicnst 
("order  service")  and  not  police,  and  to 
recruit  a  tew  Cossaiffc  iafid  Uiorai^a^ 
detach inents  from  prisoner-of-war 
camps  and  form  them  into  what  were 
called  H undertschaflen  ("hundreds")  to 
give  them  only  the  most  nebulous  mili- 
tary character.  Botli  had  one  asset,  they 
had  men  who  knew  language,  and 
the  Ordnungsdicnst  men  usually  knew 
the  local  coiiiiiryside  and  its  people, 
often  including  the  partisans. 

Wliat  they  did  not  have  was  a  cause, 
and  the  Soviet  effort  had  become  too 
pervasive  to  be  mastered  by  merce- 
nai'ies  and  collaborators.  Under  the 


strain  of  the  winter,  the  German  ArfflSy 
saw  that.  In  evaluating  the  Ordnungs- 
diensi,  the  Army  Group  Center  rear 
area  commandifr  itated,  ^One  con- 
dition for  the  successful  organization 
of  XheOrdnungsdimst  is  that  the  popula- 
tion be  kept  [sic]  friendly  to  the  Ger- 
mans by  a  distribution  of  land  and  by 
the  recognition  of  certain  national 
aspirations."^'' 

VMicn  Field  Marshal  Bock  took  com- 
m.ind  of  Army  Group  South  from 
Field  Marshal  Reichenau,  he  found  in 
Reichenaus  papers  the  draft  of  a  letter 
to  Hitler  proposing  an  alliance  with  the 
Russian  people.  Bock  forwarded  it  to 
the  OKH  with  his  endorsement.^* 
Later  talking  to  a  representative  of  the 
Ministry  foi  the  Occupied  Eastern 
Areas,  Bock  tnged  ma  kin  a,  the  Russian 
people  "accomplices  against  the  Bol- 
^evik  system"  by  giving  them  land  said 
testoring  religion.  Only  then,  lie  con- 
tended, would  the  population  iiave  an 
interest  in  preventing  the  return  of  the 
Soviet  regime. '^'^  Like  Bock,  most  Ger- 
man observers  believed  that  even  alter 
the  winteiv  the  /peasants'  longing  fm 
land  of  their  own  could  still  be  ex- 
ploited to  draw  them  into  an  alliance 
against  the  Soviet  regime,  ('riie  Ger- 
mans had  not  abolished  the  collective 
farms  because  they  f  ound  them  a  con- 
venient means  of  economic  exploita- 
tion.) For  the  commands  in  the  East, 
such  an  alliance  appeared  to  be  worth 
the  price  and  more.  The  Third  Panzer 
Army  counterintelligence  chief  ob- 
served, "An  effective  anti-partisan 
eaftipaigti  is  a>noeivable  only  if  it  in- 


T-'Sr/Zi.  iL  Riurliw.  hi.  Geb.  Milli;  V:iy.tii/m'fie  -iii  Ver- 
nuhU/n^  'In  f'liilixini'ii  iin  Rnveliw.  H.  (-I'l).  iinti  den 
rneckv:  Mnwei^fhicteH,  1.1.42,  H.  Geb.  24693/2  fiie, 

^^Ibid.,  5  Mar  42. 


THE  ma  BEHIND  THE  FRONT 


219 


sillies  the  assistance  of  dependable  fele- 
meilts  of  ihe  population."" 

liStler,  however,  was  not  to  be  per- 
soadisd.  During  the  worst  of  the  winter, 
he  was  saying,  "We'll  gel  our  hands  on 
the  finest  [Soviet]  land.  .  .  .  We'll  know 
how  to  keep  the  population  in  order. 
There  won't  be  any  f[Liestion  of  our 
arriving  there  with  kid  gloves  and 


dancing  masters."^®  In  April,  he  de*- 

clarefl.  "The  mt>st  foolish  mistake  we 
could  possilily  make  would  be  to  allow 
the  subject  races  to  bear  arms.  So  let's 
not  have  anv  native  militia  or  police. 
German  troops  alone  will  bear  the  sole 
responsibiliiv  lor  the  maintenance  of 
law  and  order  throughout  the  Oc- 
cupied Russian  territories."^' 


CHAPTER  XI 

The  Northern  Tlieater 


The  military  objectives  of  the  Ger- 
maii*Fitmish  cobelligerency  in  1941 
were  to  interdict  the  Murmansk 
(Kirov)  Railroad  and  to  secure  over- 
land contact  between  the  German  and 
Finiiish  forces.  For  Germany,  or  rather 
tor  Hitler  both  objectives  served  psy- 
chological and  political  ends  more  iliaii 
tilt  V  (lid  strategic  necessities.  The  hrst 
would  demonstrate  to  the  British  and 
Americans,  as  well  as  lo  die  Soviet 
Union,  the  futility  of  outside  aid  or 
intervendon.  The  second  wotlM  con- 
firm German  hegemon\  in  the  Baltic 
and  Scandinavian  areas.  Neitlier  of 
those  effects  would  have  hem  in  any 
doubt  if  operations  against  the  Scxviet 
main  forces  went  as  planned. 

The  OKH,  for  its  part,  was  primarily 
coiKernL-d  u  idi  employing  the  light  but 
good  Finnish  Army  as  an  adjunct  to 
Army  Group  North.*  The  drive  to  the 
Murmansk  Railroad,  uhicli  was  lo  be 
conducted  by  the  German  Army  of 
Norway  as  a  second  assignment,  indeed 
almost  a  summer  exercise  .  Haider  dis- 
missed as  a  mere  "expedition."  To 

Finland,  Hitler^  objectives  C^dfid  fhe 
opportunity  to  regain  all  of  the  ter- 
ritory ceded  to  the  Soviet  Union  after 
the  Wtaee  War  ©f  19S9-l940i  aev- 
erdieless,  for  Finland,  also,  the  real 

'For  ihf  preiiivasioii  plans  see  Zkmkf,  Mfttiketfi 
TfuOff.  pp:  113-36. 


dedsion  hinged  entirely  on  the  out- 
come of  the  contest  between  the  Ger- 
man and  Soviet  main  loices. 

The  1941  campaign  ended  widioui 
either  of  Hiders  ubjeeii\es  being  at- 
tained. In  the  summer,  the  Army  of 
Norway,  under  Generalobersi  Nikolaus 
von  Falkenhorst.  had  slaved  a  trio  of 
attacks  out  ot  norllicrn  Finland  toward 
the  Murmansk  Railroad:  one  by  a  Ger- 
man corps  along  the  Arctic  coast  from 
the  vicinity  of  Pechenga  toward  Mur- 
mansk; another,  150  miles  to  die  south, 
by  a  German  corps  \  ia  Salla,  30  miles 
north  of  tlie  Arctic  Circle,  toward  Kan- 
dalaksha on  the  railroad;  and  the  third 
by  an  attached  Finnish  corps,  south  of 
the  Arctic  Circle,  toward  Loukhi  also 
on  the  railroad.  (Map  16.)  The  first  had 
stalled  completely  the  last  week  of  Sep- 
tember on  the  Zapadnaya  Litsa  River 
40  miles  west  of  Murmansk.  The  other 
two  Hider  ordered  stopped  in  the  sec- 
ond week  of  October  when  it  appeared 
that  the  drive  on  Moscow  would  end 
the  war  before  either  could  be  com- 
pleted.- The  Finnish  Army  had  pushed 
southeast  along  the  Isthmuses  of  Ka- 
relia and  Olonels.  After  readiing  the 
pre-1940  bolder  on  the  IsthmtW  <rf 
Karelia  and  at  die  Svir  River  east  of 
Lake  Ladoga  in  the  first  week  of  Sep- 
tember, the  army  had  slopped,  consid- 

y)eT  Iwhm-  und  Oberste  Befehkhaber  der  Mkmadit, 
WtSi,  AM.  L  (I  Op.h  St.  441696141,  \\^amg  37, 
16.10,41,  AOK20  1907Q/3  file. 


THE  NORTHERN  THEATER 


221 


MAPU 


ering  its  contribution  made,  and  had 
waited  Tot  Army  Group  North  to  com- 
plete tlie  junction  froanthe  south. 

The  OKW  WOittld  have  preferred  a 
combined  command  for  the  front  in 
Finland  and  had  expected  to  offer  it  to 
Marshal  Mannerheim,  commander  in 
chief  (tf  the  Finnish  Army,  but  the 
Finns  liad  insisted  on  what  they  called  a 
blrM&gf}i0a4'iEt-<3Vim  tliat  kept  the 
commands  separate  except  for  the 
token  attachment  of  Finnish  HI  Corps 
to  Army  of  Not  way  for  the  attack  to- 
ward Fnukhi  and  the  German  163d 
Infantry  Division  to  the  F'innish  Army 
as  Maimerheim's  reserve.*  As  the  sum- 
mer campaign  drew  to  a  close,  the 
Finnish  conception  of"  the  brother- 
hood-in-arms  changed  markedly.  On 
2b  September,  Mamierlieim  refused  a 
retjuest  from  the  OKW  to  resume  the 
advances  on  die  Isthmus  of  Karelia 
and  the  Svir  River  stating  that  Finland 
could  not  afford  to  maintain  16  percent 
(it  its  populadon  in  military  service,  as 
it  had  been  doing,  and  his  next  task 
would,  dierefore,  have  to  be  to  re- 
organize the  army  by  reducing  the 
divisions  to  brigades  and  returning  the 
released  men  to  civilian  employment.^ 
Shordy  afterward  he  asked  to  have 
German  troops  take  over  the  III  Corps 
posidons  so  that  the  corps  could  be 
returned  to  him  for  the  reorgan- 
ization. In  mid-November,  Ken- 
raalimajuri  ("Major  General")  H. 
Siilasvuo,  the  III  Corps  commander, 
after  having  agreed  with  Falkenhorst 


HmV.  WFSl.  .Mil.  L.  Sr.  ■I  IV-/'l!n.  \MMhlu!f]un  die 
Vorbainiung  liff  linjin'/liuiifr/'n  iwhri  Hylciliffnig  Fiiiti' 
[antti  am  V  iitfi  iifhmen  "BurlHiruwu ."  28,4.41, 
OK\V/lU38  hlo;  Mamierhcim,  Eritineiiingen.  p.  4'>t), 

*\'hbiiulungistah  Nitrd,  In  Nr.  84141,  Uberbefehtshaber 
dn  finnischen  Wehrmaihl  nil  lierm  Gengfa^iMtttifrsehi^ 
Keilel,  25.9.41.  AOK  20  20844/2  file. 


222 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGSIAJP 


thai  a  late  season  bi  eakilirough  to 
Loukhi  might  siitceeci,  suddcniv  can- 
celled the  operation,  saying  only  tliat 
he  *not  ia  a  position''  60  42tsatiiuie 
it.® 

Ptesswresm  Finland 

The  Finns'  successes  in  the  field 
raised  troubles  for  them  in  other  re- 
spects. In  late  September  and  early 
October  the  British  and  United  States 
governments  had  both  warned  them 
against  invading  Soviet  territory.  On  27 
October  the  United  States  had  de- 
manded that  Finland  cease  ail  offensive 
operations,  adding,  "...  should  mate- 
rial of  war  sent  from  the  United  States 
to  Soviet  territory  in  the  north  bv  way 
of  the  Arctic  Ocean  be  attacked  on 
route  either  presumably  or  even  al- 
legedly from  territory  under  Finnish 
control  in  die  present  state  of  opinion 
in  the  United  States  such  an  incident 
must  be  expected  tf)  bring  about  an 
instant  crisis  in  relations  between 
Finland  and  the  United  States."*" 

On  the  other  hand,  Finlaiul  \vas  hay- 
ing diificulty  keeping  vvhai  political  dis- 
tance it  had  between  itself  and 
Germany.  In  October,  the  Germans, 
irked  by  the  Finnish  contacts  with  the 
West,  pointedly  invited  Finland  to  join 
the  Anti-Comintern  Pact,  which  v\;is 
due  for  renewal  the  following  nionili. 
The  pact  was  not  a  military  alliance,  but 
it  was  regarded  worldwide  as  die  cor- 
nerstone of  the  Roine-Berhn-Tokyo 
Ask,  At  the  same  time,  Finland  wa^ 


finding  itself  forced  to  ask  Germany 
for  150.000  tons  of  grain  to  tide  its 
popLilation  over  the  winter  and  for  100 
to  150  locomotives  and  4,000  «0 
railroad  cars  to  keep  its  transportation 
system  rimning.  The  Finnish  railroads, 
"Wllkb  had  a  low  hauling  capacity  to 
start  with,  had  deteriorated  rapidly 
after  the  war  broke  out  and  were  on 
the  verge  of  a  complete  collaj)se.  Since 
the  Army  of  Norway  also  depended  on 
die  railroads,  die  OKW  promised  some 
locomotives  and  cars,  but  it  was  less 
forthcoming  on  the  request  for  grain. 
On  25  November,  Finnish  Foreign 
Minister  Rolf  Witting  signed  the  Anti<- 
Comintern  Pact  in  Berlin  under  the 
spodight  of  as  much  publicity  as  the 
German  Foreign  Ministry  could  ar- 
range. Two  weeks  later,  Britain  de- 
clared war,  and  on  19  December, 
Germany  agreed  to  supply  Finland 
with  70,000  tons  of  grain  before  the 
end  of  February  1942  and  a  total  of 
f 60^000  mm  before  the  next  harvest  J 

Cemmmtrnd  Deployment 

At  the  turn  of  the  year,  Falkenhorst 
returned  to  Norway,  and  the  Array  of 
Norway  forces  in  Finland  became 
Army  of  Lapland,  under  General  der 
G  c  I3  i  r  g  s  1 1-  u  p  p  e  E  d  u  a  r  d  D  i  e  1 1 . 
Falkenhorst,  whether  deservedly  or 
not,  had  been  tagged  as  a  hard-luck 
general  by  the  1941  campaign,  and  his 
abrasive  personality  did  not  make  him 
the  best  man  to  deal  with  tjie  Finns 
when  rdsitloits  *ere  deiiciTGe.  ©t0fl» 


■'I n'liftiilhiinrhcntdo  Iff  A.K..  iV.  652!ni!B Jk.  tin  Hi'tin 
Ubnhii>'hhluihn  d/'r  Arm,;  .\,,nvei;fn.  1^.11. 1 1.  AOK  L'O 
20844/2  nie. 

"William  I..  l^.ingfr  and  S.  Everett  Gleason,  Tlie 

Uttderlared  Whr.  1940-1941  [New  Tfork;  UarpcT  and 
Broihers,  1953).  p.  831. 


'Der  Chef  (/fs  (fberhmmaridos  del  Welnmriel'l,  WFSt, 
Ahl.  L  a  Op  J.  44I'J7'>/4I,  an  Se.  Ex:u-lk>iz  Ceitf- 
raljeldmanrhaU  t'lnhen  van  Miniiirri.eiHi,  2J.J1A1,  H 
22/227:  Dir.  IhL  Pol..  Aujzeklmung,  No.  226,  19.12.41. 
■Scriiil  I2(_i0.  U.S.  Department  of  State.  Gcwniftt  For- 
eign .Muiistry  Records. 


THE  NORTHERN  THEATER 


who  had  conimaiuifd  ilic  atta^  to- 
ward Murmansk,  liad  not  been  much 
more  lucky  in  Finland,  but  he  had  been 
the  hero  ol  the  1940  campaign  in  Nor- 
Tray.  He  was  also  one  of  she  few  gener- 
als whom  HiUer  liked  and  trusted.  In 
creating  the  Army  of  Lapland,  the 
OKW  also  saw  an  op|>ornmir>-  to  tie 
Mannerheim  more  closely  to  German 
interests  by  offering  him  the  supreme 
command  in  Finland.  Mannerheim 
stated  in  his  memoii  s  that  in  the  winter 
of  1941-1942,  such  an  offer  was  made 
to  him,  and  he  refused  it."  Dietl's  first 
task,  with  active  operations  by  both 
sides  having  stopped  six  weeks  before 
he  took  command,  was  to  regroup 
Army  of  Lapland  and  return  tiie  at- 
tached Finnish  units  to  Mannerheim. 

In  the  far  north,  Dietl's  former  com- 
mand, Mountain  Corps  Norway, 
passed  to  Generalleutnant  Ferdinand 
Schoerner.  He  had  two  mountain  divi- 
sions and  two  infantry  regiments,  a 
ten-mile  front  on  the  Zapadnaya  Litsa 
River,  and  a  four-mile  front  across  the 
neck  of  the  Rybachiy  Peninsula,  which 
had  been  bypassed  during  the  sum- 
mer's advance.  He  stationed  one  divi- 
sion, 6th  Mountain,  in  the  river  line;  a 
regiment,  the  288lli  Iniantiy,  on  the 
peninsula;  and  held  the  2d  Mountain 
Division  and  193d  Infantry  Regiment 
in  reserve  at  Pechenga.  Schoerner  was 
known  by  his  troops — as  he  would  be 
by  the  wnble  German  Army  before  the 
war  was  over — as  a  ruthlessly  deter- 
mined general.  Told  that  the  Arctic 
winter^  claitteejte  and  coid  wece  a0'ect> 
ing  morale,  he  issued  the  order:  "ArkMs 


*■( .iiu-i .il  (!t-r  Intaiiteiii-  .i.lV  W.iliiomar  l-.ituiili. 
(.oiiitneiits  on  Pan  11  ot  iliciiikc,  Nmtliern  Tfifolei,  (i 
May  1956,  CMM  EUes;  Maimaham.Ermntraa^it,  Vi, 
472. 


ist  niilil."  ("The  Arctic  does  not  exist.") 
Hie  XXXVI  Moimlain  Cor|)s  held  a 
line  on  the  V'erman  River  forty  miles 
east  of  Salla  and  sixty  miles  short  of  its 
Km  objective,  Kandalaksha,  Tlie  cot  ps 
was  a  mountain  corps  by  courtesy  only. 
It  consisted  of  one  infantry  division, 
the  169th.  plus  one  infantrv  and  (me 
mountain  reginieiit.  General  der  In- 
fanterie  Karl,  F.  Weisenberger  had 
taken  command  of  the  corps  in 
N(jvember  1941  alter  the  drive  to  Kan- 
dalaksha had  failed . 

Finnish  III  Corps  had  two  fronts: 
one  twenty-five  miles  west  of  Lf)ukhi 
held  by  the  SS  Division  "Nord"  and 
Finnish  Division  J,  the  other  held  by 
the  Finnish  3d  Division  eight  miles  west 
of  Ukhta.  The  two  were  separated  by 
forty  miles  of  lake  and  forest.  The 
Division  "Nord"  was  composed  of  two 
S.S  "death's-head"  regiments  that  were 
trained  as  police  and  concentradon 
camp  guards  not  as  combat  units.  Divi- 
sion J  had  been  created  in  the  summer 
by  dividing  the  3d  Division.  Since  the 
SS  Division  "Nord"  had  perfomied  er- 
raucally  during  the  summei,  it  was  to 
be  returned  to  Germany  and  replaced 
by  another  SS  division  when  one  be- 
came available.  One  regiment  departed 
in  December,  leaving  the  division  with 
an  actual  strength  of  three  infantry 
and  two  mx^nzttdt  machine  gtin 
battalions. 

Mannerheim's  reorganization  of  the 
Finnish  Army  w  is  less  thoroughgoing 
than  he  had  planned.  During  the 
winter  he  furloughed  100,000  older 
men  and  men  with  essential  civilian 
CNCCupations,  but  t  he  conversion of  divi- 
sions to  brigades  jiroceeded  sSowly,  and 
he  finalh  abandoned  this  effoi  t  in  May 
1942,  after  he  had  converted  two  divi- 
sions, tim  to  Corps  stayed  with  Army 


224 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINQRAD 


Outpost  on  the  Verman  River  Line 


trflapland  through  the  winter  because 
Mannerheim  retained  an  intei  est  for  a 
time  in  an  operation  against  the  Mur- 
mansk llaitroad  and  because  Army  of 
Lapland  did  not  have  any  troops  with 
which  to  lake  over  the  corps'  front.  The 
German  and  7^  Mountain  Divi- 
sions, originaSlv  earmarked  as  rein- 
forcements for  XXXVl  Mountain 
Corps,  could  have  done  so,  but  only 
one  regiment  arrived  before  ice  dosed 
the  Finnish  Baltic  ports.** 

A  Tkpmt  10  Sekmrsk 

On  25  Septembe)",  at  ibc  same  time 
as  he  refused  to  carry  farther  the  Fin- 
nish oPFensives  on  die  Svir  and  thfe 
Istbrnus  of  Karelia,  Mannerheim  pre- 
sented a  proposal  to  the  OKW  for  a 


mid,,  p.  470. 


winter  offensive  to  be  directed  against 
Belomorsk,  the  Soviet  port  on  the 
Wliite  Sea  at  which  the  Murmansk  Rail- 
road branched  soiilhward  toward 
Leningrad  and  southeastward  via 
Obozerskaya  toward  Moscow.  He 
thought  that  after  Leningrad  had 
fallen  he  would  be  able  to  spare  eight 
or  nine  brigades  for  such  an  operation 
Wod  that  the  German  and  Finnish  ad- 
vances toward  Kandalaksha  and 
Loukhi  could  be  continued  at  the  same 
dme.'"  Hider  and  the  OKW  took  up 
Marmerheim's  proposal  immediately,  it 
was  more  than  welcome  at  Fuehret 
Headquarters  as  a  chance  for  a  fresh 
start  for  the  then  nearly  moribund 
operations  against  the  Murmansk  Rail- 
road, and  Hider  promptly  designated 
the  5th  and  7th  Mountain  Divisions  as 
reinforcements  for  the  thrust  to  Kan- 
dalaksha. He  also  elevated  XXXVI 
Corps  to  the  status  of  a  mountain 
corps. 

During  the  late  fall,  after  the  Ger- 
mans and  Finns  had  stopped  every- 
where else,  part  of  the  Finnish  Army 
kept  on  the  move  dirough  Eastern 
Karelia  reacliing  Rugozero,  sixty  miles 
west  of  Belomorsk,  in  early  December. 
Army  Group  North,  meanwhile,  had 
been  stopped  for  more  than  two 
months  around  Xeningrad  and  was 
stalled  at  Tikhvin.  To  the  last  of  several 
OKW  communications  on  the  jprp- 
jectetf  winter  operation,  Mannet-heiih 
rephed  on  4  December  that  he  re- 
garded the  cutdng  of  the  Murmansk 
Railroad  as  extremely  important;  but, 
he  pointed  out,  his  proposal  in  Sep- 
tember had  been  predicated  on  the 

"'Vrihiniliiii^y./nli  Ximl.  In  Xi:  H-IHl.  OhnhejelikhabeT 
iln  I'iiiiiimIiki  We}irmiuhl  iiii  Hiiin  GmerB^tldtSatSChtlll 
Keitel.  25.9A1,  AOK  20  2t)H44/2  file. 


THE  NQRTHERN  THEATER 


225 


assviniption  that  L.eningrad  would  fall 
and  contact  would  be  established  on 
the  Svir  in  a  few  weeks.  Since  then  the 
condidon  of  his  troops  had  deterio 
rated  and  the  war  had  created  internal 
tnmM^  for  Finland.  The  attack  on 
Kandalaksha,  he  llmuglu,  would  have 
to  begin  on  1  Maich  at  the  latest,  and 
he  added,  somewhat  bleakly,  that  Fin- 
nish troops  woulfl  hrgin  the  drive  In 
BeloraoTsk  at  die  same  time,  "if  the 
s&uatiofi  ili  any  way  permits."*' 

On  14  DecemlKi.  following  a  staff 
conference  at  Finnish  Army  Head- 
quarters, Mannerheim  and  Falken- 
hoist  met  at  Falkcniiorst's  headquar- 
ters in  Rovaniemi.  By  then,  because  ^ 
railroad  ^eaaiioii,  whicb  he  de- 
scribed as  Ortswtrophic,  Mannerheim 
was  taking  a  dim  view  of  the  Kan- 
dalaksha operation — so  dim,  according 
(o  J alkfiihorsi,  ihal  he  was  unwilling  lo 
risk  involving  Finnish  troops  in  it.  On 
flie  other  hand,  he  tnaintained  thiSt  the 
British  declaration  of  war  on  Finland 
and  die  United  States'  entry  into  the  war 
had  given  th«  Mtirmanslc  Railroad 
greatly  increased  significance,  and  it 
would  have  to  be  ciji.  He  believed  Be- 
lomofsk  was  the  Tkty  pdifit  tod  ptf^ 
posed  c(>n\ergitig  attacks  from  t!ie 
west  and  southwest  by  combined  Ger- 
and  FinnisTi  folpces.  The  OKW 
promplh  accepted  thc  «4»ange  in  the 
Operation  and  offered  him  the  7ih 
Moilnlaiii  IMvisibn,  then  still  expected 
to  arrive  in  Finland  during  the  winter. 

Before  long,  however,  as  the  Soviet 
winter  offi&mlve  developed,  Man* 
nerheim*s  determination  Sagged  again. 


"  Oliri  fiflrhUnihrr  rit  i  jiinii^ihfii  Wfhi'tnarhl  an  Hfrm 
Gr»aiillMvm>-eiiail  Kcih-I.  l.t2.-<},  H  22/227  file. 

'nhhmdtmgsstab  Nord.  la,  m  OKH.  GenSUlH,  Op. 
Abt.,  I5J2A1.  H  2^227  file. 


On  20  January,  General  dcr  Infanterie 
Waldemar  Erfurth,  chief  of  die  OKW 
liaison  staff  at  Finnish  Army  Head- 
quariers.  reported  that  the  question  of 
a  Belomorsk  operation  was  completely 
up  in  the  air  and  Mannerheim  would 
not  make  a  positive  decision  unless  the 
situation  on  the  German  front,  par- 
ticularly around  Leningrad,  improved. 
Erf  urth  could  only  recommend  that  all 
possible  means  of  persuasion  be 
brought  to  bear  on  Mannerheim,  The 
odier  Finnish  officers  he  thought  were 
less  pessimistic,  but  none  of  them  had 
any  influence.**  In  tespome,  Field 
Marshal  Keitel,  chief  of  the  OKW, 
wrote  to  Mannerheim,  telling  him  that 
the  Russians  were  wearing  themselves 
oui  in  their  attacks  and  before  spring 
would  have  exhausted  their  reserves. 
"This,"  he  told  the  marshal,  "can  be  e*- 
[jected  also  to  help  vour  intended  oper- 
ation in  the  direction  of  Sorpkka 
[Belomor^}.*" 

In  die  first  weiEffc  0if  Bsitrtiaf^,  iDietl^ 
who  was  by  then  commaadiing  the 
Army  of  Lapland,  also  disetissed  the 
Beloniorsk  operation  with  Man- 
nerheim. Durii:^  the  conversation, 
Jsfehfiefheim  avoided  a  direct  refusal 
lo  involve  his  forces,  repcatedh  si.ilinj' 
that  things  would  be  different  if  the 
Germans  were  to  cake  Leningrad,  but 
he  left  no  doubt  thatiotihe  existing  sit- 
uation he  would  not  a  winter  of- 
fensive. Erftttilt,  wbcr  Ttpmsd  oa  the 
conference  lo  the  OKW,  COIietttded 
that,  ill  addition  to  im  n^;ative  assess- 
meatt    the  war,  Mannerheim  was  in- 


**J*r6»Kiurig-.ss('//>.V,.i)</,  liiXr.  HHl.  iici.ht.  OKI  I.  I  Mej 
iKG0ilS^,2O.'  fl.  H  22/227  file. 

Ch^  dfi  Ohcrkimimnntlin  tier  \\ehrmachl,  Xr. 
!>^20SI42,  an  den  Ohnhrj.  hUhnheT  dfT  fmnischett 
Wehnmc/U.  26.1.42,  H  22/227  file. 


226 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAjD 


fluenced  l)y  Fiiuiisli  domestic  politics. 
He  and  Risto  Ryti,  the  president  of 
Finland,  had  for  months  promised  the 
people  that  the  end  was  in  sight  and 
only  another  small  effort  would  be 
needed.  An  offensive  against  Be- 
lomorsk  would  far  exceed  what  the 
Finnish  government  had  led  the  popu- 
lation to  expect.  Above  all,  Erfurth 
stated,  Mannerheim  would  not  under- 
take such  an  operation  if  it  were  possi*" 
ble  that  he  might  suffer  a  setback.^^ 

On  3  February,  Mannerheim  an- 
swered Keitel's  letter,  saying  that,  if  the 
•war  did  not  take  a  favorable  turn  soon, 
he  doubted  whether  he  would  be  al^le 
to  make  troops  available  for  a  winter 
operation  against  Beloraorsk,  but  he 
would  not  give  up  the  idea.'^  In  Er- 
furth's  opinion,  "a  favorable  turn" 
meant  that  Leningrad  would  have  to  be 
taken  before  Mannerheim  would  un- 
dertake another  offensive.  He  needed 
the  fall  of  Leningrad,  Erfurth  added, 
to  make  troops  available  and  for  the 
sake  ctf  moiale  at  home;  moreover,  as 
inquiiies  froia  th^  Finnish  chief  of  staff 
revealed,  he  recendy  had  become  wor- 
ried that  the  German  1942  offensive 
would  be  concentrated  in  the  Ukraine 
and  the  northern  sccitji  of  tlie  Eastern 
Ikiftt  wotiid  fee  left  lo  languish.  As  far 
as  Miannerheim's  keeping  the  B'e- 
lomorsk  operation  in  mind  was  con- 
cerned, Erfurth  believed  it  was  merely 
intended  to  give  his  letter  a  courteous 
tone  and  <.(iuld  not  he  taken  as  a  com- 
mitment either  for  tlie  present  or  the 


Abl.  L,  2.2.42.  H  *22/'>27  file. 

'"XMiriiiurigsstah  .\Wil,  l/i  Mr.  24142.  an  OKJff,  thn- 
StdH.  op.  Ak..  J.2.4!,  H  22/227  file. 

"Verbindungsstab  Nord,  la.  Nr.  Z5f42,  m  OKHt  Op. 
Abl..  9.2.42,  H  22/227  file. 


InMaMy,  the  tmm^gmd  Milk&ry  Ms- 

Irirl,  which  became  North  Front  at  the 
outbreak  of  the  war,  was  responsible 
for  the  Finnish-Soviet  frontier.  Ik  Itad 
Twenty-third  Army  between  the  Gulf  of 
Finland  and  die  north  shore  of  Lake 
Ladoga,  Seventh  j4my  north  of  ^elake, 
and  Fourteenth  Army  in  the  Murmansk- 
Kandalaksha  area.  On  23  August  1941, 
Mdrth  Front  became  Leningrad  FroiU  and 
soon  thereafter  lost  direct  contact  with 
its  original  armies  except  for  Twenty- 
third  Army,  which  held  the  line  across 
the  Isthmus  of  Karelia  north  of 
Leningrad.  Subsequendy,  Seventh  Army 
became  an  independent  army,  and  on  1 
September,  AV?;T//rtf;  Front  was  activated, 
under  Cieneral  Leytenant  V.  A.  Frolov, 
to  lake  over  the  550-mile  sector  from 
Lake  Onega  north  to  the  Acetic  coast 
west  of  Murmansk.'* 

Karelian  Front  did  not  figme  in  the 
Soviet  general  offensive,  but  neither 
was  it  out  of  the  Stuvka'%  eye,  par- 
ticularly not  in  the  late  winter  as  the 
[ikeliiiof)d  grew  to  a  certaint\-  that  the 
Germans  would  be  able  to  moinit  a  sec- 
ond summer  campaign.  Frolov  -was 
given  orders  in  early  April  1942  to  at- 
tack along  the  line  from  the  Zapadnaya 
lUver  to  Kestenga  and  to  drive 
the  enemv  back  to  the  Finnish  liorder. 
Winter  lingers  long  in  the  northern  lat- 
itudes, and  the  Karelian  Front  opjefa- 
tions,  therefore,  took  on  the  ap- 
pearance oi  a  postscript  to  the  general 
offensive.  Th&y  evolved,  in  fact,  from 
the  Soviet  strategy  for  the  coming 
spring  and  summer.''' 


'*St-e/V'A/V:  vol-  IV  maps  2  and  5. 
"/fed,,  vol.  V.  p.  I  la.  See  pp.  238-40. 


THE  NORTHERN  THEATER 


227 


MAP  17 


Kar^lkm  Bmii's  deployment  had  re- 
mained static  through  the  winter. 
Headquarters,  Fourteenth  Army,  kept 
two  divisions,  two  brigades,  three 
border  regiments.  ;uKi  two  machine 
gun  battaUons  standing  against  Mqim- 
ta&n  Corps  Norway  along  the  Zapad- 
nava  Litsa  Ri\  er.  Frolov  kepL  the 
command  on  the  approaches  to  Kan- 
dalaksha aifd  LotiHti  tinder  Ws  own 
headquarurs.  Dining  rhe  winter,  lie 
had  two  divisions,  a  border  regiment, 
and  two  ski  battalions  on  the  Ymiiaii 
River  line  opposite  XXXVI  MaiMitain 
Corps  and  two  divisions,  two  lHt|^»ies, 
a'  b0rder  •regwaent^  aad  three  ski  kit-* 
taiions  fadiig  Knnish  IM  Corps.^^ 


-^'AOK  20.  h  Tiirligki'ilshnirhl  fui-r  flie  Zdt  vam  1.4- 
31.12.42,  6.3.42,  AOK  20  27252/19  file. 


In  the  first  two  weeks  of  April,  the 
picture  changed  suddenly  —  and,  for 
Army  ot  Lapland,  disconcertingly.  A 
guso^lii  division  and  two  ski  biig^des 
joined  the  I^rtemih  Army  force  on  the 
Zapadnaya  l,ilsa;  Headquarters, 

III  Corps  main  f<irce  west  of  Kestf*^, 
bringing  widi  it  two  new  divisions;  aSMl 
the  ski  battalions  in  the  lines  opposing 
XXXVI  Mountain  Corps  and  III 
Corps  were  raised  to  brigade  strength. 
The  buildup  was  diminutive  fey  thie 
standards  of  the  main  front  but  enor- 
mous for  the  Far  North.  It  was  possible 
for  the  Russians  only  because  they  had 
the  Murmansk  Railroad  but  impossible 
for  the  Germans  and  Finns  to  match. 

On  13  April.  Ill  Corps  canceled  a 
small  attack  it  was  aliout  to  start  when 
air  recomiaissance  reported  over  700 
cars  in  the  Ijoukhi  rmlroad  yardSi  but 


228 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


ihe  vveatlier  thereafter  was  so  bad  thai 
the  only  new  Soviet  units  identified 
were  the  two  ski  brigades  in  the  Moun- 
tain Corps  Norway  sector.  Considering 
how  laie  the  season  was,  the  tempo  of 
the  final  Soviet  deployment  was,  in  fact, 
somewhat  sluggish,  and  when  the  third 
week  in  April  had  passed  and  nothing 
had  happened,  it  looked  to  Died  as  if 
the  Russians  had  concluded  that  they 
could  not  outrace  the  oncoming 
thaw."'  He  was  wrong,  at  least  to  the 
txit-nt  of  having  failed  to  appreciate 
the  Soviet  determination  to  seize  the 
inillati'ine  and  to  exploit  tiie  fading 
winter  by  getting  in  OiSe  more  Mow. 

On  the  inorning  of  23  April,  23fl 
Guards  Mvisioti  and  8th  Ski  Brigadf  hit 
the  thinly  held  III  Corps  left  flank  east 
ctf  Kestenga.  Frontal  attacks  on  the  cen- 
ter and  riglit  pimu  c!  the  corps  tight  be- 
tween Verkhneye  Qiernoye  Lake  and 
Tbp  Lafefr.  In  twtt  days  the  III  Corps 
left  flank  crackctl.  Bv  then  enough  \\,is 
known  about  the  extent  of  die  Soviet 
buildup  to  Make  it  apparent  that  the 
least  to  be  expected  was  .iii  effoi  l  to 
smash  the  corps  from  and  drive  it  west 
of  l^tenga.  Diet!  had  in  reserve  one 
tank  battalion,  ecjuippefl  with  obsolete 
Banzer  Is  (armed  wilii  two  30-caliber 
madtine  guns),  and  a  company  of  the 
Brandenburg  Reginit  nt  (specialists  for 
sabotage  operations  behind  the  enemy 
lines).  These  he  threw  in  along  with  the 
entire  XXXVI  Mountain  Corps  re- 
serve, one  infantiy  battalion.  The  111 
Corps  brought  up  one  feateBon  from 
die  Ukhta  sector.  German  Fifth  Air 


'KWK  lM//f/laml.  In  Xr.  ITfOMS,  ZusainmtnJiLssender 
Bniiht  iii-hi  i  flu-  Atrurlirkanupfe  tin  Armet  Ll^land  ViM 
2-tA~2}.5.-i2,  .\OK  20  27252/7  file. 


Force,  which  was  under  orders  to  con- 
centrate on  the  Allied  Arctic  shipping 
and  the  Murmansk  Railroad  except  in 
crises,  began  shifting  its  fighters  and 
dive-bombers  from  Banak  and 
Kirkenes  in  northern  Norwa\'  to  Kemi 
behind  die  III  Coi  ps  from.  (Map  17.) 

On  the  27lix*  ftnirteenth  Army  hit  the 
6th  Mountain  Division  line,  on  the 
Zapadnaya  Litsa,  on  the  right  with  10th 
Guards  Division  and  on  the  left  with  Nth 
Rifle  Dioishn.  During  the  night,  12th 
Xfn<(d  Brigndc,  coming  by  sea.  landed 
on  the  west  shore  of  Zapadnaya  Litsa 
Bay  and  began  to  push  beliind  the  Gter- 
man  line.  The  landing  was  a  complete 
surprise  to  Mountain  Corps  Norway, 
and  it  could  have  been  devastating  had 
it  been  made  in  greater  strength.  As  it 
was.  6th  Mountain  Division  had  ume  to 
overcome  the  shock  when,  two  days 
later,  the  worst  snowstorm  of  the 
winter  stopped  everything  for  several 
days.«=rMfl/7 /<S.) 

By  1  May,  the  S(»\  iet  spearheads  Were 
standing  due  iiordi  ot  Kestenpt, 
then  asked  Mannerfieira  for  the  Fin- 
nish 12th  Brigade  (formerly  the  6th  Di- 
vision) to  reinforce  111  Corps. 
Manneraefnk,  iitKfdpng  )Qgt  Involve  the 
brigade  in  vvhat  fflglgllt  ^^lop  into  a 
long,  drawn-ouS  fiptt,  ifi^tised  but  of- 
fered instead  to  give  Dietl  the  l^gSd  Ity- 
fanlry  Divisibn,  whit  h  was  still  attached 
to  the  Finniill  Army,  and  to  take  over 
iJie  Ukhta  sector  ^ter  a  German  corps 
arrived  to  relieve  III  Coips.  The  offer 
did  not  prom^ise  any  immediate  help, 
but  Diep  decided  to  aece|it>  ance,  m 
the  long  runj  he  would  gain  a  division 


^H.iiL  Kil„,  („h-K,;jn  \uncrgen.  In  .Vr.  </6^ll2, 
Bmihl  Hi  lifT  ilii'  Alm  i  hi ktJumpJf  tli'i  Gebtrgikurfti  gegrn  die 
ntywclir  I'ln/aiiiingoptnition  mm  27.4.-46.5.42^  AOK 
20  27252/6  fiJe. 


THE  NORTHERN  THEATER 


229 


Infantry  Take  Coves  in  the  III  Conp$  Sector 


ihe  west  and  south  to  tui  the  HI  C'orps 
supply  road  west  ot  Kesteiiga,  Siilasvuo 
waotied  to  evacuate  Kestei^  and 
draw  to  a  Vine  in  the  narrows  between 
Pya  L^ike  and  lop  Lake.  Dietl,  believ- 
ing a  retreat  would  entail  too  great  a 
loss  of  men  and  suppUes,  ordered 
Siilas\  uu  to  hold  even  if  he  should  be 

On  the  5th,  the  ski  brigade  and  tlje 
rifle  regiment  came  within  two  niilei  df 
liie  road  west  Qf  Kestenga  and  had  ad- 
vance partifes  out  alflttisi  tQ  tibe  foad, 
but  in  the  swamps  northwest  of  the 
town  the  main  bodies  lost  momentum. 
tn  another  two  days,  the  Germans  and 
Finns  were  able  (o  encircle  the  two  So- 
viet units  and  virtually  wipe  tlieni  out. 


and  be  freed  of  xes^nsibility  for  the 

I'khta  sei  tor.^' 

In  tile  first  week  of  May,  seeking  a 
siiowdown.  Tu'cn/y-sixlh  Army  put  in  two 
new  units,  l(S6th  Rifle  Divisiun  and  SOlli 
Rifle  Brigade,  against  the  III  G@frps.Mt 
Hank.  Diet!  brought  two  more  bat- 
talions from  XXXVl  Mountain  Corps, 
and  111  Clorps  brought  one  fcoiB 
Ukhta.  By  also  taking  2  fxiualions  out 
of  his  right  flank.  Siilasvuo  managed  to 
oppose  the  2  Soviet  divisions  and  2  bri- 
gades with  9  Ixittaiions.  Wliethcr  liiev 
would  be  enougli  was  liighly  question- 
able from  tlie  first,  and  on  3  May  when 
the  8th  Sid  Hrio-ade  and  a  regiment  of 
the  186tli  Rijle  Divmion  swept  wide  to 


^MOK  Lappland,  Kriegsingehichi  Band  /,  Nr^  2,  1 
and  4  May  42,  AOK  20  27252/1  file. 


230 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


1 


193d  Regt 


2d 

Mtn  Div 


i! 


/J 


Luostari . 

/ 


aAY 


g  12th  Navat  Bde 


J- 


w 


5th  Ski  Bde 
6th  Ski  Bde  «  , 
10th  Gd8  Dhf'f ' 


/ 


THE  ZAPADNAYA  LITSA  FRONT 

<         Soviet  attack 
0  20  Miles 


72dBde 

Ufa  <ji4flA 

.  S2jdDiv 


14th 


Mutmmtlt 


MA?  IS 


Ttm  SA  SM  Brigade,  according  lo  pris- 
oners' accounts,  was  reduced  to  be- 
tween three  and  four  hundred  men, 
approximtely  a  tenth  of  its  original 
strength. 

Elsewhere,  too,  Tiventy-sixth  Ar/nj's 
drive  was  coming  apart,  and  on  the 
6tli.  Diell  and  Siilasvuo  concUided  that 
the  crisis  had  passed.  The  defense  had 
been  successftil,  largely  because  of  a 
failure  by  IRvi'titx-sixlh  Army  to  employ 
its  vastly  superior  autnbers  effectively. 
Ithad  aissipated  fts  strengpli&ijaiiEefir* 
dinated  attacks  by  single  divistOf^'H^fll 
the  result  that  I86th  R.0e  O^i^mm  and 


2Sd  Gtuirds  Division  were  reduced  to  be- 
tween 30  and  40  percent  of  their  orig- 
inal strengths.  The  80th  Rifle  Brigade 
fared  almost  as  badly,  and  the  8th  SM 
Brigade  was  nearly  destroyed.  At  the 
end,  the  Soviet  poHtruks  were  often  no 
longer  able  to  drive  their  men  into  bat- 
tle. On  the  7lh,  certain  that  Twenty-sixth 
Army  could  not  launch  another  thrust 
without  fresh  units.  Died  decided  to 
dotuMSrattaek.^* 


'■'AOK  LappLand,  la  Nr.  1750142,  Zwama^f^smndesr 
Benefit  ueber  die  AbwehTkaetnpfe  der  Amet  t^^^^tllli  'fffm 
24.4.^  J.42.  AOK  20  2,7252/7  file. 


THE  NORTHERN  THEATER 


231 


Tlie  fighting  on  the  Zapadnaya  Litsa 

front  never  reached  a  crisis  like  that  in 
the  111  Corps  sector,  but  the  Germans, 
Hitter  in  pardccdiar,  beHeved  die  sitjia- 
tion  (here  to  be  the  more  serious  be- 
cause of  the  supposed  danger  of  a 
tJEiited  States-British  knding  on  the 
Arctic  coast.  Since  late  December  l'.)41, 
when  a  British  cruiser  and  destroyer 
force  staged  a  xakt  on  the  Lofoten  Is- 
lands off  northern  Nwway.  Hitler  had 
been  ecpecttng  a  British  and  American 
attempt  to  seize  a  foothold  somewhere 
between  \anik  and  Pechenga,  along 
the  not  ihern  sea  route. 

On  9  May,  Diet!  and  Sdieanier  de- 
cided to  stake  everything  on  a  quick 
decision.  They  ordeietl  2<;1  Mountain 
Division  to  the  front  and  stripped  the 
coastal  defenses  betueen  Tana  Fiord 
and  Pcchenga  Bay.  But  before  the  last 
reserves  were  in  the  line,  the  battle 
shil'ted.  On  the  14ih,  I2th  Naval  Bri- 
gade, its  overwater  supjily  line  under 
constant  dive-honii)er  harassment, 
gave  up  its  beachhead  im  the  Zapad- 
naya Litsa  Bay.  Thereaf  ter  Fourteenth 
Army,  although  it  liad  brought  in  an- 
other division  during  the  past  week, 
also  stopped  the  attack  on  the  south 
fi^ik.  On  the  15th,  Mountain  Corps 
Norway  regained  its  original  positions 
along  the  wliole  front. 

Noith  of  Kestenga  a  thaw  delayed 
the  III  dorps  coimierattack  until  15 
May.  Meanwhile  the  Russians,  charac- 
teristically, had  thiown  up  elaborate 
field  fortifications.  VVIien  a  flanking 
attack  by  diree  Finnish  regiments  be- 
^me  bogged  d^wn  in  impas&iibte 
ground,  the  Germans  had  to  resort  to  a 
succession  of  frontal  assaults  that  fi- 
nally broke  the  line  on  21  May.  With 
that,  the  Soviet  resistance  collapsed, 
and  111  Corps  was  almost  back  in  its 


Gjcrman  Ski  Patrol,  Kts  i  enga  Front 


original  front  wlien,  on  die  23d,  con- 
trary to  his  orders  from  Dietl,  SSlasYUO 
stopped  the  advance.'-''' 

ihe  last  week  and  a  half  of  the 
Bghlii^ff&ith  of  Kestenga  had  seen  a 
recurrence  of  constrain!  in  the  cooper- 
ation between  the  German  and  Finnish 
commands.  Armf  Cif  Lapland  noted  on 
23  May,  "In  the  course  of  the  recent 
weeks  the  army  has  received  the  grow- 
ing impression  that  the  Commanding 
General,  III  Corps,  either  on  his  own 
initiative  or  on  instructions  from 
higher  Finnish  aiuhorities,  is  avitiding 
all  decisions  that  could  invoke  Finnish 
troojjs  in  serious  fighting."^**  The  Ger- 
man liaist)!!  officer  with  III  Corps  re- 
ported that  the  German  troops  had 


^WOK  l.iifipkmil.  la  Krugstagtbuch,  Hatid  I,  Nr.  2, 
\b-2-?,  May  42.  AOK  20  27252/1  file. 
23  May  42. 


2S2 


MOSCX)WTO  STAUNGRAD 


made  all  the  heavy  attacks  slttfiie  15  May, 
and  Army  of  Lapland  recorded  that 
Siilasvuo  had  repeatedly  issued  orders 
oft  Ms  own  authority  that  he  knew  the 
army  would  not  automatically  approve, 
the  last  of  lliose  being  the  order  to 
break  off  operation. 

Although  III  Corps  had  not  re- 
amed the  best  defensive  positions  at 
s^m^  points,  Dietl  decided  to  let 
Siilasv-uo's  order  stand,  particularly 
aaace  he  saw  a  danger  that  otherwise 
tfee  Mntis  would  pufi  out  entirely  and 
leave  tlie  German  troops  stranded.  On 
the  23d,  he  attempted  to  limit 
SiiIasvuo%  antffcJFity  with  regard  to 
withdrawing  ti'oops  from  the  line;  but 
^nthe  f  ollowing  day,  disregarding  that, 
SMasvuo  pulled  all  the  Finnish  troc^ 
out  of  the  German  sector  of  the  front 
and  demanded  that  within  three  days 
the  Gerraanfis  retttffi  all  horses  and 
logons  bon  oived  from  the  Finns.  The 
la^  action  would  have  left  the  German 
txoops  without  supphes,  and  ESeti  had 
to  appeal  to  Siilasvuo  in  the  name  of 
"brotherhood-in-arms"  not  to  leave  tlie 
Germans  in  a  hopeless  position.^' 

Although  the  Finnish  liaison  officer 
with  Army  of  Lapland  assured  him 

tfee  flQ^b^  Axmy  Conamand  was 

not  putting  pressure  on  Siilasvuo  to 
spare  his  Finnish  troops  or  to  gel  them 
out  quickly,  Died  ordered  the  German 
units  made  independent  ol  Finnish 
support  as  fast  as  possible  and  asked 
the  OKW  to  speed  up  sMpment  of  the 
7th  Mountain  Division.  TTic  headquar- 
ters and  tv,'o  regiments  of  die  latter, 
however,  were  by  then  tied  down  in  the 
fighting  on  the  Army  Group  North 
front.  On  I  June,  the  XVIU  Mountain 
Corps  bmdq|uarf@(^'  lti^5fetivpet»  ifii^ 


"Ibid..  23-25  May  42. 


Dietl  propoised  having  it  take  over  the 
Kestenga  sector  at  liic  middle  of  the 
month,  but  Siilasvuo  refused  to  relin- 
quish eomtinand  ibefe  tinJess  the  ma- 
jority of  the  Finnish  troops  were  out  by 
then.  On  the  18th  Mannerheim  finally 
^reed  to  aii  ©tchange  at  the  end  of  tbe 
month,  provided  somewhat  less  than 
half  of  the  Firmish  troops  were  re- 
tfi^Aed  to  Mtfi:  On  that  tasis,  XVIII 
Mountain  Corps  took  command  at 
Kestenga  on  3  July.  One  Finnish  reg- 
iment remained  in  the  corps  area  untii 
mid-September,  wlien  it  was  rclic\'cd  by 
the  last  elements  of  7th  Mountain 
Division.** 

The  battles  east  of  Kestenga  and  on 
the  Zapadnaya  Litsa  were  defensive 
*fi*60ii€S  for  l^e  Germans  and  the 
Finns — but  ones  which  could  not  be 
exploited,  and  so  they  brought  small 
prirfit.  The  III  Corps  claimed  to  have 
counted  15,000  Soviet  dead  and  main- 
tained that  Soviet  losses  behind  the 
lines  from  artillery  fire  and  aerial  bom- 
bardment  also  were  high.  Otie  of 
Homiy-sixtli  Armfs  reinforcements,  the 
^Mi^^^mim  Bngmk,  for  instance, 

was  SiilE^ed  by  dive-bombers  before  it 
could' get  to  the  front.  Mountain  Corps 
Norway  claimed  8,000  Soviet  dead. 
The  total  German  and  Finnish  casu- 
alties were  5,500  in  the  III  Corps  sector 
and  8,200  on  the  Zapadnaya  Litsa, 

Neither  of  the  major  Soviet  war  his- 
tories says  anything  about  the  Kestenga 
<^cnsive.  VWi  legard  to  the  Zapad- 
naya Litsa  opera rion,  the  History  of  the 
Second  Wjrid  War  says  only  that  it  was 
"without  results."»«Hjie  of  Be 

Great  Patiotic  Tfe-  says  the  operatioii 

^'Ziemkf .  Norllu-rn  Theater,  p.  ?28. 

■"VIM. 

^"IVm.  vol.  V.  p,  141. 


THE  NORTHERN  THEATER 


233 


failed  but  "tied  up  enemy  forces,  dis- 
rupted his  planned  offcnsivt'  [sic],  and 
forced  him  lo  assume  the  c!efensl\  f  c»n 
the  Murmansk  axis."  It  adds,  "for  a 
long  time,  the  situation  on  the  nor  di- 
em sector  oi  die  Soviet-German  front 
remamisd  ^talde."^' 

fhl  German  Buildup 

In  mid-August  1941,  the  British  had 
iDegun  sending  single  merchant  ships 
(and  one  small  convoy)  loaded  with 
military  etjuipment  to  Murmansk  and 
Arkhangelsk.  The  first  larger  convoy, 
numbered  PQ-1,  sailed  from  Hvali- 
jord,  Iceland,  on  29  September. 
(Henceforth,  until  November  1942, 
convoys  were  given  "PQ"  numbers  out- 
bound and  "QP"  numbers  home- 
bound.)^-  The  Germans,  unwilling  to 
divert  effort  from  profitable  targets 
elsewhere,  did  not  respond  until  20 
Dt'c  ember,  when  Wo  aircraft  attacked 
PQ-6.33 

During  the  winter  of  1941-1942, 
Hitler's  preoccupation  with  possible 
Briti^  (and  American)  landings  put 
the  Gentian  Kavy  in  position  to  do 
something  about  the  Art  tic  convoys.  In 
late  December,  Hider  told  Keitel  and 
Admrral  Raeder,  the  commander  in 
chie  f  of  the  navy,  "If  the  British  go 
about  things  properly,  they  will  attack 
northern  Norway  at  several  points.  In 
an  all-oni  offensive  I>v  their  fleet  and 
giound  troops,  diey  will  try  to  displace 
US  there,  take  Narvik,  if  possible,  and 


"Wnvss.  viii.  II.  |)^  tiis. 

"See  S.  W.  Rosklll.  Ih,  \V,i,  „i  S,;,,  I'll'i-l^in 
(I  .<in(t(iii:  Ht-i  M.ijiMv'i  Stalioncrv  Oifitt:,  193-1),  vol. 
I.  [1  I't'J  .iiiil  S.imiii-l  Eliot  Mi>ris<>n.  The  Battle  oj  (he 
Atiuulii.  Svplfmhn  1939-May  1943  (Boston;  Little. 
Brrwn,  1947),  p.  160. 

vol.  IV.  p.  334. 


thus  exert  pressure  on  Sweden  and 
Finland."  He  then  gave  Raeder  an 
ordei  to  ha\  e  "eacli  and  every  vessel"  of 
the  na\  y  stationed  in  Norway,  includ- 
ing the  battleships  Sdiar^ihorst  and 
Gnmenau  and  the  hca\  y  cruisei-  Piinz 
Eugen,  all  three  of  which  were  doc  ked 
at  Brest  and  would  have  to  break 
through  the  English  Channel  to  get  to 
Norway.*'* 

The  German  Navy,  laking  advantage 
of  the  cover  afforded  by  the  long 
winter  nights,  began  transferring  its 
heavy  ships  to  Norvi/ay  in  January  1942. 
The  battleship  Tirpitz,  first  to  go, 
docked  in  Irondheim  on  the  !  (ii  h .  The 
Tirpitz  was  the  navy's  most  formidable 
ship.  With  a  displacement  of  12,000 
tons  and  eight  fifteen-inch  guns  in  its 
main  batteries,  it  was  a  match  for  any 
vessel  afloat.  The  navy  had  been  plan- 
ning to  move  the  Tirpitz  to  Norwa\ 
since  November  1941,  for  the  effect  it 
would  have  of  tying  down  heavy  British 
ships.  In  that  sense,  the  move  was  an 
immediate  success.  Churchill,  in  Janu- 
ary 1942,  believed  that  if  the  Tirpitz 
con  Id  be  removed  from  the  scene,  the 
world  naval  situation  would  be 
changed  and  the  Allies  could  regain 
naval  supremacy  in  the  Pacific.'''^  In  the 
seccmd  week  of  February,  Scharrihorstt 
Gnnse^mt  awd  f^m  Eugm  broke 
through  the Eogli'^h  Thannel,  reaching 
Germany  on  the  ISlli.  The  two  bat- 
deships  had  been  daniaged  hy  mines 
and  had  lo  be  held  in  Gernian\  for 
repairs.  I  he  Prinz  Eugen{l4,000  tons, 
eight-inch  guns)  proe^egl  toKorw^ 
together  with  the  pocket  battleship 


^^Fufliiri  f.uiijririiif  MiittrTi  DmUtig  With  the 
C-imtui  .\>r.  \,  I'l-ll  (\VjshiJit<l.in  1)  C:  OfECCOrNKVal 
liUclli;>cr].      I'MT),  \(>1.  II.  |).  'I  I, 

''•Ibid..  |i.  .'i:');  W'liiMini  S,  <.  .'iu\n\\\\\,The  Hwig$tf^lte 
(Boston:  Hougluon  MilHin,  11)50),  p.  112. 


234 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


Scheer  { 11.000  tons,  eleven-inch  guns) 
and  docked  ai  Trondheim  on  2;^  Vch- 
ruar\',  but  Prinz  Eugen'^  rudder  was 
blown  off  Ijy  a  torpedo  while  en  route, 
and  the  ship  had  to  return  to  Germany. 
By  late  February,  the  navy  also  had 
eight  destroyers  and  twelve  submarines 
based  in  Norway.  In  his  "each  and 
every  vessel"  order.  Hitler  had  orig- 
inally included  the  whole  German  sub- 
marine fleet,  but  he  had  later  been 
impressed  by  reports  of  submarine  suc- 
cesses off  the  U.S.  coast  and  had  de- 
cided to  leave  the  main  subigariiie 
force  there.** 

Meanwhile,  the  German  Navy  had 
recognized  the  target  potential  of  the 
convoys,  but,  as  of  late  February,  it  had 
only  six  submarines  deployed  against 
them.  The  other  six  were  being  kept  on 
patrol  off  Norway,  and  the  Naval  Staff 
could  not  bring  iiscif  to  allou  ihf  sur- 
face ships  to  burn  precious  fuel  oil  on 
what  would  be  long,  and  perhaps  fruit- 
less, sorties.  Convoy  PQ-7,  which 
made  the  voyage  north  m  January 
1943,  lost  (Koe  merchant  ship  oat  of 
ele\  en.  The  first  convoy  in  which  an 
American  merchant  ship  made  the 
run ,  PQ-  8,  had  one  ship  damaged  by  a 
torpedo  and  a  destroyer  sunk.  In  Feb- 
ruary, three  PQ  convoys  (9,  10,  and  U) 
got  through  without  being  sighted.^ 

German  Fifth  Air  Force,  which  was 
responsible  for  air  operations  in  Nor- 
way and  Finland,  might  also  ha^  oper- 
ated against  the  convoys.  It  had  60 
twin-engine  bombers,  ^iiStukas,  30  sin- 
gle-engine fighters,  a»d  15  naval 
Eoatplsuv^  tprp^o-boihbers.  However, 


'"Ufif  Lhiiry.  (•rrman  Xanal  Skijj,  Operations  Divtsiun, 
.\  iWashiitgioir  Office  of  Njljral' ItttdKgmw. 
I'JtS),  vnl.  'J9.  pp.  2»7,  217,  228. 
"Roskill.  War  ,tl  Sra,  vol  II,  p.  U&;  M0rboO,0<l(ti^ 

oJ  theAtlantu,  p.  160. 


the  Fifth  Air  Force  commander.  Gene- 
ralobersi  Hans-Juergen  Stumpff,  be- 
lieved ilic  darkness  of  the  arctit  winter 
made  air  operations  against  ships  at  Sea 
unprofitable,  and,  from  his  headquar- 
ters in  Kenii,  Finland,  he  directed  his 
main  effort  against  the  port  of  Mur- 
mansk and  the  railroad.  For  a  time  in 
early  1942,  Stumpff  employed  geol- 
ogists in  an  attempt  to  locate  spots 
along  the  railroad  where  bombing 
might  set  off  landslides  and  bury 
stretdies  of  the  track.  The  Germans 
had  recently  acquired  some  costly 
knowledge  about  arctic  geology.  In  late 
September  1941,  a  Soviet  bomber,  strik- 
ing at  Army  of  Norway's  only  bridge 
across  the  Pechenga  River,  had 
dropped  a  load  of  bombs  that  missed 
the  bridge  but  by  their  concussion  had 
caved  in  both  banks  of  the  river,  com- 
plcitlv  burying  tiie  liridgc  and  dam- 
ming tlie  river.  I'he  site  of  the  collapse 
was  tn  an  area  in, which  glacial  drift 
(sand  and  gravel)  had  been  laid  down 
over  a  substratum  of  oceanic  sediment. 
Tlie' latter,  having  never  dried  out,  re- 
mained extremely  unstable;  and  when- 
ever it  was  ciu.  as  by  a  river^  it  sustained 
its  own  weigh  I  and  the  drift  over- 
burden in  a  liiglilv  precarious  sort 
of  equilibrium.  Siniilar  conditions  were 
icno«m  to  exist  throughout  northern 
Finland  and  the  Kola  Peninsula,  but 
although  they  tried  a  number  of  times, 
the  Germans  did  not  tticceed  in  ex- 
ploiting these  geologit  factors  in  their 
attacks  on  the  Murmansk  Railroad.^^ 

By  early  March,  the  Naval  Staff  had 


^"Btiiisli  Ail  MiriiMiv  I'.iiiLplilet  248,  113.  Sec 
Ziettikc,  Northern  Thealrr.  p.  2^611. 


THE  NOR I  HERN  THEATER 


235 


conie  to  think  that  the  mere  presence 
6f  liie  Ti^f^  at  Ikittdheim  would  not 

fiilh  achieve  the  desired  effect  of  tying 
down  enemy  forces,  and  it  therefore 
oMeraid  &0  faSLttleship  to  imhe  a  stiiki; 
against  the  BQ-12  convoy,  which  was 
then  at  sea  noltheasi  of  Iceland.  The 
Tirpitz  and  five  destroyers  put  out  on  6 
Marcli.  .\!k'r  Hiiling  to  find  the  convoy 
in  three  days'  cruising,  they  were  or- 
dered back  to  port  on  liie  9tb.  The 
sfjrtie  had  been  a  halOicarted  enter- 
prise from  the  start  because  the  Naval 
Sta&  had  qtialtns  about  rRMng  a  bat^ 
tleship  in  an  action  against  merrhant 
ships.  Raeder  concluded  that  anticon- 
voy  operatioMs  were  too  dangerous  for 
heav\'  ships  ^\■itl^out  air  cover,  and  he 
doubted  whetlier  they  were  justihed  m 
view     the  ship^  ttmxt  tstm,  d^^tse 


against  landings.^"  The  Tirpitz  opera^ 
l^'did  liave  one  rest^  &e  steel  allot- 
ment for  building  a  German  aircraft 
carrier,  the  Graj  Zeppelin,  was  in- 
c»^sed,  ^iit^ltiH^  carrier  c6uld  ftot  be 
completed  before  late  1943. 

The  Tirpitz's  abortive  attempt  on 
may,  perhaps,  have  haa  one 
other  it'siilt.  On  14  March,  Iltilcr  is- 
sued the  first  order  for  intensive  anti- 
mrmyy  operations.  Stating^  that  the 
con\fns  could  be  used  bolh  to  sustain 
Soviet  resistance  and  as  a  device  for  a 
mirprise  lancBxig  on  lite  Norwegtan  or 
Finnish  coasts,  he  ordered  the  trsf- 
fic  on  tlie  northern  route,  "whieh  so  far 
ha$  hardly  been  ^mu^a&SL^  to  be  ittter- 
dicted.  He  vias  more  than  right  on  one 


^NmiYHtr  Diary,  vol.  31,  pp.  20,  53,  56.  ?5,  81, 8^. 


236 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


score.  By  then,  t\^"el\  e  PQ  convoys  had 
reached  S(Wietports  with  a  loss  of  only 
1  ship  out  df  lOi  nserchant  vessels  and  I 
British  destroyer.'"'  Hitler's  order  di- 
rected the  navy  to  increase  its  sub- 
marine isdfRiniQiient  and  the  lar  force 
to  strengthen  its  long-range  re- 
connaissance, bomber,  and  torpedo- 
bomber  forces.  The  air  force,  henc3e- 
forili,  was  (o  kcc[>  Nfurniansk  under 
(x>nstant  bombardment,  reconnoiter 
tibe  sea  area  beti^^eri  Bear  Island  and 
the  Minnian  Coast,  and  operate 
against  convoys  and  enemy  warships. ""^ 

Wlim^  he  received  the  Hitler  order, 
SttlEQf^f  also  suggested  occupying 
Spitzbergen,  whidi  was  being  held  by  a 
small  force  of  Norwegians.  He  pointed 
out  that  Fifth  Air  Force  could  use  the 
airfield  diere  to  attack  the  convoys 
fy&Bd  two  sides.  Army  of  Norway  be- 
lieved a  battalion  would  be  enough  to 
take  and  hold  llie  island,  but  the  OKW 
h^ie<ned  ^  Occupatidn  would  de  up 
aso  much  flltVStl  and  air  strength  in  the 
defease  without  offering  sutTiciem 
CQlittpetisatory  advdstages  since,  dur- 
ing most  of  the  yeai\  pack  ice  forced 
convoys  to  pass  within  300  miles  of  the 
German  air  bases  in  Norway  anyway. 
On  22  Match.  Hitler  shelved  Stumpffs 
proposal  tot  tiic  time  being. ''^ 

In  April,  convoys  PQ- 13  and  PQ- 14 
sailed,  bui  bad  weather  and  the  spi  ing 
thaw,  which  temporarily  rendered  the 
northern  airfields  unusable,  kept 
neai  i\  all  of  Fifth  Air  Forces  planes 
grounded.  The  PQ- 14  convoy  ran  into 


^''David  Irving,  T%t  p$stntcUm  of  Conwy  PQ-l? 
(New  "kbti:  Simon  and  Sdiiui^.  ISfiSkp.  2. 

*<twm  wm  op.  (M>  f4n  ss^msf,  wjf.^i.  o&w 

119  iiie. 

**OKW.  WFSt.  Op.  Nr.  55518M2,  Vartraginotk^ 
13.3.42;  OKW,  WFSt.  Op.  (M)  Nr.  55537(42.  Bm 
SpUibergm.  22.J.42.  OKW  US  file. 


pack  ice  north  of  Iceland  and  sixteen 
of  its  twenty-four  ships  turned  back. 
One  of  thie  eight  that  went  on  was  ffor^ 
by  a  sutoarine,  Convov  PQ-13,  with 
nineteen  ships,  fared  poorly  and 
provided  a  pfevim  of  worse  to  eonte. 
After  the  convoy  was  scattered  by  a 
heavy  storm  on  24  April,  German 
planes  picked  off  two  sti^ggters,  and 
three  Gerinan  desirijvers  sank  an- 
other— at  an  eventual  cost  oi  one  of 
their  own  number,  Submarines  safife 
two  more  ships.  The  Germans  also  tost 
a  subnuuine.  and  the  British  had  a 
destroyer  and  a  cruiser  badly 
damaged,  the  latter  by  one  of  its  own 
torpedoes.  One  of  three  Soviet  destroy- 
ers that  joined  the  escort  off  northern 
Norway  was  damaged.  In  gales  and 
snow  squalls,  die  action  was  haphazard 
on  hot^  sides.  Neither  the  German 
ships  nor  planes  could  determine  the 
size  of  the  convoy  or  the  makeup  of  the 
escort;  consequently,  the  Naval  Staff 
declined  to  risk  its  heavier  ships. 

By  late  April,  the  btiildup  flider  had 
ordered  was  taking  effect.  The  heavy 
cruiser  Hipper,  sister  ship  to  the  Prinz 
Eugen,  and  the  pocket  battleship 
Luetww  had  arrived  in  Norway.  The 
navy  also  had  20  submarines  stationed 
in  Norway.  8  foi  defense  and  12  lor  use 
against  the  lonvoys;  AmSL  tiofiwcfft 
had  brought  in  a  do/en  ncwlv  con- 
verted HE-1 1 1  torpedo-bombers.  On  3 
May,  9  of  the  torpedo-bombers,  on 
their  fiist  mission,  attacked  PQ-15and 
sank  3  ships.^"* 


Botde  4  Af  AOanlie,  p.  166;  ivm  «ol-  I^,  F*  3^ 
Naval  Vbr  Diary,  vol.  32.  pp.  t3-lB. 

*<GeneralniajDr  a.  D.  Hatis-Detlev  He(ini#  yon 
%»li4en,  Die  Kampffuehmng  dtr  Ltif^tU  S  m  Nbt- 
tP^,  vcHi  Bidideti  4S7fi>-4Q8  file.  See  abo 
iCoritittt  Wwdf^  vcL  £l,p.  129. 


THE  NORTHERN  THEATER 


237 


On  21  May  PQ-16  sailed.  It  was  the 
largest  convoy  yet,  35  merchant  ships, 
and,  with  4  cruisers  and  3  destroyers 
(joined  in  the  north  by  3  Soviet  de- 
stroyers), the  most  heavily  protected. 
By  then,  the  lengthening  days  were 
making  submarine  operations,  except 
against  single,  unescorted  ships,  too 
dangerous,  but  for  the  bombers,  the 
best  season  was  just  beginning.  On  27 
May,  100  twin-engine  JU-88  bombers 
and  8  of  the  HE-Uls  attacked  PQ-M 
and  saxtk  4  slytps^  The  sitfsffilt  showed 


that  high-level  dive-bombing  combined 
with  torpedo-plane  strikes  from  just 
above  the  waterline  could  dissipate  and 
confuse  a  convoy's  antiaircraft  defense. 
In  four  days  under  almost  around-die- 
clock  attack,  PQ-16  lost  8  ships  and 
had  se\  eral  others  so  badly  damaged 
that  they  reached  port  barely  afloat.''^ 
The  war  in  thd  Arctic  had  moved  out  to 
sea. 


*=RoskaJl,  War  at  Sea,  vol.  II.  pp.  130^32;  Rohden. 
&t  Kettsfffii^nrng,  R£ihil£ti  4^76-408  file. 


CHAPTER  XU 

Active  Defenie,  Center  and  North 


StaMn's  BidJ&r  thelniimtiue 

Ordinarily,  the  coming  of  sprinjg  h 
welcome  in  the  Stn  iet  Union.  It  brings 
lengthening  days,  sunshine,  and  the 
promise  bf  tenm^  life  to  a  fmm 
land.  But,  in  194^,  it  also  brought  »H 
unteriainty  for  this  Soviet  Coniinand 
tifflt  has  not  been  entirely  resolved  a 
generation  later  and  ma)'  not  ever  be. 
In  March,  although  the  winter  had  not 
yet  abated,  the  general  offensive,  de- 
spite strenuous  efforts  to  keep  it  a]i\e. 
was  dying  while  the  enemy  stilJ  kept  a 
h6M  oa  Leningtad  and  occupied  the 
approaches  to  Moscow  and  the  Cau- 
casus. The  Soviet  General  Stall,  going 
by  an  inteffige«ee  teport  iti«eeived  on 
18  March,  believed  the  German  East- 
em  Front  had  received  enough  new 
dSi^om  and  replacements  between 
Januar\  and  March  to  be  capable  of 
shifting  to  die  offensive  any  time  alter 
mid-Apnl.* 

The  general  offensive  had  imposed 
an  unsutltidpated  and,  at  times,  nearly 
intdlarafcle  itrsm  on  the  enemy,  but  it 
had  also,  in  the  end,  disclosed  that  tlie 
Soviet  leadership  had  not  yci  <)\  erLonie 
some  hazardous  deficiencies  in  its  con- 
duct ctf  opcralions.  Tlic  Slavki  had 
ordei%d  attacks  in  too  many  directions 
at  m>at,  imd  d^e,fimit  aitd  atmy  ©mu- 
mands  had  done  the  same.  As  a  result, 


the  forces  had  been  divided  and 
redivided,  and  none  of  the  final  ob- 
jectives had  been  adneved.  Reserves 
had  been  wasted  h\  being  sent  into  bat- 
de  piecemeal  to  such  an  extent  that,  on 
16  March,  the  State  Defense  Commit- 
tee undertook  to  prohibit  those  prac- 
tices categorically."'^ 

The  making  <rf  Soviet  strategy  m  im 
spring  ol  1942  vms  in  the  hands  of  five 
,IQen:  Marshal  Shaiposhmkov,  chief  of 
the  Ge^eraT  St#:  Ms  deputy.  General 
Vasilevskiy;  General  Zhukov.  the  com- 
niander  of  Western  Theater;  Marshal 
TIfiBHQSibeidEO,  the  commandier  of  Sot^ 
nmiemThmter;  and  Stalin,  the  su]3remc 
commnnder  of  the  Soviet  Armed 
Forces,  whose  authority  easily 
weighed  that  of  all  the  othei  s  togftheK 
In  early  March,  they  were  agrtssd  in 
beHeving,  as  ^he  whole  world  did>  Uiat 
the  Germans  uould  make  another 
strong  bid  to  defeat  the  Soviet  Union  in 
the  coming  spring  and  Summer.  Con- 
sequently, tlie\  suw  their  task,  as  Va- 
sUevskiy  later  put  it,  as  bemg  to  plan 
for  the  coming  half  year;*  or  m  othser 
words,  to  find  a  way  of  frustrating  the 
next  German  onslaught  while  gelling 
their  own  forces  into  condition  to 
strike  back  huer.^ 

Stalin,  Shaposhnikov,  and  VasilevsMy 
believed  lliey  would  not  be  able  to 


WiMV.  vd.  V,  p.  111. 


»VSiffltcv»kiy,/)*i).  p.  203. 


ACTIVE  DEFENSE,  CENTEi^  AND  NORTH 


239 


develop  any  more  major  olteiisis <. s  in 
tb©  Spring  or  early  summer.  1  hey  be- 
lieved, also,  that  Soviet  operations  up 
lo  the  beginning  of  suninitr  would 
have  to  be  restricted  to  an  active  de- 
fense that  would  "halt  the  enemy's 
!)I()^vs,  near  him  down  and  wtakcn 
him "  3nd  prepare  the  way  lor  "a  large- 
scale  offensive  when  adequate  reserves 
were  ac  ( iiniulated."'*  Zhtikov  con- 
curred in  die  defensive  strategy  but 
Mranted  a  buildup  in  early  summer  for 
an  offensive  lo  smash  the  Rzhev- 
Vyazma  "bridgehead"  west  of  Moscow.* 
Timoshenko  also  favored  the  defensive 
Stiate£^\  in  general  except  for  his  ow  n 
coinxuand.  He  and  General  L^tenant 
I.  Kh.  Bagramyan,  his  chief  of  staff, 
and  Nikila  Khrushchev,  his  member  of 
the  Military  Council  (commissar),  had 
planned  an  olBstisive  for  his  comnnattci 
on  a  broad  front  that  they  proposed  to 
start  in  Miw,* 

In  mid-Mardi,  the  Stsrte  tiefense 
Conunittec  established  the  national  re- 
quirements for  May  through  June  as 
being  to  ttaih  reserves  shd  acxrutiftflate 
gims,  tanks,  aircrSdEt,  and  other  war 
material  for  later  ofiSenslve  operations. 
The  General  Staff  plaiii  drafted  at  the 
same  ume.  envisioned  a  period  of  ac- 
tive defense  through  May  during 
whldi  reserves  wodld  be  built  up  fdr 
"decisive  operations"  to  follow.^ 

In  a  joint  meeting  at  the  end  of 
Mardi,  d^i^  Si^-Hdrense  Committee 
and  the  Slavki  undertook  to  settle  on 
the  "final  variant"  of  the  plan. 
ShaposfanifcQiS'  pi^eMNcited  the  General 
Staff  taanception  of  an  active  defense 


*lhid.,  vol.  V,  [I       Sccilsn  i  vn;  p,  139. 
'7,liiikM\.  A/cm()(!i.  p.  365. 

'"lijgi  jiiiViiM.  Tiih  \hti  nvj  k  pobede^  pp.  48—54,  See 
also /V  AM,  M,l  \,  p.  ll3  3ad\teUevskiy,Oriii.|fc2I2. 

WAn;  vol.  V,  p.  113. 


coupled  w  iih  a  buildup  of  re  serves,  and 
ZhukiA  and  Ilmoshenko  again  offered 
their  |)roposals  for  offensives  in  the 
center  and  on  the  sonth  flank.  Ti- 
moshenko  supported  Zhukov,  but 
Zhukov  was  opposed  to  any  offensives 
other  than  his  own,  which  piu  him 
actually  in  agreement  with 
Shaposhnikov,  since  he  did  not  expect 
to  Stan  the  Rzhev- Vyazma  operaMon 
before  summer.* 

The  crucial  question,  however,  was 
whether  .Stalin  would  accept  as  "at  tsNe" 
a  defense  that  did  not  include  any 
^fensives.  Shaposhnikov  and  Zhukov 
had  teason  to  belii-\e  he  would  not, 
and  when  Shaposhnikov  and  Zhukov 
attempted  to  explain  the  difficulties  of 
organizing  an  offensive  in  the  south, 
Stalin  broke  in,  saying,  "Are  we  sup- 
posed to  sit  in  diefense,  idling  away  oxrr 
time,  anfl  wait  for  the  Germans  to 
attack  hrst?  We  must  stiike  several  pre- 
emptive bibws  over  a  wide  front  and 
probe  the  enemy's  readiness."® 
Shaposhnikov  and  Zhukov  had  their 
answer.  According  to  the  History  of  the 
Sctoiul  VKwW  Wn\  "The  meeting  con- 
cluded with  an  order  from  the  Su- 
preme Commander  to  prepafe  and 
carry  out  in  the  near  (uime  offensives 
in  the  vicinity  of  Kiiarkov,  on  the 
Grimea,  and' i^  other  areas.*** 

In  the  next  several  weeks,  Stalin  or- 
dered or  approved  offensives  along  the 
Whole  front  from  the  Barents  Sea  to 
the  Black  Sea.  On  the  Crimea,  the 
objective  would  be  to  dear  the  enemy 
from  the  petmiistila.  Seu^-mst  ^ma  vms 
to  strike  toward  Khaikov  from  the 
northeast  and  die  southeast.  Bryansk 


'Zliiikov.  Mrmigis,  p.366:/VAfl't  vol.  V.  p.  U3. 
'Zliukov.  Menmn,  p.  566. 
'°/VMK  vol.  V,  p.  lis. 


240 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


Front  was  ordered  to  advance  past 
Kursk  and  Lgov.  Aiming  ultimately  for 
Smolensk,  West  Front  and  Kalinin  Front 
were  to  top  off  the  winter  by  smashing 
Army  Group  Center's  Rzhev-Vyazma 
line,  lb  assist  in  accomplishing  this 
mission.  General  lUlov's  I  Guards 
Cavalry  Corps  would  hit  the  German 
railroads  and  bases  between  Smolensk 
and  Vyazma.  Northwest  Front  would 
eliminate  the  Demyansk  poc^t,.  and 
Karelian  Front  would  attack  oti  the 
Zapadnaya  Litsa  River,  west  of  Kan- 
dalaksha, and  at  Kesteng;a,  Lgrmgrad 
fliwrf  had  the  self-proposed  wiissferrt  oF 
breaking  tlie  lAiiingrad  siege  wiili  its 
own  forces  and  diose  of  the  foniicr 

The  offensives  wei  e  to  be  iStaiductcd 
between  April  and  June  and- were  ex- 
pected to  give  the  dpiet^om  m  those 
months  "an  active  character."  In  the 
same  period,  the  Soviet  forces,  in  gen- 
eral, wmild  be  thie  strategic  d^it^ 
si\e."  reorjpaaizini;  and  reequipping 
units  and  ai^tHibling  reserves.'^ 

T%e  active  defense  with  the  •prfr- 
eniplive  blows,"  in  effect  extended  the 
genera]  offensive  into  the  spring,  in 
doing  so,  it  repeated  the  Ctttsr  «™dt, 
under  more  favoralilc  conditii ms.  Iiaci 
eventually  crippled  the  general  oiten- 
sive  dialing  the  wnter.  And  it  added  a 
complication:  as  VasilevsJay  puts  it,  a 
recwiEement  "to  defend  and  ££ttack  si- 
miMtiBaeously."'*  Zhukov  maintains  in 
his  memoirs  that  he  spoke  against  the 
preemptive  blows,  but  Timosheuko 
seconded  S^uij  and  Sh«ipo$li»i}Gicnr 


p.  113;  Mt-ictsiii\.  Sen'ing  the  Ptitpli'.  p.  2(17. 
"/VAfK  vu).  \-.  p.  II  I, 

'■''A.  M.  ^'■l^lk■^ -ikn.  'NekuUuye  zitfintsy  inkuvodstva 
Zhurnal.  8(1963).  10. 


"ke[>t  siknt."'*  Vasilevskiy  said  after  the 
war  that  people  who  did  not  know 
about  the  "difficult  conditions"  under 
which  the  General  Staff  worked  during 
the  war  mi^bt justifiably  find  fault  with 
riie  datiet^  Staff  for  not  having  dem- 
onstrated the  "negatix  e  consetjuences" 
of  the  decision  to  Stalin.'^  Tlie  Popular' 
Scientific  Sketch  states,  "It  must  be  said 
that  the  leading  members  of  the  Gen- 
eral Staff,  the  Chief  of  the  General 
Staff,  Marshal  B.  M.  Shaposhnikov, 
and  his  deputy.  General  A.  M.  V'a- 
silevskiy,  as  well  as  the  membei  of  the 
Statfka,  G.  K.  Zhukov,  in  principle,  ad- 
hered to  till'  sanu'  opinion  as  the  Su- 
preme Commander,  only  with  some 
tfeervations.'*^' 

Arm\  Gmup  ('.enters  Seaind Front 
At  the  End  of  Winter 

A?  if  it  had  settled  through  the 
liieited  snow,  the  Artny  (^tip  Center 
line  stabilized  in  Ajjril  1942  along  the 
ra^ed  leading  edges  of  half-a-dozen 
oiK^e  diead%  msm  stsdied  and  bhihted, 

Sowet  ttelists.  Tlii?  WSMer  had  passed, 

lam  Mm  §&t  e|be  Ku^i^ns.  not  soon 
enottgh  iiiriheCerniaiwJfciif  ithadleft 

behind  many  cfianges  in  the  bat- 
defield's  configuration.  Tlie  straight- 
line  distance  froin  the  army  group's 
northern  bonndai  \  near  Velikive  Liiki 
to  its  southern  boundary  jouth west  ol 
Orel  was  about  S50  miles.  Hie  ftmt  in 

between,  including  most  thoiigli  nt)t  all 
of  its  convolutions,  was  more  like  900 
n^ile^  long.  Its  outstanding  features 

were  the  l.'id-tiiilcs-cU'ep  and  at  least 
etjually  wide   Ibropets  bulge  on  the 


"Zhukov.  Mrmmn,  p,  366f, 
"Vasilcvsltiv,  "SrkoteiftVOpimf,"  p.  10. 
'•VW,  p.  139. 


ACTIVE  DEFENSE.  CENTER  AND  NORTH 


241 


north,  a  75-by-125-mile  salient  on  the 
south  that  had  evolved  from  the  old 
Sukhinichi  bulge,  and,  between  the 
tv^'o.  a  dogleg  projection  occupied  by 
the  Ninth,  Fourth  Panzer,  and  Fom  th 
Armies.  On  the  rim  of  the  Toropets 
bulge,  Tliird  Shock  Amy's  troops  were 
283  miles  west  of  Moscow  and  50  miles 
west  of  the  Army  Group  Center  head- 
quarters at  Smolensk.  At  Gzhatsk. 
Fourth  Panzer  Army  was  within  90 
miles  of  Moscow. 

R/lu\.  Vyazma,  and  Bryansk,  com^ 
TTiaiuling  the  immediate  roa4  and  tail 
ap]ji(>adhes  to  Moscow  oti  the  west, 
were  in  Army  Group  Ceiuei  s  hands 
and  so  kepi  alive  a  threat  to  the  Soviet 
capital.  Along  a  250-mile  line  from 
Rzhev  to  south  of  Bryansk,  ho\ve\er, 
die  arniy  group  had  acquired  a  second 
ttotit  that  pfai^cally  deaied  it  ter- 
ritorial control  of  Smolensk.  From 
the  army  groiip  boundary  Qorth  to 
Bryansk  and  frotti  there  ftorl^  t& 
Roslavl  and  Kinvv,  partisans  held  a^^e^ 
in  the  broad  spaces  between  the  ri^ol^ 
arid  tailfoads.  Between  the  Smolemk* 
Vyazma  railroad  and  the  RoUhahn 
dirough  Roslavl,  Belov  was  the  procon- 
sul in  a  Soviet  enclave  domihated  by  Ms 
/  CiKn/ls  Cavalry  Corps,  parachute 
troops,  partisans,  and  survivors  oi' 
Thirp^Mrd  Army.  A  network  of  partisan 
bands  provided  alinosi  tontinuoiis  con- 
tact between  Belovs  territory  and  the 
Bryansk  pardsan  coiicentratioti.  North 
of  the  Smolensk-Vyazma  railroad. 
ihirty-nhilh  Army  and  A7  Cavalry  Corps 
occupied  a  30-by-40-mile  pocket  east  of 
the  Dukhovshchina-Belyy  road.  By  the 
end  of  April,  Fourth  Panzer  Army  had 
tigh  tenea  its  front  south  tjSHtieRmhi^ 
and  at  Kiro\  enougli  tf>  den\  Belo\'  and 
the  Brj^ansk  pardsans  unimpeded  con- 
taet  wtih  Soviet  territory,  but  Thirty- 


mhilh  Army  still  had  free  access  to  the 
outside  through  an  l8-mile-wide 
northeast  of  Belyy. 

In  late  March,  as  a  smaller  alier- 
native  to  Brueckenschlag,  the  Os- 
tashkov  operation.  Ninth  Army  had 
proposed  an  attack  west  oiu  of  the 
Rzhev-Olenino  area  to  Nelidovo.  Tak- 
ing Nelidovo  would  not  have  done 
nuich  toward  eliminating  die  Toropets 
bulge;  but  it  would  have  deprived  the 
Soviet  forces  m  the  bulge  of  a  road  and 
rail  jmiction,  could  have  been  the  first 
stage  of  a  drive  to  Toropets,  and  would 
in  particular  have  cut  Thirty-ninth 
Uwy's  ground  tommunications.  By 
early  April  the  Nelidovo  attack,  code- 
nsiftxed  Opeifsrtteh  1*IOimPOt,  had  re^ 
ptaeed  Brl  K(  Kl nsj  hlag,  which  by 
dien  had  drifted  beyond  the  range  of 
fieasibfltty.  Bnt  f^mnmu  too,  had  ttow- 
hies,  first  the  thaw  and  then  dieabnoi^ 
mally  heavy  spriuj^  rains  that  eKt^^tU^bd 
the  rasputitsa  past  its  usual  terra. -In  tJie 
meanlime.  Fourth  Army  had  prepared 
an  operadon,  code-named  Hannover, 
a^ASt  the  Belov  forfe.  AlAough 
\oRDPOL  and  Hannover  hardly  added 
up  to  a  major  offensive  effort,  they 
were  together  isore  titan  j^tsny  iQroup 
Center  could  afiford  in  the  spring  of 
1942. 

The  flow  of  reii^orcienimts  to  the 
army  gi-oiip  had  st!e|>ped.i|ll  March, 
and  a3  soon  as  die  re^^^is0M  Imd  set  in. 
Hider  had  neversed  ^  ibw,  mofg 
Arnn  Group  Gfiiter  m  a  hxse  ieom 
wliidi  to  draw  reinforceHientsi'  die 
south.  In  the  first  week  of  May,  Mead^ 
(.|iiarters.  Fourth  Pan/.er  Arm\,  do- 
parted,  to  be  followed  by  five  of  tiie 
army  group's  twenty  corps  headquar- 
ters, Frf)m  A]>ril  to  early  June,  .\riny 
Group  Center  had  lost  sixteen  divi- 
siom,  a  good     pmmnt  of  its  overall 


242 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


strengtli.  30  perceni  of  its  panzer  divi- 
sions. In  the  divisions  thai  stayed,  per- 
sonnd  and  other  siiortages  tve^re  not 
going  to  be  filled  until  slimmer;  con- 
sequently,  regiments  had  to  be  reduced 
irom  thre^  l»ittaIions  to  two,  artillery 
batteries  from  ff>iir  guns  to  three.  Pan- 
zcr  and  motorized  divisions  were  suth 
in  fiaffle  iSnly.  Most  of  l3ie  tanks  and 
trucks  that  had  survived  the  winter 
were  awaiting  repairs,  and  the  shops 
eotiM  not  keep  more  than  20  percent 
in  running  condition. 

Army  Group  Center  was  to  be  a 
supemiSiinerary  in  the  1942  isampaign. 
Field  Marshal  Khige,  the  army  group's 
commander,  told  his  generals  on  18 
Apiril,  'We  must  cmtiatimie  on  the 
forces  we  !ia\e  leff.""^  Bv  mid-Mav, 
Kluge  became  convinced  that  NoRDpt)L 
was  too  ambitious;  and  when  Hider, 
whose  interest  had  drifted  completely 
away  from  die  area,  did  not  object  he 
canceled  it  and  instructed  Ninth  Mmny 
to  work  on  Seydi.it/.  a  smaller  opera- 
don  against  Thirty-nint/i  Army  and  XI 
Cmedry  Cotps.  Tti^e  meantime,  Fourth 
Arnn  would  go  ahead  with  HANNOVER 
and  when  it  was  ccmipleted  turn  the 
troops  over  m  Ninth  Arnay  for 
Seydut/,.  Hanno\'1r  and  S^rOLItve,. 
being  directed  against  conventiotidl  So^ 
viet  forces,  could  be  expected'  to  take 
rcasonabi\  predictable  courses.  Klnge 
knew  frum  experience  that  operations 
against  tlie  partisans  around  Bryaiislc 
promised  mucli  less.  The  area  was 
larger  and  the  anticipated  return  for 
the  effort  certainly  would  be  i^aaall^Sr 
Since  he  als(j  did  not  have  any  more 
troops  to  spate,  KJuge  gave  Second 
Panzer  Army  one  iieciirity  division  and 


left  the  armv  to  deal  with  the  partisans 
in  any  way  it  could. 

Hammer 

Hclov's  territory  stretched^  ''e%|lty 
miles  from  east  to  west  and,  at  its 
widest,  forty  tnites  north  and  south, 
occupying  almost  the  wliolc  of  the  tri- 
angle formed  by  Smolensk,  Vyazma, 
and  Spas-tSemensk.  In  Apni  and  early 
Mav,  Belo\  was  engaged  in  organizing 
the  partisans,  cavalry,  and  airborne 
troops  to  comply  with  orders  coming  to 
him  from  West  Fwiil,  wiiicli  v\as  at- 
tempting to  devise  another  thrust  to- 
ward Vyazma  as  part  of  the  a(#ire 
defense.  In  the  less  critical  western 
two-thirds  of  the  pocket,  he  set  up  two 
"partisan  divisions."  On  the  east,  he 
had  the  cavalry,  airborne  troops,  and 
more  partisans.  On  9  May,  planes 
brought  in  a  battalion  of  antitank  guns 
and.  with  it.  General  Mayor  V.  S.  Go- 
lush  kevich,  die  deputy  chici  of  staff 
si  Ifcfei  ^mt,  G^teMeweb  ddivered 
A  $ect$t  older  for  Belov  to  be  ready 
^strike  south,  "not  !a«er  than  5  June, " 
t&  tneet  Fiftieth  Army,  which  was  be- 
ing reinforced  widi  tank  cf)rps  and 
-would  be  advancing  north  across  Uie 
mmtihn.^*  (Map  19.) 

For  n\NN'o\TR,  Fourth  Arm%  had  a 
corps  lieadquarters  and  three  divisions 
ftom  Tlura  Panzer  Army,  which  had 
taken  over  the  Fourth  Panzer  Army 
sector,  and  a  corps  headquarters  and 
three  divisloif  s  of  its  own.  These-  forces 
were  plentv  to  handle  Belov s  (avalrv 
and  other  regular  troops,  which  were 
esd  mated  at  between  mm  aatt  twenty 
thousand,  but  not  enough  to  scour  the 
entire  1,500-squaie-mile  pocket.  (Be- 


«»Ho$ttB^  lis  P-Il^.  vei.  IV,  Ik  I^, 


ACTIVE  DEFENSE,  CENTER  AND  NORTH  243 


MAP  19 


lovs  strengili  piobabl)  was  close  lo 
twenty  thousand,  and  he  had  a  tank 
battalion  with  eighteen  tanks.) Fvn- 
thermore,  Slydutz,  altliough  it  had 
second  prtoriti^  in  terms  of  time,  was 
tactically  more  urgent  than  Hannover, 
since  it  was  essential  to  the  stability  of 
the  Szhcv  salient.  That,  and  Belov's 
presumed  deployment,  made  a  small, 
tjLiick  solution  appear  worthwhile.  Ra- 
dio intett:epts  and  information  from 
agents  and  prisoners  placed  his  head- 


'•See  ibtd. 


quarters  and  the  main  body  of  his 
regular  troops  in  the  eastern  end  of  the 
pocket,  easi  of  ihe  L'gra  Rivet.-"  Tlie 
estimate  was  wiong  in  what  was  going 
to  be  a  significant  respect:  the  elements 
oHV  Airfmnr  C.or/)s  and  the  "Zhalxi"  Fnr- 
tisav  Rcgimenl  were  east  ol  tlie  L'gra,  but 
most  of  Belo*%  J^'Vattef  was  west  of  it.*' 
Hie  army  group  and  Fourth  Army 
settled  on  a  plan  to  run  Belov  down  in 
one  fast  mm)p,  Iwo  divt5ions>  striking 


"AOK  4.  ia  KrirgsUigehiiili  \r  n.  15-21  Muv  r', 
AOK4  24336/1  file. 
**8clovi  "Pyatimt^chrum  hurba,"  y>.  f)7. 


244 


MOSCOW  TO  STAI.1NGRAD 


south  from  \Sa/ma  and  aQ^e  noftib 
from  Spas-Deraensk,  would  pinch  off 
the  eastern  end  «5F  the  pocket,  trapping 
Belov  east  of  tlie  Ugra  and  tlie 
Vya/ima-K.irov  railroad.  The  other 
three  would  drive  inward  froin  a 
scrcfiiing  line  arouiul  ihc  tip  of  the 
pocket.  Although  it  presented  no  ex- 
cep^dmtta^dcS  prdiblems,  Hannover, 
first  set  for  21  Mav,  had  to  he 
postponed  on  sc\  eral  successive  days 
t>e^nise  of  prolonged  heavy  rains  that 
turned  the  ground,  si  ill  soft  from  the 
thaw,  back  to  mud.  As  if  the  winter  had 
not  beeii  enough,  central  Russia  ytm 
experiencing  a  record  wet  spring. 
While  it  was  being  planned,  H'AM* 
^(^qtiired  one  coterie  feature. 
Late  in  1941,  at  OsitiliOrf  near  Orsha, 
the  Abwehr  (the  OKW  intelligence  or- 
ganization) had  begun  training  several 
hundred  captured  Soviet  soldiers  and 
officers  as  diversionists.  The  Germans 
had  tried  out  sfomewhat  similar  groups 
earlier  in  the  cainp;ugn,  hut  those  had 
been  made  up  ol  emigres,  members  of 
minorities,  or  Russian-speaking  Ger- 
mans, and  most  had  not  lived  in  Russia 
recenth  or  had  lived  on  the  fringes  of 
Soviet  life.  The  Gteintoff  trainees,  ac- 
cept for  their  commander,  an  emigre, 
Colonel  Konstantin  Kromiadi,  were  all 
completely  up-to-date,  ^tikientie  pfod- 
UCtS  of  the  Soviet  svsteni,  most  par- 
ticularly of  dre  So\  iet  Army.  In  Soviet 
uniforms  they  could  be  expected  CO 
merge  easily  into  Soviei  formations,  es- 
pecially heterogeneous  ones  like  Be- 
lov's.  For  Hannover,  350  of  them  were 
assigned  to  Fourth  Army  as  the  FApt  t  i- 
mental  Organization  Center.--  I  heii 

**Geria^  U  Mynberir,  The  Pufr&tm  Mamtni  in 
&e  ^ibij^^m^ksA  fifm  $)Kl^f^  Oblasi  (Mbsh- 
ingimt,  D.6.1  Mr^kfSaj^  aa&  fieveloptnem  Com- 
mand, 1954),  |h  d9;  Svoi  Sieenburg.  Wlassom 
(Cologne:  WSfSiafiidiaitimd  jtolitik,  1968),  pp.  60-^86. 


mission  would  hit^  to  disrupt  the  de- 
fense, if  p^i^fele,  %  finding  and  killing 
Selov  and  his  ttart,  or  omerwise^  by 
sneak  attacks  and  In  spreading  false  or- 
ders and  inlormaLi(jn. 

On  May  doudbimcs  tnutidated 
the  area,  hut  General  Heini  ici.  com- 
mander of  Fourth  AnUy,^  afraid  of  los- 
ing the  elcfittent  of  stjrpfisebf  another 
delay,  decided  to  let  Hanncivfr  siart 
the  nstt  morning.  The  Experimental 
Organizadon  Center  went  iato  the 
pocket  from  the  south  that  night. 
Fourdi  Army%  troops  moved  oUt  ip  the 
morning  in  pouring  rsin,  in  some 
places  up  to  their  waists  in  mud  and 
■water.  The  19th  Panzer  Division,,  ad- 
vanettif  from  the  sotxth,  ttewrtheless 
covered  almost  ten  miles  before  1200 
when  it  arrived  at  the  Ugra  River  near 
Vskhody — just  is  iSiiie'  to  see  the 

liridge  there  blow^^^ Which  was  proba- 
bly unnecessary  efrOtt  by  the  Russians 
since  the  water  was  rising  so  fast  that 
the  bridge  vei  y  likely  would  have  been 
washed  away  anyliow.  The  division 
spent  the  rest  of  the  dav  gel  ting  a 
bridgehead  north  of  the  river  and 
building  a  pontoon  bridge  o\  er  the  re- 
lentlessly rising  water.  Coming  from 
the  north.  197th  Infantry  Division  took 
five  hours  to  reach  Ugra  Station,  w  iiet  e 
Iherailroad  crossed  me  river.  After  ten 
more  miles,  the  iraji  would  he  elosetl. 
From  inside  the  ["  ic  kt  t .  what  was  taken 
t£O  beBelo^  ra<lio  was  setidittg  a  con- 
stant stieain  of  coded  messages  that 
seemed  to  give  evidence  of  alai  ni.  ii  not 
panic.  Klugc  congratulated  the  iioops 
on  their  "fme  successes,"  aiifi  llciiu  ici 
agreed  that  ilie  perfoimances  weie  re- 
laarkable.  He  had  not  expected  them 
to  reach  Vskhody  and  Ugra  Station  un- 
til the  second  day,  because  he  liad  antic- 
ipated a  tnore  solid  defense.  However, 


ACTIVE  DEFENSE,  CENTER  AND  NORTH 


245 


a  disuirbinff  lliouglu  occurred  tf)  him 
and  Kiuge  both  tliat  the  resistance  so 
far  had  oeett  more  typical  of  parri^uftt 
than  ofSov  ici  regular  troops.-^ 

The  downpours  continued  through 
the  night  and  the  next  day.  Amazed, 
die  Germans  SSW  the  Ugra,  already  a 
hundred  yards  wide,  spawn  a  second 
diannel  twenty  yards  ^de^  iF<Sr  twb 
days,  tanks,  trucks,  infantry,  and  ardl- 
lery  canie  lo  a  standstill  in  mud  and 
water.  The  rain  was  so  heavy  that  ewn 
the  reliable  little  Storrh  reconnaissance 
planes  could  not  Hy.  Fourth  Army  had 
no  id^  what  the  enemy  forces  were 
doing.  Although  Klugc  could  not 
imagine  how  the  Russians  might  get 
across  the  $4voUen  Ugra  ^ven  he  knew 
the\  would  have  to  trv,  and  on  the  af- 
ternoon ol  the  23th  he  asked  Heinrici 
to  have  his  points  bear  tsti  iriiles  west 
toward  Fursovo,  (ni  the  assnmptifin 
that  the  Russians  would  have  crossed 
the  river  by  then .  Afttv  la^o^er 
twenty-four  hours  passed  without  the 
encirclement  being  closed,  Kluge  and 
Heinrid  agreed  that  if  Beim  had  not 
already  done  so,  he  almost  certainly 
would  get  away  to  the  west,  and  Han- 
f*meit  would  therefore  have  to  go  into 

a  second  phase. 

fhe  points  met  at  Fursovo  shortly 
before  nightfall  on  the  27th.  The  mop- 
up.  in  the  next  five  days,  failed  to  bring 
eiilier  Belov  or  his  main  tbrte  to  ba\. 
Prisoners,  deserters,  and  returned 
members  of  the  Experimental  Organi- 
zation Center — of  which  about  two- 
thirds  cante  hack — roi  roboraied  each 
others'  statcmcrus  that  several  Soviet 
Staffs  had  been  in  die  pocket,  including 
Belov's  and  those  ^  the  ^^j^sme 


24336/1  (lie. 


Ciiy/is  and  the  "Zfiabo"  Regime})/.  Vnr 
Fourth  Army,  die  results  were  disap- 
pointing. Ahout  two  thoti^d  Russians 
were  captined  and  another  fifteen 
hundred  killed,  but  Belov  had  ob- 
victtsly  escaped  with  most  of  his 
troops.'* 

Prisoner  interrogations  indicated 
that  Belo^'had  had  at  least  a  day's  warn- 
ing aboiii  the  attat  k  thiough  a  deserter 
from  the  Experimental  Organization 
Center.  T%e  Russians  had  known  be- 
forelKind  nhoul  the  Experimental  Oi- 
ganization  Center,  but  they  had  not 
^Ol«m'^ftei^'ft'litN»dd^'^  Operaung. 
Consequently,  according  to  the  pris- 
oners, just  knowing  the  unit  was  in  the 
area,  had  raised  confiision  and  some 
panic.  Meinbcrs  of  the  Experimental 
Organization  Center  reported  having 
ofeWfTved  instances  of  Soviet  unitefimg 
on  each  oiher,^*  Belov,  in  his  account, 
states  that  on  23  May,  the  Sth  Airb<jrne 
Brigade  des^^jf^  a  group  of  "diire*^ 
sionists"  whf>se  mission  had  been  to 
"wipe  out"  his  staff  and  that  he  learned 
of  the  eoniiag  German  attack  from  one 
of  its  survivors.^* 

At  fhe  conclusion  of  what  the  Ger- 
mans were  In  then  calling  Hannovi  r  I , 
Belov  still  had  17,000  troops  and  his 
eighteen  tailks«biit  he  had  been  forced 
out  of  the  eastern,  tactically  most  valu- 
able, ihiiil  ol  the  pocket.  By  his  ac- 
count, Belov  had,  meanwhile,  ctm- 
(  iuded  that  the  "hope"  of  meeting  with 
fifi/clh  Army  was  disappearing,  and  he, 
therefore,  asked  West  Front,  on  4  Jtnie, 
for  permission  to  begin  the  march  back 

27  May-2  Jun  42. 
*Vm,  I  Jun  42. 

'*BelOV,  "P^dtnMjjMiMiuija  barbe,"  p.  70. 


246 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


to  the  Soviet  side  of  llie  front,  which 
■was  granted  because  the  tank  corps 
and  reserves  for  Fiftieth  Army  had,  by 
then,  been  transferred  to  the  Kliarkov 
area.*^  This,  Belov  says,  left  him  with 
three  possible  choices r  to  head  west 
inm  Ik-lonissia  and  coin  ei  t  to  partisan 
operations,  to  go  nordi  toward -Ko/train 
Fn»U,  at  to  go  south  toward  the  weale 
spot  in  the  German  liiu-  at  Kirow  l  it' 
rejected  the  first  two,  he  maintains,  be- 
cause his  fOTtt  WOtlld  ^eiMo^  ill^  "sig- 
nificance" as  regular  lroti|IS  becom- 
ing partisans  and  becatise  ^  ididi  not 
tih€  liieans  to  get  Ms  artillery  and 
t^lks  across  the  Diu  pr  Rht-y.  which  he 
woxM  bsKe  to  do  it  he  went  north.  His 
decjsioft  Ttk^  to  march  west  to  the 
vicinity  of^l^jsh^a  and  llicn  head  south 
and  east  into  the  nortiiern  part  of  the 
Bryansk  partisan  area,  frO«n -which  he 
could  make  his  exit  near  Kirov.*" 

Hannover  II,  of  which  Belov's  ac- 
eoutit  takes  no  specific  notice,  began  oh 
'^  ]ui\e  in  inoic  rain.  Heinrici  had 
turned  his  divisions  on  tlie  near  side  of 
the  Ugra  pocket  around  to  pursue  Be- 
lov west  between  Vchiya  and  Do- 
fogobuzh  and  to  force  him  back 
against  the  Dnepr  River.  TTie  better 
way  wtnild  ha\ f  liccn  to  cut  straight 
througli  and  head  liim  off  east  of  the 
river,  but,  in  mad  and  water,  the  infan- 
trv  tould  not  move  fa.st  enough,  and 
trucks,  tanks,  and  artiliery  could  not 
move  at  all.  ^U^out  eyer  catching  sight 
of  Belov's  main  force,  ihfi  Fourth  Arm\ 
troops  reached  Dorogobuzh  and 
Yelnya  after  five  days  of  slogging  across 
an  intmdated  landscape  and  skirmish- 


•'Auoniiiig  lo  Zhiikov.  liclin  dad  been  giveti  iir- 
eli-i  s  ill  c;ii"lv  May  Ui  bc-j^in  tu  iri}iin(»  his  Iroops  out.  Sc<; 
Zhiikii\,  A/cwu/ii \.  |>.  '.'''il . 

'"BcIdv,  "Pyatimesyaihiiayu  ImiiImi,"  p.  7lf- 


ing  with  nuinenius  stnall  parties  that 
appeared  mostly  to  be  partisans.  Belov 
was  then  confined  in  a  30-by-30-mile 
pocket  blocked  on  the  not  th  by  the 
Dnepr,  which  was  a  torrent  200  yards 
wide,  and  on  the  south,  between  Yelnya 
aiifi  flie  Dnept,  h\  the  221si  Security 
Division;  but  Heinrici  and  Kiuge  were 
beginning  to  doubt  whether  Belov  was 
still  around  at  all.** 

On  the  mtorning  of  the  8di,  German 
pilots  over  the  podtet  saw  an  astonish- 
ing scene;  tolumns  of  Soviet  eavali  v, 
airborne  troops,  trucks,  wagons,  and 
tanks  weaving  in  and  out  of  clumps  of 
woods,  all  heading  south.  Belo\  liad,  ai 
last,  come  into  the  open  and  was  ob- 
1?iousIy  getting  ready  to  hfeak  OUt. 
Kluge  ordeied  a  motorcycle  battalion 
from  the  north  to  the  south  ade  of  the 
ffioieket,  and  Hehirid  took  part  of  the 
19th  Panzer  Di\  ision  out  of  his  front 
north  of  Yelnya  to  backstop  the  221st 
Security  Division.  Tlie^^difetteinentS, 
however,  came  too  late.  During  the 
night,  the  Russians  overum  a  weak  spot 
Mmfe^lst  Security  Division^  line  and 
simply  walked  out.  After  daylight,  the 
Luftwaffe  reported  about  a  thousand 
vehicles  a!n«i'*omethotisaftds  of  troops 

heading  into  deep  fotcii  arminrl  ilie 
headwaters  of  the  Desna  River  south  oi 
Ifelttya.  ^When  the  motorcyClte  and  pan- 
zer troops  closed  the  gap  later  in  llie 
day,  not  much  was  lei  t  in  the  pocket.*" 
After  passing  Yelnya,  Belov  entered 

the  area  of  the  "l.nrj,"  Partisan  Rrt^in/nit 
where  ground  troops  could  not  readily 
pursue  him,  bitt,  he  skys,  C^rrban 
planes  bombed  his  positions  "all  day" 
and  came  back  at  night  to  try  to  bomb 


■'.AOK  -t.  la  Kri.n-Mtigi'liHi:!,      13,  3-7  Ju»l42,  AOK 
4  2433(5/1  file. 
"Ibid.,  8-9  Jun  4a. 


ACTIVE  DEFENSE,  CENTER  AND  NORTH 


247 


Ms  supply  planes.^*  In  three  days. 

Fourth  Arniv  built  ;i  screening  line 
along  the  Rollhahu.  ninth  it  now  knew 
he  would  have  to  cross,  in  the  mean- 
time, Belov  had  halted  in  the  woods 
near  the  village  of  Klin,  halfway  be- 
tween Yelnya  and  the  Rollbahn,  to  son 
out  his  troops  and  receive  air  supply. 
After  anotlier  two  days,  the  Germans 
began  to  believe  thai  he  might  have 
disappeared  again.  Monitors  reported 
his  radio  operating  near  Klin,  but  de- 
serters said  he  had  been  flown  out,  and 
his  force  was  breaking  up.  Finally,  just 
before  2400  on  the  night  of  15  June, 
Belov  reappeared,  \vhere  he  had  been 
otpected,  on  ihe Rollbahn.^^ 

Belov  and  the  German  records  give 
somewhat  different  versions  of  what 
happened  that  night  (which  Belov  says 
was  the  night  of  the  16ih)  and  after- 
ward. In  Belov's  version,  the  break{>ut 
was  to  have  been  made  in  two  echelons, 
with  Generstl  Mayor  V.  K.  Baranov,  the 
commander  of  ht  Guards  Cavnbj  Divi- 
sion leading  the  first  and  Belov  the 
second.  When  Baranov  emerged  from 
the  woods  a  short  distance  north  of  the 
Rollbahn,  BeloVj  who  several  hun- 
dred yards  behifid,  heard  him  shout, 
"Guards,  advance!  After  me!  Hurrah!" 
With  more  "Hurrahs,"  the  cavalry 
charged,  and  got  across  the  road,  but 
Belov  soon  learned  that  the  infantry 
with  the  first  echelon  had  not  been  able 
t0  do  the  same.  Consequendy,  Belov 
says,  he  reassembled  ihe2^i  Guards  Cav- 
eUry  Division  and  elements  of /V  Airborne 
Cmps  and  329th  Rifle  Diviswn  and  with- 
drew into  the  woods.  The  next  day,  he 
says,  he  came  out  of  the  woods  about 
ten  miles  ncitth  of  the  Rollbahn,  made  a 


"Brim,  '  l'\i!i!mr\\,ii  hnaya  borba,"  p.  72. 

'•.\i)k  -r  I,,  K::,!,'yiiigtbuA  Nn  13,  10-16  Jun  4g, 
AOK  4  2-iS'itii[  flic. 


wide  sweep  west  aAd  loutfa^  and 
crossed  the  road  ten  tn^s  cast  of 

Roslavl.='=« 

As  the  Germans  saw  it,  there  were 
three  simultaneous  attacks,  one  of 
which  was  led  by  a  general  on  horse- 
back u  hom  they  took  to  have  been 
Bel<)\.  1  lie  first  reports  indicated  that 
over  three  thousand  Russians  had  bro- 
ken out,  but  Heinrid  could  not  quite 
bring  himself  to  believe  that  so  many 
men  could  have  gone  through  three 
small  gaps  that  were  open  less  than  an 
hour.  Therefore,  he  concluded  that, 
whether  Belov  had  escaped  or  not, 
most  of  his  men  must  still  be  north  of 
the  road.  Patrols  probing  into  the 
pocket  timing  llie  day  on  the  16lli 
found  Russians  still  there,  but  they 
could  not  determine  how  many.  De- 
serters said  eight  to  ten  thousand. 
Fourth  Army  thought  six  thousand  was 
a  more  likely  number. 

During  the  afternfion  of  the  18th,  a 
patrol  found  an  ot  (U  r  on  a  dead  Soviet 
officer,  which  had  been  written  that  day 
and  which  bore  Belov's  signature.  It 
gaAe  detailed  directions  for  a  mass 
breakout  across  the  Rollbahn  and  set 
the  time  for  2400  that  day.  The  order 
could  have  been  a  deception,  bm  one 
thing  was  certain:  Belov  would  have  to 
make  his  move  soon.  The  noose  was 
closing  around  him.  Having  nothing 
else  at  all  to  go  by,  Fourth  Army  hur- 
riedly built  three  lines  on  the  section  of 
the  Rollbahn  the  order  specifieit  —  one 
on  the  road,  two  more  farther  back. 

The  Germans'  earlier  cKperieilc^ 
had  shown  that  no  single  lin^iH^getkjg: 
to  stop  a  charge  by  thousands^  g£  Sm- 
perate  men,  and  if  the  attack  came  at 
any  other  place  it  would  very  likely 


Belov,  "PyatitnesyarJiimyii  borba,"  p.  73. 


248 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


A  G^MOifsuueED  Tank  Tsapjn  TRKftMOST 


succeed.  But  it  did  not.  It  began  exactly 
on  time,  at  2400,  straight  into  the 
mii/./les  of  German  artillepjr  ma- 
chine guns.  The  fighting  went  on  tiniil 
after  daylight.  About  fifteen  lumdred 
Russians  got  across  the  first  \u\v;  live 
hundred  got  across  the  second;  and  a 
few  across  the  third.  Tlie  others  were 
fur(cd  back  into  the  pocket,  and  at 
1200  the  ne\t  da\,  helie\  ing  Beiov  Iiad 
made  his  linal  bitl  and  lost.  Heinrici 
gave  the  order  to  push  into  the  pocket, 
which,  by  nightfall,  had  been  reduced 
to  an  area  one  and  one-half  by  three 
miles.  Then  the  rain  began  again,  and 
an  infantry  company  left  a  gap  in  the 
line,  and  Belov  niatclieci  out  with  what 
Fourth  Army  estimated  to  be  between 
two  and  four  thousand  of  his  men.  The 
Rusaans  were  on  the  move,  and  the 


Germans  were  tired.  In  the  afternoon 
f)n  the  21,st,  saying  that  ihey  "should 
not  march  the  men  to  death,"  Kluge 
told  Foiu  lh  Ai  nn  to  stop  HANNOVER  II 
and  give  the  troops  a  rest.^* 

Fourth  Army's  afteraction  report  on 
Hannover  I  and  II  claimed  11,000 
Russians  captured  and  5,000  killed. 
How  many  of  these  were  Belov's  troops 
and  how  nianv  partisans  f)r  civilians 
was  luicertaiii.  L  ntil  the  end  of  the 
month,  monitors  traced  a  racho  signal 
in  the  woods  north  oi  ihe  Rollbahn  tliat 
they  believed  to  be  Belovs.^*  Belov  says 
he  was  brought  out  by  plane  to  Tenth 
Army  on  the  night  of  23  June  and  that 


■"AOK  I.  Ill  K:i,x^i„i;,'Sm,h  Nr.  13,  16-21  Jun  42. 
.AOK  4  L'  l:V',r,  I  hi, 

'V6i<J.,  2l>Jun-2Jul  42. 


ACTIVE  DEFENSE,  CENTER  AND  NORTH 


249 


MAP  20 


subsequently  10,000  of  his  trpop$ 
crossed  tlie  front  to  the  Soviet  side liejff 
Kirov  and  that  3.000  more  were  evacti- 
ated  by  air.^"  The  History  of  the  GreeU 
Patriotic  H&r  Slates  that  "some"  of  Be- 
lov's  troops  crossed  the  lines  at  Kirov 
and  noi  iheasi  ot  Smolensk  in  July, 
while  others  stayed  to  fight  as  par- 
dsans.^^  Belov  would  command  again, 
notably  at  Kursk  and  Berlin,  and 
would  be  ranked  as  a  hei  o  in  the  Soviet 
Union  for  his  raid  behind  the  enemy 


front  during  the  first  winter  of  ibe  war. 
Although  the  Germans  did  not  often 
admire  Soviet  generalship.  Haider  was 
moved  to  remark,  "The  man  did,  alter 
M,  put  seven  Gennan  divisions  on  the 
jump."^* 

Ninth  Army's  Operation  Seydlitz 
had  waited  lor  the  completion  of 
Hannover  to  receive  a  corps  head- 
4ftJ!irter5,  two  diwi^onSt  apd  #r  sup- 


'*Bel()v.  "t'vifime.sYii-hnaya  hftrha"  p»  t4f. 
"/VOm,  vol.  II,  p.  475, 


^NaMsr  biai%  voi.  tti,  458. 


250 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


port.  The  de^ay  affdrded  ample  tiine 

for  planning,  and  Sfa'DLitz  went 
through  several  revisions.  In  the  final 
vermoti,  Kluge  and  General  der  Pan- 

zerlruppen  Heinrirh-Goitfried  von 
Viclingholi.  who  was  replacing  Model 
as  commander  of  Ninth  Army  while 
the  latter  was  iiospitali/.ed  reonering 
from  a  wound,  settled  on  two  thrusts, 
each  by  a  panzer  division  backed  by  an 
infantr\  division,  to  cl(5se  the  Belyy 
gap.  Single  panzer  divisions  would 
make  two  other  assaults  from  soutli  of 
Olenino  and  east  of  Svrhevka  to  split 
the  Thirty-nintfi  Army.  The  second  tvvi> 
depended  on  5ih  Panzer  Division, 
which  was  engaged  in  H  \N\(n  F.R.  and 
20th  Panzer  Division,  which  was  lu  be 
detached  from  TTiird  Panzer  Army. 
Four  infantry  divisions  would  hold  the 
perimeter,  and  14lh  Motorized  Di\  ision 
would  he  reserve.  Eleven  divisions 
was  no  small  number,  but  although 
th^  were  rested  and  recovered  from 
the  wintei,  they  were  all  gready  under- 
strengih.  Two  liazards  could  not  be 
mitigated  by  any  amouitt  of  planning. 
One  was  the  weaihei  ,  which  continued 
TtOMSy  through  |unc.  Tlie  second  was 
the  enemy's  intention.  Other  than  diat 
Thirty-ninth  Army  and  XJ  Cavah-y  Corps 
were  s<)mewhere  in  the  fo!  t\-bv-sixty- 
niik'  expanse  oi  loiest  between  Relyy 
and  Sychevka  nothing  else  was  known 
alxiut  ihem.  Like  Beln\'s  force,  the^ 
had  virtually  disappeared  witli  the 
winter's  snow. 

Skmh  itz  began  in  the  early  morning 
on  2  July,  just  after  2400,  which  at  that 
tinie  of  the  year  was  only  ahout  two 
hours  befoie  flawn.  Kluge's  command 
train  was  parked  at  S)chevka,  and  he 
and  Vietinghoff  were  out  behind  1st 
Pan/er  Division  on  the  north  side  of 
the  Belyy  gap.  1  he  day  brought  two 


i;ht)cks:  1st  Panzer  Division  made  al- 
most no  headway,  and  what  ap])eared 
to  be  several  dozen  Soviet  tanks  were 
reported  heading  toward  the  2d  Pan- 
zer Di\ision  flank  northeast  of  Belyy, 
At  the  end  of  the  day,  bodi  prongs  of 
die  were  stopped,  and  the  one 
on  the  south  was  having  to  brace  for  a 
counterattack.  The  next  morning, 
after  ground  and  air  reconnaissance 
sighted  over  fifty  Soviet  tanks  !:)earing 
toward  Belyy,  Kluge  approved  a 
change  in  the  plan  that  would  turn  Stih 
Pan/cr  Division  west  along  the  course 
ol  the  Obsha  River  and  bring  it  out 
northeast  of  Belyy  behind  the  eniemy 
tanks.  But  5th  Panzer  Division  was 
hghting  ilirough  dense  forest  and  was 
not  yet  on  the  Obsha.  and  at  the  dayls 
end,  Skvdi  ii/'  was  stalled  everywhere. 
The  Ninth  .\rmy  journal  entry  for  3 
July  closed  with,  "Severe  and  fluctuat- 
iui;  battles  are  to  be  expected  in  the 
coming  days  and  weeks. "^^  {Map  20.) 

The  morning  of  the  4th  brought 
more  discnuragement:  the  1st  Pan/er 
Division  was  at  a  standstill;  enemy 
tanks  were  biting  into  td  PaiKEef  DSvi^ 
sioiis  Hank  from  the  east:  and  Met- 
ingholi  had  to  put  in  Hlh  Molori/ed 
Division  to  help  5ih  Panzer  Division 
ahead.  During  the  flav,  though,  the 
picture  cliaugccl  dramatically.  The 
'SOdl  Pan/ft  i)i\ision  began  its  push 
west  of  .SychcN  ka  aufl  met  astonisliinglv 
weak  resistance.  Bv  niglulail,  1st  Pan- 
zer Division  had  made  a  six -mile  jump 
forward  and  5th  Pan/ei  Di\  ision  was 
tin  ning  into  the  Obsha  Valk'\,  leaving 
14th  Motorized  Division  to  continue 
south.  In  another  twentv-four  hours, 
1st  Panzer  Division  had  closed  the 


'MOA  <^).  la  KH^fagibuiA  Nr.  6,  3  Jill  4^.  AOK  9 

51624/1  iile. 


ACTIVE  DEFENSE,  CENTER  AND  NORTH 


251 


MiDiGiNC  Up  an  Antitank  Gun  in  tm  Belyv  Gap 


Belyy  gap,  and  5rh  Panzer  Division  and 
20th  Panzer  Division  were  driving  easl 
to  spKl  the  pocket  into  three  parts.  The 
question  still  was;  Wliere  were  Thirty- 
ninlh  Army  and  XI  Cavalry  Corps?  The 
tank  attack  had  made  it  seem  that  they 
were  inassed  in  ihc  north,  readv  to 
break  out,  but  by  the  louiiJi  day,  it 
looked  as  if  they  wefe  gouagio  pla^  the 
same  onerous,  disappeanng  game  Be- 
lov  had. 

The  answer  came  in  the  morning oa 
the  6th  u  heti  Ninth  Ai  nrv's  intelligence 
deciphered  an  inierit-ptetl  radio  mes- 
sage ordering  alJ  Thirty-ninth  Army  units 
to  withdraw  toward  the  iioi  thwest.  By 
tlien,  the  clearings  were  filling  witli 
columns  of  Soviet  troops.  Thirty-ninth 
Army  after  all  was  )z,<t\n»  to  attempt  a 
breakout,  but  depending  on  how  tar 


north  and  west  they  were,  its  elements 
would  have  to  cross  one.  two,  or  three 
German  lines.  1^  the  afternoon,  5th 
Panzer  Di\ision  passed  through  the 
Obsha  V'alle)  and  197th  Infantty  Divi- 
sion pushing  east  met  the  20th  Panzer 
Division's  poitu.  At  daylight  the  next 
morning,  pilots  Hying  over  the  south- 
ern  l{)op  the  pocket  sighted  a  limg 
cohiinn  of  cavalrv,  tanks,  and  infantry. 
Tiie  .\7  Cavah-y  Corps  was  now  also  out 
in  the  open  and— to  Nifitfa  Army% 
gratified  astonishment  —  marching 
north  into  20th  Panzer  Divisions  arms. 

Tlie  batde  was  over.  The  roads  ahead 
and  behind  them  blocked,  the  Soviet 
columns  piled  up  on  each  other  and 
became  helplessly  entangled.  As  the 
German  divisions  ( losefl  in,  airplanes 
dropped  a  million  ieallets  telling  tlie 


252 


MOSCOW  TO  STMJNGRAD 


&t)dps  how  to  sutrendgr.  By  W&t 

most  of  the  Russians  appeared  to  be 
waiting  to  be  rounded  up,  and  on  the 
ISth,  Mctinghoff  dedared  SBVOtrrz 
completed.  On  that  day,  the  prisoner 
count  stood  at  25,000.  In  another 
twenty-four  hours,  it  had  risen  to 
37,000  men,  220  tanks,  and  500  artil- 
lery pieces.  The  Ninth  Army  had  fig- 
ured the  total  Thirty-ninth  Army  ajad  XT 
Cavalry  Corps  strength  at  about  50,000. 
No  doubt,  some  thousands  were  still  on 
the  loose,  but  the  army  and  the  corps 
were  destrf)ved.  The  Ninth  Army  chief 
of  staf  f  remarked,  '  This  was  a  typical 
western  European  battle,  no J>elov  per- 
formances, no  hiding  out  in  the 
woods."'"' 

In  August,  the  following  So\  iet  proc- 
lamation was  circulated  by  the  par- 
tisans in  the  former  Sevdlitz  area: 

All  nicnihcrs  r)f  ihc  aimed  forces  who 
escaped  f  rom  ihc  |>nrkei  .  .  .  re|;)()n  to  your 
rgeulsr  units  or  join  the  partisan  units! 
"lli^  who  remain  in  hiding  ...  in  order 
to  S3!re  tbfir  skim,  and  those  who  do  not 
jain  in  patriotic  war  to  help  destroy  the 
German  robbers,  also  those  who  desert  to 
the  fasci.st  army  and  help  carry  on  a  robber 
war  against  tin-  .So\iel  |jeople,  are  traitors 
to  the  lioiiifland  and  will  be  liquidated  h\ 
lis  Sdoiier  ()t  l;Her.  Deaili  to  the  German 
occupiers!  We  are  fighting  for  a  Just  causel 
In  1942,  the  enemy  will  be  totally 
ctestroye^l^* 

Concurrendy  with  Hannover  II  and 
Seydlitz,  Second  Panzer  Army  was 
running  VOGELSANG  ("bird  song"),  an 
operation,  the  first  of  raanyj  against  the 


'"/M.,  3-13  Jul  42, 

"XXIII  A.K.,  Ir,  "t'l'hi'netzutig.  Titgebuch  der  Kcmff- 
Imnillinisfi  N  ili  r  I'nr tismiriuibteilung  dei  ObU-  Momglff,"  2 
Aug  42.  XXIII  A.K.  76156  file. 


ISryansk  partisans.  In  a  l§,000-square- 

miie  area,  which  was  about  the  size  of  a 
small  western  European  country  (the 
Netherlands,  for  instance),  the  mmy 
had  an  ample  selection  of  partisan  cen- 
ters to  choose  from.  Vogelsanc;  was  to 
be  conducted  in  the  V-shaped  stretch 
of  forest  and  swamp  between  the 
Desna  and  Bolva  rivers  due  north  of 
Bryansk,  which  on  the  northeast 
abutted  the  old  Kirov  gap  and  liad 
during  the  winter  been  a  highway  for 
partisan  traffic  to  and  from  the  Soviet 
side  of  (be  front.  The  XXXXVII  Pan- 
zer Corps,  the  tactical  command,  had 
the  707th  Security  Division  and  one  of 
its  own  infantry  divisions,  the  339th, all 
told,  about  6,000  men.  (Map  21.) 

The  partisan  strength  was  not 
known.  Two  regiments  had  been  iden- 
tified, one  under  a  Liemenant  Colonel 
Oi  lov.  die  other,  a  Major  Kaluga.  Both 
liad  come  through  the  front  in  the 
winler  with  several  hundred  Soviet  of- 
ficers and  men  to  organize  and  tom- 
mand  die  partisans,  who  thereafter 
came  under  the  control  oi  tlie  Tendi 
Arm\  staff.  Small  industrial  towns  scat- 
tered along  the  ri\ers  had  pro\ided  a 
good  recruiting  base,  and  their  near- 
ness to  the  l^oi^  gap  had  made  it 
possible  for  the  partisans  to  be  lavishly 
outfitted  with  automadc  weapons,  ra- 
diO$«  Sa^^llai^S,  antitank  guns,  and  even 
some  76-XBan.  artillery  pieces. 

VcXjELSANG  began  on  6  Jmie  along 
the  west  side  of  the  Bolva  Ri\er.  In  two 
days,  707lli  and  339th  Divisions  had 
strung  skirmish  lines  around  two  hve- 
by-ten-mile  pockets  west  and  north  of 
Dyaikovo.  The  next  and  far  more  diffi- 
ctilt  step  was  to  turn  inward  and  tiush 
out  the  partisans,  and  the  Gemnans 
hopefl  to  drive  them  into  a  space  so 
small  thai  they  would  have  to  stand  and 


ACTIVE  DEFENSE,  CENTER  AND  NOilTH  253 


MAP  21 


fighi.  This  meant  beating  through 
mud,  water,  underbrush,  and  clouds  of 
Si©S^uitoes  in  ^fSuit  of  an  invisible 
enemy  who  knew  every  trail  and  hiding 
place,  might  strike  at  any  moment 
troiii  die  treetops  or  from  concadlfid 
bunkers,  but  who  would  almost  never 
come  out  into  the  open.  The  roads 


were  as  dangerous  as  the  deep  woods 
because  of  the  "bell,"  an  ambush  laid  in 
a  loop.  At  the  open  end,  the  pardsans 
would  be  far  enough  off  to  the  sides  to 
be  just  able  to  see  and  fire  on  the  road. 
At  the  closed  end,  they  would  be  near 
enough  to  pin  the  enemy  in  t±ie  cross 
fire. 


254 


MOSCOW  TO  SmLINGllAB 


On  ttoe  o^er  hand ,  V06EtSANG  dem- 
Onstrated  that  antipartisan  warfare  was 
a  strain  on  the  nerves  more  than  any- 
thing. The  casualties  were  usually  not 

large,  but  tlie  anxiety,  effort,  and  mis- 
ery were  not  balanced  by  any  sexise  of 
satisfaction.  The  partisans  we**  ei'ery- 
where  and  nowhere. 

Dyatkovo  rayon  was  the  strongiiold  of 
the  Orlov  Regiment.  The  regiment  re- 
garded itself  as  a  unit  ofTenlh  Army  and 
was  the  command  and  contiol  center 
for  the  area.  It  was  the  hard  core,  the 
model,  and  the  symbol  of  a  relentless 
Soviet  presence  imposed  upon  sateUite 
local  bands.  Together,  the  regiment 
and  bands  pressed  the  population — 
men,  women,  and  children — into  ser- 
l4c3^  as  kberers,  supply  carriers,  infor- 
mants, and  auxiliary  fighters.  Snipers 
posted  in  treetops  frequendy  were  chil- 
mw.  Ufiilf r  attack  ^^mh^^vt  f/M  to 
save  the  Cj^^samttkm, 

In  font  days  the  two  German  divi- 
sions combed  the  north  pocket,  clashed 
several  times  with  small  partisan  bands, 
were  frequently  under  fire  from  the 
fkontai^iFe^by  mmeaa^titey  could 
not  see,  and  came  up  empty-handed 
except  for  some  hundreds  of  people 
who  might  have  been  partisans.  The 
cleanup  in  the  south  pocket  went  the 
same  way  for  a  day  and  then  was 
slowed  b)'  heavy  fire  from  dugouts  and 
bunkers.  After  working  their  way 
through  a  maze  of  delenses  that  they 
only  managed  to  negotiate  with  help 
from  a  deserter,  the  Germans  came 
upon  the  Orlov  Regiments  base  camp 
near  Svyatoye  Laker-^i6  ^iims  etltpt^ 
The  partisans  had  gone  out  through  a 
swamp  over  a  path  that  the  Germans 
were  not  able  to  follow.  By  then  par- 
tisan activity  had  revived  so  strongly  in 
the  former  north  pocket  that  one  bat- 


talion sent  fjifto  the  pocket  to  pursue  a 
partisan  band  had  to  figh^lfijlfl^outof 
an  encirclement. 
On  m  Jnne,  XX3£X¥lt  Fanzet^ 

Corps  began  Vocel.sanc;  II  in  the 
woods,  between  the  Vetma  and  Desna 
rivers,  which  were  supposed  to.  be 
hideout  of  the  Kaluga  Regiment  and  the 
Rognedino  rayon  bands,  The  tactics 
were  the  same  as  feefore:  fe»*it!  a  pair  ef 
pockets  and  drive  inward.  The  corps 
stidf  had,  in  the  meantime,  concluded 
that  a  halfway  effective  pacification 
could  only  be  achieved  by  destroying 
all  buildings  and  evacuating  the  inhabi- 
tants. Again,  the  partisans  fought  spo- 
radically, never  letting  tiiemselves  be 
pinned  in  one  place,  and  finally  they 
slipped  througJi  the  net.  The  Kaluga 
Regiment's,  base  camp,  il  it  was  there, 
could  not  be  found.  Wien  Vogelsang 
ended,  mi  4  July  XXXXVII  ¥zm&r 
Corps  reported  500  presumed  par- 
tisans taptured  and  1,200  killed.  Over 
2,200  men  aged  sixteen  to  fifty  had 
been  taken  into  custody.  The  troops 
had  picked  up  8,300  women  and  chil- 
dren in  the  woods  and  evacuated 
12,500  from  villages.  The  23.000  civil- 
ians were  passed  to  tJie  Kurueck,  who 
could  not  feed  and  house  them  and 
could  only  resettle  drem  in.  some  other 
partisan-infested  area.*^ 

Demyansk  mul  the  VolMtov  Pocket 
Offensive  Against  //  (^orps 

To  Ut|uidate  the  Demyansk  pocket 
was  a  logical  objective  of  the  Soviet 
S|N^g  otfensiVe.  As  an  exendse  in  the 


"Pz.  AOK  2,  la  KriffTsltigcbuch  .V<.  2.  Tril  111. 
Jun  42,  Pz.  AOK  2  28499/3  file;  Hii't.  Teil  fV.  1-4  jiil 
42;  B39  Inf.  Div.,  la  Nr.  293142,  Bench!  ueber  L'nter- 
nehmen  Vo^biO^,  lt.7.42,  XXXXVII  ft!,  K.  28946^2 
tile. 


ACTIVE  DEFENSE,  CENTER  AND  NORTH 


active  defense  this  action  could  have 
smashed  a  substantial  enemy  force  and 
woiild  have  reduced  German  prospects 
for  operating  against  the  Soviet  armies 
west  of  Ostashkov  and,  in  the  longer 
run,  against  Moscow.  In  April,  ihc 
Stavka  gave  NorthuH'st  Front  five  rifle 
divisions  and  eight  rifle  and  two  lank 
brigades.  General  Kurochkin,  ihe 
fnmt's  conamander,  distributed  the  rein- 
forcements fo  FJeventh  Army  and  First 
Shock  Army,  and,  with  these,  he  pro- 
posed to  drive  into  the  pocket  frofflijUie 
northeast  and  southwest,  isolate  it  com- 
pletely, and  destroy  II  Corps  by  grind- 
ing it  to  pieces  against  the  stationary 
front  on  the  east.  Hie  attacks  began  on 
%  May  and  continued  until  the  20th, 
were  resumed  at  the  end  of  the  month, 
gnd  did  not  cease  imtil  late  June.** 

After  having  fought  through  the 
winter,  in  the  cold,  and  on  substandard 
rations,  the  German  troops  in  the 
pocket  were  in  poor  condition.  One  of 
the  divisions,  the  SS  Totenkopf,  which 
probably  no  worse  off  than  the 
rt!St>  was  down  to  a  third  of  its  normal 
Strength,  and  of  that,  a  third  were 
troops  who  would  ordixiarily  have  been 
COn^dered  unlit  fef  flirther  service.*** 
Nc'v  t'i  ilieless,  II  Corps  survived,  not 
with  ease,  but  without  ever  being  in 
doubt  about  the  outcome.  Tactically, 
Nm^west  Frmt's  p^otniiance  was  ster- 
©Mfped:  Kurochkin  struck  repeatedly 
in  the  same  places  at  two-  or  three-day 
intervals.  After  a  time,  II  Corps  was 
more  mystified  than  alarmed  by  the 
fejssSans'  persistence.  The  Ijridge"  to 
Sixteenlii  Axmy%  main  front  smyed  mr 


tact,  protected  by  being  mosdy  under- 
water during  that  wet  spring.  For  tlie 
same  reason,  it  was  almost  useless  as  a 
ground  supply  line,  the  airl^  had 
to  be  continued,*^ 

Secmd  Skadi  Army  Goes  Under 

The  failure  at  Deoctyaask  was  over- 
shadowed by  a  concurrent  Soviet  disas- 
ter in  tlie  VolUiov  pocket.  Before  he 
was  relieved  as  commander  of  Volkhov 
Front,  using  a  rifle  division  and  other 
available  reserves.  General  Meretskov 
had  set  up  the  VI  Guards  Rifle  Corps, 
with  which  he  intended  to  reinff)rce 
Second  Shock  Artny  after  access  lo  the 
pocket  was  restored.  He  did  not,  he 
says,  know  anything  about  Stalin's  and 
Knozin's  (commander,  Leningrad  Front) 
plans  until  23  April,  after  he  had  been 
relieved,  when  he  also  learned  that 
Khozin  had  agreed  to  let  VT  Guards 
Rifle  Corps  be  transferred  to  Northivest 
Front.  On  the  24th,  in  Moscow,  he  told 
Stalin  that,  in  its  current  state,  Second 
Shuck  Army  "could  neither  attack  nor 
defend"  and,  unless  it  could  be  given 
the  VI  Guards  Rifle  Corps,  it  should  be 
withdrawn  from  the  pocket  "at  ones,' 
Stalin  gave  him  a  polite  hearing,  a 
noneommittal  promise  to  consider  his 
views,  and  sent  him  on  his  way  to 
become  Zhukov's  deputy  briefly  and 
then  commanding  general  of  Thirty- 
iJiird  Army.*^ 

For  tbe  Soviet  leadership  to  con- 
templar  resuming  the  offensive  in  the 
Volkhov  pocket  in  the  spring,  with  or 
without  reinforceroent,  was  futile.  As  a 


"yVUVSS.  vol.  II,  p.  47i:{VMV.  vol.  V,  p.  139.  '-V/.  Gi:  Ntml.  la  K,„-ir,tagehuch,  ;.-5JJ,42,  3-31 

*^See  Charles  W.  Sydnor.  Jr.,  Holdiers  af  Destruction  May  42,  H.  Or.  N<>r<i  7,=.I28/10  file. 

(Princeton:  FrmceiOB  UniversStf  PfCSS,  )977),  pp.  "  Meretskov,  "S'/i  vniUwvskMt  rubezhakki"  61; 

222-29.  Meretskov,  Serving  tlie  People,  pp.  202-07. 


256 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


Machine-Gdn  Squad  at  the  Volkhov  Pocket 


result  of  the  thaw  and  tlie  wet  weathei". 
Second  Sliock  Army  was  silling  in  a  vast 
quagmire  and  was  wholly  dejjendent 
on  a  single  tenuous  supply  line  thai, 
besides  being  mostly  iindenvater.  was 
aliso  under  constant  enemy  fire.  On  I  lie 
perimeter,  the  Cicrnians  had  heminetl 
the  potlcei  in  tightly  on  all  sides.  Stalin 
and  Khozin,  in  fact,  were  able  to  in- 
fhilge  in  plans  for  an  offensive  only 
because  the  iveathei'  and  the  terrain 
had  imposed  a  temporary  standof  1.  B\ 
late  April.  F.ighleenth  Army  h;ul 
enough  troops  deployed  to  close  the 
pocket  and  dean  it  out,  but  Use  army 
was  haying  enormous  trouble  getting 
supplies  to  the  troops  where  they  were, 
and  diose  would  be  doubled  and  re- 
doubled by  any  movement.  Local  in- 
habitants said  Uie  giound  dried  out 


somewhat  in  the  middle  of  June,  and 
the  army  expected  to  wait  imtil  then, 
proposing,  in  the  meandme,  lo  inch 
into  the  moTifh  of  the  pocket  anri  liring 
the  Ei  ika  and  Dura  Lanes  laider  belter 
sinveillance.''^ 

VVIiar  happened  on  the  Soyiet  side 
aliei'  the  diange  in  command  is  nol 
clear.  Khozin  has  stated  that  far  (t  oiii 
being  in  the  "cheerful  mood."  \\hi(li 
.Meretskoy  attiibiites  to  him,  he  was 
nonplussed  by  his  mission,  concerned 
about  Si'/YDifl  Sfxifli  .^(7«v's  (ondilion, 
and  had  taken  a  substantial  part  ol  the 
army  out  of  the  pocket  by  4  May.'**  The 


^■H.  G>.  An/./.  Ifi  KriFgstagfhttrh.  I. -31.5.42,  II  May 
42.  H.  Gr.  Niinl  7;ili!H/I(l  lile. 

'"Sre  Mcii-sskin.  Senmi^  llif  Pmplr,  p.  207  and  M.  S. 
Khii/iii.  '(.}h  niiiin\  mnhl\slfikn'avnu\  operatsffj^''^Xlyinmh 
tilvnlke.'.kly  Zhunud,  2C1966).  35-4is. 


ACTIVE  DEFENSE,  CENTER  AND  NORTH 


257 


Hislim  itf  (lir  Sftarid  W)rld  War,  however, 
indicates  that  on  2  May,  Khozin  had 
submitted  a  proposal  to  execute  the 
Leningrad  relief.'"'  The  Histni-y  of  the 
Great  Patmtic  War  states  that  iheStavkd 
gave  the  order  to  "vhthdncwSemtd^hd^ 
Army  on  I-l  M;i\.  hul  "tlie  Lernngfod^ 
Front  did  not  demonstrate  sufficient 
operadonal  capability  in  executing  the 
order,""'"  Tlu'  Ifistmy  of  the  Second  Wrrld 
War  adds  that,  altlaough  the  Stavka  had 
given  the  order,  Second  Shock  Army  diH 
not  Ijcgin  to  uitlidraw  until  the  25th, 
"alter  the  enemy  had  launched  three 
simultaneous  attacks  against  its  weak- 
ened loiTcs  on  2'^  Mav."'"'  \'asilevskt\, 
says  die  Stavka  ordered  Khozin  to  take 
Second  Shock  Army  out  of  die  pocket 
"fast,"  Inn,  "most  regrettably^^ the  oixier 
was  not  executed."**^ 

The  Germans'  observatibm  tertd,  in 
small  pari,  to  vindicate  Khozin.  Ei<>li- 
leenth  Army,  wliich  had  an  under- 
standably close  interest  in  "What  'went  on 
in  tli(:'  po(  kel,  did  not  deteci  anv  oui- 
ward  movement  in  April  or  in  the  first 
three  weefe  «f  May.  The  traffic  on  the 
lanes  ajjpeared  to  be  mosdy  in  sup- 
plies, and  very  few  troops  went  either 
«flo  of  out  of  the  pocket.  In  mid-May, 
the  number  of  deserters  increased, 
which  could  be  taken  as  a  sign  of  disin- 
tegratibn,  Some  of  them  isaid  that  Sic- 
ond  Sliftf  k  Artny  was  being  evacuated,  but 
probing  attacks  met  sharp  resistance  all 
armmd  fee  perimeter.  The  first  out- 
W(td  isiovement,  of  about  a  thousand 
mfa,  vi9&  seen  on  die  ^ist. 

Ahoiiier  thcM^sand  went  ofut  on  iJie 
22d,  and  Oea^Sral  Vlasov's  radio  closer! 
down,  a  sign  ^^at  he  was  shifting  his 


"/VMV:  vol.  V.  j>.  139. 

■■"M'Or.S.S,        11.  ]).  47l(. 


Txventiftii  Army  command  post.  General 
Kuechler,  commander  of  Army  Group 
North,  then  called  General  Lin- 
demann,  (omniander  of  Ei^^^hieenlh 
Army,  and  told  him  it  would  be 
*Wfully  bad"  to  let  the  Russians  es- 
cape. Lindemann  said  he  was  ready  to 
Stop  tliem,  but  the  ground  was  too 
Wet.*^  On  the  25th,  after  the  Germans 

had  seen  another  thousand  men  going 
out  of  the  pocket  during  the  previous 
two  days,  Lindemann  asked  General 
der  Infanterie  Siegfried  Haenicke.  the 
XXXV HI  Corps  commander,  whether 
he  could  attack  "in  good  conscience"  on 
the  27th  if  he  had  air  support. 
Haenicke  said  he  could.^'*  But  it  was 
raining  as  Lindemann  and  Haenleke 
talked,  zmd  a  day  later  the  ground  was 
sodden  and  water  was  standing  in 
everv  depression. 

l-inalK.  early  .,n  •M^  May,,  XXXVI 11 
Corps,  on  tlie  soudi,  and  I  Corps,  on 
the  north,  pushed  across  the  mouth  of 
tlie  pocket  over  still  wet  ground.  Dur- 
ing the  day,  XXXVIII  Corps  lost  30 
percent  of  the  troops  it  had  cointnitted, 
hni  the  attacks  continued  tluougli  the 
night,  and  the  two  corps  made  contact 
near  the  Erika  Lane  at  OISO  the  wext 
morning.  By  1200  on  the  31sr,  thev  had 
set  up  %  front  facing  east,  and  in  the 
afternoon,  thev  turned  west  to  lock  fir 
Sm»>(}  Shark  Aoinr'''  Wliile  XXW'III 
and  1  Corps  braced  for  coLuiierattaeks, 
the  units  on  the  perimeter  opened  up 
witli  all  their  artillery  and  began  to  incli 
toward  die  pocket  through  mud  and 
water. 

The  counterattacks  did  ijOt  start, 
tliough,  until  4  June — and  then  dicy 


='  '.U)^  /.V.  la  Krie&bieelmdi.i€,  22  May  42.  AOK 18 

228M/2  Ilk-, 
"yte/..  2,T  \\a\  12. 
'•'•ibid..  30  and  31  May  42. 


258 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


Generals  Vlasov  Aim  Lindemann  Talk  at  ENarrgmm  Army  Heai)qpasters 


did  s(i  in  a  rurinus  manner.  The  first 
Russian  assault,  duiiiig  Uie  day  on  the 
4th,  came  from  the  west  and  could  be 
be;iten  off  easih  because  the  troops 
were  all  diunk.  Hie  next  came  tliat 
night,  from  the  east  with  tremendous 
artillery  support,  bur  the  infantry 
troops,  apparently  green,  stopped  and 
fell  back  when  they  were  hit  by  Ger- 
man fire.  Wlien  iiotliing  at  all  hap- 
pened during  the  next  two  days, 
Kuechler  and  Lindemann  talked  ab«3nit 
sending  General  Vlasov,  the  com- 
mander of  Twentieth  Army,  a  demand 
fOET  surrender  but  decided  to  wait  until 
his  army  had  been  pushed  into  tighter 
quarters.'* 


On  8  June,  Stalin  called  Meretskov  to 
Moscow  and  told  him,  "We  made  a 
great  mistake  in  combining  Volkhov  and 
Le)i/)>g-rriil  Fnints.  (Icneral  Khozin  sat 
and  thought  ab(n!i  tlie  Volkhov  direc- 
tion, but  the  results  were  poor.  He  did 
not  carry  out  a  Stm'ka  directive  to  evac- 
uate SecotuI  Shock  Army/'  Saying  that 
Meretskov  knew  VoiMiOV  Fmnt  "very 
well."  Stalin  told  him  to  go  there,  to- 
gether with  Cienei  al  Vasilevskiy,  deputy 
chief  of  the  General  Staff,  and  get 
Second  Shocl^  Anny  out,  "if  necessary 
without  heavy  wea|)ons  and  equip- 
ment."*^ By  nightfall,  Meretskov  was 
back  at  his  old  headquarters,  and 
Kho/in,  having  been  replaced  at 


■■■'■//.  r.i.  \„rd.  Ill  Kn.'f;^lit!i<-hu,  l,.  1.-30.6.42,  4-7  JuH  .  

42,  H.  Gr.  Nord  73128/11  file.  ";^e,.gtskov.  "Na  voUtlwvskMt  rubezhaJth,"  p.  67. 


ACTIVE  DEFENSE.  CENTER  AND  NORTH 


259 


Leningrad  J'Jtwaf'  by  General  Leytesant 
L.  A.  Govorov,  was  on  his  way  to  take 
over  Thirty-third Army.^'^ 

Beginning  on  tfec  lOtfe,  and  fof  ifee 
next  two  weeks,  Meretsko\  and  Va- 
silevskiy  engineered  a  succession  of 
^fMA  battles,  i^urriliij  on  fnueli  of  the 
time  in  potfiriaElgrain.  On  the  19th,  they 
managed  ISI  &ptv.  a  corridor  150  yards 
viri^  tl^it  a  do««J3  T^34  t^fiks  h^d 
tl^t^h  the  night  only  to  be  trapped 
dienisidves  the  next  morning.  The  two 
had  somewhat  better  Itiek  oh  (he  tlst 
when  Fifty -ninth  Anny  opened  a  gap 
500  yards  wide.  But  XXXVlll  Corps 
kept  the  whole  stretch  under  constant 
artillery  and  SBOall  arms  fire  and  did  not 
beUeve  atty  Seeand  Shock  Armj  troops 
could  have  gtntten  ®iit.**  Meretskov, 
who  gives  the  dates  for  the  opening  of 
the  gap  as  the  23d  to  the  25th,  main- 
that  the  Russians  brought  out 
wounded  and  some  others.^*'  At  2400 
on  the  22d,  the  Germans  sealed  the 
pocket  for  the  last  time. 

By  the  next  day,  Second  Shock  Am'v 
was  split  into  several  pieces,  crippled, 
and  dying;  and  Kuechler  dedded  ntJt 
to  bother  with  asking  Vlasov  to  sur- 
render. Some  fifteen  thousand  of 
Vlafsov's  troops  were  piled  up  at  the 
western  ends  of  the  Erika  and  Dora 
Lanes,  and  if  they  had  made  a  con- 
certed try,  they  might  still  have  overrun 
the  German  lines  holding  them  in,  but 
they  did  not.  Several  hundred  othters 
and  politniks  tafied  tO  break  out  on  the 
28th.  TTie  Gennans  stopped  them  and 
drove  them  back.  The  men  were  not 


^'Mereisko\,  Sennng  the  People,  p.  215. 

'MOA'  IS,  la  Kriegtei^iuA.'fc,  IS-23JM»4S,  AOK 
18  22864/2  file. 

'■"  Meiet.skov,  'Wa  volkhovskikh  rubeztudSf,"  p.  68fi 
Meretskov,  Serving  the  People,  p.  219. 


fighting  any  longer,  and  on  that  day  the 
battle  of  the  Volkhov  pocket  ended  for 
Eighteenth  Army  with  33,000  prison- 
ers miinted  and  more  coming  in  every 
hour.*"  Tlitlci  promoted  Kuechler  to 
the  rank  of  QmeraltetdmarsdiaU. 

For  the  Soviet  "union,  the  deepest 
psychological  trauma  was  yet  to  come. 
On  12  Jiily,  a  patrol  combing  the  ter- 
ritory '9X<mmk  the  former  pocket 
stopped  to  j>i(  k  up  two  supposed  par- 
tisans liiat  a  village  elder  had  locked  in 
a  ^ed'.  The  two  turned  out  to  be 
Vlasov  and  a  woman  <  (inipanion  who 
Vlasov  said  was  an  old  fauiiiy  friend 
who  had  been  his  cook.  IntelligetiC, 
ambitious,  aware  that  he  had  no  future 
in  the  Soviet  Union,  and  impressed 
with  G<^sideration  shown  him  first  by 
LindetEtiiiMjaand  later  by  German  intel- 
ligence officers,  Vlasov  soon  lent  his 
tlStne  to  anti-Soviet  propaganda  and 
eventually  became  titular  commander 
of  the  Russian  Army  of  Liberation,  a 
scattering  of  collaborator  units  re- 
cruited from  the  prisoner-of-war 
camps.  lo  the  Germans,  he  was  a  some- 
times useful  figurehead,  but  he  was  too 
much  a  Russian  nationalist  for  the  Ger- 
mans to  give  him  any  kind  of  fi  ee  rein. 
The  propaganda  actions  in  which  he 
participated,  however,  intlicated  thai 
he  had  the  potential  to  achieve  a  strong 
popular  appeal  in  the  occupied — and 
unoccupied — territories  of  the  Soviet 
Union.  To  die  Soviet  regime,  however, 
he  became  and  has  remained  the  ar- 
chetype of  a  traitor.  NId  Soviet  accoimt 
of  die  battle  lor  the  Volkhov  pocket 
feUs  to  vmfltcate  him  in  the  disasfieif 
either  m  a  \«eeakliiig  ot  a  tiieacherous 


Gr.  Sord.  la  Kriegstagtbuch.  L-30.6A2,  23-28 
jun  42.  H.  Gr.  Nord  75128/11  file- 


260 


MOSCOW  TO  SmLINGRAD 


sdiemer.  ¥asilc?«'skiy  says,  "The  posWoiS 
of  Second  Shock  Army  was  made  even 
more  complicated  by  the  f  act  that  its 


M  wmmr  m  Ms  trnrn^.  itim^ 

tarily  went  over  to  the  enem^  sitje*"** 


^VM^rMj/tBOa^  p  IBS. 


CHAPTER  XIll 

Active  Defense,  South 


Competmg  F^as 

In  February  of  1942,  with  the  aid  of 
an  "ice  bridge"  over  the  Kerch  Strait, 
Crimean  Front  had  been  raised  to  a 
strength  of  three  armies.  With  these. 
General  Kozlov,  commander  of  Tirans- 
caucasus  Bmt,  resumed  tJie  offensive 
on  27  February.  The  Sevastopol  Defense 
Region,  its  force  increased  by  then  to 
over  eighty  thousand  men,  joined  in 
with  a  "denionstrati\  e"  attack  bv  the 
Ind^tmdmt  Maiitime  Army  at  the  center 
df  me  fottress  perimeter.*  lElie  leollapse 
of  a  Rumanian  division  in  the  German 
line  had  allowed  the  Rus^^  to  drive  a 
seven-inile-deep  bulge  into  th**  tKHf^ 
ei  11  half  of  the  front  on  ihc  Isihmus  Oif 
Pai  pach  before  Kosdov  stopped  t&  fe^ 
group  on  3  March.  He  frtade  attothef 
start  on  the  13th,  and  ilitreafter.  in 
waves  that  rc»e  and  receded  every  sev- 
tieal  iisys,  he  stayed  on  the  attack  into 
the  second  week  of  A|)ril,  coming  close 
at  times  but  never  succeeding  in  break- 
ing out  of  the  isthinus.* 

As  the  kev  to  the  Black  Sea  and 
bridge  to  the  Caucasus,  the  Crimea 
figured  as  heavily  in  tihe  Sovier  ptans 
for  the  spring  as  it  had  in  the  winter 
offensive,  and  Kozlov  had  close  to 


three  hundred  thousand  troops,  not  an 
insignificant  force.  In  March,  Mekhlis, 
the  chief  army  political  commissar, 
joined  Crimean  Fmnt  as  the  Stavka  Pep- 
resentadve,  and  on  21  April,  theSUwka 
created  the  Headquarters,  North  Cau- 
casus Theater,  under  Marshal  Budenny. 
Budenny  assumed  overall  command  of 
Crimean  Front,  the  Sevastopol  Defense 
Region,  and  all  naval  and  air  forces  in 
the  Black  Sea- Caucasus  area.  His  mis- 
sion was  to  coordinate  these  forces  in 
the  projected  spring  offensive,  and 
Kozlovs  and  Mekblis'  mission  was  to 
liberate  the  Crimea.' 

On  2.'^  Mai  ch.  at  about  the  same  time 
as  Stalin  and  the  Stavka  were  laying  out 
Ifae Soviet  spring  oflfefisit«v  HdlfUs^cOii-- 
feried  witii  iiis  scnioi  inilitaiy«a^viscrs 
on  the  Fuehrer  directive  he  i»as  |»repar- 
ing-  for  tlie  cotttihg  stnnitter^  opeira- 
tions  and  ordered  that  the  fii^  pre- 
liminary operation  should  be  Ute 
retaking  of  the  Kefcfi  i*teiittsiila.*  In 
fact.  Hitler  was  merely  understoring 
decisions  and  actions  already  taken.  In 
Ftfbruary,  the  OKM  had  earmar&eeL^e 
22d  Panzer  Division  and  28th  iMoi 
Division,  then  being  formed,  for 

Army,  div^om  had  be- 

gan moving  into  the  Qrimea  in  the 


'Vancyev,  Cmmheshtittt  u/xminii.  208-11. 
'Mansteiii,  Verhmif  Siege,  pp.  250-.^3, 


TOV,  p.  \Am;IVm'.  vtil,  V,  p.  114. 
"HaWw Diaiy,  vol.  111.  23  Mar  48.  p.  417. 


262 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


middle  of  March.'  Throughout  the 
winter,  the  cleanup  on  the  Crimea  had 
had  first  priority  because  it  would  free 
a  whole  army  and  because  the  weather 
could  be  expected  to  improve  there 
earlier  than  elsewhere.  The  only  ques- 
tion— assuming  lhat  the  front  would 
hold,  which  had  been  far  from  certain 
in  February  and  March — had  been 
whether  to  start  tlie  cKtirt  with  Kerch 
or  Sevastopol.  Manslein  had  preferred 
Kerch  and  Bock  Sevastopol.  Hitler  had 
agreed  with  Manstein  that  to  confront 
the  enemy  where  he  was  strongest  was 
better  than  to  have  him  at  one's  back. 
On  31  March,  Manstein  issued  the 
Eleventh  Army  preliminary  directive 
for  Operation  Trappenjagd  ("bustard 
hunt"),  thf  Kri  cli  ()Hcnsi\e.'' 

Matistein's  major  problem  was  one  of 
strength.  The  most  he  could  commit  to 
Trappenjagd  were  fi\c  inianiiv  divi- 
sions and  one  pauizer  division,  plus  twQ 
Rutnanian  jnrantry  dmstom  ail4  cme 

Rum.uiian  ravah\  (li\  i.si()n.  Th^t  Jfeft 
three  Gerinan  infantry  divisions,  one 
Rumanian  infatitry' division,  and  one 
Rumanian  nuuinlain  division  to  con- 
lain  Sevastopol.  The  Rimianians  were 
mostly  inexperienc<;d  tfoops,  iiidlijf- 
fcicntls  led.  and,  as  past  experience 
had  shown,  they  could  be  more  a  dan- 
ger than  a  help. 

In  the  three  S(»\ici  armies  on  the 
Kerch  Peninsula,  borty-fomth,  Farty-sev- 
enth,  and  Fifty  first,  the  Gerinahs 


'See*  Diary,  Ostni  II.  Hi  M;n  42.  Tlie  1!>12  itghf" 
divisions,  of  which  the  2)^lh  Light  Division  was  one, 
were  light  infantry  divisiuns.  They  were  later  re- 
named "Jaeger"  divisions.  .See  Manstein,  Verlorew 
|J-  253, 

'Kritilrith  Wilhclm  Hatirk.  MS  P-n4c.  Die  Oprra- 
tioam  drr  tiruhdien  H eirrsfn-itf>l>en  an  der  OstfmnI  1941 
bis  1943,  SimiUclie^  (iehtfi.  Tnl II.  p,  42,  CMH  files; 
4tr  U.  Amur,  OptmkmabmMra,  313.42,  AOK  tl 
22279/23  file. 


counted  17  rifle  divisions,  2  cavahy 
divisions,  3  rifle  brigades,  and  4  lank 
brigades. The  Crimean  Front  strength, 
as  given  by  Vasik-vskiv,  was  21  rifle 
divisions.  The  front,  according  to  Var- 
silevskiy's  figures,  also  had  superiorities 
over  the  Germans  in  artillery  antl  mor- 
tars (3,577  to  2,472),  tanks  (347  to  180)» 
and  aircraft  (400  to  "up  to"  400).*'  The 
Sniastopol  Dcfrmi'  R^ow^^sd  8  divisions- 
and  3  brigades." 

Having  more  troops  than  they  could 
conveniently  deploy  in  the  ten-mile- 
wide  Isthmus  of  Parpach,  the  Soviet 
anmes  could  stage  a  defense  in  depth 
that  would  potentially  increase  in 
strength  farther  east  where  the  penin- 
sula widened  to  fifteen  and  twenty 
miles  antl  ill  oi  their  troops  could  be 
brouglii  into  play.  Over  the  fifty-mile 
distance  to  the  city  of  Kerch,  they  could 
loiee  the  enemy  to  chew  his  u;iv 
through  four  prepared  Hnes:  the  front] 
tlie  Parpaeh  line  proper,  which  since 

ihe  Feliriiar\'  n[Tcn.si\'e  had  Itccn  st>\en 
miles  behind  tlie  front  in  the  nordi  and 
a  nule  or  two  to  the  rear  on  the  south; 
the  Nasvr  line,  which  ran  paiallcl  to  the 
Par^ch  ii^c,  ftve  iniles  to  the  east;  and 
the'  Sttitattesp^a  Ifne,  eighteen  miles 
west  of  Kerch.  The  strongest  were  die 
Parpach  and  Uie  Sultanovka.  1  he  Par- 
paoi  Kwe  was  fronted  by  an  antitank 
ditch  that  had  Iieeii  dug  in  19  U  and 
deepened,  broadened,  and  rimmed 
with  coficrete  eraplacemetits  duiHng 
the  winter.  Tlie  Sultanovka  f<)ll()\\ed 
the  remains  of  ancient  foruficalions 
spanning  the  peninsulia  that  the  Ger- 
mans called  the  "Tatar  WalP  and  the 
Russians  the  'Turkish  Wall."  (Map  22.) 


■Drr  O.B.  der  II.  Armee,  an  Soidalen  der  Krm-Arvue, 

19.^.42,  AOK  1!  28654/'!  file. 
*Vsisikvskiy,        p  2rw. 
*>SmByev,  Ceruxhe.fkaya  ohunim.  p.  208. 


ACTIVE  DEFENSE,  SOUTH 


263 


MAP22 


lb  accomplish  aiivlhing  al  all,  Man- 
scein  had  to  break  ihc  Parpach  line  and 
do  so  b^Eare  Kozlov  could  bring  his 
massive  power  to  hcAr.  On  the  narrow 
isthmus,  liardly  any  deviation  from  an 
outright  frontal  attack  was  possible: 
Miinslein  saw  just  one.  The  Soviet 
Command  was  sensitive  ab(}ut  its  ex- 
tended iiorih  flank,  which  could  be  the 
springboard  into  rhe  Crimean  main- 
land but  which  was  also  vulnerable. 
Manstein  had  inaflvcritntly  enhanced 
that  concern  on  20  Marc  h  bv  putting 
22d  Panzer  Division,  uluch  needed 
some  seasoning,  into  an  attaci;  at  the 
ba've  ol  the  bulge.  A  siidtlen  rainstorm 
had  deprived  the  di\ision  of  its  air 
support,  and  heavier  Soviet  armor  had 
knocked  out  thirty-two  of  its  tanks  in 
the  few  hours  before  the  affair  was 
called  off.  During  (lie  io&m^mg  d&yAt 
while  Manstein  and  Bock  were  explain- 
ing the  fiasco  to  Hitler,  Crimean  Fmnt 
CQfiKmaltid  had  drawn  its  oyrn  con- 
clusions and  shifted  more  strength  to 
tlie  north  flank.  Manstein,  therefore, 


had  Judged  his  chances  to  be  improved 
on  die  extreme  south,  where  he  would 
have  to  break  die  Pai  pach  line  right 
away  and  where  the  defense  ^vas  less 
deep.  Two  or  three  miles  would  bring 
him  through  the  line,  and  thei  eafter.  a 
fast  turn  could  make  the  north  flank  a 
deathtrap  for  the  Russians.'" 

TRAPPENjAt.u  was  a  gamble.  If  lie  had 
his  wits  about  him,  K(>/lo\  toidd 
quicklv  bring  it  to  a  calamitous  hnish. 
For  Manstein  everything  had  to  w&rk 
perfectly;  even  tlien.  he  could  nf)t  ex- 
pect to  do  more  than  unhinge  the 
Parpach  line.  Manstein,  who  was  not 
ordinarily  one  to  imdereslimate  him- 
sell"  or  his  troops,  told  Field  Marshal 
Bock,  the  connnander  of  Army  Group 
South,  and  the  OKI  !  on  2  April  that 
the  discrepaiicy  in  the  forces  was  too 
gmtL^^  'Hus  alternative  was  to  wait 


'"22.  Pi.  Dir..  fa  Nr.  227142.  h,  ri,h!  utim  den  .\nnrtjj 
iitij  Km})H^rh  iim  2l).l.i2.  M  Ik  II  Tl'lT-V'l'A  Me:  O.R. 
der  II  .\nurf,  Ojiiruliati.Mih'.K hlrn.  313.42,  AOK  11 
2227i)'2:5  tile. 

"BofA  Diary,  Osten  It,  1  Apr  42. 


264 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


until  after  the  audillj&  of  May  when 

aiifjther  division  or  t^o  iniglit  become 
a\ailablc  for  Eleventli  xAimy.  Bock 
wanted  to  go  ahead  in  April  and  not 
gpve  the  Russians  another  month  or 
more  to  do  whatever  they  might  have 
in  mind. 

Hider  was  the  one  who  supplied  the 
final  and,  very  likely,  crucial  ingre- 
dient. Tlie  Milter  had  made  him  a 
devotee  of  air  support,  and  on  13 
April,  he  had  told  Genera!  Kuechler, 
the  commander  of  Army  Group 
North,  that  Toropets  would  not  have 
been  lost  in  January  if  the  army  group 
commands  had  understood  the  uses  of 
air  power.  Three  days  later,  when  Man- 
stein  brought  in  the  Trappenjagd  plan, 
he  approved  e\erydiing  except  the 
Luftwc^fe  dispositions,  announcing  that 
he  would  see  to  them  in  person."  He 
then  iirdered,  over  OKL  pi  otests.  Gen- 
eral Richthofen's  VUl  Air  Corps, 
which  was  being  transferred  from 
Army  Group  Center  to  support  Army 
Group  South  in  the  summer  campai|^, 
to  set  up  first  on  the  Crimea  ana  sup- 
port Eleventh  Army.  An  air  corps  nor- 
mally provided  the  tactical  air  support 
for  an  entire  anny  group.  Trappenjagd 
had  to  wait  while  Richthofen  brouL^In 
in  his  squadrons  oiStuha  bombers  and 
fighters  and  a  whole  flak  dr^ision  to 
protect  their  airfields,  hui  it  vvlis.  as 
Manstein  said,  going  to  have  "concen- 
trated air  support  the  like  of  which  has 
never  existed,  * 

By  the  turn  of  the  month,  the 

Under  the  itmuent^     both  the  sea 


^H}K\\\  Slettv.  WFSl.  KnegigeMhiihtttche  AbuUum 
KntgaagOu^  IA.~30,6A2,  16  42.  LM.T.  1807 
file. 

'^XXX  A.K.,  h,  Km^stagdmA,  L-20J.42, 1  May  42, 
XXX  A.K.  21733/1  file. 


and  the  mainland,  tlie  ^Kveatl^  ivas 

changeable.  Temper^HJres  ranged 
Ironi  below  Ireezing  to  the  middle  70s, 
and  $13101^-  winds  blew  clouds  and 
showers  across  the  peninsula.  On  the 
south  coast  the  trees  were  in  bloom, 
wliile  uppei  slopes  of  mountains  a  few 
miles  inland  were  still  covered  with 
snow.  Bock  was  stirred  by  the  contrast 
Itdim  he  toured  the  Elevenll)  Army 
area  at  the  end  ol  April.  The  fronts 
were  quiet,  and  the  ground  troops 
were  ready  on  the  isthmus,  but  VIII 
Air  Corps  was  not  yet  fully  setded. 
After  a  firsthand  inspecdon.  Bock  was 
impressed  by  the  "careful  prepara- 
tions" for  the  attack  and  uneasy  abput 
the  "extraordinary  risk"  it  would  stffl 
entail.'* 

Manstein  held  his  final  briefing  for 
the  corps  and  division  commanders  on 
2  May  with  Richthofen  present.  He 
described  Trappenjagd  as  a  ground 
operation  that  had  its  main  effort  in 
the  air,  and  he  said  the  planes  would 
have  to  "pull  the  infantry  forward."*" 
X-tJay  was  set  for  5  May  but  had  to  be 
put  off  until  the  8th  because 
Richthofen  was  not  ready.  By  die  first 
week  in  May,  a  complete  surprise  was 
out  of  tile  (jiiestion.  Tlie  Russians  had 
already  put  up  placards  along  die  front 
reaMng,  ^Mne  on.  We  are  waiting."" 

H<jvv  ready  the  Russians  might  be 
became  an  ominous  imponderable  as 
X-Day  approached.  Bock  worried 
about  how  deep  their  defense  was  ech- 
eloned and  considered  giving  up  the 
ttim  io  dbe  tlorth.  Manstein  believed  he 
had  to  stay  with  the  original  plan.*^ 


'•linrk  Dtan,  o,i,i,  II,  28  Apr  42. 
'-"XXXA.K  .  In  Kn,'gslag^»tk,  t.~20.S,42.2i^4Z, 
XXX  A.K.  21753/1  hk. 
">l)ock  Dkiy,  Om  a,  S  42. 
"Ibid. 


ACTIVE  DEFENSE,  SOUTH 


265 


QmrnALvmRicmvorm  (second  Jnmr^it)  Discuss  an  Ant  Strike  With  His  Si^tf 


"The  enemy,"  he  said,  "is  certain  that 
wc  are  going  to  attack,  but  he  does  not 
know  where  or  when."'*  In  the  con- 
Hned  space  on  the  isthmus,  diat  was  a 
small  consolation  and  would  have  been 
none  at  all  without  help  troni  ibv  oiher 
side,  which  Manslein,  although  lie  did 
not  know  it,  was  about  to  receive  in 
generous  measure. 

The  Soviet  accounts  agree  that  the 
attack  was  no  surprise,  even  as  to  time. 
However^  tbey  give  two  versions  of 
w  ha!  was  proposed  to  be  done  about  it. 
\'asile\  skiy  says  the  Stavka  gave  Kozlov 
and  Mekhlis  a  directive  in  the  latter 
half  of  April  in  which  it  told  them  to 


discontinue  preparations  for  the  offen- 
sive and  organize  a  "solid  defense  in 
depth"  and  to  expect  the  German  mmt 

effort  to  be  against  tlieir  left  ifenk.*" 
Tlie  Huloiy  of  the  Greal  Palriodc  War 
stales  that  Ko/lov  and  Mekhlis  failed  to 
organize  a  defen.se  in  depth. ^"  The 
History  of  Ihi'  Second  MferW  \\br,  on  the 
other  haiul,  says  AatCnm«/»  F'mii'wa& 
ready  to  launch  an  airac  k  of  its  own  on 
the  same  day  as  the  (jermans  but 
"failed  to  institute  measures  for  an 
effective  blow.""-'  Cieiieral  .\riiiii  .Sergei 
M.  Shtemenko,  who  was  at  Uie  lime  a 
colonel  in  the  General  Staff  branch 


''V;Lsilt\  skiv.  Ih'h.  pp.  208,  210. 


^^AOKtlflaAktemBtii  jiwr  K.  l.B.  mA^Me^mdutng  ''"tVOVSS.  vol.  \l,  p.  405, 
amS.5.42,  AOK 11 28654/3  file.  'WMV.  vol.  V,  p.  123. 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


respottsfljle  for  the  Caucaslii  Afid  file 

Crimea,  aflds  that  Crimean  Front  was 
deployed  for  an  offensive  on  the 
northern  half  t#  flie  line — exactly  as 
Manstein  had  thought  it  would  be.^^ 
All  blame  Kozlov  and  Mekhlis.  Va- 
sa^^sMf  Sayj'S  Kozlov,  his  chief  of  staffi 
his  chief  political  officer,  and  Melthlis 
were  "manifest  incompetents."^^ 

At  dark  on  the  evening  of  7  Mav, 
thirty  German  assault  boats  eased  out 
of  the  mine^wewM  Feodosiya  Imvhda- 
and  steered  northeast  along  the  coast. 
At  2300,  they  stopped  on  the  beach  to 
take  aboard  a  company  of  infantry,  a 
heavy  machine  gun  platoon,  and  an 
er^gineer  platoon.  Their  mission  was  to 
hsxdi.  tifte  troops  just  east  of  the  Soviet 
antft^mlt  ditch  at  the  same  time  the 
tttllds  QU  tite  isthmus  reached  it,  which 
«5as  to  be-shortly  after  dawn.  Wiile  the 
boats  were  loading  in  bright  moon- 
light, a  So\iet  patrol  vessel  appeared 
offshore,  cruising  slowly,  and  they  had 
to  stay  on  the  beach  anotlier  hoin  and 
a  half  until  it  had  passed  out  of  sight 
and  earshot.  In  die  meantime,  the  tem- 
perature had  dro]>ped  Ix  low  freezing, 
and  a  strong  wind  liad  sprung  up.  To 
reach  the  landing  poiftt  cm  time,  the 
boais  had  to  take  a  course  that  carried 
tliem  out  on  the  open  sea.  Designed  for 
river  crossings,  they  were  propelled  by 
outboard  motors  with  straight  shafts 
that  gave  them  speed  and  maneu- 
verability in  quiet,  shallow  t(?ater. 
Against  the  wind  and  waves,  tw(.)  men 
operating  each  motor  couid  barely 


-'S.  M.  Shieiiieiiko,  The  Simiet  General  Staff  at  Witr, 
J9-H'I'H7  (Moscow:  I'logress  Publishm,  19*10),  p. 

"Vasilevskiy,  Delo,  p.  209. 


keep  the  horns  headed  hi  a  straight 
Une.'f^ 

During  the  night  of  die  7di,  die 
170th  ItSantry  Division  took  position 

and  completed  the  deployment  for 
Trappenjagd.  The  XXX  Corps,  imder 
Greneral  der  Artillerie  Maximilian  von 
Fretter-Pico,  then  had  hve  of  the  six 
German  divisions.  To  hold  the  nordi- 
ern  half  of  the  isthmus  front,  General 
Matenklott's  XXXXII  Corps  had  one 
German  and  three  Rumanian  divi- 
sions. Three  divisions,  i32d  and  50th 
Infantry  and  28th  Light  Divisions, 
would  make  the  breakthrough.  When 
they  had  crossed  the  antitank  ditch  and 
the  engineer'^  had  iniilt  causewavs  for 
the  tanks,  22d  Panzer  Division  and 
170th  Infantry  Divison  W-CNlld  pass 
through  and  begin  the  turn  north. 
Manstein  had  set  up  as  his  own  reserve 
tiie  .so-called.  Gisdeck  Brigade  consist- 
ing of  a  Rimianian  motori/od  regiment 
and  two  German  truck-mounted  infan- 
try battalions, 

Wlien  the  first  gray  streak  of  light 
appeared  in  the  east,  at  about  O.^l.T.  tlie 
infantry  jumped  off  behind  a  rocket 
and  artillerv  barjage.  In  one  hour, 
Richthoten's  Stuka  ajid  fighter  squad- 
rons, waiting  on  the  airfields  in  the 
rear,  v\'ould  be  hitting  the  Parpach  Une. 
At  ()4(J0.  the  assault  boats  were  lying  in 
wait  of  f  the  beach,  just  out  of  sight  trf 
land,  the  lead  boats  radio  tuned  for  a 
signal  from  the  shore.  Forty  minutes 
later  it  came.  The  132d  Infantry  Divi- 
sion, hugging  the  coast,  was  almost  up 
to  the  antitank  ditch.  Tlie  boats  headed 
in.  By  then  fighters  were  giving  them 
cover  overhead.  A  half  mile  out,  they 
met  artillerv  and  small  arms  fire  that 


■'SliumhmilhmimtiHfli)  9(12.  Angf^  mf  PofpStSldt- 
Stellung.  f.5.-/2.  AOK  U  38654/3. 


ACTIVE  DEFENSE,  SOUTH 


267 


sank  eleven  l)i)a)s.  but  only  one  man 
was  killed  and  three  ivovindcd.  At 
0600,  132d  Infantry  Dnisioii  crossed 
the  antii^mk  diteh.  An  hour  later,  its 
neighbor  on  the  left.  -Sih  l  ight  Divi- 
sion, which  originally  liaci  .t  longer  way 
to  come,  was  fighting  in  llie  ditch.  The 
5nili  Infanti7  Division  Iiad  (lie  most 
distance  to  cover  and  the  most  Lrouble. 
First,  its  rocket  projectors  failed  to  fire 
because  their  electric  ignition  system 
broke  down;  then  it  ran  into  a 
minefield  and,  behind  that,  a  treiX(tl 
line  with  dug-in  tanks. '^^ 

The  early  morning  was  ha/y;  the  day 
sunny,  briglii,  and  warm.  The  VII 1  Air 
Corps  had  complete  command  in  the 
sky,  and  a  constant  stream  ot  its  planes 
pounded  the  Soviet  line.  Behind  132d 
Inl'antry  Division,  which  in  mid  morn- 
ing was  fighting  its  way  through  Soviet 
positions  east  of  the  antitank  ditch, 
engineers  leveled  enough  of  the  ditch 
with  explosives  to  get  two  self-pro- 
pelled assault  gtm  batteries  across.  The 
worst  possible  mischance  could  still 
happen,  though,  if  the  Russians  re- 
covered their  balance  enough  to  bring 
the  attack  to  a  stop  short  of  the  break- 
through. In  a  few  hours,  they  cotild 
muster  a  sinothering  numerical  superi- 
ority. At  1200,  Freiter-Pico  began 
gathering  whatever  reserves  he  could 
foi  a  late-afternoon  push,  but  an  horn 
later  th^  w^re  no  longer  needed.  The 
enemy  vt^  retreating  ahead  of  28th 
light  Division  and  132d  Infantry  Divi- 
sion in  dtmies."  The  divisions  had 
advanced  six  ttifles  by  nightfall,  and^e 
ail  uiiihrella  had  expanded  to  reach 
east  to  Kerch.  The  ViH  Air  Cgrps  had 
flown  over  two  ihmmi^  sotfles  mi 


-•XXX  A-K..  In  Ktirg'.iagebaickJ.'^O.SAZ,  8  May  42, 
XXX  A.K.  21753/1  file. 


shot  down  eighty  Soviet  planes.^" 
Frctter-Pico  oideied  22d  Panzer  Divi- 
sion to  come  forward  during  the  night 
kind  asked  Manstein  for  the  Grodeck 
Brigade."^ 

In  the  morning,  the  infantry  waited 
for  an  hour  after  dawn  while  the  planes 
worked  over  the  enemy  line.  Tlie  So- 
viet recovery  overnight  was  less  than 
expected,  so  little  that  in  another  hour 
or  so.  132(1  Infantry  Division  appeared 
to  have  an  open  road  to  the  east,  maybe 
Straight  through  to  Ketch.  Manstdn 
wanted  to  stay  with  the  planned  turn  to 
the  north,  but  because  the  crossings  on 
the  antitank  ditch  were  not  wide 
enough  or  firm  enough  yet  to  take  22d 
Panzer  Divisions  tanks,  Fretter-Pico 
sent  the  lighter  Grodeck  Brigade 
across  first.  Befiire  1200,  the  brigade 
passed  iln-ough  132d  Infantry  Divi- 
sions line  with  orders  to  head  east  as 
far  and  as  fast  as  it  could.  In  the 
af  ternoon,  2 2d  Panzer  Division  crossed 
the  ditch  and  deployed  alongside  28th 
Light  Division.  At  1600,  with  five  hours 
of  daylight  left,  it  began  to  roll  north. 
The  Grodeck  Brigade  by  then  had 
passed  the  Nasyr  fine  and  was  aln^^t 
halfway  to  Kerch.  If  the  tanks  did 
nearly  as  well,  they  could  close  the 
pocket  before  dark,  but  the  Crimea  was 
about  to  live  up  to  its  reputadon  for 
( hangeabte  weather.  In  less  than  two 
hours,  rain  was  pouring  down  on  the 
peninsula,  and  everytliing  was  sto]3ped. 

Rain  continued  through  the  night 
and  into  the  forenoon  on  die  10th,  and 
22d  Panzer  Division's  tanks  only  began 
grinding  slowly  through  the  mud  in 


•'■I'Uv,,  AOK  11.  liiffnribsrhlitmmldut^  VHI  ^lieger 
Kml!-..  <>,  =>.  12.  .M  )K  I  i  28634/3  file, 

-'XXX  I  K  .  h,  Kncg'.uigitlmth,  I  J.~40.9.4Z,  B  May 
42.  XXXA.K.  21753/ifile. 


^68 


Aiming  a  Six-Inch  Rocket  Projectob 


tlie  afiernoon.  They  had  almost  closed 
die  pocket  by  dark,  and  by  then,  the 
Grodcck  Brigade  had  crossed  the  Sul- 
tanovka  Une.-**  In  the  morning  on  the 
10th,  the  Stavka  had  ordered  Crimean 
Front  to  pull  its  armies  back  to  the 
Turkish  Wall  (the  Sultanovka  line)  and 
defend  it,  but,  Vasilevskiy  says,  thefmnt 
command  delayed  executing  the  order 
for  forty-eight  hours  and  then  failed  to 
organize  the  withdrawal  properly.^^ 

The  front  command  may  have  been 
somewhat  more  effective  than  Va- 
silevskiy had  credited  it  with  having 
been.  During  the  night  on  the  10th, 
Fretter-Pico  learned  that  the  Russians 
had  been  manning  the  Nasyr  line,  for- 
imrd  of  the  Sultanovka,  on  the  9th,  and 


"Ihiti..  9  and  10  May  42. 
-"Vasilevskiy,  DeUi,  p.  209. 


MOSCOW  TO  STMINGRAD 

the  Grodeck  Brigade  had  been  lucky 
enough  to  hit  a  still  unoccupied  section 
on  the  extreme  south.  Consequendy, 
he  decided  to  send  the  132d  Infantry 
Division  east  the  next  morning  along 
the  route  the  brigade  had  taken  and 
put  the  I70th  Infantry  Division  in  right 
behind  it  for  a  thrust  to  the  northeast. 
I  he  objectives  would  be  to  overrun  the 
Nasyr  and  Sultanovka  lines  and  get  to 
Kerch  and  the  coast  on  tlie  Kerch  Strait 
in  time  to  prevent  Crimean  Front  from 
organizii^  a  b^urhhead  defense  or  an 
evacuation. 

During  the  uioninig  on  the  11th,  22d 
Panzer  Division  closed  the  pocket  to 
the  east  of  the  Parpach  line  and  to- 
gedier  widi  50di  Infantry  Division  and 
28th  Light  Division  drew  the  ring  tight. 
The  three  divisions  then  passed  to 
XXXXH  Corps  for  the  mop-up,  leav- 
ing XXX  Corps  to  carry  the  drive  east 
with  two  divisions  and  the  Grodeck 
Brigade.  Mud  slowed  all  the  move- 
ments and  stopped  the  Grodeck  Bri- 
gade, which  was  also  running  out  of 
amnumilion.  At  the  day's  end,  the 
pocket  was  practically  elimuaated;  22d 
Panzer  Division  was  turning  east;  132d 
and  170th  Infantry  Divisions  were  half- 
way to  the  Sultanovka;  and  the  Gro- 
deck Brigade  was  standing  off  attacks 
on  the  other  side  of  the  wall  with 
ammunition  airdropped  to  it. 

By  the  I2th,  the  Soviet  coniinands 
had  completely  lost  control  of  the  bat- 
tle. Their  units,  everywhere,  were  bro- 
ken and  jumbled.  The  132d  and  I70th 
Infantry  Divisions  came  within  sight  of 
the  Sidianovka  line  during  the  day  and 
crossed  it  early  the  next  morning. 
When  22d  Panzer  Division  passed 
through  the  infantry  line  several  hours 
later,  Fretter-Pico  had  three  divisions 
bearing  in  on  Kerch  and  tb&  coast  to 


ACTIVE  DEFENSE,  SOUTH 


269 


ilu'  iinrrh  and  soulh.  In  the  afternoon 
on  Lhe  14tli,  170th  InfaojEty  Kvision 
pushed  'mm  the  dty,  md  l^d  lafantrf 
Division  brought  the  post  under  fire 
from  the  souili. 

According  to  all  previous  ^peri^ 
ence,  the  battle  should  have  ended  on 
the  14lh  or,  at  the  latest  on  die  15ih 
when  Kerch  and  the  small  peninsula 
northeast  of  the  city  fell.  Eleventh 
Army's  last  concern  had  been  that  Cri- 
mean Fnrrd  woi^  Stage  a  Bunldrk-type 
evacuauon  across  the  narrow  strait. 
That  did  not  happen,  and  lor  the  next 
six  days,  disjointed  small  batdes  con- 
tinued ail  the  way  back  to  the  Parpach 
line.  Tlie  first  Germans  on  the  heights 
ovisrlooking  the  toasi  had  seen  Soviet 
t)-oops  boarding  ships  ollshore.  Intt  al- 
terward,  very  fe\\  slu[)s  had  appeared. 
Later  the  talk  .iniimg  the  prisoners  was 
that  those  who  had  crossed  to  the 
mainland  were  being  "called  to  ac- 
eount"  and  sometimes  being  (ired 
upon.  Tlic  piisoners  claimed  io  have 
heard  a  Stalin  order  telling  them  not  to 
e^3«Ct  to  be  evacuated  because  theie 
were  plenty  of  caves  aiifl  gullies  on  the 
peninsula  from  whidi  to  carr\  on  the 
resistance.'" 

Manstein,  nevertheless,  declared 
1 KAPPENJAGD  completed  on  the  19di. 
In  the  next  several  days,  the  prisoner 
count  reached  170,()(H>.'"  One  Soviet 
account  gives  the  tunnber  of  Crimraii 
Fraiil  troops  lost  in  die  battle  as  176,000 
and  I Iiose  evacuated  as  120,0(10.  Mekh- 
lis  lost  his  posts  as  deput)  commissar 
for  defense  and  as  chief  dF  the  Army!i 


May  42.  XXX  WMlMIe, 

XmrniAS.  SD0?m  m-,  Str QA.  in ll.  4niMk  m 
Mimk^ktMrntJaim.  19J.42,  AOK  U  SSSS^tfile; 


Main  Political  Directorate  and  was  re- 
duced to  the  rank  of  a  corps  com- 
i3iis$ar.  Kozlov,  his  chief  of  staff,  and  his 
chief  political  officer  and  the  comman- 
ders a£  Forty-fourth  and  Forty-seumtfi  Ar- 
mm  were  relieved  eit  lhekr  posts  and 
demoted.** 

Prospects  and  Problems 

In  eapty  Mafeh,  ^Simka  asked^e 

command  of  Southwestern  Th0^  to 
submit  its  strategic  and  operational  es- 
timates for  the  coming  summer.  On  the 
22d,  Marshal  Timoshenko,  the  the- 
ater's commander,  sent  in  a  propcjsal 
for  a  spring-summer  offensive  by 
Bnamk,  Soutliwe.st.  and  South  Fn»it.\.  It 
would  aim  to  clear  the  hne  of  the 
Dnepr  River  from  Gomel  south  to 
C'lierkassy  and  would  conclude  with  a 
tirive  across  the  lower  Dnepr  to  the  line 
(.'herkassy-Pervoma) sk-Nikolave\ .  In 
the  first  phase,  lo  be  liegun  in  late  .April 
<.)!•  early  May,  Suulltwest  and  South  Fnmtn 
would  chop0fFl3ieGemrian-hcld  north 
and  south  cornerposts  of  the  l/vutn 
bulge  at  Balakk\a  and  Slavyansk,  and 
Southwest  Front  wool'd'  ihfen  ad\ance 
north  out  of  the  western  end  of  the 
bulge  to  take  Kharkov.^*  Tnnoslu  nko 
asked  for  reinforcements  amoiuiting 
to  ?y\  ride  divisions,  28  tank  brigades, 
24  artillery  regiments,  756  aiiciaft, 

200.000  bulk  replacsemen.%  said  "lat^ 
i|uantiiie.s"  of  weapons,  equipmentt  and 
motor  vehicles.'*^ 
In  tihe  last  week  of  March,  Ti- 


*V£»E  p.  144;  IVaVSS,  vcrf.  II,  p.  406. 
411. 


270 


MOSCOW  TO  SIALINGRAD 


moslicnko.  Khrushchev,  his  member  of 
the  Military  Council,  and  General 
Bagraffiyan,  his  chief  ^  staff,  went  to 
Moscow  to  defend  the  proposal  before 
the  Stavkn.  The  discussions  appear, 
from  Bagramyan's  account,  actually  to 
have  been  between  the  three  of  them 
and  Stalin  with  Marshal  Shaposhnikov, 
cliief  of  the  ( kiieral  Staff,  and  Getief^ 
Vasilevskiy,  his  deputy,  present. 
Shaposhnikov  had  convinced  Stalin  be- 
forehand that  tlie  offOTsive  should  not 
be  attempted  on  the  proposed  scale, 
and  in  the  first  conference  in  the 
Kremlin,  on  the  night  of  the  27di, 
Stalin  said  he  only  had  a  lew  dozen 
divisions  in  the  whole  reserve,  not 
nearly  enough  to  meet  the  require- 
ments of  tlie  rest  of  the  front  and  also 
give  Suutliwestein  Theater  what  it 
wanted.^^  Stalin  then  said  that  the  ol^ 
fensive  would  have  to  he  r^tricted  to 
the  Kliarkov  region. 

In  another  night  met-ting  on  the 
28th  Stalin  and  Shaposlmikov  i  c\  iewed 
the  first  plan  for  a  Khai  ko\  ollensive 
and  required  that  it  be  reworkgii  to 
limit  it  exclusively  to  the  Kharkov  area 
and  to  reduce  die  number  of  units 
lequested  from  the  reserves.^^  What 
had  been  proposed  was  apparentlv  an 
offensive  by  Southwest  and  South  fronts 
similar  to  the  first  phase  of  the  original 
plan  plus  participation  by  Bryansk  Front. 

On  the  night  of  the  30th,  Stalin 
accepted  a  proposal  to  develop  an  op- 
erarion  that  could  be  executed  with 
provision  from  the  reserves  of  10  rifle 
divisions,  26  tank  brigades,  10  artillery 
regiments,  and  enough  replacements 
to  bring  Southwest  and  South  Fwnts  up  to 


2&l!^^'     k  ^edsi  v,  62-  See  dm 


80  percent  of  authorized  strengths. 
The  idea  was  to  have  Southwest  Front, 
aloder,  take  Whmkm  mA  ibxa^i^-  i^c 
the  stage  for  a  subsequent  ||ifi3®t 
South  Front  to  DnepropetroSsk.*^ 

Timoshetiko  ttmk  €&mmAnd  of 
Smithwest  Front  in  person  on  8  April, 
and  on  the  10th,  he  turned  in  a  plan  for 
a  two-pronged  attack  on  Kiiarfcov. 
One,  the  main  drive,  was  to  go  out  of 
the  nordiwesl  corner  of  the  Izyura 
bulge,  the  other  out  of  the  smaller 
Volchansk  salient.  The  Stavkn  ap- 
proved this  pioposai.***  Shaposhnikov, 
Vasilevskiy  says,  pointed  out  die  risks 
of  launching  an  offensive  out  of  a 
pocket  like  the  Izyum  bulge,  but  Ti- 
moshenko  convinced  Stalin  that  theop» 
eration  would  be  a  "complete  suc- 
cess."^" Moskalenko,  who  saw  the  deci- 
^nfrom  die  point  of  view  of  an  army 
commander  (71urty-eight/i),  says  the 
Stm'ka  made  a  mistake  in  approving  die 
plan,  but  it  did  so  at  the  "insistence"  of 
die  theater  command.*" 

The  plan,  as  written  on  10  April  and 
issued  to  fiit^  form  on  die  28th,  pro- 
jected not  only  the  liberation  of 
Kharkov  but  an  extensive  encirclement 
that  would  trap  most  of  German  Sixth 
Army.  The  attack  from  the  Volchansk 
salient  would  go  due  west  and  be 
spearheaded  by  Tivefity-eighth  Army,  a 
new  army  with  4  rifle  divisions  from 
the  Stuvka  reser\'es.  It  would  be  under 
Ryabyshev,  an  experienced,  gseaeidl* 
who  had  successfully  commanded  Fi/iy- 
smeiith  Artny  during  the  winter  offen- 
sive, and  it  would  be  suppiorte^  on  its 
flanks  hy  elements  of  "Memty^first  and 


V,  p.  127. 
■""'Bagramyan.  Tnk  shii  my  k  pobede,  p. 
^"Vasilevsijy.Dai),  p.  213. 


ACTIVE  DEFENSE,  SOUTH 


271 


Tankmen  Flush  Out  Soviet  Soldisrs  After  i  he  Battle 


Thirty-eighUi  Amues.  The  main  thrust, 
out  of  the  Izyiim  bulge,  was  assigned  to 
Sixth  An?i\.  under  General  Levlenanl  A, 
M,  Gorodnyanskov,  and  die  "Bobidn 
Group,"  TJiider  General  Mayor  L.  V. 
Bobkin.  The  attac  k  was  to  be  made  in 
two  stages:  the  hrst,  to  break  through 
the  enenay^  first  and  smind  defense 
lines  and  destroy  bis  tactical  lescrves 
and  tiie  second,  to  smash  the  enemy's 
operational  reservi»  and  cdtnplete  me 
encirclement.  For  the  attack,  .S/.vf/;  Army 
and  the  Bobkin  Group,  between  them, 
would  have  10  rifle  and  B  cavalry  divi- 
sions, II  tank  brigades,  and  2  niolor- 
ized  rifle  brigades.  16  make  the  break- 
through on  a  fifteen-mile  iem%  Sedk 
Army  had  8  rifle  divisions,  4  tank  bri- 
gades, and  14  regiments  of  supporting 
artillery.  The  BoiMn  Group  was  a  newly 


fbrmed  mobile  operational  group  com- 
posed of  2  rifle  dtvtstons,  a  cavalry 

corps,  and  a  rank  brigade.  Its  com- 
mander had  successtully  led  a  similar 
group  lift  die  Thirty-eighth  Army  area 
dining  the  winter.  Timoshcnko  had 
560  tanks  for  the  hrst  stage  and  269 
indfie  to  be  put  ifi  during  the  secrond. 
He  held  as  the  re.serve  of  ilie  frotil  a 
cavalry  corps,  2  rifle  divisions,  and  an 
independent  tank  brigade,  which,  ac- 
cording to  Moskalenko,  had  about  a 
hundred  tanks.  He  also  had  close  at 
hdnd  the  iVikifft  and  FifVi-seven^  Armes 
South  Front  and,  potentially  a\ailal>!e, 
South  Front's  reserve  of  a  tank  corps  and 
7  iMe  i^tmktm.*^ 


*'lbid.,  pp.  182-84;  Bagmmyan.lhksh&mfkpebede, 
pp.  69,  71-74,  84:/VJMV,  vol.  V,  p.  127. 


272 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


In  the  tiieantime,  Army!  Oroup 
South  also  had  had  its  eyes  on  the 
Izyum  bulge.  A  situation  estimate  Bock 
sent  to  the  OKH  on  10  March  specified 
that  the  bulge  would  have  to  be  wijDed 
out  as  soon  as  the  rasputitsa  passed, 
because,  otherwise,  the  Russians  would 
use  it  as  a  springboard  for  an  attack  on 
Kharkov  and  because  the  army  group 
could  not  keep  on  defending  the  extra 
length  of  front.  Getting  rid  of  the 
bulge  was  essential  to  the  army  groups 
summer  operadons.  Bock  asked  foi 
two  fresh  divisions  for  Seventeenth 
Army  and  two  for  Sixth  Army.*** 

On  2')  March,  Army  Group  South 
had  issued  a  directive  for  Operation 
Fridericus.  In  concept,  Fridericus  was 
simple  enough,  .i  malu  r  of  luo  (lirusls. 
one  from  the  north,  die  other  from  the 
south,  meeting  at  Izyum.  But  the  staff 
work  liati  hi  ought  to  liglit  an  irritating 
complication:  owing  to  the  lie  of  the 
front  in  relation  to  the  Donets  River, 
the  best  route  for  the  thrust  from  ihf 
nordi  was  east  of  the  Donets,  straight 
along  the  Kharkov-Izyum  road,  which, 
however,  would  be  wide  open  to  attack 
on  the  east.  Sixth  Army,  already  having 
two  exposed  fronts,  would  be  hard  put 
to  hold  a  third.  To  avoid  tliis  problem, 
the  Fridericus  directive  put  the  Sixth 
Army  thrust  west  of  die  Donets,  whitih 
would  ;^i\c  it  ihc  proltx  tion  of  rlie  ri\  er 
but  which  would  also  be  awkward  be- 
cause of  a  dtmlile  bend  in  the  riveft 
Because  the  rivers  protcttion  would  be 
greatest  during  the  time  of  high  >vater, 
the  starting  dsm  i/m  Set  for  ^2  April.*' 

Army  Group  South  ha4  given  Fta- 


«Bv^&9.f}.0il'"  II.  1(1  Maria. 

fun  den  Aia^f  "FUderictes."  253A2,  P*.  AOK  1 
25179/3  fife. 


p^a7S  a  name  and  an  existence  on 
paper.  From  there  on,  the  operation 
acquired  a  life  of  its  own.  First  off,  it 
spawned  a  second  vei  sion,  FridkricuS 
U,  after  HiUer  and  Haider,  chief  of  the 
General  Staff,  objected  to  the  army 
group's  choice  and  wanted  the  Sixth 
Army  ef  fort  cast  of  the  Donets.  Bock, 
in  turn,  complained  that  Fridericus  II 
was  based  on  "all  kinds  of  assumptions 
but  not  a  single  tact"  and  was  con- 
vinced that  the  only  practicable  version 
was  die  army  gioup's  own,  whicli  be- 
came Fridericus  I.'"'  When  either 
could  start  depended  on  the  weather 
and  on  the  railroads  that  were  already 
laboring  at  capacity  under  the  weight 
of  traffic  for  the  coming  sutnmer  cam- 
paign. Tlie  OKH  released  two  new 
infantry  divisions  for  FRiDERlCLrs  in 
early  April,  but  it  could  only  deliver 
them  by  rail  as  far  as  Roviio  and 
Grodno  in  Poland,  and  they  had  to 
make  their  way  east  another  500  miles 
bv  road.  On  2-1  April,  iw(.>  daws  after 
die  original  stai  ting  date  for  the  opera- 
tion, Bock  and  Hifler  were  still  debat- 
ing the  deployment.** 

Finally,  on  30  Aprils  Bock  issued  a 
directive  for  FRifigftlcftJS  IT.  Tt  was 
"bom  in  severe  pain,"  he  remarked, 
aod  "on  the  whole  not  pretty"  but  it  was 
also  unalterable  because  of  xhtFuJ^m^ 
insistence.*®  Setting  the  time  for  "prob- 
ably" 18  May  took  another  week.*' 
Wh^e  Army  Group  South's  reiftfeftce- 
ments  ( aiiic  forward  &lowlv.  tlie  rivCFS 
were  subsiding,  the  roads  were  becom- 

"limk  Dian.  CM'ii  II.  ;'.  I  M.ii  42. 
*^Jhid..  24  .\pi  42. 

^Vbid..  30  4t'.  OIM...  ,1.  H.  Gr.  Siml,  la  Nr. 
946142,  \\Hu,„g  X,.  2  l„y,  ,i,n  AngTiff  "trMmots," 
30.4.42,  P/..  .^OK  !  2:.171t/.i  (ilc. 

*^A(>K  17,  h:  .Vi.  7>.'/2,  li,-l,h!  j,in  Ar^gl^  "W- 
der>cUi"H.5.-l2,  Vz.  AOK  1  2717U/a  file. 


ACTIVE  DEFENSE,  SOUTH 


273 


ing  passible,  and  thf  Russians  were 
stirring  ominously  in  ihe  northwest 
corner  tS  Hie  $zfum  bulge  and  in  the 
Volchansk  salient.  Hitler  antt  Halfiei. 
who  had  done  the  sanie  witli  earlier 
reports  of  simile  Russian  activity,  dis^ 
missed  thi'  idci  nf  an  .ittark  toward 
Kharkov  aliliough,  as  tiie  weaUier  and 

condition  or  t^e  mm^  imm^, 

Ha  Id  c  r  d  id  m  Sntoli^  GOIl^C^a  tEmn 

The  Drive  mKhiff^ 

On  the  moraias  of  12  May.  Soviet 
Sixth  Armyf  the  B^bkin  Group,  and 
Tiuenty-eigh^  Army  wait  mev  to  <he  0^ 
fensive.  therewith  opening  what  was 
jfoing  to  be  the  Soviet  battle  of  World 
War  H  ^at^neraced  i3ie  most  long- 
lasting  controversy.  Mliile  Stalin  lived, 
it  would  be  made  to  disappear  from 
hisfimy.  Ift  the  IdSOs,  tt  vtom^  be  resut^ 
rected  as  a  chief  exhibit  in  the  de- 
Stalinizadon  campaign;  and  in  the  late 
1960S,  It  would  he  tamed  against  Sta- 
lin's critic  and  siiccessoi.  Nikifa  Khru- 
shchev. Consecmently,  as  seen  from  the 
Ssfviet  side,  the  battle  appear  in  several 

versions,  all.  to  some  exteiil.  tailored  to 
purposes  oUier  than  purely  historical. 

By  both  th«  Soviet  and  German  ac* 
counts,  the  beginning  was  spectacular, 
in  its  impact,  not  a  far  second  to  the 
Moscow  Cdanterat^k.  The  SdViet  his- 
tories maintain  thai  iheir  initial  advan- 
tage was  not  great.  The  Sliort  fiistory 
^ves  a  advantage  m  mlkntry  and 
2:1  in  tanks  at  the  points  where  the 
attacks  were  made.  The  History  oj  the 
Secmd  W)rld  War  indicates  an  overall 
Stmthivest  Fnmt  superioiitv  of  1.51:1  in 
troops  and  2:1  in  tanks  but  says  the 


**Bttck  Diary,  Oslen  Ih  tb  Apr  and   Mtif  i% 


tanks  were  mostly  tight  inodels,'"'  The 
actual  advantages  could  have  been 
iMudi  grater,  at  least  so  it  appeared  to 
the  GemmnS.  Sixth  Avmy  ic[7orfed 
being  hit  hf  tw^ye  ride  divisions  and 
300  tariks  m  the  nm  waves.  %teran 
troops,  who  had  fought  thfsOUgh  the 
winter,  were  overawed  by  the  ins^ses  of 
armor  rolling  in  on  them  that  moilJ- 
ing.^"  Bock  told  Haider  Sixth  Artny 
was  fighting  "for  its  iite."'^ 

Heaviest  hit  on  the  first  day  was  Sixth 
Armvs  V'lII  Corps  in  tlie  noi  thwestcrn 
cornel-  of  the  Izyum  bulge.  Against  it, 
Soviet  S*3C^  Arm^  At&m  ditie  north  to* 
ward  Kharko\-,  while  ihe  Sobkiti  (irvup 
pushed  west  and  northw!^t  to  get  tire 
aitny  elbow  room  on  its  left  fiank; 
Twenty-('ii!;l>th  .Irmv's  attack  ont  of  the 
Vokhausk  salient  was  less  powerful  but 
more  dangermis  because  it  had  tJie 
shorter  distance  to  jj,<'.  (Map  2^.1  Rt^fore 
1200,  all  three  attacks  had  cracked  the 
German  lines,  and  by  evening,  7Wm^3>- 
eighlh  /\r;)n''s  tanks  were  ranging  to  with- 
in eleven  miles  of  Kharkov.  After  per- 
suading Haider  that  these  were  tiot 
mere  "cosmetic  flaws."  Bock  released 
the  23d  Panzer  Division  and  71st  and 
1 13th  Infantry  Divisions  to  CSeneral 
Paidiis,  the  commander  of  Sixth  Army. 
1  hey  were  to  have  been  Sixth  Army's 
spearh^d  force  for  FRiDEractJS.*? 

In  two  days,  the  Soviet  armies 
opened  broad  gaps  south  and  north- 
east of  Kharkett^  and  the  BohMn  Grtmp 
drove  VIH  Corps  a^\■av  from  its  contact 
with  the  Arraeegruppe  KJeist  and  back 
ag^^t  the  ierestibvaya  l^ver.  WMe 


128. 

^Soch  Dim  Oaten  IK  f2  May  42. 
mm..  12  May  42, 


MAP2S 


ACTIVE  DEFENSE,  SOUTH 


27& 


Paulus  positioned  the  three  dK^ions 

and  elements  of  the  3fl  Panzer  and 
303th  InfaiUiy  Divisions  lo  parry  ihe 
thrusts  at  Khai  k(>\  .  Generaloberst  Al- 
exander I.oelu,  tlic  Luftwaffe  com- 
mander lor  the  Arni\  Group  South 
zone,  began  shifting  ground  support 
units  from  Richthofen's  V'lll  Air  Corps 
north  fi  «)m  the  Crimea.  The  attack  had 
come  just  at  the  dme  Soviet  resistance 
was  beginning  to  collapse  on  die  Kerch 
Peninsula,  and  the  VllI  Air  Corps 
uinis.  added  to  thOSC  iaf  IV  Air  Clorps 
already  operaUng  around  Kharkov 
and  die  Izyura  bulge,  would  create  in 
sodatg  ttoe  im  @itnionlimTily 
powerful  concentration  of  air  support. 
By  nighllali  on  the  13(h,  a  ten-niile- 
wide  gap  had  opened  on  the  VI 11 
Corps  left  Hank  southwest  of  Zniiyev. 
On  its  right  dank,  Soviet  cavalry  was 
probing  we^Otrnd  toward  Kiasaograd 
through  an  e\  en  wider  gap.  The  oii!\ 
obstacle  in  Tu'fiiiy-cighlh  At)/iy'si  wa\  ou 
the  Volchansk-Kharkov  road  was  a 
party  of  Germans  surroiuided  in  the 
village  of  leniovaiia.  On  die  I4th,  it 
was  time  for  Bock  and  his  Soviet  coini- 
terpart.  Tlmosheako,  to  make  big 
decisions. 

Hmosbenko  still  had  tiie  tanks  for 
the  second  stage.  B\  ilu-  I4iii,  even 
though  the  hrcakihi  nughs  had  been 
achieved,  rnin>shenko  did  not  put  the 
armor  in.  The  History  of  tki'  Seamd  World 
War  says  that  the/row/  and  daeatcr  tom- 
mand  did  not  advantage  of  the 
favoraMe  situation  existing  on  14  May 
and  did  not  put  in  the  mobile  forces  to 
complete  the  encirclement.^^  The  His- 
tory of  the  Great  Patriotic  War  and  the 
thpular  Scwntific  Sketch  maintain  that 
Itmoshenko  was  "misled**  by  mistaken 


"/VMV,  vol.  V,  p.  129. 


intelligence  l'gfK>ftS  of  strong  enemy 

armoi  lieing  concentrated  near  Znii)  ev 
and,  therefore,  delayed  committing  the 
tanks.''*  Bagramyan  says  that  the  "mo- 
ment" had  arrived,  on  the  14tli.  when 
Twenty-eighth  Army  should  have  com- 
mitted its  mobile  groups,  but  die  army 
staffs  "poor  organization"  prevenled 
that.  He  also  says  Sonilni'fs/  Front  sent  a 
report  lo  ihe  Slavlio  t>n  the  night f^tiie 
14tli  in  whicli  it  described  its  successes 
but  pointed  out,  as  well,  that  two  en- 
emy panzer  divisions  still  consutUt«l*a 
serious  impediment"  to  the  advance  on 
Kharkovv^-^  The  Short  Hislory  implies 
that  the  front  cotnmand  could  not  make 
up  its  mind,  waited  for  "a  more  favor- 
able moment,"  and,  so,  missed  the 
chance.^"  Moskalenko  also  mainl^iiis 
that  the  trouble  was  with  thefmrU  GOlfl- 
mands  indecision.''' 

Bock,  of  course,  unaware  of  the  help 
he  was  getting  from  die  other  sifie,  had 
two  choices  on  the  I4lh:  he  could  act 
directly  to  save  Sixth  Army  from  an 
expensive  trouncing,  or  he  could  try  to 
accomplish  die  same  eiiec  i  and  possi- 
bly more — ■while  also  risking  two 
failures — by  going  ahead  with  Fri- 
DERICU.S.  The  circumstances  were  as 
peculiar  as  any  in  the  wm:  No  matter 
how  successful  the  Kharkov  battle  was, 
it  was  going  to  be  a  dead  end  for  die 
Russians.  The  Army  Group  Soulh.»eir 
area,  particularly  the  Kharkov  region, 
was  begintiing  to  hll  up  witii  divisions 
£9r  fhe  mxmm&t  offensive,  more  than 
enough  te  guarafiice  the  strategic  ini- 
tiauve.  On  me  odier  band,  those  divi- 
sions were  under  OKH  control.  Bock 
apjparenUy  did  not  even  know  where 


^iv(n  ss.  vui  n.  p  4Li:  vov,  p.  140. 

^^B;!iTr;iiinriii.  Tnk  Jili  my  li  pithnli:  pp.  9.1-97. 
■''^VOV  {KiKlliiivi  I^Uiriy,,!.  \t  lliL'- 
"}Au^k^[c\-\V.o,Nayuga-mpadtwm  tiapravlenii,  p,  247. 


all  of  them  were  or  what  their  states  of 
readiness  were,  and  Hitler,  who  was 
having  to  painstakingly  ht^b&Bid  %^ 
manpower  for  the  simimer,  was  not 
disposed  to  release  them.  Con- 
8e(|Qeatly,  the  batde  would  Imve  t0  be 
fou^t  practicalh.  if  somewhat  iar- 
dfic^y,  ill  die  hand-to-mouth  af^le  of 
the  winter. 

From  General  Kloist.  BoGk  teaHted 
that  Seventeenth  Army  probahly  CGcdd 
cany  out  the  soiithem  half  of  Fri- 
DFRicus.  Doing  so  would  narrow  tlie 
mouth  of  the  Izyum  bulge  to  about 
twenty  miles.  But  Kleist  did  not  believe 
he  could  go  any  farther,  and  if  his 
advance  lell  short,  it  would  not  have 
any  effect  at  all.  As  an  alternative, 
Kleist  thought  he  could  scrape  to- 
gether three  or  four  divisions  for  a 


counterattack  off  the  Armeegnippe 
left  Hank  across  die  rear  of  the  Bobkin 
&inmp  and  Sendee  SixA  Army.  Bock  in- 
clined rtnvard  the  first  possibiliiv  but 
f  elt  compelled  by  prudence  to  recom- 
HAeUd  the  second  to  HMen  Having 
4pZI6this.  he  remarked  to  his  chief  of 
S^lfr,  "Now  die  Fuehrer  will  order  the 
Hg  scMtkm  [FfcJDERiOTsl.  The  laurels 
Ural  go  CO  tile  Supreme  Command  and 
tswe  wi  have  to  be  content  widi  what  is 
left.*  As  estpected  ,  Hitler  did  promptly 
order  the  big  solution,  which  Bodt 
then  said  he  could  "approach  cheer- 
fully," parti^EllaTly  since  Hitler  had  also 
unflerlaken  to  send  our  of  llu-  C'rimea 
"every  aircraft  that  can  possibly  be 
spained."" 


•Sock  Dmry.  Osten  II,  11  May  42. 


MAP  24 


278 


MOSCOW  TO  STAliNGRAD 


Fridericus 

On  die  mnrning  of  ihe  17th,  H- 
moshenko  committed  his  second-stage 
forces,  ami  Kleist  began  FRIDERICUS. 
Timoshtiiko  was  pia)  ing  primarily  his 
two  biggest  trumps,  XXI  and  XXIII 
Tank  Coip,  which  had  been  waiting 
beliind  Sixth  Army.  They  were  going  in, 
however,  after  the  first-stage  attack  liad 
a  ested  and  was  beginning  to  subside/" 
Nevertheless,  during  die  day,  in  9(FF. 
heat,  die  Soviet  tanks  drove  five  miles 
deep  imo  the  looseJy  patched  VIII 
Corps  line  south  of  l^artcov.  (Map  24.) 

Friderkxis  was  light  on  reserves  but 
had  powerful  air  support.  The  22d 
Panzer  Division,  coming  from  the 
-Gzim^i  probably  would  not  arri%e  in 
time  to  count,  but  IV  Air  Corps,  with 
the  reinforcements  from  VIII  Air 
Corps,  had  an  imposing  assemblage  of 
fighier.  Stuka,  and  bomber  squadrons, 
ail  ol  v\  hith  were  able  to  take  to  the  air 
when  the  day  dawned  bright  and  clear. 
The  surprise  \\as  complete  on  the  So- 
viet side  and  almost  as  great  on  the 
German — at  how  fast  the  Soviet  ,V/»//( 
Army  collapsed.  By  sundown  on  that 
shimmeringly  hot  day,  supported 
"most  effectively  by  the  Liijtwaffi',"  III 
Panzer  Corps  had  gone  fifteen  miles  {o 
Barvenkovo,  and  the  Sevehtfeettth 
Army  left  flank  tlivisions  Iiad  co\ered 
sixteen  or  seventeen  miles,  moi  e  than 
two-diirds  of  tJie  distance  to  Izyura.*** 
During  the  day,  the  commander  of 
Smith  Front,  General  Malinovskiy.  lost 
contact  with  the  Ninth  Army  headquar- 
ters land  with  nrattforcemeflts  he  was 


'*Hfg$aiEnkn.Nttyug3-zapadiiom  mpriwtmii,  p.  201: 
WlkV,      V.  p.  129. 

AOK  J,  la  Kritgstagebuck  Nn  8,  17  May  42,  J?¥. 
AOK  1  24906  file;  AOK  17.  la  KriegHagetueh  Nr.  3;  17 
May  42.  AOR 17  244J1/1  fUe. 


trying  to  deploy  south  of  Izyum. 

Bagramvan  sa\s  ihat  Malino\'ski\  bad 
made  two  "  ei  rors"  hcloreliaud:  he  had 
put  part  of  his  reser\  es  into  ^e  litte  ow 
the  south,  and  he  and  ihe  armv  com- 
mand had  failed  to  set  up  a  sufhcienlly 
solid  defense.'*'  According  to  the  Popu- 
lar Sdnitifir  Sketch.  "The  Sinth  Army 
troops  were  not  pieparcd  to  ward  off 
tiieeii«tnyMow."'- 

The  17th  and  the  ISili  were  davs  of 
rising  crisis  lor  the  Soviet  tionimaiul — 
and  df  decisions  made  and  not  made 
that  would  remain  in  dispute  decades 
later,  Tlie  History  oJ  tiie  Great  Patriotic 
War  passes  over  the  eveaats  of  the  17th 
in  a  single  sentence  confirming  the 
German  breakthrough.  Bagramyan  in- 
dicates that  on  that  day,  both  the  the- 
ater command  and  the  Skivka  believed 
South  Frnnl's  right  flank  could  be 
strengthened  enough  to  master  the  cri- 
sis. Timoshenko,  he  says,  ordered 
Gorodnyanskov  to  lake  oui  XXIII  Tank 
Corps  and  get  it  kj  Fifty -seventh  Army  by 
the  night  of  the  ISth  ibr  a  counterat- 
tack towatd  Barvenkovo.  and  the 
Stmiui  released  two  rifle  divisions  and 
two  tank  Ijtigacles  from  its  reserves. 
The  Short  Histnry  maintains,  however, 
that  since  the  Stavka  reserves  could  not 
have  arrived  in  less  than  three  days, 
Tmioshenko  should  have  slopped  Sim 
Army  and  shifted  all  of  its  offensive 
strength  to  ihe  south.  The  acting  chief 
of  the  (ieneral  Staff,  Vasilevskiy,  the 
Short  Histury  sa\s  (as  he  does  also),  pro- 
posed doing  that,  but  Stalin  refused 
after  the  Militai  y  Council  of  the^a««ft^ 
ii'csirrri  Theater  {Tnnoshenko,  Khru- 
shchev, and  fiagramyan)  told  him  it 
could  continue  die  offensive  and  stop 


•"IViHi.iinvan.TaiSiiAfiBiyftjSofrHfoi  p.  166fi 
"^v  oV;  p.  141. 


ACTIVE  DEFENSE,  SOUTH 


279 


the  German  attack.''''  The  Popular  Sden- 
tijit  Sketch  states,  "The  Supreme  Com- 
mandei  let  the  Military  Council  of  tlie 
Southwest  Front  [also  Tilooshtlnko, 
Khruslichev.  and  B.itframvan]  per- 
suade liim  that  to  coniiiuie  llie  offen- 
sive was  necessary  and  fe2s834&  -and 
rejected  the  General  Staffs  argunimts 
for  breaking  off  the  operation."®'* 

On  the  18th,  lig^iter  by  a  tank  corps, 
Timoshenko's  armor  rolled  against 
Sixth  Aimy  again.  In  places,  the  tanks 
broke  through,  but  where  they  did,  the 
Germans  counterattacked,  and  at  day's 
end,  the  front  stood  about  where  it  had 
in  the  morning.^*  FiUik&^GtJS,  mean- 
while, almost  became  a  rout.  South 
Front,  Ninth  Army,  and  thelatter's  neigh- 
bor, foiled  again  to 
put  together  a  cohesive  defense. 
Against  confused  resistance,  Seven- 
teenth Army  and  III  Panzer  Corps 
fanned  out  and  cleared  the  line  of  the 
Donets  River  north  to  Izyimi  and  v\est 
to  the  mouth  of  the  Bereka  River. 

The  History  of  the  Great  Patriotic  War 
and  Bagramyan  depict  the  18tli  as  the 
crucial  day.  The  history  states  that 
Khrushchev,  in  Iiis  capacitv  as  the 
member  (political)  of  the  Military 
C;ouncil  of  the  theater  and  front,  con- 
tacted Stalin  and  proposed  to  stop  the 
offensive  immediately  and  redepk>y 
Sixth  Amj's  and  the  Bohkin  Group's 
forces  to  counter  Fridericus,  but  "tiie 
Stai>ka  insisted  on  the  execution  of  its 
pre-vious  orders.""^  Khrushchev-  told 
the  Twentieth  Party  CiongresSi  iti  Feb- 


"HVOVSS.  v,,l,  II,  p.  413;  Bagramyan,  Tali  Mi  my  k 
jinhni,-,  p.  115;  rov' fAL™j%a/4tori^>j  p.  leS-Sce  aJso 

Vasilcvskiv, />r/ii,  p,  '214. 
"V'Oi;  p,  Ml- 

"•'.40A  6.  la  Kneg-'.higrhiu  h  II.  18  Ma>  42,  AOK  6 
""/WViA',  vol,  a.  p.  414. 


ruary  1956,  that  he  had  talked  to  Va- 
silevskiy  and  indirectly,  through 
Malenkov,  a  member  of  the  State  De- 
fense CAMiimillee,  to  Stalin  by  tele- 
phone. Vasilevskiy,  in  Khrnshchevs 
version,  refused  to  take  up  the  matter 
of  stopping  the  offensive  with  Stalin. 
Stalin  vvcjuld  not  talk  on  I  he  telephone 
but  liad  Malenkov  gi\  e  the  answer.  "Let 
c\ CI  y thing  remain  as  it  is."''' 

Bagramyan  says  he  had  concluded, 
on  the  night  of  the  17th,  that  the  offen- 
sive would  have  to  be  stopped  and  the 
tiiass  of  its  forces  shifted  to  the  Bar- 
venkovo  area,  but  he  had  not  suc- 
ceeded in  convincing  Tlmoshecko  of 
"the  urgent  necessity  to  take  that  car- 
dinal decision."  In  fact,  he  says,  on  the 
morning  of  the  18th,  Timoshenko  told 
Stalin  there  was  no  need  to  take  forces 
from  Sixth-  Army  or  the  Bohkin  Group  to 
beat  off  the  (S^man  attack.  Bagram- 
van.  by  his  account,  then  initiated  an 
appeal  to  Stalin  ihrctugh  KJirushchev, 
but  Stalin  declined  to  reverse  Ti> 
moshenko's  decision.'"'*^ 

Vasilevskiy  says  he  intormed  Stalin  of 
the  worsening  situation  in  the  Bar- 
venkovo-lzyum  area  on  the  nH)rning 
of  die  18th.  In  writing  his  menions, 
Vasilevskiy  remembered  talking  to 
Khrushchev  by  telephone,  "either  on 
the  18th  or  19th, "  in  approxiitiately  the 
sense  Khrushchev  described,  except 
that  he  told  Khrushchev  he  could  not 
go  to  Stalin  again  with  a  pi  ojjcjsal  that 
contradicted  what  the  military  councU 
of  the  theater  was  reporting.^"  Accord- 
ing to  the  Short  History,  Vasilevskiy 

poade  another  att^pt  to  get  Stalin  to 


''''Ojiigrfsniiiia/  Riivril.  1  19B6. 
'*^B;ig!  .iiin  ar[.  liik  s!i!i  my  k  ptihediti  p.  11^ 
'"VasilevsisijviJfV'o,  p.  214. 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


PAK.  40,  VS^MM.  AimTAjJR  Guri  GiBWr  xsn  ihe  Watch 


stop  the  offensive  on  the  18th  and  was 
torned  down  after  Stalin  again  con- 
Stilted  Timoshenko.'"  To  this  Zhukov 
adds,  "The  vcrsi(Mi  about  the  military 
council  of  the  theater  sending  alarm- 
ing rep(jrt.s  to  Sialiii  is  not  true.  I 
maintain  this  Ijecaiise  1  \vas  present  in 
person  when  Stalin  spoke  over  the 
telephone."^"^ 

No  matter  where  the  lespoiisibilitv 
rested,  with  Stalin,  ^vllh  tlie  mihtary 
council  of  the  theater,  with  Tt- 
moslienko,  or  with  all  three,  Soiilhwest 
Frunl  had  indeed  been  kept  on  the 
offensive  south  of  Kharkov  too  long. 
Because  it  had,  the  trap  that  was  about 


'"V()\'  (Kmlkiya  Istoiiyah  p<  164. 
"Zhukov,  jWffflwra,  p.  36S. 


to  be  sprung  was  going  to  i)e  in  good 
part  one  of  the  Russians  own  making. 
Bock  conferred  with  Kleist  at  the  lat- 
ters  headt]uarters  in  Stalinf)  on  the 
18th.  In  the  midst  of  an  almost  un- 
believable success,  tiie  two  were  wor- 
lied.  Wien  they  readied  Izvinn  and 
the  moutlr  of  die  Bereka,  wliich  they 
were  tQ  do  within  hotjrs^  the 

Friderfcus  forces  would  have  gone  as 
far  north  as  Kleist  had  figured  diey 
eOUld  go;  lint  so  Far,  they  had  failed  to 
aeeomplish  their  main  mission,  wliich 
was  to  draw  SoallmesL  Fnnit  away  tfoni 
Sixth  Army.  The  RKSBIims  had  «Jt  re- 
acted at  all.  The  next  stage,  as  planned, 
would  be  to  turn  111  Panzer  Corps  due 
west  along  the  south  side  of  the  Bereka 
behind  Fifty-seventh  Army,  but  that 
hardly  seemed  likely  to  produce  an 


ACTIVE  DEFENSE,  SOUTH 


281 


effect  that  the  more  threatening  north- 
ward thrust  had  failed  to  achieve.  Be- 
fore Bock  departed,  KJeist  offered  to 
try  to  have  III  Panzer  Corps  take 
bridgehead  north  of  the  Bcreka  from 
which  it  could  advance  northwest  in 
the  Russians,  as  it  seemed  the^ 
very  likely  would,  proved  insensitive  to 
the  push  to  the  west-^* 

By  comparisOft'Wilfe  the  [arevious  tWO 
days,  the  Armeegruppe  Kieisi  ahnost 
stood  still  on  the  19th.  The  III  Panzer 
C(jrps  was  wheeling  to  the  west.  It  dM, 
though,  send  14th  Panzer  Division  over 
the  Bereka  to  take  Petrovskoye.  The 
distance  gained  was  only  about  five 
miles,  l>ui  it  depr  i\ed  Southwest.  Fmnl  of 
a  Donets  crossino;  and  narrowed  the 
mouth  of  the  Izyum  bulge  to  fifteen 
miles.  During  the  dav,  Smtlhwest  Fmn! 
finally  did  begin  to  react.  1  he  pressure 
OB  ¥111  Corps,  strong  in  the  morning, 
became  disjointed  by  inidniorning.  In 
the  afternoon,  air  reconnaissance  de- 
tected an  increase  in  road  traffic  away 
from  the  VIII  C^orps  front  to  the 
southeast,  and  at  tlie  end  of  the  dav, 
Sixtb  Army  reported,  "The  eneniys 
offensive  strength  has  cracked.  The 
breakthrough  to  Kharkov  is  therewith 
prevented."^^ 

In  the  evening  on  the  19th,  an  order 
went  out  to  Soviet  Sixth  Army  and  the 
Bohkin  Group  to  stop  the  offensive  and 
redeploy  to  tlic  southeast.  The  History 
of  the  Great  FMriotic  War  implies  that 
Hmoshenko  had  to  give  the  order  on 
his  own  responsibility  and  only  later 
received  the  SUivka's  approval."  The 
Hismj  of  tfm  Smnd  mrM  War,  the  Short 


"/'j.  AOK  I.  Ill  Knegslagebmh  Nt.  S.  18  May  42,  Pz. 
AOK  I  'i4!i()(S  Tile. 

'■'AOK  0.  Ill  Kriegstagebmh  Nr.  U,  19  Mav  42,  AOK  6 
22391  file. 

"/VOKSS.  vol.  U.  p.  414. 


History,  and  Vasilevskiy  present  the  de- 
cision, made  "at  last,"  as  having  been 
enurely  up  to  the  dieater  commandJ^ 
Biagiramyan  says,  "the  commanding 
ocneral,  Soitlhwestem  Thmter.  did  not 
make  tht  lielated  decision  to  stop  die 
^fensive  until  the  latter  half  of  the  day 
on  the  19th.  .  . 

Coming  when  it  did,  the  most  signifi- 
cant effect  of  Timoshenko's  decision 
was  prohaljly  to  hasten  the  destruction 
of  the  Soviet  f  orces  in  the  Izyum  bulge. 
Relieved  their  concern  over  what 
might  happen  to  Sixth  Armv,  Hitler 
and  Bock  conferred  by  telephone  on 
tlug-Mght  of  the  19th  and  quickly 
agreed  it  would  now  be  a  good  idea  to 
try  to  accomplish  the  whole  original 
Fridericus  by  having  the  Ariaae- 
gruppe  Kleist  go  the  rest  of  the  way 
from  Petio\skoyc  to  the  Sixth  Army 
line  at  Balakleya.  As  soon  as  they  had 
finished  Bock  called  Kleist's  chief  of 
staff,  gave  him  the  gist  of  what  he  had 
talked  about  with  Hitler,  and  said  he 
wanted  Protopopovka ,  the  next  Donets 
crossing  north  of  Petrovskoye,  taken 
"under  all  circumstances  and  as  soon  as 
in  any  way  possible."^'^ 

The  14th  Panzer  Division  took  Pro- 
topopovka on  the  20th.  which  reduced 
the  mouth  of  the  bulge  between  there 
and  Balakleya  to  twelve  miles.  The 
bridgehead  was  then  eight  miles  deep 
but  only  a  mile  or  two  across.  The  III 
Panzer  Corps  main  force,  still  on  the 
westward  orientation,  gained  almost 
twelve  miles,  however,  with  disappoint- 
ing results.  TTie  object  was  to  smash 
F^smenA  Arn^  M  the  western  end  of 


•  VVAfV.  vol.  V.  p.  130;  VOV  (KntOtm  ^■ 
164:  Vasilevskiy,  Dffo.  p.  214. 
'"Bagraniyan,  Tnk  ••hit  wjy  i  jxihnir,  p.  11$. 
"Buck  Diars,  OHm  U,  Itl  May  42. 


282 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


the  biilge,  but  tlic  outer  ring  of  front 
there  was  held  hi,  Rumanian  di\  isions. 
and  ihey  showed  litde  dcternnnaiion 
and  less  enthusiasm.  One  of  the  Ruma- 
nian division  commanders  had  sent 
himself  home  on  leave  when  he  iieard 
t^ieat^jdcwas  about  to  start.  Having  an 
alternative  that  he  also  preferred, 
KJeist  began  turning  die  16lh  Panzer 
Division,  60th  Motorized  Division,  and 
1st  Mountain  Division  around  after 
dark  and  sending  them  into  the  Bereka 
bridgeheatl  behind  14th  Panzer  Divi- 
sipp.  On  Bock's  urging,  Paulus  agreed 
to  shift  the  3d  and  23d  Panzer  Divi- 
sions south  from  the  Volchansk  salient 
and  thus  partially  to  reconstitute  his 
former  Fridericus  force/*  Bock  qfo^ 
served,  "...  tonight,  I  have  given  or- 
ders aimed  at  completely  sealing  off 
the  Izyum  bulge.  Now  everything  will 
turn  out  well  after  all!"^'* 

On  die  21sl,  14Ui  Panzer  was  the  only 
division  on  the  offensive.  Ii  jumped 
north  fom-  mUes,  reducing  the  distance 
to  Balakleya  to  eight  miles.  The  next 
day,  16th  Panzer  EKvisibil  and  60th 
Motori/t'd  Division  struck  out  north- 
westward from  Petrovskoye,.  and  14th 
Panzer  DivJiaon  cdnriiiueo  n&tlh.  WAl 
before  dark,  I4th  Panzer  had  contact 
with  Sixth  Army  at  Balakleya.  £arly  the 
next  moitung,  23  d  f^nzer  Dfi^bEi  met 
16ih  Panzer  Division  ten  miles  \«i$$tllf 
Balakleya.  With  that,  14di  Panzer  Bm- 
sion%  narrow  bridgehead  was  con- 
verted into  a  ten -mile- wide  barrier 
across  the  mouth  pf  the  bulge. 

On  the  west  and  sCMttfeu  the  Soviet 
fronts  were jccdtafKdiaig  iiim^  in  two 
more  day«,  the  Sm#  and  W^-sevmUi 


^'Pz.AOK  1. 1,!  ki„i;,i„i:,-i'iuii  .\,.  .V.     Mi\  i2.  P/. 

AOK  1  24901,  hi,-;  M)K  iK  l„  Km-gatagi-kii-li  Mi.  U,  20 
May  42.  AOK  ti  22391  iik-. 
"fim/i  Diaty.         //,  2U  Ma*  42. 


Armies,  the  Bobkin  Group,  and  the  rem- 
nants ai' Xinth  Anny  were  piled  against 
the  III  Pan/ei  Corps  line.  An  attempt 
at  a  breakoiu  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
25th  carried  almost  to  Peirovskoye. 
Another,  the  next  morning,  several 
miles  to  the  north,  came  within  four 
miles  of  succeeding.  By  afternoon  on 
the  26th,  ial!  that  was  left  was  a  ten-by- 
two-mile  pocket  in  the  Bereka  Valley. 
From  a  hill  south  of  Lozovenka,  Bock 
could  see  over  almost  the  whole  of  it. 
"An  overpowering  picture,"  he  said,  as 
shells  exploded  in  the  cloud  of  smoke 
hanging  in  the  valley,  and  23d  Panzer 
Division  and  1st  Mountain  Division 
troof)s,  still  on  the  attack,  pushed  past 
crowds  of  prisoners  streaming  out  of 
the  pocket.'**' 

The  batde  ended  in  bright  sunshine 
on  the  morning  of  the  28th.  After  they 
finished  counting,  which  took  some 
^wsi  da<pf .  Arnae^gruppe  Kleist  and 
Stclh  Atmy  feund  they  had  captured 
240,000  prisoners,  over  1,200  tanks, 
and  2,(jOO  artillery  pieces.**  Severt 
teettth  Arfny,  whfdi  had  taken  over  the 
from  on  die  Donets,  observed  "with 
astonishment"  that  during  the  whole 
tfen-day  i^ttfe,  vinoaUy  no  rettef  had 
been  attempted  friMt  the  east.*-  Ae- 
cprdiog  to  Shtem6Il3k|>»  Stalin  had  told 
ilmosbenlco  and  Ktiiii^diev,  "Biit^ 
must  be  won  not  numbers  but 

by  skill.  If  you  do  not  learn  to  direct 
your  froops  better,  afl  the  sumainents 
tlie  (ountry  can  produce  will  not  be 
enough  tor  you."®^ 


■"'III,,/..  L'C)  Ma^'  i2;/>;.  AOK  I.  In  Vmiirhliui^^^,  lilnekt 
im  IJmir-Jhil^ni  7tnl!  Iiyrim.  I'/.  AOK  1  7.'ilHVfi  tilf. 

iir^ll.  Iiwm,  P/  .\(»K  f  7511ll/li  lile:  UJK  h.  In  Snwln- 
wiMiiiif:.  VI.  ^.-I>.  AOk  h  22H91/7  Hit-. 

'''AOh  17.  In  Ki,rf;-l,ig,'hmfi  X):  3.  28  Mav  42,  AOK. 
17  2-J.JIl  l  lilr- 

'^Shtciiitnko,  iuKH'l  Genet  id  Slu/J.  p.  56. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

A  Time  for  Dedsions 


A  1942  campaign — contingent  on 
how  much  was  accomplished  betore 
the  etitTiMit  op»ations  stopped  for  the 
wnter — came  within  Hitler's  range  of 
concerns  in  November  1941.  He  gave 
General  Haider,  chief  of  the  General 
Staff,  an  order  of  priorities  on  the  19th. 
First  would  come  the  Caucasus,  in 
March  and  April;  then  Vologda  and 
Gorki\.  at  the  end  of  May,  Other,  more 
distant,  objectives  would  be  set  later 
aild  would  depend  on  die  capabilities 
of  the  railroads.'  The  directive  of  8 
December,  terminating  the  1941  offen- 
sive, would  stili  ^ve  Army  Group 
South  the  tentadve  mission  of  waiidwng 
the  lower  Don  and  Donets  and  would 
urge  Army  Group  North  "to  clean  up 
the  situation"  south  oT  l  ake  Ladoga, - 
These  plans,  however,  were  only  wisps, 
already  being  buried  in  ilic  Russian 
snows.  Nevertheless,  luitil  well  into 
December,  Hitler  appears  not  to 
hav©  iMlddog  of  a  break  between 
the  two  vears'  operations,  but  insteatl 
of  mere  pauses  in  die  action,  more  or 
less  long  depending  on  location 
and  weather,  after  which  the  forces 
would  continue  in  their  previous 


^Haider  Diary,  vol.  Ill,  i>.  l'!>5. 

^OKW.  WFSt,  Ak.  L  U  op.)  Nr.  44$0mMl,  Weisimg 
files. 


Hitler  did  not  begin  to  take  account 
of  a  strategic  discontinuity  in  ihe  oper- 
ations imtil  255  Decembei,  when  he 
talked  to  General  Fromm.  the  chief  of 
Array  Armament  and  the  Replacement 
Army.  He  told  Fromm  the  army's  aim 
would  have  to  be  "to  clear  the  table"  in 
the  East  during  1942.  Fromm,  in  reply, 
told  him  the  army  would  no  longer  be 
on  a  full  war  footing  in  1942  and, 
apparently,  recommended  going  over 
to  the  4^081*6  for  the  whole  year.^ 

A  Question  of  Means 

The  Hider-Fromra  exchange  brought 
out  what  would  be  Hider's  most  per- 
vasive strategic  problem  during  1942: 
how  to  bring  his  means  into  con- 
sonance with  his  objectives.  Not  new,  it 
had  been  there  all  along,  masked  to  a 
degree  by  the  war's  early  and  easy 
successes.  In  the  past,  though,  while 
the  margins  of  strength  had  often  been 
less  than  they  later  appeared,  he  had 
always  possessed  some  elasticity.  The 
coming  year  was  going  to  be  different. 
The  capacity  to  stret<3i  would  be  gtjne. 
The  knowledge  of  that  also  was  not 
anything  new.  It  accounted  in  major 
part  for  Hitler's — and  Haider's — 
efforts  in  November  and  December  to 
blanket  as  much  as  possible  of  the 


'■'■lii'i  ('.lii'j  liff  Hem'sruestung  und  Befehhhaber  des 
Ersiiiih.ni'^.  ,l,r  C/ief  des  SiBAsi,  "Bgebt^,  2S  Dec  41^ 
CMH  \-124  file. 


§84 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


unfinished  business  of  the  war  in  the 
Soviet  Union  into  the  1941  campaign. 
:S{^)edi@cMly^  tlie  problem  iav#«ed  two 
concerns:  material  and  manpower. 

Wlien  Hider  conferred  with  Fromm, 
on  23  December,  the  army  mts  five 
moniiis  into  a  decline  that  was  in  part 
mandated.  In  Diiective  32,  of  11  June 
1941,  Hitler  had'  laid  down  requii  e- 
ments  for  the  period  after  the  victory 
in  the  East.  Since,  as  he  saw  it,  no 
serious  tlireat  would  exist  any  longer 
on  the  European  mainland,  he  had 
announced  that  the  army  would  be 
"substentially"  reduced  for  the  benefit 
of  the  air  force  and  navy,  the  senices 
that  would  henceforth  carry  the  weight 
of  the  war  against  England.^ 

A  month  later,  on  14  July,  believing 
the  victory  to  be  almost  at  hand,  he  had 
issued  an  implementat^  fefeetive;  Iftl- 
der  it,  the  main  effort  m  armament  was 
to  be  shifted  immediately  to  the  air 
force  and  navy.  The  only  production 
increases  for  the  army  would  be  in 
tanks  and  heavy  antitank  weapons. 
How  much  the  army  was  to  be  cut  back 
would  remain  to  be  detided,  hut  it 
would  have  to  start,  "at  once,"'  adjusting 
it&  re^^lamtnent  and  procairement  of 
"weapons,  ammunition,  and  equip- 
ment," to  reduced  force  levels.  Orders 
for  items  for  which  more  than  a  six 
months'  supply  stockpile  existed  were 
to  be  canceled,^ 

Firomm  reminded  Hitler  that  the 
army,  expecting  to  disband  about  fifty 
divisions,  had  since  curtailed  all  wea.p- 
oK^  pa?Odlif^»||it  Cflher  tjian  tanks  gpd 


*0KW.  WFSi.  Abt  L  (1  Op.)  Nr.  448864/41,  misung 
Nr.  3Z,  11^.41,  German  High  Level  Directives,  CMH 
files. 

HiKw.  wFSt,  Abt.  L  (u  Org.)  Nr.4fmmkism^ 

Nr,  32by  14.7M.  Geraaan  High  Lerd  I&-ectives.  CMH 
files. 


antitank  guns.  He  added,  too,  that 
even  with  the  new  allotiuents  of  non- 
ferrous  metals,  granted  jlJSt  feours  be- 
fore their  meeting,  the  army  would  be 
unable  to  complete  more  than  80  per- 
cent of  its  tank  and  antitank  weapons 
programs.^  Hider  indicated  that  he 
had  already  instructed  Dr.  Fritz  Todt, 
the  minbter  for  Armament  and  Muni- 
tions, to  restart  ammunition  produc- 
tion, and  he  told  Fromm,  "Air  Force 
and  Navy  [production]  are  now  stopped 
for  the  benefit  ot  the  Army."^ 

Tlie  stop  was  not  quite  as  fast  or  as 
complete  as  Hitler's  statement  to 
Froniin  seemed  to  imply,  but  he  did 
issue  a  supplementary  directive,  "Ar- 
mament 1942,"  on  10  January  1942.  It 
upheld  \  h<r  air  force  and  navy  buildups, 
"in  liie  long  v  iew."  while  specifying  that 
the  changed  war  situation  "for  thetitaie 
being  prohibits  a  decline  in  Army  ar- 
mament." The  army  was  to  be  gnaian- 
teed  a  four  months'  stockpile  of 
general  supplies  by  1  May  1942  and,  in 
ammunition,  one  basic  load  plus  six 
times  the  total  August  1941  eo9iS£iffi|h' 
tion  in  all  categories.  In  ariQanienf, 
"preference"  was  to  be  given  to  the 
"elevated  requirements  of  tlie  Army,"® 
The  man  to  whom  the  job  of  exectiting 
the  directive  fell  was  Albert  Speer,  who 
replaced  Ibdt  on  8  February,  the  day 
the  latter  was  killed  in  an  airplane 
crash.  Speer's  appointment,  as  it 
turned  out,  was  going  to  have  several 
advantages:  Speer  very  quicklv  dis- 
played a  high  talent  as  a  production 
organiser;  1^  had  flitler's  confidence; 


'Cktf  H.  RuesU  and  BdE,  Slab  OKH.  Nr.  mmi, 
Nodxen  ueimr  \kriragbidm  futhreram  2SJ2A1, 28,12.41, 

m^/^im^Mum  Jmiea^a,  1969).  pp.  61-64. 


A  TIME  FOR  DECISIONS 


285 


and  he  managed  to  aaiuire  more  an- 
thority  than  his  predecessor  had  had. 

Nevmheless,  neither  a  (£a^i£l^e  nor 
the  promise  of  its  lirilUant  execution 
could  circumvent  the  hard  .ferities 
pressing  in  on  all  sides.  The  Gemoans 
[kkI  inn  the  194 1  campaign  on  stock- 
piles ui  supplies  accumulated  be- 
forehand. By  November,  they  had 
almost  exhausted  these,  and  from  tlien 
on,  they  had  had  to  provide  for  their 
aniiies  in  the  Soviet  Union,  of  £121^ 
rent  production,  which,  even  with^HIt 
the  cutbacks  made  during  the  summer, 
would  have  been  insufficient  to  keep 
them  adequately  supplied.  Some  kinds 
ol  artillery  ammunition  hatl  been  run- 
iUF^  ^prL  Ixm  dian  one  in  three 
Wegc  tiito  thousand  tanks  and  self-pro- 
pdOed  assault  guns  lost  had  been  re- 
placed.^ Trucks  smA  #£her  motor 
vehicles  Iiad  been  worn  OUt,  destroyed, 
or  broken  down  in  stich  numbers  and 
their  |>ioduction  mt  l)ack  so  far  that 
Haider  had  toUl  die  cinefs  of  staff  at 
the  Orsha  Conference  that  same 
month  that  the  in  la  11  try  division  would 
have  to  be  completely  tlemotorized . 

In  December  and  January,  Hitler 
had  counted  on  a  several  months' 
pause  in  the  fighting,  dining  which 
consumption  would  clecline  and  |)ro' 
duction  could  catdi  up.  'What  he  was 
going  to  get  was  vast  new  wastage  of  all 
kinds  of  equipment  during  the  winter 
and  spring  batik  s  fhe  fl<nv  from  the 
pipelines  would  ha\  e  to  be  strong  just 
to  keep  up,  much  less  get  aJiead,  and  it 
would  have  to  draw  from  a  depleted 
reservoir.  Electric  out  jiut  in  Ger- 
many was  cut  Ijack  more  llian  20  per- 
cent in  January  to  conserve  coal;  even 
SO,  production  of  iron  and  steel  in 


»fykiSi^t4t^Makau,  ft.  114. 


tonnages  declined  in  die  first  tjuarter 
of  1942.  Nonferrous  metals,  par- 
ticularly alumihum  and  copper,  ra- 
tioned since  September  1941.  conld  not 
be  supplied  to  some  high-priority  in- 
ditstnes  in  the  allotted  quantities.'" 

The  most  pervasive  deficiency  was  in 
manpower.  The  laciories  needed  men 
and  so  did  the  army,  and  after  the 
campaign  lugan  in  the  Soviet  Union, 
either  one  could  only  get  more  men  at 
the  other's  expense.  At  least  half  of  the 
Jul\  dire(  ti\  es  jinrpose  bad  been  to  get 
skilled  \\orkers  out  of  uniform  and 
back  into  the  shops.  A  million  and  a 
half  had  been  needed.  As  planned,  the 
army  reduction  would  have  sup[jlicxl  a 
Iialf  inilUon."  By  January,  that  pros- 
pect had  vanished  (ompletelv.  On  die 
5th,  Fromm  had  told  bis  senior  gener- 
als in  the  Replacement  .A.rmy,  "We  be- 
lieved we  would  be  able  to  put  500.000 
men  ba(  k  into  industry.  Now  we  will 
have,  instead,  to  take  600,000  men 
ou!,"'-  For  the  most  part,  however,  the 
loss  to  the  labor  force  would  not  be 
translated  into  a  net  intreasein  fight- 
ing strength.  The  ( )KH  was  committed 
to  supply  500,000  replacements  for  the 
Eastern  Front  by  1  April  and  expected 
If)  need  340, 000  more  h\  1  June.'-'  In 
the  14  July  directive,  HiUcr  had  wanted 
to  delay  calling  up  the  men  Ixjrn  in 
1922.  That  resolve  had  only  lasted  until 
October.^"*  By  February,  virtualb  all  of 
the  1922  class  was  al  the  front  01  w  fxild 
be  there  "before  ihc  1942  [offensive] 
operations  begin,"  and  the  OKH  was 


'Vbid..  pp.  2»t-m 
''Ibid.,  p.  39. 

"£)i?r  CAgT  dn  Heemrutstttng  und  Befehhhabgt  its 
EmabJieeres,  der  Chtf  its  Slabes,  Tagebuth.  5  JaR  42, 

cMil  ^-mm. 

1^0^.  Gti^HM,  Org.        Kne^tagtbuch.  1-5  Jan 
and  lS-22  Feb  42.  H  I/21S  fife, 
^^Rdnbardt,  Mmkau,  p.  40. 


2m 


MOSCOW  ro  STALINGRAD 


preparing  to  start  taldng  iix  the  1923 
class.** 

An  Offfmme  in  Ute  Sm&i 

Hitler  knew  in  N<>\fniber  1941  that, 
in  all  likelihood,  he  would  be  lied  down 
in  Lite  Soviet  Union  during  the  coming 
year,  and  he  knew  that  he  would  not 
have  tlie  resources  to  mount  another 
general  offensive  like  Barbarossa. 
Nonetheless,  he  at  ni<  fnuf  iiliowcd 
those  considerations  or  the  mischances 
of  the  winter  to  sway  him  from  ^  early 
turn  to  the  at  tack  w  ith  as  muchfOK^as 
he  could  assemble.  I  he  direc^vfi  of  8 
December  1941  set  as  one  of  its  three 
objectives  "a  basis  foi-  the  lesumption 
of  larger  offensive  operations  in  1942," 
with  the  otJier  tMi  oeuaig-^  bblii 
territory  alreaiiy  tafccaa  »nd  t®  rest  and 
refit  the  armies  in  the  East,  Hie  direc- 
tive specified  a  drive  into  the  Caucasus 
in  the  spring  and  a  "dcaivup"  around 
Leningrad  and  south  oi  Lake  Ladoga 
"when  T^mmmthi&  arrive.""  On 
the  20th,  wheshewas  having  to  revise 
his  instrucuons  im  resting  and  refit- 
ling.  Hitler  remarlced  that  Itely,  Hun- 
gary, and  Riunania  were  gnint^  to  be 
"induced"  to  furnish  strong  foi  ces  in 

1942  and  to  have  liieaa  mdy  to  be 

brought  east  "befofpftiefftow  melts."'' 
Three  days  later,  fee  Ojder^  Fromm  to 
set  up  half-a*dca!en  new  divisions  h) 
spring  for  an  ofleiisi\e  to  Rostov  and 
Maykop."*  On  3  January,  he  told  the 

'  ■OKI I.  (..nSitlH,  Oti'.  Ak..  KrifgstagrbmK  10- 13 
ami  ir>-2*J  W>42.  H  l/*213fLk-. 

"VKW.  Uf.S(.  Abl.  L  (/  Op.}  Nr.  4420901'! I.  Weisung 
Nr.  is,  aJ2.4!,  Gwman  X«m!  Oiwctivia,  CMH 
files. 

"Haldn  Dam.  viil.  Ill,  p.  561. 

Chi  Heertsiueshtng  und  Befehlshaber  des 
t.tuiizhrrv,-'..  <M  At  Alote.  ISgjAfM*,  23  Dec  41, 
CMH  X- 124  flic. 


Japanese  Ambassador,  Ck  iicral  Hirosi 
Oshtma,  that  he  did  not  cotuemplate 
any  more O^nsives  in  the  t  enter  of  the 
German  front  in  the  Soviet  Union  but 
would  concentrate  on  the  south,  the 
Caucasus,  "as  soon  as  the  weather  is 
better.""'  On  the  iHth,  he  gave  Field 
Marshal  Botk  two  missions  for  Army 
Group  South:  "to  hold  lor  the  present 
and  attack  in  the  spring."'"  During  the 
winter  he  often  talked  longingly  about 
campaigning  season  to  come,  and 
in  March,  making  it  clear  that  the  main 
effort  henceforth  would  be  elsewhere, 
he  began  leaving  Army  Groups  North 
and  Center  to  shift  for  themselves. 

Aldiough  Hitler  was  unswervingly 
determined  to  ha\  e  an  ofiensive  on  the 
souUi  flank  in  l'.M2.  the  planning,  par- 
ticularly as  compared  to  die  elaborate 
work  done  on  Barbarossa  the  year 
before,  appears  to  have  been  almost 
desultory.  OKH  instructions,  sent  on  15 
February,  dealing  with  procedures  to 
be  i'ollovved  during  the  raspudtsa,  al- 
luded "in  very  broad  terms"  to  opera- 
tions "contemplated"  later  in  the 
spring  -'  On  the  20th,  Bock  sent  Hitler, 
"on  Haiders  suggestion,"  a  memot^- 
dum  on  the  probable  situation  m  die 
spring  and  die  conduct  of  an  offensive. 
Eleven  flays  later,  Haider  said  WfAet 
had  the  memorandnm  but  had  not  read 
it  be<  ause  he  had  ''so  litde  time  lor  ex- 
amining 1  ar-reaching  operation*."** 
Haider  talked  to  his  branch  chiefs  on  6 
March  aboin  rebuilding  the  Eastern 
Front  armies,  particularly  thoise  ^< 


"Hans-Adolf  Jacobsen,  !93<f-1945,  Dn  Zweite 
Weltkriegin  Chronik  und  Di,kii»i,-t,tr)i  (Daniisiadl;  Wchr 

Wwiea  Vetfepgesellschaft.  1961).  p.  288. 
Stj  I  Mar  42. 


A  TIME  FOR  DECISIONS 


287 


would  be  on  the  offensive.*'  On  th& 
15tli,  in  his  annual  Memorial  Day 
(H eldengedenktag)  address  in  Berlin,. 
Hitler,  in  effect,  dosedtihelKiiQiks-oa'^i^ 
winter  and  promised  to  wxeak  unspec- 
ified destruction  on  "the  Bolshevik  co- 
h)SSi£$''iD  the  coming  summer.^* 

After  mifl-Marcii,  the  pace  of  the 
planning  did  pick  up.  On  the  18di,  die 
OKH  assigned  a  code  name,  Siegfrjed, 
to  the  summer  offensive.  Haider  and 
his  staff  went  to  work  on  the  deploy- 
ment, which  they  at  first  thought  would 
take  imtil  August  but  later  esrimated 
could  be  mosdy  completed  by  the  end 
of  the  first  week  in  July  with  some  ele- 
ments left  to  come  as  late  as  August. 
Haider  took  the  deployment  plan  to 
Hitler  on  the  28th,  and  in  the  subse- 
quent discussion,  Hitler  gave  him  the 
objectives  for  the  offensive  and  instruc- 
tions for  it.s  execution. The  OKW 
Operations  Staff,  in  its  capacity  as 
Hitler's  personal  staff,  took  the  results 
■land  worked  them  into  a  draft  directive, 
which  Hider  signed  on  5  April  after 
"heavily  revising"  and  adding  "substan- 
tial new  parts"  to  it.  In  the  intj@njll,  he 
had  also  dropped  the  code  name  Sieg- 
fried and  substituted  Blau  ("blue").^" 

Tlie  directive,  Weisung  41,  in  some- 
what ambivalent  teraas,  gave  two  objec- 
tives- for  the  summer;  to  destroy  the 
Soviet  Union's  defensive  strength  "con- 
clusively" and  to  deprive  it  of  the  re- 
sources necessary  for  its  war  economy 
"as  far  as  possible."  The  "general  in- 
tent" would  be  to  bring  about  the  fall  of 


-'Hnhin  Dmn.  vol.  Ml,  |).  411), 

"Domains,  vol.  IJ.  p.  18;50. 

'^^OKH,  GmStdll.  Op.  .\hl.  Nr.  ■I20IIUI42.  l,S.7.42. 
H22  ai.'j  tile:  Hiilihr  Duin.  vol.  111.  pp.  SIG,  417. 
420-21. 

-VKW.  Stdlv.  WFSt,  Krifgsgeschtchtlichr  AbleiLiing, 
Krieg.'.tai;,'lmrh,  L4.-30.6A2.  tand  S  Apr  42,  1M,T. 
1807  fUe. 


heim^^  smdi.  10  br^k  into  the  Cau- 
casus area.  The  main  effort  would  be 
on  the  south  flank  where  the  aims 
would,  be  to  destroy  the  enemy  forces 
forward  of  the  Don  River,  lake  the 
Caucasus  oil  area,  and  gain  posses.sion 
<rf"  the  Caucasus  crossings.  Tlie  action 
against  Leningrad  would  be  held  in 
abeyance  pending  favorable  circum- 
stances or  availability  offerees.-' 

Although  much  of  Directive  41  can 
be,  and  in  some  accounts  virtually  all  of 
it  has  been,  attributed  directly  to  Hider, 
the  plan  for  executing  the  offensive 
appears  to  have  been  derived  from  the 
memorandum  Bock  had  submitted  in 
February.  In  it,  he  and  the  Army 
Group  South  staff  had  maintained  that 
a  drive  into  the  Caucasus  would  first 
have  to  be  covered  on  the  north  and 
east  by  advances  that  would  extend  the 
front  east  of  Kursk  ninety  miles  to 
Voronezh  and  tlience  southeast  along 
the  Don  River  to  the  vicinity  of  Sta- 
lingrad, a  distance  of  close  to  three 
hundred  miles  at  the  latitude  of  Sta- 
lingrad, lb  go  that  far  in  one  sweep  on 
a  front,  ewer  three-hundred-and-fifty 
miles  long  would  have  required  more 
strength  than  Bock  could  imagine  hav- 
ing in  the  spring  or  summer  of  1942. 
Consequently,  he  had  projected  a 
phased  offensive.  The  first  phase 
would  carry  east  to  the  Don  between 
Voronezh  and  Novaya  Kalitva,  provid- 
ing cover  on  the  north.  (Map  25.)  In  the 
second  phase,  the  armor  used  in  the 
first  woiild  move  southeast  from  Novaya 
Kalitva  toward  the  lower  Don 
while  the  armv  gioup's  right  flank 
drove  east  to  Rostov  and  the  Don.  A 
diird  phase  would  then  be  required  to 


'-'OKW,  WFSt.  Sr.  "^^616142,  Wei.uiiig  41. 
Ijennau  High  Level  Dii-ecdves.  CMH  files. 


28S 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


PLAN  FOR  SUMMER  OFFENSIVE 
ARMY  GROUP  SOUTH 
19  February  1942 
-  Front  line,  18  Febfuary 
Pranunmar  HminKt  i 


-PtifM  1  opwathm 


MAPZy 


take  possession  of  the  Don  bend  and 
the  narrows  between  the  Don  and  the 
Volga  west  of  Staliiigrafl.  Bock  had 
believed  hm  WOuld  need  eighty-iive  di- 
viaons  at  the  start,  tfrffty-fline  thot^ 
(han  lie  had  had  in  Februarv  IT)  12. 
Because  he  could  not  see  where  tlie 
di^^ons  wooW  come  frem  on  consid- 
ering  the  condition  of  the  railroads, 
how  they  would  get  deployed  in  time. 


he  had  described  the  memorandum  as 
a  *thcoreti(^  inquiry  toto  the  opera- 
tional possiliilities."-'* 

Diiective  41  took  the  device  oi  die 
phsfted  offettMve  fmm  the  Boek  mem- 
orandum.  keeping  the  progression 
from  iioi  ih  to  south  Imt  altering  the 


-'[h'f  ()l,r,l»'l,/ihh/ihn  ,ln  II  f.t.  S,„-,l.  In  Nr.  276/42, 
lifli:  l-inll!iiliniii!f  ilrt  (>lin/itui!i  nil  Sommtf  1942^ 
19.2.42,  MS  P-il4c,  pt.  111.  GMH  files. 


A  TIME  FOK  DECISIONS  289 


MAP  26 


distribution.  The  iirst  two  phases,  sub- 
sequently kn&mt  m  BtAtT  I  and  Biau 
II,  by  (.arrying  the  advance  between 
the  Donets  and  Don  to  tiie  vicinity  of 
MiEl^OVO,jQ»nly  sUghtly  enlarged  ©ti  tiie 
first  ply^  proposed  in  the  memoran- 
dltm^  MlMI  III,  on  the  other  hand, 
tmAWt^  the  ^ifrd  plase  proposed  in 
the  memorandum  by  merging  it  with 
tlie  second  phase  to  complete  the  drive 


to  Stalingrad.  A  "Blau  IV,"  the  advance 
teto  the  Gatjcastis,  was  imphdt  in  the 
direrrive  but  not  described.  (Map  26.) 

The  rearrangement  of  tlie  phases, 
fer  fr&m  fe^djag'  mtt^y  cmm&tx  &f  a 
matter  of  tactical  taste,  was  for  several 
reasons  the  actual  heart  of  the  plan. 
V&T  me,  tt  wmM  ki  Bla©  lie  mn  ©ft  a 

feasible  schedule.  The  deployment,  as 
Bock  had  pointed  out  in  the  memoran- 


290 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


dum,  was  going  to  be  difficult  and  slow, 
and  it  would  be  most  difficvilt  and 
slowest  on  the  south.  In  their  com- 
p^pssfed  form,  however.  Blau  1  could 
be  completed  and  Bi.al  II  he  started 
and  brought  well  along  while  troops 
and  material  for  Blau  III  were  still 
being  deployed.  Secondh,  B1.AI'  was 
going  10  depend  hea\"ih  on  young, 
inexpei  ienced,  hastily  trained  troops. 
A  small  Bi  AL'  1  and  an  only  somewhat 
larger  Blau  II  would  give  oppor- 
tunities to  buUd  experience  and  con- 
fidence, particularly  confidence.  As 
Hider  put  it,  "The  operation  must  start 
with  success:  yoiuig  troops  cannot  be 
exposed  to  setbacks.  Setbacks  must  not 

Finally,  the  object  of  the  summer 
campaign  would  be  not  just  to  advance 
but  to  destroy  the  Soviet  forces  while 
doing  so.  Hitler  believed  this  had  to  be 
done  by  small,  tight  encirclements.  The 
sweeping  fflaneuvers  of  the  previous 
summer,  he  maintained,  had  let  too 
many  of  the  enemy  get  away.  The  Blau 
operations,  he  said,  were  designed  So 
that  "in  each  one  of  these  attacks  the 
ground  and  air  forces  can  achieve  the 
highest  degree  of  concentration  at  the 
decisive  points."^" 

Obliquely,  Directive  41  also  ad- 
dresfsed  the  gues^n  of  forces  raised  in 
the  Rock  metnorandum.  In  a  post- 
script to  tfai:  li^ierational  plan,  it  as- 
signed tiie  lorig  stationary  front  that 
would  develop  on  the  Don  below  Voro- 
nezh to  the  allies — Hungarians  on  the 
north,  Italians  in  the  center,  and  Ru- 
manians on  the  southeast.  The  deploy- 
ment was  significant  because  the  Hun- 


-WaW-'i  llnin;         HI.  [),  420. 

H'fsV.        =i=>hlhll2.  Wfmiii«  -II.  SAM, 
German  High  Level  Dii  etiivts,  CMH  files. 


garians  and  Rumanians,  who  would 
rather  ha\  e  fought  each  other  than  (he 
Russians,  cotild  not  be  stationed  in  ad- 
jacent sectoi  s.  All  three  Wiayld  have  to 
be  backstopped  by  German  cli\isi<»is, 
but  many  fewer  of  those  would  be 
needed  than  if  die\  had  to  man  the 
whole  line  alone.  Hitler,  who  bad  not 
particularly  w^elcomecl  allied  participa- 
tion in  the  1941  campaign,  had  let  Field 
Mai\shal  Keitel.  chief  of  the  OKW,  do 
the  recruiting  during  tlie  winten  Hun- 
ga;!^,  jigiailDus  at  earlier  German  favor- 
itism toward  Rumania,  had  been  the 
slowest  to  "volunteer."  Italy  had  been 
the  most  willing  because  the  Duce,  Be- 
nito Mussolini,  had  wanted  since  June 

1941  to  have  his  troops  participate  in 
the  defeat  of  communism.*'  The  allied 
troops  were  not  trained  or  armed  for 
fighting  on  the  Eastern  Front,  and  they 
were  especially  weak  in  armor  and  anti- 
tank weapons.  Their  sense  of  commit- 
ment and  endurance  also  was  doubtful, 
and  Hitler's  instructions  were  "to  hold 
them  to  die  cause"  by  showing  them 
"fanatical  loyalty"  and  by  being  "un- 
stilntlQgly  geiaerous"  with  praise.** 

MMef*S  Resdess  Spring 

The  coming  of  spring  in  Russia  in 

1942  gave  Hitler  time  to  turn  to  other 
affairs:  relations  with  the  allies,  the 
defense  of  the  Atlantic  perimetei  ,  and 
the  home  front.  On  6  April,  the  Ruma- 
nian Chief  of  the  Genei  al  Staff,  Gen- 
eral IHa  Steflea,  visited  the  Woljsschanw, 
and  in  the  last  week  of  iflie  month. 


**Wjlker  VViii  hiMDiK,  Im  Hinij^tqnnylirr  tiri  tlftil\f  hn( 
Wehrmacht,  19?9-l')-lJ  ( I'Tankfm  t:  Bernard  &  Gr;ica-. 
1962).  p.  244;  Waller  Gaerliu,  ed,.  The  Mnmin  uj 
liM-MnnhoJ  K0it(l  lUmrV^^  ^^  WbA  D^y.  1966), 
[)p.  171-715. 

■'-OKW.  Slelh.  Wh'Sl,  Kni-fr.^ge'.iltii/dluhc  Ahlfilmig, 
Knc.giUigfbuch,  l.4-30.b.-l2,  5  jiin  42,  LM.T.  1807  file. 


HiTLER-s  "Young"  Troops  on  the  March 


Mussolini  came  to  Salzburg.  In  be- 
tween, Hitler  conferred  decorations  on 
the  president  of  Finland,  the  king  of 
Bidgaria.  the  "field  marshal"  oi 
Croatia,  and  Admiral  Miklos  Horthy, 
the  «!^nt  of  Hungary,"  Some  weeks 
Inter,  on  4  June,  Hitler  made  a  surprise 
trip  bv  air  U)  Finland  to  congtaiulate 
Marshal  Mannerheim,  comiii.uulei  in 
chief  of  the  I  nmish  Army,  on  his  sev- 
eniy-fiftli  birihday. 

Hitlei"  had  fretted  endlessi)  through- 
out the  winter  about  possible  Anglo- 
American  landings  on  the  Atlantic 
^ontien  That  bad  l^een  oim  of  the. 
reasons  for  sending  General 
Falkenhorsl,  commander  of  the  Army 


''Domariis,/7(///7.  vol.  11,  pp.  1860-62. 


of  Norway,  back  to  Norway.  It  had  also 
moli\aied  a  train  ot  orders  on  coastal 
defense  and,  in  February,  the  dash 
through  the  English  Channel  by  the 
warships  Scharn/iorst,  Gueiseuau .  and 
Prinz  Eugen,  wMch  were  supposed  to 
haye  gone  on  t()  Norwegian  bases. 
HiUer  had  already  sent  the  battleship 
Tirpi^,  C^frinanys  largest  and  one  oE 
the  most  powerful  in  the  world,  to 
Trondheim  in  Januai  \.  In  February,  he 
had  assigned  Generalfeldmarschall 
^\'ilhelln  List  to  inspet  t  the  defi'iises  of 
Nor\va\  and  northern  Finland.  Direc- 
tive 40,  of  23  Mat  ch,  dealt  entirely  with 
coastal  defense,  and  a  British  raid  on 
the  nayal  base  at  St.  Na/aite  had 
prompted  a  shake-up  of  the  commands 
in  the  West.  Titlking  to  Mussolini,  on  30 
April,  Hitler  dwelled  at  length  on  the 


292 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


dangers  of  British  landings  in  Norway 
or  France  and  supposed  Swedish  and 
■Wchy-French  hostility.^"* 

The  winter  was  over  but  ni»t  forgot- 
ten,  and  Hider  decided  to  give  an 
accounting  to  the  German  people  an 
ilie  afternoon  of  Sunday,  26  April.  T]ie 
forum  he  chose  was  the  Reidutag, 
which  having  provided  the  stage  for 
several  anthenlic  victoi  y  spcet  lies,  ^sas 
now  to  furnish  the  window  dressing  for 
a  somewhat  spiHious  one.  He  had  no 
conquests  to  claim.  Instead,  lie  under- 
took to  elevpte  the  •winter  campa^n  to 
a  triumph  over  the"  det»ents»  fee 
embellished  with  compari^QJlS 
Napoleons  experience  in  1812.  Me  said 
a  batde  had  been  fought  during  the 
winter  that  had  raised  problems  "far 
exceeding  what  should  or  could  be 
expected  in  normal  ware,"  and  he  gave 
himself  credit  for  having  confronted, 
"with  my  own  person,  what  destiiiy 
appeafed'to  hia^e  tn  store  for  us.*** 

Goebbefei  tijc  Germa!i  iM(.)|3agaiKla 
minister  ^le^the  speech  a  resounding 
success,^*  Count  (yis^ESffk&  Oiano,  the 
Iralianfi^eign  niinisCer,  fer  less  an  ad- 
mirer jHider  tha^lt  Goebbels  was, 
found  che  tone  *not  very  optimisdc," 
nod  observed,  "...  there  is  not  a  hint 
of  what  all  are  waiting  for — die  endiiig 
of  the  ^^ar.*^''  What  straclt  Qimfo  pai^ 
ticularly  was  thai  Hitler  apparently 
took  for  granted  a  second  winter  of 
•mt  M  the  Seviet  Union,  and  he  was 
sparing,  for  him  almost  dilTidcnt.  in  his 
predictions  for  the  coming  summer.  In 


'  ^LRensttutnder  AdjulanI  (Sclitnundi),  Bertcht  uebn  Be- 
iprechujigam3U.-i.-l2.  CMH  X-IOlO  file. 

"Domarus, //!(/<•).  vol.  [I,  pp.  1867-71. 

'■LoaisP.  LcKhner,  ed.,Tke  Gorbbels  Diaries  (Garden 
fStJ-:  nonblcday  &  Cii.,  1948).  pp.  191-93. 

"'Hugh  Gibson,  cd.,  Th^  Cinni  Diarm  <GaufdlettC%: 
noubkday  Sc  Co.,  1946)  p.  476. 


contrast,  he  talked  at  length  about  what 
he  would  do  to  be  ready  for  the  next 
winter  "no  matter  where  it  finds  us."^' 
For  the  first  time,  Hitler  was  hedgix^ 
on  )m  own  strategic  initiative. 

"The  speech  also  did  not  impress 
Ciano,  "because  by  now  all  his  speeches 
are  more  or  less  alike."  Ciano  noted 
that  Hider  had  asked  for  additional 
p|)vver^  (which,  of  course,  were 
granted)  but  dismissed  that  as  merely  a 
dramatic  gesture  since  Hider  already 
possessed  complete  power.''*'  What 
Ciano,  and  probably  most  oUier  out- 
siders, did  not  catch  was  that  Hider^s 
ret[uest  was  aimed  at  a  group  over 
which  he  did  not  yet  have  complete 
power,  namely,  the  German  generals. 
.A.ldiough  Hitler  at  one  point  spoke  of 
his  confidence  in  "my . . .  Reichs  Mar-^ 
shal,  fi<S3''marsihafls>  it^wnt^s,  colonel 
generals,  and  nuni@^0¥ls  other  com- 
manders at  the  fronts,"  in  odier  pas- 
sages, he  barely  took  the  trouble  to 
conceal  his  displeasure  widi  the  genet- 
als.  He  shared  the  credit  he  gave  bun- 
self  for  the  winter  campaign  with  the 
soldiers,  noncommissioned  officers, 
and  officers  "up  to  those  generals  who, 
recognizing  the  danger,  risked  then- 
own  lives  to  tugc  tlic  soldier  onward." 
Elsewhere,  he  remarked  diat  he  had 
been  *Ssmpelled  to  rtitetvmst  severely 
in  a  few  individual  cases  where  nerves 
gave  way,  discipline  broke  down,  or 
mstifHcient  sense  of  duty  was  dis- 
plaved."''"  'lalking  to  Spccr,  some  weeks 
later,  he  said  "almost  all"  of  the  gener- 
als had  Mled  Mm  dtiMiig  rkie  winter.*^ 

The  request  for  more  powers — 
which  was,  of  course,  granted — while 


»*Domarus,H!7/fr.  vol.  II,  p.  1873. 
^"Gibson,  Ciann  Diariis.  p.  476. 
*°DomarLis, /////fc.  mj!.  II,  pp.  1872-73, 
**Baelcke,  Riu:\lung,  p,  127. 


A  TIME  FOR  DECISIONS 


293 


ostensibly  motivated  by  a  recent  court 
decision  on  a  civilian  case,  was  put  in 
i^tm  tiiat  cmild  ftot  kavt  heta  fost  on 

the  generals.  Hitler  asked  for,  "...  an 
explicit  confirmation  that  I  have  the 
legal  right  to  hold  m0ief^(m  to  the 
fulfillnieni  of  liis  duty  andtoyeduce  to 
the  common  ranks  or  t&0X^e  from 
past  aind'  jK^ation,  ii^thmit  PcSgaani  &r 
aOEjuired  rights  or  status,  anyone  whom 
I  iftjtd  not  to  have  done  his  duty."*^  lb 
iGScj^bels,  Hitler  reiBarked  afterv^atl 
tibat  he  was  determined  "to  Invoke 
%h^fp&c  measures  against  certain  types 

44%!^  ^^ae«^y  Reichstag  session, 
IBt^  "vm^  mH3^  to  meet  Mussolini  at 
§feiiiiliarg  aiid  spent  several  daeys  at  the 
Serghof,  liis  Bavarian  retreat,  and  re- 
ttO'ped  to  the  Wbl/ssclianze  on  3  May.  He 
ftid  &»tended  lo  ^stcStioii  Ibngea-  at  f3ie 
Berghof  but  had  cut  his  stay  short  be- 
cause of  snow,  which  he  claimed  he 
ceroid  fiot  st£tfiid  BtgiiC  of  after  the 
last  winter.  He  was  restless,  and  in  May, 
he  made  several  excursions  to  Berlin. 
On  I  June;  ht'mskwlkiiM^h^esiSi^a^ 
ters  in  Poltava  to  congratulate  the  army 
commanders  on  the  Kharkov  battle.^* 
Three  days  tafer,  ^  was  in  Fiii^id  on 
the  birthday  visit  to  Mannerheka.  On 
the  8th,  he  went,  aboard  his  private 
train,  via  Berlin  to  theBergfu^  to  com- 
plete his  interrupted  vacation  and  did 
not  return  to  the  Wilfsschanze  untU  the 
24tb. 

Gerntan  Strategic  Estimates 
Men,  Firepower,  and  Mobility 

While  Hider  was  occupied  with  plans 


*'Jkiaamis,  Hitler,  vol.  II.  p.  1874. 
**Lochner,  GoeiAefc  Diancs,  p.  192. 
"Sot*  Z&ry.  Oskn  II,  i  J  an  42. 


the  OKH  was  engaged  in  compiling  a 
document  that  began  as  a  precursor  to 
IMfecdve  41  and  e«pt;itttially  became  a 
subsidian  companion  piece  lo  ii.  On  19 
March,  tbe  OKW  had  announced  that 
it  pi  cjposed  to  compile  an  estimate  of 
the  Wehrrnacht'f.  sri  cngtli  for  the  spring 
of  1942  and  asked  tlie  armed  services 
to  supply  datav**  The  first  army 
mission  at  the  end  of  the  mon^  had 
been  a  gloomy  recital.  During  the 
wrinter,  the  forces  on  the  Eastern  Front 
had  lost  nearly  7,000  artillery  pieces 
ranging  from  37-mm.  anutank  guns  to 
glO-mm.  howitzers.  The  new  prGfliii> 
tion,  restarted  in  Januarv,  could  not 
replace  more  than  part  of  them.  Of 
dose  to  75,000  motor  Cransptsrt  "^dM- 
cles  lost,  only  7,500  had  been  replaced; 
another  25,000  could  be  secured  in 
(j^eTmm%  btft  ffee  absolute  deftcil 
would  still  be  42,500.  More  than 
179,000  horses  had  died,  and  only 
20,000  new  animals  had  been  secnrea. 
The  176  million  gallons  of  motor  fuel 
and  390,000  tons  of  amniuiiition  con- 
isltmed  had  cut  deep  into  the  stockpiles, 
which  would  therefore  be  propor- 
tionately smaller  in  1942.  The  con- 
dnsimi  iwaSi  *^rbg  sbdmge&  iGantiotj  ifefr 
tlie  time  being,  be  covered  by  new 
production  or  by  rebuilding.  This  will 
compel  cutbacks  and  sharp  emphasis 
on  priorities  in  all  areas. "^^ 

Five  weeks  later,  die  OKH  refined  its 
^©SciMatfe  to  eliminate  what  it  pro- 
nounced {intemalh)  to  be  "nonsense" 
in  an  OKW  draf  t  simimary  and  to  take 


*'OICW.  WFSt,  Org.  (I).  Zusiimiiciil^iisrnde  DarsleUung 
ier  Wehrkraft  im  Fniehjahr  1942,  19.3A2.  H  1  382  file. 

*^OKH,  OenStdH.  Gen.  QuJQuJ.  Nr.  18270142, 
Dantdhng  der  V^krcft  der  Wekmrneht-fim  iM2  dureh 
OKW.  31JA2,  H  1 382  HiC. 


294 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


nu  iiis  established  by  Dfireetlve  41/^ 
The  result  was  a  mixed  picttKre  or  as 
the  OKH  pat  it,  a  ''revievP  df  efforts 
iuul  accomplishments,  taking  into  ac- 
count also  certain  iiTemediable  deh- 
dentdes/'  Of  the  latter,  two  imste 

mmeMaxcU  acme:  the  inabilitv  of  the 
industrial  switchover  to  army  j|)roduc- 
rfon  made  in  J&noary  to  he  effective 

before  the  start  of  llie  1942  sunniici 
campaign  and  the  pressures  the  winter 
had  imposed  o»  itiieu,  material,  and 

linn  Thtv  were  affecting  short-term 
readiness.  Two  other,  the  strain  on  raw 
materials  and  the  mutually  mtemcting^ 
civilian  and  miliian  manpower  shori- 
ageSt  affected  tlie  short-  and  long-term 
re^ditiess.  lb  relate  the  "«et3omplish- 
ments"  and  the  deficiencies,  the  OKH 
expanded  the  estimate  to  include 
"striking  power^  (Schlngkraft)  as  wetl  as 
conventional  force  strength. 

Under  the  hrst  category  of  die  three 
ooiifide^ed»4aen,  firepowei^,  and  mt)^ 
bility— the  estimate  ga\e  the  arm\"s 
"strictly  numerical"  strength  (in  terms 
of  diviiioins)  as  of  1  May  1M2  as  greatm* 
than  that  of  June  1941  by  7  infantry 
and  3  panzer  divisions  with  4  more 
infantry  divisions  to  come  before  late 
June  1942.'"'  On  ihe  other  hand,  even 
though  die  Eastern  Front  had  received 
LI  imlEon  replaeements  sine&St  June 
1941,  it  was  short  625,000  raoi  as  of  1 


"The  OKW  draii  has  iioi  been  found,  RefereRC« 
lo  it  are  in  OKH.  GtnSldH.  Org.  Abt.  Nr.  3t89(i2, 

10.5.42.  H  1  382  file. 

■•"On  S  April  1941.  Miildci  had  proposed  eliniiniil- 
ing  Iwo  flivisions  Iwcaiise  tlicy  only  cxislt'd  on  paper, 
.iml  lliilci  liad  refused.  OKW.  KTB.  vol.  II,  pi.  2.  p. 

I  7.  .\i  ihe  Orsha  Ojnfeix'iiit  in  November  1941,  the 
rliic-l  oC  the  Organizalioual  Biaiuh,  OKH,  liad  iiilkwl 
al)cmt  disbanding  eleven  divisions  on  ihc  Easleni 
hioiil  m  bring  die  odiers  up  to  Mtfiiglh,  TTiai  al.so  had 
ncil  Ijeen  tUnie.  H.  Gr.  Sittti,  Dei  Uiej  di's  Gftierahlaben , 
lo  ,Vr.  21323MI,  Vortngitntta,  17.ti.ii,  AOK  6 
181117  Ble. 


May  1942.  Armv  Group  .South  had  ,'50 
percent  ol  its  (ji  iginal  infantry 
strength;  Army  Groups  Center  and 
North  each  '^.^  percent.  Armv  r.roup 
South  could  be  iuUy  replenished  by  the 
dme  iJie  swmmer  offensive  began,  but 
it  would  take  until  August  to  bring 
Center  and  Nordi  up  to  55  percent  of 
their  original  infantry  strengths,  Re- 
serves in  the  lorni  of  new  units  could 
not  be  created.  All  of  die  men,  weap- 
ons, and  equipment  becoiming  avail- 
able in  the  suimner.  including  the  1923 
class  of  recruits,  would  have  to  be  used 
to  replace  losses.  The  foi^es  on  &e 
F.astern  Front  would  have  a  solid  core 
ot  veterans,  but  drey  would  have  to 
absorb  large  numbers  trf'^atfeniierly 
would  have  been  regarded  as  underage 
and  overage  recruits,  and  owing  to  the 
Imx^  during  t^e  v^tet;  th^  w<Hild  be 
short  on  experienced  officers  and  non- 
commissioned ofhcers. 

As  an  "accomplishment"  in  sustain^ 
ing  firepower  in  spite  of  curtailed  |iro- 
ducuon,  the  army  had  sent  to  the 
Eastern  Front  725,000  rifles,  2?,000 
machine  guns.  2,700  antitank  guns, 
and  559  pieces  ot  light  and  350  pieces 
hi^n^  field  artillery.  The  weapons 
requirements  lor  .Armv  Group  Sf>iith 
would  be  "substantially"  met  by  the 
tini«  operations  resumed.  Army 
Groups  Center  and  North  uould  have 
enough  inlaniry  weapons  to  arm  the 
troops  they  had,  but  their  artillery  bat- 
teries would  have  to  be  reduced  from  4 
to  3  guns  and  some  of  those  would 
have  to  be  old  or  captured  pieces.  All 
told,  3,300  tanks  would  be  on  hand  in 
the  East,  360  less  than  in  June  1941,  but 
heavier  armament  w<b^d  ^sake  np  the 
difference.**  The  aftdsl  serious  prob- 

'*The  Mark  III  and  IV  tanks  vttv  bdng converted 
10  mount  long-barreled  gun«. 


A  TIME  FOR  DECISIONS 


295 


Improvised  MobiutV:  The  "Marder"  (Martin),  Captured  Soviet  762-mm.  Antitank 
Gm.  m  an  OBsoUte  Utrnk  Chassis 


lem  with  firepower  was  likely  to  be 
ajmnuiiition.  Output  of  artillery  and 
some  kinds  of  fuititank  ammunitisja. 
would  not  get  ifito  full  swing  until  the 
fall,  and  "strains"  on  the  ammunition 
stocks  could  be  expected  by  August. 

Mobility  was  the  least  satMaetoty  cat- 
egory. Army  Group  South's  armored 
and  motorized  units  would  attain  about 
80  percent  of  the  mobility  they  had  in 
1941.  The  infantry,  however,  would 
have  to  make  do  with  horses  in  place  of 
ttaelis.  Army  Groups  Nbtib.  and  Cen^ 
ter  would  not  be  capable  of  "largei' 
operations"  except  along  railroads. 
Tht  7B,000-vehicle  deficit  in  motor 
transport  would  not  be  covered  by 
meoh  more  than  half,  and  ntwpreduc- 
iMn  m  the  ms^^  mmths  "W^avSA  Ebo^ 


be  enough  to  cover  the  expected  sum- 
mer's losses.  Nearly  a  quarter  million 
horses  were  being  requisitioned  in  Ger- 
many and  the  occupied  Soviet  territory, 
but  they  would  not  be  enough  to  com- 
pensate for  the  numbers  lost  and  for 
fhose  r@qi^t<ed  to  substitute  for  motor 
transport  Wtid  they  wnukl  Ix'  liglitei. 
less  powerful  animals  than  had  been 
used  in  the  past. 

"A  complete  replenishment,"  es- 
timate concluded,  "can  Q.&lf  3be 
achjevedt  at  Army  <^tjup  Sbtttfi.  Atid 
there  the  deficiencies  in  mobility  and 
tlie  wear  of  the  winter  campaign  on 
men,  horses,  and  vehicles  raise  a  like- 
lihood that  t!ie  endiuance  will  Ije  less 
than  it  v^m  in  the  summer  of  1941.  In  all 
:«f&er  $&BafeiS-»      Aittrf  can-  M 


296 


MOSCOW  TO  SmJNGRAD 


defensive  ^i^^s^em  pm^ed  110  pt^ 
ently  unforeseeable  events  occur.''^" 

The  navy  and  air  force  estimates,  as 
the  OKW  had  probatbly  desii^d/^te 
cast  in  nioic  general  terms.  Tlie  navy, 
which  only  had  peripheral  missions  in 
the  in  the  East,  balanced  a  "^clear* 
German  superiority  in  submarine  war- 
fare against  an  "oppressive"  overall 
British  and  American  naval  superi- 
ority. The  air  force  reported  some  de- 
dine  in  numbers  of  aircraft,  compen- 
sated for  by  newer  iD@diIs,  better  ar- 
mament, and  more  experienced 
crews.^'  In  fact,  the  air  strength  in  the 
Es^t,  2,750  planes,  would  not  be  sub- 
stantially less  than  it  had  been  in  June 
Wil  (2,770  planes),  and  a  larger  pro- 
pp^on  (1,500)  would  be  assigned  to 
support  Army  Group  South. 

On  20  June,  eight  days  bef  ore  the 
imaimer  ofifeiSSKie  began,  Haider  ma^fe 
his  own  capsule  estimate,  Blau  I  was 
ready.  1  he  buildup  of  men  and  mate- 
rial for  Blau  11  was  still  underway  but 
would  be  satisfactorily  completed  in 
time.  It  was  too  early  to  make  a  judg- 
ment on  Blw  III.  The  Germans 
would  have  the  initiative,  and  the  mo- 
rale and  endiusiasm  of  die  troops  were 

Of  Soviet  Capabilities 

At  tlie  Orsha  Gonference  in  Novem- 
ber 1941,  Haider  told  the  chiefs  of  staff, 
"Although  [we  are]  iveak  in  the  knees 
. .  . ,  die  enemy  presently  is  worse  off 
than  we  aJie;  he  is  on  the  veiige 


^KH,  Chef  H.  Rtmt.  u.  Bdt,  AHA,  Chef  des  Stabes 
Nr.  41/42.  Wfhikrufl  tier  VtStoMidil . Mu^^t^  t94t, 
12.') A2.  H  1  382  file. 

■•'OKW,  W/Miyiijl  lin  Wehrmarht  im  Fmekjahr  IMSt:, 
6.6.42.  ii!  \Mci\>sfu.(Jimnik,  pp.  314— 17, 

"BriLish        Mini.sti-v  Pamphlet  248,  prp,  178. 

"■^Ualdey  Diary,  vol.  Ill,  p.  461, 


eoliapse,"**  In  the  spring  of  1^2, 
Haider's  aphorism  acquired  a  renewed 
currency.  Sober,  even  somber,  as  their 
vievr  m  their  own  condi^on  was,  the 
Germans  felt  compelled  to  believe  that 
the  Russians  were  worse  off.  Having 
endured  the  winter  without  breaking, 
the  Germans  felt  that  they  had  proved 
themselves  superior  to  the  enemy  at  his 
best.  This  appeared  to  i?econfirm  what 
they  had,  in  fact,  always  believed, 
namely,  that  the  strategic  problem  the 
Soviet  Union  posed  for  them  was  not 
qualitive  but  quandtalive,  a  matter  es- 
sentially of  arithmedc.  The  winter  had 
drastically  altered  the  Germafl  num- 
bers, but  had  it  not  done  the^iae  8nd 
more  on  the  Soviet  side? 

Foreign  Armies  EaSt»  the  OKH  intel- 
ligence branch  concerned  with  the  So- 
viet Armed  Forces,  compiled  a 
ti&Otprehensive  estimate  of  Soviet 
strength  in  the  coming  summer  as  an 
annex  to  the  first  draf  t  of  Directive  41. 
It  was  a  small  masterpiece  of  staff  intel- 
ligence work — logical,  precise,  and  per- 
suasive. It  was  also  narrowly  conceived 
mSSL  fiie^  to  its  pi  emises.  The  first  and 
most  crucial  of  the  latter  was  that  the 
Soviet  Union  iisetl  its  manpower  essen- 
tially die  same  way  Germany  did,  which 
meant  that  the  absolule  ceiling  on  So- 
viet strength  was  loughly  18  million 
men.  The  losses  in  killed  and  captured 
berween  June  1941  and  April  1942  (6.8 
million)  and  in  eligibles  left  behind  in 
tlie  occupied  territories  had  brought 
the  number  down  to  9.7^  million,  not 
far  fiTHii  a  50  percent  reduction.  The 
Soviet  Arnnad^WMf^^  as  of  I  April,  festd 
6.6  million  men  and  were  20  percent 
below  established  strength,  llie  dil- 

"H.  C.r.  Norii.  Chef  ili-s  Geni-mUabes,  la  Nr.  769141, 
Nicdnrsdirijl  uehn  tlie  BespiTdnuig  heim  des  Gtn- 
StdH,  13.U.41,  AOK  18  3594a/l  file. 


A  TIME  FOR  DECISIONS 


2^ 


ference  between  the  potential  and  ac- 
tual strengths,  3.13  milhon,  Foreign 
Armies  East  figured,  was  the  man- 
power reserve.  After  allowaiKes  were 
made  for  tinreliables  and  physically 
unfit,  it  would  yield  1.2  million  men  to 
cover  the  existing  deficit  and  1.12  mil- 
lion for  new  units.  From  the  1.12  mil 
lion,  the  Soviet  Army  could  form  sixty 
rifle  divisions,  twelve  tank  brigaides, 
and  some  lesser  units.  Soviet  armament 
output, Eofeigtt  Armies  East  predicted, 
would  stay  as  it  app^tifid  m  be,  ade- 
quate for  current  operations,  with 
chronic  shortages  at  hand  weapons, 
and  not  suificieiit  to  Iniild  rese^rviiSv 
Coke  and  steel  shortages,  however, 
could  cause  cutbacks.  The  sixty  rifle 
divisions  and  twelve  tank  brigades, 
then,  were  the  last  real  Soviet  trump 
and,  on  the  scale  of  past  experience, 
not  a  hugely  important  one.  The  esti- 
mate concluded:  "Tlie  enemy  can  no 
longer  withstand  losses  such  as  he  took 
in  the  battles  from  Bialystok  to 
Vyazma-Bryansk  [June  to  October 
1941].  He  also  cannot  for  a  second  time 
thniu  reserves  into  the  scales  the  way 
he  did  in  ihc  winter  of  1941/42."^^ 
After  anodier  month  of  study.  Foreign 
Anni^  ]g^t  reported,  "The  figure  *60' 
keeps  recurring  as  the  number  of  units 
in  the  Soviet  operational  reserve,"^* 
ifitier  told  ^Rekhste^,  "^e  hour  will 
come  when  the  front  frees  itself  from 
its  torpor  and  then  history  will  decide 
who  won  in  this  winter:  the  attacker 
who  idiotically  sacrificed  his  njasses  of 


"■'"OKH,  (jfiiSltlll.  I'lIO.  Hussisdur  Knufh'.ltind. 
^1..^.  I2.  H  'V/nHA  a]c:OKfl.CniSl<l/l.  l-'llfl.  \„^;r,rlr. 
GrupjH'.  Of.  II.  -I.-I.-I2  and  OKH.  (n  uSi.lH.  hrmd,- 
fieen  (hi  Sr.  Sin/42.  an  Op.  Aht.  -I.  I.  IZ.  11  ;</|'I.S  lile 

"'H)KH.  (.niSi.lll.  .\hl.  Fmnde  Heere  Ofl,  Bettrleilung 
tli'i  GrsamtJi'imiUigi'  ittul  ^tOl^il^^eg^lBiee^&dA^Bti, 
1.5A2,  H  3/198  tile. 


men,  or  the  defender  w^iimpl^  Mdid 
his  positions."^'^ 

Foreign  Armies  East  had  win  ked 
hard  at  counting  Soviet  divisions  in  the 
1941  campiiign  and  had  compiled  vol- 
Lunes  of  reports  on  those  actually  and 
supposedly  destroyed.  In  November, 
Colonel  Eberhard  Kinzel,  then  the 
branch  chief,  had  admitted  that  the 
^eount  so  fai  had  been  inconclusivCi  to 
sav  the  least,  and  had  said  that  count- 
ing divisions  did  not  mean  much  inso- 
far as  the  Soviet  Union  was  concerned. 
It  had  had  (hv  his  estimate)  140  divi- 
sions in  June  1941,  liad  suffered  gigan- 
tic losses  during  the  summer,  and  had 
had  190  divisions  standing  in  the  line 
just  before  the  battles  of  Bryansk  and 
Vyazma  in  October  Nevertheless,  he 
had  maintained,  the  system  had  been 
improved  and  now  reliably  showed  the 
total  Soviet  nominal  strength  to  be  160 
divisions  and  the  actual  effective 
strength  to  be  the  equivalent  of  75 
divisions  and  40  tank  brigades.  By 
spring,  he  had  predicted,  the  Soviet 
Union  could  have  150  divisions  and  40 
tank  brigades  at  full  strength  and  no 
more.^*  As  of  20  June  1942,  the  For- 
eign Armies  East  count  stood  at  270 
rifle  divisions,  115  rifle  brigades,  69 
tank  brigades,  and  2  tank  divisions. 
Nevertheless,  five  days  later.  Hitler 
Speculated  that  BiAU  would  go  faster 
and  more  easily  than  had  been  ex- 
pected because  the  Russians,  by  Ms 
count,  had  already  lost  80  divisions  in 
the  German  preliminary  offensives.** 


"Domarus, //(fK  vtd.  II.  p.  1875. 

Gr.  \<n,l.  C.hrj  (.n:nal-.liih,-^.  l/i  \'f.  769/41, 
Niedendirijl  uet>t-r  B&.spntiiiiiig  hrim  Chij  iln  Gi'itStilH, 
13.11.41.  AOK  18  3!i!;)45/I  HIc. 

^"Holder  Diary,  vol.  III.  p.  4(il;  OKW,  WFSt, 
Kriegsgeithnhtlirhf  Al'lnliim^  Ki legikigeiufk,  1.4,— 
30.6,42,  25Juo42,  l.M.T,  iti07  lile. 


298 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


The  main  Gcmian  strategic  interest 
had  always  been  confined  essentially  to 
otie  question:  Where  would  the  Soviet 
forces  have  to  stand  and!  accept  a  fight 
to  the  finish?  Mf)st  of  the  generals  had 
thought  that  it  would  be  in  the  Moscow- 
region.  Hitler  had  believed  it  would  be 
in  the  south,  the  Ukraine  and  the  Cau- 
casus. In  1941,  the  Germans  had  tried 
both,  had  riiri  out  of  time  and  liad  not 
proved — or  disproved — the  \ali(hty  of 
either  view.  Late  in  the  campaign,  in 
November,  the  OKH  contentioii,  as  put 
by  Halili^f  stiU  had  been; 

The  oil  region  [of  the  Caucasus]  is  not 
essendal  to  the  Soviet  conduct  of  the  war, 
so  his  defense  there  will  be  passivt ,  thai  is, 
to  deny  us  flic  oil,  not  lo  pieset  ve  hi.s  own 
existence. 

Moscow  is  tlie  central  point  of  all  Rus- 
sian life.  It  is  also  die  western  terminus  of 
the  laud  bridge  between  European  and 
A^ti^  l|llSSa^(lh^  decisive  operational 

Hitler,  on  the  other  Iiand,  was  more 
than  ever  certain,  after  the  Moscow  of- 
fensive felled,  tfiat  fee  had  been  right 

all  along.  As  the  gist  of  a  talk  with  Hit- 
ler in  March  1942,  Goebbels  recorded: 

The  Fuehrer  had  a  plan  that  was  bound 

to  lead  lo  \  iciory. 

The  Fuehrer  ha4  oq  wjentiion  wilisteiSBr 
of  going  to  Mmmik.  Ife-TsSoMjed!  to  ait  mf 
the  Caucasus  and  ther^^  Strike  the  Soviet 
svsiein  at  its  most  vuli&er^ble  point.  But 
Biaiichitsch  and  his  general  Staff  knew 
better'" 

Although  the  points  of  view  about 
tliem  apparently  remained  as  far  apart 
^  ever,  Moscow  and  the  Caucasus  did 
not  reappear  as  rival  objectives  in  1942,. 


Ct.  Sued,  Der  Chef  des  GmnalstahfS,  la  Nr. 
2mm  Wtragsnotiz.  17.ll.-U.  AOK  6  181117  file. 
•'LtJchiler,  Goebbels  Diaries,  p.  136. 


and  the  debate  was  not  reopened. 
While  the  Moscow  offensive  still 
seemed  headed  toward  a  successful 
conclusion  in  late  Wil,  Hitiier  had  des- 
ignated the  Caucasus  as  the  next  objec- 
dve.  From  December  on,  the  choice 
had  beisft  betfi^ti  the  Caucasus  and 
nothing,  and  the  determinant  had 
been  die  German,  not  the  Soviet  con- 
dition. General  Fromm,  for  instance, 
who  believed  no  major  olTensive 
shoidd  be  attempted  in  1942,  had  con- 
ceded that  one  in  the  south  could  be 
worthwhile  tot  die  sake  of  the  oil  but 
then  doubted  that  the  army  would 
have  enough  strength  to  get  to  the  oil 
fields.*'-  By  the  spring  of  1942,  Army 
Group  South  was  the  only  one  of  the 
three  army  groups  anywhere  near  fit 
for  an  offensive,  and  a  discussion  of  the 
strategic  implications  for  the  Soviet 
Union  of  an  attack  on  Moscow  wotiM 
have  been  largely  f)eside  the  point. 
Besides,  Hitler  was  in  no  mood  to  lis- 
ten. He  was  convinced,  with  some  rea- 
son, tliat  he  had  saved  the  army  from  a 
complete  disaster  in  the  previous 
winter  hf  mKt-f&^iBag  Mention  to  the 
generals. 

Hitler  gave  his  view  of  the  Soviet 
strategic  situation — in,  no  doubt,  delib- 
erately enhanced  colors — to  MussoHni 
on  30  April  1942.  Ihe  "Bolshevik"  in- 
dustrial capacity  had  declined  dras- 
tically. Outside  lielp  cotdd  only  come 
through  Murmansk,  via  Iran  (in  small 
quantity),  or  through  Vladivostok  that 
the  Japanese  had  cut  off.  Therefore 
the  "Bolsheviks"  could  not  expect  sub- 
stfUtitial  material  assistance  from  the 
outside.  Food  was  akeady  ^tremely 


'malder  Dim-i.  III.  p,  295;  Ch4  H.  Kuesl.  w»d 
BdE,  SUlbOKH.Nf  I -141141.  Noliieii  iithfr  Yorlrfi^  beim 
^hfer 0012X12.41,  Z8.12A1,  CMH  X-124  file. 


A  TIME  FOR  DECISIONS 


299 


shads  cu^cks  in  die  cMUati  mtiom 

would  incvital>l\  "radiate  into  the  mili- 
tary sector";  and  the  Soviet  Union 
would  have  to  get  dong  for  aiioWter 
ri\f  monlhs  on  thf  stocks  it  had.  If 
Germany  cut  off  tlie  oil,  then  Soviet 
transpon  wmM  also  lie  paralyzed.  The 
Soviet  Ocplosives  and  powdei  pro- 
grams could  nut  keep  pace  with  the 
*highly  developed  €*ef»an  chemical 
industry."  The  So\iri  losst-s  in  dead 
were  "almost  incalculable,"  and  "the 
tfiaises  bdng  throivn  ags^nst  m  rnovF}** 
Hgere  ''no\vhere  near"  as  effective  as  the 
SOi\Set  troops  had  been  in  tlie  1941  cam- 
paign. He  shkd  away,  tiiOYi|^,  htm 
predicting  an  outright  victory,  saying, 
"It  can  in  no  wise  gel  worse  [foi  Ger- 
many], only  better.  TTiere  can  be  no 
doubt  that  we  will  have  t  lassital  suc- 
cesses in  the  forthcoming  operations  il 
we  inatiage  all  of  iJie  dme  to  concen- 
trate our  strength  at  the  decisiye 
points."''^ 

As  he  had  in  1940  and  1941,  Hitler 
professed  to  sec  the  Soviet  Union  as 
primarily  a  tool  of  British  strategy.  Ii 
was,  he  told  MussoHni,  England's  "most 
vahiable  and  most  dangeioiis  alls."  It 
tied  down  German  strength;  if  it  de- 
fected, the  British  "could  not  do  any- 
ihing  anvniore";  and  Stalin  was  black- 
mailing dieni  by  ihi  eatening  a  separate 
Ho%\ever,  unless  tihey  wanted  to 
rid  themselves  of  this  onerous  ally  by 
conceding  the  German  victory,  the 
British  would  have  to  Oy  to  help  hfeto. 
Consecjiicntly,  Germanv  would  ha\'e  to 
be  on  the  alert  for  landings  in  Norway 
or  France  and  be  ready  to  occupy  Vichy 
France.** 


WOKAf,  l.Sia..  la.  Btriekt  ueiitr  Beiprgckang  am 
30 A. 42,  CMH  X-IQIO  file. 

Mm 


The  StnmtOmdMm 

In  tnia-March  1942,  G^elibelS,  as  he 
did  witli  nearlv  all  of  his  best  thoughts, 
confided  to  liis  diary,  "VVliethcr  we  shall 
succeed  during  the  coming  spring  and 
summer  in  defeating  the  Bolsheviks — 
this  no  man  can  say.  We  know  what  we 
have  and  what  we  must  im%  hiit  we 
don't  know  what  the  Bolshfl^  have 
and  what  they  can  risk."**  Tb«Si?f  wa&— 
and'  is-Mthe  mystery.  The  Gerftiaas  did 
not  know  then  and  the  world  does  not 
know  yet  what  the  Soviet  Union  had 
and  what  it  could  risk.  The  Germans,  it 
would  appear  from  the  result,  must 
have  been  far  oil  in  their  estimates. 
SovtW  afccbtints,  howeven  do  not  give 
suffit  ient  information  to  support  clear 
judgments  about  the  extent  of  the  Ger- 
man niiStC»lGixla:donS. 

T\w  first  fis^  months  of  war  had 
done  enormous  economic  damage  to 
the  Soviet  Union,  particularly  in  the 
output  of  basic  raw  materials,  and  that 
would  be  felt  more  in  1942  than  it  had 
been  in  As  Ae  following  table 
shows,  output  in  most  key  categfiiics 
during  the  first  six.  months  ol  1942 
would  be  less  than  half  of  that  called 
for  in  the  1942  military-economic  plan 
and  substantially  below  1941  levels.** 
The  figures,  of  course,  do  not  account 
for  quantities  in  the  production 
pipeline  or  stockpiles  that  may  have 
existed. 

On  the  other  hand,  unlike  Hitler, 
Stalin  had  not  hesitated  to  convert  to  a 
total  war  economy.  By  1941,  te^Mietal- 
working  industries  (ahnmt  totally  en- 


"^l  (M  hnei,  („M,-h  Diaries,  p.  129- 
'■'■BuMfl  oil  [viistikevich.  Vomokem^  sil^.  p.  269, 
and  IVOVSS,  vol  II.  p.  491. 


BOO 


MOSCWrO  STAUNGRAD 


1941  1942 


Category        6  unoia.  6  mos.  Wanwai  B  mos. 


Eletiridty 
OcSL.  kwh.)  . 

.  S7.4 

5J.0 

15,0 

fiuit,  I0IB3 

.  MM 

mt 

SS.7 

Oil 
[mil-  ions) 

.  17,3 

15,7 

11,7 

Pig  Iron 
(iTiil,,ft>as> 

.  9.0 

4.S 

5.1 

?3 

Steel 
(rail.,  tens) 

.  U.4 

6.3 

9^ 

4.0 

gaged  in  war  production)  constituted 
57  percent  of  all  industry  in  the  Soviet 
Union,  up  from  36  percent  in  1940 
when  the  emphasis  on  military  produc- 
tion had  already  been  heavy. In  com- 
parison, only  43  percent  of  German 
industry  was  devoted  to  metalworking, 
with  only  30  percent  of  that  engaged  in 
armaments  production."^  The  allgca- 
tions  of  iron  and  steel  for  aaiAtoaMon, 
which  had  been  830,000  torn  m  1940, 
were  1.8  million  tons  in  1942.'*  Output 
of  artillery  pieces  went  from  about 
30,000  in  ttie  last  six  months  of  1941  to 
QVtcr  53,000  in  die  first  half  of  1942.  In 
thi^  same  period,  output  of  mortars 
oaore  than  trebled,  and  pmd  Lirii*sn  of 
hand  weapons  and  machine  guns  in- 
creased substantially;  however,  am- 
munition production  went  up  less  tluui 
5  percent.  Output  of  combat  aircraft, 
8,300,  was  about  the  same  in  the  first 
six  months  of  1942  as  in  the  last  lialf  of 
1941,  but  it  exceeded  the  German  pro- 
duction, which  was  approximately 


®' Voznesenskiy,  £«)»Bimji  qfihe  US&R,  p.  43. 
"'Deutsrfies  Inscitut  fuer  Wirtschafts&astiCttttI;, 
Tkutsche  Induslrk  irn  Knege,  p.  159. 

"Voznesenskiy,  Economy  of  Ae  USSR,  p.  43* 
■"yVMV,  vol,  IVi  p.       BodkltJe,BitHturig.  p.  SS- 


The  most  notable  single  production 
Micrease  was  in  tanks,  of  which  11,200 
were  reportedly  turned  out  in  the  first 
si*  months  of  more  iima  twice 
the  number  for  the  lasl  half  of  1941 
and  close  to  4  times  the  German  output 
ci  japproximately  B'MQ  taufes.  Hie 
number  of  T— 34s  produced  was  ap>- 
parently  close  to  double  the  total  1941 
Q^i^t  fif  f,00@.  The  achievement  in 
iaafe  pmduction,  howcAx^r.  great  as  it 
was,  was  less  than  it  appeared  to  be 
because  60  percent  of  the  output  was in 
the  light  T-60  and  T— 70  types  and 
mosdy  still  T-60s.^i  The  T-60,  wliich 
liadialso  made  up  more  than  half  of  the 
1941  output,  had  "not  demonstrated 
outstanding  qualities  in  combat,"  but  it 
was  easier  to  manufacture  and  not  de- 
pendent on  the  availability  of  diesel 
engines  as  the  medium  and  heavy 
tanks  were.  Th«  T-T®,  pllC  iftto  pro- 
duction in  late  1941,  was  an  upgraded 
T— 60,  widi  a  three-man  crew,  weighing 
somewhat  m&F  nine  torn,  and  carrying 
slightly  more  armor  and  a  45-mm. 
gun.'^  The  alterations  made  the  T-70 
superior  te»-^e  T-fObttCl^  it  inferior 
to  the  German  Panzer  Ills  and  IVs/^ 

In  tiie  spring  of  1942,  tlie  Soviet 
armored  forces  iwere  undergoing  their 
second  major  reorganization  of  the 
war.  One  defect  observed  during  Uie 
general  offensive  had  been  a  tendency 
by  commands  to  break  up  the  tank 
brigades  and  battalions  and  to  commit 
their  veiiadies  ^g!y  or  in  smalt  batches 
in  infantry  support.  A  Stax'hn  order  of 
22  January  1942  had  required  the  bri- 


^WAfV,  vol.  IV,  p.  158;  Boelcke,  Ruestung,  p.  24; 
Deborin  and  Telpukhovskiy,  ttogi  i  umki,  p.  260. 

'^^Tyushkevich,  ]iiomxhennye  dfy^  p.  273. 

'*See  EettcB.  Fighting  Vehicles,  p.  20f  and  Johij 
Milsom.  Bimim  Tanks,  1900-1970  (London:  Anns 
anti  Annoiir  IteSs,  19?0),  pp.  92-94. 


gad.es  and  battalions  to  be  used  otJj 
full  strength  and  with  adequate  imtca- 
II  \  and  air  support,  but  that,  to  the 
extent  diat  it  was  followed,  had  still  not 
produced  a  eapabihty  to  employ  taiiks 
in  the  mass.  The  units  were  too  small. 
Consequendy,  in  the  spring,  the  ar- 
mored f&vem  began  siting  up  tanlt 
corps  consisting  of  3  tank  brigades  (168 
tanks),  a  motorized  infantry  brigade,  a 
reconnaissance  battalion,  smA  ailfflery 
and  rocket  projectors.  From  Mav 
through  Augustj  4  tank  armies,  First, 
TMf^  j^l^  WM$^,  were  activated. 
Eicb  fliese  projected  to  have  2 
tmk  ipiSfflS,  $Xl  iupspendent  tank  bri- 


In  spite  of  losses  in  the  winter  and 
Iteavier  ones  in  the  spring,  the  titiilief- 
ical  strengths  of  the  Soviet  forces  iip- 
pear  to  have  gi"own  steadily  through- 
out the  first  sfi£  wionflis  &f  IMt.  *Mte 
Histoty  of  till'  Second  WurM  War  gi\cs  the 
total  armed  ibrces  strength  "in  action" 
in  "csarlf  1942^  as  5M  ttMi&n  men,  of 
which  approximately  4.9  million  were 
in  ground  forces.  The  armies  "in  ac- 
tion" had  t9S  rifle  divisions  (at 
srrent^rhs  bctiveen  5,000  and  9.000),  34 
cavalry  divisions,  121  rifle  brigades,  and 
Se  ihdepettdewt  lank  br%td#S'.^  M  &e 

beginning  of  the  spring  offensives,  the 
ground  iorces  had  "over"  5.1  million: 
308ear  *atoG«ft*  $00  msk$, 
taller y  pieces  and  mortars»  and  the  sap* 


""^IVOVSS,  n.  |>,  Tyiishkevich,  ^hmnhmnye 
sUy,  pi  284;  Ki  ujithenko,  Tankwye  iHiyska,  p.  55. 


'■V\',Vn',  vol.  Vip.  22. 


302 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


port  of  2,200  combat  aircraft.^*  At  the 
end  of  June,  ihe  ground  forces  "in 
action"  had  5.5  million  troops,  over 
6,000  tanks,  55,600  artillery  pieces  and 
mortars,  and  2,600  combat  aircralt  in 
support.  1  Ills  amounted,  with  the  bri- 
gades converted  lo  an  equivalent  in 
divisions,  to  410  di\  isions.^'^  Elsewhere, 
the  number  oi  divisions,  Ijrigades,  and 
independent  l  egimcnis  is  given  as  348 
divisions.  239  brigadt-s,  and  329  reg- 
iments."" None  ol  ihv  above  figures 
includes  StefAa  reserves,  which  theHis- 
lory  of  the  Second  World  War  gives  as 
having  been  (in  June)  10  field  armies,  1 
tank  army,  3  air  armies  being  foimed, 
and  "more  than"  50  independent 
units. Golubovich  gives  the  reserves 
as  152  divisionSj  107  brigades,  and  225 
independej^it  ri^punents."'' 

Estimates  of  German  €i^t^i>^»$ 

In  an  order  of  23  February  1942,  the 
People'^  Commissariat  of  Defense  initi- 
ated planning  for  the  coming  spring 
and  summer  with  the  admonition  that 
it  would  be  "inexcusably  shortsighted" 
to  be  content  with  the  winter's  successes 
and  assume  from  ihem  that  the  Ger- 
man troops  had  been  already  beaten. 
The  enemy  had  suffered  defeats,  but 
he  was  not  defeated.  He  was  still 
strong,  and  he  would  muster  all  of  his 
forces  to  achieve  successes.*^ 

On  18  March,  General  Staff  Intel- 
ligence submitted  the  following 
estimate; 


'"'Ihttl..  p.  121  It  a{»peara  tikety  th»  die  Soviet 
figuri-s  on  [^inks  for  this  s^jeof  the  warQM»'lia|9iaIto 
eai  lu  r)  <in  mn  include  tfieU^l  tankl.  Swrp^  300, 

p.  143. 

'"Sft-  Golubovich.  "Sozdaniye,"  17- 
'"/I'A/V:  vol.  V,  p.  143. 
""(ioliilmvith,  "Sozdaniyc,"  p.  17- 
''IV MV,  vol.  V,  p.  30. 


.  .  .  Preparation  for  a  ICtiiiianJ  spring  of- 
iensive  is  confirmed  by  deployment  of 
troops  and  material.  In  the  period  from  I 
lanuary  to  10  Mart  li,  as  man\  as  tliirtv  five 
divisions  were  hKuit^ln  in.  and  ilic  ticld 
armies  receivt-d  a  sicad\'  [\o\\  oi  replace- 
menls.  ResiuratKni  of  ilu'  railroad  nctwtjrk 
in  ihc  occupied  Icn  iim  ies  of  the  USSR  is 
beiiie  worked  on  more  intensively^,  and 
combat  and  trsHSpott  nkmSk 
supplied  in  greater  numbers. . . . 

It  cannot  oe  ruled  out  that  the  decisive 
German  offensive  will  be  accompanied  by 
a  simultaneous  Japanese  attack  on  the 
US.SR  and  thai  ilic  (iennans  will,  besides, 
put  pressure  on  rnrkc\  in  permit  u  ansit  u( 
German  lixxjps  lo  liif  C^aucasus.  .  .  .  I'lu' 
Germans  cannul  again  attack  on  a  broad 
front,  because  they  cannot  regroup  their 
forces  to  accomplish  that.  They  will  con- 
centrate all  dieir  efforts  on  preparing  suc- 
cessive operations;  first  aiming  at  con- 
quering the  Caucasus  and  taKing  the 
Murmansk  (Kirov)  Railroad  and  subse- 
quently at  expanding  the  operations  to 
take  Moscow  ari<l  Lenmgiad.  In  tliis  man- 
ner the  main  stialegic  objectives  could  Ije 
attained:  the  USSR  would  be  cut  off  from 
her  allies;  she  would  lose  her  ^ilj.aund  even 
if  she  were  not  totally  defeat^,  t^e  cocm- 
try  would  be  so  weakened  as  to  lose  all 
significance.  This  is  the  main  objective  of 
the  German  leadership. 

TTie  main  effort  of  the  spring  offensive 
lie  on  die  southern  sector  oftlie  front, 
witli  a  secondary  attack  on  the  north  and  a 
simultaneous  feint  m  the  center^  towards 
Moscow. 

Germany  is  preparing  a  decisive  offen- 
sive on  the  Eastern  Front,  which  will  begin 
in  the  southern  sector  and  expand  to  trie 
noith.  For  the  spring  offensive,  Germany 
and  her  allies  at*'  bnnging  in  as  many  as 
sixty-five  divisions,  ,  .  .  liic  most  likely 
time  for  the  offensive  will  be  mid-April  or 
early  May*'* 

Oti  fS^  March,  tike  security  orgaite'of 

the  State  Defense  Cemimittee  subtnit- 
ted  a  variant  projection.  The  part  oi  it 


**VCV.  p.  138t.  Sec  aUo/V.\/l.  v.,1.  \.  p,  Ulf. 


A  TIME  FOR  DECISIONS 


303 


that  has  ^en  tmdt  pu^c  rfsbi  ^ 
follows: 

The  main  blow  will  be  in  the  southern 
sector  via  Rostov  to  Stalingrad  and  into  the 
North  Caucasus — and  from  there  toward 
the  Caspian  Sea.  In  this  fashion,  the  G^- 
m«ns  hope  to  take  possession  of  the  Cau- 
castis  oil  sources.  If  the  operation 
succeeds,  the  Germans  expect,  on  reaching 
the  Volga  at  Stalingrad,  to  continue  the 
offensive  norllnvarcT  along  the  Volga.  In 
this  summer,  they  will  not  only  want  to  get 
to  the  Volga  and  the  Caspian  Sea,  bvt  tmy 
will  also  undertake  main  operations 
against  Moscow  and  Leningrad,  because 
tSdng  those  places  is  a  matter  prestige 
with  me  German  Command.^* 

The  History  of  the  Second  V\ibrld  War 
describes  the  two  "prognoses"  as  having 
been  "not  without  influence"  on  the 
decisions  relating  to  die  turlher  con- 
chlet  of  the  war.**  However,  their  influ- 
ence, apparently,  was  either  small  or 
virtually  nonexistent.  The  Histmj  of  the 
Scamd  World  War,  Zhukov.  and  ihc  Popu- 
lar Scieiitfic  Ski'trh  indicate  thai  Stalin, 
whose  opinion  was  the  deciding  one, 
^Ikved  iiie  Germans  had  Strength 
enough  to  conduct  simultaneous  offen- 
sives m  the  center  and  the  south,  and 
he  gave  particular  importance  to 
Moscow. "^-^  The  fi/.\tor-\'  of  thr  Great  Pa- 
trkitk  War  maintains  that  the  Stavlia 
reeognized  the  possibility  of  a  German 
offensive  in  the  south  but  made  "a 
strategic  error"  and  assumed  that  the 
most  probable  German  attack  would 
not  be  toAvard  Stalingrad  and  the  Cau- 
casus but  tovvard  Moscow  and  the  cen- 
tral industrial  region.*^  Vasilevskiy  says 
that  the  eneroy's  strength  on  the 


"mm,  vol.  y  p.  112. 
"/ftiu,  p.  m. 

*^J^ft^  a,  m:  Zhahm,Mensiirt,  pr.  Sfi*:  p.  139. 
'WmSi  vol.  U,p.404. 


Moscow  approaches  ("more  than  sev- 
enty divisions")  led  the  Stavka  atid  Uie 

C^ttetal  Staflff  to  estmchide  ^at  his  trnm 

attack  would  be  in  the  center.  "This 
opinion,"  Vasilevskiy  adds,  "1  know 
very  t©  fea*e  been  shared  by  the 
majority  of  the  front  commands."'*' 

Soviet  accounts  have  maintained  diat 
a  midal  ^B^cration  for  the  Soviet 
Command,  as  it  went  into  the  second 
summer  of  the  war,  was  a  numerical 
infelie*ity  in  troop  strength.  The  most 
fre<:|uently  given  figure,  since  it  was 
first  used  by  Platonov  in  1958,  has  been 
6.2  ^liQIisai  German  and  allied  troops  at 
the  otnset  of  the  1942  summer  cam- 
paign.'*'* The  History  of  the  Second  W)rld 
gljpes  m&  figures:  5,655,000  Ger- 
man alone,  as  of  28  June  1942,  and 
6,198,000  German  and  allied,  as  of  1 
May  1942.  Of  these,  5,3»8,0£>0  were 
German.^**  The  Germans'  own  cotmt 
was  3.9  million  men  in  the  ground 
forces,  distributed  as  follows:  2.6  mil- 
lion (allies  not  counted)  on  the  Eastern 
Front  proper,  212,000  in  die  occupied 
Soviet  territory,  150,000  in  Finland, 
and  1.3  miltion  in  the  occupied  territo- 
ries oiusidc  the  Soviet  Union,  in  the 
Replacement  Army%^Mra;^^i|ndin 
North  Africa,'*** 


"'Vasilevskiy,  i>i>&,  p.  20g. 

'^f^aov  implied, t^t#e  n^BvA.  ^eps  not 
i»ju jed  in  the  6.2  tiwm.  Itepiit^  Vietw^  MimH^ 
Vryna,  p.  286.  The  sub^^Oli  ^tnmts  give  the 
figtire  as  heing  indusiye.  mt  v&¥  (iSmAaf/a  liisiya), 

fi.- 197;  IMwria  m&  l^Ipul^MDst^  / jE«{  x  miBt, 

**llie  figures  tar  the  la^  •fiifews;  'Hdn&b, 
300,000;  Rumanian,  330.000;  HtB^jiaria&i  MJOm, 
Itgliag,  68.000;  Slovakian,  28,000;  aud  Spanish, 
l^^fl^  '^Sp^n  was  not  an  ail;'  but  supplied  a,  division 


304 


MOSCOW  TO  STAXINGRAD 


A  Seamd  Front 

In  May  1941.  Soviet  Foreign  Minister 
Molotov  jounieyecl  to  tlie  West,  to 
London,  to  negotiate  a  treaty  of  al- 
liance and  to  Wiishington  u>  discuss  a 
second  lend-lease  protocol.  His  most 
urgent  tas^k  m  both  capitate  M 
secnre  a  commitment  from  tfee  l^lfeSt- 
era  Allies  tg  open  a  second  front  in 
Ixrrope  in  194%.  Prime  M  mister 
Cluncliin's  response  to  the  second 
front  proposal  was  sympatiietic  but 
ft&iitximuriittal.**  ^Vesident  Rooseve!t 
told  Molotov  that  tiie  U.S.  government 
"hoped"  and  "expected"  to  open  a  sec- 
ond front  in  iMt?^  On  11  Jisife  in 
Washington  and  12  Jime  in  Moscow, 
the  y.S.  and  Soviet  governments  re- 
teia^d  a  jbiftt  coiamunique,  one  sen- 
tence of  which  read,  "In  the  coiir.se  of 
the  conversadons  full  understanding 
was  tme&ed  with  regard  to  the  urgent 
tasks  of  creating  a  Second  Fi  ont  in  Eu- 
rope in  1942.""^  Molotov  had  drafted 
the  communique,  and  ■Roosevelt  Bad 
approved  it,  although  General  George 
C.  Marshall,  the  U.S.  Army  chief  of 
staff,  had  objected  fliat  Uie  statement 
was  "too  strong."^''  Marsh;ill  had  loid 
Roosevelt  and  Molotov  earlier  that  the 
pfo'bfem  wotild  fee  ii*  gettfng  tit^  ships 
to  transport  U.S.  troops  and  equip- 
ment to  Europe.''^  On  10  June,  in 
h&m^^T  CliiiiFcfaill  gave  Mcdotenr  a 
statement  which  read,  in  part,  "It  is 


'^J.  R.  M,  Butter.  Onmt  Sfm^  PigpdbR.-  Her 
Majesty^s  Stationery  OfScit  1964),  iSat.       pt.  U,  p. 

Plamsingfiir  Coalition  nfori^  imM94ai 
!>.&;  GPO.  1953).  p.  231. 

p.  232;  ivm  vol.  V,  p.  73. 

"Matlcrff  and  Sndl,  5fral«gif  Pianving,  p.  232. 

*^Sherwdod.  t(mtmk  tmd  Hi^ns.  p.  5^;  IVMV> 
voi.  V.p.  72> 


impossible  to  say  in  advaiice  wlierlier 
the  situadon  will  be  sucli  as  to  make 
this  operation  [an  invasion  of  Etirope 
in  1942]  feasible  when  the  dine  comes. 
We  can  therefore  give  no  promise  in 
the  matter. . . 

In  the  Soviet  vie^^^  there  c<.nild  not 
have  beeii  any  substantive  reasons  for 
i^e  l^stern  Allies'  not  opening  a  sec- 
ond front  in  1942.  In  the  Soviet  view, 
also,  a  commitment  was  made  during 
tlie  May- June  negotiations.  The  His^ 
&e  Great  Patriotic  War  maintains, 

.  .  ihe  Kovcr  nments  of  the  USA  and 
Eng^ancT as.sured  the  Soviet  delegation 
that  a  second  front  would  be  opened  in 
1942  "97  Tire  Short  History  states.  "The 
pertinent  communique  pointed  out 
that  complete  agreement  had  been 
reached  concerning  [the  second 
front's]  opening  in  Europe  in  1942."'* 
The  History  of  the  Srcovd  Wor/rl  Wnr  and 
the  Popular  Scientific  Sketch  maintain 
that  Washington  and  London  were 
"forced  to  announce"  the  creation  of  a 
second  iiont  in  1942  by  "progressive 
public  opinion"  and  their  obUgations  to 
the  Soviet  Union."" 

Tliat  the  second  Iront  did  not  mate- 
riahzc  in  1942  was,  in  the  Soviet  view, 
the  resLih  of  cieliberale  British-Amer- 
ican policy  decisions  made  "beliind  the 
back  of  me  Soviet  Union."i""  Tte  S^fert 
History  asserts,  .  .  neither  country, 
later  events  showed,  had  any  intention 
@f  lifing  up  to  its  commitment."^"^  The 
reason  tliey  did  not,  according  to  the 
Histoiy  of  the  Great  Patriotic  \Mir  and  the 


'»'M(^,  Gn&aSlrale^,  vol.  Ill,  pt.  BSf  /Sfe 

^  ftW,  vol.  V,  p.  73. 
«WJirS^  vol.  II.  p- 4013. 
^ti^  fiki^^-Ji^a},  p.  152. 
«9fiaiK       V,  |)t  t?;  VOV.  p.  480£. 

^*'Vm^raikayaistirriya}.  p.  lit. 


A  HM£  FOR  DECISIONS 


305 


Histnry  if^  Second  Wbrld  War,  was  be- 
cause the  %tling  circles"  in  Great  Brit- 
ain and  tiie  United  States  wanted  to  let 
GermaJiy  add  the  Soviet  Union  exhaust 
themselves  "in  heavy  and  bloody 
batdes.'^M  ' 

In  the  Ss^vtet  actoLiiiLs,  the  absence 
of  die  neocmi  front  and  the  alleged 
duplicity  of  djig  THfestem  Allies  relative 
to  it  are  depicced  as  having  had  critical 
bearing  on  Siiivi^  ;^t^^  planning 
fbr  the  mmm  ^  1942;  the  Soviet 
plans  for  ^fil^  Mid  Summer  offen- 
sives, \h&Himryiefiiu&mt Patriotic  War 
implies,  id^re  msed  on  im  aapsjampnon 
that  tliey  would  coincaje  it^iMtl.  Attacks 
by  Ai^io-Anierican  Jiirces  on  Ger- 
many worn  dtetwest*  affli  that  the  plans 
mi^t  have  been  different  if  the  Soviet 
Union  had  known  "the  tts^  inlentions 
of  its'.anies."**  B^ramyan  has  said 
Tlmoshenko  and  iKhrushchev  told  him 
in  March  1942,  «|ien  Southwestern  The- 
began  work  m  its  plan,  that  there 
\vould  be  a  secoajd  front  created  in  the 
latter  half  of  19#2,  and  it  would  "draw 
off  part  die  enemy's  forces  and  his 
tcseives."'"^  Tlie  ///v/orv  the  Second 
\Mrrld  War  contends  that  the  Soviet  gov- 
ernment \m  left  in  uncertainty;  until 
niid-Augiist  1942,  as  to  whether  there 
would  be  a  second  front,  while  tlic 
Germans,  all  along,  "counted  oiae 
noi  existing,  and  they  made  theil^  di^* 
positions  accordingly. The  iiisiory  gf 

GmU  PiOm&c  mcr  charges  fliat  the 
Germans  knew  there  u<uiM  noi  be  a 
second  front  dirougli  "secret  negotia- 
tic^s  on  a  separate  pea^se*  conducted 
by  "unofSdal  representadve^  of  indus- 


'«n  A;v;  v„i.  v.  p.  n-ivovss,  »«il.M.p.m 
'•"/vfn-.vs-,  vol.  II.  p.  401. 

""H.inr.inivan.  liik  \hli  tnyklK^edt,  p,  SL 

""/I  ivn;  vol.  V,  p.  111. 


trial  and  financial  drdes  the  USA 
andEngiand."!"* 

As  the  S(jviet  spring  offensives 
failed,  one  by  one,  the  ceriaintv  that 
the  inidative  would  change  haiuls  Ije- 
fore  summer  became  inescapable,  and 
it  became  imperative  for  tlie  Soviet 
Command  to  devise  a  defensive  strat- 
egy. The  problem,  potentially  deadly 
though  it  was.  \^as  loss  compliratefl 
than  it  had  been  tlie  \ear  betore.  1  he 
Germans'  condition  was  known,  and 
their  options  were  limited.  Time  was  on 
their  side,  but  it  wa.s  lunning  out  be- 
cause they  were  going  to  have  to  resiSBt 
from  a  dead  stop.  By  mid-February, 
German  Foreign  Armies  East  had  be- 
lieved an  offensive  in  the  south  could 
hardly  be  a  surprise  to  the  Russians.  It 
observed  that,  according  to  ageiu  te- 
ports,  Marshal  Timoshenku.  the  eoin- 
mander  of  Southwrsterv  Theater,  li.id 
talked  as  early  as  December  about  the 
Germans'  being  compelled  to  attack 
again  in  the  south  to  get  oil  and  that 
British  newspaper  reports  from  the 
Soviet  Union  had  repeated  the  same 
theme  several  times  since. Estimates 
made  in  April  and  May  by  Foreign 
Armies  East  no  longer  c[uestione(l  So- 
viet knowledge  of  the  Germans"  ])laus 
for  the  spring  and  addressed  possible 
Soviet  responses  "to  the  expected  (k  i- 
man  offensive."'"**  The  Soviet  (,(  ucial 
Staffs  and  State  Defense 


'""/VOr.S.S-.  vol.  II,  ]),  1(M(. 

'"'OKU.  Ci-iiSlilH.  hnnilr  lla-re  Osl,  Xr.  6JM2,  Hiif 
wmIv,  AiifpiJJ  im  Fnu'h/ahr  19-12,  20.2.42,  H  S/2  tile. 

"'"okfl.  Ol-iiSIiIH.  Frrmdf  Hiinr  Oil,  Betirteiiung  der 
/■•'•ullage,  tOAA2  and  OKH,  GenSidH,  Frmde  Hem 
O^t.  Bmrttibing  der  GtsamfmntBa^,  tiA2,  H  3/198 
file. 


306 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


estimates  of  German  intentions  cited 
abo\'e  ^vere  singularly  close  to  the 
mai  k,  in  lact  almost  prescient,  consid- 
ering that  they  were  coinpleied  ten 
days  to  two  weeks  before  Hitler  put  his 
own  plans  on  paper.  To  them  can  be 
added,  from  the  Popular  Scientific 
Sketch,  the  general  statement,  "As  the 
Supreme  Command  worked  out  the 
l^t^s  for  further  ^speiations  it  had  stiffi- 
deait  information  concerning  the  inten- 
tions and  measures  of  the  enemy." '"^ 

The  General  Staff  completed  its  cal- 
culations in  mid- March,  and  the  strate- 
gic plan  for  the  spring  and  summer  of 
1942  was  put  into  hnal  form  during  the 
conference  at  the  end  of  the  month. 
Within  that  time,  as  has  been  seen,  the 
General  Stafft  concept  of  an  "active 
defense"  against  an  expected  German 
offensive  gave  way  to  Stalin's  active 
defense,  which  aimed  to  forestall  the 

German  iniuatiye  entirely.  This,  while 
it  did  n6t  ijwalidlaee  the  e^6atam:s  of 

German  intentions,  made  them  largely 
irrelevant  to  the  plan.  In  the  stage  of 
the  active  defense.  May  through  June, 
the  Soviet  offensives  would  "improve 
the  pperative-strategie  situation  of  ^e 
Sovfel  Afffied'  Forces,  uncovef  the  en- 
cm\"s  intentions,  deal  his  groupings  a 
defeat,  and  by  preemptive  blows,  frus- 
trate the  enemy's  prospect  of  develop- 
ing another  large-scale  offensive  on  the 
SoVieirGerman  front."  After  the  period 
of  ae^e  defense,  probably  in  July,  the 
forces  would  develop  "larger"  offen- 
mve^  ^  a.  broad  front  "from  the  Baltic 
Sim  to  the  Black  Sea,  with  the  aim  of 
smashing  the  enemy's  main  groupings 
and  bringing  about  the  decisive  turn  of 
the  war  in  favor  of  the  Soviet  Union 


'"n'TJV;  p,  139.  See  p.  'M)2f. 


that  had  been  initiated  at  Moscow  in 
the  winter  i94i/42.""*'  In  the  second 
stage,  the  main  offensive  effort  would 
be  in  the  sotith,  but  beyond  that,  the 
plan  was  not  worked  out  becawse  the 
details  would  depend  on  the  miiiSlES 
the  first  stiige.'" 

At  what  point  the  Soviet  thinking 
turned  from  the  active  defense  to  what 
is  called  the  "strategic  defensive"  is  not 
entirely  clear.  The  History  of  the  Second 
Wrrld  War  indicates  that  defensive  ele- 
ments were  included  in  the  March 
plan,  and  the  fronts  operating  in  the 
western  smd  southwestern  ■'directions" 
were  required  to  build  up  their  flefense 
lines  and  create  reserves  lo  be  used 
either  to  support  their  own  offensives 
or  to  counterattac  k  "in  the  case  of  an 
unexpected  enemy  offensive."'***  On 
the  other  hand,  theHtstoiy  implies  that 
not  until  late  June  did  the  Slnvka  t  on- 
sider  it  necessary  to  observe  Lenin's 
dictum  that  methods  of  warfare  should 
change  to  accomniodate  changed  cir- 
cumstances. Then  it  decided  to  aban- 
don its  offensive  plans  and  revert  to  the^ 
strategic  defensive.^*^  Hie  J%>^far  Sci- 
entific  Sketch  states: 

By  the  end  of  Tune,  the  situation  of  the 
Soviet  forces  had  worsened  every whisfe  Oft 
the  Soviet-German  front.  TThe  spti^  t^r- 
ations  of  the  year  1942,  with  Wlfffih  the 
Headcjiiai  ters  had  wislied  to  create  condi- 
tions tot  development  ul  a  larger  offensive 
in  the  summer,  liad  been  f riisiratt-d  by  tlie 
enemy. .  .  ,  Tiie  Stavka  saw  itseU  compelied 
to  forego  the  offensive  and  reswwe  ihe 
Strategic  defensive.*'* 


"WMK  vol.  V.  p.  117.  See  pp.  238-iO. 
'"I hid.,  p.  114. 
"•Ibul..  p.  mi. 

p.  m. 

>'^VOV.  p.  146. 


A  TIME  FOR  DECISIONS 


By  ¥^3evstuy%  account,  the  Soviet 

forces  went  over  to  the  defensive  in 
Mii\.  after  kharkos.' '  '  1  lie  liming  of 
ll)c  Molotov  mission  aji|)<  iis  also  to 
have  been  the  result  ol  a  etiaiigc  in 
Soviet  thinking  in  die  laitei  liall  of 
May.  In  March,  Stalin  had  not  believ  ed 
the  Soviet  forces  would  be  capable  uf 
"larger  offensive  operations"  in  the 
spring  wthout  a  second  front,  but,  by 
implication  at  least,  he  had  thought 
they  would  have  such  a  capability  in  the 
summer.*"^  The  British  government 
had  invited  Molotov  to  come  to 
London  on  8  April,  but  the  Soviet 
response  had  been  slow,  and  for  the 
more  than  five  weeks  before  he  ar- 
rived, the  main  Soviet  concern  had 
been  widi  getting  better  territorial  and 
political  terms  for  itself  in  tire  alliance 
treaty.  At  the  first  meeting  in  London, 
on  2 1  May,  at  the  height  oi  t  lie  Khai  kov 
battle,  Molotov  said  he  had  come  to 
discuss  two  matters:  the  treaty  and  a 
second  front,  and  the  latter  was  now 
the  more  ii]aport%[it.  to  the  subsequent 
sessions  m  l&adxm  and  Washington, 
he  appeared  to  be  talking  in  terms  of 
two  possihiiQties:  at  victory  in  1942,  with 
a  second  front  that  would  draw  at  lieast 
forty  German  divisions  off  the  Eastern 
Front,  or  a  Soviet  reversion  to  a  defen- 
sive, tfie  restilts  of  whk^  conTd  not  be 
positively  predicted."*  The  summer 
ofifen^ve  had  by  then,  most  probably, 
b«aome  wholly  contingent  on  the  sec- 
ond front. 

The  HisUity  of  the  Second  Wbrld  Whr 
^ves  a  picture  of  preparation  by  stages 
for  the  shift  lo  tlie  defensive.  Begin- 
ning in  March,  the  f mils  and  armies 


"•■V.isllei  skiv. |).  218. 
""/V  .\/V,  vol.  V.p.  113. 

' '  'Sc-c  Butler,  Orand  StraU^  v(A.  lU,  pu  11.  pp. 

592-96. 


bti^  tip  their  lines  td^cptita  df  ^  to 

seven  miles.  At  the  same  time,  and 
continuing  into  tlie  summer,  the  the- 
ater fSommands  and  the  Stavka  saw  to 
the  construction  of  rear  lines  back  to 
the  V'olga  River,  a  distance  of  up  to 
three  iiiindred  and  fifty  miles.  This 
included  renovating  and  improving 
works  built  in  1941,  the  Mozhaysk  line, 
the  Moscow  and  Oka  River  defenses, 
and  lines  on  the  Volga  east  of  Moscow 
and  on  the  Don,  from  Voronezh  to 
Rostov.  In  May,  work  began  on  de- 
fenses for  the  Caucasus,  between  the 
Don  and  the  Kuban,  along  the  Terek 
River,  and,  ainong  other  places, 
gjTQund  Voroshilovsk,  Krasnodar,  and 
GfToznyy.""  In  May,  "when  the  big  bat- 
tles in  the  south  began,"  the  Stavka 
"took  measures"  to  strengthen  the  de- 
fenses of  Bryansk,  Smithu>est,  and  South 
Fro/?/>. In  May  and  June,  when,  as 
the  HitUiiy  of  the  Second  World  War  puts 
it.  "the  Wehrmachl  attacked  only  on  the 
south"  and  not  toward  Moscow,  the 
Stavka  "made  corrections"  and  began  to 
prepare  for  a  strategic  defensive, 
which  included  building-  up  the 
streng^  in  the  south.'-" 

Almough  the  fiistary  of  "Second 
World  War  maintains  that  as  part  ol  the 
preparations  for  the  strategic  defen- 
sive, five  of  the  ten  reserve  armies  were 
redt])I(i\ ctl  from  the  center  to  the 
southwest  (in  early  July,  after  Blau 
began),  Stalin,  the  S^dpfe,  arid  the  Gen- 
eral Staff,  apparenih,  at  no  time  be- 
lieved the  German  main  attack  would 
be  aimed  anywhere  other  than  at 
MoscovN.  Vasilevskiy  says  they  did  not 
"exclude"  an  attack  from  the  vicinity  of 
Kursk  to  Voronezh  but  believed  Otes 


''m  m:     v,  p  iit>, 

"•'lh„i..    \:.    1  III. 

'-7i«/„  p.  i4tH. 


308 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


final  objective  \v()ult|j  nevertheless,  be 

Moscow.'*'  At  ihe  end  of  June,  the 
main  weight  of  the  Soviet  deploymeni 
was  in  the  center.  The  former  Western 
Theater  (Kalinin  and  West  Fronts)  was 
somewhat  stronger  than  the  South- 
western Theater  (Byyamk,  Southwest,  £10^ 
South  Fronts).  Expres.sed  a.s  percentages 
of  total  Soviet  front  line  strength,  rela- 
tidiiships  were  jds  f oliowsi 


dommand 

Divisions 

ArtiHery 

tanks 

Aitta^ft 

Western 

Theater 

.  31.3 

31.6 

40.3 

32.7 

Southwestern 

Heater  . 

.  28.3 

Tbesie,  however,  did  not  compj^gg^  tlie 
whole  diUcrence.  Of  die  resets  ar- 
ndes,  six  and  the  one  tank  army  tben 
operational  were  posidoned  to  co\er 
Moscow  on  the  line  Kalinin-Tula-  lam- 
bo«^Boriso|^fceb&k-Staltngrad,  satiA  four 
were  ranger!  in  a  broad  arc  east  oi' 
Moscow  on  die  line  Vologda-Gorkiy- 
SaxAtm.^^  Mamemi^  i^^  to  a  third  of 


'»'V:i.silevskiv./W,..  p.  219. 

'^^'[hf  WfSlmi  'I'heiiln  was  terminated  ;is  a  toni- 
iiiaiid  oil  May;  the  North  Ciiucasm  Tliealer  on  lit 
Mav;  and  I  he  Soutitmtstgrn  Tlteattroo  21  June. TVMV, 
vx>l.  V.  p.  143. 


the  former  Southwestern  Theater  forces, 
almost  all  of  B?-yansk  Front,  were  de- 
ployed on  the  north  flank  to  defend 
the  Tula  approach  to  Moscow. 

The  implication  to  be  drawn  from 
the  deployment  is  that  a  stronger  con- 
.Getttiatkm  in  the  south  would  have 
produced  a  better  result  in  the  summer 
campaign.  The  History  of  the  Great  Pa- 
tmtic  tiondudes: 

The  incorrect  determinadon  by  the  So- 
viet Siipreme  High  Command  of  the  direc- 
tion ofthe  enemyV  attack  in  ilie  first  stage 
of  the  summer  campaign  led  to  deci^tnis 
lhat  were  in  strategic  error.  Instead  of 
conceniraiing  forces  in  the  operations 
zone  of  the  Soutlnvest  and  Soutit  Fronts  an<i 
establishing  on  the  lef  t  flank  a  deeph  ec  he- 
loneti  flelense  ihai  would  ha\  e  been  insut- 
motuTlable  lor  the  enemy,  the  Stavkn 
continued  to  fortiiy  die  central  sector  of 
thefiront . . 

On  the  other  hand,  the  course  di  the 
war  in  the  coming  months  would  show 
the  "en  or"  at  least  to  be  self-coinpeu- 
sadng  and,  perhaps,  to  have  beeil  a 
stroke  of  high  good  fortune. 


"WOVSS,  vol.  u,  p.  40t 


CHAPTER  XV 

Prelude  to  Sonwner 


fUd^  3^06  was  Eleventh  Army's  ar- 
tillery command.  A  Harko  (Hoeheres 
Artillerie  Kommando)  ordinarily  con- 
trolled an  army's  heavy  artillery,  feut  fai 
early  April  1942,  Harko  306  snrveyed 
the  Sevastopol  perimeter  not  to  em- 
place  just  heavy  artillery — but  the 
heaviest.  At  various  places  in  Germany, 
guns,  originally  built  to  ciack  massive 
fxmcrete  and  steel  French  and  Belgian 
forts,  were  being  dismantled  to  be 
shipped  ui  pieces  by  train  to  tiie  Cri- 
mea. The  lightest  were  twelve  11-inch 
(280-mm,)  coastal  howitzers.  The  tur- 
ret-mcjunted  naval  guns  in  several  oi 
the  Soviet  for  ts  had  calibers  about  an 
inch  larger.  Next  heavier,  and  un- 
matched on  the  Soviet  side,  were  a 
dozen  14-inch  howitzers.  But  even 
those  were  dwarfed  bv  GAMMA  and 
KARL.  Bolh  were  su]3erheavv  mcji  tars. 
(.AMMA,  tlie  "Big  Bertha"  of  World 
War  1,  had  a  iT-inth  (4120 mm.)  bore 
and  fired  a  1-ton  shell.  KARL  had  a  21- 
inch  boi  e,  and  its  Shell  weighed  a  ton 
and  a  half,  four  times  more  than  the 
14-inch  howitzer's  shells.'  Harko  306 
mas  to  receive  three  KARL  and  six 


'Ruclull  Liisar.  German  Sem:>  Weafxin,',  uj  the  Setvmi 
Wnlil  Will  (New  Yrjrk:  Piiiliistjpliital  Ijhrary,  1959), 
()]).  13-16.  Sff  also  Wlliam  G.  Dooly,  Jr.,  Great 
Wivjnim  of  Whrkl  War  1  Qiew  liSte*!  litefllwr  and  Qov, 
1969J,  pp.  53-55. 


GAMMA  weapons.  Neither  one  was 
mdbile,  and  K.ARL  could  only  be  as- 
sembled or  disassembled  with  the  aid 
«f  a  ?S-1it>tt  crane.  But  KARL,  at  132 
tons,  was  almost  a  light  fieldpiece  when 
compared  to  DORA,  which  weighed 
1,S45  tons  and,  to  be  dismantled  and 
moved,  needed  a  special  sixty-car  train. 
DORA  had  a  101-foot-long  barrel,  a 
31 V2  inch  bore  ()80iN(Hin.)^  and  fired  a 
7-ton  shell  to  ranges  up  to  thirty  miles. 
Tn  tests,  it  had  demcjlished  a  concrete 
wall  24  feet  thick  and  punched 
through  90  inches  of  steel  with  single 
shots.  The  most  powerful  artillery 
piece  in  the  woild,  DORA  v\as  also 
highly  visible,  hence  vulnerable,  and 
had  to  have  antiaircraft  artillery  and 
seaekB'  gBneratoT  detachm^ife  to  pr@^ 
tect  it.^ 

At  Cottbus,  in  Germany,  Panzer  Ab- 
teilung  300  was  c  rating  its  equipment 
for  a  move  to  the  Crimea.  It  operated 
demolition  vehicles  known  as  GOLI- 
ATH Standing  about  2  feeChi^ 
and  weighing  less  than  half  a  ton, 
looked  like  a  midget  World  War  I 
rhomboid  tank.  It  could  be  steered 
over  distances  up  to  a  half  ttiile  by  wires 

■CliMiles  B.  Burditk.  "DORA.  Tlie  Germans  Big- 
gest <.uii."  Militim  Rfviiiv  llll'.ltil),  12— lb:  Lusiii; 
Seovt  Wenjjini'..  p.  1^1);  Ail  AhL  (imit/l  ,y5  5.  la  Nr- 

17142.  Eimatz  KarUirrtirl.  II. -I. -12:  I.IV  A.K..  la  Nr. 
Bl  >I42,  Vnrl»'iri/ung  dci  Angrijfi  aji/  SevasUipul,  10.4.42; 
AUK  II.  In  \r.  I444MX  Einsaiz  Kwf-GiTBgt,  tQ.'t.'tZ, 
AOK  IJ  aS(i,')4/a  file. 


310 


MOSCX?W  TO  STALINGRAD 


attached  to  a  coniiol  panel.  The  150 
pounds  of  superhigh  explosive  it  car- 
ried made  it  most  effective  in  confined 
spaces,  but  its  blast  could  knock  out  a 
fuUy  secured  tank  in  the  open  at  a 
radius  of  as  much  as  50  yards.* 

In  the  winici.  the  OKH  chief  of 
artillery  had  looked  at  DORA  and  pro- 
nounced it  to  be  "an  extraordinary 
vvoi  k  of  art  but  useless."*  So  also,  in 
fact,  were  GAMMA.  KARL,  and  GO- 
LIATH. Thev  were  out  of  place  in 
mobile  war.  tin  (u\ iiae  ks  to  V^erdiin  and 
1916 — but  tlien  so  was  Sevastopol.  As 
an  objective  in  any  strategic  sense  it  was 
equally  useless.  I'ven  General  Man- 
stein,  the  commander  of  Eleventh 
Army,  whose  own  worlt  of  ait  tihe  oper- 
alion  was,  (xtold  n(.>t  sav  it  would  a©^ 
coniplish  easfte  iliau  the  release  of 
"three  to  Fotw  divmon^  ftom  what 
\\  <  HI  Id  <  ttherwise  be  an  extended  siejc;e.  ' 

Hitler,  who  found  it  difhcult  to  resist 
a  challenge,  especially  oneasvis^lie  aB 
Sevastopol,  also  liad  doubts.  In  Hurec- 
tive  41  of  5  April  1942,  he  desipuite^ 
Sevastopol,  the  kerd>  Peninsula,  and 
I  he  IzvLnii  bulge  as  the  targets  for 
preliminary  operations  before  the 
main  summer  campaign.  When  on  16 
April  he  appt  oved  l.leventli  Arnn  s 
plan  for  the  Kerch  operation,  he  also 
reviewed  one  for  Seva.stopol,  Stoer- 
I  \\(;  ("sturgeoai  catda"),  hut  put  off 
deciding  whento  etecute  it.  By  May,  he 
had  in  mind  starting  the  main  f^en- 
sive  in  mid-June,  and  on  the  24th.  he 
said  Blau  1  would  have  to  start  on  15 
June  even  if  it  meant  giving  up  ^ 
Sevastopol.  A  dieck  by  the  OKW  Opea^ 


'AOK  II.  ii,  Sr.  isni-f2.  l-ins^  vmjirmdmitm 

SprfHgilujttnirgern.  2  5.5.72.  .VOK.  11  286S4/4nte. 
Vl<ilil,-i  D„i>y.  vol.  in,  |>. 
"Marislciii,  Verbreitr  Siggr,  p.  262. 


ations  Staff  then  indicated  that  SroERr 
FANG  probably  would  have  to  be 
abandoned  because  it  could  not  begin 
enough  ahead  of  Blau  1  to  be  given 
full  air  support  for  more  than  three  or 
four  days.' 

On  die  night  of  26  Mav.  Hiiler's 
thinking  took  a  new  turn.  The  final 
reports  of  the  Kharkov  battle  were 
coming  in,  and  he  believed  the  speed  oi 
the  victory  permitted  "favorable  in- 
ferences to  be  drawn  with  respect  to 
the  entire  enemy  siuiation."'  C'.i>u- 
sequendy,  it  was  not  necessary  any 
longer,  he  said,  to  hold  rigidly  to  the 
schedule  se)  foi  Bl.AU.  It  could  he 
postponed  for  a  while.  He.  thought  it 
more  important  to  strike  fast  atid  de- 
stroy more  So\  iet  units  \s  hile  they  were 
Still  luider  the  shock  of  Kharkov,  lb  do 
that  he  wanted  two  new  operadOns: 
one  northeasi  of  Kharkov  near  Vol- 
chaiisk,  the  other  east  of  the  Donets 
River  in  the  Izyum  area.'  The  first 
became  Operation  Wilhelm.  Tlie  sec- 
ond, which  had  an  antecedent  in  the 
original  FfeTOERietiS  plans,  was  desig- 
nated Friderk  I  S  II.  Wii.HELM  and  Fri- 
0ERICUS  II  and  the  postponement  of 
Blait  adso  prodded  ti^^  jfor  Sto^ 
f  ANc;,  whicli  Mansfiem  C3fp«aiBd  to  have 
ready  to  start  on  7  JUiie, 

The  artillery,  some  six  hund^d' 
]iieces  in  all,  intluding  the  lieaviesi. 
opened  fire  on  the  Sevastopol  delenses 
on  2  June.  The  VllI  Air  Corps  joined 
in.  DORA  and  KitRL concentrated  on 
tlie  forts  north  of  Sevemaya  Bay  and 
claimed  hits  on  one&  the  Germans 
caUed  Maxim  Gorkiy  I,  Malakov,  and 


\)KW,  Slelh:  WFSl,  KriegsgescliiclUlKht  Ableilung. 
Krwg'.iugebMl).  1.4. -W.6.42.  2  ami  5  Apr  42.  24  May 
42,  l.M.T.  1807  file. 

UMd.,  26  May  42. 


PRELUDE  TO  SUMMER 


311 


German  150-mm.  K-18  Guns  On.N  Firf. 


Wliiic  Cliffs  (apparently  ones  with  the 
Soviet  designations  Pillbox  2,  37,  aad 
3S)."  The  infantry,  meanwhile,  were 
still  being  redeployed  from  the  eastern 
end  of  the  peninsula. 

The  defendei's  wwc  l  earh  .  as  i  each' 
as  they  GOilld  be.  Adnural  Oktyabrskiy  's 
Seoastopei  D^knsg  Regim  had  worked 
throuj^h  till'  winter  to  bring  in  men 
and  supplies,  and  Oktyabrski^  had 
been  toM,  on  1§  May,  to  i»ake  his  fiaal 
])rt:']xirati()ns.  On  thai  dav  aho, Crimean 
Front  had  gone  out  ol  existence,  and  the 
North  Cesucams  Tkmter  had  become 
North  Caiifd.siis  Front.  Still  under  Mar- 
shal Budeiiny,  it  had  the  missions  of 
hoI(£iiag  Sei^stopol  and  preventing  a 
Geitnan  crossing  from  Kerch  to  the 


•See  Vaneyev,  Gemchfskaya  obomm,  p.  112, 


Taman  Peninsula.'"  General  Petrov's 
Independmt  Maritime  Army  had  eight 
full  strength  divisions  and  sc\cral  bri- 
gades and  separate  regiments.  The  de- 
fenders also  liad  mh&txt  ^  hundred 
ariillcrv  pieces,  although  none  were 
equal  to  the  heaviest  the  Germans  hadj 
lathd  thdr  strength  is  given  9$  ii^ivmu§ 
been  188,000  men  (and  some  «r0Qicxi), 
106,000  of  them  in  "line  units."*^ 

Matiiitdn  mov^  i&m  im  forward 
tommaiid  post  on  ihe  night  of  6  June. 
U  was  situated  in  a  sheltering  valley 
dii%ctly  ^hind  tbia  &(mt,  about  nitd- 
way  on  (he  perittieei^r.  From  a  nearhv 
height,  he  could  look  out  over  the 


'"IVMV.  vol.  V,  [J.  i:vi, 

"IVOVSS.  vol.  11.  p.  KIT.  See  .iko  IVMV,  vol.  V.  p, 
132:  V'OV  (Kr/ilhiyn  hlimyu).  p.  (60;  and  VsncyeV, 
Gnokheskaya  nbomm.  pp.  24^-57. 


$12 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAJD 


tances  were  not  great,  at  most,  sixteen 
iiiilcs  east  to  west,  louricen  miles  nortli 
to  south.  The  LIV  Corps  stood  on  the 
north  with  foui"  divisions  and  a  rein- 
Forcetl  regiment.  TIjc  XXX  Corps  was 
on  tlif  south,  with  thicc  divisions,  and 
Rumanian  Mountain  Corps  occupied 
ilie  center  with  two  divisions.  The  ar- 
tillery was  ahnost  all  on  the  north,  not 
by  choice  bm  beciuise  the  roads  in  die 
center  and  south  wcw  liopelessh  inad- 
equate for  moving  gin  is  and  ammuni- 
tion. The  north  also  afforded  tlie  only 
viable  line  of  attack.  The  center  crossed 
the  western  rim  of  the  Yaila  Mountains, 
a  jumble  of  ridges  covered  with  sci  ub 
forest.  The  south,  almost  equally  rug- 
ged, offered  one  attraction,  steep-sided 
valleys  covering  a  road  that  ran  from 
the  coast  near  Balaklava  northwest- 
ward to  Sevastopol,  but  the  ground  was 
studded  with  obstacles,  and  the  fields 
of  lire  for  artillery  were  restricted. 
There  the  GOLIATHS  would  have  to 
be  tried  as  substitutes  for  artillery.  An 
attack  in  the  center  promised  nothing; 
from  the  south,  not  much  more;  but  ii 
ones  were  not  made,  the  defense  could 
concentrate  entirely  on  the  north, 
wliere  the  approach  was  only  some- 
what less  forbidding.  Everywhere  away 
from  the  &^st,  the  daytime  tem- 
[H  r.itures  In  Jtuie  leguterly  rose  above 
100°  F.'^ 

The  mfantry  attack  began  on  the 
north,  in  the  LIV  Corps  sector,  at  dawn 
on  7  June.  The  XXX  Corps,  whicli  had 
ndt  fully  redeployed  its  units  from 
Kerch,  would  have  to  wait  another  four 
daj^s.  Humaniaa  Mouriitain  Corps'  misr 
siofi  nm  to  WE  domi  die  dei^)^  in  i^e 
center.  Having  had  the  wuii@r  and 


'*MansleiJi,  VeiUiinu'  Sivgi:  pp.  263-72. 


spiiiig  to  ^  ready,  the  defenders  were 
prepared*  even  naving  swastika  flags 
liiat  they  intended  to  lay  out  to  confuse 
the  German  aircraft.  (Map  27.) 

In  the  late  afternoon  on  the  7th, 
after  LIV  Corps  reported  having  not 
yet  found  a  single  w^k  spot,  Hider 
sent  word  through  Army  Group  South 
that  the  operation  would  ei- 
ther have  to  make  headway  fast  or  be 
stopped  and  converted  again  into  a 
siege.  Hider  was  seeing  Wilhelm  and 
Fridericus  II  as  a  pair  of  quick,  cheap 
virtoiies,  and  he  now  tied  Stoerfang  to 
them.  He  wanted  to  start  Wilhelm  on 
7  June,  Fridericus  II  on  the  12th,  and 
have  both  of  them  and  Stokrfang 
completed  in  time  to  begin  Blau  I  on 
the  2(Ml'«» 

VKIhelm,  Ridencus  fif 
attd  Stoerfang 

While  Stokriang  had  about  it  the 
aspect  of  head-on  encounter  o£  the 
World  War  I  style,  Wk.helm  and  Fri- 
dericus II  depended  on  maneuver  to 
an  extent  that  made  them  almost  re*mi- 
liiscent  of  the  eighleenUi  ceniiny.  A 
matched  setof  ete^nt  double  envelop- 
ments, they  were  designed  to  achieve 
tactical  effects  beneficial  to  Blau.  cut 
into  the  Soviet  defensive  strength,  and 
accomplish  a  p.sychological  mission 
HiUer  had  set  for  tlie  prelimmai  y  oper- 
ations in  Directive  41,  namelv,  to  re- 
store the  German  troops'  confidence 
and  "hammer  into  the  enemy"  a  sense 
of  inferiority." 


"AOK  H.  In  KiHii^lnnrlm,/,  A'r  12.  7  IL'.  AOK  11 
2«fi.'i4/l  file;  OAVV,  ifcZ/f.  WtSl.  Knegsgesrhuhtliche 
Abtntung,  Kneg^tagibuiek,  lA.~3Qj6.42,  !  Jun  42, 1.M. 
T.  !«07  file. 

^*OKW,  WFSl.Si:  '•y6l6!l2.  Wemmg  Xr.  -11.  MA2, 
German  High  Level  Diietiives.  CMH  files. 


PRELUDE  TO  SUMMER 


313 


MAP  27 


WiLiiLLM  would  trap  the  Soviet 
Humty-eightli  Army  in  what  was  left  of 
the  Volfcliaiisfc  salient  and  provide 
cover  on  the  south  for  Sixth  Army's 
main  thrust  in  Blau  i,  which  was  to 
carry  nssr^eastwafd  &e  m^mif 
of  Belgorod.  Tlie  objectives  M  Fri- 
DERicus  II  were  to  encircle  the  Soviet 
I^^if^  smdTMrty-d^A  Arrrdes  no«3b  afid 
east  of  Izyum  and  bring  the  First  Pan- 
zer Army  front  east  thirty  miles  into 


starting  position  for  Blau  II.  on  the 
Oskol  River  below  Kupyansk.  The  Itey 
to  both  operalfoiis  -vms  ttl  f^atKEer 
Corps.  Tlie  attack  in  Ma\  across  llic 
mouth  of  the  Izyum  bulge  had  brought 
ie  north  tett*  fee^iktJi  Aitey  sector.  Fbr 
WiLHELM,  it  was  attached  lo  Sixth  Army 
and  was  to  strike  northeastward  aJong 
itoe  Buritik  Riwr  to  Iotm  sottiimi 
arm  of  the  envelopment.  For  Fri- 
DERicus  II,  it  would  revert  to  First 


314 


MOSCOW  TO  SmiNGRAO 


Wsmzee  Army,  make  a  Sflf*  tram,  and 
bear  east  and  south,  past  Kupyansk,  to 
complete  the  second  encirclement 
from  the  north  and  bring  itself  into 
position  for  Bl  AU  11.'^ 

On  the  Soviet  side.  Marshal  Ti- 
nioshenkov  commander  of  Soofym^em 
Theater  and  Southwest  Front,  and 
KJirushchex  and  General  Bagramyan, 
bo^  members  of  Ms  Staff,  knew  th^ 
were  headed  for  more  trouble,  but  not 
how  much  or  what  to  do  about  it.  On 
29  May,  they  sent  aa  Appraisal  t&  Ibe 
Stavka  predicting  renewed  German  at- 
tacks in  "five  to  ten  days."  However, 
Tinioshenko  and  his  two  staffs,  both 
tlieater  and  front,  believed,  as  the  Stavka 
and  the  General  Staff  apparendy  also 
did,  that  Ihe  big  G^^nimn  drive  on 
Moscow  was  also  about  to  begin  and 
regarded  wiiatever  might  happen  in 
the  south  as  secondary.*®  Nevertheless^ 
Timoshenko  knew  he  would  need  rein- 
forcements, and  not  wandng  at  that 
point  to  face  Stalin  hiinself,  he  per- 
suaded Khrtishchev  and  Bagramvan  to 
go  and  ask  f  or  them.  They  found  Stalin 
less  reproachful  t^ism  tikcy  had  ex- 
pected. Bagramyan  says  one  of  Stalin's 
outstanding  characteristics  as  a  war- 
time leader  was  his  "iron  self-control." 
And  they  were  given  reinforcements, 
but  not  on  a  lavish  scale — 7  rille  divi- 
sions, 2  tank  corps»  and  4  tank 
brigades.^  ^ 

In  WiLHEL.vi,  speed  was  the  first  es- 
sential, as  it  was  also  for  FridE3UCUS  H, 
The  envelopments  would  be  shallov?^ 


"■AOK  6,  la  \r.  l9W!-42.  Anmrhij/'hl  .\r.  47.  10.5.42, 
AOK  6  22:l'.)!/7  hk-:  .\rm,'ejrruppi'  imi  Kl/'iit.  lii  Nr. 
43142,  1.  Wmtii!^  jun  FlUDEIiK  VS  2..  !y.6.42.  P?. 
AOK  1  2517y/4  hlu. 

"n'.MV.  u;\.  V.  |v  13«.  Set-  .dsn  Musk.ilenko.  Nu 
yiii^"-:.itl>ii'lru>ni  tuifiiiii'lftm.  ]>,  1221. 

'  'Bagraiiiyaii,  I'ak  sidi  my  h  pubede,  p.  131. 


©ot€5iiQ;ptionaBy  difficult  to  evade,  and 
wet  weather  in  May  had  kept  the  roads 
muddy.  The  first  week  of  June  was  dry 
and  sunny,  with  tempieratllfiBS  io  tlie 
80s  until  the  6th  when  an  ovcixast  sky 
dropped  the  temperature  twenty  de- 
grees and  brought  intermittent  rain- 
squalls.  Becatise  of  the  rain.  III  Panzer 
Corps  reported  that  its  tanks  would 
have  ha^  B^J^^g  on  level  ground  and 
might  get  stuck  on  inclines,  and  IV  Air 
Corp.s"  landing  strips  became  too  soggy 
to  let  loaded  StiiJms  and  bombsM  ^MSke 
off.  Sixth  Array,  which  had  been  ready 
to  start  WiLHELM  on  the  7th,  ordei  ed  a 
day's  delay. 

VVltile  Sixdi  Army  waited  one  flav 
and  then  anoUier  for  the  ground  to 
dry  enough  to  let  WiuJOSUIJ  begin,  Elev- 
enth Army  clawed  its  way  into  the 
Sevastopol  north  front  at  a  disconcert- 
ingly slow  pace.  Tlie  heavy  artillery 
scored  hits  on  the  Ibrts,  biU  it  was  all 
but  useless  against  the  hundreds  of 
natural  and  man-made  caves  that  gave 
the  defenders  cover  and  interlocking 
fields  of  fire  in  seemingly  endless  com- 
binations. The  infantry  had  to  deal 
with  these.  645  of  them  in  the  first  five 
days,  and  at  a  high  price,  10,300  casu- 
alties. On  the  8th,  Manstein  already 
wanted  to  bring  the  46th  Infantry  Divi- 
sion in  from  Kerch,  which  HiUer  would 
not  allow,  although  he  added  that  he 
wanted  Stof.rfang  to  continue  as  long 
as  it  had  a  "chance"  to  succeed.  Ihe 
ehance  did  not  appear  Icj  be  much  of 
one,  especially  after  XXX  Corps  began 
its  attack  on  the  lltli  and,  as  Field 
Marshal  Bock,  the  commander  of 
Army  Group  South,  observed,  accom- 
plished "notliiitg  at  aU."  On  the  12th, 


"*M)iC  6,  tik^mng-rihtriliini;  Ktk^gd^  Nr.  IZ^  6 
Jun  42.  AOK  6  22835/1  hie. 


MAP2S 


316 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAJ) 


Bock  demanded  a  silaaticm  estimate, 
and  Manstein  answered  that  lie  be- 
lieved he  could  complete  the  operation 
if  lie  had  three  more  infantry  reg- 
iments. Bock  passed  the  e.stimate  to  the 
OKH,  adding  that  one  thing  was  cer- 
tain; without  the  ii^^nisrcements  Man- 
stein wanted,  Stoertang  was  a  hopeless 
case.^* 

Iti  the  meantime,  Wilhelm  had 
started  on  10  June,  and  for  Bock,  the 
first  days  results  had  been  "gratify- 
ing."^" In  spite  ^'octasional  rain.  III 
Panzer  Corps  crossed  the  Burkik  River, 
after  capturing  two  bridges,  and  Ijegan 
the  advitfice  upstream.  The  VIII  Corps 
did  even  better  north  of  Volchansk.  It 
took  three  bridges  on  the  Donets  and 
was  passing  Volchansk  on  the  northeast 
by  late  afternoon.-'  (Map  28.) 

During  the  night  on  the  lOdi,  Bock 
had  gone  by  train  from  Poltava  to 
Kliarkov  to  be  with  III  Panzer  Corps 
the  next  day.  He  arrived  at  the  front  in 
tJie  early  afternoon,  just  in  time  to 
ivitness  a  downpour  that  in  less  than  an 
hour  engulfed  the  tanks  in  niud.-^  The 
VIII  Corps,  mostly  infantry,  kept  mov- 
ing in  the  rain  and  reached  Belyy 
Kolodez,  ten  miles  southeast  of  Vol- 
chansk, in  the  late  afternoon.  The 
tanks  were  supposed  to  have  been 
there  to  meet  it,  but  they  were  thii  ty 
miles  away  on  the  Burluk  River.-'' 

Wlicn  Bock  had  arrived  back  at  Sixili 
Army  headquarters  after  dark,  he  had 


'MOX  n.  la  Knegsiagetmch  Nr.  12.  8-12  Jun  42. 
AOK  11  28654/1  He;  B^ekDmff.  (MenJI,  11-12  Jua 

42. 

"'Borli  Di/in.  (hlen  II.  ]()  Jum  42, 

-'AOK  (>.  I'ltfhi inigtdlitfiluiig  Ktiegilagebuch  Nr.  12,  10 
Jun  42.  A<  )K  (1  22855/1  hie.' 

"/ior/.-  DfwjT.  Oslni  II.  1 1  Jun  42. 

-MOA  6.  Fnthriaigwibtt-ihmgKn^^lagtikii^Nr..I2,  U 
Jun  42.  AOK  6  22855/1  file. 


learned  what  General  Paulus,  the  com- 
mander of  Sixth  .'Vrmy,  had  known  foi 
several  hours,  namely,  that  Twenty- 
e^bth  Army  had  ab^tadctfied  ils  &imt 
west  of  the  Donets  and  was  marching 
east.  Throughout  the  day  on  the  12th, 
III  Panzer  Corps,  under  orders  from 
both  Bock  and  Pauhis  to  forget  about 
everything  else  and  close  the  encircle- 
ment, ground  its  way  nrjrth,  while  Sti- 
viet  columns  headed  southeast  past 
Belyy  Kolodez  and  out  of  the  pocket 
At  the  last,  before  it  made  the  contact 
in  the  midmorning  on  the  13th,  III 
Panzer  Corps  had  to  hght  through 
several  Unes  of  iei  tanks  dug-in  to 
hold  open  the  pincers'  jaws.  There- 
alter,  the  mopping-up  went  quickly, 
bringing  in  24,800  prisoners.** 

WTiile  Wit-HELM  was  not  quite  living 
up  to  its  expectadons,  Stoerfang  was 
looking  more  and  more  like  a 
throwback  to  World  War  1.  The  LIV 
Corps  took  the  fort  known  as  Maxim 
Gorkiy  I,  with  its  heavy  naval  guns  and 
underground  galleries,  on  the  13lh. 
One  of  the  armored  turrets  had  been 
shatterefl  befbiehand  by  fire  either 
trom  KARf  or  DORA.  There  were, 
though,  a  dozen  similar  fons  north  of 
Severnaya  Bay  and  hundreds  of 
smaller  emplacements.  Army  Group 
South  gave  Manstein  one  fresh  infan- 
try cegiment,  let  him  exchange  two 
worn-out  regiments  from  LIV  Corps 
for  46th  Infantry  Division  regiments, 
and  prepared  to  send  him  thJee  jttore 
regiments. 

But  Bock  was  getdng  impatient.  He 

imd  counted  on  having  tfee  air  utiits 


Jun  42. 

"AOA  //,  1(1  Kriegoa^huik  Nr.  12,  Jura  42, 
AOK  11  28654/1  8Ie. 


PRELUDE  TO  SUMMER  Sl7 


MAP  29 


fydm  Sevastopol  in  time  to  start  Bl.AU 
on  the  20th,  and  he  observed  tliat  it  did 
not  tmikc  sem6  K»  imj^  ttte  troops  for 
the  main  operai^ora  sByiding  by  their 
loaded  vehicles  1s4l3llS0  place  to  go.  On 
the  13th*  He  lecmsidet^  going  ahead 
with  Blau  I  and  leaving  the  planes  on 
the  Crimea.  That  idea  evaporated  the 


next  day  when  lie  noted  wil^i  &&■  plea- 
sure at  all,  "FRiDERicus  11  h^iS  siirfaced 
again.***  Apparetttly  he  had  tlitwi^iiC 
Fridericus  II  would  be  forgotteSt-. 
Hitler,  who  was  vacationing  in  BavaTl^* 
had  ticft  shdwfi  may  tttMt  interest  ks 


^Bock  Diary.  Osten  II.  12-14  Jun  42, 


318 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


it — or  in  BlAU  either  for  that  iartattei*— 
and  the  OKH  had  seemed  to  sym- 
patliize  with  Bock's  concern  about 
ianie.  late  m  !he  r%Iit  itf  th<&  14#i,  itihe 
OKH  relayed  an  order  FroiTi  Hiiler  lo 
execute  Fridericus  II  and  begin  JBlau  1 

^  tfte  L!*/?i(w//>  can  fee 
firom  BuDERK  L's."  The  earlie^fost  day 
for  Blau  I  would  be  the  23di*^  Mean- 
while, STtaERFANG-WOld^ieS^ntffl^ 

After  having  had  ail  fenpression  the 
day  before  Uiat  the  Sgifltt  infantry  was 
weakening,  LIV  CieirfKS  mkAe  a  big 
sweep  on  the  17th,  taking  six  forts — 
Bastion,  Malakov,  Cheka,  G.P.U.  Sibe- 
fia,  and  Volga^-^aitd  driving  a  wedge 
thrtrngh  almost  to  the  north  shore  of 
Severnaya  Bay.  On  the  18th,  while  LIV 
Corps  engaged  North  Fort  and  hut* 
teries  at  the  month  of  the  bay,  XXK 
Corps  pushed  two  spearheads  through 
to  the  Sapun  Heights.  Next  they  woiild 
ha\e  to  clear  the  approaches  to  the  bay 
and  the  heights.  Then  tliey  would  face 
the  ftmer  dfefeum.*®  Manstein 
fiar  lime  to  regroup  the  infantry  and 
*eposiUon  the  artillery,  time  which 
Bc^k  temtrked  wouM       Isenefit  the 

Tmamms  ll  was  scheduled  to  begin 
the  lt»3»,  fettt  because  of  daily  min- 
storms  was  not  ready  until  the  20th. 
and  did  not  actually  begin  until  the 
mmiMg  1^  the  2M.  The  111  PaMe)e 
Gor^s  again  was  the  main  foice.  Its 
mission  was  to  strike  east  from  the 
vidnity  of  Chuguyev  to  Kupyansfe  and' 
tinn  south  along  the  Oskol  River.  On 
the  south,  XXXXI V  Corps  was  to  cross 
the  Donets  between  Izyum  and  the 
of       Oskpl  and  head  north. 


14Jtin  42. 

''"AOK  II.  1(1  Krirgslagehitrh  Nr.  12.  16-18  Jun  42, 
AUK  II  286.WI  tile; 
"Boe*  Diary,  Oiten  it,  18  Jun  42. 


in        iri  Panzer  Corps  went  halfway 

to  Kupvansk  on  the  first  (Ia\  and  be- 
gan turning  diree  divisions  south,  witli 
Banxer  tJ^^crti  tn  flue  lead.  The 
XXXXIV  Corps  took  a  bridgehead  on 
the  Donets.  The  next  morning,  every- 
whef^  beK^^eti  Kctpy^ask  and  Iseyinn, 
the  Soviet  units  were  on  the  march 
toward  the  OskoL  Overrunrung  some 
dF  tfeese,  iMt  Panzer  Dfiefetoft  was  int® 
the  northwestern  quarter  of  Kupvansk 
by  nightfall.  In  the  late  afternoon  on 
the  24tih,  §H  Panzer  IMvisidfi,  foinf 
south,  met  the  10 1st  Light  Division, 
coming  north,  at  Gorokhovatka  on  the 

Oskidl  iMsriteBast  of  Izynsi^  mii 

DERicus  II  was  (  ompleted.Ift  isw^faore 
days,  die  pockets  were  mopped  tip  and 
First  Panzer  Army's  tally  of  ptwtners 
reached  22,800.'"'  (Map  29.) 

Bock  congratulated  First  Panzer 
Awny,  saying,  "The  First  Panzer  Army 
can  look  on  its  latest  victory  with  justi- 
lEcaMe  pride."  Kleist  added  his  own 
^hatife  %>  the  officers  and  the  troops, 
including  our  young  comrades  from 
the  Labor  Service."'''  At  the  higher 
£a»i£tttnd  lieveis,  though,  the  teatfibns 
to  FRiDERictiS  II  and  Wi  Lit  elm  were 
mixed.  As  ba^CS  went,  they  had  been 
easy,  biit  Ifiey  had  aliSO  brought  in  com- 
paratively few  prisoners.  Talking  to 
General  Haider,  chief  of  the  General 
SteiS;  Bofek  Spmilat«!d  that  the  Rus- 
sians were  waiting  for  the  Americans  to 
intervene  and  had  decided,  until  then, 
tj»         txpQ^mg  tbsas^ves  to  big 


'"Pz-AOkl.  Id  Nr.  43142. 1.  Wmungjuir  Frideriats.2.. 
1X6.42.  Pz.  AOK  1  23179/4  RIe;  Pi.  .AOK  I,  la 
Krifg.ilagebufh  Nr.  8.  22-26  jun  42,  Pz.  AOK  1  24906 

S5(il)'i  nie. 

■"Pz.  .AOK  I.  la  i&%sifc^aSMcS  JVe  8,  2^  Jim  42.  Bt, 
AOK  1  24.906  file. 


PRELUDE  TO  SUMMER 


319 


defeats. '^^  One  Sixth  Army  staff  paper 
stated,  "The  Soviet  capacity  for  resis- 
tance has  declined  markedly  in  com- 
parison with  the  previous  year.  The 
infantry,  in  particular,  lacks  spirit."^^ 
Another,  also  from  Sixth  Army,  added, 
however,  "The  objective  of  enemy 
operations  in  1942  will  be  to  slow 
the  German  advance  to  the  Don  and 
the  turn  toward  the  Caucasus.  .  .  , 
[The  Soviet  Armies]  will  evade  envel- 
opments and  attempt  to  build  new 

Stoeij'ang  Computed 

By  the  time  Wilhelm  and  Fridemcus 
II  were  finished,  Stoerfang  had  gone 
too  far  to  he  stopped  without  looking 
like  a  defeat  but  not  far  enough  to 
bring  an  end  in  sight  The  LIV  Corps 
deared  the  north  shore  of  Sevemaya 
Bay  on  the  23d,  and  thereby  unhinged 
the  outer  defenses  in  the  center  and 
the  south  as  well.  But  XXX  Corps  and 
Rumaniaii  Mountain  Corps  needed  an- 
other four  days  to  bring  themselves 
face  to  face  with  the  line  of  the  Sapun 
Heights.  When  they  had,  Eleventh 
Anay  confronted  the  inner  Sevastopol 
perimeter.  To  breach  it  from  the  north 
meant  crossing  the  bay,  which  acted  as 
a  half-milc-w idc  moat  diat  could  be 
raked  by  artillery  and  small  arms  fire 
from  the  steep  south  shore.  'Pi-Otti  Tn- 
kerman.  at  the  head  of  ihe  iiay.  the 
Sapun  Heights  ran  almost  due  souths 
fbicming  a  right  angle  with  die  bay.  A 
Goniiiiuous  escarpment  broken  only  by 
one  road,  the  heights  had  lost  none  of 


^^Bnck  Ditny,  (hien  11,  24Jun  42. 

'"AOK  h,  hIAO.  Bmrti!ibtngderFm^agf  tim24.6.42i 
AOK  (i  ;«)15rV5  hie. 

■'MOA"  6,  l/i.  HeurtMlmg  ier  FtivALtgf  ^  Z4.S.4-2, 
AOK6  3(J15ij/52  file. 


their  natural  defensive  potential  since 
the  British  and  French  had  used  ihem 
in  the  Crimean  War  to  hold  oil  a 
Russian  relief  army  while  besieging 
Sevastopol  on  tiie  other  side.  Behind 
them,  slill  la\  at  least  one  other  line, 
more  forts,  and  the  city  itself. 

On  the  22d,  the  day  after  Tobruk 
had  surrendered  in  North  Africa, 
Manstein  had  asked  Haider  to  try  to 
persuade  the  OKW  to  have  the  British 
garrison  commander  flown  to  the 
Crimea  so  that  he  could  be  dropped  by 
parachute  into  Sevastopol  as  evidence 
of  the  surrender.  Because  Tobruk  had 
become  a  symbol  of  resistance  by  with- 
standing a  siege  in  1941,  Manstein  had 
said  he  anticipated  "a  strong  demor- 
alizing elTect."^^  It  was  an  idea  that 
ignored  practicality,  and  the  Geneva 
Convention  as  well,  and  no  more  was 
heard  of  it  or,  for  several  days  follow- 
ing, of  anything  better.  On  the  24th, 
Eleventh  Army  designated  U-day  as 
the  day  on  which  LIV  and  XXX  Corps 
would  simultaneously  attack  the  inner 
defenses,  but  it  did  not  say  when  U-day 
would  be  or  where  or  how  the  attacli 
would  be  made. 

Finally,  on  the  26th,  Manstein  de- 
cided to  gamble  on  sin  prise  and  strike 
straight  across  the  bay.  After  dark  on 
the  28th,  engineers  eased  a  hundred 
assault  boats  flown  llie  rock  bank  into 
the  water.  At  0100  on  die  29th,  the 
boats  pushed  off,  carrying  troops  from 
the  22d  and  the  24th  Infantry  Divi- 
sions. Artillery  was  ranged  and  ready 
along  the  entire  length  of  the  shore  but 
under  orders  not  to  open  fire  until  the 
enemy  did.  The  first  wave  was  across 
and  landed  east  of  the  city  before  the 


11  28654/1  file. 


defense  reacted.  From  then  on  artillery 
spotters  on  the  north  shore  and  in  the 
teachhead  brought  down  fire  wher- 
ever Soviet  guns  showed  tlicinselves. 
The  XXX  Corps'  artillery  opened  fire 
oatiby&'Sapun  Heights  just  as  the  assault 
boats  were  landing,  and  its  infantry 
iHGWred  oiu  a  half-hour  later  By  early 
afternoon,  LIV  Corps  had  a  solid 
beachhead  and  XXX  Corps  a  foothold 
on  the  heights.  Manstein,  expecting 
still  to  have  to  besiege  the  dtjr,  oed^ed 
Ijfjtli  coi  ps  to  carry  the  atKlck  west  past 
Sevastopol  to  Cape  Khersones. 

On  the  30th,  LIV  Corps  took  Fort 
Malakov,  a  refurbished  relic  of  the  Cri- 
mean War,  on  the  city  hne;  XXX  Corps 
cleared  the  Sapun  Heights  and  broke 
into  Balaklava.  the  defensive  anchor  on 
the  south  coast;  and  VUI  Air  Corps 


and  the  artillery  mounted  a  day-long 
bombardment  designed  to  paralyze 
the  f#siMt3a«e,  partietiforif  inside 
Sevastq^.f* 

Meanwhile,  the  garrison  had  run  out 
of  reser\  cs  and  was  using  its  last  am- 
miniition.  rations,  and  water.  (Surface 
warships  and  submarines  had  biou!j;hf 
in  another  25,000  men  antl  tr>.00(t  tons 
of  stipplies  during  Jinie.)  Early  on  the 
30th,  Oktyabrskiy  asked  Marshal 
Budenny,  coHiBaaiider  of  tlie  North 
Caucasus  Front,  to  cancel  a  planned  di- 
versionary lancQtlg  at  Kerch  and  or- 
dered him  to  OTgaMM  ail  evacuation. 
The  Stm>ka\  approval  came  during  the 
night,  and  Oktyabrskiy  departed  by  air 


""Ibid.,  24-30  Jun  42, 


PRELUDE  TO  SUMMER 


321 


Id  take  charge  of  the  evacilatiiin  M 

\o\  orossiysk,  leaving  B^stt^v  in  com- 
mand at  Sevastopol.^^ 

Tkaing  the  tught  on  flic  30th,  the 
gat  rison  Iroops  began  withdrawing  to 
Cape  Klieisones  and  other  likely  evaic- 
uation  p€jiitB.  Over  the  next  four  dajv, 
while  some  rear-guard  actions  went  on 
and  a  few  bypassed  forts  held  out, 
several  hundred  officers  and  other  pri- 
ority persoiinc]  of  the  Blark  Sea  Fleet, 
Snristf/pol  Defense  Region,  and  Indepen- 
ile)it  Coastal  Army  were  evacuated  by 
air.'"*  The  last  of  the  forts  to  fall  (on  4 
July)  was  one  the  Geimans  called 
Maxim  Gorkiy  II,  on  Cape  Folient.  It 
was  the  strongest  and  most  modern  of 
die  whole  Sevastopol  t()tn[>lex,  and  se- 
lect Independent'Coastal  Army  personnel, 
including  women,  defended  it.  appar- 
endy  expecting  to  be  evacuated  by  sea. 
The  ships  did  not  come,  however,  smSi 
those  ot  tlif  defenders  who  refused  to 
surrender  were  buried  alive  by  the 
Eleventh  Army  engineers  as  they  de- 
molished the  fort,  and  its  underground 
galleries.^' 

The  battle  ended  on  4  July.  Eleventh 
Army  counted  "over  90,000"  pris- 
oners.'"' According  to  ihe  History  oj  (he 
Second  Wbrld  War,  the  cost  to  the  Elev- 
enth  Army  was  "approximately 
150,000"  casualdes  (a  figure  whicii 
seems  high).' ' 

On  5  Julv.  Manstein  staged  a  viciory 
celcbiaiion  lor  the  corps,  division,  and 
regimental  commanders  and  bearers 
of  the  Knight's  Cross  of  the  Iron  Cross 


'"VOV  (Kratkaya  hmriya).  p.  160:  IVMV.  vo!,  V,  p. 
135;  Vanevev.  Grmkhnkaya  obomna,  p.  3X3f. 
'"/I'Ol'i'.S,  vol.  II.  p.  410.  See  also  Vaneyev, 

Geniieheihiya  obamm,  pp.  312-20. 

^KWK  I'l.  la  Kri^a^tbutk  Nr.  i2.  <ijul42,  AQK  U 

28654/1  hie 

"'Manslfiii.  Vi'ihrmi'  Siege,  p.  282. 
*WMV.  vol.  V.  p.  137. 


and  the  German  Cross  in  Gold.  He  had 

received  his  promotion  to  field  mai  shal 
three  days  earlier.  For  the  Eleventh 
Army  officers  and  troops,  Hider  au- 
thorized the  Krim  Srhlhl  ("Cr  inica 
Shield "),  a  bronze  patch  with  an  oudine 
the  Crimea  and  the  ntimerals  "IM:!" 
and  "1942"  in  low  relief,  to  be  worn  on 
the  left  sleeve  beiow  the  shoulder.  It 
t»as  one  of  only  four  similar  devices 
awarded,  the  olhet  being  for  Narvik 
(1940),  Kholm,  and  Ucmyansk,  all  of 
which  were  victories  by  narrow  mat^ 
gins.  On  the  Soviet  side,  the  medal  "For 
Defense  oi  Sevastopol"  was  instituted, 
and  39,000  were  awarded.  On  8  May 
1965,  the  Presidium  of  die  .Supreme 
Soviet  awarded  to  the  city  of  Sevastopol 
the  Order  <i£  I«^;^d  tlie  Gold  Star 
medaL*? 

Jl^t0i!fift0iifirBkiu 
Bock's  Plan 

Bock's  entiy  in  his  diary  for  29  April 
reads,  "In  the  evening,  on  the  insis- 
tence of  the  OKH,  the  first  draft  of  our 
directive  for  the  [summer]  offensive 

was  hastily  thrown  together."^''  Taken 
by  surprise  and  ni)t  having  liad  time  to 
do  terrain  studies  or  sohcit  projjosals 
from  I  he  armies.  Bock  and  his  staff  had 
done  the  draft  entirely  as  a  desk  exer- 
cise. Contrary  to  past  practice,  there 
also  had  been  practically  no  con- 
sultation between  the  army  group  and 
the  OKH.  Hitler  had  been  in  Berlin 
and  at  the  Rcrghoj  and  had  been  tend- 
ing to  diplomatic  affairs.  Bock  had 
been  on  leave  for  twelve  days,  and 
Haider  had  gone  to  Berlin  for  a  week 
beginning  on  the  27th  to  audit  lectures 


*»BpcA  Diflfj,  Osten  11,  29  Apr  42. 


322 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


at  the  War  Academy  and,  among  oilier 
things,  to  have  liis  tecrh  fixed.  Al- 
thougli  DiiL-ttisc  41  had  bctn  daifd  5 
April,  it  had  not  reached  Army  Group 
South  until  after  the  10th,  while  Bock 
was  on  leave,  and  he  had  not  seen  it 
until  the  23d.''* 

Aside  from  the  contents  of  Directive 
41,  about  all  Bock  knew  was  that  divi- 
aaOHS  were  beginning  to  m^e  into  It  is 
area,  that  he  would  receive  an  addi- 
tional panzer  army  headquarters,  and 
that  at  some  point  in  Blau,  Army 
Group  South  would  be  divided  in  two. 
He  did  not  know  how  many  divisions 
were  lo  come,  nor.  probably,  didatty- 
body  else.  General  Hoth,  the  com- 
mander of  Seventeenth  Army,  had 
been  told  just  before  he  went  on  leave 
that  when  he  returned,  in  May,  he 
would  take  command  of  Headquarters, 
Fourth  Panzer  Army,  which  was  being 
transferred  from  Army  Group  Center. 
On  14  April,  Hitler  had  ordered  the 
OKH  Organizadon  Branch  to  set  up  a 
new  army  group  headquarters  that 
would  come  tender  Field  Marshal  List, 
who  had  commanded  tlic  1941  cam- 
paign in  the  Balkans  and  had  been 
there  since  as  the  Southeastern  iTie- 
atcr  t  (iiiuiKindcr.  Bock  had  been  in- 
formed tliat  List's  headquarters  would 
come  into  Emu  sometime  after  the 
operai3on  stilted  and  would  have  pri- 
mary resp0ii$ibiUty  lor  the  advance 
into  the  Caiicasus.  What  Bock  did  not 
know — and  he  would,  doubtless,  not 
have  been  flattered  if  he  had — was  that 
several  days  before  he  ga\'e  the  order 
to  cicale  the  new  army  t;n)Li|).  Hitler 
had  said  tliat  he  wanted  only  the  best 


**HMrj  liiary,  vol.  III,  p.  435:  Bodt  Dhrf,  Ostmtt, 
10-22  Apr  42. 


commanders  used  in  the  all  impoFtsmt 
drive  into  the  Caucasus.'''' 

Army  Group  Soudis  Duecuve  1, 
mitteia  ^  iJjie  m^A  'vS  29  April,  was, 
consequei^y,  not  much  more  than  a 
detailed  expansion  of  Directive  41.  The 
three  phases  of  Blau,  as  given  in  Dieee' 
tive  41,  were  the  framework.  Tlie  one 
new  element  was  the  introduction  of  a 
second  army  group  headquarters. 
Bock  and  his  staff  assumed  that  they 
would  retain  exclusive  command  until 
Blau  11  was  completed.  Thereafter, 
they  projected,  Headquarters,  Army 
Group  South,  would  become  Head- 
quarters, Army  Group  B,  and  List  and 
his  staff  would  take  over  the  south 
flank  as  Headquarters,  Army  Group  A. 
From  then  on.  Army  Group  B's  mission 
would  be  to  hold  a  line  from  Kursk  to 
Voronezh  and  along  the  Don  River  to 
the  vicinity  of  Stalingrad.  Army  Group 
A  would  take  the  main  responsibility 
for  Blau  III,  the  drive  to  Stalingrad, 
and  would  be  solely  responsible  for 
planning  and  executing  the  advance 
into  the  Caucasus  (Blau  IV). 

For  Blau  1,  Army  Group  South  had 
on  the  left  Second  Army,  Fourth  Pan^ 
zer  Army,  and  Hungarian  Second 
Army — temporarily  combined  under 
General  Weichs,  the  commanding  gen- 
eral. Second  Army,  as  Armeegruppe 
Weil  lis — and  on  the  right  Sixth  Army. 
Fourdi  Panzer  was  lo  make  the  main 
thrust  east  of  Kursk  to  Voronezh.  Sec- 
ond Army  would  cover  Fourth  Panzer 
Army  on  the  left  and  build  a  front 
from  the  Army  Group  Center  bound- 
niy  lo  the  Don  north  of  Voronezh. 
Sixth  Antty,  at  Belgorod,  eighty  miles 

«0A7/,  (.,;,St:ltl.  Org.  Mil..  Krii-g.'.lagiliiKh.  f,iin,l  lit, 
14  Api  \2.  11  l/'Jia  file;  OKW,  WFSi.  Knegsgesclitcht- 
lifhi-  Mieiluug.  Knegsb^tlmck,  1.4,-30.6.42, 11  Apr 42, 
LM.T  1807  Hie. 


PRELUDE  TO  SUMMER 


323 


Field  Marshal  von  Bock  (seaied  m  ear) 


south  of  Kursk,  would  put  its  mobile 
divisions  under  Headquarters,  XXXX 
Panzer  Gorjps  for  a  seeaiidaly  dirust  to 

Voronezh.  Just  short  of  the  halfway 
point.  Fourth  Panzer  Army  and  XXXX 
ifmazer  Corps  would  each  divert  one 
panzer  division  off  their  inner  flanks 
toward  Suiryy  Oskol  to  create  a  pocket 
that  would  be  tightened  and  cleaned 
out  b\  Hungarian  Second  Army  and 
some  of  the  Sixth  Army's  infantry. 
After  taking  Voronezh,  Fourth  Panzer 
Army  would  make  a  fast  right  turn, 
pick  up  XXXX  Panzer  Corps,  and 
drop  soul  1 1  ioriv  miks  along  the  Don 
to  Korotoyak  where  it  would  be  in 
position  for  BlaI'  U.  Hungarian  Sec- 
ond Army  and  ek  incins  i  it  Sixlii  Ai  niy 
would  mop  up  the  Blal  I  area,  wliile 
the  Sixth  Army  main  body  also  tui'ned 


south  and  ranged  itself  on  Fourth  Pan- 
zer Arniys  right.  If  the  offensive  were 
t&  begin  approximately  on  15  June, 
Army  Group  South  expected  to  finish 
the  first  phase  during  the  second  week 
of  July. 

In  Bi  AC  II.  First  Panzer  .^rmv  would 
strike  east  oi  Kliarkov  along  the  noi  th 
sideof  dte  Donets,  and  Fourth  Panzer 
Armv  would  continue  south  along  the 
Don.  I  heir  points  would  meet  midv\a\ 
between  th^  livers,  noi  th  of  Miller o\  (i. 
On  the  way  and  in  conjunction  with 
Sixth  Army,  they  would  divert  forces  to 
divide  the  large  pocket  b^ag  formed 
between  llietn  into  two  or  three  smaller 
ones.  Italian  Eighth  Army,  on  First 
i'an/cr  Army's  right,  would  make  a 
sliori  diive  south  of  the  Donets  to 
Voroshilovgrad.  Blau  II  would  be 


324 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


completed  in  the  second  week  uf  Au- 
gust and  end  on  a  line  from  Bogiichar 
on  die  Don  to  tlie  coiilluence  of  the 
Oerkul  and  the  Donets,  its  center  ap- 
proximaTel\  180  miles  due  west  of  Sta- 
lingrad. Just  before  Blal  II  began, 
Headquarters,  Army  Group  A,  would 
take  command  of  Italian  Eighth  Army. 
Seventeenth  Army,  and  Eleventh 
Army,  which  by  then  was  expected  to 
have  come  out  of  the  Crimea  to  take 
over  the  front  on  the  Mius  Ri\  er  west 
of  Rostov. 

Before  Blau  111  began,  .Army  Group 
A  would  take  control  of  First  Panzer 
Army  and  Fourth  Panzer  Army.  It 
would  then  use  Eleventh  and  Seven- 
teentli  Armies  to  take  Rostov  and  oc- 
cupy the  eastern  Donets  Basin  and  the 
two  panzer  armies  lo  clear  the  lower 
Don  and  develop  the  main  thrust  to 
Stalingrad,  Army  Group  South,  by 
then  Army  Group  B,  would  participate 
ill  Blal  III  with  Sixth  Army,  which 
would  advance  east  along  the  right 
bank  of  the  Don.  When  Blau  111  was 
comjjlcted.  Army  Group  B  would  have 
Setond  Army,  the  allied  amiies,  and 
Sixth  Army  dug-in  on  a  front  from  the 
Army  Group  Center  boundary  to 
Voronezh  to  Stalingrad  and  from  then 
on  would  cover  the  rear  of  Army 
Group  A  as  its  armies  headed  south 
act  OSS  the  lower  Doti  towErd  the 
Caucasus,*^ 

1%e  Buildup 

In  the  fust  week  of  May.  General 
Greiffenberg,  who  had  been  Bock's 
chief  of  staff  at  Army  Group  Center 
and  would  be  List^,  be^n  assembling 


*«0&M1».  dtr  H.  Cr.  Sufd,  la  Nr.  820142.  Weisung  Nr.  I 
Jwr  dm  0#^^  1942,  30.4.42,  Pte.  AOK  1 25179/? 
file. 


the  Army  Group  A  staff  in  Z^siSn,  the 
OKH  compound  at  Zossen  south  of 
Berlin.  Two  \veeks  later,  he  took  a  for- 
ward echeltin  to  the  Army  Group 
South  headquarters  in  Poltava  and 
from  there  dispatdied  an  advance 
party  to,  SteMno,  which  would  be  llie 
Army  Group  A  headquarters.  Until  it 
look  control  in  the  front,  the  staff 
would  go  under  ihc  cover  name 
"Coastal  Staff  Azov."  To  preserve  se- 
curity, Hider's  orders  were  that  no  new 
unit  symbols,  flags,  or  other  identifying 
markings  were  to  be  introduced  in  the 
Army  Group  South  area  until  Blau 
began,  and  the  other  staffs  coming  in 
were  also  assigned  cover  names.  Fourth 
Paixzer  Army  became  "Superior  Spe- 
cial Purpose  Staff  8."  Si.x  coi  ps  head- 
quarters were  designated  I'ortress 
staffs.  Division  headquarters  became 
"sector  staffs."^" 

Between  Match  and  late  jime.  new 
arrivals  from  die  west  and  from  /\rmy 
Group  Center  brought  the  Array 
Group  South  strength  to  65  divisicms, 
of  these  45  were  infantry,  5  light  infan- 
try, 4  motorized  infantry,  and  1 1  panzer 
divisions.  Twenty-five  allied  divisions 
brought  the  grand  K^tal  to  90.  This  was 
5  more  than  Bock  had  estimated  he 
would  need  in  the  February  proposal, 
but  the  alUed  divisions,  being  smaller 
mi^  W&ft  lightly  armed,  even  leaving 
a^idc  any  questions  about  their  perfor- 
mance, could  not  be  rated  as  equivalent 
to  more  than  half  their  number  .^rf 
German  divisions.  The  German  troops 
probably  numbered  close  to  a  million 
men.  The  allies  added  anotlur 
300,000.  The  panzer  divisions  had 
spaces  for  1,900  tanks,  but  hardly  any 


''Ohhh.  d.  li.  C„.  Sueit.  tii  Nt.  1131/42, Hffmmgfiur 
Opnatum  BUtu,  12.5,42,  H,  Gr.  Dwi  554?9/2. 


PRELUDE  TO  SUMMER 


325 


had  their  full  alloiments.  Since  they 
were  being  refitted  in  or  near  the  front 
and  some  were  in  action  until  late  June, 
it  was  impossible  to  tell  how  manyfeuiks 
thev  had  in  opcratin<(  rondicion  at  any 
one  lime.^"  Houe\er,  increasing  num- 
bei  .s  of  tanks  were  carrying  long-bar- 
reled 50-mm.  (on  Pan/er  Ills)  and  75- 
mm.  guns  (on  Panzer  IVs)  that  tests 
showed  were  capable  of  knocking  out 
Soviet  T-34s  from  all  angles,  though 
in  the  case  of  die  Panzer  Ills,  only  at 
ranges  less  than  400  yards.*'  A  tank 
desis^nccl  to  be  superior  to  anv  of  die 
Soviet  models,  the  Pander  VI  "Tiger" 
that  mounted  an  88-mm,  gun,  had 
been  expected  tt>  be  ready  in  dme  lor 
Blau,  but  its  deljiii  had  to  be 
postponed  in  May  and  again  in  June 
because  of  mechanical  troubles.^"  On 
the  other  hand,  the  oulpuf  of  75-nnn. 
heavy  antitank  guns  had  been  unex- 
pectedly high,  and  Hitler  ordered 
to  be  usetl  to  the  maximum, 
esp^fidlly  on  the  static  front  Second 
Army  would  be  building  west  o\ 
Voronezh.^^  Ihe  hitch  was  that  until 
anuttui^on  producuon  picked  up  in 
the  summer,  there  would  be  only  70  to 
150  75-mm.  rounds  per  gun.  including 
those  mounted  on  the  Panzer  IVs,  and 
only  30  to  50  rounds  woiUd  be  of  the 
most  effective  armor-piercing  types. 
Consetjuendy.  the  ^Ui  and  CSU^  crews 
would  have  to  be  very  sparing  with  the 


•OJtH.  Org.  Ab!..  ih  \r  s^-li-12.  Clinlmtug  und 
Kampfkraft  der  Verbai-ndr  iiml  Tritpjini  dn  H.  Gr.  Sued. 
27.5.42,  H  1/382  file;  S,li,'m,ilis,he  Kiiigsglittlrtun)^  d,  r 
H.  Gr.  Sitril.  .Slum!:  2-1.6.42,  In  Hauck,  Die  Ofierationen 
der  diiiluhni  Heeiesjriuppen  an  dor  C3lijfh)Ttl,  SitedHdM 
GitbtH.  Ti-il.  111.  MS  P-114C, 

AOK  I,  la  Kjiggst^^Stit  i^  $pe4&tTz. 
AOK  J  24906  file. 

^"OKH.  OnSidH.  Org.  Mk.^Knise^auek,  Band  Bi. 
1  e  Iiiit42.  H  1/213. 

'//w/ ,  ■>  Mav  42:  AOK  2,  /a  Nr.  6^m,  17.6.42, 
AOK  2  29585/9  file. 


75^mni.  ammuniiion.  Second  Army  in- 
structed its  antitank  units  to  use  the  7.'>s 
only  for  head-on  shots.  If  the  Soviet 
tanks  exposed  their  Jess  heavily  ar- 
m()i  ed  sides  or  r^rfi,  they  were  to  be 
left  to  the  3U-mm.  pieces. 

Soviet  Deployment 

The  principal  Soviet  commands  in 
die  Blau  area  were  Bryansk  Front  (Gen- 
eral Golikov),  Southwest  Front  (Ti- 
moshenko).  South  Fnmt  (General  Ma- 
linovskiy),  and  North  Caucasu.\  Front 
(Budenny).  For  the  first  three,  Head- 
quarters. Soulhivt'sterri  Theater,  had  ap- 
parendy  ceased  being  a  fully  effective 
command  before  it  was  abolished  in 
June,  and  Tunosheiiko  and  his  staff 
had  been  engaged  mostly  in  the  cora- 
niiuid  of  Soullni'est  Front  during  May 
and  June.  Sialin  had  told  Timoshenko 
and  Bagramyan  at  the  end  of  .March 
that  Bryansk  Front  woidd  not  be  part  of 
the  theater  much  longer,  and  there- 
after, it  had  been,  as  a  pracucal  tnatter, 
under  Stavku  control.^^  Thef^r/rontv 
together  had  a  total  of  seventeen  field 
armies.  Southivest,  Smth,  and  Bryansk 
Fnmts  had  five  a  [jiecc,  and  North  Cau- 
casus two.  Each  had  one  air  army  at- 
tached. Biyaii.sk  Front  had  the  Fifth  Tank 
Army  in  its  reserve  and  gave  up  one 
army.  Sixi^first,  to  West  Fnmt  on  29 
June. 

In  the  first  week  of  June,  before 

Wii.HFLM  and  FRinFRKi's  II,  .^rmv 
(iroup  South  i.iUulated  tliai  it  would 
have  to  contend  with  91  So\ii(  lilie 
divisions,  32  rifle  brigades,  20  cavalry 
divisions,  and  44  tank  brigades. 


■'■Bjgraiiuiiii.  Ink  shl:  m\  A  fxiliede,  p.  62. 

'■7/,  Gr.  Surd,  k/AO,  VtrmuUte  Ftindkrarjle  vor 
Hreresgruppe  Sued.  Staifi4.i.^,  S  Jun  42.  H.  Gr.  Sued 
75124/1  file. 


326 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


These  were  the  estimated  combined 
totals  for  fi)-y/in.sk,  Sdiilhwest,  and  Sotilli 
Fwiits.  For  them,  as  ot  1  July,  the  Jiislmy 
of  the  Second  Wjrld  War  gives  81  rifle 
divisions,  rifie  brigades,  12  ca\alr\ 
divisions,  and  62  tank  brigades  with 
totals  of  1.7  million  troops  and  2,300 
tanks. "'^  Army  Group  South  intel- 
ligence estimated  another  36  rifle  divi- 
sions, 16  rifle  brigades,  7  cavalry  divi- 
sions, and  10  lank  brigades  were 
deployed  in  the  Caucasus.  Grechko 
gives  the  strength  in  the  Caucasus  in 
June  as  17  rille  divisions,  3  rifle  bri- 
gades, 3  cavali  y  divisions,  and  3  tank 
Imgaules.  As  is  usual,  the  Soviet  hgurcs 
apparently  do  not  include  the  available 
Stovkti  reserves.  Foiu"  reserve  armies 
were  stationed  behind  the  Don  River, 
to  the  rear  of  Biyansk  and  Smithwest 
Fronts — at  Stalingrad,  Tambov, 
Novc^Ehopersk,  and  Novosnninskiy-^ 
and  two  weie  farther  back,  at  Saratov 
and  Stalingrad.^' 

In  die  view  of  Stalin,  xhe  Stavha,  and 
the  General  Staff,  Bryansk  Fmnl  was 
strategically  the  most  critical  frtint  of 
the  four.  Its  right  flank,  north  and  east 
of  Orel,  covered  the  Tula  approach  to 
Moscow,  and  its  let  t  flank  straddled  die 
Kursk- Voronezh  axis.  Geamtid  AxiaOSi 
M.  1.  Ka2ako\',  who  was  at  the  time 
Golikov's  thief  of  staff,  has  said,  as  has 


"AWV,  \"l  \*,  ))  M  l  L'sirii;  tlic  fijiincs  given  in 
TyushkevK  li.  \  inn''  ■■ih  ip.  284).  ihe  average 

strength  <>f  a  lank  brigade  would  be  56  tanks,  or  a  total 
«tf  B,472  for  62  brigades.  Elsewhere,  the  actual 
strength."!  of  tank  rnrps  at  Bryato*  FronI  in  June  19-12 
are  given  as  'M  KVs,  88  T-34s,  and  68  T-60s,  ftji-  ;i 
total  of  181):  a  brigade  strength  of  approximateh  <»(); 
and  a  total  fur  (i2  brigades  of  H,7121).  From  (his,  ii 
appears  that  the  2,300  figure  excludes  all  T-fiO  tanks. 
See  M.  Kazakov,  "N<i  vi!irinrzh-\hnm  iinpravlenii  lelnm 
1942  goda,"  Voymno-uUincliehkn  Zintmnl,  H>  (l<Wvl). 
28n. 

9»Grechlto.  Ca^  voyirf,  p.  182;  IVMV,  vol.  V,  map  9. 


VasUevskiy,  l&at  two  possible  German 
thrusts  were  considered,  one  from 
Orel  via  Mlsensk  toward  Tula  and  one 
from  Shchigry  {northeast  of  KtttS^C.) 
toward  \'oronezh,  and  the  first  Was 
t  ousidcred  the  most  likely.''*' 

On  23  Apnl,  l^eStavka  ordered!^ 
likov  to  prepare  a  drive  on  Orel  to  run 
concurrently  with  Timoshenko's 
IShdrk^rv^  oBTemif^gi  Golikov  could  not 

get  ready  on  time,  and  after  the  Ger- 
man 1  oLiiuerattack  began,  all  ol  his  air 
suj)[)()t  t  had  tobadiverted  to  Smit/niTsI 
Front. For  the  operation,  Golikov  had 
been  given  5  tank  and  2  cavali  v  corps, 
\  l  iile  divisions,  and  4  tank  brigades.'"'^ 
lliose  stayed  with  the  front,  and  in 
June.  Golikov  was  getting  ready  to 
counterattack  in  either  of  the  two  antic- 
ipated directions  of  German  attack.  His 
reserves,  on  28  June,  consisted  of  2 
l^BSlIry  corps.  4  rifle  divisions.  6  lanfc 
corps  (including  2  in  Fifth  Tank  Amy 
and  2  being  Iranslerred  trom  the 
north  flank  of  Southwest  Front),  and  4 
tank  brigades,  a  total  of  1,640  tanks.  Of 
ifiese.  191  were  KVs,  650  were  T-34s, 
and  799  were  older  models  and  T— 60s. 
One  problem  Golikfn  had,  according 
to  Kazakov,  was  that  the  General  Staff 
liad  activated  the  tank  armies  and 
corps  without  giving  guidance  to  their 
commands  oi  the fmnt  and  arm)  ctjin- 
ottands  as  lo  how  dief  were  to  be 
employed." 


""Ka/akov,  "Mimnezh.'.km  napravlenii,"  p.  30.  See  also 
V;isitevskiy, /3cfo.  p.  219.  Sec  p.  'M)7f. 

"*'Kii/akov,  "Vimnt'iJishm  napranlenh."  p.  29f. 

'"Viisilevskiy,  Delo,  p.  219.  Kazakov  gives  the  rein- 
Inn  t-infnt.s  rereived  from  ihe  Stai'ka  reserves  in  .'\pril 
;ind  earl)'  May  as  4  tank  corps,  7  rifle  divisions.  1 1  rille 
brigades.  4  lank  brigades,  and  "a  signifirani  niitnbei 
of  artillery  rfgiments."  Kazakov,  "Vorontzhsluim 
napravlenii p.  28n. 

Kazakov,  'Mummhskm  mpmulem,'  ]^p.  30-32. 


PRELUDE  TO  SUMMER 


B27 


New  75-mm,  SELK-RiamiED  Assault  Gun  at  Bbactice 


On  the  Eve 
Army  Girmp  South'.s  Rcadiiu'ss 

Concurrently  with  the  OKW's 
broader  analyses  of  H^tefatajt^A* 
strenj^ih,  the  OKH  Organization 
Braiich  made  a  study  of  Army  Group 
South's  readiness  for  the  summer 
fensive  in  terms  of  its  basic  units,  the 
divisions,  i  he  study  disclosed,  in  the 
hrsi  f>lace,  that  whereas  formerly  all 
divisions  of  one  tvpe,  say  infantry, 
could  be  assumed  to  be  nearly  idendcal 
in  quality,  tliat  was  no  longer  true.  Hie 
divisions  for  Blai  woukl  fall  from  the 
outset  into  Uiree  categories.  In  the  first 
were  fifteen  infantry  aiad  six  panzer 
and  motoii/ed  divisions  which  were 
either  new  or  fully  rebuilt  behind  the 


front.  I  hey  would  be  at  full  allotted 
strength  and  would  have  ttiad  tiine  to 

Ici  (Iieir  cxjx  rieiKed  troops  rest  and  to 
break  in  the  replacements.  The  second 
category,  conlislit^  of  seventeen  infan- 
try and  ten  panzer  and  motorized  divi- 
sions, would  be  the  same  as  the  first, 
but  divisions  would  be  rebuilt  in  the 
front,  and  there  would  be  no  time  to 
rest.  In  ihc  third  caiegory  were  seven- 
teen infantry  divisions,  a  good  quarter 
of  tlie  total  number,  that  would  neither 
be  rested  noi  fully  rebuilt.  1  liey  would 
be  at  "approximately"  lull  strength  in 
personnel  and  material,  hm  ihev  would 
be  short  on  officers  and  nouconunis- 
sioned  officers,  and  they  would  have  to 
depend  on  the  output  of  the  repair 
shops  lor  equipment. 


MB 


MOSCXjW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


In  all  three  categories,  iCMflfe  c&mm 
iiad  been  cut.  The  infantry  divisions' 
supply  trains  would  be  horse-drawn, 
and  every  dnf^btt  Wcnild  to  take 
about  a  thousand  of  the  so-called 
young  troops,  eighteen-  and  nineteen- 
year  olds  who  had  no  mot«  thas  toght 
weeks'  training.  In  the  panzer  divi- 
sions, the  rifle  battalions  would  be  re- 
duc^^  ft*Oin  five  t6  fotir  eotnpanies. 
The  panzer  and  motorized  divisions 
would  also  have  fewer  tracked  person- 
nel-carrying Vehicles.  They  would 
reach  about  80  percent  of  full  mobility, 
but  about  20  percent  of  that  would 
hme  to  be  attained  by  using  trucks  and, 
in  consetjiietH  e,  would  entail  some  loss 
of  cross-country  capability.  Since  there 
was  nothing  in  reserve,  all  equipment 
would  have  to  come  from  current  out- 
put, which  meant  that  the  schedules 
for  rebuilf^ng  could  not  be  aceetet- 
ated,  and  tlnantic  ii5aicd  losses  in  pre- 
liminary operations  could  not  be 
replaced.** 

Army  Group  South  looked  at  the 
same  divisions  in  terms  of  probable 
perCdrmance  atid  edfiiiihided: 

Owing  to  diverse  composition,  partial  lack 
of  battle  experiencQ^cid^lpS  in  didrout' 
fitting,  the  units  araiiaWe  for  (Jie  suftunef 
operalioii  in  1942  will  not  have  the  combat 
ett'cctivencss  that  could  be  taken  tot 
Ljianted  at  the  beginning  ol  the  campaign 
in  the  East.  The  mobile  units,  too,  will  not 
have  the  flexibility,  the  endurance,  or  the 
penetrating  power  they  had  a  year  sigo. 
The  commands  will  have  to  be  aware  <tf 
this,  and  in  assigning  missions  and  set- 
ting objectives,  they  will  have  to  take  into 
account  the  composition  and  battJc-wor- 
thiness  of  the  uidividual  divisions.  The 


""O/lW,  Org.  Ahi..  (I)  Nr.  854142.  Ctiederung  und 
Kampptmjt  di  r  Verbm-ruie  unti  Truppvn  detM.  Sited, 
27.5.42,  H  1/382  file.  See  pp.  293-96. 


attack  elements  will  have  to  be  put  togethct 
witb|»auiiaiakiBg  caie." 

The  question  was  how  .serious  the  Rnws 
Wotild  be.  Army  Group  South  saw  rea- 
son fer  «x>ncern.  Others,  closer  to  the 
front,  were  downright  worried,  as  the 
following  letter  from  General  Paulus, 
commander  of  the  Sixth  Army,  txi  1^ 
corps  commanders  indicates: 

Recently  numbei  s  of  reports  have  come 
to  my  attention  and  that  of  tlie  higher 
leadersliip  in  which  ilivision  coinniaiiders 
have  described  the  condition  ot  dieir  divi- 
sions with  extreme  pessimism.  Ttm  I  mti- 
not  tolerate. 

The  personnel  and  material  dehd^^es 
afflicting  the  divisions  are  well  known  to 
the  higher  leadership.  Nevertheless,  the 
higher  leadership  is  determined  to  carry 
out  its  intentions  in  the  eastern  theater  of 
war  to  the  full.  Therefore  it  is  up  to  us  to 
get  the  most  out  of  the  troops  in  their 
present  condidon. 

I  M^Uest  that  you  exert  influence  on  the 
dS\nsaon  oommanders  in  this  sense.** 

OperatKin  Kreml 

After  Kharkov,  the  strategic  inidative 
reverted  to  the  Oefmans;  any  dbtibis 
about  that  fact  that  mighi  have  lin- 
gered on  either  side  no  longer  existed. 
Wehsme'  as  iMs  mks  to  Hider  fof  its 
effects  on  his  own  troops'  and  the  en- 
emy's morale,  by  presumably  putting 
the  Soi^  mmh  Hank  oa  ik6  defensive 
alert  it  could  afso  impair  Blau  s  chances 
for  a  smooth  start.  Surprise  was  going 
fee  less  to  achieve— and  more 
essential.  On  the  one  hand.  Hitlci  had 
seen  to  it,  in  person,  that  the  deploy- 
ment for  BLAtJ  ivi^  carded  out  in  great- 


"H.  Cr.  Su/-d,  la  Nr.  820142,  Anlagi-2,  Rkhtlmien  fuer 
die  Kmnpffmhntng,  30.4.42.  Pz.  AOK  I  25179/7  tile. 

"I)«r  O.B.  ^  6,  /a  Nr.  55142,  an  die  fiermt 

Konam^^m^  4.S'.4^  AOK  iS  39S+2/7 


PRELUDE  1 0  SUMMER 


329 


est  secrecy.  All  new  headquarters  and 
units  were  billeted  well  away  from  the 
front,  in  scattered  locations,  and  dis- 
guised as  elements  of  the  permanent 
rear  echelon.  At  the  heigiit  of  the 
Kharkov  battle,  to  prevent  giving  their 
presence  awa\,  Hitler  had  refused  lo 
put  in  any  of  the  new  troops.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  new  troops  were  still 
untested,  and  the  losses  and  wear  and 
t^r  on  men  and  e()uipment  in  the 
veteran  tinits  that  hsid  fought  at 
Kharkov  were  not  going  to  be  made 
good  in  time  for  Blau.  The  Directive 
i«ss  to  de^tfoy  the  Me^m.  mim 
{<mm,  hm  having  tik^  mk  #He  ^ert 
and  on  the.  Ssene  at  tti£  stait  imnM  be 
very  iticoiavenieiit. 

All  in  an,  it  was  wonliwhilc  to  do 
wiiatever  could  be  done  to  divert  Soviet 
attention  away  fironi  die  soutfo  fihailk. 
The  mission  fell  to  Army  Group  Cen- 
ter, which  was  low  on  rousde,  but — 
because  oF  its  jwwtimity  to  Mbscow — 
high  in  potential  for  niinRting  So\ici 
notice.  On  29  May,  Headquarters, 
Army  Group  Center,  isstied  a  top  se- 
cret directive.  The  first  sentence  read, 
"The  OKH  has  ordered  the  earliest 
possiMe  resutnptiow  of  the  attaek  oil 
Mf)sco\v."  All  subseqitent  correspon- 
dence regarding  the  uperation  was  to 
go  forward  under  me  code  name 
Kreml  ("Kremlin").*^ 

Kreml  was  a  paper  ci^ration,  an 
Odt-and-out  deception,  bttt  ft  had  the 
substance  to  make  it  a  masterpiece  of 
this  somewhat  speculative  form  of  mili- 
tary ast.  In  the  &im  place,  it  «6itiddeii 
with  Soviet  thinking— which,  of  course, 


Gr.  Mille.  la  Nr.  43%0I42.  ISrfM  juer  dm  Angriff 
mt/Mmkau,  29.5.42,  AOK  4  24;i:ifV2r»  file.  On  Ui>i  i  ,i- 
tiiin  KREML  sec  also  Eiirl  [•.  Zk'inke.  'Opeiatitin 
KREML:  DecepUoii.  Sii  ait-gv,  .nul  ihe  Fortunes  of 
Wav,"  Paramelm,  vol.  IX.  1  (1978).  72-82. 


the  Germans  did  not  know.  In  the 
second,  its  premise — to  simulate  a  re- 
peat of  the  late  1941  drive  on 
M0.SCOVV — was  solid;  in  fau.  ii  made 
better  strategic  sense  ilian  did  that  of 
Blau.  The  front,  though  badly  eroded, 
was  close  to  where  it  had  been  in  mid- 
November  1941,  and  Second  and 
TTiird  Panzer  Armies,  which  had  been 
the  spearheads  then,  weie  in  relatively 
the  same  positions  southwest  and 
northwest  of  Mcmcow  that  they  had 
held  when  the  fall  tains  stopped  and 
the  advance  resmned.  The  army  group 
directive,  which  assigned  the  two  pan- 
zer armies  the  identical  missions  they 
had  received  in  the  previous  fall,  could 
have  heen  taken  for  the  real  thing  even 
by  German  officers  who  were  not  told 
Otherwise,  and  most  were  not. 

tm  the  ftr*|k  week  of  June,  the  army 
group  distributed  sealed  batches  <n 
Moscow-area  maps  down  to  the  reg- 
imental level  with  instructions  not  to 
open  them  undl  10  June.  On  that  day, 
army,  corps,  and  division  staffs  began 
holding  planning  conferences  on 
Kreml  with  a  target  readiness  flate  of 
about  1  August.  Security  was  tight,  and 
only  the  chiefs  of  itm  md  hraneh 
chiefs  knew  they  were  working  Oan  a 
sham.  At  the  same  time,  ^le  air  ibrce 
increased  fts  reconnaissance  flights 
fflf^er  anfl  around  Moscow;  prisoiici -of- 
iSSM"  interrogators  were  given  lists  of 
tjtieseions  to  ask  about  the  (kfs  de- 
fenses; and  intelligence  groups  sent 
out  swarms  of  agents  toward  Moscow, 
and  Kalinin.**  Since  very  few 
agents  sent  across  the  lines  in  the  past 
had  been  heard  from  again,  it  could  be 
assumed  that  Soviet  c^ufltefintelli- 


•"W  <:>.  Miue,  laNn  4S?m2,  •Kmd,"  SjSAZ,  AOR 
4  34226/25  file. 


330 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


gence  did  its  work  thoroughly.  That 
the  prisoner-of-war  componntls  were 
loaded  with  Soviet  agents  and  lliat  al- 
naost  every  civilian  in  the  occupied  ter- 
ritory was  at  least  an  indirect  informant 
for  Soviet  agents  or  partisans  also 
could  be  taken  for  granted.  The  barest 
trickle  of  information  would  suffice. 

The  Soviet  postwar  accounts  have 
liule  to  say  about  Kreml.  The  History  of 
the  Serxmd  Wtrld  War,  however,  mentions 
it  twice,  once  in  conjunction  with  an 
actual  order  alerting  Army  Group 
CeBter  to  the  possibility  of  a  radical 
Soviet  weakening  in  the  center  after 
BlrtiD  fee^m.  The  History  describes  the 
operation  as  coinprising  a  "varied  com- 
plex of  desinformation  [sic]"  designed 
to  mislead  the  Soviet  Command  and 
says,  "However,  Operation  Kreml  did 
not  achieve  its  aim."®^  In  the  Popular 
SHentifjc  Sketch,  where  KREML  is  assod^ 
ated  with  the  Soviet  strategic  planning 
in  March  1942,  it  is  said  to  have  been  an 
"attempt"  to  disguise  the  direction  of 
the  inain  attack  and  "arouse  an  impres- 
sion" of  a  strong  offensive  in  the 
Moscow  direction.  "But,"  the  account 
eontipues,  "the  Tascists  miscalculated. 

«ivered  in  good  time  "** 

A's  the  deployment  entered  its  fitial 

stage,  the  timetable  for  Blal'  was  com- 
ing into  tjuestion  from  the  two  alipost 
diametiically  opposed  poinCs  of  view. 
Hitler  saw  Wii  ifi  i.M  and  FRintRiCUS  II 
as  having  demonstrated  tliat  "tiie  So- 
viet ability  to  resist  has  become  substan- 
tially weaker  in  comparison  with  tlie 
previous  year,"  He  believed  die  phases 


"Hvm:  vol.  V,  ptp.  121,  f 43. 

"•KOV;  p.  138. 


of  Blau  would  be  executed  "more 
easily  and  faster  than  bad  been  as- 
sumed," and  he  talked  aljijiu  taking- 
some  (ihitiions  out  of  Bi  ai  \l  and 
transferring  them  to  Army  (irotip 
Center,  where  they  could  be  used  to 
acquire  jump-off  positions  tor  a  later 
attack  toward  Mosdtw.''"  Army  Group 
South  also  believed  Ulau  would  go 
faster  than  had  been  anticipated,  but 
added,  "The  experiences  in  FrlderxcuS 
II  and  Wii.HELM  have  demonstrated 
that  the  enemy  no  longer  hold$  OJl 
stubbornly  and  lets  himself  be  en- 
circled, hence,  large-scale  withdrawal 
of  his  forces  must  be  taken  into  ac- 
count." The  army  group  considered 
merging  Blau  I  and  Blau  11,  which 
would  give  the  Russians  less  chance  to 
escape  but  would  also  force  First  Pan- 
zer Army  back  into  action  before  it  had 
time  to  rest  and  refit. 

More  immediately  in  doubt  was  the 
starting  date  for  Blau.  After  having 
talked  about  15  June,  Hitler  had  put 
WiLHELM  and  Fridericus  II  into  the 
schedule  and  then  had  gone  to  the 
Berghof  for  a  vacation.  By  the  20th, 
waiting  for  the  rain  to  let  up  enpugh 
f*!RlDERlCUS  II  to  begin.  Boclc  was 
wdtlSed  that  in  the  midst  of  the  pro- 
iDnged  delay  something  untoward — a 
Soviet  spoiling  attack,  for  instance — 
jBlight  occur.  He  did  not  know  it  yet, 
imt  something  already  had  happened. 

Contrary  to  standmg  orders  rein- 
forced by  the  ettraordinai  \  security 
measures  Hider  had  demanded  for 
Blau,  a  23d  Panzer  Bl^ioit  s^lf 
ficsr,  Major  Joajcbjm  Retdhei  had^  on 


'''OKW,  WFSl.  Knegsgeschichtliche  AbUiiung, 
file." 

««0/)fo/ii.  (/.  H  Gr.  Sueil.  Cciintil  .In  I'muirrt,  TotU- 
igkeibbendil.  29.6.42,  H.  Gr.  Sued  343U3  tile. 


PRELUDE  TO  SUMMER 


331 


the  X9th,  carried  plans  I'or  Bi.av  I  with 
himQD  a  flight  in  a  light  airplane.  The 
plane  had  Stipafed  across  tfte  afll 
had  landed  two  and  a  half  miles  M  Oil 
the  Soviet  side.  A  German  patrol  foutid 
it  some  hours  later,  intact  except  for  a 
bullet  hole  in  the  gas  tank.  Reithel.  the 
pilot,  and  the  papers  had  disappeared 
without  a  tra^.  I&ra^days  later  anatJaer 
|jairol  found  two  bodies  but  no  sign  ^ 
the  papers. 

fi5ek%  ft^  reaction,  when  a  report 
reached  him  late  on  the  20th,  was  that 
it  was  high  time  to  start  Blau  before 
the  Russians  couM^plcSt  tiie  t&fenft*- 
tion  they  might  have  arcjiiired.  The 
OKH  apparendy  agreed  and  told  him 
1©  amBge  fer  the  offensive  to  istait,  W 
ordered,  on  the  26th.®''  For  the  deploy- 
tneiit,  the  22d  became  X-day  minus 
fetor,  Wt  tfee  Sail  jdg^Mcuit  tm  utm^ 
depended  on  Hidei;  and  he  was  still  itt 
Bavaria. 

■When  Hitlep  retaimed  i(y  the  Wfs- 
sella lizr  on  the  afternoon  of  the  24th, 
Blau  appeared  for  a  time  almost  about 
to  slip  out  of  sight.  Bdt^t  i*a#  sfffiga*' 
moned  to  report  in  person  on  the 
Reichel  incident,  and  Haider  gi  um  bled 
about  "a  great  agitation  condttdred 
against  ihe  General  StafP  in  the  OKW 
over  the  affair.'"  Field  Marshal  Keitel, 
chief  of  the  OKW,  "visibly  nemouif 
met  B(5ck  on  his  arri\'al  the  next  day 
and  "depicting  the  situation  in  black  on 
^bE^c,"  told  him  that  HMei*  was  ^n- 
vitic^  the  gencials  were  not  obeying 
orders,  was  determined  to  make  exam- 
ples of  some  of  theitt,  and  t^d!  directed 
that  Bock  be  told  not  to  try  to  persuade 
him  otherwise.  Hitier,  however,  ap- 


"^Bock  Diary,  Osten  II,  18-22  |un  42.  See  also  Walter 
Goerlilz,  Pttulwi  and  Stalingrad  (New  Vork:  Citadel, 
m-\),  pp.  1H3-89. 

'"Hfildei- Diary,  vol.  III.  p.  464. 


peared  more  depressed  than  angry 
and  inteijected  only  a  few  questions  as 
Boc^  fold  him  th^  artny  groupis  inves- 
^^ation  had  not  revealed  any  disobe- 
dience other  than  by  the  dead  Major 
Reichel.  ^  he'  or  any  of  the  senior 
generals  suspected  anything  of  tlie 
sort.  Bock  added,  they  would  "inter- 
vmm  »i!ereilessl)t"  W^ct  appeared  to 
isgrfeassured,  and  #£  rest  of  the  inter- 
1iiew,Bock  obseE*id  J^predativeiy,  was 
'**Verf^^dfy.***^ 

By  the  time  Bock  ai  ri\ed  back  in 
Poltava,  Blau  I  was  on  twelve  to  thirty- 
^rik  hours'  staftdby.  the  codei^ord  2>fn- 
kflshwhl  would  be  the  signal  to  start  the 
next  morning.  Aachen  would  postpone 
the  dedsion  until  the  following  after- 
noon. Heavy  rain  was  faUing  all  along 
the  Iront,  and  the  code  word  on  the 
f 6th  was  Am^en.  The  ncstt  afternoon, 
after  consulting  Weichs,  who  thought 
he  could  start,  and  Paulus,  who 
thought  he  could  not  because  of  con- 
tinuing rain,  Bock  sent  out  Dinkclshucld 
to  Armeegruppe  Weichs  and  Aachen  to 
Six&  A«i^.^ 

Blau  was  getting  under  way  at  last — 
but  not  smoothly.  An  hom:  after  the 
code  werds  were  sent,  l^eitd  told  Bode 
by  telegrain  to  relieve  the  commanding 
general  and  chief  of  staff  of  XXXX 
Panzer  Corps  and  the  23d  Pansa^  I>ivi- 
sion  commander.  .A^ I  most  simul- 
taneously, a  plane  carrying  their 
^•eplitcefiaeiits  mnded  M  Mtevra.  Ms- 
mayed  at  having  to  make  conim;infl 
changes  in  crucial  units  at  die  last  min- 
nt#,  Bdck  catted  Haider  and  General 
Schmundt.  Hitler's  chief  adjutant,  who 
told  him  Uiat  Hider  had  been  readiirg 
!&x^  We  m      Rfeiehe!  affsaf  arid  Ijad 


'^Bock  Diary,  Oiteii  II,  2a  Juii  42. 
'■'AUK  6,  id  Kn,-g.it(^eku;h  Nr>  IS.  23-27  Juti  42, 
AOK  ti  22855/1  tile. 


332 


MOSCOW  TO  SXAJULNGRAD 


concluded  diat  an  attempt  was  being 
made  to  shift  the  blame  to  a  subordi- 
nate. (One  report  raised  the  possibility^ 
of  bringing  charges  against  a  clerk  in 
the  23d  Panzer  Division.)  Later,  Hit- 
ler listened  while  Bock  explained  that 
the  charges  against  the  clerk  had 
been  dropped  several  days  before,  but 
when  Bock  asked  whether  he  still 
wanted  tlie  officers  relieved*  JJBlteir  an- 
swered curdy,  "Yes." 

On  the  28th,  the  code  word  for  Sixth 
Army  was  Aachen  for  one  more  da\', 
and  Paulus  began  talking  about  recom- 
mending a  cOart-iiiairtiial  for  6i«ti^f 
over  tlie  Reichel  affair.  Bock  told 
"That  is  out  of  the  question.  It  h  time 
now  to  pemt  jtmr  nose  forward  and 

By  Riid-June,  Xkil^ixm  ttsi4med 
his  reserves  to  meet  the  aiilidpated 
German  attacks.  Fif^  ISink  Army  and 
€dmlry  Carps  were  at  Chern,  on 
the  Orel-Tula  road,  and  V7/  Cavalry 
€0rps  and  two  tank  brigades  were 
sotnewhat  farther  north.  On  his  left 
Hank,  facing  Kursk,  he  had  the  /.  XVI, 
and  ly  Tank  Corps.  By  then,  also,  air 
r^fcQiiHaissattce  had  begun  sighting 
heavy  enemy  traffic  in  the  Kursk- 
Shcliigry  area,  but  these  reports  were 
regarded  as  tes  significaot  ^an  owe 
from  Gcnctal  Staff  intelltgi^^  on  the 
18  th  concerning  ten  Gerj^SOi  infantry 
and  fotir  pamfer  divi^f»is  iaj;p^|«^edly 
massed  near  Yukhiiov,  0ft  Brya/mk 
Fronts  north  iiank/^ 

Ott  20  juttfe,  Ibmts^iiaal^o  tailfced  tb 
Stalin  by  telepilQi^e*  Ifelpad  the  papers 
Reichel  had  been  carrying*  He  told  Sta- 

"fi<«A  Duin.  OsttH  11.  27-28  Jua  ^. 
32. 


lin  there  had  been  three  men  [sic]  in 
the  plane,  the  pUot  and  two  officers. 
Hie  pilot  and  one  officer  had  burned 
to  death  in  the  crash.  Tlie  other  officer, 
a  SP^pr,  had  survived  the  crash  but  had 
Be^fi  kUled  when  he  refused  to  sur- 
render. To  Timoshettko's  report  on  the 
contents  of  the  documents,  Stalin  re- 
plied, "First,  keep  it  secret  that  you 
irave  intercepted  the  directives.  Sec- 
ond, it  is  pKJSsible  that  what  has  been 
intercepted  is  only  part  of  the  enemy's 
plan.  It  is  possible  that  analogous  plans 
exist  for  other  fronts."^^ 

Golikov  had  received  copies  of  the 
documents  from  Timoshenko  on  the 
19th.  On  the  22d,  Golikov  reported  the 
presence  of  "six  or  seven"  panzer  and 
motorized  divisions  in  the  Kursk- 
Shchigry  area.  Two  days  later,  air  re- 
connaissance observed  enemy  columns 
going  souih  ont  of  the  vicinity  of  Orel 
toward  Kursk.  Bombers  and  Shturmovik 
dive-bombers  went  out  to  attack 
thein.'" 

On  die  26th,  Golikov  was  summoned 
to  Moscow,  where  Stalin  told  him  he 
did  no!  l)e!ieve  the  Bijvu  plan  was 
"plausible"  and  that  it  was  a  "big 
trumped-up  piece  of  work  by  the  intel- 
ligence people."  It  was  necessary,  Stalin 
said,  to  beat  the  enemy  to  the  punch 
and  d^  Min  a  'lilQtnr,  and  he  cndesFed 
Golikov  to  be  ready  to  attaek  toward 
Orel  by  5  July. 

Oolikov  and  his  staff  finished  dtatfl- 
ing  the  plan  for  an  Orel  operation  iti 
the  early  morning  hoursj  "between  two 
m&  thtte  o*clodt  *  ott  M  Vmex  th&y 
expected  to  start  wofk  CM  me  *details" 
during  the  day.^^ 


^''A.  M.  Srimsonov.  Stfil.wgra^kkefft-  fife*  i^tjSQ&m 
Izdatelitvo  "Nauka,"  1968),  p.  7S£ 


CHAPTER  XVI 

Operation  BLAU 


At  daylight  on  28  June,  General 
Weichs,  the  commander  of  Second 
Array,  ascended  a  low  hill  slighdy  east 
of  Shchigi  y.  From  the  top,  he  saw,  on 
either  side,  lines  of  ardllery  and  rocket 
launcher  emplacements  still  partly 
obscured  by  the  morning  haze.  Look- 
ing ahead  through  field  glasses,  he 
could  make  out  Fourth  Panzer  Army's 
tanks  standing  in  attack  formations 
with  their  motors  off.  The  troops  were 
nearly  as  immobile  as  their  vehicles  and 
weapons.  For  the  moment,  everything 
that  needed  to  be  done  had  been  done. 
Then,  timed  to  a  second,  die  artillery 
opened  fire  with  a  shattering  crash  and 
salvos  from  the  rocket  launchers 
screamed  away  trailing  plumes  of  white 
flame  behind  them.  Tlie  preliminary 
barrage  lasted  only  half-an-hour,  which 
was  long  enough,  though,  to  give 
Weichs  a  tluc  ,is  to  how  the  battle 
would  go.  The  Soviet  artillery's  re- 
sponse was  slow  and  ragged;  the  en- 
emy might  have  been  taken  by  surprise 
af  ter  all.  When  the  guns  paused  to  lay 
their  fire  deeper,  the  armor  rolled  for- 
wiiixl,  and  in  the  few  minutes  it  took 
lor  the  new  ranges  to  be  set,  the  second 
wave  of  tanks  began  to  file  between  the 
aillUerjr  p€)«itlons.  ^ 

'Maxitatlian  Freiherr  von  Weich*,  TagesmOixen, 
8mid  6,  r«7  /.  p.  1 ,  CMH  X-1026  file. 


The  iTiDniiiig  was  cloudy  and  warm, 
promising  rain.  Soon  most  of  the  ac- 
tion was  not  visible  from  where  Weichs 
stood.  The  offensive  swept  east  without 
a  hitch,  and  the  armor  disappeared 
into  the  distance.  Fourth  Panzer 
Army's  spearhead,  XXXXVIII  Pan/er 
Corps,  had  gone  ten  miles  to  the  lim 
River  by  1200.  There  it  captured  and 
crossed  ail  undamaged  railroad  bridge. 
That  afternoon  it  moved  another  ten 
miles  to  and  acroffii  ttoe  Ksben  River. 
(Mil/)  TO.)  Passin®  1^  Kshc-n  it  on 
the  so-called  land  bridge  to  Voronezh,  a 
five-  to  ten-mile-wide  divide  between 
the  basins  of  the  Oskol  and  the  Sosna 
rivers.  Russian  resistance  was  spotty- 
determined  in  some  places,  feeble  in 
others.  One  thing  was  certain:  the 
enemy  had  not  pulled  out  beforehand. 
Battlefield  evidence,  prisoner*,  dead, 
abandoned  command  posts,  and  so 
forth,  showed  that  all  iJie  units  pre- 
vitsiiaiy  identtB^  were  stiH  fliere  fight- 
ing, ;(i  Ir;isi  ilic\  were  trving  to.  Before 
dark,  XXXXVlil  Panzer  Corps  coveied 
aneffher  iEsSse^,  lAe  ]^t  of  i^ese  in 
heavy  rain.  By  th£ii%  netghbor  on  the 
left,  XXIV  Rsti3^€gtms,^d  drawn  up 
m  Kshen.^  Fof  Sisah  Atmf  the  c^xte 
word  again  was  Afuhm.  wliich  meant 
another  iwenly-four-hour  postpone- 
ment. Tlie  Tsdn  m  tfee  Swt&4»iay  sector 


'AOK  2,  U  IMmtagOuck.  W  VI,  SB  Jun  42,  AOR  2 
29617/2  file. 


334 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


Panzer  III  Tanks  on  the  Attack 


had  almost  stopped  durmg  the  day^  but 
f&m^  V^ez«  stil  impassable. 
At  <^eiseral  G0Kko\  s  B)-yansk  Front, 
Tkirte^nth  and  Fbr^effi  Armies  were  hard- 
hit,  but  his  reserve  tank  corps  and 
brigades  were  intact,  ^ths  JV  and  XXIV 
Mnk  Corps  were  on  the  vmf  from  Sow^A- 
west^Bii^  sold  iSttitSim^  vm&  sending  in 
the  XVn  Timk  Cofps  from  its  reserve, 
which  would  bru^  the  total  comple- 
ment of  tank  corps  to  seven.  Dtmug 
the  day,  die  froiii's  aii  support  was 
increased  by  four  regiments  of  fighters 
and  three  of  Skkmnem^  dive-bombers. 
At  the  day's  end,  (;i>lik<)v  gave  Fortieth 
Army  two  tank  brigades  and  ordered 
the  /  and  XW  Tmk  Corps  to  the  ICshen 
River.  The  tr<>iil)lf  uas,  Kazakov  says, 
that  the,^^  did  not  know  how  capable 
of  "deastve  wc^ti*  the  tmiik  ^rps 


were,  and  Uiere  w«^  jjjpt  enongh  fael 
for  the  fighters  and  ShturmotAh^ 

The  rain  lasted  until  1200  the  ogKt 
day.  In  the  mud,  XXXXVIII  Panzer 
Corps  made  just  enough  headway  to 
confirm  its  breakthrough  on\o  the  land 
bridge.  The  XXIV  Panzer  Corps 
worked  on  bridgeheads  ao^eiss  die 
Kshen.  On  Fouith  Panzer  Arigy% 
right.  Hungarian  Second  Army  0OUld 
not  get  past  tihe  ttm  iRiVef.  It  vm^ 
held  up  less  h\  the  rain  or  hff  Ihe 
enemy  than  by  its  command's  iQ^yiity 
to  stage  a  coottllnated  attack.  Sixtii 
Army  canvassed  its  coips  in  llie  alter- 
noon;  all  of  them  reported  their  roads 
pass^le;  and  FieM  Mafs&iiJi  Bo<^»  f^e 
commander  of  Ariny  Croup  South, 


MAP3§ 


336 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNURAD 


then  issued  the  code  word  Dinkrishiirhl 
lor  Sixth  Army,  effective  at  daybreak 
oothe  30th.* 

While  Fourth  Panzer  Army  was  held 
Up  ^^in  by  rain  on  the  30th,  Sixth 
Army  behaved  like  a  panzer  army  and 
made  a  dean,  tweiitv-mile-deep  break- 
through to  the  Koroclia  River.^  llje 
code  name  Blau,  which  had  been  com- 
proinised  by  the  Reichel  affair,  went 
out  ol  olficial  existence  on  the  30th  and 
was  replaced  by  BftAUNSOfwxio  for  the 
whole  offensive.  Bi.AU  II  became 
Clausevvitz  and  Blau  IU,  Dampfham- 
MER  Cstema  hsdaamet*}^  Vioa^  tf  the 
three  was  going  to  be  much  used, 
however.  Plans  picvioitsly  made  were 
aboui  lo  be  overrun  by  events. 

On  the  30th,  Golikov  had  a  blinil 
wedge  driven  into  his  line.  It  was  bi- 
sected b)  the  Km  sk  Voro»e2bra3road. 
The  /  and  A'V7  lank  Corps  were  on  the 
north  side,  but  the  main  weight  of  the 
German  armor*  XXIV and  XXXXVIII 
Fan/t  r  (^orps,  was  ranged  on  the  rail- 
road and  south  of  it.  The  position  ol 
tlie  panzer  corps  and  Sixth  Army's  de- 
veloping breakdiiough  on  the  south 
presaged  an  encii clement  that  would 
engulf  Fortieth  Arm\'s  left  flank,  lalkutg 
tf)  Stalin  late  in  the  day,  Golikov  re- 
ported that  IV  and  XX/ V  Tank  Carps 
were  moving  "extreiaeif  shawiyi"  a»d 
tht'fmn/  did  not  have  anv  regular  con- 
tact with  them.  1  heXVV/  lank  Curfi.s,  he 
added,  was  coming  west  from  Voro- 
ne/h  but  running  out  ol  dicscl  oil  be- 
cause the  corps  staff  had  not  organi/.ed 
its  fuel  supply  properly.  Golikov  be- 
lieved it  would  be  best  lo  take  Fiuln-tli 
Army'%  left  flank  back  and  out  of  the  way 


of  the  developing  encirclement.  But 
Stalin  insisted  on  a  counterattack  by  IV, 
MKIV,  and  XVIJ  Tank  Corps  near 
Gorshechnoye.  to  stop  the  German  ar- 
mor south  of  the  railroad  and  to  drive 
it  back.  General  Leytenant  Ya.  N. 
Fednrenko,  the  army's  chief  of  tanks, 
had  arrived  at  the Jrunt  during  the  day 
to  OFgaxHze  the  countetattacik.  Flnadly, 
Sialin  admonished  Golikov  to  "keep 
well  in  mind"  that  he  had  "more  than  a 
thousand  tanks  and  the  enemy  not 
more  than  five  hundred."  that  he  had 
over  hve  hundt  ed  tanks  in  the  ai  ea  ol 
the  proposed  counterattack  "and  the 
enemy  three  liundrcd  to  three  hun- 
dted  and  lifty  at  the  most."  and  that 
"everything  now  depends  nn  your  abil- 
ity to  deploy  and  lead  these  forces."" 
During  the  night,  elements  of /V  lank 
Corps  en^a^ed  the  enemy  near 
Gorshechnove ,  and  A'V 7/  Tank  Corps 
"maneuvered'"  in  the  area  .south  ol  the 
railroad  without  getting  into  the  8|^t' 
ing.  .All  ol'  ihe  .\'.\7V'  Tank  Corps  HftstS 
miles  away,  at  No\  \  y  Oskoi.' 

In  the  morning,  on  1  July, Boek  Went 
to  the  Fourth  Panzer  .\rmv  command 
post,  where  he  and  General  Hoth.  the 
army  comi&ander.  agreed  the  army 
would  have  to  head  straight  for 
Voronezh,  "without  looking  lo  either 
side."  Because  ihe  r(.)ads  were  clogged 
with  supply  ctiluinns  bogged  down  in 
the  mud.  Bock  (cmld  not  get  clo.se  to 
the  front.**  It  was,  to  say  the  least,  not 
good  weather  for  i.niks.  and  during  ihe 
day,  the  Grossdeulschlaud  Di\  ision  s  in- 
fantry took  the  lead  at  XXXXV  III 
Panzer  Corps  and  passed  the  head- 
waters of  the  Olym  River,  forty  miles 


"  Kazakov.  "Vn  vonmezhskom  napravUnii,"  pp.  3-1-36; 
IVMV,  vol.  V.  p.  150. 

^Bei^May.fMm  Jt,  I  jut  4^ 


OPEEAI  ION  BLAU 


33? 


west  of  Voronc/'h.  Meanwhile,  liie  16th 
Motorized  Iniamry  Division,  operating 
o©  the  XXXXVai  "Psama^  Ckjrps  right 
flank,  had  tonic  abreast  and.  in  the  af- 
ternoon, turned  south  toward  Staryy 
OskoL" 

h\  late  afternoon.  Sixt!i  Armv  hat! 
smashed  tlie  wliule  rigiu  haU  of  ic/u</;- 
west  Front  west  of  the  Oskot  River  and 
had  a  bridgehead  across  the  river. 
Early  in  tlie  day,  however,  the  Stavka 
had  realized  that  counterattSi^  ^ 
the  tank  corps  ivas  not  likely  to  accom- 
phsh  anything  and  had  given  Fortieth 
and  Twenty-first  Armies  permission  to 
lakt'  their  fort  i  s  t)ut  of  the  pttt  ket.'"  In 
the  iilternoon,  ihe  Soviet  units  west  of 
the  Osktj!  were  going  back  so  fast  that 
Bock  did  tit)l  think  enough  of  them 
could  be  tr  apped  by  dosing  tlie  pocket 
it  Staryv  ()skt)l  to  make  it  wcjbtowMIc 
to  turn  .Sixth  Army  nt^rth,  and  he 
talked  to  Hitler  about  letting  the  arniv 
gt)  northeast,  instead, "to cu t  oti  what  is 
SI  ill  \o  be  cut  ofP  by  trapping  the  Rus- 
sians between  the  flanks  of  Sixth  .Ar  nn 
and  Fourth  Panzer  Army  somewhtii- 
fariln-r  east,''  General  Pauhis,  llie 
cumiuauder  of  Sixth  Anny.  believing 
the  Russians  were  in  full  retreat  anrl 
would  not  let  themselves  be  caught 
ain  vvhere  west  tjf  the  Don.  wanted  to 
head  due  east. 

On  2  July.  Ka/akov  savs.  "Tlie  rtiad 
to  Vortjnezh  was.  in  elfi  t  l.  opt-n  tt)  the 
enemy." To  close  it  on  ilie  Don,  the 
Stavka,  during  the  day,  shifted  two  ar- 


•AOK  2,  ia  Kriegstagebach.  Teit  VI.  1  Jul  42,  ACJK  2 

'*i4&K  <5i  Jb  Ki-iegstagebuck  Nn  12,  I  Jul  42,  AOK  6 
23§#lt  tiki  Kaicakov,      rmoe^iAm  napmolam" 

"Bock  DUm.  Oilm  II.  1  Jul  42. 
"AOK  6.  la  Knegilagfbuck  Nr.  12.  1  Jul  42,  S 
2285.V1  file. 
■^Kazakov,  "Nitvmimh^im  napmoUm,"  p.  38. 


mies,  Sixfh  and  Sixtieth,  out  of  its  re- 
serve, while  at  the  same  time  ordering 
anodlter  reserve  army,  S«c^^Vvl,  up  to 
the  river  behind  Sniilliwcsf  Fnntl.  Fifth 
Tank  Army,  which  had  been  uncler 
Stavka  control,  was  released  and  t>r- 
dered  to  asst-mhle  neai'  Yelets.  Golikow 
leaving  his  headquarters  in  Yelets  un- 
der Gener^  Leytenant  N.  Ye.  Chibisov, 
his  deputy,  went  to  Voronezh  to  take 
command  of  Sixtti,  Sixtieth,  and  Fortieth 
Armies.*^  He  would  not  have  much 
time.  Vasile\skiy  says,  "B\  tlie  end  of 
the  day  on  2  July,  conditions  iiad  dras- 
tically deteriorated  m  tliii^  liSSironessh 
dir^^tjon,"** 

At  0^00  on  tlic  :'.d.  Hitler's  Condtu- 
transport,  caitmskg  him.  General  Hai- 
der (chief  of  the  "General  Staf  f),  Field 
Marslial  Keitel  (chief  of  the  OKW), 
General  Schinundf  (Hitlers  thief  adju- 
tant), and  others  of  his  retinue  landed 
at  Poltava.  The  plane  had  taken  off 
from  Rastenburg  at  0400,  an  unusual 
ht)ur  foi-  Hitler  to  be  abroad,  par- 
ticularly on  a  missit)n  that  later  ap- 
peared to  hasp  Jiad  no  discernible 
purpose-. 

All  Hitler  did  of  any  substance  was  to 
put  Bfick  "at  libertv"  to  refrain  frrim 
taking  Voronezh  if  clf)ing  so  woultl  ni- 
\olve  "tt)o  licavy  figlning,"  Months  af- 
terward, F\eitfl  told  Bf)ck  that  this  had 
been  the  reason  lor  the  ttip.'" 
However,  Haider  had  given  Botk  the 
same  insiructitjn  ahoiu  Voronezh  by 
teleplione  the  night  fief  ore. 


*''Wkvski\, /j.v«,  p.  sat), 

^SmjOmfi  <^     3^  Mar  43. 


338 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


Su-f-Propelled  Assault  Gun  and  Mounted  Troops  Crossing  the  Os&ol  River 


During  the  meeting,  Haider  revived 
11  projjosal  that  had  been  made  before, 
iianitly.  to  give  Field  Marshal  List's 
Army  Groug  A  conuuand  of  First  I^- 
zer  Amy  jfer  BxAtJ  IIACLAtrsfwlTZ. 
Bock,  as  he  imA  before,  objected  be- 
cause he  beHeved  it  would  do  nothing 
bot  eompficate  Hties  dF  cammsma. 
Hitler  said  nothing;  nevertheless, 
Haider's  proposal  may  well  have  been 
the  origiiral  reasofl  for  the  flight  to  Pol- 
tava. (')n  ihv  2d.  the  OKH  had  in- 
stiucied  Coastal  Staff  Azov  (Army 
Group  A)  to  prepare  to  take  ccmmamd 
of  the  panzer  army  on  5  July  or  any 
time  thereafter.^*  Perhaps  Hitler  had 
ocpected  a  ttmt  complm^nt  reaetion 


Cr.  A,  la  KriegstagOach,  Band  t.  2M  i,  2  JuJ  42. 

H,  Gn  A  75126/1  file. 


from  fiock,  aihd  when  none  was  forth- 
coming, his  nerve  failed.  He  could  at 

times  be  quite  diffident  about  taking 
up  impleasant  matters  vwth  the  older 
senior  generals. 

lb  Be)ik,  who  out'  nun  suspect  was 
not  an  exceptionally  acute  judge  of  the 
Fktehrer^  ttioods,  Hitler  seemed  in  high 
gfKKl  Iniinor.  Ajjpa  i  t-nllv  haviag  in 
mind  the  recent  relief  of  Lieut^aant 
Gteiteral  Neil  M.  Ritdik  as  cdmmand- 
ing  general,  British  Eighth  Aniiv.  in 
North  Africa,  HiUer  joke4  about  what 
he  saw  as  a  pecuKariy  British  tendency 
"to  saw  off  evtTV  general  for  whom 
things  do  not  go  exactly  right."'"  At 
0900  he  reboarded  his  atrcralt,  and  by 
1200  he  was  back  at  the  yiblfssdkarm. 


^SockiJiaTy,  OnUn  U,  3  Jul  42. 


OPERATION  BLAU 


Thedft^was  gratihing  lor  Bock.  He 
could  nssiiine  he  had  the  Fuehrer's  lull 
conlideiite,  and  ihe  rcporis  from  die 
front  regiate^^d  nothing  hut  successes. 
In  only  occasional  lighi  vain.  XXXW'III 
Panzer  Corps  was  making  i^^  Im.il  push 
to  the  Don,  with  just  a  few  miles  left  to 
go..  The  pocket  west  of  the  Oskol  was 
almost  dosed  at  Staryy  Oskol.  Sixtli 
Army  was  pursuing  aoi  eiieniy  who  was 
not  making  even  a  pretense  of  co- 
herent resistance.  After  the  dav's  le- 
ports  were  in,  Bock  seni  a  teietyped 
message  to  Weichs  and  Paulus.  The 
opening  sentence  read,  "The  enemy 
opposite  Sixth  Army  and  Fourdi  Pan- 
zer Army  is  defeated."  For  Paulus,  he 
included  an  order  to  turn  XXXX  Pan- 
zer Corps  east  to  cover  Fourdi  Panzer 
Army's  right  flank.  It  would  then  drive 
to  Korotoyak  on  the  Don  and  Os- 
tn^ozhsk  on  die  Tikhaya  Sosna  River. 
Eauhis,  Bock  added,  was  to  swing  the 
isis^try  on  XXXX  Panzer  Corps'  right 
flaxik  east  and  southeast  to  clear  the 
line  of  the  Tikhaya  Sosna  upstream 
from  Ostrogozhsk.**  In  the  morning, 
on  learning  that  Paulus  had  all  of 
XXXX  Panzer  Corps  headed  due  east, 
Bock  ordered  him  to  divert  23d  Panzer 
Division  to  the  northeast  toward  Hoth's 
flbnk.*' 

"Stmpede  to  TSnm^zft" 

The  olTtn.sivc  uas  rolling  at  lidl 
speed  on  the  ninth  day,  5  July.  The  XX- 
XXVIII  Panzer  Corps  had  three  solid 
br iflgchcads  across  the  Don  in  t!ie 
morning,  one  reaching  to  within  two 
ifiilea  of  Voronezh.  The  XXXX  Panzer 


-"W.  t.r  Su,;l.  hi  Xr  I<>3-Ii-I2.  /in  AOK  6,  undA.  Gr. 
Wi'iik.  3  '. -12.  AOKti3()la5/3«rile. 

-",40A  f,,  1,1  Kf^g^fbuek.m.  /2.4Jwl42.  AQlie 
22855/1  file. 


Corps  bearing  in  on  Ostrogozhsk 
and  approaching  Korotovak.  Bock, 
seeing  himselt  as  master  ol  tlie  bat- 
defield,  isstied  DirttAive  2  for  Opera- 
tion BiumtscmmG.  In  part  it  read; 

The  enemy  has  not  succeeded  in  organiz- 
ing a  new  defense  anywhere.  Wherever  he 
\\as  Liitackt'd  liis  lesisiaiue  collapsed 
<jiiickl)  and  lie  licet.  Ii  has  been  inipossible 
to  discern  any  purpose  nr  plan  in  his 
retreats.  At  no  point  thus  far  in  the  cam- 
paign in  the  East  have  such  strong  evi- 
dences of  distnteeradon  beeo  observed  i^ 
the  enemy  side." 

Specifically,  the  object  was  "to  exploit 
the  pi  csent  condition  of  the  Soviet 
Army  for  tiie  furtherance  of  our  oper- 
ations and  not  to  permit  the  defeated 
enemy  to  come  to  rest."  Sixdi  Army 
was  to  "stay  on  the  enemy's  heels,"  and 
Armeegruppe  Weichs  was  to  release 
Fourth  Panzer  Army  "at  the  earliest 
possible  time"  and  put  k  at  the  dis|>(]^ 
of  the  army  group.** 

While  Bock  was  pi  r|>;iiing  m 
tinue  what  he  considered  to  be  his 
display  of  virtuosity,  his  performance 
was  being  judged  differently  in  the 
OKH  and  at  fuehrer  Headquarters. 
Hider  and  Haider  believed  that  turn- 
ing 23d  Pan/cr  Di\isi()n  nordi  was  a 
waste  of  time  and  effort.  Both  diought 
Bode  and  ffoth  were  launched  on  a 
mindless  "stampede"  toward  Voronezh. 
Hitler,  moreoiverr  iquerulqusly  asked 
Haider  to  feid  out  why  XXXX  Panzer 
Corps  had  not  yet  rcailicd  ilic  Don. 
Bock's  hij^h-handed  reply  that  much  of 
the  reason  why  was  the  firing  of  the 
two  best  gfiier.ils  in  ilie  corps  because 
ol  I  he  Reichel  affair  probably  did  not 


'^Hl.  Gf.  S,„;l  1,1  Sr.  1950142.  UijsHji-  \  r  \m 
Operiitmn  "BmuiLv/iweig,"  i.7,42,  AOK  6  30155/39  Jile. 

=V/j«/.,-  H.  Gr.  Sued,  la  Nr.  m6l4S,  AOK  6 

30155/39  file- 


340 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


improve  the  attnospliefe  at  the  tipjsfer 

levels.-^" 

During  the  evening,  Lhc  OKH  liaison 
officer  with  Fourth  Panzer  Army  raised 
another  doubt,  (liaison  officers  were 
attached  to  every  army  headquarters, 
and  they  reported  independently  to 
Hitler  via  the  OKH.)  The  officer,  a 
general  staff  major,  radioed,  ''Coup  de 
main  at  Voronezh  has  failed.  24th  Pan- 
zer Division  opposed  by  strong  enemy 
south  of  the  city.  Grossdeutschland  also 
strongly  opposed  in  its  bridgehead. 
Concerted  attack  being  planned  for 
tomorrow."  The  reality  was  not  quite  so 
dramatic.  On  the  outskirts  of  Voro- 
nezli,  the  24th  Panzer  Division's  lead 
elements  had  encountered  Soviet 
troops  and  workers'  militia  with  mor- 
tars but  no  artillery  and  only  a  few 
tanks.  Grossdeutschland  Division  was 
having  to  beat  down  some  resistance  to 
ejtpand  its  bridgehead.^®  At  Fuehrer 
Headquarters,  however,  the  liaison  of- 
ficer's message  raised  a  vision  of  streei- 
fighting  and  a  debilitating  battle  for  the 
city,  and  Hitler  tlieteupon  forbade 
using  the  "fast"  divisions,  Gross- 
deutschland or  24th  Panzer,  and  in- 
structed Bock  and  Hoth  to  leave  Voro- 
nezh to  less  valuable  divisions.^" 

One  more  day  brought  Blau  1/ 
BliATJNscFrwETG:  to  a  stiperfici^jjf 
gloi  ioiis  and  piofoiuidly  anticIimaCtlB 
conclusion.  Voronezh  was  taken  on  the 
6th  with  hardly  a  shot  having  to  be 
fired.  The  24ih  Panzer  Division  patrols 
ranged  through  the  streets  in  the 
morning  with0urt  sedrtg  an  em&iRy.  A 
motorcycle  teidalion  from  the  8d  Itt'' 


H<il<l,;  Dtan.  vol.  IH.  p.  47:V.  Hvk  Dwiy,  Osten  11,5 
Jul  42. 

^''AOK  2.  In  Kii,'g'.Hii>-'-/iu(i,.  Tai  Vl,  5  Jul  42,  AOK  2 
2:H)17/2  lile. 
"'^Bock  Dian,  Oskii  U.  5  Jul  42- 


fantry  Division  did  the  same  in  the 
afternoon.  In  acrimonious  telephone 
calls  to  Haider,  Bock  asked  permission 
to  occupy  the  dty,  which  Hitfergranted 
late  in  the  day. 

By  then  Ihe  Germans  had  had  to- 
other, greater  surprise:  Suuthwest  Front 
was  retreating  all  along  the  Sixth  Army 
front  on  the  Tikhaya  Sosna  River  even 
though  the  army  was  stopped  on  most 
of  its  line  west  of  Ostrogozhsk.  No  one 
knew  for  certain  what  this  highly  un- 
typical Soviet  behavior  meant,  but  if 
the  Russians  were  in  full  retreat,  it  was 
time  to  be  heading  south.  That,  how- 
ever, was  to  Iiave  been  Fourth  Panzer 
Army's  job,  and  Hoth's  panzer  divisions 
and  the  Grossdeutschland  Division 
were  still  at  Voronezh  and  north  of  it. 
Paulus  only  had  one  panzer  division 
and  one  motorized  infantry  division. 

71k-  \  lottery  was  tLirning  sour,  and 
die  whole  offensive  was  on  the  verge  of 
being  thrown  into  disatray.  While  Bock 
and  Haider  exchangefl  enervating'' 
telephone  calls.  Hitler  talked  aboiit 
every  hour  being  important,  and  Keteel 
showered  "ill-judged"  pronouncements 
on  all.  Haider  longed  for  "time  to  con- 
template quiedy  and  then  give  clear 
orders."  He  also  believed  he  knew  the 
cause  of  the  problem — Bock's  gener- 
Bock,  HaMer  condudeo.  had 
teiilElisdf  be  taken  in  tow  by  Hoth  and 
had  piled  too  much  of  liis  ai  mor  into 
the  north  flank.*^ 

A  St.rali'f:;ic  Relrmt 
The  Soviet  DiUinma 

While  the  Germans  were  finding 
their  success  awkward,  the  Soviet 
forces  were  running  more  deeply  into 


"Halditr  Diary,  vd.  IIJ.  p.  4?Sr 


OPERATION  BLAU 


341 


Panzer  iil  Iank  in  VoRONtzu 


genuine  trouble.  On  2  July,  the  best 
initial  move  seemed  to  be  to  bring 
Bryansk  Front's  still  powerful  armor  into 
play  against  the  enemy  spearhead 
aimed  for  Voronezh,  To  do  that,  the 
fmtt  was  able  to  gather,  under  lk;id- 
quarters.  Fifth  Tank  Army,  five  tank 
corps  (the  array's  two  plus  /  and  XVI 
and  Vll  Tank  Corps  from  the  Stavka 
reserves)  and  eight  rifle  divisions.  This 
brought  together  about  six  hundr^ed 
tanks,  at  least  twice  the  number  of 
Hoth's  two  panzer  cprps.  But  Golikov's 
departure  to  Vomiiezh  mad,  appar- 
ently, a  drop  in  confidence  in  him  and 
his  staff  in  Moscow  created  a  hiatijs  in 
^ixtoomand.  Kazakov  says  t^e  General 
Staff  and  [he  Slavki  took  Over  on  the 
night  of  3  July  and  isilktd  orders  di- 
rectly to  Ffth  Bid*  Ar^  The  mm  dagT, 


Kazakov  adds.  General  Vasilevskiy,  who 
had  become  chief  of  the  General  Staff, 
came  in  person,  explained  the  mis- 
sion to  the  army  staff  "in  very  cau- 
tious terms,"  and  departed  again  (on 
the  5th)  bef<ire  tlie  counterattack  be- 
gan.** Vasilevskiy  maintains  that  he 
and  the  Stavka  had  to  intervene  be- 
cause Bryansk  Fnint  was  not  giving  any 
orders.  According  to  Kazakov,  only 
Golikov  could  make  decisions  concern- 
ing the  counterattack,  and  he  vras  away 
at  Voronezh.'*'' 

Tlie  4th  through  the  6th  of  July  were 
days  of  high  crisis  in  the  So\  iti  Com- 
mand, which,  no  doubt,  accounts  for 


*»Kazakov,  'Na  va/nmeth^im  napmt^emi, "  p.  SO. 
•»Va»iJevskiy.  Diln.  p.  220;  Kazakov.  "Na 

xmtmithsltom  mjtiaitlemi,"  p.  'MX 


34S 


MOSCOW  TO  SIAUNGRAD 


Vasilevskiys  abrupt  coming  and  going 
at  Bryansk  Front.  Tlie  Soviet  literature  is 
more  than  usually  sparing  in  its  treat- 
ment of  the  decisions  taken  at  this 
stage.  Nevertheless,  it  leaves  a  clear 
impression  that  Stalin,  the  Stavka,  and 
the  General  Staff  saw  themselves  as 
having  to  deal  witli  a  dangerous  tactical 
surprise  that  confirmed  their  previous 
strategic  estimates,  specifically,  that  the 
march  on  Moscow  had  begun.  In  one 
version  of  his  memoirs,  VasUevskiy  said 
that  the  Slavka,  in  (.  o n sifl l- l  i  n 
Voronezh  as  a  possible  German  objec- 
tive, "believed  the  subsequent  develop- 
iiu  nt  of  the  offensive  would  not  be  to 
the  south,  as  actually  occurred,  but  to 
the  north,  in  a  deep  encirclement  of 
Moscow  from  the  southeast."*"  Con- 
sequently, the  j^Epiaiy  Soviet  strategic 
concern  was  direSed  to  the  area  north 
and  northeast  of  rhe  line  Kur.sk- 
Voroneeh.  (AJthouj^h  the  prospect  of  a 
sticcessfuf  deceptioEi  bad  appeared 
vastly  diminisliec!  after  tJws  Steichel  af- 
fauv  Operation  Kr£ML,  had  cx)ntinued 
and  the  OKW  had  announced,  on  1 
Juh.  iIkii  an  ofTt'iisivc  had  begun  "in 
the  soutliern  and  central  sectors"  ot  the 
l^tem  llfiEint  (The  History  of  the  Sec- 
md  WbtMWar  desci  ibes  both  as  having 
been  important  in  tlie  German  scheme 
but  does  mA.  attribute  any  significance 
to  theiJli feoni  the  Soviet  slandpoint.)''- 
Agaiost  a  drive  on  Moscow,  tlie  So- 
viet Coixlniand,  apparent^,  m»  itself  as 
havinp;  iwo  strong  trumps  siill  to  plav: 
the  Orel  offensive  and  the  Fijftfi  lank 

Army's  mimtsmtXAck.  Hiese  could 


■"'A.  M.  Vasilevskiv,  "Delo  ^itf  uMlni."  \'on'  Mir.  5 
thl73l,  2*1 1,  While  ihf  t-sierpts  prinu'd  in  .Viwv  A/'r 
are  nrhriuiM-  idriiiiiLiI  wilfi  llic  Ijnok.  lliis  passugf 
tliH's  imr  j()jieai  m  ilie  Imok  (See /><■/«,  p.  219)- 

"OKW.KTB,  voL  II,  p.  73. 

"See  IVMV,  vol.  V,  p.  243. 


( hangc  the  picture  swiftly  and  inighlily. 
They  would,  in  fact,  do  that,  but  not  in 
the  way  expected. 

General  Zhukov,  whose  West  Front  ini- 
tially bad  a  share  in  the  Orel  operation, 
had  tafeen  it  over  entirely  after  Bryansk 
Fwnt  was  hit.  On  5  ]ul\.  iliree  of  his 
armies,  Tenth,  Sixteenth,  and  Sixty-first, 
hurled  a  massive  attack  against  the 
Second  Panzer  Army  line  from  north 
of  Orel  to  Kirov.  Second  Panzer  Army, 
which  had  not  anticipated  such  earnest 
evidence  of  its  status  as  a  ihreai  lo 
Moscow,  was  shaken  but,  with  mucli 
luck,  managed  to  bring  the  attack  to  a 
standstill  within  a  day  and,  thcrcl)v,  lo 
give  the  impression  of  much  more 
strength  than  it  actually  had.^ 

Owing  to  the  mix-up  at  tlif  higher 
leyels,  responsibility  for  plaimiiig  and 
^i^tuting  Fifth  Arniy^  courittrat- 
tatk  fell  almost  endrely  to  the  army 
conunander.  General  Lizyukov,  and  his 
Staff.  lizyukov  had  been  one  of  the 
fii  St  offit  crs  U)  vvin  the  dec  oration 
Hero  of  the  Soviet  Union  in  the  war, 
and  he  was,  Vasilevskiy  says,  *a  very 
energetic  and  determined"  coin- 
Qiander,  but  neither  he  nor  his  staff 
experienced  in  leading  large  ar- 
mored forces. In  Kazakov's  at  (  <  Mint, 
Lizyukov  coordinated  his  tanks,  artil- 
lery, and  SkturmotJik  air  support 
"wcakl\"'  and  j^ave  his  corps  (onnnan- 
ders  Liicir  instructions  in  superhcial 
va»p  ^efings  that  th^,  in  turii,  re- 
peated to  their  subordinate  comman- 


='•'/':.  AOf:  2.  la  KiifgMiifirhwIi  \>.  2.  Tnl  IV.  'i-T  jiil 
42,  I'/.  .A.t)K  2  2H-|iH)/4  tile;  Zlnikm.  Mnnoiy..  |i.  :i'7ri. 
See  alsii /V'AfV.  vol.  V.  p.  2l:S,  wiiuli  itiiplies  llial  llie 
pur])i)se  ot  llic  (tlliTisivr  u",is  n>  dr;i\v  iiwuv  l>i-iniaii 
resenei.  iiiui  B.iii'i .iniviiii,  ink  my  li  Imlnilr,  [),  I  II. 
«lu)  snvstlif  piiipoM-  w,!.',  1(1  pre\fiU  llieeneniy  triim 
using  .-\rniv  Griiii|i  t^etilei  ,ts  a  reservoir  ol  reillloree^ 
niciiis  I'lr  ihe  (ilii  iiMM  in  i lie  south, 

'n'asilevskiy,  ili'/u.  p.  221. 


OPERATION  BLAU 


343 


tkis.^'  Bv  the  liinc  tlu;  t;uik  ariiiv  went 
into  action  on  the  tjtli,  it  was  already 
too  late  to  save  Voronezh.  Mofreover, 
I,i/\ukov  and  his  corps  tominandcrs, 
unable  to  manage  a  quick  thrust,  re- 
verted to  ^cdf^  <^attriti0ii  that  were 
highly  inconvei^IIt  to  ^K:  enenu  Inii 
more  costly  to  thc^inselt^ds.  During  tlie 
day,  9th  fsamr  Mvidon  sm^m  Vm 
of  die  tank  armyls  brigades  m  a 

On  tfie  6ilt,  tiie  Soviet  Coflnmand 

faced  a  dilemma.  The  prospects  of 
halting  a  thrust  toward  Moscow  in  the 
first  stage  'were  evapcnatii^.  1^  ^£f, 
the  a  I  tempts  seem  to 'bavS  <^^9Bl<iBed 
greait  r  enemy  strenglii  had  Been 
anticipated.  On  lhe  Oilier  hand,  the 
actual  situation  was  worse  on  the  south 
Hank  than  in  die  center.  Sou^west  Emii 
was  dislodged,  fioadng  loose  between 
the  Do  nets  and  the  Don.  and  feeing 
shoved  into  and  behind  the  fiank  of  its 
neighbor.  Sm^  Under  these  two 
pressures,  the5to©Jfei,  for  the  First  tune 
in  the  war,  ordered  a  strategic  retreat. 
Uiipce  the  previous  year,  when  armies 
and  fro n/^  Iiad  been  riveted  in  ])Iace 
regardless  of  the  consequences,  the 
whole  south  Aank  was  allowed  to  pick 
up  and  pull  out  (o  the  east. 

The  Hislory  of  the  Second  W/rld  War 
^ves  iJie  date  m  the  dbcasi^n  as  6  July 
and  savs  the  letreat  Started  on  the 
night  oi  die  7th.  GerniSlll  ^di  Army, 
however,  observed  a  general  witii- 
thawal  in  full  swing  fliii  ing  the  day  on 
the  6th,  which  leaves  open  the  pos- 
sibilities that  the  deeiskm  was  made 
earlier  or  that  it  was  not  as  deliberate  as 
the  Soviet  accounts  present  it.  A  cap- 
tured oSleer  &cmi  ^m%^ 


'■'Kj/akirt,  ",Va  voront^shm  fUtpravieKO,,"  p.  40. 
^"Buth  Dimy.  Oslen  IS,  fjjul  42. 


l\ri>it\-first  Antiy  had  (old  liis  inter- 
rogators on  die  2d  that  by  then  control 
bad  slijiped  entirely  ifTotn  tbe  army% 
command.''" 

The  actual  order  must  be  pieced 
together  frtm  a  balf-dozen  senteiices 
in  thiee  soutcet. "Ifee  W/.v/o?t  nf  ihc  Sec- 
ond Vhrld  War,  while  it  is  specific  as  to 
tii»e,xftet%ly  says  that  theStowfei  under- 
took to  "extricate"  Sotit/nvr.st  and  Saulfi 
:Bmis  "from  the  enemy's  blows."''**  The 
History  of  the  Great  Patriotic  War  states 
thai  Si/ut/iu'cst  Fivril  and  the  rigli(  Hank 
ot  South  Fmnt  were  ordered  to  wididraw 
to  the  line  of  Novaya  Kalitva  (on  the 
Don)-Popasnava  (on  the  Doneis),  a 
distance  of  roughly  60  miles  (lOU  kilo- 
meters), and  dig  in  l^m.'^^MePbpvihr 
Seim/ific  Shrtrli  states,  "  *  Supreme 
Headquarters  ordered  Smtikmst  and 
Simi!ft  J%B£r  fO  retreat  to  the  Don. . . 

The  decision  to  relt  eat  did  not  apply 
in  Uie  Voronezh  area  or  anywhere  to 
the  west  and  north.  Golikov  had  orders 
to  dear  the  enemy  off  the  entire  east 
side  of  the  Don  "at  all  costs"  and  to 
establish  a  solid  defense  on  the  river  "in 
the  whole  sector."^'  On  the  7th,  Goli- 
kov's  tliree  armies  became  VoronezJi 
Front,  and  General  SolEOS^skty,  who 
had  been  one  of  Zhnkov's  best  ai  iny 
commanders  during  the  winter,  was 
appointed  to  command  Brymtsk  B&H. 
Golikov  had  with  him  as  Stavka  repre- 
sentatives. General  Vatuun,  the  deputy 
ehtef  of  the  General  Staff,  and  Army 
Commissar  Stuond  Rank  P.  C.  Stc- 
panov,  die  chiet  air  torce  commissar. 
Gcsu»^  ¥atUllii  was  designated  to  taiie 


"IVMV,  vol.  V.  p.  152;  AOK  6.  In  KrifgstagtBuch  AFr. 
12.  2  and  6  Jul  42,  AOK  6  22855/1  file. 
'•/VMV;  vol.  V,  p.  1.'52. 
"tVOVSS,  vol.  II.  p.  421, 
*'>VaV,  p.  148  f. 
*WAfV;  vol.  V,  p.  152. 


344 


MOSCOW  TO  STAI^INORAD 


over  ilie  jroiti  cOTnniand  and  would  do 
S0  in  a  week.''^  Zhukov's  Orel  offensive 
tan  for  five  days  and  (hen  stopped  as 
abnipdy  as  it  had  begun.  Lizyiikov  was 
killed  on  24  July  while  fighting  to  beat 
fjff  German  efforts  to  improve  their 
line  that  apparendy  the  Russians  had 
taken  as  having  had  farther  reaching 
objectives.** 

"Bhu  II  Is  Dead" 

That  the  Soviet  Command  might  go 
over  to  a  flejdMe  digfOaig  was  not  ex- 
acdy  a  surprise  to  thfi  ^^mans.  They 
had  talked  about  it  as  &  |>£^sibility  since 
WiLHELM  and  Fridericus  II  and  dur- 
ing Blau  I,  which,  for  all  its  apparent 
success,  produced  a  disjippointing 
of  70,000  prisoners.  bad  told 

Hitler  on  3  July  that  the  Russians  were 
"giradually  getting  smart"  and  had 
l^ara^  to  evade  encirclements.''''  Nev- 
ertheless, the  entire  Bi  au  concept  had 
assumed  a  repeat  of  the  Russians'  1941 
performance.  Buvu's  small,  tightf^^lSfii- 
erate  envelopments  were  fine  against 
an  enemy  who  stayed  put,  but  one 
inclined  to  disappear  over  #te  fer  hori- 
zon required  different  handling  not 
easily  administered  by  demotorized  in- 
fantry and  rebuilt  armor, 

Tliis  \vas  the  Germans'  pi  oblem,  but 
to  deal  with  it,  they  had  to  believe  it 
really  existed,  and'  oti  ^bsLt  tfeey  could 
not  make  up  (heir  minds.*"'*  Haider 
could  not  see  Southwest  and  South  Fronts' 

^km^Sm^a^  bad- w^ked 


*^t*»iL^  p.  152;  Vastlevskiy.  DWu,  p.  223. 

AOX  2,  la  Kriegstagehwk  Nr.  2.  'M  IV,  10  Jul 
42,  Pz.  AOK  28499/4  file;  Vasilevskiy.  Detih  p.  822: 
Rokossovskiy,  Soldier's  Duly,  pp.  120-22, 

"The  fim  ddtaiheiit^  endiseiiiit  M  the  retreat 
Army  Group  Somh  had  was  an  order  of  the  day 
signed  by  Timoshenko,  captured  on  12  July,  that 


on  for  half  a  year  nitlidut  a  fi^ilt.. 
Hider,  going  by  foreign  news  repoiPts> 
■ms  %iclin^'*  to  ^Mnik  ihe  JM^ans 
might  be  attempting  m  "dSS^  de- 
fense, but  apparendy  saw  no  pro^iiincl 
implications  in  tfiat.**  Bock  came  dev- 
est to  the  point  in  a  teleivped  message 
he  sent  to  Haider  on  the  af  ternoon  of 
the  8th.  In  it  lie  safd  Bt.Atr  ll  ^was 
"dead";  if  the  aimies  maneuvered  as 
they  were  required  to  under  existuig 
plans,  they  would  "most  likely  strike 
inlo  thin  air";  iherefore,  the  OKH 
needed  "to  consider"  what  dre  objec- 
tives ought  to  be  and,  in  partiefifer 
where  die  armored  forces  should  go.*^ 
Bock  would  have  to  wait  for  his  an- 
swei:  The  Soviet  retreat,  whatever  else 
it  niiglii  yet  do,  had  at  iis  outset  created 
a  monimiental  distraction.  In  the  week 
after  6  July,  almost  the  whole  'Oetoaan 
command  effort  was  absorbed  by  the 
accelerating  pace  of  the  offensive.  To 
switch  the  main  effort  froan  noiili  to 
south,  Bock  ordered  Headquarters, 
Fourda  Panzer  Army,  XXXXVIII  Pan- 
zer Corps  "vdOk  24m  TftaiXBf  Etfvisaon 
and  Grossdeutschland,  and  XXIV  Pan- 
zer Corps  with  3d  and  16th  Motorized 
Infantry  Divisiows  away  from 
Voronezh.  On  reaching  the  vicinit\  of 
Rossosh-Novaya  Kalitva,  Hoth  was 
also  to  pick  up  and  tate  cCttBMStod  of 
VllI  Corps  and  XX XX  Panzer  Corps 
on  Sixth  Aimy's  left  flank.  The  latter 
two  cor|^  were  already  in  motion 
south,  toward  the  I^ead^vate^s  of  the 
Derkul  and  Kalitva  rivers.  The  odiers 


instructed  commanders  to  evade  encirclements  and 
not  to  make  it  a  point  of  honor  to  hold  their  positions 
at  all  costs.  (Appaiently,  some  Soviet  commanders  also 
did  not  coniprehend  what  was  going  on.)  H.  Gr.  A,  la 
Nr.  J 17142,  m  Px.  AOK  4  ll  Jul  42.  Pz.  AOK  1 
24906/1  file. 

'^'Haider  Diary,  vol.  HI.  p.  475, 

"Boch  Duiry.  Osten  II.  8  Jul  42. 


OPERATION  BLAU 


345 


An  Iwaktrv  Divismms  Heaos  lAfr  at  thJ  P^fiGEOF  Its  HoniSES 


would  first  have  to  cross  110  miles  of 
previously  occupied  territory  on  their 
own  tracks  and  wheels.  On  the  6th,  the 
OKH  had  transferred  First  Panzer 
Army,  which  was  in  the  midst  of  refit- 
ting its  panzer  divisions,  to  the  Coastal 
Staff  Azov,  To  list  it  had  given  orders 
to  have  First  Panzer  Army  ready  to 
start  on  the  12th.  These  had  been  can- 
celed within  hours,  and  List  then  had 
heen  told  to  get  First  Panzer  started  on 
the  9th,  at  which  time  the  Coastal  Staff 
would  become  Army  Group  A.*^  Bock, 
who  had  not  been  consulted,  had  ob- 
served wryly  that  the  battle  now 
"sliced  in  two."^* 


Or.  A,  laKriegslagebuch,  Bardt,  Wtl,  6  Jul  42, 
H.  Gr.  A  75126/1  He, 
*^flocA  Diary,  Osten  II,  5  Jul  42. 


By  the  9th,  when  the  second  phase 
went  into  fuU  swing,  the  offensive  was  a 
good  two  weeks  ahead  of  its  projected 
schedule  and  nearly  as  much  behmd  in 
terms  of  current  readiness,  tbt  23d 
Panzer  Division,  after  having  run  out 
of  motor  fuel  two  or  three  times,  was 
just  eatdiing  up  to  Sixth  Army;  f4di 
Panzer  Division  and  the  Grossdeutsch- 
land  Division  were  stopped  halfway  be- 
tween Vbronez:h  and  Novaya  Kalitva, 
waiting  to  be  refueled  ;  and  the  3d  and 
16th  Motorized  Infantry  Divisions 
could  not  depart  from  Voronezh  until 
infantry  divisions  arrived  to  relieve 
them.  First  Panzer  Army  had  to  lead 
off  with  its  infantry.  The  panzer  divi- 
sions were  still  in  bivouac  areas  thirty 
or  forty  miles  behind  die  front.  Hidet, 
moreover,  had  begun  to  worry  about  a 


346 


MOSCOW  TOSTmiNGRAD 


British  landing  in  the  West  and  was 
holding  back  Army  Group  A's  best 
equipped  motorized  division,  the  SS 
Leibstandarte*Adolf  Hitler,'  for  trans- 
fer to  the  Channel  coast. 

Meanwhile,  Blau  II  was  all  but  dead, 

and  it  had  no  successor.  First  Panzer 
Army  put  its  right  flank  in  motion  on 
the  morning  of  the  9th  with  instruct 
tions  to  strike  across  the  Donets  at 
Lisichansk,  then  veer  sharply  north, 
crossing  tlie  Aydar  River  at  Starobelsk, 
and  meet  Fourth  Panzer  Army  at 
VysQchanovka.  The  assumption  was 
that  Sixth  Army  would  lie  the  enemy 
down  north  and  west  of  Vysochanovka 
and  so  set  the  scene  for  an  envelop- 
ment from  the  south,-''"  First  PailZ^ 
Army,  if  it  held  to  the  assigned  course, 
would  likely  run  into  Sixth  Army's  left 
flank  about  the  time  it  reached 
Starobelsk. 

Dui  ing  the  day  on  the  9th,  it  became 
apparent  that  while  First  Panzer  Army 
woLiId  probably  be  ac  r(jss  the  Donets  in 
another  twentv-four  hours,  Sixrli 
Army,  with  nothing  ahead  of  it  but 
long  columns  of  Sn\  iet  troops  heading 
east,  would  by  then  have  passed  the 
Une  of  the  Aydar  from  Starobelsk 
north,  and  XXXX  Panzer  Corps  would 
be  well  south  of  Vysochanovka.  Ob- 
viously there  was  no  point  in  having 
First  Panzer  Army  continue  past 
Lisichansk  on  its  assigned  course,  and 
in  the  early  morning  hours  on  the  lOUi, 
the  OKH  issued  a  new  directive  which, 
in  its  general  concept,  reverted  to  die 
BiAU  II  plan.  Ftrst  l^^ozer  Aaamy  to 


'"H.  Gi:  A.  Ill  Kri^gslngi-hurfi.  Band],  TMl.  7  JuJ  42, 
H.  Gi.  A  75120/1  Hie;  f'l.  AOK  I,  la  Krieeifa^iwANr. 
7  Jul  42,  Pz.  AOK  1  24906/16  Qle. 


head  due  east  past  lisidhanf^  KrWSiM 

Millerovo.  Fourth  Panzer  was  to  aim  its 
right  Hank  at  Millerovo,  its  left  at 
Meshkovska:ya  between  the  Don  and 
upper  Chir,  and  to  take  a  bridgehead 
On  the  Don  at  Boguchar  as  a  spring- 
board for  a  subsequent  thrust  fefir  t£ 
the  Don  toward  Stalingrad.^* 

On  tlie  morning  of  the  11th,  Moth 
had  command  of  XXXX  fsm&t  Corps 
and  VIII  Corps,  which  were  heading 
south  and  east,  but  XXXXVIII  Panzer 
Corps  and  XXIV  Panzer  Corps  were 
strung  out  behind.  The  Grossdeutsch- 
land  Division  and  24th  Panzer  Division 
were  stalled,  as  they  had  been  for  two 
days,  in  the  valley  of  the  Tikhava  Sosna 
waiting  to  be  refueled,  and  the  two 
motorized  divisions  were  •stSll'  at 
Vori  >ne/li,  where  Soviet  counterattacks 
and  the  inesjierience  of  the  infantry, 
mosdy  "young"  troops  sent  to  relfe*s* 
diem,  slowed  their  disengagement. 
During  the  day,  the  29th  Motorized 
Infantry  Division  passed  through 
Boguchar,  and  the  OKH  dropjjcd  the 
idea  of  taking  a  bridgehead  alter  die 
division  reported  the  bridge  th^fe 
the  Don  destroyed.  The  offensive  was 
now  moving  over  open  steppe  in  sear- 
ing heat  and  choking  clouds  of  fine 
dust.  First  Panzer  Army  reached  the 
Aydar  River  during  the  day,  and  Sev- 
enteenth Army  reported^  the  etieiay 
pulling  away  from  its  north  flank. 

After  2400,  fresh  OKH  orders  came 
in  over  the  teletype  madiine*  ac  Army 
Groups  A  and  B.  First  Panzer  Army 
was  to  aim  its  left  Hank  at  Millerovo,  its 
right  toward  the  Donets  crossing"  Wt' 
Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy.  Bock  was  to 
put  all  die  forces  he  "could  lay  hands 
otf*       a  drive  via  Millerovo  (whicJi 


'•'Ibid.,  JO  Jul  42. 


OPERATION  BLAU 


347 


Fourth  Panzer  Army's  atlvaiice  ele- 
ments reached  during  the  day)  to  Ka- 
mensk-Shakhtinskiy  and  finally  to  the 
confluence  of  the  Donets  and  the  Don. 
He  was  to  use  any  remaining  strengtti 
to  pitmde  flank  cover  on  the  east  and 
to  "c  reair  conditions  for  an  advance  to 
Stalingrad."  To  Bock's  protests  that  tliis 
was  going  to  create  a  useless  pileup  ol 
First  and  Foin  tli  Panzer  Armies' arraor 
around  Millerovo  and  scatter  his  other 
panzer  dMsioos  "to  the  winds,"  the 
OKH  replied  that  his  mission  was  now 
in  the  souths  Haider  further  adnion- 
shed  General  Greiffenberg,  Bock's 
chief  of  stiifr.  by  tele^am  "to  avoid  any 
unnecessary  commitment  of  moljile 
forces  to*ratd  the  east."  Fourth  Panzer 
Army,  he  added,  had  to  be  ready  "at 
any  time"  to  turn  southwest  and  strike 

behind  the  Soviet  forces  holding  north 
of  Rostov. 

From  "a  variety  of  reports,"  the 
OKH  believed  the  Russians  were  going 
to  make  a  stand  on  the  line  Millerovo- 
Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy-Rostov.33 
Bock  knew  differently,  and  after  grum- 
l)ling  aboiu  it  to  himself  ior  a  day,  he 
could  not  resist  telling  Haider  so  in  a 
tel^^ram  oh  the  morning  of  the  13th. 
The  eneniv  ahead  of  Fourth  and  First 
Panzer  Armies,  he  said,  was  retreating 
to  *e  east,  southeast,  and  south,  par- 
ticularly the  souih.  An  operation  cen- 
tered on  and  past  Millerovo  would  to 
some  eJrtent  plow  mto  the  midst  of  the 
Soviet  columns  but  would  not  accom- 
plish a  substantial  endrclement.  The 
place  for  Fourth  ^nzer  Army's  right 
flank  to  go  was  to  Moro/.ovsk,  seventy- 
five  miles  east  of  Kamensk-Shakhtin- 
skijr.  There  it  might  SliQ  <s^  wmt  dT 


tfie  enemy,  and  from  there  it  could 
I  urn  either  southwest  &t  east  as  condl- 

tioiis  rc<juired.** 

Bock  Goes  Htm^ 

Bv  then,  the  same  or  similar  con- 
clusions were  beginning  to  come  to 
mind  at  Fuehrer  Headquarters — ^with 
consequences  foi  Bock  that  he  had  not 
anticipated.  Hider  opened  the  after- 
noon situation  conference  with  "ex- 
pressions of  utmost  indignation"  ovei 
the  delays  in  getting  23d  and  24th 
Panzer  Divisions  and  the 
Grossdeutsrhland  Division  headed 
south.  He  also  suddenly  recalled  that 
back  in  May,  Bock  had  originated  the 
"unfortunate  proposal"  to  oppose  the 
Soviet  attack  south  of  Kharko\  fion- 
tally  instead  of  pinching  off  die  gap  at 
[/)  uni."  In  an  hour,  a  message  was  on 
the  vviie  transferring  Fourth  Panzer 
Army  to  Army  Group  A  and  telling 
Bock  to  turn  over  the  Arniy  Group  B 
command  to  Weichs. 

Over  the  telephone,  Keitel  "advised" 
Bock  to  report  himself  sick  and  added 
that  Army  Group  B  was  now  "prac- 
tically shut  down"  anyway*  %  Bodk% 
question  why  he  i\as  being  dismissed 
just  when  he  "presumed"  he  had  pro- 
duced a  great  success,  Keitel ^d  it  was 
because  (he  mobile  tlivisions  were  too 
slow  coming  away  from  Voronezh,  and 
ihcii  fuel  sup^fies  wete  "not  in  dttler." 
Wlien  Bock  protested  that  his  disposi- 
tions at  (Hind  Voronezh  had  been  "clear 
as  the  sun "  and  pointed  out  digit  the 
OKH,  not  the  artny  group,  was  respon- 
sible for  the  motor  fuel  supplies,  Keitel 
urged  him  not  to  *make  a  Kieket  right 
now."  Things  were  not  inrepKarable,  he 


="/J"rA  Dmn.  Chlm  II.  ]'2  \u\  12. 
"•'Haider  Diaiy,  vol.  111.  p.  478. 


**BockDifin.  thun  11.  I.'ljul42. 

^rtoldn  Duiiy,  vul.  Ul.  p,  480.  See  p.  TIM. 


348 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


said,  and  iliere  would  be  timelal^  fo 
straighicn  ihcm  rmt.  Vnv  ihe  moment, 
though,  he  hurriedly  added,  any  kind 
of  discussion  with  tiieRtehrer  was  out  of 
the  question.*" 

Later  it  would  appcai  tiiat  ilie  mosi 
consequential  charge  ii>  be  raised 
against  Bock  was  thai  he  liatl  in\<>Kx'd 
loo  nuich  armor  on  die  advance  ol 
Voronezh  and  thereb)?  deified  the 
turn  soutli.  At  the  time,  however,  ev&X 
Haider,  u  h<»  was  die  lirst  lo  raise  it,  saw 
it  as,  at  most,  a  tactical  blemish,  not  as  a 
major  failing.  As  of  13  July,  Hitler,  in 
particular,  wilh  his  armies  seemingly 
on  the  edge  of  their  greatest  victory, 
had  no  compelling  reason  to  resurrect 
the  irritations  of  the  past  two  weeks 
unless  he  was  responding  to  some  far 
more  deep-seated  impulse.  One  pos- 
sibility is  that  he  had  become  uneasy  as 
he  saw  the  enemy  repeatedly  slip  from 
his  grasp.  The  haul  of  prisoners, 
88,000  thus  far,  was  relatively  low,  and 
the  unexpected  Soviet  retreat  had  un- 
hinged his  plans,  but  his  subsequent 
acdons  indicate  that  his  premoniuons, 
if  any.  could  not  have  been  very  strong. 
The  13  th  was  for  him  a  day  of  minor 
misgivings  and  great  opportunity.  In 
getting  rid  of  Bock,  he  was  not  dispos- 
ing of  a  failed  general  but  of  a  rival  in 
credit  for  the  victory. 

^'BoAmgf.mm  fir  l»Jlrt  4S. 


Weichs  caught  a  glimpse  of  that  the 
first  time  he  went  to  fuehrer  Headquar- 
ters as  commanding  general.  Army 
Group  B.  Talking  to  Schmundt,  he 
suggested  that  Hitler  be  persuaded  to 
take  notice  of  Bock's  accomplishments 
in  some  form  "fof  the  sake  of  public 
opinion  and  troop  morale."  Schmundt 
replied  that  Hitler  would  never  do  any 
such  tiling  because  he  had  developed 
"a  distinct  antipatlu  lor  Bock."  On  the 
same  occasion,  in  talking  to  the  Reich 
press  chief,  Weichs  learned  that  Hider 
would  not  allow  the  General  Staff  to  be 
mendoned  in  newspaper  ardcles  about 
himself  because  he  beUeved  it  de- 
tracted from  his  image  and  his  military 
reputadon.*^ 

On  15  July,  Bock  relinquished  his 
command  and,  having  been  told  his 
presence  at  Fuehrer  Headquarters 
would  not  be  welcomed,  went  to 
Berlin.  He  would  divide  his  time  be- 
tween there  and  his  estate  in  East  Prus- 
sia for  the  rest  of  the  war,  brooding 
about  his  downfall,  searching  for  the 
reason,  and  more  dian  half  hoping  the 
cloud  would  one  day  lift  and  the 
Fuehrrr  \v'ouId  find  employment  for 
him  again. 


^'Mi^iaiHatt  tfad  Weichs,  Naehlass  its  Cent- 
n^dm^m^JFfmhfrrwm  Wtiehs.Stmd  6,  IS  Jul  42. 


CHAPTER  XVII 


Hitler's  Grand  Design 


"A  Certain  Cmis" 

MtMl  n/QAUSEwnz,  such  as  it  had 
been,  came  to  an  end  between  13  and 
15  July  under  clouds  and  in  oppressive 
heal  bnjken  l)y  intermittent  rainstorms 
that  settled  the  dust  over  the  moving 
coltimns  but  turned  the  ground  be- 
neadi  thcni  to  mud.  Within  a  25-mile 
radius  of  Millerovo,  First  and  Fourth 
Panzer  Armies'  tanks  hit  line  after  line 
of  Soviet  columns  headed  east.  In  the 
melee,  some  were  dispersed  and  some 
smashed.  Others  slipped  through  or 
veered  south  away  from  the  onslaught. 
During  the  day  on  the  15th,  First  Pan- 
zer's 14th  Panzer  Division  and  Fourth 
Panzers  3d  Panzer  Division  met  south 
o(  Millerovo  thereby  technically  com- 
pleting the  encirclement,  but  they  did 
not  form  a  pocket.  With  gaps  in  all 
directiotis,  the  armies  were  slicing 
through,  not  enveloping,  the  enemy. 
(Map  31.)  Fourth  Panzer  Army  reported 
21,000  prisoners  taken,  First  Panzer 
did  not  stop  to  count.  It  certainly  took 
as  many,  and  it  may  have  taken  two  or 
three  times  as  many;  nevertheless,  the 
greater  pan  of  the  potential  catch  es- 
caped. The  most  remarkable  capture 
WJ|S  twenty-two  trainloads  ot  American 
atti  BfMsh  lend-lease  tanks  and  sup- 
pJies  tnjEcn  on  I  lie  lailroafl  between 
Millerovo  and  Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy.' 


'SljCtically,  vvhal  Field  Marsha!  Bock 
had  predicted  was  happening;  Army 
Group  A  vm  developing  a  knot  of 
ino.sil\  superfluous  armored  muscle 
around  Millerovo  and  on  a  line  to  the 
south.  Shoulder  to  shoulder,  Fh^  and 
Fourth  Panzer  Armies  were  puncliiug 
into  tliin  air.  Tbenty-ffmflh  Army,  Smlk 
Evmt^  reserve  army,  tftade  a  feeble  and 
shori-lived  attempt  to  stand  at  xMille- 
rovo  on  the  13ih.  Soutliwesi  irora/,  which 
had  ^  lifiadquarters  east  of  the  Don, 
had  k$St  antral  of  its  armies.  They 
were  turned  over  to  South  Front,  but 
after  the  Germans  reached  Millerovo  it 
had  iroubles  enough  ol  iis  own  and  did 
not  succeed  in  establishing  contact  wdth 
any  of  thetn  except  Niiim  Anw^^  Cfeie 
ill  i  lit;  tlie  German  armies  did  have  was 
command  of  the  field,  and  that  at  a 
low  price.  After  better  than  tw6  weeks 
in  action,  General  Hoth,  the  com- 
mander of  Fourth  Panzer  Army,  rated 
the  eondition  his  motorized  and 
panzer  divisions  ;md  the  Grossdeutsch- 
land  Division  as  veJ7  good.  Their  main 
deficiencies  were  mechanical  break- 
downs and  fuel  shortages.  Gencial 
Kieist  put  First  Panzer  Army,  alter 
six  days,  at  00  perd^&Ht  of  its  opti- 
nuini  (  rfu  iriuw  but  it  had  started 
at  below  40  percent  because  most  of 
its  trcnop  and  equiprocii*  r^place- 


'H.  Or.  A,  la  Knegstagelnich.  Band  I.  Tml  /,17  Jul  42, 

H .  Gr.  A  75 126/ 1  file;  Pi.  AOK  1 .  la  Kneptage^  Nr.   

n  Jul  42,  P«-  AOK  J  24906  file.  HVOVSS,  vol.  U,  p.  421. 


SECONp 
MMY 


OPERATION  BLAU- 
BRAUNSdHWEId 

U  -  31  July  1942 

 ApproKimste  front,  14  Jui 

•avsoovo  Approixinial*  front,  31  Jul 

0  BO  MII8B 


BOIdQiMttw 


SIXtH 

armV 

'    ^  SIXTH  AR^Y  1^^^'"'' 

/l'  STALING^ A 

Montovsk  '  s 

*  f  * 

FOURTH  PANZeK' 

^     ARMY  64th ,  _ 

tig  o"'--^    7  FRONT 

«■        i'^si  °  r KotBlnlktva 

RUMANIAN!  i,  \ S!ta^JS?*n"'"'""v«  / 

'  1  /»  PANZER  AftMY 

teO^*^  ""SEVENTEENTH  ARMV  f^^-^^H  akmy 


felGHTH 
ITALIAN 

THIRD  f 


letb 


orthjCaucasus  front 


TtkhoraSsk 


MAP  31 


HITLER'S  GRAND  DESIGN 


351 


meats  were  still  en  route  from 
Germany.* 

NmMisskm 

Late  in  the  night  on  13  July,  Army 
Groups  A  and  B  receivetl  oiders  "for 
continuing  Gyrations  on  the  lower 
Don."  The  dbfjeaSve  would  be  to  pre- 

\rni  Simlh  Fmvt  anfl  whatever  was  left 
ol  Southwest  Front  f  i oiii  escaping  by  dos- 
ing the  line  of  the  Don  down  to  Rostov. 
Bi  At  II  had  died,  and  Bi  Ai  III  was 
lor^nuen.  The  orders  did  not  mention 
Sialingi  ad,  ihe  original  BtAU  III  direc- 
tive. The  whole  olTensive  was  to  be 
reoriented  to  the  soiilh  and  sonicuhal 
to  ihf  west  to  accomplish  one  grand 
encirdement  inside  die  great  bend  of 
the  Don.  Field  Marshal  Keitel,  chief  of 
the  OKW,  had  not  exaggerated  when 
he  had  told  Bocl<^  thai  Army  Group  B 
was  being  shut  down.  Sixth  Arni)'s 
missions  would  be  to  establish  a  front 
on  the  Don  frotii  northeast  of  Mesh- 
kovskaya  to  Pavlovsk  and  to  turn  over 
all  unite  not  needed  to  do  this  to  Fourth 
Panzer  Army.  First  Pan/or  Arm\'  was  to 
turn  south,  cross  die  Donets  at  Ka- 
mensk-Sbalchtinskiy,  and  bear  in  on 
Rostov  from  the  nf>nht'ast.  Fonrlh 
i*an;£er  Army,  rimning  parallel  to  First 
Panzer  east  of  the  Donets,  would  keep 
its  main  weight  on  its  right  flank,  but 
(as  Bock  had  proposed)  would  let  its 
left  sweep  east  to  Morozovsk.  From  the 
line  between  Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy 
and  Morozovsk,  it  would  drop  soudi  to 
the  Don,  take  bridgeheads  at  Konstan- 
tinovskiy  and  Tsimlyanskiy,  and  pre- 


pare toftmalomg  the  soudi  bank  t£  the 
Don  westward  toward  Rostov. ' 

A  day  later,  Hitler  shifted  the  fui'ltm- 
Headquarters  from  East  Prussia  to 
Vinnitsa  in  the  western  Ukraine.  This 
Fuehrer  compound  at  Vinnitsa,  code- 
named  Wenwlf,  in  contrast  to  the  for- 
tress-like W)lfss(httnz(\  consisted,  except 
for  two  concrete  bunkers,  ol  prefabri- 
cated wooden  buildings  erected  in  a 
patch  of  pine  forest  lialf -a-dn/en  miles 
outside  the  town.  General  Haider,  chief 
of  the  General  Staff,  and  the  OKH 
occupied  quarters  in  Vinnitsa,  The 
move  appeared  to  lend  emphasis  to 
a  statement  in  the  orders  of  the  13th 
in  which  Hitler  assigned  control  of 
the  offensive  to  Hcadciuarters,  Army 
Ciroup  A  "subject  to  my  directives." 
.\ctually,  he  could  have  exercised  just 
as  dose  supervision  from  Rastenburg 
as  from  Vinnitsa.  The  WJ^'ntYV/,  however, 
did  not  place  him  symbolically  on  tlie 
batdefield  and,  as  he  liked  to  claim,  at 
the  head  of  his  troops,  which  possibly 
enhanced  his  psychological  leverage 
and  undoubtedly  would  give  him  a 
personal  daim  t©  the  victory  when  it 
came. 

Coinddent  with  the  move  to  the  Wer- 
imlf  Hitler  released  a  strategic  dire<  tiv t- 
written  four  days  earlier,  Directive  43 
for  Operation  Bluecher.  It  gave  Elev- 
enth Army  the  mission  of  crossing  the 
Kerch  Strait  to  the  Taman  Peninsula, 
from  which  it  was  to  take  tJife  Sovt^* 
naval  bases  at  Anapa  and  Novorossiysk 
and  to  strike  along  the  northern  frin^ 
of  tiie  Caucasus  .to  Maykop.  €enem 
Majasteiii,  the  army^  comwander,  wm 


*OKH.  CmStdti,  Oj,  Ahr  ih  \v.  -t^O^^SN^.  1 1. 7. 13. 

  H  file;  ti.  Gr.  B,  la  A>.  2043/42,  Wmungjui-r  die 

■"■I I  A.  l„  Knrushigebueh,  Band  I,  TiU  1,16  Jul  42,  lbr0ulmmg  der  OpfraUm  an  dm  unuren  Dm,  13.7 A2, 
i\.  Gi.  A  7ijl2tj/l  lile-  AOK  6  SdXSS'SS  fil«. 


S52 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


German  Tanks  Rove  Over  the  Steppe  in  Search  of  Targets 


to  be  prepared  to  ocecute  Bluecheh  in 
early  August.  ^ 

Staling  ad  Fwn  t 

For  the  Stavko,  the  German  entrv 
into  the  great  bend  of  tJie  Don  opened 
the  tontesf  loi  Staliagrad  regardless  of 
what  Hil lei's  intentions  for  the  mo- 
ment might  be.  I  he  Papular  Srientijtc 
Sketch  says.  "Ahcady  in  mid-July  1942, 
the  Soviet  leadership  had  discerned  ihe 
enemy's  aim  to  advance  to  the  Volga  in 
the  Stalingrad  area  to  occupy  this  im- 
portant strategic  point  and  at  tlie  same 
lime,  seiic  ihc  country's  largest  indus- 
trial region.  On  14  July,  a  slate  <af  -war 


^KW.  WFSt,  Op.  Nr.  551208142.  Wfhimg  Nr.  43, 
11.7.42  .Mill  OKW  ,  n'FSt.  Ofi.  \r  (lf>2}5^/42,  I3.7.4Z. 
German  Higli  Ixvel  Diieclives,  CMH  tiles. 


was  declared  in  the  Stalingrad  ai  ea."*' 
Whedier  the  Soviet  leadership  had 
altered  its  fundamental  ass^aament  of 
German  strateg\'.  however,  remains  in 
doubt.  Stalin's  official  biographv  pub- 
lished in  1949,  undoubtedly  written 
with  his  approval  and  possibly  with  his 
help,  maintains,  "Comrade  Stalin 
)»EOmp%  divined  the  plan  of  the  Ger- 
man command.  He  saw  that  the  idea 
was  io  cieate  an  impression  that  the 
seizure  of  the  oil  regions  of  Groznvy 
and  Hakti  was  the  major  and  nol  (he 
subsidiaty  objective  of  the  German 
sunamcE  offensive.  He  pointed  out 
that,  in  reality,  the  main  objective  was 
to  envelop  Moscow  from  the  east." 
Consequently,  the  bic^aphy  con- 


»V6>K  p.  149. 


HTTLER'S  GRAND  DESIGN 


353 


I  in  Lies,  he  anchored  the  defense  on 
Stalingrad."  It  appears  that  again,  as  he 
had  eariier  in  the  mondi,  Stalin  drew 
the  best  possible  conclusion  for  the 
long-terra  from  a  mistaken  premise. 

On  12  July,  the  Stavka  created  the 
Stalingrad  Front,  using  Marshal  H- 
moshenko's  Headquarters.  Smiffnoest 
Front,  and  three  resei  \  e  armies,  Suxty- 
se&md,  Sixty-third,  and  Sixty-fourth,  plus 
Mtha.t  vms  left  of  the  former  Smithwest 
FitMt*s  Twenty-first  Arm.%  Timoshenko's 
mission  was  to  defend  the  left  bank  of 
the  Don  from  Pavlovsk  to  Kletskaya 
and,  from  Kletskaya  south,  to  hold  a 
line  inside  the  Don  bend  to  the  point  at 
which  the  river  turned  wtst  forty  mUes 
east  of  Tsimlyanskiy.  North  Caucasus 
Fronts  Fifty-first  Aiiriy  was  stationed  on 
the  river's  left  bank  between  Stalingrad 
Front's  flank  and  the  Sea  of  Azov.* 

The  armies  were  far  from  being  in 
full-fighting  trim.  General  Leytenant 
V.  I.  Chuikov,  acting  commanding  gen- 
eral of  ^xfyfourth  Army,  stopped  at 
Headquarters,  Twcntyfir^t  Army  on  the 
15th  and  observed  that  although  it  was 
supposedly  defending  the  Don  be- 
tween Kletskaya  and  Serafimovich  it 
was  "living  on  wheels,"  that  is,  operat- 
ing out  of  trucks  and  vehicles  as  if  to  be 
r^idy  to  pick  up  and  move  at  any  mo- 
ment. A  day  later,  his  own  army,  whidi 
was  assigned  to  the  southern  half  of  the 
frtmt  inside  the  Don  hend^  was  only 
beginning  to  detrain  between  the  Volga 
and  the  Don.  Anodier  week  would  pass 
before  all  of  it  arrived.  His  neighbor  on 
'^'^Vlot^,  Sixty-second  Army,  was  in  posi- 
^ij  audi  in  aaxjrdance  with  orders 

"G.  F.  Aleksaiidnn.  el  li>Mj  Vivnnntim  irli  SUilni, 
Kratkaya  biogiiifh'ii  (VIi«<uvv:  Iztl.irelsun  Piiliiitht\t.i.i\ 
Jjjeratuty.  I'M'.'t.  \>.  \'M. 

"A.  M.  Boi<.«Jin.  exL.Bitvn  za  Stalingrad  (Volgograd: 
Xi/linive-Volzhskoye  Kni/hnoyfe  IjdatefetSfO,  19^),  p- 
\l:iv6vSS,  vol.  It;  p.  426. 


from  the  front,  had  a  picket  line  on  the 
Chir  River,  but  it  was  keeping  its  liead- 
quarters  well  behind  the  Don,  fifty 
miles  &om  ^tfoops.^ 

Stalingrad  Bypassed 

For  the  moment,  Stal/i)i^-iri<i  Front  had 
almost  as  little  bearing  on  i  he  Germans" 
real  concerns  as  Vomncz/i  Front  had  had 
a  week  before.  HiUer's  attendon  and 
the  efforts  of  his  generals  were  di" 
rected  elsewhere 

South  of  the  Donets,  opposite  Seven- 
teenth Army's  center  and  right  flank, 
Smth.  Front  held  tight  to  its  original 
positions  undl  die  15th,  when  it  began 
to  pull  away  firom  Voroshiiovgraa  W 
the  southeast.  Seventeenth  Army  was 
ready  to  attack,  but  the  day  before, 
Field  Marshal  List,  the  commander  of 
Army  Group  A,  had  told  General 
Ruoii,  the  army's  commander,  to  wait 
until  the  pocket  was  closed  on  the  east 
between  the  lower  Donets  and  Rostov. 
By  1200  on  die  16th,  South  Front's  right 
flank  was  clearly  in  full  retreat,  smd 
List,  after  giving  Ruoff  permission  to 
let  infantry  follow,  scheduled  the  gen- 
eral attack  for  the  morning  of  the  18th. 
Ruoff  believed  that  even  though  the 
Russians  appeared  to  be  standing  firm 
on  the  southern  half  of  the  front  in 
their  heavily  fortified  line  on  the  Mius 
River,  he  was  not  going  to  catch  many 
of  them  if  he  waited  another  day  and  a 
half.  The  infantry  advancing  along  the 
south  bank  of  the  Donets  was  hardly 
seeing  a  trace  of  the  enemy.  When  it 
took  Voroshilovgrad  on  the  17th  the 
city  was  empty.** 

*Vjesi]i  I.  C;iiuikci\.  Thi  Baltic  lor  Hlaiingrad  (New 
ferks  Holt,  Rinehar!  and  Whisidii,  1964).  pp.  15-17. 

'"j40A'  n.  In  Krh'gshigelnuh  Nr.  3.  14-17  Jul  42, 
AOK  17  24'Ul/l  Ilk-;  H.  Gr.  A.  la  Kni-gslagfhich,  Band 
I.  Teill.  14-16  Jul  42,  H.  Gr.  A  75126/1  ftle. 


3S4 


MOSCK)W  TO  STALINGRAD 


In  thcr  DoQ  henii,  ^  ^seSm&f^msend 

and  Sixty-fourth  Annies  were  to  see  for 
some  days  alter  the  15th  were  strag- 
^fefS,  not  just  single  soldiers  but  fre- 
quently whole  staffs — thirsty,  dirty, 
and  demoralized — coming  out  of  the 
T^nestwer  the  steppe.''  Tlie  Germans 
were  not  all  that  far  away,  forty  to  fifty 
miles,  but  Sixth  Army  had  slowed 
down,  and  General  ^miiS,  the  com- 
mander of  Sixth  Army,  was  dutifully 
turning  his  attention  nortli  toward  the 
Don.  And  Fourth  Panzer  Army  was 
running  due  south,  parallel  to  the  So- 
viet hue  tiiat  was  forming  off  its  left 
flank.  By  1200  on  the  16th,  Fourth 
Panzer  Army's  tanks  were  in  Ta- 
tsinskaya  and  Moiozovsk,  and  before 
li^htfaU,  Hoth  had  a  spearhead  stand- 
ing at  Tsimlyanskiy  on  the  Don.  By 
then.  First  Panzer  Army  was  across  the 
Donets  and  headed  toward  Rostov. 
During  the  day  on  the  I7th,  advance 
detachments  of  two  of  Paulus'  divisions 
after  meeting  (jnly  light  resistance  en- 
tered Bokovskaya  on  the  uppet^  C'hir 
River.'-  Tlie  appearance  of  the  Ger- 
mans on  the  CSaSt  &a  17  July  is  taken  in 
the  Soviet  literature  as  the  beginning  of 
the  defensive  battle  for  Stalingrad.'^ 

An  encirclement  was  forming  on  tlie 
lower  Don,  but  an  eighty-mile  stretch 
of  the  river  from  the  confluence  of  tlie 
iD^ets  to  the  Gulf  of  Taganrog  waSSdH 
open,  and  to  reach  the  crossings,  par- 
ticularly at  Rostov,  the  Russians  hi  the 
pocket  had  shorter  distances  to  go  than 
did  the  Germans.  Hitler  was  deter- 
mined not  to  let  the  quarry  escape 


"Clhuikov,  Slalingrad.  p.  18f. 

'MOK  6.  In  Kru-^itogffmch  Nr.  12,  15  and  1(3  Jul 
AOKfi  2'2Hr)')/l  lile;  //.  Gr.  A,  la  Kriegstagebiicli ,  Bniiill. 
Teill,  13  and  16      42. H.  Gr.  A  75126/1  fUe;A0A'6./fl 
Kiiegstageburh  Nf.  12,  17  Jiil  42.  AOK  6  22895/1  fife; 

"VOV,  p.  151;  IVMV.  vol.  V,p.  159- 


although  there  was  reason  to  suspect  it 
had  in  part  already  done  so.  (^n  the 
night  of  the  17th,  disregarding  Hai- 
ders protest  that  all  hte  would  at«>m- 
plisli  would  be  to  create  a  useless 
pileup  of  armor.  Hitler  set  all  of  List's 
armies  on  the  shortest  cQPiitses  to  Ros- 
tov. He  instructed  List  to  stop  Fourtli 
Panzer  Army  al  Tsimlyanski\  and 
KonstanUnovskiy  and  to  turn  ii  west 
along  the  north  bank  of  the  Don.  Ruoff 
was  to  shift  Seventeentli  Army's  attack, 
which  had  not  yet  started,  fifty  miles 
south,  from  the  uppci  Mi  us  to  the 
coast  just  north  of  Tagaiu  og.  When 
List  and  Ruoff  bods  otgected  tfiat  while 
tlie  distance  to  Rostov  was  somewhat 
shorter,  the  regrouping  would  waste 
three  or  four  days,  Colonel  Heusinger, 
the  OKH  operations  chief,  said  he 
shared  their  opinion,  but  the  Fuehrer 
had  g^effiH  the  order  "and  it  is  not  to 
be  supposed  that  he  will  alter  his 
decision."'* 

Hider  included  in  the  night's  dis- 
patches, also,  an  order  to  Ai  mv  Group 
B.  .Sixth  Army's  mission  would  remain 
as  it  had  been,  to  cover tbeflank  on  the 
Don,  but  it  would  be  expanded.  The 
two  divisions  whose  advance  detach- 
ments had  reached  Bokovskaya  during 
the  day  would  press  on  to  the  east, 
"advance  detachments  ahead!,"  occupy 
the  whole  nortliea^ern  quarter  of  the 
Don  bend,  and  "by  gaining  ground  in 
die  direction  ol  Stalingrad  make  it  dif- 
ficult for  tiie  enemy  to  build  a  defense 
west  of  the  Volga."'^ 


'H)KH,  Gi-nSldH.  Op.  Abt.  (IS/A/  AV-  -l2ll^rU!42.  an 
H.  (,r.  A.  17.7.42.  l-l  22/215  file:  Ihildi-i  Dtmy.  vtA.  111. 
p.  4H;)n;  //.  Gr.  ,4,  la  Kiieg.'itag^i'hiiili,  Biniil  I,  Ti'il  I,  17 
Jul  4L'.  H.  Gr.  A  7hm/\  file. 

'^OKN.  Gen.SldH.  Oj,.  Aht.  (IS/B)  Mr.  420503142.  an 
H.  Gr.  A.  17.7.42.  H  22/215  file;  .40/1  6,  la 
Kiitgitagebiich  Nr.  12,  17  Jul  42,  AOK  6  22855/1  file. 


HITLER'S  GRAND  DESIGN 


355 


Endretemmt  at  Rostsv 

While  the  ofdim  were  being  written 
in  \'innitsa,  it  ivas  raining  in  tlie  great 
beiifl  ol  tlie  D(.)n,  not  just  in  local 
showers  but  as  a  ciMHinuous  dowii^SUf 
that  had  begun  in  the  early  afternoon. 
The  rain  lasted  through  the  night  and 
the  entire  next  day.  No  motor  vefaM^ 
moved.  The  panzer  divisions  were 
"paralyzed."  Seventeenth  Army's  re- 
deployment could  not  begin,  and  Sixth 
Army's  drift  along  the  Don  came  to  a 
stanclslUI,  The  only  significant  change 
reported  came  from  the  Grossdeutsch- 
land  Division  that  reached  the  lower 
Donets  with  its  infantry  and  put  some 
troops  across.  Hider's  mood  match^ 
the  weather.  Haider  and  Heusinger 
were  on  die  phone  to  all  the  armies 
repeatedly  din  ing  the  day  on  the  19th 
voicing  the  Furhrer's  impatience.'*' 

In  between  times,  diey  transmitted 
notices  of  impending  changes  in  the 
army  group's  directives  to  List  and 
General  Weichs,  the  Army  Group  B 
commander,  and  their  chiefs  of  staff. 
To  Haider's  professional  relief — inter- 
mingled witli  personal  annoyance  at 
having  had  liis  advice  to  the  same' 
effect  toidlv  ignored  two  days  earlier — 
Hitler  had  decided  to  hedge  on  the 
Rostov  encirclement.'^  Hoth  was  to 
send  four  of  Fourth  Panzer  Army's 
panzer  and  motorized  divisions,  in- 
cluding Grossdeutschland,  toward  Ros- 
tov along  the  north  bank  of  the  Don; 
but  another  four  were  to  cross  the  river 
at  Tsimlyanskiy  and  other  places 
downstream  to  the  mouth  of  the  Do- 
nets "as  fast  and  in  as  much  streijpth  as 
road  coiiditioas  and  fuel  supplies  in 


•'•H.  Cr.  A,  Id  Kri(giliif:dwii.  Band  I.  T,-d  I,  18  and  19 
Jul  42.  H.  Gr.  .\  75126/1  hie. 

"lUd.,  19  Jul  42:  HaUtifrDrnTy.  vol.  Ill,  p.  486. 


any  way  peraoit."  Those  four  would 
strike  east  twenty-five  miles  to  cut  the 
Salsk-Stalingrad  railroad  and  to  take 
possession  of  the  Sal  River  valley  be- 
tween Bolshaya  Orlovka  and  Re- 
naontnaya.  There  they  would  position 
themselves  "to  proceed  eidier  south- 
west or  west  with  the  object  of  destroy- 
ing forces  the  enemy  has  withdrawn 
south  of  the  river." 

The  greater  change  was  in  Army 
Group  B%  and  Sixth  Army%  mission. 
Paulii.s  was  to  leave  light  .security  on  the 
Don  and  "take  possession  of  Stalingrad 
by  a  daring  high-speed  assault."  He 
\\(ntlil  rrfi  as  reinforcements  from 
Fourth  Panzer  Army,  the  LI  Corps 
with  three  infantry  divisions,  and  XIV 
Panzer  t'orps  with  two  motorized  divi- 
sions and  one  panzer  division.'''  The 
LI  Corps  was  northeast  of  Morozovsk 
and  XIV  Panzer  C'orps  north  of  Millc- 
rovo.  Their  transfers  were  accom- 
plished by  shifting  the  Army  Group  B 
boundary  south  to  the  line  Millerovo- 
Moiozovsk  and  switching  theii"  head- 
ing from  south  to  east. 

The  stage  was  set  on  the  20th  for  the 
last  act  around  Rostov.  Seventeenth 
Army  finished  regrouping  north  itrf 
Taganrog,  and  First  Panzer  Army's 
point,  slowed  a  little  by  Soviet  rear 
guards,  crossed  tfee  Ktmdryuchya 
River  forty-five  miles  north  of  the  city. 
When  Seventeenth  Army  jumped  off 
the  next  morning  against  what  had 
been  the  strongesi  sector  (.>f  the  whole 
Soviet  south  flank,  the  Russians  were 
gone.  They  had  pulled  tnJt  dtiWfig  the 
night.  .After  picking  their  way  through 
minefields,  Ruoffs  lead  divisions  had 


"OKH.  GenStdH.  Op.  Ah!.  (I)  Nr.  42050814^,  an  H- 
Gr.  A  imd  11.  Cr.  «,  i<-).lA2,  H  22^215  file. 

'»;A(W.  ;  AOK  6.  la  Kne/rstagauchNr.  M.  19 and  20Jril 
42,  AOK  6  22855/1  file. 


356 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


General  Hoth  (center)  Gives  an  Order  ai  i  Ht  Don  Crossing 


covered  thirty  miles  to  the  western  arc 
of  the  Rostov  defenses,  w  liicli  had  been 
considered  exceptionally  strong,  bv 
1200  on  the  22d  and  had  broken 
through  before  dark.  First  Panzer-  anil 
Seventeenth  Armies  botli  drove  into 
the  city  on  the  23d  and  secured  it 
during  the  day  after  sporadic  house-to- 
house  fighting.  In  less  than  another 
twenty-four  hours.  Seventeenth  Army, 
which  had  brought  bridging  equip- 
ment to  i&  train,  had  parts  of  three 
dividons  across  the  Don;  and  on  the 
2Sth,  it  had  a  five-mile-deep  bridge- 
head on  the  south  bank  reaching  past 
Bataysk.^" 
'lae  Rostov  pocket  had  never  de- 


«/f.C<  \.  1,1  K,vgstagebuch.Bmidt,WI,  20-25 Jul 
42,H.  Gr.  A7:)126/lfile. 


veloped.  At  the  lasi,  noh<xl\  exptrictl  it 
to.  Fiist  Panzer  Arniys  tail)  showed 
83,000  prisoners  taken  in  the  whole 
200-mile  drive,  not  anywhere  near 
enough  to  have  cut  decisively  into  the 
Soviet  Union's  supply  of  manpovngf. 
Several  months  later  a  First  Panzer 
Army  souvenir  history  featured  the 
Don  bridgehead  m  l^e  big  aeiiieve- 
ment  of  the  campaign  thus  lar.-' 
Haider's  expectation  of  a  traffic  jam  at 
Rostov,  however,  was  amply  fulfiliefi. 
On  die  25th,  twenty  divisions  were 
standing  within  a  fifty-mile  radius  of 
the  city,  most  with  nodiing  useful  lo  do. 
Fourth  Panzer  Army  took  bridge- 


*'Pi.  AOK  I.  Ahl.  Idilc.  .\l}srhlu\'.mddung  der  1.  Pz- 
Aim,;;  31.7.12.  Pz.  AOK  I  ^41)06/19  file;  JM*  JCijM*  MI 
lien  Kuukuiw,,  Pz.  AOK  1  8Ijt)02  file. 


HITLER'S  GRAND  DESIGN 


357 


heads  at  Ts&nlyanskiy,  Nikolayevskaya, 
and  Konstantinovskiv  on  ihc  2Ist  and  a 
day  later  had  one  al  Uie  mouth  of  the 
Siai  River,  taken  by  the  Grossdeutsch- 
land  Division.  The  two  at  Nikolayev- 
skaya and  Konstantinovskiy  were 
jomed  on  this  f  3d  and  expanded  south 
twenty  miles  to  Bolshaya  Oiiovka  on 
the  Sal,  but  Hoth  was  still  short  of 
hditf  i%ady  to  inake  a  tong  sweep  to 

the  west  and  south.  Losing  two  corps 
headquarters  and  six  divisions  had 
weakened  Im  Sscak  em  ibe  east,  and  oti 
the  22d.  Hider  had  also  transferred 
Headquarters,  XXIV  Panzer  Corps 
aad  the  24th  Tsaaer  Divifflon  to  Sixtit 
Army.  ^"  The  Germans  were  beginning 
to  feel  the  effects  of  operating  simul- 
taneouaJy  in  two  directions. 

On  the  Road  to  Stalingrad 

Sixtli  Army,  alter  a  len-dav  hiatus, 
had  die  strength  to  come  back  into  die 
offensive  in  earnest.  Its  opposidon  in 
the  Don  bend  was  still  weak,  but  it  was 
mcvczSttXg.  Sixt^'Sf'mnd  Army  had  6  rifle 
divisions,  a  tank  brigade,  and  6  inde- 
pendent tank  battalions  on  its  half  of 
the  line,  and  Sixty-fourth  :\y)ii\  had  2 
rille  divisions  and  a  tank  brigade.  Be- 
tween the  Volga  and  tbe  Don,  Fifty- 
semftikMm^vmhem^  i efbmied as 
front  reserve  and  the  Headquarters, 
Thirty-i'ighth  antl  Iwruty-cighth  Armies, 
together  with  those  of  their  troops  that 
had  survi\  ed.  were  l)eing  used  as  cad- 
res ibi  building  the  First  and  Fuurlh 
Htnk  Armies.  East  ol  the  Don,  virtually 
the  whole  able-bodied  population  of 
Stalingrad  was  at  work  simultaneously 
building  four  concentric  defense  lin^ 
arotuid  the  city.  The  Stavka  had  given 


"11.  Gr.A.laKntgii^i^h.Baadl.'Eilt.  Zt-SSJid 
42.  H.Gr.A75tMIfile- 


Eighih  Air  Army,  Whidl  supporting 

Stalingiad  Front,  10  air  regiments  with 
200  planes.  On  die  23d,  General  Leyte- 
nant  Gordov,  who  had  been  ^oim<^ 
manding  general,  Tuvnty- first  Army  and 
had  nominally  commanded  Sixty-Jourtii 
Army  for  a  wm  days,  replaced  Timo- 
shenko  as  commander  of  Sifiliuij^riifl 
Fnmt.^'^  On  that  same  day,  Paulas  sub- 
nnttied  Ms  plan  to  take  the  dty.  He 
proposed  to  sweep  to  the  Don  on  both 
sides  of  Kalach.  take  bridgeheads  on 
the  run,  and  then  drhr€  a  Df 
armor  flanked  iiy  infaABy  j|ia!©«|!^ 
remaining  Uiirty  miles.** 

Skin  Amof  had  been  running  into 
and  over  Sixty-wnmd  and  Sixty-fourth 
Annies'  outposts  since  the  17di  widiout 
knowing  it.  On  the  23d,  it  did  nodce  a 
change  when  it  bit  their  main  line  east 
of  the  Chir.  The  VI II  Corps,  on  die 
north,  encountered  several  Soviet  rfflfe 
divisions  in  the  mf)rning,  and  those 
delayed  its  match  east  four  or  Hve 
hours.  The  XIV  Panzer  Corps,  beaiihg 
in  toward  Kalacb,  reported  200  enemy 
tanks  in  its  path  and  knocked  out  40 
during  the  day,  (If  the  German  tally 
after  this  date  of  tlie  numbers  of  .Soviet 
tanks  was  aiiywiiere  near  accurate, 
more  tank  units  must  have  been  in  die 
field  than  are  given  in  the  Soviet  ac- 
counts.) On  the  24th,  VIII  Corps 
cleaied  the  northern  quarter  of  the 
f^oi!  bend  except  fur  a  Soviet  briflge- 
head  at  Set  afiino\  i(  h  and  another 
around  Ki fnu'nska\ a  and  Sirotin'- 
skaya.  To  tiie  soiitli,  as  ilu-  fl.iily  report 
put  it,  Sixth  Army  "'consoli(laled,"  be- 
eame  XIV  Panzer  C:(jrps  ran  oiti  of 
moKor  ftid  and  the  infantry  could  not 


-■'tv<.>vss.  vo!.  tl.  pp.  426-28;  lvm,i(ciL  V^Jfc  IS7; 

\()Vl  Kmthiyti  f^OBTifa},  pp.  168-70. 

'.\()K  b.  i„  Krweni^auth  Nr,  B,  23  Jul  42.  AOK  6 

23948/11  file. 


make  headway  against  stiffening  resis- 
tance  noiiii  liiuI  i^asl  of  Kalach.  Tlie 
next  day,  while  XIV  Panzer  Corps  was 
SJai  ivaitifig  to  tdftiel,  <B0  &met  taafcs 
tut  the  road  bchiiuf  it,  and  3d  and  ROth 
Motorized  Divisions,  tlie  ones  closest  to 
K^adi,  became  aitaogied  with  200 
Soviet  tanks.  The  army  chief  of  staff 
told  the  army  group  operations  chief, 
*Fdr  the  tBo*Qent  a  tsertain  orisfe  Ym 
developed."  At  the  day's  end,  XIV  Pan- 
zer, LI,  and  XXIV  Panzer  Corps  were 
ranged  shoulder  to  shoulder  on  fJie 
Stahngrad  axis,  but  the  Russians  were 
still  holding  a  forty-mile-wide  and 
twenty-oiUe-deep  bridgehead  f|N39^ 

tHreciim^S'-'^ki^NQ.  227 
HMef  tim^  His  fbrces 

The  batde  for  the  line  ©Fthe  tkm  was 

joined  everywhere  do^vnstream  from 
Serahmovich  on  25  July.  Under  the 
or%iiiai  'l^u  concept,  which  had  par- 
tiaffy  reemerged  in  the  ordeis  given 
during  the  pievious  week,  the  next 
s^^gie  would  have  been  to  estabhsh  a 
$ecil1?e  north  flank  anchored  on  the 
Volga  at  Stalingrad.  During  the  day  on 
the  25th,  Directive  45  reached  Army 
Groups  A  and  B.  It  was  entitled  "for 
tiie  continuation  of  Operation  Bralin- 
SCHimG  I'BlAtJ]."  Howevei,  the  open- 
ing sentences  indicated  ihat  the 
piimary  objective,  the  "conclusive  de- 
struction of  the  Soviet  defensive 
strength,"  was  already  accomplished, 
The  sentences  read:  "In  a  little  more 
than  three  weeks  the  deep  objectivet  I 
set  for  the  south  flank  of  the  Eastern 
Front  have  in  substance  been  reached. 


«f2flU.  23-25  Jul  42, 


MOSCOW  TO  SXAJUNGIIAB 

ceeded  in  escaping  eneirclement  and 
reaching  the  south  bank  of  the  Don." 
The  intent  of  the  directive  was  not  to 
condntie  Bftmj^scH^te  btit  to  mm* 

plete  it,  in  one  swoop,  by  conducting 
wliat  was  left  of  Blau  II  (Stalingrad) 
sicajaltaneously  with  Blau  IV  (the  Gsm- 
casus  and  the  Caspian  oil  fields). 

What  had  been  Blau  IV  was  for  the 
SxM  1km  ipdled  mt,  aaad  ft  was  as* 
signed  to  Army  Group  A  as  Opera^^li 
EuELWictss.  It  was  to  be  carried  out 
titee«  stages.  In  the  first,  "the  enemy 
forces  that  have  escaped  across  the 
Don"  would  be  "encircled  and  de- 
stroyed south  and  southeast  of  Rostov.* 
The  envelopment  would  be  formed  by 
Seventeenth  Army's  infantry  on  the 
west  aitd  Fiirst  and  Fourth  Panzer  Ar- 
mies' annor  on  the  east,  and  the  ring 
would  be  closed  ninety  miles  south  of 
Rostov,  near  Tikhoretsk.  Army  Gl^tip 
A  would  concentrate  in  the  second 
stage  on  clearing  the  Black  Sea  coast  to 
eliminate  the  Soviet  Navy,  while  at  llie 
same  time  employing  "all  (he  excess 
mouniaui  and  Jaeger  divisions'"  to  lake 
the  high  groimd  around  Ma\  kop  and 
Armavir  and  close  the  passes  in  the 
western  Caucasus,  In  the  third  stage,  a 
IttoMIe  force  would  head  south  and 
east  to  close  the  Ossetian  and  Grusi- 
nian  Militai"y  Roads  (across  the  Cau- 
casus), take  Groznyy,  and  strike  along 
the  Caspian  coast  to  Baku.  All  three 
appeared  to  be  so  well  within  Army 
Group  .A's  capabilities  that  the 
Grossdcutschland  Division  could  he 
taken  out  and  shipped  to  the  Western 
Tbe^r  and  Operation  Bluecher,  the 
crossing  From  the  Crimea  to  the  Taman 
Penuisula,  could  be  reduced  to  a  much 
smaller  Bluecher  II.  Consequently, 
five  of  Eleventh  Army's  seven  German 
divisions  were  to  be  shifted  to  Army 


HITLER'S  GRAND  DESIGN 


359 


SovKT  jiimTAWK  Gun  C«£w  Gomjes  Unjjer  Fim 


Group  Nortli  for  an  attack  on 
Leningrad. 

Under  the  code  name  ImschrilIHER 
("heron").  Army  Group  B  would  retain 
the  two  missions  it  aheady  had,  namely, 
to  defend  the  line  of  the  Don  and  to 
take  Stalingrad,  After  it  had  possession 
of  StaJingrad  and  had  set  up  a  solid 
front  between  (he  Don  and  the  Volga, 
it  would  dispatch  a  mobile  force  down- 
Stream  along  the  Volga  to  take  As- 
trakhan, The  Liiflivdffr  would  assist 
Fist:HRf:iHER  by  "timely  destruction  of 
Stalingrad. "^^ 

In  Directive  45,  Mirier  committed 
the  cardinal  lacucal  sin  of  splitting  his 
forces  and  sending  them  off  in  tmo 

'"OA'H',  WI'Sl.  Op.  Nr.  5  ?/2cS'A'/^2.  Wei.sinig  Nr.  4Sfltfr 
die  RirLielzuiig  dft  Opinilini)  "Binutisfhuvig."  23.7.42, 
German  High  Level  Directives,  CMH  files. 


directions  at  right  angles  to  each  other. 
Henceforth  they  wouJd  be  conducting 
separate  campaigns,  each  having  to  be 
sustained  independently  without  either 
being  fully  independent.  The  effects 
were  already  beginning  to  be  felt  by 
both.  The  railroad  between  Millerovo 
and  Katitensk-Shakhtinskiy  was  the 
only  one  taken  rea,sonably  intact,  and 
the  iorccs  were  having  to  share  die 
motor  transport  out  of  the  Kamemk'- 
Shakhtinskiy  railhead,  Wliaiever  one 
received,  no  matter  how'  inadequate  it 
might  have  been,  was  always  se^^Swiiat 
at  the  olliers  exjiense.^^ 

Sixth  Army  lelt  the  pmch  first.  Short 
on  motor  fuel  and  ammunition  for  two 
dafs  ■and  not  likely  to  get  a  full  re- 


»'Pi.  AOK  1.  ().  ill!..  (.III.  J  .\y.  6  /7/-/2,  lirnrlnlang 
derVmorgungslage,  29.7.42,  Pz.  AOK  i  24906/53. 


360 


M0SC50W  TO  STALIKGRAD 


plenisliment  for  at  least  the  next  sev^ 

enil,  Paulus  had  lo  pull  his  spearhead 
around  Kalach  back  (.m  ihe  26th.  Hah 
of  his  daily  supply  tonnage  was  going 
lo  Army  Groiiji  A  that  Iiad  divisions 
closer  to  the  railhead  and  higher  pri- 
ority under  fifreetive  45.  By  the  28th, 
Sixth  Army  was  almost  on  the  defen- 
sive, and  XIV  Panzer  Corps  was  down 
to  lf>0  fotittds  of  artillery  amiaumlidn 
per  battery  and  half  of  a  nortoal  load 
per  tank.-*  At  the  Wermlf,  Sixth  Anny's 
fuel  trouble  put  Hider  into  a  state  of 
"great  agitatirm."  anri  Haider  confided 
to  his  diary  thai  this  was  "intolei-able 
grumbling"  over  mistakes  the  Fu^rer 
had  provoked  by  his  own  previous 
orders.^* 

Army  Group  AS  armies  were  no 

better  supplied,  jiartieularlv  with 
motor  fuel  and  ammunition,  tlian 
Sixdi  Amofms^.  Th^  had  piatiser  £ind 
moiori/ed  divisioxi$  standing  al! 
around  Rostov  and  along  the  lower 
Don  with  nearly  empty  tanks.  They 
had  eovered  miteh  more  distance  faster 
than  had  been  anticipated  in  calculat- 
ing^ the  supply  schedule,  and  First  Pan- 
zer Army  had  had  to  relinquish  730 
tons  ot  transport  lo  help  get  Sixth 
Army  moving  after  the  19th.*"  One 
complication  Army  Group  A  did  not 
have  to  be  concerned  with  was  enemy 
resistance.  Eiccept  at  Fourth  Panzer 
Ai  rii\'s  bridgeheads,  most  notable  the 
one  al  I  simlyanskiy,  the  Russians  were 
not  lowing  any  sign  of  even  attempt- 
ing to  make  a  stand. 

List's  problems  were  lo  gel  his  divi- 
sions sorted  out  and  refucfed^ — and 


^'AOK  6.  1,1  Kriegslagflmrh  Nr.  13,  26-28  Jul  42, 
AOK  6  3394,H/n  lilc. 

■•'llHldn  Dioij.  vol.  111,  p.  4!»:<. 

AOK  I.  O.  Qit.  KnegyiagebwA,  1.4.~31J0.42,  25 
Jul  42,  Pz.  AOK  1  24906/52  file. 


then  to  determine  where  they  should 
go.  The  OKH  told  hitn  on  the  27thnot 
to  let  Seventeenth  Army,  which  being 
mosdy  infantry  was  in  the  best  con- 
ilitioii  to  ad\ance,  go  too  Fast  south  of 
Rostov  because  that  might  push  the 
eaemyf  bdPdre  First  and  Fooith 
Panzer  AjCHiies  could  make  the  sweep 
lo  TUdloretsk  and  complete  the  en- 
drdement  specified  in  Directive  4S. 
But  List  did  not  believe  there  was  going 
to  be  an  endrclemenl,  especially  not 
after  Ruoff  told  him  that  the  Russians 
v\ere  ah  eady  in  fuU  retreat  ahead  of 
Seventeenth  Army  without  having 
been  pushed.  Later  in  the  day,  List  m^ 
with  KJeist  and  Hoth  at  Kleist's  Iiead- 
quarters  in  Krasnyy  SuUn,  norlli  of 
R<^ie6^;^e  tfitnee  agr^ised  litm  the  Ktis» 

sinns  were  not  going  to  let  themselves 
be  encircled  and,  therefore.  First  and 
Fourth  Panzer  Armies  ought  not  to 
bear  southwest  toward  Tikhoretsk  but 
due  south  and  souilreast.  List,  however, 
regarded  himself  as  bound  by  Directive 

On  the  28th,  Seventeenth  Army 
reached  and  crossed  the  Eagatnik 
River,  twenty  miles  south  of  Rostov, 
and  First  Panzer  Army  took  a  bridge- 
head on  the  Manich.  The  Maiuchv 
though,  was  going  to  be  tronblcsoine. 
It  was  a  river  emptying  into  the  lower 
Don  that  had  been  converted  Mto  a 
eana!  by  damming  and  some  canali/a- 
lion.  The  dams,  whicli  had  sizable  lakes 
behind  them,  were  upstream  from 
First  Panzer  Armv's  crossing  point. 
The  Russians  had  opened  Uie  dams; 

some  infantry  and  enpneers  m  the 


»W.  Cr.  A.  la  Krifptagi-hurli.  Ba,ui L  Tall,  27 Jul  42. 
H.Gr.  A  75126/1  file;  Pz.  AOK  I.  la  mi^gUgiimek  Nr. 
8.  27  Jul  42.  Pi.  AOK  I  24906  file. 


HITLER  S  GRAND  DESIGN 


361 


bridgehead,  all  of  First  F^zss&f  Axmy 
was  on  the  Qorth  side. 

Wliilc  Army  Group  A's  ^tUS^on  on 
2B  July  was  not  entirely  saidsifactory, 
ana  Sixth  Aitny^  was  so,  fht  ccm- 
dition  of  their  opponents  was  worse. 
The  Soviet  armies  did  not  have  a  trace 
of  a  genuine  front  anywhere  south  of 
the  Don  l>end.  A.  A.  Cirt  t  hko — then  a 
major  general  and  commander  of  the 
Tvfeyth  Army  and  after  the  war,  a  Sovfel 
marshal,  defense  minister,  and  histo- 
rian of  the  Caucasus  campaign — has 
written,  "By  the  end  of  the  day  of  28 
Jlily  there  were  huge  gaps  between  tlie 
armies.  The  defensive  front  was 
erack«d.'^?  The  Strategic  retreat  was  in 
danger  of  becoming  a  rout. 

On  28  July,  Stalin,  as  people's  com- 
missar of  defense,  signed  Order  No. 
227.  Under  its  familiar  name,  'W/  sliag'ii 
mzad!"  ("Not  a  step  back!"),  it  is  re- 
gard^cf  ni  %he  Soviet  literature  as  a 
successful  impetus  lr>  the  Soviet  Army's 
will  to  fight.  In  part,  its  most  frequendy 
quoted  passages  read: 

Every  commandier,  sdltKer,  9nd  pdKtleaY 
worker  must  understand  that  our  re- 
sources are  not  tmlimited.  .  . .  After  losing 
the  Ukraine,  BeIonis,si;i.  ihe  Baltic,  the 
Don  Basin,  and  otiu  r  arras  we  now  have  a 
much  smaller  lerriiory.  icww  j>eople  and 
factories,  less  grain  and  metal  We  have  lost 
more  than  70  million  persons,  over  BOO 
miUxmintd  [14.3  rniUion  tons]  of  grain  per 
year,  and  f&are  Aan  10  tnilfiott  tons  of 
metals  j>er  year.  We  no  longer  have  superi- 
ority over  the  Germans  either  in  man- 
power leserves  or  in  grain  stocks.  To 
rt'treat  larther  is  lo  cast  oncst  if  and  die 
Homeland  itito  ruin.  Kver\  dod  of  eardi 
wc  give  up  strengthens  the  enemy  and 
weafeens  our  defense  and  our  mMan. 


*'Crechlw>,  Gadf  wrpy,  p.  190. 


_N<>i  a  .sir))  fi.iik!  Such  tmM  be  our 

highest  |jiir])osf  now,"''^ 

The  Hisloiy  uj  the  Hecond  Wirid  WJir 
indicates  that  C>rder  No.  227  was  more 
than  a  patriotic  a|jpeal.  "This  order."  it 
states,  "contained  the  harsh  trutli  about 
the  dangerous  situation  on  the  Soviet- 
German  front,  condemned  "voices  of 
retreat,'  and  pointed  out  tlie  necessity 
to  use  all  means  to  stop  the  advance  ctf" 
the  fascist-German  troops,  h  threat- 
ened all  of  those  who  showed 
themselvie*  c?t*watcBy  or  unspiriied  in 
battle  with  ilie  most  severe  punish- 
ments and  projected  practical  mea- 
sures to  tawe  the  fighting  spirit  of  the 
soldiers  and  strengthen  their  disci- 
pline." The  order,  the  history  con- 
tSnties,  ** . . .  was;  an  extraordinary 
measure.  The  Central  Committee  of 
the  Communist  Party  of  the  Soviet 
Union  and  the  military  leadership  un- 
der took  this  step  in  view  of  the  difficult 
situation  thai  had  come  to  exist.  I  hey 
utilized  the  expci  iences  of  the  party  in 
the  \ears  ol  the  Civil  War  ;uid  let 
themselves  be  guided  by  V.  i.  Lenin's 
advice  that  the  party  ttmst  tesort  to 
cxtraordinai)  measures  yih&l  condi- 
tions demand  it."^^ 

The  Soviet  accounts  do  not  give  the 
wh(}\c  Ni  shagUWimrl!  order.  A  full  text 
has  survived  tli  the  German  records, 
however.  In  it»  the  "bii^  ttiith*  in- 
dudes  thefoUowiuig: 

The  people  of  the  nation,  who  have 
looked  on  the  Reel  .'\rniv  with  love  and 
respect,  are  clisillusioned.  Tliey  are  losing 
faith  in  you.  Many  of  ihem  curse  the  Red 
Army  because  it  is  abandoning  our  people 
tQ  the  yoke  of  the  German  oppressors  and 
itsetf  ilediig  to  the  iem^ 


'HVCVSS.  vol.  II,  p.  430;  A'iMK  vol.  V,  p.  Ififi. 
p,  165. 


362 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


Another  passage  indicates  that  the 
Older  sleninied  from  Hitlers  example 
of  December  1941  as  well  as  from 
Lenin's  precept  and  the  experience  of 
tlie  Civil  VVai.  It  read: 

The  GetttiLin  iri»i|is  wvic  forced  to  re- 
ntal in  die  vMiiiri  iiiiili  1  ilif  pressure  of 
the  Red  Army.  Tlieir  duicipline  was  shat- 
txmS>  'fbem  pie  Germans  resorted  to  ^ 
vere  meas^ares^  aop4  ^mse  bave  n&t  ^kxrnn 
bad  results. 

As  is  well  knowa,  ^Q8e  measures  have 
liLicl  their  cf  tett,  and  the  fleiman  troops 
niiw  figlit  iH'tier  ilian  i[it  \  did  in  the 
vviiiie!".  The  tiei'maii  n"<>(([)s  rmw  hnvc  <r<»()d 
■  li-^i  i[.)linc  cwn  ihcaigh  iIk.a  (U>  ikjI  ha\e 
betore  them  the  lofty  mission  of  defending 
their  homeland  and  have  only  the  pred- 
atory objective  of  occupying  enemy 
territory. 

The  "punishments  and  practical  mea- 
sures to  raise  th.^  I^gpbtmg  ijpii^'  mste 
given  as  follows: 

In  each  front  area,  from  one  to  three 
punishment  battalions  of  five  hundred 
men  each  are  to  be  ir^.iic*!.  Into  thcni  arc 
to  be  placed  all  intei  nuihaic  and  scnioi' 
commanders  ;md  poiilical  ntlicers  ot  com- 
parable ranks  who  have  shown  themselves 
guilty  of  cowardice,  cf  notpreserving  disd- 

Sline,  or  of  not  maintaimng  reastance  to 
le  enemy.  They  will  be  conmiitted  in  es- 
pecially dangerous  jituati{Ha»  m  that  t)aey 
may  expiate  their  crimes  aga&ist  the  home- 
land with  their  blood. 

Corps  ,iM(l  division  toriinianders  who 
allow  iroops  lo  retreat  wiihcjut  an  order 
trom  the  ainiy  commander  are  to  lie  un- 
conditionally removed,  fhey  will  be 
turned  over  to  the  military  councils  of  the 
fmnts  to  be  condemned  by  court  martials. 

In  each  army  area,  three  to,  five  iveUr 
armed  blocking  detachments  trf  approx- 
imaiely  \wo  hiindrt'd  men  are  to  he  cfe- 
;iie<l.  'I'liey  will  be  stationetl  dii  cclly  iK'hintl 
iiineliable  divisions,  and  it  will  be  iluir 
chit\,  in  the  event  of  panics  or  un- 
aiidiot  ized  retreats,  to  shoot  spmseS^eS  iOlf 
panic  or  cowards  on  the  spot.  , 
In  «3£h  iamy       thtte  to  five  ptidsii- 


ment  companies  of  dii@  iiundred  fifty  to 
two  hundred  men  are  to  be  created  in 
which  all  enlisted  men  and  junior  ollu  ers 
are  to  In-  placed  who  are  guilts  ol  c  owaid- 
ice,  not  picsei\ing  discipline,  uv  nl  l;iiling 
to  maintain  resistance  to  the  enemy.  They 
will  be  committed  in  especially  dangerous 
situations  so  that  tb^  mm  expiaiie  tibeir 
crimes  aiainse  Hhdir  liometaiiid  vMi  iheix 
blw^«s 

The  Mmims  Revised 

Army  Group  As  biggest — and  vir- 
tually only — trotdiles  in  the  last  three 
days  of  July  were  supplies  and  the 
Manich.  The  panzer  divisions  wcte 
having  to  be  given  motor  fuel  by  airlifts 
to  keep  tliem  from  running  dry.  The 
flooded  Manich  was  more  than  a  mile 
wide,  and  water  seeping  outward  was 
turning  the  ground  on  both  sides  to 
mtid.  Tlie  troops  were  having  to  man- 
handle and  ferry  tlieir  equipment 
across  in  intense  suniiuer  heat.  The 
Soviet  lesistante,  though,  if  anything, 
was  on  the  decline.  First  Pan?er  Army 
described  the  enemy  ahead  of  it  as 
being  "in  wild  flight."^*  An  inierc  epted 
Soviet  radio  message  read,  "We  are 
going  back.  No  reprisals  (against  the 
troops^  work  any  m«)re."'''^  Seventeenth 
Army  reached  the  Yeya  River,  forty 
miles  south  of  Rostov;  First  Panzer 
Arm\  liad  a  spearhead  fifty  miles  past 
the  Manich  and  halfwav  to  the  Kuban 
River;  and  Fomlh  Panzer  Army 
crossed  the  Salsk-Stalingrad  railroad  at 
Prolyetatskava  ;ind  Remontnava.  On 
the  29ih,  List  asked  the  OKH  to  cancel 


''Pz.  AOK  I.  ta  m^^m^  m^S.  Si  M  S& 
AOK  I  24906  file. 


HITLER  S  GRAND  DESIGN 


363 


the  projected  eojclrcle nu  n <  at  llklio- 
retsk  because  he  vms  sure  liiere  would 
not  be  any  Russ^s  there.'* 

Sixtli  Army's  fuel  and  amminiition 
drought  continued  as  did  the  tern- 
pestucnis  Soviet  iminterattacks  along 
ilic  KalacbtaTHSgebBad,and  Paiilus  was 
ieehng  pmdfaed  for  infantry.  Some 
help  for  the  latter  problem  was  on  the 
way  in  the  form  of  the  Italian  Eighth 
Army,  whidi  had  earher  been  attached 
to  Seventeenth  Army  but  had  not  been 
needed  in  the  advance  on  Rostov, 
Eighth  Anny,  with  its  six  sonorously 
named  divisioiil,  Cteler^e,  l^aventia, 
Torino,  Cosseria.  Sforzesca,  and  Pas- 
ubio,  was  on  the  march  via  Millerovo  to 
eafce  over  the  Bon  front  between 
Pavlovsk  and  iho  mmitli  oi  the  Khoper 
River,  which  would  let  Paul  us  bring  two 
of  his  infantry  divisions  east.  In  part, 
Sixth  Army's  continuing  ammunition 
shortage  was  causal  by  the  extraor- 
dinarily ^rge  nuinheFS  of  Soviet  tanfcs 
it  was  meeting  in  tlie  Kalach 
bridgehead.  The  tally  of  XIV  Panzer 
Corps  alone  ran  to  482  tanks  knocked 
out  in  the  last  eight  days  of  the  month, 
and  the  total  Sixth  Army  claimed  was 
well  overSOOi'* 

The  Soviet  accounts  confirm  that 
strong  tank  forces  were  in  the  Kalach 
bridgehead,  but  ilot  as  iixany  tanks  as 
Sixth  Arin\  claimed.  General  Mayor 
K.  S.  Moskalenko,  who  hkid  taken  com- 
mand of  First  Thf^  Amty  three  days 
before,  liegan  the  counterattack  on  25 
July,  widi  General  Vasilevskiy  present 
as  Stavha  representative.  The  army, 
Moskalenko  savs,  had  A7//  and  .Y.YV7// 
Tmih  Corps  (with  just  over  thiee  liun- 


»'/fta..29JuU2. 

"AOK  6.  la  Krifgsbtgebueh  Nk  13,  29  J»il  -I  Aug  42, 
AOK  6  23948/11  file. 


dred  tanks)  and  one  rifle  division. 
Fourtii  lank  Army,  under  General  Mayor 
V.  f).  KnuChetildn,  joined  in  on  Hie 
2Rth  \vilii<^e  tank  aM  ps.-*' 

Active  as  it  was,  the  Soviet  armor  was 
apparendy  not  giving  fully  satisfactory 
jjerformance  at  this  stage,  and  in  early 
August,  it  became  the  subject  of  the 
following  StitGb  order: 

Our  armored  forces  and  their  units  fre- 
quently suffer  greater  losses  through  me- 
chanical breakdowns  than  they  do  in 
battle.  For  example,  at  Stalinep  ad  Front  in 
six  days  twelve  of  our  tank  origades  lost 
326  out  of  their  400  tanks.  Of  those  about 
260  owed  to  mechanical  pioblems.  Many 
ol  the  tanks  v\ere  abandoned  on  tlie  bat- 
deheld.  Similar  instances  can  be  observed 
_on  other  fronts. 

Since  such  a  high  incidence  of  mechan- 
ical delects  is  implausible,  the  .Supreme 
Headquarters  sees  in  il  coveil  sabotage 
and  u recking  by  certain  elements  in  the 
tank  (feus  uho  try  lo  tAjiliiii  small  me- 
chanical troubles  to  avoid  batde. 

Hencelorth,  every  tank  leaving  the  bat- 
tlefield for  alleged  nieehanieal  reasons 
was  to  be  gone  over  by  technicians,  imd 
if  sabotage  was  siispet  tefl,  ilie  crews 
were  to  he  put  into  lank  [junishment 
companies  or  "degraded  to  the  infan- 
try" and  put  into  iniantry  punishment 
companies.* 

The  plans  as  outlined  in  Diicui\e 
45,  whii  It  was  just  going  on  a  week  old, 
were  coming  unraveled  at  the  end  of 
the  month.  At  the  situation  conference 
on  the  20th,  General  Jodl,  chief  of  the 
OKW  Operadons  Staff,  announced, 
"in  pcn-tentious  tones"  according  to 


"Moskalenko,  Na  yugih-utpodium  ne^mtdmu.  pp. 
26S-80;  fVOVSS,  vol.  II,  p.  429. 

*^Pz.  AOK  /,  /t  ATr.  6868142,  FdndnachTuhietMaU  Nr. 
70,  Atibigt  m  «,  JMeht  Nr.  IS6S95  vm  IOjS.42, 


364 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


ABmaam&l^-^M  Tmvi  PRovmss  O&vm  for  a  i 


Haider,  that  the  fate  of  the  Caucasus 
would  be  dedded  at  StaJingrad,  and 
therefore  sortie  of  Army  Group  A's 
strength  would  have  to  be  shifted  to 
Sixth  Army.  On  the  whole,  though, 
Haider  was  grsitifii^  at  chouf^t^ 
having  finally  joiscai  in  brilliant 
society  of  the  OKW."  On  the  other 
hand.  General  Jodl  still  wanted  to  have 
First  I'an/er  Army  turn  west  and  make 
the  Tikhoretsk  encirdement,  which 
Haider  thought  was  ''vapid  nonsense." 
"  riie  enemy,"  he  maintained,  "is  run- 
ning as  last  as  he  tan  run  and  will  be  on 
the  north  slope  of  the  Caucasus  ahead 
()[  our  mol)ile  units. "'^  List,  when 
Haider  talked  to  hiiu,  of  course,  did 


not  oppose  abandoning  the  Tikhoretsk 
encirclement,  but  he  did  oppose  giving 
up  part  of  his  strength  to  Sixth  Army. 
It  would  be  "a  great  gamble,"  he  in- 
sisted, to  send  a  "relatively  weak  force" 
deep  into  the  Caucasus,  iit  response, 
with  less  than  faiildess  logic,  Haider 
argued  tiiat  it  would  at  least  mitigate 
the  supi>!v  problems.  Finally,  Haider 
added  that  the  Gtossdeutschland  Divi- 
sion, which  List  wanted  to  keep  as  a 
mobile  reserve,  would  probably  also 
liave  lo  go  liet  ausc  Hitlct  liad  repeat- 
edly said  it  would  do  him  no  good  to 
win  victories  in  the  East  if  he  lost  the 
West.*' 


**Halder IXaty,  vol  111,  p.  494. 


*^H.  Gr  A.  I;  Knigstagekidt,BmdI,  Tiai,  30Jid42, 
H.  Gr.A  7512G/1  tile. 


HI  I  LERS  GRAND  DESIGN 


During  the  day  on  the  31st.  Ilitlei" 
revised  Directive  45.  The  cutting  ol  the 
railroad  "between  Stdingrad  nhS  the 
Caucasus,  he  said,  had  "loi  ti  to  pieces" 
the  enemy  front  soutli  ot  the  Don. 
Soviet  forces  would  siJll  make  an  effort 
lo  defend  the  Claiieasns,  btlt  *|lo  rein- 
forcements wortJi  mentioid(li0*'  could 
get  there  ffQia  iJie  i«terk>r  of  the  So- 
viet L'nion.  On  the  f>ther  hand,  the 
enemy  would  throw  "every  bit  of  avail- 
able strengda"  into  the  Stalingrad  area 
to  hold  open  his  "vital  artery,"  the 
Volga.  Therefore,  Headquarters, 
Fourth  l^aiaer  Army  im€k  X^XXVIII 
Panzer  Corps,  IV  Corps,  and  Riinia- 
iiiaii  VI  Corps  would  be  transferred  to 
Army  Group  B.  The  Grossdeutschland 
Division  would  be  left  with  Army 
Ciroup  A  approximately  eight  more 
days,  two  weeks  at  the  most.  Array 
Group  Bs  mission  was  not  changed. 
Army  Group  As  "next  and  most  im- 
portant assignment"  would  be  to  take 
possession  of  the  Black  Sea  t  oast  to 
eliminate  die  Soviet  Navy  and  to  open 
sea-lanes  for  its  own  supplies.  The 
Tlkhoretsk  encirclenieni  disappeared, 
but  First  Panzer  Army,  while  sending 


detachments  southeastward  to  Vt)ro- 
shilovsk  aiid  Fetrovskoye,  wa^  still  to 
bear  naostify  toward  the  southt^^  to- 
waid  Mayko])  "to  \\;)\lav  the  eX^smy 
retreating  to  Uie  Caucasus."  FrOmMl^ 
kop,  it  would  dispatch  dements  west  to 
Tuapse  on  the  Black  Sea  coast  and 
south  alon^  the  coast  to  Batumi.^'' 

The  revisions  of  the  31st  completed 
the  division  of  the  offensive  initiated  in 
Directive  45.  Fourth  Panzer  Army, 
which  had  provided  a  Unk  between  the 
two  army  groups,  was  split,  Hoth 
would  take  his  headquarters  and  three 
corps  norft  toward  Stalingrad,  One  of 
iiis  f  ormer  cor[:>s,  XXXX  Panzer,  would 
go  south  widi  Fii  St  Panzer  Army.  Army 
Group  A  had  been  weakened,  and 
Arinv  Group  B  had  been  strength- 
ened, but  Jodl  was  right  when  he  said 
the  fate  of  the  Caucasus  would  be  de- 
cided at  Stalini^rad.  Wliat  remained  to 
be  seen  was  whether  Army  Group  Bs 
gain  (four  German  and  four  I|l^iiaiiiaiQ 
Divisions)  ^vould  be  enou^  to  ensure 
the  outcome. 


'  'OKH.  CniSKiH.  op.  Mt.  m  Nr.  420373142.  an  H, 
Or.  A  uHd  H.  Gr.  B.  3UA2.  H  22/216  fUe. 


Operadon  EDELWEISS 


The  Kuban  and  the  (Caucasus 

"SitnH<i\\ei""  would  ha\e  been  a  more 
appiopriaic  code  name  tlian  EDEL- 
WEISS, if  sucli  had  been  desired.  TTie 
region  Army  Group  A  had  entered 
into  souiii  oi  the  Don  was  one  of  sun- 
flowers, grain,  and  oil — bul  also  of 
desert,  mountains,  few  raihoads,  and 
hardly  any  roads  worthy  of  the  name. 
Between  the  Kuban  River  and  the  Don 
and  from  die  Biat  k  Sea  coast  inland  to 
the  headwaters  oi  the  Kuban  the  land 
was  as  productive  as  any  in  Europe.  At 
first  trlatue,  the  agricuUural  specialists 
attaclied  to  the  army  group  estimated 
the  crops  standing  in  the  fields  would 
be  enough  to  feed  the  troops  and  the 
population  and  leave  a  substantial  sur- 
plus for  export  to  Germany.  Not  easily 
impressed  by  Soviet  farming  methods, 
they  were  awed  by  the  model  state  farm 
"Gigant,"  located  nearSalsk,  \vhi<  h  had 
three-quarters  of  a  million  aci  es  and  its 
own  laboratories,  shops,  and  process- 
ing plants.'  From  the  upper  reaches  of 
(he  Kuban  and  east  of  Salsk  to  the 
Caspian  shore,  however,  the  land 
shaded  off  rapidly  into  desert  where 
survival,  even  for  a  modern  atmy, 
could  depend  on  widely  scattered  weBs 
and  water  holes.  Much  of  the  ten  itory, 
particularly  in  the  east  and  south  of  the 
Kuban  and  in  the  mount^jS  was  m- 


habited  by  non-Slavic  peoples,  die  Kal- 
myks, Adygei,  Cherkess,  Kabai^ins. 
Chechens.  Ingush,  Karachai.  Balkars, 
and  Ossetians.  They  were  fiercely  inde- 
pendent Moslem  tribes  who  had  not 
Ix^en  hrought  imo  I  lie  Russian  empire 
until  lire  nineteenth  century,  had  been 
restive  under  the  tsars,  and  re^ 
ligious  and  f>ther  reasims  had  U©  tSfSlfe 
at  all  lor  the  Soviet  regime.^ 

Hie  cat,  which  Armf  &rmp  A  hoped 
would  sustain  its  own  operations  and 
from  which  Hitler  expected  to  fuel  the 
entire  Wehrmackt,  was  produced  in 
fields  situated  at  and  to  the  southwest 
of  Maykop,  around  Groznyy,  and  near 
Baku  on  the  Caspian  coast.  These  were 
the  sitmmei  s  ultimate  strategic  objec- 
tives because  ol  dieir  value  to  the  Ger- 
man war  effort  and  the  presumed 
effect  of  their  loss  on  the  Soviet  ability 
to  resist.  Although  alter  the  march  to 
the  Don  tiiey  appeared  to  be  easily 
within  grasp,  ihe  artiial  distances  the 
Germans  would  have  to  go  to  reach 
them  were  enonnous.  In  stFswght  lines, 

not  taking  inio  artoiint  mountains, 
rivers,  deserts,  road  conditions,  or  tac- 
tically required  twists  and  ttims,  May- 
kop was  ISO  miles  from  Roslovi 
Grozny y  vvas  4UU;  and  Baku  7U().  The 
lasttw^s  sottiewhat  tfitwpc  than  the  whole 
distance  of  rhe  ad\  ance  across  the  So- 
viet Unicjn  to  RosU)V. 


'J>».  Amii&^&iigibig^tA  m  8,  S  Aug  42,  Pz.  ^Sie^  tt.  Conquest,  Ths  Sotdtt  Dtpmntkn  of  Na- 
hOK  1 fib,  UmMfiUt^im  Usimm &Co.,  WXIi^^  l-4t. 


North  Catuxisus  fkmt 

The  greatest  advantage  Army  Group 
A  had  Ett  the  beginning  of  August  was 
that  the  Soviet  grip  on  this  vast  area, 
for  the  moment,  was  weak.  The  armies 
defending  it  were,  in  the  t&mt  part, 
shattered  remnants  of  past  defeats.  On 
28  July,  the  Stavha  had  merged  what 
was  left  of  South  Front  into  me  Nmih 
C(iu((i\u\  !■')(>  tit  under  Marshal 
Budenny.  He  then  had  the  Twenty- 
fourffi,  Nm^,  Thirty-seventh,  Fifty-sixth, 
Ta'dfth,  Eisrhleenth,  Fifty-frnt,  and  Forty- 
seventh  Armies  and  one  independent  in- 
Ikntry  corps  and  S  caralry  corps.  Six  of 
the  eight  armies  had  made  the  retreat 
to  the  Don,  and  two,  Ninth  and  Tiventy- 

be  sent  to  the  rear  to  be  rebuilt.  "Bvo, 


Forty-s(i<mth  and  Fi/ty-/irst  Armies,  had 
been  resurrected  after  the  defeat  on 
the  Kerch  Peninsula  in  Mav. 

Having  better  than  250  miles  on  an 
almost  quarter-circle  arc  to  cover, 
Budenny  had  been  compelled  to  divide 
his  forces  into  a  Maritime  Operational 
Group  imder  General  Chercvirhenko 
and  a/)o«  Operational  Croup  under  Gen- 
eral Malinovskiy.  The  Maritime  Groups 
with  Ei^lfym^,  Fifty-sixth,  and  Forty-sev- 
enth Armies  and  the  two  separate  corps, 
was  considerably  the  stronger,  and  its 
mission  was  to  cover  Krasnodar  and 
the  Black  Sea  naval  bases  at 
Novorossiysk  and  TUapse,  The  Doa 
Group  had  Fifty-first,  Thirty-sn>eiilh,  and 
Twelfth  Armies  and  theoretical  respon- 
sibility for  the  whole  sweep  of  territory 
east  of  Krasnodar.  By  31  July,  F^tyfvrst 


MAP  32 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


Arn^  Jjacl  been  pushed  away  to  the 
aorflbeast,  and  it  was  then  transferred 
mSUMngrad  FronL^ 

Behind  North  Caucasus  Front.  General 
Tyulenev's  Tramcaucasus  Front  had  Farty- 
jy^lh  m^  f^^-sixfh  Armies  and  another 
of  the  Kff€^  armies.  Forty- fourth,  with 
which  to  Iti^M  the  Black  Sea  coast  from 
Tuapse  to  Bafwmi,  the  mmtntmn 
passes,  and  die  Turkish  boisier  and  to 
defend  the  approaches  to  Baku  on  the 
Caspian.  To  do  the  latter,  Tyiilefte* 
proposed  to  install  fbrf^^oiirt/z  Army  in  a 
line  on  the  Terek  River  and  back  it  with 
a  seoond  line  oa  JS^sec^ 

To  the  CaiiaisKs 

Even  though  Fourth  Panzer  Army 
btoke  contact  arid  ftiMed  away  toward 
Stalingrad,  Army  Group  A  onh-  had 
one  real  problem  in  the  first  week  of 
August,  and  tfiat;  to  get  enough 
gasoline  and  diesel  <^  6d  sustain  the 
speed  it  was  capable  of  achieving.  On 
the  4th,  General  list,  the  commander 
of  Army  Group  A,  submitted  a  sweep- 
ing optimistic  preclictiioB:  the  enemy 
commakd  most  likely  liad  in  mind 
making  a  stand  souih  of  die  Kuban 
River  to  protect  Maykop  and  the  naval 
bases,  but  the  troops  were  "dispensing 
with  an\  sort  nf  imHicd  tomniand," 
and  it  could  be  assumed  "that  a  fast 
thnist  to  #te  «OMt£teMt  with  sttffidem 
tnobile  forces  waU  ittot  encotmter  se- 
rious enemy  re^^jam  anywhere  for- 
of  Balcil.**  ihe  Succeeding  days 
seemed  to  bear  him  out  con\  incingly. 
Seventeenth  Army,  which  had  Ruma- 
mm  Third  Anny  coxafnig  ^caag  behind 


W.  Gr.  A.  la  KriegstagfbwJi.  Saitil.  T^tl,  4  AHg42. 
H.  Gr.  A  75126/2  file. 


it  lo  guard  the  coast,  reported  the 
enemy  retreating  faster  than  before. 
First  Panzer  Asrmf  had  a  bridgehead 
on  the  Kuban;  on  the  5th  it  threw 
a  bridge  across  the  river  and  cap- 
tured fifty- one  loaded  trains  on  the 
Kropotkin-Armavir  railline  south  of  the 
river.  {Map  32.)  The  army  group  read- 
ied ffie  Headquarters,  XXXXIMMoim- 
tain  rnr(5s  to  take  over  the  advance  into 
die  mountains  south  of  Armavir.  On  the 
6th,  Seventeenth  Army's  infantry  gain- 
ed an  astonishing  thirty  miles.  In  cross- 
ing the  Kuban,  First  Panzer  AtlOXf 
forced  Twelfth  Army  westward  'M^-tite 
aiea  of  the  Marilimr  Group,  tliereby 
reducing  MaUiaovskiy  s  Don  Group  to  a 
single  array,  Thirt^^4etfm0i* 

In  one  respect,  ho\vc\cr.  Lists  pre- 
diction was  already  beginning  to  break 
d&m.  €ff  Ms  left  flank,  on  the  Terek 
River,  at  the  behest  of  the  Stavka,  Tram- 
ccnuasvs  Front  was  building  a  North 
Group,  under  General  Maslennikov, 
around  Forty- fourth  Army  and  Head- 
quarters, Ninth  Amiy.  The  North  Group 
was  not  a  force  of  touch  consequence 
for  the  moment,  but  sc\en  divisions 
and  four  brigades  were  coming  north 
friom  6i«f  Turkish  bcMrder,  aiodl  the 
Stavka  was  sending  two  guards  rifle 
corps  (seveti  Iwigades)  and  eleven  sepa- 
rate rtfie  bri^dfgs  hf  rail  tu  Astiiiili^ 
and  thence  by  sea  to  Makhac&fella.' 
Army  Group  As  race  to  the  would 
not  be  imcontestedl. 

But  what  the  Russians  were  doing  on 
die  Terek  could  not  help  them  on  die 
Kuban.  First  Panzer  Army  was  across 
the  river  in  strength  and  bearing  west 
toward  Maykop,  guided  night  and  day 


^iSd..  4-fi  Aug  42;  AwlM  Gf^«3iko,  Batlle  for  Ote 
Caucasus  (Moscow:  Progress  PubBshers,  1971),  p.  fi7. 
'Grechko,  Gody  vayny,  p.  239. 


OPERATION  EDELWEISS 


571 


by  slieets  of  flame  Lliousands  of  feet 
high:  the  oil  refineries  and  tank  farmf 
were  burning.  The  was  i  day  eC 
almost  nothing  but  good  news  fiar 
Army  Group  A.  In  liundred-de^p^ 
and  a  swirling  dust  storm.  Seven- 
teenth Army  took  Kiasnodar  on  the 
north  bank  of  the  Kuban  while  First 
Panzer  Army  passed  through  Maykop 
and  into  the  oil  liclds,  wlitTC  it  was 
disappointed  to  hiid  the  above  ground 
equipment  thoroughly  wreckedlsut  re^ 
lieved  to  sec  cbat  ilie  wells  were  not  on 
fire.  Air  reconnaissance  reported 
heavy  Soviet  columns  streaming  south, 
ant}  List  toncluded  ibat  the  enemy  had 
probably  given  up  all  diought  of  stag- 
mg  strong  resistance  anywhere  norm 
of  the  main  Caucasus  lange.  Seven- 
teenth Army  was  encountering  more 
of  a  fight  on  the  Kuban  than  It  had 
ain  wheie  else  on  the  140-mile  march 
from  Rostov;  nevertheless,  the  army 
group's  most  urgent  problem  had 
nothing  in  particular  lo  do  with  the 
enemy  but  resulted  from  its  orders 
tinder  Directive  45^  Ahnost  the  whole 
weight  of  First  Panzei*  Aimy  was  being 
drawn  lo  its  right  Sank,  and,  as  had 
happened  at  Rostov  two  we^es  £a^r$er, 
tliis  developmeni  \vas  <  i eating  apileup 
of  divisions  around  Maykop." 

This  time,  though,  List  and  his  st^lf, 
who  earlier  had  Ui  ihriDselves  be  gov- 
erned entirely  by  instructions  from  the 
OKH,  had  tneady  a  pfetn  of  their  own: 
one  which  would  jireserve  the  "intent" 
of  Directive  45.  siojj  liie  westward  pull 
on  First  Panzer  Army,  under  General 
Kleisl,  and  make  it  possible  to  go  after 
tlie  opportunities  beckoning  in  die 
east.  It  would  also  create  aixothef  tna|or 


"H.  Gt.  AflA^Kti^S^^Mi^Bmil,  "Mil,  7-9  Aug 
42.  H.  Gr.  k  nx^  m. 


division  in  the  offensive,  but  that  ap- 
peared to  be  an  acceptable  price  for  the 
advantages  gained.  The*  plan  was  to 
reorganize  and,  bv  transferring  LVll 
Panzer  Corps  and  XXXXIV  Corps, 
boife  of  ^wMcm  t««eretti  die  Maykop  area, 
from  First  Pin/ei  to  Seventeenth 
Army,  to  make  General  Ruoff  respon- 
sible for  deahing  out  the  Black  5ea 
coast  and  release  Kleist  to  head  east  to 
Groznyy,  Makhachkala,  and  Baku. 

"The  mountains  presented  the  one 
complicadon.  Tlie  passes  to  the  west  of 
Mount  Elbrus  oiiered  shortcuts,  al- 
though somewhat  arduous  ones,  to  the 
coast  between  Tuapse  and  Sukbuini, 
and  .op§i^g  tliem  would  boUi  assist 
attid  iseietft^  Seventeenth  Army's  ad- 
vance. East  of  F.lbrus,  the  Grusinian 
and  Ossetian  Mihtary  Roads  gave  po- 
tential aiisoess  to  the  Ifanseauc^tis,  and 
First  Panzer  Army  wf)u!fl  have  to  con- 
trol them  before  it  could  continue  past 
Groznyy  to  Makhachkala  and  Baku  .  To 
make  the  march  into  the  mountains, 
ilie  army  group  had  Headquarters, 
XXXXIX  Mountain  C&rps.  two  €^ 
man  mountain  divisions,  and  one 
Rumanian  mountain  division.  List 
wanted  to  put  the  corps  headquarters, 
one  of  the  German  divisions,  and  the 
Rumanian  division  west  of  Elbrus  and 
iejEve  the  Other  German  division  for  the 
military  roads.  The  OKH  apptoved  the 
plan  in  general,  but  Hitler  insisted  on 
having  both  German  mountain  divi- 
sions west  of  I'll H  lis,  which  left  First 
Pairzer  Army,  as  Rleisi  later  put  it,  with 

i»ngle  untried  foreign  chvision"  to 
execute  a  very  critical  mission." 

The  reorganization  was  to  take  effect 


Cr.  A.  la  Nr.  6f&4^  m  Pt  t,  tW^i,  ftk 
AOK 1 2494)6/1  tile:  H.  Or.A,laXmgSagfbueh,  Band/. 
mu.9~l2  Aug  42,  H. Gr.  A  75186/? ffle. 


372 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


as  soon  as  First  Panzer  Army  had  full 
possession  of  the  Maykop  oil  fields  and 
Seventeenth  Army  had  cleared  the 
lower  Kuban,  which  apparently  would 
happen  in  a  few  days  but  turned  out  to 
take  longer.  Both  amsies  found  the 
going  slower  a.s  the\  hitMt&the  outly- 
ing mountains,  which  although  they 
were  not  nearly  as  liigh  as  the  main 
range,  were  steep  and  cut  by  heavily 
wooded  gorges.  South  of  Krasnodar 
and  along  the  Kuban  River  east  of  the 
t  ity.  Seventeenth  Ainn  not  only  had  to 
contend  with  mountainous  terrain  but, 
for  the  first  time  since  it  crossed  the 
Don,  met  concerted  Soviet  resistance 
and  bad  to  jgo  over  to  a  methodical 
attack, 

But  the  unexpected  slowdown  was 
accompanied  by  an  unanticipated  suc- 
ms.  On  the  Ifih,  X^5C50X  Mountain 
Corps  plunged  into  tiie  mountains 
south  of  Armavir  and  iu  four  days  was 
engaging  Soviet  rear  guards  at  the  im- 
portant Klukhorskiy  Pass,  thirty  miles 
west  of  Mount  Elbrus,  and  was  forming 
a  party  to  dimb  IS^fhis  (18481  feet) 
and  plant  a  swastika  flag  at  the  summit 
(which  was  done  on  21  August).  If  the 
mountain  troops  reached  the  coast 
near  Siikhmni,  they  would  imderniine 
the  entire  Soviet  defense  not  th  to 
Novorossiysk.  %  Assist  in  exploiting 
that  prospect,  the  annv  group  dis- 
patched two  batialions  of  special  high- 
mountain  ti  oops  in  motor  buses  frdni 
Staiino.'" 

The  advance  into  die  mountains  was 
a  tret^^ztcli>ii$  aback  fe*  the  Soviet 
Command.  They  had  been  [irestnued 
to  be  reasonably  easy  to  defend.  Trans- 
eamasus  fymt  had  tibrl^^i^c^  Arti^  to 


'W.  Gr.  A,  la  Knegms*bvKk,  Band  t,  ttil  fl,  12-17 
Aug  42,  H.  Gr.  A  75126/2  filit. 


man  the  passes  and  the  military  roads, 
and  it  had  supposedly  been  at  work 
fortifying  them  since  June.  According 
to  all  the  postwar  Soviet  accounts  the 
blame  for  the  failure  to  make  a  better 
initial  showing  rested  with  Trans- 
Caucasus  Brmt — for  complacency — and 
on  Forty-sixth  Army — for  general  inep- 
titude in  mountain  warfare. 

Another,  and  different,  problem  is 
seldom  alluded  to  and  then  obliquely 
as  follows: 

Tlie  Fascist  invaders  placed  great  hopes  in 
the  instability  of  the  Soviei  rear  area  in  the 
Caucasus.  They  estimated  that  as  soon  as 
the  German  forces  broke  tht  oiigh  into  the 
Caucasus,  violence  and  uprisings  would 
begin  among  its  inhabitants,  hi  order  to 
tacilitat^  this.  Hitler's  intelligence  att-' 
temptesi  to  estabfisli  agent  operatidiis 

among  the  nationalistic  elements  in  the 
Caucasus  both  prior  to  and  during  the 

There  were,  as  far  as  the  Germans 
knew,  no  actual  uprisings,  but  many  of 
die  mountain  peoples  welcomed  the 
invaders  as  liberators.  No  doubt,  a 
good  part  of  the  German  mountain 
troops'  early  success  depended  upon 
the  availability  of  willing  native  guides. 
Some  men  from  the  region,  who  had 
been  taken  prisoner  earlier  in  the  war, 
were  already  enlisted  in  the  German 
service,  and  the  hM^b-mountairi  bat- 
ta^ons  had  widi  tnetn  platoons  of 
CSfaerkess,  Chechens,  an<l  Dagestani.''* 
Hue  crisis  in  the  Caucasus  brouffht  a 
sinisfer  figure  to  Wemscmcasus  Mm 
People's  Conunissar  o(  Internal  Aft 
fairs,  Lavrenti  Beria,  the  head  of  the 
secret  political  police.  Beria  came  as  a 


'WGVSS,  vol.  U.p.4SS. 

^Pt.  AOK  U  la  Krie^iagtktek  /Vk  S,  13  and  18  Aug 
42,«z-AOKI249a6iae. 


OPERATION  EDELWEISS 


373 


Stavka  representative.  For  a  time,  he 
apparently  tried  to  take  personal  com- 
mand  of  the  mountain  defenses,  but 
his  [Ji  iinary  job  was  to  hold  the  popula- 
tion in  line,,  which  he  and  his  NKVD 
troops,  of  wfiom  many  were  stationed 
in  the  Caucasus  border  aret^^dM  thCBf? 
oughly  and  ruthlessly. 

"Empse  mid  the  Te^k 
The  Tempo  Slows 

Wlicn  Seventeenth  Army  reached 
Krymsk,  halfway  between  the  Kuban 
ana  Novorossiysk,  on  17  August,  List 
mued  a  directive  putting  the  army 
group  reorganizadon  into  effect  the 
next  day.  Seventeenth  Army  then  be- 
came responsible  ft  <v  all  tjf  the  territory 
west  of  Mount  Elbrus,  and  it  acquired 
three  interim  missions.  t5fte  to 
complete  the  advance  to  Novorossiysk 
with  its  original  forces;  another  to 
thrust  along  the  road  running  south- 
west out  of  Mavkop  to  Tuapse  with  the 
two  corps  taken  over  from  First  Panzer 
Arffiy;  and  the  to  push  XXXXIX 
Mountain  Corps  tlirougli  the  passes 
and  down  the  south  slope  of  the  moun- 
tains to  Sukhumi.  First  Pander  Awny, 
which  had  XXXX  Panzer  Corps  ap- 
proaching the  Terek  River  and  III  Pan- 
zer Corps  coming  in  froitt  the 
northwest,  had  as  its  next  missintis  [o 
cross  the  Terek,  take  Ordzhonikidze 
and  Groznyy,  and  opetl  the  Grusinian 
Military  Road.'^ 

None  of  the  missions  looked  impossi- 
ble or  &/m  wi^;^iBtcdt,  $6vefiteen0 
Army  ib^  ttventy-five  miles  to  go  to 


"Erickson,  Baad  to  Stalingrad,  p.  378;  Sewcryn 
dialer,  (mi  Mi  Qmrn^  iN«w  ^K^m»f 
1969),  p.  m. 

"H.  Gn  A.  la  Kriegstagehtnh,  BanH  I,  HU  B.  17  Aug 
42,  H.  Gr.  A  75126/2  file. 


German  75-mm,  AiNTriANK  Gun  in  the 
Caucasus  Fqotmbxs 


Novorossiysk  and  about  the  same  to 
liiapse.  TTie  approach  to  Sukhumi  fie- 
pended  on  which  of  a  dozen  passes  was 
used.  List  and  Ruolf  preferred  the 
Klukliorskiy  Pass  wliich  was  roughly 
fifty  miles  northeast  of  Sukhinni  and 
necessitated  a  substantial  bend  to  the 
east  but  offered  a  route  that  could  be 
used  by  motor  vehicles  over  most  of  its 
lengdi  while  tiie  others  were  onh  ac- 
cessible to  men  and  pack  animals.  First 
Panzer  Army's  point  nearing  the  Terek 
was  about  sixty-five  miles  from 
Ordzhonikidze,  ninety  from  Groznyy. 

But  the  tempo  was  changing.  By  the 
18th,  the  days  of  thirty-mile  advances 
were  already  just  a  memory,  and  five 
miles  a  day  or  less  was  the  mle.  TTiere- 
after,  local  gains  of  a  mile  or  two  began 
to  be  considered  significant,  par- 
ticularly in  the  Seventeenth  Army  area. 


B74 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


Germajj  Mountain  Iroops  in  the  Sancharo  Pass 


The  V  Corps  had  been  at  Krymsk  OO 
the  l^th  and  was  still  fighting  thereon 
the  20th.  The  LVII  Paii/cr  Corps  and 
XXXIV  Corps  were  completely  ued 
down  in  seesaw  battles  in  ifce  msm^ 
tains  south  and  west  o{  Mayfe0p.  Hie 
XXXXIX  Mountain  Corps  wasiBtt©!^© 
Saneharo  f*ass  notifceast  of  SuldiTJini 
and  through  the  Klukhorskiy,  but  the 
going  was  getting  slower.  First  Panzer 
Afftty;  comtaniiy  piindhed  for  motor 
fuel,  leachcd  Mozdok  on  the  north 
bank  oi  die  lerek  on  the  24th  and  then 
liad  te  mtftemplate  crossing  die  fest- 
flowing  river  that,  being  the  last  natu- 
ral line  forward  of  Groznyy  and 
MaiMtadikaM,  wss  cea^a  tm.  t©  fae 
given  up  without  a  figiit.^® 


The  Soviet  forces,  aldiough  they 
were  to  softie  extent  still  on  the  refreat 

cvcry\\  here,  were  beginning  to  benefit 
from  being  pushed  into  shorter  lines, 
especially  since  these  aliso  traversed 
are^  that  were  almost  ideal  for  the 
defense.  A^ortA  Caucasus  Front  had  Forf^- 
seventk  and  Fifty-sixth  Armies  afoljnd 
Novorossi\'sk,  Twelfth  :And  Eighteenth  Ar- 
mies north  and  east  of  Tuapse.  Trans- 
maeasm  ^nmt^  Nmik  Gmtp  imd  TMr^ 
•inu'tith,  Ninth,  and  Forty-fourth  Amd^S  lM 
the  line  on  die  Terek  and  Fi/t^-^^M 
Am^htsagrmMd  at  MakMcbfesiia.^* 

Army  Group  A,  on  tlic  other  hand, 
was  being  relegated  piecemeal  to  a  su- 
pernoaerarf  jiiMti!sv  'As  G&m^  MsH-* 
der,  liiief  of  the  General  Sw0^  put  it. 


''/«.,  17.  18,  20.  24  Aug  42. 


'"GretJiko,  Cody  voyny,  p.  245. 


OPERATION  EDELWEISS 


375 


the'^lempo"  of  the  army  groups  opera- 
^qtti  was  having  to  be  permitted  to 
jdcdStte  to  eoptfr  w^th  d€9i£a!ri{!&^m 
se^rs.  The  Grossdeutschland  Divi- 
sion and  the  22d  Panzer  Division  left 
Amiy  Qrotip  A  in  the  ^eeemd  week  ti 
Av^isl,  Grossdeutschland  to  go  to  the 
Western  Theater  via  a  detour  to  Array 
Group  de&ter,  lEd  Psn^er  to  pi  to 
Sixth  Army.  By  the  time  they  had  de- 
parted, the  army  group  was  under 
notice  to  relinqtikfi  a  f  aati- 
aireraft")  division  and  two  rocket 
launcher  regiments.  The  Italian  Alpini 
Corps,  with  the  fUDuataln  divisions  "M* 
dentina,  Cuneense,  and  Julia,  ap- 
peared briefly  in  the  Army  Gioup  A 
area  at  midmonth  and  ilitn  was  di- 
verted to  Italian  Eighth  Ai  my  withoui 
having  gotten  near  the  front.  General 
Richthofen,  who  was  cosiixa0i1]edlillg^ 
Fourth  Air  Force,  the  air  suppc^iSP'm 
for  Army  Groups  A  and  B,  tola  Hist  on 
the  20th  he  w^s  having  to  swiu  h  all  of 
the  planes,  "except  for  very  small  rem- 
nants," to  die  attack  on  Stalingrad.  It 
was  ''regrettable,"  he  said,  but  the 
order  had  come  from  Hitler.  He 
thought  the  planes  could  be  back  in 
"six  to  ten  days."  Two  days  later,  Hitler, 
who  was  worried  al>ou(  what  he 
thought  might  be  a  strung  Soviet  con- 
centimtion  west  of  Astrakhan,  ordei  cd 
List  to  station  the  16th  Motf)rized  In- 
fantry Division  at  Elista  on  Fii  si  Panzer 
Army^  extreme  left  flank.  To  get  fuel 
to  move  the  division  150  miles  from 
Voroshilovsk  to  Elista,  Genera!  Kleist, 
the  army's  commander,  had  to  drain 
the  tanks  of  one  panzer  division.'^ 

On  the  24th,  List  went  to  Armavir  to 
consult  with  Ruoff,  Kleist'kchief  ©f  staff 


and  the  commander  of  XXXXIX 
Mountain  Corps.  Later  he  sent  a  sum- 
mary m  the  01KM.  In  h  ht  said  the 
army  groups  operations  had  "lost  their 
fluidity";  the  fuel  shortage  and  losses  of 
liioeps  and  air  support  had  given  the 
enemy  opportunity  to  dig  in  and  bring 
up  reserves.  As  a  result,  the  "whole 
progress  of  the  fighting"  was  being 
retarded,  which  in  view  of  the  long 
distances  and  advanced  season  was  "a 
cause  for  serious  thought."^*  The  ex- 
tent of  the  retardation  became  more 
apparent  the  next  day  when  First  Pan- 
zer Army  had  to  give  tip  its  attempt  to 
strike  to  Gi-oznyy  by  way  of  Orflzhoni- 
kidze — because  it  did  not  have  enough 
fuel  for  the  tanks — and  to  begin  re- 
grouping for  a  frontal  attack  across  the 
ierek  via  Mozdok.'" 

List,  on  ttie  26ili,  retmned  to  the 
subjects  he  had  raised  with  the  OKH 
two  days  before.  Wlien  it  crossed  the 
Kuban,  he  saifl,  the  army  group  had 
anticipated  havmg  Seventeenth  Armv 
in  c(jini"ol  of  the  Black  Sea  coast  and 
First  Panzer  Army  on  t!ie  Caspian  by 
the  end  of  St']>teinber;  but,  for  the 
reasons  given  eai  lier,  the  operations  so 
far  had  taken  mm  e  than  the  time  "jus- 
tifiablv  allotted  to  them."  Consequently, 
unless  diey  could  still  reach  the  objec- 
tives, which  would  take  itit^tadlSal  re- 
inforcements and  air  support,  they 
would  soon  have  to  be  allowed  to  take 
up  winter  positions.  "Unfortunately," 
he  added,  the  time  tor  doing  that  was 
almost  at  hand  as  fai  as  XXXXIX 
Mountain  Corps  was  concerned.  There 
had  already  been  several  snowstoiins 
at  the  liigher  elevations,  and  the  deci- 


m.  Gn  4,  IiLi&wgp^ebudt,  BmcL  1,  Hsil  U.  13,  Ifi,       "f^,  A(m  4-W  m^tti^tbuck  Nr.  &,  2S  Aug  42,  fts. 


376 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


sion  could  not  be  put  olP  past  IS 
Sqptepiber.*'' 

Lists  communications  did  have  ;in 
effect  but  not  the  one  he  wanted.  He 
did  not  get  even  a  hint  about  reinforce- 
ments, and  when  his  chief  of  staff  tried 
to  find  out  wiien  the  army  g^rnup  « ould 
expect  to  have  air  support  again,  he 
was  told  the  phtnes  would  return 
"when  Stalingrad  is  taken  or  given  up 
as  impossible."^^  In  the  situation  con- 
ference on  the  29tli,  though,  Hitler 
made  "very  irritated  remarks"  about 
the  conduct  of  operations  at  Army 
Group  A  and  asked  to  have  List  report 
in  person.^^  The  trouble,  he  insisted, 
was  not  in  the  original  plan  but  thai 
List  had  noi  regrouped  when  he  saw 
hitches  deveJoping.^^  Later  Haider  told 
List  that  Hider  had  also  raised  several 
specific  complaints.  For  one,  he  had 
heard  through  the  air  force  that  the 
terrain  north  of  Novorossiysk  was 
"comparable  to  the  Grune\vald  [a  park- 
like woods  outside  Berlin]'"  and  there- 
fore believed  "a  vigorous  attack"  ought 
to  take  it  easily.  He  also  thought 
XXXXIV  Corps  had  tailed  to  concen- 
trate its  forces  sufficiently  for  the  at- 
tack on  Tuajise,  and  XXXXIX  Moun- 
tain Corps  ought  not  to  have  gone  into 
the  easterti  mountain  passes,  the 
Sancharo  and  Klukhoi  skiy,  but  should 
have  confined  itsell  to  those  farther 
west.** 


-"!}<■:  <>l„<l»j:bl-,hiib<r  //.  <,,.  .\.  til  Sf.  17-1/ 12, 
2(i.H.42,  IV.  AOK  1  21906/1  lilf, 

'-'H.  Gi.  A.  Ill  Kriffr.,i„frrf,u,h.  Hand  I,  Tat!  I,  28  Aug 
42.  H.  f.r.  A  7r>l2i;/2  iili-. 

'  'Holdn  Ihiin,  V(>l_  III.  [j-  'iKi- 

'^Helniiitli  tirt-'int'i',  Z>jc  Obir^li-  WrlmnmhtfuihiMnfi. 
/yjy-;y-/?  |\McslxiHtii;  Limes  Vdrlag,  1951),  p.  4U7. 

"W.  Or.  A.  hi  KrirgMtigi'hurh^Battdf.mtJ,^  Aug 
42.  H.Gr.  A  7.^126/2  file. 


Wr  I  I  List  arrived  at  the  Wem^  on 

the  31st,  however,  the  reception  was 
altogether  dif  fei  eiii  trom  what  he  had 
been  led  to  expect.  In  the  meantime, 
Seventeenth  Army  had  made  some 
progress  toward  Novorossiysk,  and  List 
had  begun  putting  more  weight  on  the 
approaches  to  Novorossiysk,  Hitler's 
mood  was  so  good  that  he  invited  List 
to  hmch,  and  the  atmosphere  was  so 
relaxed  that  later  il  was  difhcult  to 
determine  what,  if  anydiing,  had  been 
decided.  Hider  told  List  he  really  'dtd 
not  have  any  objections  to  the  isa!^ 
Army  Group  A  had  deployed  its 
forces,  although  he  would  "rather  have 
had  the  mountain  (orps  somewhat 
closer  to  the  Tuapse  i  D.id." 

Hider  apparendy  believed  thai  List, 
who  had  come  armed  with  aerial  pho- 
tographs from  which  to  show  why  the 
monmain  corps  ought  to  be  stopped, 
had  undertaken  to  keep  the  corps 
going  and  to  shitt  iis  main  effort  west. 
List,  on  the  other  hand,  apparently 
believed  Hider  had  agreed  to  let  the 
mountain  corps'  luture  operations  be 
contingent  on  whether  the  army  group 
could  find  an  airfield  from  which  its 
supplies  could  be  flown  in.  Rechecking 
through  the  OKW  did  establish  one 
solid  result  of  the  meeting:  Hitler  had 
authorized  BLUEC;HtR  II,  the  am|jhibi- 
ous  attack  across  the  Kerch  Strait.  It 
would  eliminate  a  pocket  of  Soviet 
troops  holding  out  against  Rumanian 
Third  .-^rmy  on  the  Taman  peninsula 
and  would  bring  over  a  German  infan- 
try division  and  a  Rumanian  mountain 
di\  Ision.'- ' 

Bluecher  11  wasi  ^jecuted  on  2  Sep- 
taoabert  Mtler  haid  i^mmted  enough 


*VA(rf.,  :S1  Aug  42;  UKW.  KTB.  vol.  11,  p.  H(t2. 


OPERATION  EDELWEISS 


377 


aircraft  from  Slalingrad  to  give  stip- 
port  on  the  beach  and  to  hold  off  the 
Soviet  Black  Sea  Fleet  On  the  same  day 
First  Panzer  Army  established  a 
bridgehead  on  the  Terek  at  Mozdok, 
and  on  the  6th,  Seventeenth  Army 
broke  into  Novorossiysk,  taking  the 
center  of  the  city  and  the  naval  base. 
List  then  wanted  to  concentrate  on 
Tuapse  and  commit  all  of  XXXXIX 
Mountain  Corps  there  except  for  light 
s&ctirity  screens  to  be  left  in  the  passes, 
but  Hitler  demanded  thai  ad\;inces  l)e 
continued  both  toward  Tuapse  and 
tjarough  the  western  passes  toward 
Siiklmmi.** 

CM  ,  dehel^i  JodI,  diiieFdFtiie 
OKW  Opciaiions  Staff,  who  seldom 
left  die  Fuehrer  Headquarters  unless 
Wdist  4id,  i/mm  to-  Mtay  Grotip  A% 
Gonunand  post  in  StaMiSO  on  an  in  gent 
1Ce<|uestfrom  List.  There,  with  General 
def  Gebirgsiriippe  Rudolf  Konrad, 
cornnianding  general,  XXXXIX 
Mountain  Corps,  present,  List  using 
aerial  photographs  and  captured  So- 
viet maps,  showed  him  what  con- 
tinuing the  mountain  corps'  operation 
9S  Kfiner  wished  wdilld  ents^:;  a  long 
march  over  a  single  mountain  trail, 
hayiag  to  transport  all  supplied  by  ^ck 
animaifa  ^^f  wMeh  the  eorps  had  \ 
less  thaa  would  be  recjuirecL  and  ex- 
posure Vpi  attacks  on  both  flanks.  Jodl 
f^ttirnfed  to  Werwolf  carrying  a 
"unanimous"  lecommenclation  against 
continuing  the  moutitain  corps' 
opeiations.^'^ 


-"HeliiiLith  Gveiner,  Greitiei  liian'  Xuln  Fniin  12  Aug 
42  U>  n  Mur  43.1-4  Sep  42,  C-065a  CMH  tile. 

"^'H.  Gr.  A.  la  Kiiet^ilagelnitk,  Band  I,  'Mm,  7  Sep 
42,  H.  Gr.  A  75126/3  file. 


Captain  Helmut  Greiner,  keeper  of 
the  OKW  War  Diary,  made  the  follow- 
ing entry  in  his  notes  for  8  September; 

Tlie  Clhiel  ol'  ilie  Aimed  Korccs  Opera- 
tions Staff  [Jodl],  following  his  conference 
with  the  Conimandin!^  General,  Army 
Group  A,  at  tlie  huterV  lieadqiiarter  s  on  7 
September,  has  declared  himseli  in  agree- 
ment with  Field  Marshal  List's  contention 
that  XXXXIX  Moimtain  Corps,  after  leav- 
ing screening  detachments  in  the  passes, 
should  be  withdrawn  to  the  north  and 
recommitted  in  the  Mayko]5  area. 

The  Fuehrer  is  e\ircinclv  nut  at 
General  Jodl's  taking  iliis  posiimcj  \vliich  is 
diaint'irically  opposed  to  liis  own.  He  has 
demanded  that  all  the  records  pertaining 
to  Anny  Group  A's  conduct  of  operations 
since  it  oiossea  the  Don  River  he  brought 
to  him.'* 

To  List,  Hitler  "declined"  to  give  any 
further  orders,  saying  that  if  List  was 
convinced  he  could  not  get  the  moun- 
tain corps  through  to  the  coast,  then  he 
should  "leave  it  go."^^ 

In  tlie  afternoon  on  the  9th,  Keitel 
called  on  Haider,  at  Hitler's  bidding,  to 
tell  him  List  ought  to  resign  his  com- 
mand and  to  "infer"  changes  in  other 
high  posts,  including  Haider's  and 
Jodl's.^"  Afterward,  Keitel  told  Jodl's 
deputy.  General  der  Infanterie  Walter 
Warlimont,  whose  sfatim  also  -sras  in 
doubt,  that  he  too  expeeledl  to  he  re- 
lieved. The  morning  after  he  talked  to 
Haider,  Keitel  had  a  "private  interview' 
with  List  at  the  latter's  headquarters, 
and  List  thereupon  "withdrew  from  his 

As  far  as  can  be  told  from  Greiner's 


^Himmn-  Uian  Sutrs.  8  Sc[>  -12.  C-OiMOWi  file. 
^'Haider  Dmy.  vol.  III.  p.  .^1<J. 
^"IMdii  Gmm  J^  NfOts,  9  Sep  42.  e-065a  CMH 
file. 

"H.  Gr.  A,  la  Kriegstagebufh,  Sand  I,  HUlM,  tO  Se^ 
42.  H.Gr.  A  75126/3  file. 


378 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


notes  or  the  Army  Group  A  records,  all 
of  the  fuss  was  raised  over  the  deplov- 
meni  of  one  mountain  corps.  VVaili- 
mont  recalled  later  that  Hitler  had  also 
accused  list  of  having  comistentiy  not 
followed  orders  and  Jodl,  who  would 
have  been  responsible  for  detecting 
any  such  lapses,  had  maintained  that 
List  had  scrupulously  executed  all  of 
the  orders  given  to  him — hence,  pter- 
haps,  the  request  for  Army  Group  A's 
records.  Jodl,  acctii  ding  to  Warlimont. 
lK;!ieved — and  regretted — that  he  put 
Hider  into  the  position  of  either  doing 
what  he  did  or  taking  the  biame  him- 
self for  the  errors  he  imputed  to  List. 
Warlimont's  own  opinion,  not  made  a 
matter  of  record  until  a  number  of 
years  later,  was  that  Hitler,  knowing  he 
was  on  the  edge  of  a  severe  crisis  in  the 
war,  resorted  to  a  tactic  he  had  used 
before  and  sacrihced  his  subordinaies 
to  protect  himself.''^ 

The  atmosphere  of  the  situation  con- 
ference at  the  Wrni'nII  on  11  September 
was,  as  Haider  described  it,  "icy," 
letter,  who  otherwise  did  most  ^ms 
taDking,  barely  said  a  word.  For  the 
next  two  weeks,  he  transacted  vety  little 
business  through  either  the  OEW  m 
the  OKH.  He  also  did  not  name  a 
successor  to  List.  liisLeada  be  ordeined 
Rudtf  aad'  Kteist  to  subiriit  to  him, 
every  other  day.  siiiuiion  reports  and 
maps  detailed  down  to  the  t^attalions. 
Hwaical  proposals  and  fecjuests  were  to 
be  sent  to  him  by  telesjrapli  ihiough 
Che  QSH.^^  In  effea,  he  assumed  com- 
mand  q£  the  armies  hunseM"  aad  kit 
Hcadijtmiliers,  Army  Group  A,  to  do 
the  housekeeping. 


*^KVl^  KTB.  vol.  11,      1)97,  702- 

(,>: .!.  la  K>vpt„ji,-hiuh,Bma tt'oain.  12 Sep 
42.  H.  Gr.  A  7512e/3  lilc. 


Itie  frustrations  of  fitting  in  the 

Caucasus  harl,  meanwhile,  also 
brouglit  command  changes  on  the  So- 
viet side,  though  not  nearly  as  radi£^ 
ones.  On  1  Scplenihcr,  as  tlic  Clcrmans 
were  drawing  up  to  Novorossiysk.  lIjc 
old  cavalrymkit,  Budenny,  had  been 
relieved  as  cfinimanding  general,  f^orth 
Caucasus  Fwni,  thereby  ending  lor 
good  h^  career  as  a  held  commander. 
At  tlie  same  time  Nnrlh  Caucasus  Front 
went  out  of  existence,  and  Bttdenny's 
replacement,  General  Cherev^e)ai@Civ 
took  over  its  staff  and  armies  as  com- 
manding general  of  the  Black  Sea 
Group,  Tianscaucasus  Fmnt.^* 

For  the  first  time  in  that  summer,  it 
began  to  look  as  if  the  game  could  go 
eith^  'Wsiff  but  the  stakes  were  sdll  far 
from  even.  Hitler  liad  come  lo  the 
point  of  having  to  contemplate  a  major 
disappointment  and  possibly  a  massive 
failure.  Wiat  (onfronted  the  Soviet 
Union,  however,  was  no  less  tiian  a 
iSfiStaiDnal  catastrophe.  On  6  September, 
Moscow  Radif)  broadcasted  the  follow- 
ing appeal  from  Stalin  to  the  troops  on 
the  south  flank: 

The  enemy  is  slowly  advancing  lowartl  ilic 
andeitt.|lu^v»a  mm,  the  Voiga^  and  the 
iiChis  tif  me  Caucasus.  Our  i*risien<5e  de^ 

pends  on  the  outcome,';  of  ihc  batiks  imw 
being  (ought.  Not  a  step  hat  kl  Siand  to  iln- 
death!  Tins  is  the  suTiinions  ol  nm  <  omiii\. 
The  fate  of  the  Faiherland,  the  future  of 
our  lamilies,  aiiti  the  destinies  of  our  chil^ 
dren  lie  in  our  hands. ''-^ 

Army  Group  B  published  the  appeal  to 
the  troops  of  Sixth  and  Fourth  Panzer 
Armies  as  evidence     Soviet  despera- 


^H.txrhkti.  lififllf  I'll  llir  CauaisiLi,  p.  125. 

r,,;  [i.  hi  \r  2'>65t42,  Fimsfinuh  vm  10.9.42, 
fz.  AOK  4  mimtt  lile. 


OPERAnON  EDELWEISS 


379 


tion,  but  Army  Group  A  let  it  pass  in 
silence,  possibly  because  the  interpreta- 
tion of  it  by  Kleist's  and  RuofPs  troops 
was  somewhat  uncertain.  On  the  11th, 
Seventeenth  Army,  indeed  advancing 
slowly,  came  to  a  full  stop  at  the  wall  of 
a  cement  factory  on  the  southern  out- 
skirts of  Novorossiysk.  (And,  in  fact, 
the  front  would  stay  in  that  exact  spot 
for  just  five  days  short  of  a  year,  that  is, 
until  the  Germans  withdrew  from  the 
Kuban  entirely.)**  In  the  morning  on 
the  Hth,  X  Gttards  Rifle  C.i»f>s  ]i'n  First 
Panzer  Army's  open  left  flank  north  of 
the  Terek  Rrver  and  came  close  to  cut- 
ting      the  Mctgehesd  at  Mozdok.^' 

tn  Motion 

At  midmonth,  First  Panzer  Army 
and  Seventeenth  Army  both  ncederl  ei- 
ther to  eormpiete  their  paissions  fa^t  or 
to  iSnd  tewaBfe  pt^^nxm  tm  thei«pter, 

and  both  were  at  a  jaatodstift  fen- 
ter  was  having  to  vi^t  its  flank,  secure 
and  dean  ejtit  Ae  Tferek  bend  west  of 
Mozdok  to  give  itself  a  solid  liold  on 
the  river  before  heading  toward  Ord- 
zh'enfkidze  aftd'  <Si-oznyy.  Hitler  ^iias 
sending  the  SS  liking  Division  from 
Seventeenth  Army  to  give  iPeist  some 
additional  weight  sStarted  up 

again.  Seventeenth  Andtt^^Was  bringing 
two  mountain  regiments  west  out  of 
the  passes  and  preparing  to  direct 
main  effort  to  Tuapse,  when  and  if  it' 
could  get  enough  air  support  to  makea 
start. 

In  a  "special"  report  on  the  16th., 
Kleist  told  Hider,  through  tine  OKH. 

and  com  and  in      ravinel  alid  nooks 


l/til^!ty,  13.  129. 

III.  fl  Sep  -12.  H.  Gr.  A  75120/;!  Iile. 


and  ci  annies  of  the  mountains,"  the  in- 
fantry he  had  would  be  "just  barely 
enough"  to  keep  on  fighdng  until  the 
SS  Viking  Division  arrived.  Two  day.s 
later,  however,  LII  Corps  staged  a  ten- 
tative push  against  the  west  face  of  the 
Mozdok  bridgehead  and  suddenly 
found  itself  plowing  at  a  run  through 
the  lines  of  Soviet  fortifications.  The 
next  eight  days  were  almost  like  those 
of  early  August.  Along  the  valleys  and 
on  the  ridges  inside  the  Terek  bend, 
\\  licrever  the  Germans  turned  the  Rus- 
sians gave  way.  On  the  21st,  Kleist  made 
up  his  mind  to  commit  the  SS  \lking 
Division  as  soon  as  it  arrived  and  then 
strike  south  to  Ordzhonikidze,  with  the 
13th  Panzer  Division  going  along  the 
west  bank  of  the  Terek  through  the 
Elkhotovo  Gate  and  SS  Viking  Division 
and  the  lllt3i  Infantry  Division  going 
to  Malgobek  and  south  along  the 
nordiern  extension  of  the  Grusinia.n 
Military  Road. 

Tlie  SS  Viking  Division  crossed  the 
Terek  after  dark  on  the  25th  and 
moved  into  the  line  noffh  of  Malgobek 
dui  ing  the  night.  To  the  division  com- 
mander, Kleist  sent  tlie  message,  "All 
eyes  are  on  your  division.  The"  wljole 
operation  depends  on  its  being  un- 
sparingly committed."  The  division 
«r^t£pl9  aie&}n  the  nart  mciming  and 
in  ibe  e^iwrae.  of  a  day  and  half  got  to 
withia  a  mile  of  Malgobek,  but  it  stalled 
there  without  getting  ontolJie  heights 
to  the  south  from  which  it  might  have 
made  a  clean  breakthrough.  By  then 
13th  Panzer  Divisioi?t  iwas  at  Elkhotovo 
and  also  stopped.  Kleist  believed  the 
Viking  Division  had  the  numbers  and 
the  weapons  to  have  goitte  the  thif  ty- 
Fivc  miles  to  Oi  dzhf)nikidzc  but  lacked 
Llie  internal  cohesiveness.  (The  division 

4Qse  to  two  thousaiid  mmG^t- 


man  troops,  half  Dutch  and  Belgian, 
the  others,  except  for  a  few  Swiss, 
Scandinavian.) 

On  3  October,  through  the  OKH, 
Kleist  asked  "to  be  informed  when  and 
in  what  strength  the  army  can  ex  pec  t  lo 
get  reinforcements  to  contintie  the  ad- 
Vance  to  Makhachkala  vik  Ord^hoiu- 
kidzf  .Hit!  Citoznyy."^*  A  week  later, 
after  repeated  inconclusive  statements 
from  the  OKH,  Hitler  answered  that 
depending  on  developments  ai  Sta- 
lingrad, the  army  would  get  ather  one 
or  two  mobile  divisions  later  in  the 
monlh.  Until  then  its  mission  would  I)e 
"to  create  the  best  possible  conditions 


for  an  advance  after  the  reinforce- 
ments arrive,"" 

While  First  Pan/ei  Army  was  maneu- 
vering in  the  Terek  bend,  Seventeenth 
Array  began  its  advance  on  Tuapse 
along  the  Maykop-Tuapse  road  on  23 
September,  with  LVII  Panzer  Corps, 
antl  two  days  later  with  XXXIV  Corps. 
The  straight-line  distance  was  about 
thirty  miles.  On  the  ground,  across  the 
western  end  of  the  main  Caucasus 
range,  ii  was  somewhat  more  than  that. 
Shaumyan,  twenty  miles  from  Tuapse, 
was  ihe  first  objective.  From  there  the 
iiiiutli  wiiiild  he  more  downhill  than 
up.  The  mountain  regiments  as  the  Di- 


'"Pi.  AOK  /,  hi  Kni-ti^iiigebaeh  Nr.  8,  16  Sep-3  Oct  ■'■Y/.  (,>:  A.  l,>  Kni-g.-.tn^rhin-h,  Band  I,  Teit  /K  10  Oci 
42,  Pi.  AOK  1 24906  file.  42.  H.  Gr.  A  'b\2m  file. 


OPERATION  EDELWEISS 


381 


vision  "Lanz,"  under  Generalmajor 
Hubert  Lanz,  took  the  east  flank  where 
the  distance  was  longer  and  the  terrain 
the  roughest. Richthofen  provided 
adequate,  but  not  lavish,  air  support. 
Ruoff  had  insisted  that  he  could  not 
start  without  it.^'  The  Soviet  main 
force  on  the  defense  was  Eighteenth 
Army. 

The  advance  on  Tuapse  went  slnvvly 
from  tlie  start.  Without  the  benefit  of 
enemy  lapses  such  as  had  occurred  in 
the  Terek  bridgehead,  momentum  was 
hard  to  generate  and  guickly  lost.  The 
Russians  were  dug  fa  e««rywhere,  and 
squad  and  platoon  actions  were  the 
rule.  The  weather  wz&  nightmarish: 
late  summer,  with  tropical  downpours, 
in  the  valle\  and  lu  ii  winter  on  the 
mountains.  On  tlie  sixth  day,  Ruoff  re- 
ported tfiat  the  experienced  troops, 
having  been  ou  ilie  niaiih  for  more 
than  two  months,  were  either  gone  or 
m&n  cftit,  antf  the  replacements  were 
mideirti^ttail  and  not  sufficiently 


"/Swt,  23-25  Sqp^. 

*'AOK  17,  la  Ibit^l^ihutk  Nk  4,  18  Sep  42,  AOK 
17  25601  file. 


liankned.  "\Vliat  is  missing,"  he  said, 
'is  the  old,  battle-tested  private  first 
class  whom  nothing  can  shake."'**  After 
ten  more  days,  the  batde  was  rolling  in 
on  Shaumyan,  and  Ruoff  thought  the 
defense  might  be  weakening,  since 
there  had  not  been  any  counterattacks 
in  the  past  day  or  two  even  though 
Shaumyan  was  endangered. 

On  10  October,  at  the  same  time  that 
he  told  Kleist  to  wait  for  reinforce- 
ments, Hitler  ordered  Ruoff  to  "push 
ahead  toward  Tiiapst-  forthwith"  after 
taking  Shaumyan."'''  On  the  11th,  the 
Steaj/ca  relieved  Cherevichenko  from 
command  of  the  Black  Sea  Group  and 
appointed  General  Petrov  in  his  place. 
Ruoff  said  he  jiroposed  to  do  as  Hider 
had  ordered,  bm  he  reminded  the 
aiiny  group  and  the  OKH  that  the 
Tuapse  operation,  so  far,  had  cost  him 
10.00a  casualties.** 


"/Wi..  28  Sep  42. 

"H.  Gr.  A,  la  Kriegstagebuch,  Bund  I,  Hil  IV,  $-10 
1^42.  H.  Gr.  A  75126/4  file. 

^KcUto,  Battiefor  the  Cmteastts,  p.  156;  H.  A,  fa 
Krugacfgaita^iSMd  I,  'MIV,  ISOm  42,  ti.  Gr.  A 


CHAPTER  XIX 


From  the  Don  to  the  Volga 

NoEnmyWistefStaUngmd  On  ihe  night  of  1  August,  C.encr.il 

Ereraenko  was  called  to  ihc  Kixinlin 

Fo^rtb  Panzer  Army  turned  lujrtli-  f^ff^  ^  hmpiM  where  he  harl  been 
east  from  Tsimlyanskiy  and  Re-  sii^^e  Febru^ii  v  when  hv  tiad  been 
montnaya  on  1  August.  In  another  two  wounded  while  toumiandiiig  Fourlli 
davs,  after  having  captured  several  5^^;^  Army.  After  ascertaining  that  he 
loaded  Soviet  troop  trains  near  vvas  ready  lo  return  to  dvitv.  Stalin  told 
Koielnikovo,  the  advance  detachments  Eremenko  that  Slalingntd  honl  was 
of  Gcaieral  Hoths  Fourth  Panzer  Army  being  divided  into  two  fronts,  Stalingrad 
were  on  the  Aksay  River  sixty  miles  Sniitlicasl.  and  he  was  the  State 
southeast  of  SlaUngrad.  There  thc\  Defense  Connniuie's  choice  for  corn- 
met  Stalingrad  Front's  South  Group  that  mand  of  one  of  tlicni.  In  studying  the 
was  being  formed  by  General  Chuikov,  situation  in  the  Don- Volga  area  at  the 
acting  commander  of  Sixty-fourth  Army,  General  Stall  the  next  day.  Eremenko 
out  of  units  from  his  army  and  some  learned  that  the  boundai  y  betwet  11  the 
reserve  divisions.' (Ma/)  fwnts  was  laid  from  Ralat  h  to  the  line 

Sixth  Army,  under  General  Paulus,  the  f  saritsa  Rivei,  \\  Inch  flowed  east 

while  waiting  for  its  motor  fuel  and  thronjrh  Stalingrad  at  about  the  center 

ammunition  stocks  to  be  replenished.  f,f  ^\■^^;  ^jtv.  Tliat  night,  at  the  Kremlin, 

was  getting  Headquarters,  XI  Ct)rijs.  Eicmenko  suggestetl  it  might  have 

which  had  been  held  at  Kamensk-  been  better  to  assign  the  entire  city  to 

Shakhtinskiy  with  two  inf^try  ti^vi-  op^.  f„)nt  or  tiie  other,  but  Stalin  and 

sions  as  the  OKH  reserve.  Oft  tffe4th,  General  Vasilevskiy.  chief  of  the  Gen- 

when  his  mobile  units  had  enough  fuel  ^^al  Staff,  told  him  the  attacks  woidd 

to  go  about  thirty  miles,  Paulus  or-  be  coming  from  the  north  and  the 

dered  the  attack  ofi  the  Ka^aeh  south,  and  Eremenko  sensed  they  were 

bridgehead  to  start  on  the  Sxh.  The  ^ot  disposed  to  reconsider  the  deci- 

next  day  the  OKH  asked  to  have  the  During  the  interview,  Stalin  gave 

attack  start  at  least  a  day  earlier  bctaiise  Eremenko  command  of  SmUheast  Fnmt, 

Hitler  was  worried  thai  tlic  Soviet  which  would  take  ovfiTtlie  Secl50*!  from 

troops  would  escape  across  the  Don  if  ^hc  1  saritsa  south 

Paulus  waited  longer,^  Xhe  realignment  took  effect  on  5 


42.  P?.  AOK  28lH:l/i7  lilt-:  C:luiikuv,  .Srf//»i^W,  pp. 
■t4-f-i0, 

'^AOK  6,  la  Kiiegitagdiufh  Ni:  13,  2-5  Aug  42.  AOK 


6  23948 It  file:  H.  Gr.  B.  la  Nr.  2S83M2,  etn  AOK  i, 
5.*. 42.  AOK  6  30155/39  file. 
'Eremenko,  flmnni  voyny,  pp.  ITZ^-^S. 


FROM  THE  DON  TO  THE  VOLGA  383 


MAP  33 


August.  General  Gordov  kept  Sta- 
lingrad Bmt  and  SixPf'^hd,  Twenty-first, 
Sixty-second,  and  Fourth  Tank  Armirs, 
Eremeilko  acquired  Sixty-Juurlh,  Fijty- 
sevm^,  {Hid  i^^-ftrsi  Afmes  plm  First 
Gunrds  .4rmv,  which  was  Iieing  broii<>"li! 
out  oi  the  Stavka  reserve,  first  Tank 
Amy  vm  dkbaiuled.     m&  beeame 


the  nucleus  for  the  slatf  ol  SouUieoil 
Wwif,  and  what  vm  left  of  its  troops  -ms 

iiK orpoi-atcd  tnio  S/.xly-scrond  Army.* 
i'he  headcjuaners  ol  both  fiants  were 
sitliaiedl  m  Stalingrad. 


WAfV,  vol.  V,  p.  IM.  IVOVSS.  vol.  II,  p.  431; 
Moskalenko,  JVo  Yugo-^tjHidHitm  nuj/mvhm,  288. 


3S4 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


From  the  noi  ihcasi  and  southwest. 
Eight  against  the  river.  XIV  and  XXIV 
Panzer  Corps  struck  into  the  Kalach 
bridgehead  on  the  morning  of  7  Au- 
gust, Their  points  had  contact  by  late 
afternoon,  and  they  had  trapped  the 
main  body  olSixty-smmd Army.  Together 
with  die  infantry  of  LI  Corps,  the  two 
panzer  corps  cleaned  out  the  pocket  in 
four  more  days,  eventually  tallymg 
nearh  fiftv  thousand  prisoners.^ 

At  Ralach,  Sixth  Army  was  on  the 
most  direct  route  to  Stalingrad,  the  one 
it  had  originally  intended  to  take,  but 
several  considerations  now  spoke 
against  using  it.  For  one,  the  terrain 
between  Kahich  and  Stalingrad  was 
crisscrossed  by  bulkaa,  deep  gullies  that 
often  forced  tanks  iatsteagthy  detours 
and  could  be  used  as  trenches  by  the 
defense.  Also,  since  Fourth  Panzer 
Arm\  was  on  the  Aksay  and  had 
bridgeheads  across  it,  the  envelopment 
formed  by  a  thrust  due  east  from  Ka- 
iach  was  likely  to  be  shallow.  Moreover, 
Fourth  Tank  and  Tiocnty-fir'^t  Armies  were 
still  holding  a  bridgehead  line  from 
Kletskaya  to  Peskovatka  across  the 
northeastern  loop  of  the  Don  bend.  To 
keep  the  Russians  confined  tliere, 
Paulus  reckoned,  would  take  more 
troops  than  would  be  needed  to  hold 
them  on  the  river,  and  the  terrain 
north  of  Peskovatka  appeared  to  af- 
ford a  somewhat  better — and  about 
five  miles  shorter — approach  to  Sta- 
Hngrad,  On  the  ilth,  PauliJ5  ordered 


■MOA'  6.  la  Krifgitagi-hitih  -V'  /  V-  ir>  Aug  -12,  AOK 
(i  t;^94H/li  hie.  In  M()sk;iJeiik<i's  .hiijiint,  1  [i-.Kkjiiar- 
ters,  Fii\l  Trink  Aiyiiy  luiucd  iivt-i  irs  irinijjs  to  .S/v/v- 
\eiiinil  Aniif  cliiring  tin;  &dL\  mi  ilie  7th.  alter  li.iving 
Hi  (.Hill  an  iirder  to  do  so  tlic  night  bet  ore. 
Moskaleiiko,  Na  i'ugu-mfxidnom  naf/ravlena,  p.  2B8. 


XIV  and  XXIV  Panzer  Corps  to  shift 
north,  clean  out  the  "northeast  corner" 
of  the  Don  bend,  and  get  bridgeheads 
there  for  the  advance  to  Stalingrad.*' 

Tlie  loss  of  the  Kalach  bridgehead 
brought  the  close-in  defense  of  Sta- 
lingrad nearer  to  actuality  on  the  So- 
viet side,  and  the  Stavka  was  putting  in 
more  of  its  reserves,  fifteen  rifle  divi- 
sions and  three  tank  corps  between  I 
and  20  August.  On  the  9th,  Vasilevskiy 
talked  to  Eremenko  from  Moscow  and 
told  him  Stalin  had  decided  to  put  Sta- 
lingrad and  Southeast  Fronts  under 
Eremenko.  He  would  have  Gordov  as 
his  deputy  for  Stalingrad  Front  and  Gen- 
eral Goliitov,  the  commander  of  Tenth 
Army,  as  deputy  for  Southeast  Front,  and 
Genera!  Moskalenko,  who  had  been  his 
deputy  for  the  past  several  days,  would 
take  command  of  First  Guards  Army. 
NKVD  Colonel  A.  A.  Sarayev,  who  was 
bringing  the  10th  NKVD  Division, 
would  take  command  of  the  Stalingrad 
city  defenses.  While  Eremenko's  ap- 
pointment ended  the  division  of  the 
city  between  two  independent  com- 
mands, it  was,  Eremenko  has  said,  "an 
extremely  heavy  burdeii"  to  have  to 
conduct  operahohs  thffOiigfe  f  $epi^ 
ties,  2  chiefs  of  staff,  and  S  ft^^r' 

Eremenko  took  cqitumaiid  on  the 
10th,  wtSi  Khrushchev  as  his  political 
officer  for  both  Jmiih.^  On  the  12th,  a 
high-ranking  trio,  consisting  of  Ma- 
lenkov,  secretary  of  the  Central  Com- 
mittee of  the  Communist  Party^  as 


'AOK  6.  la  Nr.  2948142,  AimeebeJM Juer  die  Gimiin- 
nung  f/cA  l.hmUtgi'its  •(iii'iims^tk  lmiimh%yt,  JL8AZ, 
AOK  0  :ll)l,'-):V42  hie. 

'Va.sile\  skiv.  /)(■/(/.  ]).  2:1-1;  Mosk^jk'nko,  iVrt  fHtgO- 
ziipiuliiuiii  iii}jinn-lrHu,  ]).  ErtiiR  iiko,  Fnniiii  voyny, 

p.  187. 

"Eremenko.  I'mrnii  i'vttty.  p.  187.  See  also  IVOVSS, 
vol.  [I.  |>.  432,  vvliidi  gives  13  August  as  the  <iate  of 
Eremenko's  appoiiuuiciu. 


FROM  THE  DON  TO  THE  VQIjaA 


385 


representative  of  the  State  Defense 
Committee;  Vasilevskiy  asStavka  repre- 
sentafiye;  and  General  Leytenant  A.  A. 
Novikov,  commanding  general,  air 
fierce,  as  Stavka  air  representative,  ar- 
Wied  in  Stalingrad  to  assist  and  guide 
Eremenko." 

While  Hoth,  who  in  the  meantime 
h&d  moved  his  right  flank  up  to 
Abgsmerovo  Station  on  the  railroad 
forty  miles  south  of  Stalingrad,  waited, 
Paulus  began  the  attack  across  the 
Kletskaya-Peskovatka  line  on  the  15ih. 
In  two  days,  XIV  and  XXIV  Panzer 
Corps  cleated  the  entire  loop  of  the 
Don,  and  VI 11  Corps  took  two  small 
bridgeheads  near  Trekhostrovskaya. 
But  ctJMiplicattOMS  had  also  begun  to 
develop.  Tlie  ground  surrounding  the 
bridgeheads  proved  to  be  marshy  and 
not  g&dd  f&t  t^tStS,  and  Eremenko,  on 
orders  from  the  Stm'ka,  was  rushing 
First  Guards  Army  to  the  Don. 
Mbskaleolua.liftil  the  first  dP  Mk  five  di- 
visions  acr^&e  river  on  the  lOtli,  and 
by  the  ISti[,.%  had  reestabUslied  a 
tWeiitf"!riail€*10ng  bridgehead  from 
Kremenskaya  to  Sirotinskaya.'" 

This  turn  in  events  gave  Paulus  the 
<§ietee  of  accepting  a  prolonged  contest 
for  the  Don.  which  was  undoubtedly 
just  what  the  Stavka  wanted,  or  making 
the  Mve  to  SSilJftgfad  ivith  his  deep 
left  flank  exposerl.  He  took  the  latter, 
expecting  that  an  imminent  threat  to 
Staingrad  would  fee  eitmigh  to  divert 
Eremenko's  attention  from  the 
bridgehead.  The  decision  gave  Paulus 
mm  almost  ihsfant  advantage;  on  the 
tnoming  of  the  21st,  LI  Corps  attack- 
ing east  across  the  Don  toward  Ver- 


^iVMV,  vol.  V,  p.  168. 

'■'rVOVSS,  vol.  II,  p.  432;  MoskaleidtO,  NH  VugD^ 
tapadnam  mprmilenii,  pp.  294-96. 


i\  acliiv  look  the  Russians  eompletely  by 
surprise  and  in  a  few  hours  carved  out 
a  three-by-five-mile  bridgehead.  By 
daylight  (he  next  morning,  the  engi- 
neers had  Uirown  up  two  twenty-ton 
bridges  and  XIV  Panzer  Corps'  tanks 
were  rolling  across.' ' 

For  diree  days  past.  Fourth  Panzer 
Army  had  been  cutting  its  way  slowly 
through  the  Stalingratl  outer  delense 
ring  north  of  Abganerovo  Station.  In  a 
letter  to  Colonel  Heusinger,  chief  of 
o]5ci  ations,  OKH,  on  the  19th,  Hoth 
told  why: 

Here  on  the  border  between  sieppe  and 
desert  the  troops  live  and  fight  under  un- 
speakably difficult  conditions.  In  spite  of 
mimmering  heat  that  does  not  let  up  at 
night,  in  spite  of  indescribable  dust  and 
lack  of  rest  at  night  owing  to  vermin  and 
air  raids,  in  spite  of  tlie  absence  of  any  kind 
of  shade  or  ground  <.river,  in  spite  of  scar- 
city ol  w.iier  ,111(1  j)iMir  health,  ibey  are 
domg  their  best  to  cari-y  out  their  assigned 
tmssKOTS.'* 

The  Russians,  of  course,  were  no  more 
comfortable.  Eremenko  says,  "Tlie 
days  in  Stalingrad  were  toitid  and  the 
nights  were  stifling."'^ 

The  Enemy  Thrci'  Vt'rsts  Away 

The  pl^n  for  the  last  act  at  Stalingrad 
had  been  ready  for  more  than  a  week. 
The  main  effort  would  fall  to  Sixth 
Army.  It  would  strike  east  past  Ver- 
tyachiy  to  the  Volga  north  of  Stalingrad 
and  from  there  send  a  force  south  to 
take  the  city.  Between  the  rivers,  Paulus 

cast  to  meet  Foiirlii  I^nzer  Army  and 


*1^0K  6.  la  KriegUngflmih  .V,.  /?,  15-22  .Xiii^  -42, 
AOK  6  23948/11  file. 

"Dfr  Ohfrhffrhhiifihfr  tin  4.  Pami-iurmi-e,  tin  Geiifial 
Heuiiu^n:  /<J.,V,^:?.  Py.  \OK  4  28183/S61e. 

'^Eremenko,  thmiii  nvyny,  p.  183. 


386 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


Sixth  Army-s  Tanks  Ci^p^s^ieauE  Don  m  Vmpfi^^ 


to  envelop  the  Soviet  forces  standing 
east  of  the  Don.'^  Somewhat  am- 
bivalently, the  Sixth  Army  final  order 
added; 

The  Russians  will  defend  the  SmUngrad 
area  stubbornly. 

In  advancing  across  the  Don  to  Sta 
iingrad,  the  army  will  have  to  reckon  widi 
resistance  at  the  f  ront  and  heavy  coun- 
terattacks on  its  north  Hank. 

It  is  possible  that  the  destructive  blows  of 
recei^  weeks  have  deprived  the  Russians 
of  the  strength  for  a  dedsLve  tesistanee." 

The  XIV  Panzer  Corps  pushed  out 
of  the  Vertyaichiy  bridgehead  on  the 


"AOK  6,  la  Kri^itagebuckNr.  0, 16  Aug4g,  AOK6 

239481!  Hlf. 

''"■AOK  6.  In  \r.  }U'I-IH2.  Armeclvli-h!  fuer  den  Angt^ 
auj Stalmgiad.  l9.S.-i2,  AOR  6  30155/42  tile. 


moraing  of  23  August  behind  a  citrtain 
of  bombs  laid  down  by  VI 11  Air  Corps. 
Dining  tlte  day,  the  planes  dropped 
1,000  tons  of  bombs  ahead  of  the  pan- 
zer corps  and  on  the  northern  quarter 
of  Staluigrad.  In  a  bit  more  than  twelve 
hours,  the  tanks  covered  thiir\-six 
miles  and  took  a  handhold  on  the 
Volga  north  of  the  eitf.*-*  General 
Weichs,  the  commander  ol  Army 
Group  B,  then  ordered  Paulus  and 
Hoth  to  drive  for  a  junction  of  their 
forces  after  wliicli  Sixth  Army  would 
take  Stalingi  ad . 

Hoth  thereupon  gathered  all  the 
strength  he  could  and  headed  nor  th, 
but  Paulus  had  a  long,  exposed  new 
fmm  on  his  left  flank  to  cOtttei^  with. 


Plochcr,  German  Air  Force,  p.  231. 


FROM  THE  PON  TQ  THE  VOLGA 


$87 


The  XIV  Panzer  Corps  had  stretched 
itself  very  thin  on  the  dash  to  the 
Volga.  On  the  26th,  a  counterattack 
carried  mmw  three  miles  of  its  front  be- 
tween the  rivers,  In  the  afternoon, 
Getieral  Paftztrtfnippen  Gustav 
V<Jli  Wietershcim.  the  lorps  com- 
mander, radioed,  "It  is  not  possible 
with  present  forces  to  stay  on  the  Volga 
and  hold  open  communications  to  the 
rear.  .  . .  will  have  to  pull  back  tonight. 
Request  decision.''  Paulus  replied,  "Do 
not  retreat,"  and  stopped  everything 
else  while  he  put  LI  and  VIH  Corps  lo 
work  at  Stretching  their  lines  east  to 
close  II ]i  uith  XIV  Panzer  Corps.  Since 
Fourtli  Panzer  Army  had  not  yet  man- 
aged to  break  away  on  its  front,  the 
whole  attach  $^peat^  to  be  atxMt  to 
stall/' 

The  Germiaails  sadden  appearaiice 
on  the  Volga  was  a  deep  shock  to  the 
Soviet  leadership.  On  23  August,  the 
city  authorities  began  evacuating  from 
Stalingrad  civilians  wlio  were  not  work- 
ers in  war  industries,  and  two  days 
latef,  the  Strnfta  #@dbtr^  a  state  of 
siege.  Dtiring  the  tll^tdron  the  23d,  the 
Stavka  sent  Ereraenk©  tlie  following 
order: 

You  have  enough  strength  to  annihilate 
the  enemy.  Combine  the  aviation  of  both 
fjxmts  and  use  it  to  smash  the  enemy.  Set  up 
armored  trains  and  station  them  on  the 
Stalingrad  beh  railroad.  Use  smoke  lo  de- 
ceive file  enemy.  Keep  after  the  enems  noi 
only  in  the  daytime  but  also  at  night. 
Above  all,  do  not  give  way  to  panic,  do  not 
let  the  eDcmy  sc^re  you,  and  keep  faith  in 
yowr  owtt  streiigltBs:,'* 


"Pz.  AQR  4.  la  Knfgstagehwk  Noiizen  Chef,  23-26 
Aug  42,  Pz.  .'\OK  4  38183/17  file;  AOK  6.  la 
Kmgstagehirh  Nr.  13,  23-26  Aug  42.  AOK  6  2394811 

'"A&silevskiy,        p.  236. 


On  the  26th,  Stalin  named  General 
Zhukov,  the  commander  of  West  Front, 
deputy  supreme  commander.  The  next 
day  he  recalled  Zhukov  from  West  Front, 
where  be  had  been  directing  an  opera- 
doii  that  had  been  considered  as  \m- 
pcjrtant  as  an\  on  ilic  soiuii  flank,  and 
sent  him  lo  Stalingrad  with  instructions 
to  assemble  First  Guards,  Twmiy-f mirth, 
and  Sixh-sixth  Annies  for  a  c<.»u!iterai- 
tack  from  the  north  to  break  Sixth 
Army  away  from  the  Volga,** 

Zhukov  arrived  on  the  scene  on  the 
29th,  just  in  time  to  witness  another 
blow.  During  the  day,  Fourth  Panzer 
Army's  XXXXVIII  Panzer  Corps 
reached  the  Karpovka  River,  Tlie  next 
morning  it  took  a  bridgehead  at 
Gavrifovka,  thirty  miles  southwest  of 
Stalingrad.  With  tliat,  Sixty-second  and 
Stkty-fiiurtk  Amdes  were  on  the  verge  o£ 
being  encircled  and  had  to  be  with- 
drawn to  the  Stalingi  ad  suburbs.^" 

In  the  afternoon  on  the  30th,  at 
Sixth  Aimy s  command  post,  Weichs 
urged  Paulus  to  strip  his  fronts  east 
and  west  of  the  Don  and  put  every- 
thing he  cotik!  into  getting  a  junction 
wilii  Hoth.  Afterward,  Paulus  told  XIV 
Panzer  Corps  and  LI  Corps  to  be  ready 
to  strike  south  on  short  notice  re- 
gardless of  their  other  troubles.  When 
Fqw^  VameT  Afftff  made  a  clean 
break  awav  from  the  Karpovka  on  the 
31st,  Weichs  ordered  Paulus  and  Hoth 
to  seek  a  junction  at  Pitorairak  dae  east 
of  Stahngrad.  smash  the  ^t^lpiy  west 
and  south  of  there  between  them,  and 
then  turn  east  and  drive  into  the  center 
of  the  city  along  the  Tsaritsa  River. 

Events  at  the  turn  of  the  month 


to  sulsiaaiiiate  a  report 


^'IVm:  vol.  V,  p.  175;  7.huUn.  Memoirs,  p.  377. 
^«Vasilevskiy,  Dtlo,  p.  239;  IVOVSS,  vol.  H,  p.  438. 


388 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAI) 


German  Machine  Gunner  Looks  Across 
THE.  VoijGA  North  of  Stalingrad 


tributed  to  General  Riclithofen,  the 
commander  of  Fourth  Air  Force,  that 
StaMngrad  was  virtually  undefended. 
Qn  the  altemoon  of  2  September, 
I^ourth  IRaniter  Army  reported  the  ter- 
ritory ahead  of  il  clear  ofencmv  as  far 
as  Voroponovo  Station  six  miles  from 
the  center  etf"  the  city;  1*^ehs  ehere- 
upon  told  Hoth  to  (iii  n  east  into  Sta- 
lingrad without  waiting  for  Sixth 
Army.  On  flhe  M,  VIII  Air  Corps, 
recendy  reinforced  witli  practically  all 
of  IV  Air  Corps'  planes  from  the  Cau- 
casus s^ed  a  twenty-fonr-houf, 
roUEBd-rtil^-idock  raid  on  the  cit>.-'  In 
the  mti^  poriiiiig  hours.  Sixth  Army 
atfcd  FgUtliS;  'Bm$m  Atmf  jmde 
cotitact  at  Goiicitary,  seven  miles  north- 


west  ol  Voroponovo.  With  that  both 
armies  were  in  position  to  head  east, 
and  af  the  Werwolf  the  word  was, 
"There  is  no  longer  any  enemy  west  of 
Staliiigrad."  Hitler  issued  orders  to 
"efiacfeaje  die  male  inhabitants"  and 
depofttih^e  women  becau.se  tlie  popula- 
tion, in  liis  opinion,  was  strongly  Com- 
munist and,  hence,  a  danger.**  During 
the  day  on  the  4th.  Patihis  foiwarded  a 
plan  to  the  OKH  for  going  into  winter 
quarters.  It  hardly  seemed  significant 
that  Sixty-M-miiii  .md  Sixty-fourth  Armies 
had  avoided  an  encirclement  and  fallen 
back  into  the  city. 

To  the  Soviet  Command,  as  well,  it 
looked  like  the  end  was  in  sight.  On  the 

3d,  ^tlliQ  i^l€d  m  Wmkmi 

■tlkesatoatioii  at  Stalingrad  has  worsened. 
ThesEtti^iy  >a  jihin  three  verststa  mile  and 
a  halfj  of  Suiliiit;]  ad.  Sialiugraii  Kuiki  be 
taken  today  ur  toinorrovv  ii  the  nurtherii 
group  ol  Forces  does  not  render  iniinediate 
suppoi  t . 

Order  the  troop  commanders  to  the 
north  and  northwest  of  Stalingrad  tai  attEack 
the  enemy  immediately.  . . 

But  Zhukov  was  not  ready  and  had  to 
wait  anotlier  day  and  a  half  to  bring  up 
ammuaiitfti  3^  Ms  artillery.^ 

Corfrontation 

The  City 

SUiliugrad  was  nothing  special,  a  re- 
gional administrative  center  in  the 
steppe  with  some  war  industry  ,  a  popula- 
tion just  under  half  a  million,  and  a  hard 
climate  both  in  stimmer  and  winter. 
(Map  34,)  Strung  out  over  some  twelve 


=  '  Grchier  Diary  2H  Aug  42,  C-OfiSqCMH  Sle; 

Plother.  German  Air  Force,  p.  234. 


^Grsinfr  Diary  No/a.  2  Sep  42,  C-tl65q  CMH  file. 
'"IVOVSS,  vol".  II,  p.  438. 
**Zhuko\,  Mmoirs,  p.  379. 


390 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGXUJ> 


General  Paulus  (right)  Watches  the  Ajtack  Oil  MmMfil^-Jfl^mid  Mm,  &te 
Commander  oj  U  Corps,  Seydlitz. 


miles  along  the  Volga  and  flanked  bv 
suburbs  extending  several  more  miles 
to  the  ti&t&i  and  ^imtii.  it  did  Hot 
anywhere-  reach  more  than  two-and-a- 
half  miles  inland.  Its  most  prominent 
phfsSod  feature  was  the  30^foot-high 
Mainai  Hili  (shown  on  maps  as  Height 
102),  which  was  actually  a  kurgan,  an 
ancient  burial  mound.  The  hill  divided 
the  cit\  in  two.  On  the  south  lay  the  old 
town,  the  prerevolutionary  Tsaritsin. 
It,  in  turn,  was  bisected  by  the  Tsaritsa 
River,  to  the  soiitli  of  which  were  rail- 
road yards,  liglu  indnstry,  grain  ele- 
vators, and  blocks  of  apartmetlt 
buildings.  North  ol  the  river  were  gov- 
ernment buildings,  clustered  around 
the  Red  Square,  me  stain  *^lroad  sta- 
tion, the  waterworks  and  power  plant, 
and  more  blocks  of  aparuiient  build- 


ings. The  railroad  ran  north  between 
Mamai  Hill  and  an  oil  refinery  and 
tank  lantn  mt  t9i«  ^Iga.  iRanged  along 
the  ri\'er  north  of  Mamai  Hill  were  the 
"Juizur"  diemical  plant,  the  Krasuy  Ok- 
i^br  metalhirgical  ymtks^  a  breaa  \ss^ 
erv,  the  Barrikady  gun  fa^tor^,  a %1ek 
works,  a  large  tractor  plant,  and 
beyond  it  the  suburbfS  of  Spaitakdv'ka 
and  Rynok.  The  plants  and  factories 
with  their  complexes  of  steel  and  ma- 
sonry buildings  wigfe  lior^red  on  the 
west  by  workeis'  sesfements  made  up 
niosdy  ot  small,  ^hdy  packed,  un- 
painted,  otje^rpj  w^ciden  houses,  a 
tv|ic  (if  struct nre  also  to  be  found  in 
large  number.s  elsewhere  in  the  city. 
Since,  like  other  southern  Russian 
rivers,  the  Volga's  right  bank  is  higher 
than  die  left,  the  Stalingrad  river  f  ront 


FROM  THE  DON  TO  THE  VOLGA 


was  a  lim:  laf  dill  that  vra^  'i£i,)^laGi^  as 
mudu  as  3  thousand  feet  high. 

Cmnterattach 

Diiring  the  day  on  4  SlprihIk  i. 
Sixih  Army's  LI  Corps  took  Giiimak 
Sialioii,  which  put  it  in  position  to 
attack  into  Stalingrad  bt  lween  Mamai 
Hill  and  the  Tsarilsa.  Fourth  Panzer 
Army  was  bearing  in  south  of  the 
Tsantsa  along  the  railroad  east  of 
Voroponovo  and  frotn  the  southwest 
by  way  of  Peschanka.  Panlus  ,t;aye  gen- 
eral Seydlitz.theLI  Corps  commander, 
another  infantry  division  and  told  hira 
to  attack  into  Stalingrad  tlie  next  day.^® 
At  damn  pn  *he  Sth,  thvk&v  was  at  a 
#fes!j  Gtuirds  Army  observation  |i0St  op- 
pimee  the  XIV  Pan/ei  C  orps  north 
ft'omt  to  watch  the  st  n  t  of  the  coun- 
terattack, Moskalenko  liad  made  one 
sun  ah  ead)  on  tlie  2d  and  then  had 
Sloped  to  wait  for  Twenty-fourth  and 
Sixty-sixth  Armies  lo  get  into  position  on 
his  left  and  right.  General  Malinovskiy, 
<Who  hscd  taken  ovei  Sixty-sixth  Army 
after  his  front  was  disbanded,  had  told 
Moskalenko  on  the  night  of  the  4th 
that  in  the  morning  he  would  be  start- 
ing the  attack  piecemeal  because  he  still 
had  divisions  on  the  march.  The  saroe 
was  as  much  ot  more  the  case  with 
General  Ko/lov.  who  commanded 
Twenty-fourth  Army.'-^  Consequently,  the 
counterattack  hinged  mainly  on  First 
Shack  Arms,  \vhich  was  the  only  one  of 
llie  three  that  was  fully  deployed— and 
the  only  one  to  have  seen  previous 
action.  Fir^t  Shoik  Army,  however,  was 
not  cxpcrientcfl  enough  to  carry  the 

^^^K  (i.  I<i  Kn,'fi^lu'^rhu,h  Sr.  S3,  4  Sep  42.  AOK  6 
2394H;iHi!t  :P:  \(>h  I.  hi  KmgstagtiutkNiflizetlGhgf. 
4  Sep  42,  Pjl.  AOK  4  281«-t/17  file. 

•"Mosltaleniio,  IVa  Yugo-utpattmm  uapntPkHil.  p, 
32H. 


Other  two  along.  The  artillery  and 
rocket  barrages  began  at  0600,  and 
Zhukov  saw  that  the  density  of  fire  was 
low.  The  fire  the  in  I  an  try  inet  as  it 
moved  out  showed  him  "that  we  were 
not  to  expect  any  deep  penetration  Of 
our  assault  units.""  Sixly-^ixth  Arm\ 
joined  in  at  0900  and  Twmly-Jourth  Army 
at  1300.  By  then,  Moskalenko^  divi- 
sions were  stopped  and  being  hit  by 
counterattacks.^* 

Nevertheless,  Stalin  told  Zhukov  to 
It  V  again  the  next  dav.  The  coimterat- 
lack,  he  maintained,  had  already 
bought  some  time  for  Stalingrad."  Sta- 
lin was  more  right  than  he  knew.  At 
midday  Paulus  had  canceled  the  U 
Corps  attack  into  Stalingrad  and  had' 
di\  erted  all  of  Sixth  Army's  air  support 
to  the  north  front.  The  XIV  Panzer 
Corps  cleaned  up  half-a-dozen  break- 
ins  and  had  a  dght  front  again  before 
dark  but,  in  doing  so,  had  incurred 
"pet  ceptible  losses  m  men  and  ^li^eii^ 
...  and  a  heavy  expeii^|0Wilf|r  of 
ammumuon.  ^ 

The  second  day  was  M®  feette*  f«>r 
Zhukov  but  was  soniewlial  worse  for 
XIV  Panzer  Corps,  because  grt>Lind 
fog  prevented  the  pl^es  flnom  giving 
any  help  in  the  morning.  In  the  after- 
noon Wietersheim  called  Paulus  and 
told  hiin  his  front  was  "stipained  to  the 
limit."  He  had  to  have  more  infantry, 
he  said,  and  constant  air  support,  even 
if  it  tneant  putting  off  the  attack  'mt& 
Stalingrad  indennitcly,  because  that 
could  only  "be  lliought  of  aiiyway 
after  the  atMTth  fi«tt  was^cure,  M«It» 


528-Sl. 

»aiuk(»v,Al«iiotrj.  p.  580. 

*oAOk  6,  ta  Kmgsiagawlt  t3,  6  Sq>  42,  AOK  6 
23&tSll  fife. 


392 


Fourth  Panzer  Army  ;>  Infan  irv  on  the 

DeMNSIVE  at  KUi>OK0SNO¥E 


replied  that  he  knew  Wietersheira's  sir- 
nation  "clearly  and  exartly"  but 
lliought  differently  about  how  to  han- 
dle it.  "Stalingrad  must  fall,"  he  said, 
"to  free  streng^th  for  the  north  front." 
The  XIV  Panzer  Corps  mission, 
Paiilus  coudwded,  was  to  hold  out  until 
then.'" 

The  LI  Corps  attacked  at  daylight  on 
tile  7 ill  and  in  fourteen  hours 
stretched  its  line  east  to  Razgulyayevka 
Station,  which  put  it  five  miles  north- 
east of  Mamai  Hill*  Sey^tS:  md  life 
cliief  of  staff  went  To  the  army  com- 
mand post  the  next  morning  with  a 
proposal  to  drive  into  Stalingrsid  that 
day  or  the  next,  hul  Paulns  now  told 
them  they  could  not.  Paulus  was  not  as 
sure  about  what  te  d©  nesct    ^  UfHid 


»'/AKi.  6  Sep  42. 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 

been  when  he  talked  lo  Wetersheim 
two  days  befoT-e,  and  he  said  LI  Corps 
had  to  be  kepi  loose  lor  a  while  yet.  Its 
next  assignoasilt,  beginning  on  theSiili 
would  be  to  go  northeast  and  to  mop 
up  behind  XIV  Panzer  Corps  to  Or- 
lovka.  He  added  that  for  the  time  being 
Holh  would  nol  be  able  to  attack  into 
the  city  either  because  he  was  having  to 
turn  soutli  to  take  some  of  the  strain 
off  the  infantry  on  his  flank;  so  the 
advantage  of  a  coordinated  double 
thrust  into  the  city  would  be  lost 
an\^vay. 

After  a  day's  pause,  the  Soviet  pres- 
sure on  XIV  Panzer  Corps'  north  front 
resumed  on  the  9th  as  LI  Corps  began 
pushing  northeast  against  an  enemy 
who  "tenaciously  defended  every  single 
btmker."  Late  in  the  day,  Seydlitz  re- 
ported that  the  Soviet  losses  were  high 
but  "our  own  were  not  inconsequen- 
tial."^'- Hoth's  effort  to  tree  his  Hank 
had  a  notable  success  on  the  morning 
of  the  10th  when  the  29th  Motorized 
Division  got  a  battalion  through  to  the 
Volga  at  the  southern  Stalingrad  sub- 
urb of  Kuporosnoye.  The  battalion  lost 
the  half  mile  adjacent  to  the  river  again 
duiing  the  night  when  it  was  overrun 
by  furious  charges  from  the  north  and 
south,  and  wild  melees  continued  there 
for  four  more  days.^^ 

The  10th  was  the  darkest  day  yet  for 
the  defense.  During  the  day,  Fourih 
Panzer  Army  drove  a  wedge  Ijciween 
Sixty-second  and  Sixty-fourlh  Annies  iso» 
lating  Sixly-scamd  Army  inside  the  city; 
and  Stalin  had  to  concur  in  Zhukov's 
assessment  diat  on  the  ||@ftfo  ima%, 
"further  attacks  with  the  same  taroops 


"•■'Ibul..  7-t).Scp42. 

R.  71  imnl.i.  Ill,  Ci'fi'vhlsbi'ruhl  dn  IllJTI  vom 
US.42,  2U.9A2.  Pi.  AOK  4  28J83/5  file. 


FROM  THE  DON  TO  THE  VOLGA 


393 


and  the  same  dispositions  would  be 
useiess."^*  Moskalenko  has  pointed  out 
thai  a  tactical  success  had  not  been 
possible  at  any  time  because  "the fimt 
command"  underestimated  the  en- 
emy^ strength  and  because  the  enemy 
knew,  after  5  September,  that  it  only 
had  to  concentrate  on  one  army,  First 
Guards.^^  But  the  attacks  had  bought 
some  time. 

On.  the  other  hand,  time  was  running 
out,  and  the  battle  was  at  the  potiil 
being  carried  into  the  streets  of  Sta- 
lingrad- On  the  10th,  Hoth  told  General 
derT^inzertruppen  Werner  Kempf,  the 
coninKmding  general,  XXXXVIII  Pan- 
zer Corps,  to  start  into  the  south  quarter 
the  next  day  and  to  take  it  "piece  by 
piece."""'  tn  the  moi  ning  on  the  12th. 
Eremenko  and  Khrushchev  briefed 
Chuikov,  the  newly  appointed  com- 
manding general  oi Sixty-si'vimd  Anny. 
The  previous  commander,  General 
Leytenant  A.  1.  Lopatin,  who  had  lost 
the  oreatcr  part  of  the  army  in  the  Ka- 
lach  bridgehead;,  "did  not  believe  that 
hS&  ^amny  ttruld  &oId  city/  Chuikov 
swore  "tn  defend  the  dtf  or  diein^e 
attempt."^  ^ 

l!  was  lime  also  for  LI  Corpf.!©  ilse 
heading  east  again;  only  the  c@3^>be- 
carae  sludt  outside  of  Orl©^  iH-day 
on  tlie  11th  and  was  fighting  off  coun- 
terattacks iintil  2400,  Paulus  told 
Scydfitz  the  nesrt  inorniiig  to  tuWi  the 
Kne  around  Orlovka  over  to  XIV  Pan- 
zer Corps  and  to  get  ready  to  strike  "to 


^Thakm.SUmmrs.  p.  381. 

"■MosLili'Tiki I,  ,V<i  Yns:o-z/ipaihiu>ii  iinjndvifnii.  p. 

m. 

'*P2.  AOK  4,  In  Knegsliigflmrh  NoUzcri  CfieJ,  K)  Sep 
42.  Pz.  AOK  4  28183/17  file. 
^^Chuikov,  Stalingrad,  p.  76, 


the  Volga"  on  the  I3th.'^  Hoth  was  tell- 
ing Weichs  at  the  same  time  that  the 
attack  was  "going  to  take  a  whUe"  be- 
cause the  fighting  was  "more  rigorous 
than  any  the  troops  have  yet  experi- 
enced in  this  war."  Weichs  and  Hoth 
also  talked  about  putting  XXXXVIII 
Panzer  Corps  under  Sixth  Army  in  a 
day  or  two,  which  would  give  Paulus 
complete  charge  at  Stalingrad  and 
would  let  Hoth  start  thinking  about  the 
terminal  phase  of  Operation  Fisch- 
REIHER,  the  advance  to  Astrakhan.''^ 

On  the  morning  of  the  13th, 
Chuikov  was  in  the  Sixty-second  Army 
cxjnimand  post,  a  dugout  on  Mamai 
Hill,  when  LI  Corps'  artillery  opened 
up  from  behind  Razgulyayevka.  In  the 
wake  of  the  barrage,  ihe  infantry  came 
on  from  the  nortlivvest,  its  left  tlank 
aimed  at  Mamai  Hill,  its  right  following 
the  Tatar  Trench,  another  feaiure  oi 
ancient  and  indeterminate  origin.  By 
nightfall,  the  Germans  were  into  a 
vvoi )( !  s  :  I ; !  i  !e  west  of  the  hUl  and  at  the 
termijius  of  the  Tatar  Trench,  where 
the  built-up  area  of  the  city  began. 
Chuikov  moved  his  command  post 
south  during  the  night  to  a  bunker 
close  to  the  Tsaritsa  River  that  had  ear- 
lit-r  bt-en  the  Stalingrad  Fmu I  lieadquar- 
ters.  It  was  secure  enough  with  forty 
feet  of  compacted  eardi  bvei^iead,  but 
it  put  Chuikov  right  between  LI  Corps 
and  XXXXVIII  Panzer  Corps  that 
were  aiming  for  a  meeting  on  the 


'■"*AOK  6.  Ill  KrugskiirfhHih  Nr.  13,  II  and  l'2  Sep  42, 
AOK  G  2394811  lik', 

■'■'Pi.  AOK  4.  In  J'nmpn /lni„lizni  mm  K.  I.Ii.  .\r.  5,  IS 
Sep  4L>,  Pz.  AOK  4  28I)S3/!9  file;  I'z-  AOK  4.  la 
Kriegstngfhuih  Noli-en  Cliff,  12  Sep  42.  Vi.  AOK  4 
2KIS3I7  nie. 

*"AOK  f>.  1(1  Knrg'.liitrfhiith  Mr,  13,  13  Sep  42,  AOK  6 
239481!  (lie:  (.:iniik«v.  Slaliiigrad.  pp.  86-88;  Sam- 
soiiov.  Slaliitgracklaita  biiva,  p.  190. 


394 


MQSGOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


Tlie  14th  was  another  dark  clay  for 
the  defense.  In  the  south  quarter, 
XXXXVni  Panzer  Corps  reached  the 
railroad  station  and  forced  a  spearhead 
through  to  the  Tsaritsa.  North  of  the 
river,  LI  Corps  rammed  two  divisions 
abreast  into  the  center  of  tiie  city,  by 
1200  had  the  main  raih  oad  station,  and 
at  1500  reached  the  Volga  at  the  water- 
works. By  dark,  the  corps  he  ld  almost  a 
mile  of  river  bank,  and  anutank  guns 
set  up  there  had  sunk  two  ferries  and  a 
steamer.^' 

When  the  report  on  the  days  events 
tidied  Stalin,  he  was  conferring  with 
Ehukov  and  Vasilevskiy  in  the  Kremlin 
on  a  matter  that  enormously  enhanced 
the  strategic  value  of  holding  any  part 
of  Stalingprad.*^  He  instructed  Vasilev- 
skiy to  have  Erenienko  send  in  the  best 
^^kni  in  ^  SCaMtigrad  area,  the  IMM 
Guards  Order  of  Lenin  Rifle  Division 
under  Hero  of  the  Soviet  Union,  Ge- 
neral Mayor  A.  L  Rodimtsev.  Rodimtsev 
was  at  Chuikovs  headc(uarters  in  the 
alter  noon,  and  the  10,OOQ-iJian  divi- 
sion crossed  the  twfer  dtifing  the 
night."^ 

Seydlitz's  LI  Corps  began  to  experience 
on  the  i4th  and  ISdi  what  XXXXVIII 
Corps  aheadv  had  for  several  days: 
street  hghting  in  a  city  that  was  being 
fX>m^^^  U6t%  by  block,  btiUding  by 
building,  even  floor  by  floor.  Nothing 
was  conceded.  Houses  were  fought  over 
as  if  they  were  niajorfoTi3^8«».  Accerd- 
ing  to  the  History  of  the  Great  Patriotic  War. 
the  main  railroad  station  changed 


"Pt.  AOK  4,  la  Femsprecktuahen  mm  K.T.B.  Mr.  5,  14 
Sep  42,  Pz.  AOK  4  28183/19  file;  AOK  6,  la 
KriegOa^buek  Nr.  B.  14  Sep  6  2SS481I  file. 

«Sice  p.  442, 

*'Zhiikov,  Memoirs,  p.  384;  Chuacov,  5tofmgjn«^  p. 
91;  Samsoaov,  SteUnff'a^kliiP/ei  biitia,  p.  l9Mt. 


14lh  and  another  thirteen  times  in  the 
next  several  days.  VVlio  held  what  at  any 
particular  time  was  almost  impossible  to 
tell.  The  LI  C^oi  ps  took  Mamai  HiU  (M 
the  15th.  The  next  day,  one  of 
Rodimtsev^  regiments  stormed  it,  and 
some  .Soviet  actoitn is  maintain  the  regi- 
ment retook  it  and  held  it  for  at  least 
another  ten  days.^**  The  Sixth  Army  rec- 
ords, on  the  other  hand,  indicate  that 
repeated  Soviet  attempts  failed  to  dis- 
lodge the  Germans  from  the  lull  after 
tlic  15th.  Rodimtsev,  however,  did  suc- 
ceed m  breaking  the  German  hold  on 
the  Volga  east  of  the  railroad  station. 
Realizing  that  he  did  not  have  a  secure 
grip  on  any  part  of  the  city,  Paulus,  who 
on  the  14th  had  ratnted  Seydlitz  to  turn 
north  next,  on  the  !5th  ordered  him 
first  to  join  forces  with  XXXXVIII  Pan- 

Sixth  A  rni^iaBdt0tdeiin-^at:  die  contrail 
and  south  quarters.*** 

On  the  17th,  LI  Corps  and  XXXXVm 
Panzer  Corps  mdide  contact  with  each 
other  on  the  Tsaritsa,  less  than  a  mile 
upstream  from  Chuikov's  headquarters 
bunker.  Chuikov  and  his  staff  moved 
north  to  the  vicinity  of  the  Krasny  Ok- 
tyiatbr  wot^  during  the  night.  His  own 
situation  was  precarious,  but  during 
the  day»  he  had  received  good  news: 
Smlingrad  and  BiM'^mM  Bmis  vfettr 
going  o\er  to  the  offensive,  with  the 
objective,  no  less,  of  pinching  off  the 
whole  German  Stalingrad  force.  Fftst 
Guards  and  Turnty-fourth  Armirs  would 
strike  from  the  uortli  and  Si^ct^-JourtJi 

had  beeii  beefed  up  to  a  strength  of 


*wmss,  vol  II.  pp.  441-42;  ca»aikw,  snHin^, 
p.  97. 

*'-AOK  6.  la  KTiegstagi^h  Nr.  B,  14-22  Sep  42. 
AOK  6  2394811  file. 


FROM  THE  DON  TO  THE  VOLGA 


395 


eighi  tifle  divisions  .nid  iliiee  tank 
coi  ps  and  had  been  shiiied  west,  to  the 
right  oi Twenty-fourth  Army.** 

The  oFfensive  began  in  the  nortli,  im 
both  sides  of  KoUuban  on  the  18th  and 
continued  ait  intervals  over  the  next 

four  days,  but  it  did  noi  t  ome  near  to 
making  a  breakthrough.  Chuikov  has 
said  that  the  one  effect  his  army 

nottcect  was  that  the  C.crnian  planes 
disappe^ed  from  overhead  for  five  or 
six  Iidurs  at  a  time  while  the  attacks 
were  going  on.^"  Aciuallv.  ahhougli  lie 
may  not  have  known  it,  Chuik<n  bcne- 
fit«Mf  more  than  that.  The  LI  Cor|is  ad- 
vance in  Slalingi  ad  slowed  almost  to  a 
Stop  on  die  19th  and  2Uth,  and  Paulas 
reported  on  the  S&th,  "The  infantry 
strength  of  the  army  has  been  so  weak- 
ened by  our  own  and  the  Russian  at- 
miM  m  t^emt  days  that  a  supploneot 
is  needed  to  activate  it."'*^ 

The  ''Mam  Effbrt  in  StaUngrad 

The  "suppltsioent "  as  Paulus  saw  it, 
(oiild  tdnie  from  seven  divisions  he  still 
liad  standing  inside  the  Don  bend  up- 
stream to  tie  mtkt^  tif^el^QptP 

Ri\ei.  Although  he  had  not  been  able 
to  eliminate  the  Soviet  bridgeheads  al 
Kremensfcaya-Sirotinskaya  or  at  Sera- 
fimovi(h  and  the  Russians  had  in  fart 
expanded  tlieni  substantially,  he  re- 
garded the  lector  as  being  ^n  little 
danger."  and  he  had  <livisions  to  sub- 
stitute tor  those  tliai  would  be  taken 
wmy.  The  Rumanian  Third  Army, 
eleven  divisions  all  Cold,  was  coming  in 
from  Army  Groap  A.  It  was  not  being 


"Chuikov.  .S/fl/Hj£vnr/.  p.  l02lMt»l!a!©iIsil.Arfl  Yugo- 
tapnihii'ni  nojirtivlriiii.  p.  VMS. 
*'(  :huik()v,  i'(a/ing7od.  p.  113. 
"AOK  6Jii  Knt^tagtbuehNr.  13.  SO  Sep  43.  AOK  6 

2394^11  tile. 


brought  not  til  bet  ause  of  its  prowest 
on  the  batdeheld;  in  fact,  the  reason 
•was  just  the  opposite:  Army  f*Tdup  A, 
ill  spite  of  its  chronic  sliorlage  in 
suength,  had  wanted  to  get  rid  of  the 
Riiihanians  since  early  August  bi^cause 
diey  were  unreliable  on  the  defense, 
and  their  offensive  plans  paid  more  at- 
tendon  to  fall-hack  positions  than  to 
objectives  to  be  attained.'"* 

HiUer  had  finally  let  Third  Army  be 
traiisfiisjti^  in  €arly  September,  be- 
cause he  tbdUght  the  fall  of  Stalingnid 
was  imminent  and  he  wanted  to  reward 
Rumanian  Marshal  Ion  Antonescu,  his 
ally  strongest  in  cli\  isions,  by  setting  up 
a  Rumanian  army  group  under  An- 
tonescu. Hider's  assumption  had  been 
that  Rumanian  Fourth  Army,  part  of 
which  already  was  widi  Fourdi  Panzer 
Army,  Rtmianian  'Third  Atmy,  and 
Sixth  .\rmy  \v<nild  make  up  the  army 
group  and  it  would  lake  over  what 
would  by  then  have  become  a  station- 
ary front. Paulus'  proposal  n("  die 
20th  would  bring  die  Rumanian  I  hird 
Army  into  play  earlier  dsgd  fai  a  laore 
critical  role  than  had  been  anticipated. 

Apparently,  an  alternative  also 
crc»s5ed  Paulus'  mind ,  namely,  Co  go 
over  to  the  defensive  in  Stalingrafl,  He 
had  lejected  that  idea  earlier  when 
Wietersheiin  proposed'  it;  snid  on  the 
Kitli,  after  one  or  two  more  exchanges 
ol  a  similar  nature,.  Wietersheim  had 
been  "c^Ied  away  to  another  assign- 
nient"  and  replaced  at  XI\'  P:in/er 
Corps  by  Generalieutnant  Hans  Hulx;. 
He  rej^ibed  it  again  on  the  20th  be- 
oiuse  ^world-wide  interest  in  the  *wair 


*HDmii^et>^,  op.  AbL  mN.r.-mmm2,M.4&, 

**0m.  GmSidH.  Op.  Mf.  (i)  m  4206^42.  Bur 
Dm,'  3.9.42,  H  S2fia6 itte. 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


of  Stalingrad  makes  it  essential  that  the 
army's  main  effort  now  be  at  Sta- 
lingrad." As  a  "supplement,"  Weichs  let 
Paulus  have  the  lOOth  Jaeger  Division 
right  away  and  agreed  to  consider  re- 
leasing two  more.divisions.^' 

On  the  22d,  LI  Corps  piished  two 
spearheads  through  to  the  Volga  east 
of  the  railroad  station  but  had  to  with- 
draw them  again  after  dark.  During 
the  night  Soviet  pjanes  bombed  Sta- 
lingrad, and  heavy  artillery  fire  from 
across  the  river  kept  activity  down  on 
the  23d  while  Stalingrad  Front's  armies 
battered  at  the  north  front  once  more. 
Tlie  dffense  in  the  city's  center, 
though,  was  breaking  up  on  the  34Lh. 
The  71st  Infantry  Division  took  "half  of 
what  has  been  in  enemy  hands  north  of 
the  Tsaritsa  untU  now,"  and  XXXXVIIl 
Panzer  Corps  reached  the  Volga  at  the 
month  of  the  Tsai  itsa.  In  another  day, 
7 1st  Infantry  Division  had  taken  the 
party  and  government  buildings  and 
pushed  through  lo  tlie  mouth  of  the 
Tsaritsa  on  the  north  bank. 

Pftuhis  dedared  thecenter  of  the  city 
secured  on  ihe  afternoon  on  the  26th, 
after  tiie  docks,  the  last  government 
buildings,  and  the  big  bunker  in  which 
Chuikovs  headquarters  had  been  were 
t^eil.  "Since  noon,"  he  reported,  "the 
©eMwan  war  flag  has  been  flying  over 
the  party  buildings."  The  resistance 
was  actually  far  from  over  on  either 
side  of  the  Tsaritsa,  btit  he  iiarf  issued 
orders  three  days  before  to  start  the 
drive  nortli  on  the  27  th,  In  the  mean- 
tteie  he  had  aoqtiiVed  ©tie  more  dfii- 
sion  from  the  front  on  the  Don.''- 

In  troop  stiength,  Sixty-second  Army 


was  now  more  than  keeping  up.  Within 
the  next  four  or  five  days,  it  would  have 
received,  since  mid-September,  rein- 
forcements amounting  to  9  rifle  divi- 
sions, 2  tank  brigades,  and  1  rifle  bri- 
gade. And  the  front  commands  were 
being  reorganized  and  tightened.  Gen- 
eral Rokossovskiy,  who  had  proved 
himself  during  the  summer  at  Bryansk 
Front,  was  being  brought  in  to  take  over 
Stalm^rad  Front,  which  on  28  Sep- 
teiiiWr  was  renamed  Don  Front, 
Eremenko  rehnquished  his  double 
command  buL  kept  Southeast  Front, 
which,  renamed,  became  Stalingrad 

Front. 

Sixth  Army  showed  it  was  becoming 
accustomed  to  thinking  in  new  orders 
of  magnitude  w  hen  it  l  et  orded  the  first 
dayk  acoomjilishments  in  the  attack  to 
title  north.  Th#  i^m^^  fe^esB  ym^e 
"Height  I07.5f  ^e  IsSm^  i^f  im^es 
northwest  of  there,  and  the  gully 
northwest  of  Krasny  Oktyabr  [the 
worker's  settlement]."  On  the  28tli.  LI 
Gorp>s  took  "about  half  of  the  Barri- 
kady  setdement,  "two-thirds"  of  a  blocfc 
of  houses  around  the  "Meat  Combine* 
at  the  foot  of  Mamai  ffill,  and  the 
"western  part"  of  flie  Krasny  Oktyabr 
works.  The  next  day,  while  taking  tlie 
blocks  of  houses  west  of  the  bread  bak- 
ery that  was  situated  betweeii  the 
Krasny  Oktyabr  and  Barrikady  plants, 
the  coi-ps  lost  the  houses  it  had  taken 
arottnd  the  "Meat  Combine"  and  Icm 
and  retook  part  of  the  Barrikady  settle- 
ment. 1  he  30th  brought  no  change  at 

ti  €orps,  but  XII?  JP^ifeeer  Corps  broke 
iiito  Orlovfea  from  the  nofdi.** 


"AOK  (y.  la  Kn/'g.^Uigrhiuh  Nr.  13,  20  and  21  Sep  42,  ^^IVOVSS.  vo).  II.  [>[>.  1^42-44:  IVMV,  vol.  V,  p.  187. 
AOK  6  2394H1 1  '•*AOK  6,  lit  KnnrsiagOmii.  Nr.  /I,  27-30  Sep  42, 

^nbid.,  22-26  Sep  42.  AOK  6  23948 IJ  file. 


FROM  THE  DON  TO  THE  VOLGA 


397 


On  1  October,  "in  seesawing  bailie," 
Sixth  Array  held  what  il  had  so  far 
taken  and  counted  itself  lucky  to  have 
done  so.  A  day  later,  the  war  diary  rec- 
ords, "The  chief  of  staff  informed  the 
army  group  that  in  spite  of  the  most 
intensive  efforts  by  all  forces,  the  low 
combat  strengths  of  the  infantry 
will  prolong  the  taking  of  Stalingrad 
indefinitely  if  reinforcements  cannot 
bestipplied."  Paulas  told  Weichs  on  the 
3d,  "At  present  even  the  breaking  out 
of  individual  blocks  ol  houses  can  only 
be  accomplished  after  lengthy  re- 
groupings to  bring  together  the  few 
combat-worthy  assault  elements  that 
can  still  be  found."  The  next  aftemooil, 
following  a  visit  to  the  front,  the  chief 
of  staff  reported,  ".  .  .  without  rein- 
forcements, the  army  is  not  going  to 


take  Stalingrad  very  soon.  Tlie  danger 
exists  tliat  were  the  Russians  to  make 
feirly  strtftig'  ^untemt^«:ks  our  front 
might  not  hold,  because  tbef®  SOPe  DO 
reserves  behind  it."^^ 

Sixth  Amoy's  war  diary  entry  few  6 
October  reads,  "The  army's  attack  into 
Stalingrad  had  to  be  temporarily  sus- 
peMd(^  [today]  because  of  the  extJep- 
tionally  low  infantry  combat  strengths." 
In  the  divisions,  the  diary  continues, 
metage  battalion  strengths  were  down 
to  3  officers,  11  noncommissioned  of- 
ficers, and  62  men.  The  army  could 
scrape  togetlier  enough  replacements 
from  the  supply  service  to  make  small 
advances,  but,  "Tlie  occupation  of  tlie 
entire  cit)  is  not  to  fig  a©Mf^Wi^in 
such  a  fashion."'*® 


■"/M.,  1-4  Oct  42. 
6  Ocl  42, 


Summer  on  the  Static  Fronts 


On  the  Moscow  Axis 

Believing  iliai  the  eneniv  uoiild, 
sooner  ot  hitei,  seek  the  decision  Uiere, 
the  Sovioi  leadership  did  not  m  any 
wise  regaiti  die  renrral  sector  a>;  sec- 
ondary in  the  summer  of  1942.  General 
Zhukov,  who  had  been  the  chief  trou- 
bleshooler  the  summer  before,  stayed 
in  command  of  West  Front.  The  fronts 
opposite  Army  Group  Center — Ka- 
linin, Wlest,  and  the  two  right  wing  ar- 
mies of  Bijansk  Fmnt — had,  all  told, 
140  divisions  to  the  Germans'  70.'  The 
Stavka  held  4  field  armies  and  tlie  Third 
and  FiJ til  Tank  Aviniis  as  reserves  in  the 
Moscow  area.^ 

The  straiegv  <>l  the  active  defense 
remained  in  eflet  i  on  the  Moscow  axis. 
On  16  July,  four  days  after  the  offen- 
sive north  of  Orel  against  Second  Pan- 
zer Army  was  slopped,  tlie  Stavka 
instructed  Zhukov  and  General  Konev, 
the  commander  of  Kalinin  Front,  to 
prepare  an  offensive  in  the  Rzhev-Sy- 
chevka  area.  The  objecti\es  were  to  he 
to  drive  the  enemy  back  to  the  Volga 


VVjW  (vol.  V,  p..  Haam  ^an  the  German 
divisians^  ttowever,  wise  'Sa&sdMiMiiee'  the  nrength  of 
Soviet  i^iMbm.  ^ixnef         6eiiK«i:^i.iie»en^  dtvi* 

area  security)  and  fstin^memt'tiiim^m^Ms^Siee 
OKW.  KTB.  vol.  II.  p.  tS?4. 

HVMV,  vol.  V.  p.  243.  The  headquarters  and  staff  of 
Fifth  T&idi  Army  reverted  to  the  reserve  in  late  ]  uly,  and 
Ihe  ii^  ma  EebtnSt  with  icsult*  that  wiQ  be  observed 
later.  See  ttkatamSt^  Sol^o^Dutf,  p.  WL. 


and  Vazuza  rivers  and  take  Rzhev  and 
Zubtsov.* 

When  Operation  StvoLi  i  /  ended,  in 
the  second  week  of  July,  Army  Group 
Center,  for  its  part,  was  ready  to  settle 
into  a  supernunierar\  role  for  the  sum- 
mer. Hannover  and  Seydlitz,  by  elim- 
inating the  most  critical  dangers  to  tfie 
army  groups  rear,  had  made  it  once 
more  an  almost  credible  threat  to 
Moscow  and,  consequently,  a  bit  more 
than  a  bystander  in  tlie  war:  but  at  tive 
campaigning  would  be  out  of  Llie  ques- 
tion at  least  until  a  partial  rebuilding 
was  accomplished  in  August.  Tlie  ar- 
mies had  three  operations  in  the  paper 
stage  of  planning:  Derfflinger,  Orkan 
("lornado""),  and  WiRBfitWIND 
("whirlwind").^ 

DERi!WiiM6ER,  descended  froni  the 
old  BftljECatENS(  HI  A(..  was  to  be  a  Ninth 
Army  drive  from  the  front  north  of 
fb^ev  m  if3ma:stkm.  Omum  and  Wir- 

BELWIND,  as  their  code  names  suggest, 
were  related.  Both  were  to  be  con- 
ducted 'by  Fotirth  and  Second  Panzer 
Armies  agaiivsl  the  Sukhiniclii  salient. 
In.  Orkan,  tlie  two  armies,  striking 
from  the  nmiJi  and  the  south,  would 

eUtninate  the  whole  salieni  and  tarrv 
the  front  out  to  Belev,  Kaluga,  and 
YtiS^^noe  WiMwmmiii  n  eccMtdersibly 
less  ambitious  alternative  to  Orkan, 


^fVMV,  vol.  V.  p,  244. 

^£tee^  V9a  OerlBuiger  was  a  Brmiian  fidd  max>- 
sk^  of  ihe  se»«nt(eiidt  Gentuty, 


lININ  FRONT 


22d 


30th 


WEST 
FRONT 


NINTH 
ARMY 


4th 
Shoek 


SOVIET  ATTACKS 
RZHEV  AND  VORYA  RIVER  AREAS 

30  July  -  23  September  1942 

^  ApproJtimate  front,  30  Jul 

gnaasseaa  ^pproximste  ttont,  23  Sep 

<  Soviet  attacks 

0  BO  Miles 

I  n  

0  fO  icnometers 


ARMY 


400 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


would  only  pinch  off  ihe  western  tliird 
oTMlie  ]^ent  and  establish  a  line  some 
•miles  east  of  Stilchinidii.  Although 
Orkax  could  have  l)een  substantially 
more  effective  than  Wirbklwind  (by 
reopening  the  southwestern  ap- 
proaches to  Mosc<uv  via  Viikhnov  and 
Kaluga),  as  of  mid-July,  barring  a  sud- 
den So^et  collapse,  there  was  almtMit 
no  chance  of  its  being  attemprefl.  Army 
Group  Center  was  not  likeiy  to  have 
enough  troops  or  material  to  try  any- 
thing that  big.  Whether  Derfflinger 
could  be  executed  was  also  doubtful. 
Hie  buildup  for  it  wottW  have  to  coitie 
out  of  the  forces  used  for  Wirbelvs  ind. 
which  had  priority;  therefore,  Derf- 
PLINCER  could  not  start  until  Sep- 
tember, which,  at  best,  would  put  it 
uncoinfortai%  late  io  tbe  season.^ 

Konev  was  ready  to  start  on  30  July. 

He  had  Thirtieth  andHuenty-ninth  Ayl^lil•.<; 
positioned  north  and  nprtheast  of 
Rzhev,  25htlkov,  who  would  carry  the 
main  effort  and  would  coordinate  the 
operations  of  both  fronts  alter  die  of- 
fensive started,  needed  five  more  days. 
He  had  Thirty-first  and  Twentieth  Armies 
in  the  line  and  2  tank  corps,  2  guards 
cafvalry  corps,  Iftid  S  t^tmtf  dfdMotts 
staiifling  behind  tliem.  Each  of  the  ar- 
mies also  had  a  mobile  group  of  3  tank 
brigades;  T^iSrfy-pFSi  AtWy  to  sweep 
south  of  the  Volga  toward  Zubtsov, 
where  it  would  be  able  to  threaten 
SKhev  ftom  ch*  ^utheast.  Tw&rMe^ 
Attt^  woiild  hear  somhwest  xxxmtd  the 


WOK  9.  In  Kriegstngtliuch  Nr.  6.  1-20  Jul  42.  AOK  9 
a  1624/1  file;  AOK  4,  la  Kriegstagelmrti  Nr.  13,  1-31  Jul 
42,  AOK  4  24336/1  file;  Pz.  AOK  2,  la  Kriegstagebuch 
Nr.  2,  TdlJV.  1-31  Jul  42,  Pz.  AOK  2  2B499/4  file. 


Vazuza  River  and  Sychevka.''  {Map  ?5.) 

Ninth  Army  became  aware  of  the 
buildups  in  the  last  week  of  the  month. 
It  identified  several  new  (ti\  isiuns  with 
Thirtieth  Army  and  several  more  with 
Thirty-first  Army.  However,  since  'WeH 
Front  had  already  conducted  several 
similar,  seemingly  vague,  regroup- 
^etits  elsewhere"  Ninit  Aimy  more 
than  half  suspected  a  deception,  a  So- 
viet counterpart  to  Operation  Krkml/ 

At  0600  on  30  July,  in  pouring  rain, 
after  an  hour-long  artiller\  ban  age  ac- 
conapanied  by  air  strikes.  Thirtieth  Army 
hit  Ninth  Army's  froftt  Oft  the  Volga 
River  bridgehead  due  nonh  of  Rzhev. 
By  nightfall,  it  had  broken  open  four 
miles  of  the  line  and  had  overrun  artil- 
lery positions  two  miles  in  tlic  rear.  For 
the  next  four  days,  the  Germans  held 
tight  to  the  cornerposts,  the  flanJts  of 
the  hreaklhrough,  and  thereby  jire- 
vented  the  attack  from  gomg  deeper 
vAake  they  lat^eed  iJieifisSlVes  ^si&  fbr 
the  atiark  from  the  easi,  ]>ast  Zubtsov 
toward  Rzhev,  that  was  now  certain  to 
come.  Thedi^tttsss  werie^hdrt.  cmi  th^ 
noiil^  less  ihari  len  miles  and  on  the 
east  twenty- live  miles,  and  the  stakes 
wcf*  disproportionately  high.  If  HsihfV 
fell.  Army  Group  Center  would  l^SSe 
the  anchor  of  its  north  flank,  every 
chafrt^e'  tjf  closmg  the  gap  to  Army 
Group  North,  and  most,  if  not.^,  oif  ite 
status  as  a  threat  to  Moscow. 

In  'the  iwomitig  on  4  AugUisl,  "Vkhty- 
fust  Army  surged  into  and  over  the  ItHst 
Infantry  Division  on  an  eiglit-mile 
strctcfe'  «ase  qI'  ^tjfetsm  The  hreak- 
^ough  was  ct^QipIete  ahnost  £tt  once. 


*IVMV.  vol.  V,  p.  245. 

'OKH.  GenStdH,  Fremde  Heere  Ost.  Kurzf  Beur- 
tritungm  tier  FeiwUage,  23-29  Jul  42,  H  23/198  file; 
f\OK  9,  la  Krii^^ibueh  Mr.  6,  29  Jul  42,  AOS-  9 
31624/1  file. 


OPERAnOM  WfRBELWtND 

11-24  August  1942 
— —  Approximata  front,  1 1  Aug 
«»«««««•  Approximate  from,  24  Aug 

«  ^  AKtt  6t  WiHBEUWIND 

-«jss2^  Projaetair  airfs,  WmBltWlNO 

 o  Projected  advance,  WtRB£(.WINQ 

 Projected  advance,  ORKAN 


25  Miles 


25  Kilometers 


SECOND  PANZER 
ARMY 


MAP  36 


402 


1^ 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


Machin£-Gun  Nest  Nori  h  of  Rzntv 


By  dark,  the  only  trace  of  the  former 
ffottt  >ms  oocasiofial  wMie  flaw^  that 
were  sent  up.  here  and  there,  over 
some  bypassed  strongpoiiit.  During  the 
day,  Jvmtli  Army  had  recieiv«d  two 
more  shocks;  the  attack  through  the 
breech  on  the  east  was  not  only  gomg 
toward  Zubtsev  but  southwest  tcward 
Sychevka  as  well,  and  Fourth  Shock  Ariri\ 
appealed  to  be  bestirrmg  itselt  west  of 
Belyy.* 

It  thereupon  bec  ame  clear  to  General 
Vietinghoff,  the  acting  Ninth  Army 
cOffiJMaflder;  to  Field  Marshal  Kluge, 
the  commander  of  Army  Group  Center, 
who  returned  from  leave  in  Germany  in 
the  early  afternoon  m.-  tfe^  4tlliJ  asfil  tiS 


HiUer  drat  Nindi  Army,  which  had  no 
reserves  it^.  owfl,  eotild  not  hold 
Rzhcv  or  tlse  iVS-mile  n(irthuaid  loop 
of  its  frontwithout  early  and  substantial 
help.  Tliere  was  help  to  be  had,  and 
Hitler  was  more  than  usually  cjuirk  to 
give  it.  It  meant  dismantling  Fourth 
Army's  force  for  Wirbelwind,  but 
Hitler  did  not  at  that  ]3oiut  want  to  allow 
die  Soviet  Union  a  prestige  victory  at 
Rzhev-  So,  he  released  the  1st,  2d,  and 
5th  Panzer  Divisions  and  the  78th  and 
i02d  infantry  Divisions  and  instructed 
Kkige  t0  see  tiiM  tibe  pamet  i^mmmmi 
were  only  used  in  a  concentrated  coun- 
terattack from  the  south  across  the 


»ACiK  ft  h  mmas^tfA  m  €  SO  JwJ-4  Aug  42,       "AOK  9,  la  Kn^itagM  Nt.  4,  4  Ang  €2,  AOK  9 

Am^mS^m  mimm  vet,  %  p  tis,,  mtm 


SUMMER  ON  THE  STATIC  FRONTS 


403 


The  front  held  nordi  of  Rzhev  and  at 
Zuhtsov  on  the  5th  and  6th,  but  it  disin- 
tegrated on  the  setith'west,  leaving  a 
broad  road  open  to  Sychevka.  Tu  lake 
advantage  of  the  latter  development  in 
particular,  Zlitikov  revised  his  plan.  On 
the  6th,  he  secured iheStax'kas  perinis- 
sion  to  stop  Twenty-ninth  Anny,  which 
had  ifiMe  no  progress  anyway,  and  ie» 
leave  Rzhev  to  the  Thirtieth  and  Thirty- 
Jirst  Armies.  At  tlie  same  time,  he  shifted 
the  weight  of  the  operation  south,  put- 
ting his  spare  armor  and  cavalry.  VI 
and  VUl  Tank  Corps  and  II  and  VIII 
Gti&ri^  Gtm^  Corps,  in  with  TlyeJiifife^ 
Army.  Sychev^lSl,  which  had  originally 
not  been  onectf^them,  now  became  die 
first  of  the  objectivies  as  Thentieth  Army^ 
mobile  group,  VI  and  VIII  Tank  Corps, 
and  //  Guards  Cavahy  Corps  headed  to- 
vtkcd  it.^" 

For  Klugc  and  Vietinghoff.  there  was 
not  time  to  assemble  die  panzer  divi- 
m&m  for  a  counterattack.  They  had  to 
l)e  put  in  frontally  along  the  Vazuza 
and  Gzhat  rivers,  ten  miles  west  of 
Sydiewl^.  Talking  to  KStIer%  adjutant, 
G^m^tui  Sdunundt,  on  the  night  of  the 
6th,  Vi^m^^ii  said  he  might  be  able 
to  counter^ctadt  if  he  could  get  &iiie 
fully  e(|uipped  panzer  division  (besides 
those  coming,  which  were  all  under- 
strength),  hut  ^ie  actual  chance  of  his 
doing  that  was  slight,  and  it  disap- 
peared entirely  the  next  morning  when 
VIII  Guards  Cavalry  Corps  struck  soudi 
off  the  Tiuentieth  Army  flank."  The  rein- 
forcements were  having  to  be  thrown 
into  the  expanding  battle  as  fast  asfhey 
arrived,  and  they  were  being  set  upon 
just  as  fast  by  waves  of  Soviet  inf  antry, 

*WMV.  vol.  V.  pp.  245-47. 
MWmweitVm VBl.  V,  map  15. 


On  the  7th,  Ninth  Arni>  was  on  the 
defensive  everywhere  and  on  the  vei^ 
of  being  oveiWhelmed.  Onte  mnxre, 
help  was  to  be  had.  Three  or  fouf  paa- 
zer  divisions  and  a  couple  of  infantry 
divisions  could  have  been  extracted 
from  Second  Panzer  Army's  force  for 
WrasELWiND.  During  die  day,  Kluge 
went  to  the  Wilfischame  to  get  a  deci- 
sion—  and  got  one  that  was  completely 
different  from  what  he  had  wanted  or 
etpected.  As  HidCT-^rarit,  the  offensive 
on  the  soiuh  flank  had  reached  its  ter- 
minal stage,  and  Soviet  diversionary  at- 

These,  such  as  the  q*^  against  Ninth 
Ai  my,  he  Sciid,  would  haim^  to  be  dealt 
wf&'fhe  iway  flie  Soviet  ivinier  etffenMve' 
had  been,  by  holding  fast  in  spite  of 
occasional  breakthroughs.  The  correct 
way  to  prtwas^,  he  faiMsted,  was  to  get 
WiRBELWiND  going  "immediately." 
After  it  was  completed,  die  panzer  divi- 
sions could  be  used  to  clean  up  at 
Ninth  Army,  and  then  Ninth  Arinv 
coiUd  go  on  and  finish  off  the  suimiier 
with  Derfflinger.^^  When  Kluge  re- 
turned to  Smolensk,  he  brought  Gen- 
eral Model,  who  had  been  recalled 
from  convalescent  leave,  with  him  to 
resume  the  Ninth  Army  command. 

Wirbdwind 

Since  the  starting  date  set  in  Jtii^  fcstr 
WtRBELwiND  had  been  7  August.  Sec- 
ond Panzer  Army  was  ready  to  begin 
almost  "immediately."  fMaj^  M.)  Fotif^dl 
Panzer  Army's  circmnstances,  on 
other  hand,  had  changed  completely  in 
the  meantime,  and  its  commander, 
General  Heinrici,  told  lilug©  be  could 


(Sr  tt.  &i  A*£Bft  la  Nr.  6200/42.  Der 
fufhrtr  hat  skh  e«fr<*foiwB,  8.S.4S,  Pz.  AOK  2 
mm42  file. 


404 


MOSCOW  TO  STALJNGiyUJ 


not  do  an  operatioas  diat  had  been  cs^ 
dilated  to  take  seven  or  eight  divisions 
widi  only  two,  which  were  all  he  had 
left.  Hitler's  OTder,  however,  included 
Foiii  th  Army,  and  Khige,  therefore,  in- 
sisted on  at  least  a  token  thrust  ten 
miles  past  its  front  to  Mosalsk.^*  M€V^ 
ertheless,  that  converted  Wirbelwind 
into  a  one-armed  envelopment  and 
lengthened  the  diStaiiceSgcond  Panzer 
Army  would  liave  to  cover  from  about 
forty  to  sixty-five  miles.  General 
SdliM(t»  Second  Panzer  Army's  com- 
mander, pi  oposed  to  do  it  in  two  phases 
with  lour  [panzer  and  three  infantry  di- 
wsioiis.  In  the  first,  the  panzer  di'^-> 
sions,  starting  in  pairs  from  the  east 
and  west  sides  of  a  twenty-mile-wide 
dip  in  the  front  around  Ulyanovo, 
would  traverse  fifteen  miles  of  heavily 
wooded  territory  south  of  the  Zhizdra 
River,  coo'verging  on  the  river  fifteen 
miJes  sotith-soiitheast  of  Sukhinichi.  In 
the  second,  o\  ei"  open  ground  north  of 
the  river,  they  would  sweep  north  fifty 
miles  to  Mosalsk,  passing  Suldiiiuchi on 
die  way.*^* 

Delayed  two  days  by  rain  .Wirbel- 
wind began  on  II  August,  in  more 
ram.' '  Conuug  from  llie  east,  11th  Pan- 
zer Division  covered  eight  miles,  about 
half  the  distance  to  the  Zhizdra,  before 
it  was  stopped  just  short  of  Ulyanovo. 
The  two  panzot*  divMons  on  the  west 
gained  about  one  mile.  The  day 
brought  two  surprises:  the  Russians 


'MOVf'?.  la  Krii-gslagelnith  Ni.  /?.  8  Aug  42,  AOK  4 
24:i3(Vl  file. 

"P;.  ADK  2.  la  N>.  !<5/-f2.  HifM  jui'i  ih.'  OjH-rnlMm 
"WirhfhHn.r  l(I.S.42.  Pz.  AOK  '2  2S4mi':)  file. 

'^Rain  affected  all  opei .itinns  in  tfie  tenlr.ii  sfitor 
during  the  suinniei.  The  pacrern  was  one  ol  localized 
sudden  dfuviijxini  s  and  doudbursLs  that  rolled  hap- 
ha/ar-dlv  m  c-r  die  landscape  I^VU^  fl^iiO^si 'ti0a^ 
and  mud  behind  ibeni. 


liad  built  fortifications  at  leasi  all  the 
way  back  to  the  river,  and  they  were 
reacting  with  startling  speed.  In  the 
late  afterafifon,  pilots  flying  support 
missions  reported  columns  of  trucks 
and  tanks  on  all  the  roads  leading  in 
ftGKn  the  north  and  east.  The  tank 
corps  that  had  been  tised  in  the  Orel 
offensive  in  July,  and  which  Second 
J^fi^r  Army  had  thought  were  lotig 
ago  transferred  out,  had  been  refitting 
east  of  Belev  and  nordi  of  the  Zhizdra 
and  were  being  thrown  into  the  batde. 
In  the  trench  lines  laced  through  the 
forest,  the  infantry,  observing  Stalin's 
"no  step  b^^*  Birder,  frequendy  fought 
to  the  last  man.  One  panzer  division 
managed  to  t:la^^■  its  way  to  die  Zhizdra 
in  another  two  days  and  to  get  a  small 
bridgehead  on  the  14th. 

Hider  coidd  possibly  have  expected 
Wirbelwind  to  arouse  enough  concern 
over  Moscow  to  draw  Soviet  attenrion 
away  from  the  rest  of  the  Army  Group 
Center  front,  lliat  did  not  happen. 
Zhukov,  who  had  all  of  his  original 
force  for  the  Rzbcv-Sycbcvka  opera- 
tion committefl  by  the  9th,  also  put  the 
right  flank  o[  Fifth  Army.  Tu'entieth 
Army's  neighbor  on  the  S(juth,  in  mo- 
tion east  of  Karmanovo.  In  four  more 
days.  Thirtieth  Army's  tanks  were  rang- 
ing into  the  municipal  forest  three 
miies  northeast  of  Rzhev.  On  the  I3th, 
in  a  stn-prise  attack,  Th/rty-tliird  Army 
broke  through  Third  Panzer  Army's 
right  flank  on  die  Vorya  River.  After 
that,  all  of  Kluge's  armies  except 
Fourth  Army  were  embroiled  in  des- 
perate battle,  and  Fourth  Army  was  in 


"'Pi.  AOK  2,  la  Nr.  92142.  Beurleilung  der  L,igi-  am 
22.li.-t2.  Pz.  AOK  2  28499/48  file;  Pz.  AOK  2.  la 
KrifgHtagelmch  mS.THim  U-14  Aug  42.  Vz.  AOK 
28499/4  file. 


SUMMER  ON  THE  STATIC  FRONTS 


405 


some  respects  worse  off  than  the  oth- 
ers. It  had  to  give  an  infantry  division 
lo  Third  Panzer  Army  on  the  13th, 
after  having  sent  a  reinf  orced  regiment 
to  Ninth  Army  two  days  before.  What 
was  left  of  Fourth  Army's  force  for 
WiRBELWIND  had  evaporated,  and  its 
divisions  were  holding  from  ten  to  fif- 
teen miles  of  front  apiece,  hardly  more 
than  a  picket  line.  The  single  bright 
spot  in  Army  Group  Center's  picture 
was  on  Ninth  Army's  west  front,  where 
I^mnih  Sluuk  Army  hafl  so  far  not  man- 
aged to  pull  itself  together  enough  to 
do  anything  consequential." 

Klugo  N[XMit  the  dav  on  tlie  f4tli  at 
Second  Panzer  Array,  giving  pep  talks 
to  the  division  commanders  and  pri- 
wtely  tout  Ividing  that  the  prospects 
for  WiRBELWIND  wcTC  too  Small  to  be 
■worth  the  risks  of  losing  Rzhev  or  hav- 
ing thf  t  iu-my  "chew  in"  deep  into 
Third  Panzer  Anny.  l<ater  he  told  Gen- 
eral ttalder,  cMef  of  the  CSesBtejal  Staff, 
the  anny  i^tniip  had  no  m«reT€Sewes:, 
and  WiRBELWIND  would  have  to  be  can- 
celed to  get  some  forces  for  Ninth  and 
Third  Panzer  Armies.  Ffjiikr.  \\ho,  no 
doubt,  knew  what  Hitler's  reaction 
would  be,  •'insisted*  tJie  thought  of 

stopping  WiRBELWIND  but,  at  the  late 
situation  conference,  persuaded  HiUer 
to  give  Khige  anomer  two  dMstons, 
72d  Iiiiaiurv  Division  and  the  Gross- 
deutschiand  Division.  The  72d  Infan- 
try B^^Mion,  tt^hii^  itax!  l*eefl  sthedttled 
to  g(t  lo  the  Leiiib3g;rad  area  with  Elev- 
enth Army,  was  just  coming  out  of  the 
drimea.  Grossdeutscfaland  was  at  %os» 
tov  awaiting  shipm:ent  to  the  West.  Nei- 


"IVMV,  vd.  V,  p.  247;  AOX  9,  la  Kneg^Utgebiu  h  Nr. 
6,  iS-14  Aifg  42.  AOK  9  31624/1  file;  AOK  4.  la 
ttrngstag^u^  Nr.  13.  Aug  43,  AQK  4  24S36 

aie. 


ther  one  could  get  to  Smolensk  in  less 
than  a  week,  and  because  of  the  rail- 
roads, both  could  not  be  there  before 
the  first  week  in  September.**  -Muge 
once  more  had  reserves,  but  they  were 
700  miles  away. 

Cmis  and  Recovery 

Two  days  later,  Model  presented 
Kluge  with  what  amounted  to  an  ul- 
dmatum.  He  told  Kiuge  that  Niniii 
Army  was  just  about  finished  and  had 
to  have  three  more  divisions.  If  those 
could  not  be  given,  he  said,  the  army 
group  would  have  to  take  responsibility 
for  what  happened  next  and  "provide 
detailed  tnsti  iictions  as  to  how  the  bat- 
de  is  to  be  condnued.""  Aithough  nei- 
ther could  have  imagined  it  at  tlie  time, 
Kluge  and  Modtl  we  it*  ai  the  psycho- 
logical turning  point  lor  the  summer's 
operations.  Kluge  needed  to  persuade 
Ninth  Army  to  stay  on  its  feet,  and  the 
army  needed  to  believe  it  could.  Kluge 
did  that  by  offering  the  72d  Infantry 
Division  and  the  "prospect"  of  another 
division,  which  Model  assumed  to  be 
the  Grossdeutschland  Division.  The 
Nintli  Army  war  diary  registered  "new 
hope  for  the  cominjg  difficult  days  and 
weeks.***  That  hopewOtild  have  to  go  a 
long  \vay.  The  first  trainload  of  72d 
Inlaniry  Division  troops  and  equip- 
ment was  3tie  in  Smolensk  on  the  17th, 
l)ui  ii  look  iipwanls  of  thirty  trains  to 
move  a  division.  Hider,  not  Kluge,  con- 
trolled the  Grossdeutschland  Division, 
and  Hitlei  wanted  it  to  be  used  in 

WiRBELWIND.^  ^ 


"Gretnt'r,  fJ/jm(e'  Wchrmachiftiehrung,  p.  40\',AOK  4, 
la  Krifgilaj^fhufh  Nr.  14.  14  Aug42.  AOK.4  26937  file. 

"•AOK  9.  la  KritgstogtbmihNr.  6.  16  Ad^42.  AOK.9 
31624/1  file. 

"IM..  Ifi  Aug  42. 

"Creincr.  (Jim(f  Wehrmadiljuehrung,  p.  403. 


406 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


QUAORUFLE  ANTIAlRCSAFr  GUNS  GUARQ  A  BiUDGE  Qti  tm  ^mWS^^I^ifOi 


B\  the  thiifl  week  of  the  moiitli. 
Army  (.roup  Cx-nter  was  ihoroughly 
ensnared  in  tliree  World  War  I-slyle 
battles  ol'  materiel.  Nintli  Army  liad 
suiiered  (j\er  20,000  casualties  as  oi  17 
August.  Third  Panzer  Army  was  fight- 
ing in  trenches  on  the  Vorya  River.  At 
the  bridgehead  on  the  Zhizdr  a,  Second 
Panzer  Array's  tanks  were  boxed  in  by 
minefields.  Ninth  Army's  cornerposts 
were  being  shaved  away  east  of"  ^hev 
and  aiound  Kaitoaiiovo.  On  the  22d, 
Hitler  finally  gave  up  on  Wirbelwind. 
He  wanted  then  to  take  out  two  panzer 
divisions  and,  with  those  plus  the 
Grossdeutschlatid  Division,  try  a  new, 
smaller  WiRBt  i.wiXD  northeast  of 
Kirov,  but  before  he  could  get  the 
divisions  out,  Second  Panzer  Army  was 
hit  by  furious  counterattacks  that 


forced  it  to  evacuate  the  Zhizdra 
bi  idgehead  oti  liie  24th.*'* 

Acmpti^lfg  to  the  Soviet  reckoning, 
the  sutnmer  offensive  against  Army 
Circjup  CciiLer  was  "practically  com- 
pleted" by  23  August.^'  In  terms  of 
tactical  accomplishment,  i(  probably 
was  over,  particularly  after  /.hukov's 
departure,  three  days  later,  remo\  cd  its 
chief  archiiL-t  t.  Between  2A  and  30  Au- 
gust, Thitd  Pan/cr  At  my  climinatetl  a 
breakthrough  across  the  Vorya,  and 
thereafter  its  fi  ont  held.  By  tiie  end  of 
the  month,  Second  Panzer  Army's 
front  south  of  the  Zhizdra  v\as  solid 
enough  that  Hitier  could  begin  to 


AOK  2.  1,1  KrieiJsHiiii'lmrh  Nr.  2,  fell  /1 ,  2'I-'J4 
Aug  .12,  Pi.  AOK  2S490/4  File. 
■^"IVMV,  vol.  V.  p.  a4». 


SUMMER  ON  Tm-  STATIC  FRONTS 


407 


think  about  taking  a  panzer  division 
out  there.  Kalimn  and  West  Fronts  were 
as  dose  to  R^her  and  Sj«^evlca  as  they 
were  going  to  get. 

As  a  test  of  enduraiwe,  however,  the 
offensive,  particularly  iB  tnain  compo- 
nent, the  Rzhev-Syc he\ k;i  operation, 
was  by  no  means  ended.  On  1  Sep- 
tember, Kluge  "went  oftce  again  to  the 
Fuehrer  Head(|uarters,  tliis  time  to  re- 
port what  Model  had  told  him  the  day 
before:  Niit^  A^rtny  \ras  at  i^e  point  cr 
having  its  ivftole  front  collapse.  Its  cas- 
ualties wexcr  ll||t  to  42.000  and  rising  at 

a  rate  dose  to  2;O60  a  ds^,  BStte-  tc- 

fused  lo  consider  shortening ijie  front, 
since  doin^  so  would  iix(n@ly^  losing 
Rzlie^r.  tte  afcsd  refiisied  to  release  the 
Grossdeutschland  Division,  vshich  was 
asseinbling  at  Sychevka.  Grossdeutsch- 
land, he  ^d,  guards  divisldMl* 
and  as  such  should  be  used  onlv  for 
short  periods  in  acute  crises.^"*  He 
wowM,  lie  added,  bring  the  QSth  Infen* 
try  Division  north  fiom  the  Voronc/h 
area  in  about  two  weeks  and  take  9ih 
^mer  Bnnsfon  out  at  Second  Panzer 
AriTiv,  but  in  the  meantime.  Ninth 
Army  would  have  to  gel  along  as  it  was. 
'^meone,*  fre  i^ndHided^  "^tttist  eol* 
lapse.  It  will  not  be  usT-^ 

For  a  brief  period,  the  enemy  did 
seem  to  be  wteaJtei^ng,  Ninth  Army 
registered  three  (|uiet  days  on  6,  7.  and 
8  September,  the  hrsi  such  since  30 
July.  But  was  different.  TMrtiOt 

.4nnv  hit  the  Volga  River  bridgehead 
around  Rzhev,  and  Thitty-Jirst  Army 
broke  open  six  mSes  of  f^ra^i  m 
Ziihtsov.  Thirty- first  Anny,  in  pantXCular, 
came  on  with  such  intensity  th^lifodel 


'^tm^mMf  ih^Nii^  wi  n,  ]  S^<^£A? 
*»AOK  %  la  f£ri^slagiMi  Nr.  6.  I  Sep  4t.  AOK  9 

mmm  file. 


suspected  Zhuko\  was  back  in  com- 
mand. After  much  back  and  forth  tele- 
phoning. Hitler,  in  the  afternoon, 
alltmcd  the  Grossdeutschland  Division 
to  be  deployed  between  JUhev  and 
Zubtsov.  Finafly,  in  the  evening,  he 
turned  the  <Ii\isi(in  over  to  .Model's 
command  with  strict  instructions  that  it 
Iras  only^  to  be  used  offensively  in  a 
counterattack. 

Thiriy-first  Army  opened  the  next  day 
at  04(M)  with  an  amlfery  barrage  that, 

in  fad.  (ontimied  all  dav.  Gross- 
deutscliiand  began  its  counterattack  an 
hour  and  a  half  later  and  ran  head>on 
into  S<3viet  infantrv  with  strong  air  su|i- 
port  coming  the  other  way.  Ninth 
Army  from  men  on  heard  aboiA 
ing  but  successive  calamities — a  regi- 
mental commander  wounded,  Ute  tank 
Ibatt^d^n  t»mntander  wounded  ,  tanks 
lost  right  and  left.  The  division, 
brought  up  on  the  hit-and-run  tactics 
of  the  feJitmteg,  appeared  to  be  about 
t<t  wreck  itself  trying  lo  negotiate  a  few 
miles  ol  woods  and  swamp.  Iwenty- 
four  hours  later,  the  division^  affairs 
were  in  such  confusion  that  Model  [int 
it  temporarily  under  the  commander 
rf  the  neighboring  72d  Itrfantry  iQivi- 
sioii  to  finf]  out.  if  possible,  at  least 
what  had  happened.  Some  hours  later 
fie  knew:  m  mt  Sve  <tf  the  divisiotils 

fcjrtv  tanks  were  out  of  comjuission; 
the  troops  were  suftering  more  from 
confusion  dian  from  losses;  and  the 
counterattack  was  bcvond  salvatir)n. 

At  the  Fuehrer  Headquarters  on  the 
13th,  Model  persuaded  Hitler  to  let 
him  have  the  9,'>th  Iiifanlry  and 
Panzer  Divisions  tor  anodier  try  when 
j^i^becameavaOteibte.  It  locked  as  i(,  in 
the  meantime,  the  outcome  at  R/hcv 
vvt)uld  hang  indefinitely,  as  Kluge  put 
it,  on  a  "knife  edge;**  mit  the  15th  was 


408 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


an  astonishing  and  For  Ninth  Army  a 
"beautiful"  day.  In  the  morning,  Thiri^- 
first  Army  pufled  ifiself  together  t»  fet 
7 2d  Infantry  DivMcoat  witJl  a  tremen- 
dous rush  of  tanks  and  infantry.  In  the 
afternoon,  one  regiment,  the  430th 
Infantry  Regiment,  stopped  the  Soviet 
main  force,  the  IV  Tank  Corps;  kxiodked 
«mt  ti^fe  A&Etti  of  its  tanlcsMaxu)  re- 
closed'  tiie  line,  Dining  three  davs  of 
rain  that  followed,  Thirly-Jirst,  Thirlietfi, 
aod  again  FoMt^  Shock  Armies  seemed  to 
be  getting  poised  for  another 
onslaught,  but  when  the  rain  stopped, 
only  the  TM/^^t  ymat  Mtfe  oii  flte 
attack,  but  not  wholeheartedly.  The 
artillery  and  air  support  subsided  on 
the  22d,  and  two  days  later  the  infantry 
began  breaking  contact.  Army  Group 
Center  had  held  its  own  through  the 
sustmeT"— barely,** 

Leningrad  and  Dcniyansk 

Both  sides'  half-successes  and  near- 
failures  ©f  die  past  were  tangibly  evi- 
dent on  the  fronts  aroimd  the  Ora- 
nienbaum  pocket  and  Leningrad.  A5  of 
Jaly  1942,  they  had  beeii  stati^flary  fbr 
almost  ten  months.  Tlie  city  was  solidly 
in  Soviet  hands,  and  the  landward  ap- 
proadies  f©  it  'mr^  ^jpjMf  tsnder  tight 
German  control  aftei'  the  Volkhov 
pocket  collapsed.  The  worst  of  die  siege 
was  oyer.  Once  navigation  had  re- 
sumed 00  Lake  Latloga  in  late  May, 
boats  and  barges  had  been  able  to  carry 
larger  cargQ^  dian  could  have  been 
hauled  across  the  ice  in  t!ie  winter.  In 
June  they  had  begun  to  evacuate 
women,  children,  old  people,  andstifEtfe 
men  with  special  skills  on  the  return 
trips  bringing  out  about  a  hundred 


^llnd.,  6-24  Sep  42, 


thousand  dining  the  month.  (Over  two 
himdred  thousand  were  evacuated  in 
July  and  another  hundred  thousand ift 
August  leaving  an  almost  exclusively 
male  populauon  of  between  seven  and 
eight  hundred  thoiisand.)^'' 

In  June,  a  pipeline,  laid  in  the  lake, 
had  gone  into  operation.  It,  hence- 
forth, provided  th^  troops  ih  Wt&a* 
grad  and  the  Oranicnbaii m  pocket 
with  a  secure  motor  fuel  supply.  Boats 
and  barges  would  be  able  to  bring  ifi 
over  a  million  tons  of  goods  and  mili- 
tary supplies  and  290.W0  military  per- 
«OHtiel  during  the  summer.  In  late  May, 
Leningrad  front  had  submitted  a  plan  to 
lift  the  siege  by  breaking  through  iJie 
bottleneck  east  of  the  Neva  River.  The 
Skivka  had  approved  the  plan  "in  prin- 
ciple" but  had  postponed  its  execudon 
because  it  could  not  then  supply  the 
required  reinforcements.  Lfiiiugrad 
and  Volkliov  Fronts'  missions,  as  diey  en- 
tered the  summer,  were  to  improve  the 
city's  defenses  and  to  stage  limited  of- 
fensives to  weaken  the  enemy  enough 
to  prevent  Ms  mounting  ^  assata*  OH 
the  dty  and  to  create  the  conditions  for 
breaking  the  siege  later.^^ 

Attoy  Group  North%  eoncenis  ^rore 
for  the  future  more  than  for  the  pres- 
ent. Until  frost  again  afforded  ground 
cC)iidl^ns^tutiib&for  e$£i%r(^  opera- 
dons,  the  bottleneck  appeared  to  be 
securely  in  German  hands.  The  bot- 
fletteck  bad  sui«^ived  the  witocr  and 
would  be  more  diffu  nit  to  break  in  the 
summer;  nevertheless,  in  so  confined  a 

spa^j  the  f^rtMit  dtefei^  csiuld  tm. 


-'\.  M.  Kovalchuk,  Leningrad  i  bohkaya  tntdya 
(Leningrad:  Izdaielstvo  "Nauka,"  1975).  pp.  210.  262. 
rVMV  (vol.  V,  p.  235)  gives  the  tutal  lucmber  of 
persons  evacuaied  bclwecn  20  June  1941  and  1  April 
194.^  as  1.75  million. 

=WMV.  vol.  V,  p.  233r. 


SUMMER  ON  THE  STATIC  FRONTS 


409 


afford  any  mistakes.  Between  the  bot- 
tleneck and  ilic  Volkhov  River,  the 
Pogostye  saUent  projected  to  within  10 
lam&i  dF  Lyuban.  The  Bii^f&m  were 
not  likely  to  use  it  ill  the  summer 
because  the  ground  was  underwater 
for  miles  around  on  all  sides,  but  when 
winter  came,  it  would  again  threaten 
the  rear  of  the  Eighteenth  Arm\  f  ront 
around  Leningrad.  East  and  vsest  of 
the  salient,  two  small  German  bridge- 
heads on  the  V'olkliov,  at  Kirishi  and 
Ourdno,  served  as  very  exposed,  and 
expensi\'e.  "lightning  rods"  for  the 
front  on  the  river.  Farther  soutli  tlie 
Soviet  Volkhov  bridgehead  possessed 
the  same  potential  for  futiu  e  use  by  the 
Russians  as  the  Pogostye  salient,  and 
each  enhanced  the  other.  South  of 
Lake  llmen.  Sixteenth  Armys  anchor. 
Staraya  Russa,  was  just  2  miles  inside 
the  front  and  the  c»rridor  to  the  Dem- 
vansk  pocket  was  no  more  than  3  to  5 
miles  wide  over  most  ol  its  25-mile 
length.  From  the  eastern  tip  of  the 
pocket  the  might v  loropets  bulge 
reached  west  125  miles  before  it 
dropped  off  into  the  Army  Group 
Center  zone  north  of  Velikis  e  Luki.  In 
the  summer,  particularly  the  wet  sum- 
taaer  of  1942,  either  side  could  profita- 
bly maintain  only  infantrv  outposts  in 
the  bulges  forests  and  swanips — and 
these  were  aU  AmkY  Gmap  No?Fth 
could  afford. 

NordUcht  and  O^er  Opm^kms 

Like  Army  Group  Center,  Army 
Group  North  was  assigned  a  secondary 
role  for  the  summer,  but  with  a  dif- 
ference: it  had  a  prospective  strategic 
mission.  Under  Directive  41  (of  5  April 
1942),  it  was  to  finish  oti  Leningrad, 
est^M^  land  €:$aicac±  wit^  tiie  Efnoish 


Army         ta&imm  di  Kirel^^  mii 

occupy  Ingennanland  (the  area  of  the 
Oranienbaum  pocket)  "as  soon  as  the 
[enemy]  situation  in  the  enveloped 
areas  or  the  availability  of  other\vise 
sufficient  forces  permits."^*  Although 
its  execution  was  deferred,  in  Hider^ 
thinking  the  mission  was  much  more 
than  one  of  opportunity.  His  concern 
went  back  to  the  fall  of  1941  and  par- 
ticularly to  the  failine  in  December  to 
gel  contact  with  the  Finns  on  the  Svir 
River  after  which  Marshal  Man- 
nerheim,  the  Finnish  Army's  com- 
itiaiider  in  chiel,  had  made  it  clear  that 
the  Finnish  forces  would  not  take  the 
olfcnsive  anywhere  until  they  were  at 
least  relieved  of  the  necessity  for  hold- 
ing a  front  north  of  Leningrad.  In  the 
early  winter,  on  Hitler's  orders.  Army 
Group  North  had  devised  a  plan,  code- 
named  Nordlk:h  r  ("aurora  boreali^), 
to  take  Leningrad.  Overwhelmed  by  its 
subsequent  troubles,  the  army  group 
had  not  taken  the  plan  beyond  the 
paper  stage,  but,  for  Hitler  at  least,  it 
had  continued  to  hold  top  priority  as 
Direi^e  41  had  deraortsQ^ted.  One 
tiling  was  certain:  barring  a  near-total 
Soviet  collapse,  Leningrad,  whicli  dur- 
ing the  winter  had  achieved  heroic 
stature  worldwide,  was  not  going  to 
come  cheap.  Nordlich  i ,  in  the  sum- 
.aaer  of  1942,  was  theref  ore  g<iing  to  be 
SI  major  operation  and  would  require 
StlbstantiaUy  greater  resources  than 
Army  Gettmp  North  had  or  had  any 
near  prospect  of  getting.  (Mai)  37. ) 

On  30  June,  at  ihe  Wolfssclianw,  Gen- 
eral Kuechler,  ihe  commander  of 
Army  Group  North,  briefed  Hitler  on 


-"Dcf  Fiii'hm  1111)1  (Ihi-rsir  Brfflihliiiher  der  WthniMcht, 

OKW.  W'FSt  Sr.  ^16IM2.  \Vyi^:n,f( -fi,  s.4,4Z,  'Oemxn 

High  L^vel  Directives,  CMH  iiles. 


MAP  37 


SUMMER  ON  THE  STATIC  FRONTS 


411 


tlie  operadotis  aside  from  Nordlicht 
thai  ihr  arniv  jryonp  might  undertake 
after  it  liad  rcsicti  its  units  and  receivetl 
Its  sdieduled  iroop  and  equipment  re- 
placements. He  listed  live  possibilities: 
a  joint  attack  vvidi  Armv  Group  Center 
to  Ostashkov  (Brue(  Ki  \s(  111  A(.);  ex- 
pansion of  the  corridor  to  die  Dem- 
yansk  pocket;  ehmination  of  the 
Volkhov  bridgehead  and/cMP  the 
Pogostye  salient;  and  occupadon  of  In- 
germanland.  He  rated  three  of  these — 
the  Demyaii.sk  torridor,  the  Fc^£>$t^e 
pocket,  and  the  Ostashkov  o|Jeraition' — 
as  "urgent."^" 

Kuechler  retiu  iied  to  his  own  head- 
quarters on  1  July  and  put  his  staff  to 
work  on  two  operations,  Schling- 
PFLANZE  ("vine")  and  Moorbrand 
("moor  fire").  Schungpflanze,  which 
was  to  widen  the  corridor  to  the  Dem- 
yansk  pocket  on  its  north  side,  was  to 
come  first  because  II  Corps  in  the 
pocket  still  could  not  get  along  without 
air  supply.  Aside  from  being  exposed 
to  enemy  fire  from  two  sides,  Uae  lanes 
the  Germans  had  hacked  through  the 
corridor  wei  e  uiidcrwater  whenever  it 
rained  and  muddy  all  the  time.,  Moor- 
brand  would  pinch  offth^  Pbgostye 
salient  and  so,  KuechJci  believed,  "con- 
strict" the  Soviet  m>tions  for  deploy- 
ment between  the  votkhov  River  and 
Lake  Ladoga.  Hiik  i  had  liked  the  idea 
because,  wlule  the  terrain  geflieraliy  was 
tmsuitabte  for  tnotor  vehfeles  of  any 
dcsi  ription,  the  German  tanks  might 
be  able  to  nm  on  the  railroad  embank- 
ment that  ccmveni^tly  ^ssed  the 
base  of  the  salient.'*^ 


'■'"OKW,  SIfltv.  WfSt,  KrK^igeuinchlMu-  Abttilwig, 
Kntgstagtkuh,  1.4.-30.6.42,  80  June  42,  IM-T.  1807 
file. 

"H.  Gt.  Nord.  la  KivgMngehueh,  1,-^^J.7M.  I  Jul  42. 
H.  Gr.  Noni  75128/12  file. 


On  2  July,  the  OKH  let  Army  Group 
\oi  ih  know  a  special  artiller\  recon- 
naissance group  was  being  se[U  to 
check  tlie  ground  between  the 
Leningrad  front  and  the  Oranienbaum 
pocket  for  emplacement  of  very  heavy 
ariillerv.  Hitler  was  going  to  have 
DORA,  which  had  finished  its  work  at 
Sevastopol,  transferred  north  for  use 
.i|^nst  Kronshtadt,  the  Soviet  naval 
fortress  on  Kodin  Island  in  the  GnU  o[ 
Finland.'*-  Kronshtadt,  widi  a  ling  of 
forts  on  sm  rounding  small  islands  and 
three  niilt's  of  water  separating  it  from 
the  mainland,  was  a  worthy  companion 
piece  to  Sevastopol.  In  the  next  two 
weeks,  Hitler  added  to  DORA,  the 
GAMMA  and  KARL  batteries,  the 
other  siege  ardllery  from  SevastojJol, 
and  four  batteries  ranging  in  caliber 
from  240-  to  400-mm.  that  had  not 
been  at  Sevastopol.  All,  including 
DORA,  for  which  a  five-mile  railroad 
spur  would  have  to  be  built,  were  to  be 
emplaced  by  the  last  week  in  Augu,st. 
Because  so  much  ardllery  would  not 
achieve  tactical  profits  worth  the  cost 
of  the  ammunition  by  shelling  Kron- 
shtadt  alone,  most  of  it  was  to  be  sited 
to  fire  on  targets  iti  ihe  Oranienbaum 
pocket  as  well.  Eighteenth  Army  then 
also  began  planning  an  infantry  opera- 
don  against  the  pocket  under  the  code 
name  Bettelstab  ("beggars  staff"). 

Before  Eighteenth  Array  and  Army 
Group  North  completed  their  first  esti- 
mates for  Bettelstab,  Hider's  atten- 
tion was  turning  toward  Leningrad,  In 
a  teletyped  message  to  the  OKH  Oper- 
ations Branch  on  18  July,  he  an- 


■"OKII.  a,'HSl,!ll.  Oji.  Abl.  {Ill)  Nr.  4294SmSi, 
Ziifiulmiiifi  ilis  D„n,-Gfmet$33iH,  Gr.Nsrd,  2,7.42,  H. 

t.r.  Nnril  75l2'.>/bL'  iilc. 

<■'!!-  l.r.  Saul,  hi  Kn.-Zil<ig,-I>uth.  I.~3L7.4Z,  11-22 
Jul      H,  til.  Noid  73128/11!  He. 


412 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


nounced  that  Operation  Bluecher,  the 
attack  across  the  Kerch  Strait,  woulrl  he 
canceled  as  soon  as  the  Don  was 
crossed  and  the  break  into  the  Gau- 
casus  region  from  the  north  was  as- 
sured. The  German  divisions  thereby 
released  uould  be  transferred  out  of 
Eleventh  Arniv  and  sent  north  to  take 
Leningrad.  He  made  tiie  decision  final 
in  Directive  45  of  23  July.  Army  Group 
North  woiikl  get  five  divisions  from 
Eleventh  .\nnv  in  addition  to  the  heav  \ 
Mlallery  already  on  the  way  and  would 
be  ready  by  early  September  to  take 
Leningrad.^'*  Two  days  before,  in  Di- 
rective 44,  he  had  ordered  Twentieth 
NIountain  Army  to  get  ready  for  a 
thrust  together  with  the  Finns  to  the 
Murmansk  Railroad,  on  the  assump- 
tion that  "Leningrad  will  be  taken  at 
die  latest  in  September  and  Finnish 
forces  will  be  released  (from  the  front 
on  the  Isthmus  of  Karelia)."^^  First 
given  the  code  name  Feuerzauber 
("fire  magic"),  the  operation  against 
Leningrad  was  changed  after  a  week  to 
NoRDUCHT  for  correspondence  above 
the  Eighteenth  Army  level  and  Georg 
("George")  within  the  army." 

Hider  next  instructed  Kuechler  to  go 
through  the  docket  of  "local  opera- 
tions, SCHLINGPFLANZE.  MqORBXAND, 

and  Bettti-stab,  in  "short  order*"  Seod 
have  them  out  of  the  way  by  the  bi^ilr 
ning  of  September.'^  The  army  group 


»mVK  WF^t.  Op.  .Vr  55I26IM2.  an  GmStdH.  Op. 
AM.  18.7.42.   H  Ti/2\b  file;  ()K\\ .  WFSi.  Oj,.  \, 
f5!2Sftl42.  niiMiri),'  Mr.  45,  fuer  die  Fdrlsetzung  der 
(fpiiitiitiii  "itniiiiiH-hweig,"  German  High 

Li-Vfl  Dirt;<  livfs,  CMH  files. 

'VJA'VV;  WFSl,  Op,  .Vr,  55127^142.  WtrMin)^  ,\r  II. 
21.7.42.  (It-iiii.iii  High  Level  Dii ti tivei.  C.VIH  liks. 

"'fiKIL  r„nSidH.  Op.  .\k.  .Vi  420^50/42.  anH.  Or. 
.\,>rd.  2..S.42.  1 1,  (.r.  Noi'ti  7.^l:?>.t/5.".  tile. 

''OKJ4.  (.u;,St,UI.  op.  .\bt.  Nr.  420'i50l42.  mti.  Gr. 
Nard.  24.7.42,  H.  Gr,  Nord  73129/55  file. 


knew  from  the  outset,  as  Hider  in  all 
likelihood  also  did,  that  anvdiint^  of  the 
sort  was  out  of  the  quesdon  in  die 
aUotted  tnse  b^Onise  titiops,  tanks,  ar- 
tillery, ammunition,  and  especiallv  air 
support  could  not  be  mustered  for 
more  than  one  op>eradon  at  a  tiiae.  As 
it  turned  out.  NoRDi  ICHT  in  part  af- 
forded and  in  part  compelled  the  solu- 
'fion.  Be  iTi  i.STAB  had  from  the  first  not 
raised  real  enthusiasm  in  the  army 
gt  oup,  and  since  it  could  ptobabiy  be 
done  more  easily  after  NoRin.KUT  than 
before,  it  was  postponed.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  army  group  regarded 

SCHUNGPFL.^NZE  and  MOORBRANB  aS 
more  vital  to  its  survival  in  the  ap- 
proaching winter  than  Nordlich  i .  But 
NoRDLiCHT  was  more  important  to 
Hitler  and,  presumably,  to  German 
grand  strategy.  When  the  early  esti- 
mates showed  that  Eighteenth  Army 
would  in  no  way  have  enough  strength 
to  do  MooRBRAND  and  Nordlicht, 
even  if  cjne  were  done  before  the  other, 
Kuechler  "with  a  heavy  heart"  can- 
celed MooRBRAND.   Which  left 

SCHUNGI'Fl^ANZE  .■■'^ 

ScHLiNGPFLANZE,  besides  being  the 
sole  survivor  of  the  so-called  local  oper- 
ations, was  also  the  onlv  one  f)f  the 
three  that  was  anywhere  near  ready  to 
execute.  Sixteenth  Army,  under  Gen- 
eral Busch,  had  positioned  the  troops 
for  it  in  mid-July  and  had  been  set  to 
start  on  the  19th  when  bad  flying 
weather  and  Soviet  attacks  on  the  H 
Corps  perimeter  forced  successive 
postponements.  Later,  a  lingering  spell 
of  heavy  rain  flooded  ihe  entire  area 
between  the  pocket  and  the  main  front. 


""W.  Gr.  AW,  111   Kii,fr.-,lii,i!:,  lmrh.  I. -11.7.42,  24 

Jul-S  Aug  42,  H.  Gr.  Nord  75128/12  file. 


SUMMER  ON  THE  STATIC  FRONTS 


413 


At  the  turn  of  the  month,  Kuechler 
and  fiuscti  were  waiting  for  three  or 
four  dry  days  but  were  almost  at  the 
point  of  starting  Sc  hi  im  i  ii  w/t  re- 
gardless of  the  weather  because  II 
Corps  was  as  badly  off  as  it  had  been  in 
the  height  f)f  the  \s  inter.  The  corridor 
was  underwater,  and  the  airlift  wa£  only 
getting  in  30  to  40  percent  of  the  daily 
supply  requirements.  On  4  August, 
however,  Schlingpfl^nze  had  another 
setback  when  all  of  the  ground  support 
antl  fighter  aircraft  assigned  for  it  were 
flown  out  to  help  Ninth  Army  at 

At  Fuehrer  Ht'diliiuartcrs 

Four  days  later.  Hitler  summoned 
Kuechler  to  tbe  Wtrmlf  to  review 
SonjS^i^Fi.AN/E  and  Nordlicht.  He 
^pOtlfd  the  conference  with  a  surprise 
t^fvSt,  lAnhething  he  liked  to  do  to  put 
the  generals  off  balance  and  himself  in 
control  of  the  discussion.  He  told 
Kuechi^  ttiat  Army  Group  North 
would  be  getting  the  first  of  the  new 
Tiger  tauiks  and  jpropo$ed  ppttiiig 
Sditie  of  them  into  the  Kirishi 
hi  idgelu'iitl.  A  few  of  ilie  Tigers,  he 
implied,  ougin  to  be  able  to  iaold  the 
bridgehead  practically  by  thetnisd^S. 
Wlien  Kuechler  pointed  out  that  the 
army  group  had  no  means  of  getting 
the  ^3^t6itners  aonoss  the  wlkhov 
River,  he  suggested  using  them  in 
SCHUNGPFL.ANZE,  which  Kucchlcr  non- 
committally  agreed  *Hw>u!d  be  easier  to 
do  than  at  Kirishi."  Later,  in  private. 
Field  Marshal  Keitel,  chief,  OKW,  told 
Kuechler  that  the  Tigers  were  not  yet 
off  the  assembly  line,  and  he  had  better 
not  count  on  having  them  in  time  for 
SCH1U1NGPFLAJ4S1E. 

30Jul-4  Aug  42. 


Turning  to  the  agenda.  Hitler  told 
Kuechler  the  aircraft  transferred  out 
of  his  area  would  stay  with  Ninth  Army 
until  the  crisis  at  R/hcv  had  Ixcu  over- 
come and  would  then  be  used  to  sup- 
port Second  Panzer  Army's  Operation 
WlRBEtwiND,  which  would  mean 
SCHLiNGPFLANZE  could  HOt  Start  bcforc 
20  August.  He  asked  Kuechler  how 
much  time  he  would  need  for 
ScHUNGPFi-ANZE.  Kucchlcr  Said  four- 
teen days.  Hitler  then  asked  when 

NORDLICHI.  which    would  follow 

SCHUNGPfij\.NZE,  would  be  completed, 
and  Kuechler  said  at  the  end  of  Oc- 
tobci.  Hiilei-  said  that  was  too  late  be- 
cause NoRDUCHT  was  itself  not  a 
terminal  operation  hitt  a  pFel&riinat7  to 
the  operation  against  the  Murmansk 
Railroad  tliat  would  have  to  be  done 
before  winter.  He  wondered,  he  add^^ 
\vh\  .\i  nu  Group  Noi  th  was  "insisting*' 
on  aiming  Schungpfi^nze  north  of  the 
Demyansk  corridor  when  the  enemy 
was  less  strong  on  the  south  side.  He 
remembered  that  there  had  been  a 
supply  road  on  the  south  during  the 
wintei.  Such  a  road  indeed  liarl  existed, 
Kuediler  replied,  but  it  had  been  made 
of  logs,  sawdnstv^an^  ice  msit  ha4  lon^ 
since  niclled  and  floated  ai^^J^  Ih? 
only  actiial  road  on  either  the 
corrf<ior  was  t^e  Staraya  Russa- 
DernvanSlLl?i3acJ  on  the  north,  and,  he 
pointed  ottt,  taking  it  was  essential  also 
to  the  defense  of  Staraya  !Rmsa. 

After  remarking  thai  he  would  "feel 
better'  about  Schungpflanze  if  tlie 
Tigers  could  be  worked  itot»  it,  Hider 
turned  to  NoRDi.icnt.  The  ohjeci,  he 
said,  was  to  destroy  Lcningiacl  totally. 
General  Jod!,  chief,  OKW  Operations 
Staff,  who  was  present,  added  that  this 
was  necessary  because  the  Firms  re- 

^ir^  th#  dty     a  lm0$  burden  o« 


414 


MOSCOW  TO  STAi4NGRAD 


ihtir  lmure.''Tht^  jol).  Hitler  observed, 
tnukl  be  compaied  l«i  llic  one  rcceiillv 
iinished  at  Sevastopol,  hut  it  vvoukl  tioL 
be  nearly  as  diffit  till.  For  one  thing,  the 
area  ivas  smaller.  Foi  another,  at 
.Se\astopol  the  terrain  was  rugged  and 
the  fortifications  exceedingly  strong 
while  Leningrad  lav  on  flat  lanfl  anrl 
was  not  nearly  as  well  lorrilied.  "  1  he 
whole  thing  at  Leningrad,"  he  asserted, 
"must  actualh  In-  done  with  simple 
mass  of  mateiiel."  jotll  ai  one  point 
asked  wheihei  it  might  not  be  well  to 
put  Field  Marshal  \Ianstein  (Eleventh 
Armv),  the  recent  vii  lor  of  Sevastopol, 
in  connnand  *>t  the  opeiation,  Init 
HiUer,  Kuechler  noted,  "did  not  take 
that  up." 

When  Kuechler  countered  that  "in 
the  last  analysis"  the  operarion  would 
have  to  have  adetjnate  infantry,  the 
conference  reached  what  he  and  HiUer 
had  both  known  ail  along  was  its  real 
nub.*"  The  army  group  had  asked  for 
4  more  divisions.  3  infantry  and  I  ].)an- 
zer,  before  Nordlicht  started  and 
either  a  constant  flow  of  replacements 
or  2  to  3  more  divisions  to  be  supplied 
later.^'  Hid€rjna^l3tiii§d  that  the  army 
group's  et^&mSL^ 'i^e  wh  high.  Any- 
way, he  continued,  he  could  not  gi\e 
what  he  did  not  have,  and  he  had  no 
more  divisions.  That  was  why  h€  liad 
provided  the  artillcr\ — "in  a  mass 
greater  than  any  since  the  Batik  of 
Verdun  itt  the  World  War"— a  thou- 
sand pieces  to  the  enemv's  less  than  five 
himdred.  The  diing  to  do  would  be  to 
di op  hutidreds  of  mot^atul^  df  incen- 
diary bombs.  "If  the  city  really  burns, 


Or.  AW.  la  Kni-gstagelnieh,  t,-31^.42.  8  Aug 
42.  11.  Or.  Nord  7.^128/ 1:!  file. 

r.T  \md.  In  Ni.  >5/^2.  iin  OKH.  GniSldM,  Op. 
Aht..  26.7 A2.  H.  Gr.  N(»rd  75129/53  file. 


no  defender  will  be  abte  to  %0ld  4mt 

ihei-e."*- 

After  returning  to  his  own  licad- 
quarters,  Kuechlei  leexaminef!  NoRD- 
IK  nr.  From  Eighteenth  Arm\'s  com- 
mander, Cieneral  Lindemann,  he 
learned  that  to  get  even  two  divisions 
out  of  its  existing  resources  the  army 
would  have  to  give  up  (he  Kii  islii  and 
Gruzino  bridgeheads,  whith  would 
weaken  its  hold  on  the  Volkhov  line 
and  the  Pogostyc  salient.  Lindemann 
also  told  him  that  the  number  of  artil- 
lery pieces  was  not  going  to  he  1.000 
but  exactly  598,""^  On  the  14th,  a])par- 
endy  for  the  hrst  dme,  Kuechlei  went 
out  to  look  at  Leningrad,  Fiom  the 
Alexander  T()wer,  on  the  nortliern  out- 
skirts of  Pushkin,  the  highest  point  on 
ihe  front,  he  saw  clumps  and  masses  of 
concrete  anti  stone  factories  and  apart- 
ment buildings.  "These,"  he  concluded, 
"one  can  presume  will  only  be  in  small 
measure  vulnerable  to  fire."^'* 

A  Mission  for  MansUin 

Meanwhile,  Schlingpflanze  was 
waiting  on  its  air  support.  Finally,  on 
the  Kith,  Colonel  Urusinger.  the  OKH 
operations  chief  .  io!d  kneehler's  chief 
of  staff  not  to  expcc  t  the  planes  in  less 
than  another  eighi  lo  ten  days  or  more 
and  to  remember  that  Hider  was  "hold- 


*W.  GtNerd,  In  Kneg'.i/ig,!,,!,!,,  l.->l..s.  l2.  H  .Ann 
42.  H.  Gr.  Nord  75128/ i:4  lik 

*'AOK  IS.  la  Mr.  4HI-t2.  mi  H.  (,,.  Sm,l.  <).H  J2.  \\  ( .t 
Nun)  7i)12'.)/.'>,'i  (ilf,  Tlic  iimiu-s  nn  .iiiillciv  v.irv. 
Kut-ilik'r  liilcv  iisi'il  llif  luimbfi'  8(11).  .■\|)j),'iic-nlly  llit 
numtx'rs  depended  on  how  mudi  of  the  frniTI  was 
being  talked  afxjiit:  Leningrad  only:  Leningrad  and 
llle  bfrtllenerk;  or  Lenin^jnid,  the  txildeiief.  k.  .ind  lln- 
Oninienbaiini  poikcl.  .Snnie  uf  die  tieavicst  |)ien>i, 
OOR.'V  loi  in-slatu  e.  were  i misidered  not  to  have  any 
Wurihwliile  targets  in  l  enitigrad. 

**H.  G>  \„i,l.  1,1  K<  i.  i::l:,f;,-lmrh,  L-31\S.42,  14  Au.g 
42,  H.  (ii.  Ni.rd  7al2«/i:Milc. 


SUMMER  ON  THE  STATIC  FRONTS 


416 


ing  onto  Nordlk.ht  hard  as  iron  "  "We 
must  now,"  Heusinger  added,  "make 
some  very  sober  calculations."  In  the 
next  day  or  two,  he  went  on,  Haider 
was  going  to  propose  evacuating  the 
Demyansk  pocket.  If  that  failed,  as  it 
most  likely  would.  Army  Group  North 
was  going  to  have  to  do  whatever  it 
coulci  "in  the  few  good  weeks  left"  to 
prevent  an  "untenable  situation"  when 
the  fall  rains  and  winter  came.  A  day 
later,  Kuechler  canceled  Schling- 
PFLANZE  and  substiiuKd  Winkilrhd, 
an  operation  to  widen  die  Demyansk 
corridor  on  the  south.  On  the  21st, 
Haider  called,  on  Hitler's  behalf,  to  ask 
Kuechler  whether  he  could  come  to 
the  fuehrer  Headquarters  two  days  later 
i<»  report  on  WinkELRIED  and  Nokd- 
UCH  r.  He  had  also  just  heard,  to  his 
surprise  he  said,  that  Manstein  would 
be       in  comiiiaiul  ol  \oRni  icn  i . 

At  the  WerwolJ,  Hitler  greeted 
Kuechler  with  the  remark  that  "a 
stone"  had  fallen  itom  his  heart  win  n 
he  heard  the  army  group  was  turning 
away  from  SchlincpfijVNze.  He  said  he 
iiad  "aluavs  regarded  it  as  an  exlraor- 
dinarlly  difhcult  operation,"  and  he 
aiictfKi  tfiM  li«e<3tler  should  be  careftd 
not  to  try  to  go  too  far  south  uiih 
WUJKELRIED.  Time  was  important.  The 
Ftnntsii  Army^  chief  of  staff  and  opei^ 
ation.s  ( Iiit  f  were  coming  the  next  day, 
and  he  wanted  to  |pve  them  a  hrm 
eommitnient  on  Normjcht,  TwWdi  he 
again  characterized  as  an  easy  repeat  of 
Sevastopol.  When  Kuechler  brought 
out  aenkl  photographs  showing  count- 
less solid  blocks  of  ijuilrlings  still  stand- 
ing in  Leningrad,  HiUer  admitted  to 
being  "impressed*  But  he  had  the  an- 
swer: he  was  sending  General  Rich- 
thofen,  commander  of  Fourth  Air 
Fonee      waslcn^^  d&  the  ttmb&f^ 


©Oilimander,  to  conduct  the  air  sup- 
port. That  was  why,  lie  added,  almost 
as  an  afterthought,  he  was  giving  Man- 
Stein  command  oi  Nordlichi  .  Man- 
stein and  Richilujfen  had  developed  an 
"ideal  collaboi  ation"  at  Sevastopol.** 

A  day  later.  Hitler  gave  Manstein  his 
mission,  which  he  was  to  execute  in  any 
way  he  saw  fit  provided  he  accom- 
plished two  things:  made  contact  ^vith 
the  Finns  and  "leveled  Leningi  ad  to 
the  ground."  As  Nordlicht  com- 
mander, Manstein  would  be  indepen- 
dent of  Army  Group  North  and  would 
come  direcdy  under  the  OKH.  Hider 
also  told  Manstein  he  could  expect 
some  help  froypa  the  Finns,  and  the  next 
day  Hitler  secured  a  prdmlrse  $t0ta 
the  Finnish  Chief  of  Staff,  jalka- 
vaenkenraiJi  ("Lieutenant  General") 
Erik  Heinrichs,  to  have  the  Finnish 
Isthmus  Front  assist  Nordlicht  with 
artillery  and  a  feigned  attack."*^  Man- 
stein would  have  liked  a  great  deal 
more  liclp  {mm  the  Finns,  but  Hitler 
tiad  in  fact  gotten  all  that  he  could  and 
possibly  more  than  he  had  expected. 
Hitler  knen  li  f>ni  long  experience  that 
Mamierheini  was  exceedingly  skittish 
about  id^lving  his  foftm  m  a  direct 
attack  (m  Leningrad.^' 

Seemingly,  the  Russians  were  going 
m  s^mt  Army  Group  Nortib  enough 


*'tbid.,  l8-2SAug42. 

*»Greiner,  Obtrslf  Wehrmathlfurkniiig,  |>.  406: 
GiiBB«ri0MW|^P*J?i  2S  Aog42,  €J(565q  CMH  file. 

^T^ilafiffl^mebb  ae^tstmeed  >&tpit  tie  accepted  eaio- 
Biil}d  t<#  t^ffQnisf)  Army  in  I9il^  the  c<ta<iMoii 
diat  he  tmti  bt  required  to  lead  iMt  ^^msiw  against 
I^ningrad  t>ccausc  he  4Ud  tuff ' wMKti7'ti^4  <x<aence 
It)  a  long -sending  cMsi  ^«timtMg?«DdpU 


416 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


tanie  to  itsdf  to  Nordlicmt  off  the 
map  tabtesand  onto  the  ground.  North- 
west ancl  l^lkhov  Fronts  were  busy 
^irough  the  satntner  gnawing  at  the 

Demyansk  pocket  and  the  Volkhov 
line,  and  Sixteenlli  and  Eighteenth  Ar- 
mies were  taking  nioi  e  casualties  and 
ht'a\  ici  drains  on  their  equipment  and 
am  munition  stocks  than  ihey  could 
readily  afford,  but  nothing  big  ap- 
peared to  be  in  die  inaking. 

The  appearance  was  deceptive.  \bl- 
khov  F^t^  ttnder  General  K^retskdV, 
had  been  working  in  elaborate  secrecy 
since  early  July  on  an  offensive  to 
Ijieak  the  Leningrad  blockade  at  the 
bottleneck  and,  as  the  History  of  the  Sec- 
ond World  War  puts  It,  "deal  the  enemy  a 
pieemptive  blow  in  llie  Leningrad  sec- 
tor."^** To  do  tlie  job.  Vferetskov  liati 
Kighdi  Army,  the  IV  Giumis  Rifle  Corps, 
and  Second  Shock  Amj^  which  was  in  die 
process  of  being  reconstituted. 
Leningrad  Front  Iiad  set  up  several  divi- 
sions with  artiUery  that  would  join  in 
from  the  west  as  iheNevn  Group.  By  the 
last  week  in  August,  Mereisko\  had  a 
3:1  superiority  in  troops,  4:1  in  tanks, 
and  2:1  in  artillerv  and  mortars;  hut.  by 
his  account,  he  did  not  know  about  the 
German  buildup  for  Nordlicht.^'' 

Meretskov  proposed  to  smash  the 
whole  7-mile  bottleneck  front  north  of 
the  Mga-Voikhov  railroad,  take  tbe 
Sinyavino  Heights,  and  finish  at  the 
Nev'a  bend  west  of  Mga  ncai  the  Village 
of  Otradnoye.  {M^p  38.)  The  dis- 
tances were  not  great:  4  miles  to  the 
Sinyavino  Heights;  anotlier  6  from 
there  west  to  tlie  Neva;  and,  at  the  base 
<^  the  bottleneck,  15  miles  from  the 


front  to  O^dndye;  Tlie  terrain  was 
another  matter  altogeihei.  The  entire 
area  was  a  patchwork  of  woods, 
swafflps,      fmt  bogs.  Large  stretches 

were  undenvater,  and  the  water  table 
was  so  close  to  tlie  surface  neat  I y  eveiy- 
wherethat  fortifications  had  to  be  built 
above  ground,  which  complicated  the 
defense  but  also  made  it  impossible  for 
an  attacker  to  dig  foxholes  or  trenches. 
The  only  really  di  y  ground  was  on  the 
Sinyavino  Heights,  which  rose  to  a 
maximum  of  150  ieet  and  atfordefl 
unimpeded  obsei  vation  for  miles  in  all 
directions.  Meretskov  expected  his  as- 
sets to  be  superiority  in  numbei  s  and 
material,  surprise,  and  speed;  he 
hoped  to  have  joined  hands  with 
Leningrad  Front  on  I  he  Neva  in  two  or 
three  days,  before  the  Germans  could 
bring  in  reinforcements.  For  a  tiigli- 
speed  operation,  however,  the  .Soviet 
plans  were  cumbersome.  Volkhov  Fwni's 
force  was  split  into  three  echelons, 
which  would  have  to  be  committed 
separatelv;  and  the  Stavka,  remember- 
ing  bad  exj^eriences  it  had  with  coordi- 
nated operations  bv  the  two  fmnts  in 
the  winter,  ordered  \  hv\n>a  Gmup  not 
to  make  its  bid  until  alter  VoUdiov  Front 
had  made  a  clear  breakthrough.®*" 

Full-fledged  surprise  was  going  to  be 
all  but  impossible  to  attain,  and  this, 
although  Meretskov  does  not  mention 
it,  \vas  \hlkhov  Fwnt's  niunber  one  pi^ob- 
lem.  Ihe  Germans  had  worked  on 
their  defenses  iti  the  botdeneck  for  al- 
most a  year,  and  they  knew  exactly 
what  the  consequences  of  a  lapse  could 
be.  During  the  summer,  Hitler  had 
constantly  kept  an  eye  on  the  bot- 
deneck as  a  likely  spot  for  Stalin  to  try 


''IVMV.        V.  p.  ^;18. 

'^Mereiskov,  Serving  tht  Peopk,  pp.  224-26. 


^^HiuL.  pp.  224-31. 


SUMMER  ON  THE  STATIC  FRONTS 


417 


MAP  38 


for  a  prestige  victory  to  ofTset  the  de- 
§mu  ill  tiie  mo&t.  lie  t<jM  KuecM^^  in 

the  conference  on  23  August  tliat  the 
Russians  would  launch  "rabid  attacks 
. .  .  ahove  all  agatest  the  bot- 
tleneck" as  soon  as  they  caught  wind  of 
NoRDLiCHT.  He  advised  Kiiechler  on 
that  deeasiQti  to  put  the  Tigers  in  bi*- 
hind  the  front.  "Then,"  he  said, 
"nothing  can  happen;  they  are  unas- 


sailable and  can  smash  any  enemy  tank 
tttcack.*** 

Nevertheless,  Meretskov  did  achieve 
some  surprise.  From  the  second  week 
©f  August  on,  tJie  OKH  anii  the  a*tny 
group  became  more  nnd  more  con- 
vinced that  an  attack  would  take  place 


■-'H.  Gr.  Nmd.  In  Krii'gHiigebuck,  L-3JS.42,  23  Aug 
42,  H.  Gr.  Nord  75128/13  file. 


418 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


at  the  bottleneck,  and  eveix  tbouglt 

they  exchanged  information  almost 
daily,  they  could  not  reach  conclusions 
as  to  when  it  would  come  or  how 
strong  it  would  be.  The  pattern  of  the 
buildup  was  more  vague — deliberately 
so  according  to  Meretskov — than  they 
were  accustomed  to  seeing,  and  the 
Kirishi  bridgehead  and  Pogostye  actu- 
ally appeared  to  be  niort-  likely  plates 
for  something  big  to  happen.  On  the 
23d,  XXVI  Corps,  which  was  holding 
the  bottleneck  with  227th  Infanti  y  Di- 
vision north  of  the  Mga-Vollthov  rail- 
Toad  and  223d  Infentry  Division  sotitli 
of  the  railroad  and  which  had  12th 
Panzer  Division  in  reserve  at  Mga, 
asked  for  another  infantry  division  to 
put  into  the  bottleneck.  Four  days  later, 
early  ap  the  morning  of  the  27th,  the 
OKH  alerted  Kuechler  to  increasing 
siij;ns  ol'an  atl.u  k  at  iIk-  Ixildencck,  and 
told  him  to  move  in  liie  170tli  Inlantry 
Division,  one  of  the  Crimean  divisions 
standing  hy  lor  N* )KDI.u,ii r.  Kuechler 
{ptmfinned  that  he  would  do  so  and 
add^  tfiat  he  would  also  put  in  the 
11^rS»  se\c-!al  of  which  were  report- 
edly aboard  a  train  near  Pskov.** 

While  Kuechler  and  the  OKff  were 
thus  riiL;Lit>t-(:i .  Mcretsk«»\  s  first  eche- 
lon. Eighth  Army,  was  opening  the  ctP- 
Fensive.  Shortly  before  I2W  ori  the 
27tli,  Lindemann  reported  attacks 
along  the  whole  front  north  of  the  rail- 
road. At  one  point  twetity  tanks  had 
broken  in,  but  no  main  effort  could  be 
detected.  The  sicuadon  was  still  much 
the  same  at  nightfklll,  land  X?tVI  Corps 
had  not  detected  any  units  other  than 
ones  it  had  previously  ideuufied  and 
hssd  been  midf  to  Jismdle^  Ku@Mer^ 
main  concern  was  for  the  NoRDttCHT 


23-27  Aug  42. 


timetable  He  t(jld  SchmuMdt,/''When 
the  Russian  attacks  he  keeps  at  it  for 
weeks  on  end;  consec|uently,  substan- 
tial quantities  of  infantry  and  ammuni- 
tion may  become  tied  up  in  a  direction 
that  was  not  provided  for  in  the  army 
group's  program."''' 

The  next  morning  at  0900,  Kuechler 
and  Manstein  had  their  first  meeting, 
and  Kuechler  was  pleased  to  hear  that 
Manstein  believed  taking  Leningiad 
would  be  every  bit  as  hard  a  proposi- 
tion  as  Army  Group  North  had 
claimed  it  was.  In  his  experience,  Man- 
stein said,  he  had  not  found  the  Rus- 
sians susceptible  to  "terrorization"  by 
bombing  and  shelling,  and  he  thought 
it  would  be  simpler  just  to  seal  the  city 
off  "and  let  the  defenders  and  inhabit- 
ants starve."^''  While  the  field  marshals 
were  talking,  XXV!  Corps  reported  a 
lireak-in  two-thirds  of  a  mile  drep  on 
the  bottleneck  between  the  Sin  ya vino 
Heights  and  the  railroad.  A  battalion 
commander  had  lost  his  nci\r  and  or- 
dered a  retreat.  Wlien  die  rest  ot  die 
day  brought  evidence  of  several  pre- 
viously uniflentiFietl  Soviet  divisions  in 
and  around  the  break-in  ar^  Kuech- 
Ifcr  oideiied  the  Sifh  Monfitm^  W^^mm 
aiad  2  8 1  h  I  a  e  ge  r  Division  mit  the 
KiOROUCHT  Staging  area  to  B^ga,  At  the 
day'^  ettd,  ifi^ef,  w<ho  was  "^ceedingly 
agitated  oVCT  itoe  simalinn  al  XXVI 
Corps,"  diverted  the  3d  Mountain  Divi- 
sion, witich  wa&  at  $^  in  the  Baltic  on 
the  way  frOffla  Norway  to  Finland,  to 
Reval  to  attaclted  to  Eighteenth 
Army.^' 

Ei^tft  Amy  deepened  the  break-in  to 


*nm..  27  Aug  42. 
**TMd..  28  Aug  42. 

Gn^tf  Dkay  Nm,  28  Aug  42.  C>06Sq 

CMH  Hie. 


SUMMER  ON  THE  STATIC  FRONTS 


419 


A  Tiger  Tank  Waits  for  a  Tow 


thx^  miles  on  the  third  day,  almost  to 
(heStnyavino  Heights,  and  on  the  next, 
Kuethler  conunitied  the  Tigers.  He 
had  four,  but  two  broke  down  on  the 
mads.  Ruediler  also  went  out  fb  see  for 
himself  what  was  going  on  at  XXVI 
Coips  and  reported  to  the  OKH  that 
he*Tiad  no  particulatly  bad  impression 
of  the  situation"  but  the  hgliting  would 
"drag  on  for  some  time."  Ou  the  31st, 
LindfeffiaAii  pronounced  the  crisis 
passed  aad  the  bfeak'-in  contained.''*' 
At  the  smm  time  oil  the  other  side  of 
the  front  Meretskov  was  ordetklg  I1& 
Iiis  second  echelon,  IV  Guards  Ripe 
Corps. 


HH.  Gr.  l^M,  la  Kriegstagebueh.  I.-31M.42.  29-91 
Amsf  42,  H.  Gn  Nord  75128/13  file. 
"Metaskiav,  Serving  the  People,  p.  234. 


Manstein  at  tiie  BoUleneck 

For  the  next  several  days,  XXVI 
Corps  felt  the  presence  of  IV  Guards 
Rifle  Corps,  not  in  a  heavy  onslaught, 
hut  as  a  steady,  stubborn  infiltration 
tlirough  the  woods  and  swamps  south 
and  wesi  ol  \\w  Sinyavino  Heights.  On 
3  September,  the  Meva  Gtou/j  joined  the 
batde  briefly  with  attempts  to  cross  the 
Neva  in  several  places.  These  were 
beaten  off  so  thoroughly  by  artillery 
and  air  strikes  that  theATei/o  Gmup  lost 
most  of  its  crossing  equipnum  iW 
the  end  of  the  day  on  the  4  th,  IV 
Guards  Rifle  Corps,  in  the  woods  south- 
west of  the  Sinyavino  Heights,  had 
deepened  the  penetration  to  almost 


p.  235. 


420 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


five  miles  and  was  tu  o-ihirds  of  the  w;i\ 
across  the  bottleneck.  But  XXVI 
Corps,  troubled  mostly  by  the  terrain 
and  thick  forest  grouTh  that  limited 
visibility  to  fifty  feet  or  less,  believed  it 
had  the  push  contained.  Hitler, 
however,  was  "exasperated."  Army 
Group  North,  he  sai<i^  had  foiu:  NoRl^ 
LicHT  divisions  tied  up  in  the  bot- 
tleneck and  still  was  not  able  to  bring 
the  enemy  to  a  stop,  and  that  showed  a 
lack  df  purposieral  leadcrsWp.*^  By 
telephone,  he  told  Manstein  to  take 
Command  in  the  bottleneck,  where  he 
«ild  there  had  been  "atrocious  develop- 
ments," and  to  "restore  the  situation  of- 
fensively." Headquarters,  Eleventh 
Army,  was  to  come  direcdy  under  the 
OKH,  and  Manstein  was  to  "report  im- 
mediately failures  on  the  part  of  any 
commanders.*®'* 

The  XXVI  Corps  had  been  right. 
The  Soviet  advance  was  stopped  on  4 
September,  and  Meretskov  could  not 
get  it  going  again  even  though  he  piil 
in  his  third  echelon,  Scanui  Shock  Anny, 
on  the  5tli.  On  the  9th  and  10th.  XXVI 
Corps  handily  beat  off  attacks  by  the 
Neva  Group  from  the  west  atid  Second 
Shock  Army  on  the  east."'  Nt-vertheless, 
the  Soviet  offensive  was  l:a\ing  one 
very  consitleralile  success;  it  was  badly 
scrambling  the  timetables  for  NoRD- 

IJCHT  and  WiNKELRlI'D,  NORDI  I(  HT 
could  not  begin  until  the  bottleneck 

was  secure,  and  WjantiLiixED  had  to 
wait  until  the  air  support  could  be 


^'ihi  divisions  were  5ih  Mountain  Division,  SStb 
jKger  Division,  170tli  Infantry  I^vinoa.  mi 
Infkntiy  Wviaaa.  The  24th  tnfaatijr  l^inma  l«%ac 
iiito  the  botdeneck  oit  4  Septen^ier. 

«&*»Mr  J)iajy  4  Sep  4?,  O-OeStj  CMH  fiJc; 
AOK  n,  ta  m^^a^m^  m.  2.  A  Sep  42.  AOK  11 
S3I67/1  file. 

o'Meretskovt  SaiiM  m  A(#ir.    ^  AQK  Ui  fa 


shifted  fetMOttthe  bottleneck.  Hitler  had 
already  put  off  the  operation  against 
the  Murmansk  Railroad  untu  tkt^ 
winter.  The  latter  flecision  removed 
one  source  of  time  pressure  on  Nord- 
ucHT  and  l^KELRiED  but  not  another, 
namely,  the  approach  of  the  fall  rainy 
season."^ 

The  last  Soviet  efforts  to  get  the  of- 
fensive going  again  gave  Manstein 
wrhat  he  thought  might  be  an  oppor- 
tutlity  fbr  a  surprise,  and  on  the  10th, 
he  put  the  24th  and  170th  Infanirv  Di- 
visions and  the  I2th  Panzer  Division 
into  a  thrust  northward  i  rom  the 
southeastern  corner  of  the  break- 
through to  dose  the  gap  behind  the 
Russians.  The  infantry  started  at  0800 
and  were  stopped  almost  at  once  by 
shattering  artillery  and  mortar  fne.  In 
the  afternoon,  another  try,  this  time 
also  using  the  12th  Panzer  Division, 
ended  as  quickly  as  tire  first  when  the 
infantry  vms  once  more  pinned  down 
by  the  enemy  artillery  and  mortarS, 
and  the  tanks  ran  into  minefields.  The 
next  day,  while  the  infantry  was  fitt- 
ing oil  counterattatks.  Manstein  can- 
celed the  attack  and  ordeied  reeon- 
nsdssance  to  locale  the  enemy  siiong- 
poinis  so  that  they  could  be  picked  off 
one  by  one.  To  Keitel,  he  said  he  was 
going  to  have  to  knock  dut  ened^ 
artillcrs  first  and  then  go  over  to  set- 
piece  attacks  from  the  norUi  and  tlie 
south."'' 

Manstein  was  ready  to  make  another 
attempt  on  the  18th  but  then  liad  to 
wait  three  more  days  because  of  rain 
and  fog.  The  rain  did  not  make  much 


m.  Gr.  Nord,  la  M^i^iiime^  l-Mki^. 
4g,  H.  Gr.  Nord  751l!8l1<l  fib^ 

U,  lu  mi^^iuf^  Nr.  2,  19-U  Sep  43. 


SUMMER  ON  THE  SX^IC  FRONTS 


421 


dliffereiice  to  the  infantry,  because  the 
ground  was  permanently  sodden  any- 
way, but  the  airplanes,  which  would  be 
flying  in  close  support,  needed  good 
visibility.  the  meantime,  ardjlery  aad 
SteAttT  Md  wwked  over  me  Soviet  ar- 
tillery emplacements.  Manstein  had 
four  divisions  at  the  ready:  on  the 
north,  under  XXVI  Corps,  the  121st 
Infantry  Division  and  on  the  south, 
under  XXX  Corps,  the  24th,  132d,  and 
170131  Infantry  Divisions.  The  objective 
for  both  thrusts  was  [he  village  of 
Gaitolovo,  which  lay  about  midway  in 
die  TftioMlii  dt  tiie  bulge  astride  file 
main — in  fact  the  only — Soviet  s^pl^ 
toad.  The  start  this  time  was  good.  *nie 
artillery  and  the  Stukas  had  done  their 
work  well.  By  nightfall  on  the  second 
day,  22  September,  one  regiment  of  the 
132d  Infantry  Division  was  just  two^ 
thirds  of  a  mile  short  of  reaching 
Gaitolovo  from  the  south.  Having  am- 
ple reason  now  to  remember  what  had 
happened  to  Second  Shock  Am^  in  the 
spring,  the  Russians  fought  furiously 
to  hold  €Mtolovo,  but  121st  Infantry 
Division  was  at  the  northern  edge  of 
the  village  on  the  24th,  and  the  two 
groups  join^  iiii-tii^  day.  The  bulge 
hail  beceuise  a  piscket.'* 

Winkelmd 

While  Mahstem  w^  engaged  in  l3le 

bottleneck,  Kuechler  r  aised  the  tines- 
tion  witii  Haider  of  what  to  do  about 
tJie  Demyansk  poc^t.  The  season 
getUng  late  and  soon  would  be  too  late 
even  for  Wimkeuoed.  \Mth  or  without 
Wi*JiEEfcJtiia5>  feiedller  rt^ihtained  that 
the  pocket  would  be  horrendously  dif- 
ficult to  hold  through  another  winter. 


^tMd..  11-25  Sep  42. 


since  the  Ostashki  )\  operati<ni  (to  close 
the  gap  to  Army  Group  Center)  could 
certainly  not  be  done  in  1942,  and  he 
knew  of  no  plan  to  do  it  in  the  coming 
year,  he  "suggested"  it  might  be  better 
to  forg&t  about  Winkelried  and  evacu- 
ate the  pocket.  Haider  replied  that  the 
pocket  had  to  be  held  because  it  was 
"the  sole  solution"  to  the  problem  of 
the  Tiiropets  bulge  and  because,  "Tlie 
Fuehrer  completely  rejects  the  idea  of 
evacuating  II  Corps.***  Thereupon, 
Kuechler  and  Busdl  becanie  desperate 
to  get  WiNKEUUED  going  before  the 
lij^fher,  which  was  begiiming  to  turn, 
Il^ed  it  out  altogether.  Expecting  Man- 
stein^ success  at  the  bottleneck  to  re- 
lease the  air  support,  Kuechler,  on  the 
24th,  set  Winkelried  for  either  the 
26th  or  27th,  depending  on  the 
■Weadiei'  and  ihe  speed  with  which  the 
planes  could  be  redeployed.  Wlien  the 
OKH  advised  him,  on  the  26tlr,  that 
■due  Luftwaffe  high  command  had  or- 
(ilspilhaif  the  planes  to  stay  with  Elev- 
enl&  Army  until  the  envelopment  at 
Gaitolovo  was  "one  hundred  percent 
secure,"  Kuechler  decided  to  go  ahead 
with  Winkelried  the  next  day 
anyway.^"  (Map  39.) 

After  a  whole  summer's  prepara- 
tions, first  for  ScHLiNGPFLAXZE  and 
•^en  fcMT' Wri^iaoSD,  Sixteerrth  A«My 
hardly  expected  to  achieve  a  sin  prise, 
but  it  did.  The  5th  Jaeger  Division  and 
126th  Infantry  Division,  striking  out  of 
the  east  face  of  the  pocket,  encircled 
the  1st  Guards  Rif  le  Division  east  of  the 
%0m.  Wif€t  in  fi^  days,  thereby  com- 
pleting WiNKEi_R]Fn-OsT  ("east").  Be- 
cause the  divisions  did  not  have  means 


"W,  Gr.  Word.  In  Kntgstagebuch,  1.-30.9.42,  14  amJ 
2SS^42.  H.  Ci.  Nord  75128/Mfik. 
'^m,  24-26  Sep  42. 


MAP  39 


to  cross  the  Lovat,  5th  jaeger  Di\  ision 
then  had  to  be  drawn  north  and  sluiced 
through  the  corridor  to  the  west  side  of 
the  river  w  here  it  was  joined  by  the  SS 
Totenkopf  Division,  which  after  a 
winter  and  a  summer  in  the  pocket  was 
n-duced  to  350  effetiives,  and  die  Air 
I'orce  Field  Division  "Mcindle,"  a  half- 
dozen  battalions  of  surplus  Luftwa/fe 
personnel  being  used  as  infantry. 
These  began  Winkelried-West  on  7 
October  and  completed  it  in  three 
days.'''  The  corridor  then  was  ten  raiies 
wide  at  its  narrowest  point. 

••'M>K  /ft.  I,t  K<u  ffsl/ti;>'h,ieh.  Band  11,  27-30  Sep  42. 
.•\(>K  i»>  :hs:)N.s,  :;  hlV,  .u>k  it,,  la  Kriegslagtbueh,  Bmid 
111.  I  - 10  Oci  42,  AOk  Iti  3(i58«/3  file. 


Mop-up  at  Gmteiam 

Meanwhile,  Manstein  had  ftfiished  at 
the  bottleneck,  though  not  quite  as 
quickly  as  he  might  have  expected.  For 
three  days,  beginning  On  26  Sep- 
tember, the  \-iT(i  C.rmp  had  made  its 
strongest  eiforl  yel  to  cross  the  Neva 
aiid  had  taken  three  small  bridgeheads 
opposite  Diibrovka.  The  bridgeheads 
for  a  time  raised  a  possibility  ol  the 
German  east  front^  t»Ti^i|^g  open  just 
when  the  west  fnSOt  Itfas  closed,  but 
after  the  Neva  Group  failed  to  expand 
thetn  by  the  29th,  Manstein  began 
mopping  up  thf  (iaitolovo  poc  ket.  The 
battle  ended  on  2  October.  It  had  cost 
the  WMm  and  Leningrad  fronts  over 


SUMMER  ON  THE  STATIC  FRONTS 


423 


twelve  thousand  men  who  were  taken 
prisoner  and  an  estimated  three  times 
as  many  wounded  or  killed,  but  it  had 
also  not  come  cheaply  for  the  GermaiS 
who  took  over  twenty-six  thousand  ca- 
sualties. Several  of  the  Nordlicht  divi- 
sions were  "burned  out,"  battle  weary 
and  weakened  by  lo'ises  Manstein 
thought  he  could  begin  Nurducht  in 
three  weeks  tf  he  had  Go,  but  such  an 
order  was  not  W^'dy  tQ  ecwae.** 

Cfossmrrenis 

In  late  April  1942,  a  day  before  the 
Soviet  spring  offensive  against  Army  of 
Lapland  began,  General  Died,  the 
army's  commander,  bad  informed  his 
superior  headquarters,  the  OKW,  that 
since  the  reinforcements  allotted  to 
him  during  the  winter  most  likely 
would  not  all  be  delivered  for  another 
four  or  five  months,  he  considered 
offensive  operations  by  his  army  ruled 
out  for  the  coming  summer.  A  month 
later,  in  its  directive  on  Army  of 
Lapland  operations  in  the  simimei,  the 
OKW  accepted  his  estimate  and  set 
only  two  specific  tasks  for  his  army:  to 
reestablish  a  solid  line  east  ol  Kestenga 
and  then  to  transfer  as  many  troops  as 
mMd  bfc  spar^  from  there  to  the 
Mountain  CorpsHorway.  The  Army  of 
Lapland  ra|iin  effort,  henceforth, 
-WefaM  hein  the  Mountain  Corps  Nor- 
way sectoi,  where  the  primar\  mission 
wnstild  be  defense  against  possible 
tlfl^^d;  Siafes-Bndsh  invasiorj  at- 
tetii^;  Tlie  OKW  also  stated  that  it 
consMigred  the  Rybachiy  Peninsula 


AOK  a  33167/1  file. 


very  important  to  the  conduct  of  the 
war  in  the  far  north  (because,  in  Soviet 
hands,  it  impeded  access  to  Pechenga 
jind  was  a  lingering  threat  to  the  rear 
of  the  Litsa  River  line)  and  instructed 
Died  to  make  preparations  for  taking 
the  peninsula.  Since  the  OKW  could 
not  foresee  the  time  when  the  troop 
and  supply  situations  would  permit 
anything  of  that  sort,  however,  the  date 
was  left  open — possibly  to  be  in  the 
late  summer  of  1942  or  the  late  winter 
of  1942-1943.«3 

The  OKW's  concern  over  Allied 
landings,  which  was,  in  fact,  mosdy 
Hider's,  was  exaggerated  but  not  an 
absolute  delusion.  Early  in  the  year,  ts> 
satisfy  in  some  measure  the  Soviet  call 
for  a  seconfi  front,  the  British  had  put 
forward  a  plan  known  as  Project 
Sledgehammer  in  which  they  envi- 
sioned large-stale  raids  along  the  (oasi 
of  Europe  from  northern  Norway  to 
the  Bay  of  Biscay.  In  the  spring, 
Sledgehammer  had  evolved  into  a  pro- 
posed cross-Channel  operation,  and 
Prime  Minister  Churchill  had  pre^ 
sented  Operation  Jupiter  as  an  alter- 
native. In  Jl  pii  er,  Churchill  envi-^ 
sioned  landings  at  Pechenga  and  at 
Banak,  the  latter  in  northern  Norway, 
as  ooeans  of  operating  in  direct  con- 
juncdon:  witfi  theRtissrans  andiof'ejim- 
iiiating  German  air  and  i^pij^  bases 
that  endangered  Allied  convoys  on  the 
arctic  route,  Jupfter  aroused  litde  en- 
thusiasm among  Churchill's  own  mili- 
tary advisers  and  none  at  all  on  the  part 


"H>K\\'.  Stflh.  WFSl.  KriegsgeschickKdir  MiialuHg, 
KrivgilagflHi.h.  SA.-iO.hAl.  23  Apr  and  16  May  42. 
I.M.T.  1807  lilc;  OKW.  W'FSt.  0/7.  Nr.  5579HI42. 
We.isimg  fun  litf  wfitm  Kiimlijliu-lti  iiiig  'diS-  AOK  ho^f^ 
land.  16.5A2.  AOK  20  27253/6  lilc. 


424 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


of  thr  Anierit  ans,  l)ut  Churchill  kept  it 
alivf  in  the  Allied  high  touncils/" 

When  Hitler  made  liis  sm  prise  birth- 
day visit  to  Mannerheiin  on  4  June, 
whici).  incident  ilh.  (aused  the  Finns 
some  anxiety  and  jjroxoked  a  breach  in 
consular  relations  between  the  United 
States  and  Finland,  he  conferred  with 
Dietl,  who  told  him  that  Army  of 
Lapland  would  noi  have  enough 
strength  to  take  the  Rybachiy  Penin- 
sula or  to  hold  it  if,  by  a  stroke  of  luck, 
it  were  taken.  Nevertheless,  Hide!,  mi- 
willing  to  give  up  the  effort.  oTden  d 
Died  to  carry  on  the  preparations  ami 
assured  him  that  the  weakness  on  the 
ground  could  be  compensated  for  in 
die  air.  To  Genera!  StumplT,  the  Fifth 
Ait*  commander,  he  then  issued 

an  order  to  ready  the  ground  instalia- 
dons  in  northern  Norway  and  Finland 
for  "\  ery  strong  forces."'^' 

In  June,  it  appeared  that  Army  of 
Lapland's  next  mission  would  be  to 
octupy  the  Rybachiy  Peninsula,  and 
the  plans  were  then  given  the  codt 
name  Wiesengrund  ("meadow  land"). 
Since  Mannerheim  was  about  to  lake 
over  the  Ukhta  sector,  which  would 
release  7th  Mountain  Division,  die 
troop  problem  appeared  to  be  solved. 
In  the  first  week  of  July,  iiowever,  the 
OKW  informed  Dietl  that  7th  Moun- 
tain Division  could  not  be  ti^ieisn!%d 
to  the  Pechenga  area  because  it  was 
impossible  to  bring  up  enough  supplies 
to  maintain  another  full  strength  divi- 
sion there.  The  OKW  proposed  in- 
stead to  send  "in  the  long  run"  enough 
"statjc"  troops  (that  is,  without  hotses 


'»C3iurchill,  Hmge  oj  tale,  pp.  256.  32*,  &5(^  448. 
47?;  MatiolT  and  Snell,  Sliai^ir  PSam^ng^  .pfi 
189.  2S5.  244. 

»»0^^W,  WFSt.  Km^sclurhiluh,-  Ahteilung,.  Ibi^- 
Mt^Oueh  IA.-30.6.42,  5Jun  42,  l.M.T,  1807  fife. 


or  motor  vehicles)  to  relieve  6th  Moini- 
tain  Division  on  the  Litsa  and  to  free  it 
and  2d  Mountain  Division  tor 
WiKSENGRtiND.  Dietl  promptly  pro- 
tested that  the  L.itsa  line  was  no  place 
for  scantily  equipped,  third-rate 
troops,  and  WIESENGRUND  was  then 
shelved." 

After  the  Russians  fell  back  from 
Kestenga,  in  late  May,  the  front  in 
Finland  became  quiet.  In  ]une.  Army 
of  Lapland  set  up  five  recently  received 
[ortress  battalions  on  the  coast,  and 
during  July  and  August  it  pushed  work 
on  coast  artillery,  emplacing  twenty- 
one  batteries  in  tlie  zone  between  Tana 
Fiord  and  Pechenga  Bay.  In  the  late 
summer,  Head^juarters,  2I0th  Infantry 
Division,  was  brought  in  to  command 
the  fortress  battalions  and  the  coast 
aruUery.  In  the  meauume,  Aimy  of 
Lapland  had  been  redesignated  Uven- 
tieth  Mountain  Army.  In  Juh,  XV'III 
Moimtain  Corps  had  staged  a  small 
attack  to  recover  a  hill  off  its  left  flank 
I  hat  had  been  left  in  Soviet  hands  when 
(Jeueral  Siilasvuo,  commander  of  HI 
Corps,  had  stopped  his  units  opera- 
tions. Otherwise,  throughout  the  sum- 
mer, the  Germans  and  Russians  both 
contented  themselves  with  harassment, 
which  for  the  most  part  took  the  form 
of  stardng  forest  fires  in  each  other's 
areas.  White  phosphorus  shells  easih' 
ignited  the  evergreen  trees,  and  the 
fires  occasionally  burned  across  mine- 
(ieids  or  threatened  installations," 

The  one  summers  operation  that 
came  near  having  strategic  significance 
was  Operation  Klabautermann 


"fGc;;.)  M>K  20.  la  \  r.  1105/43.  nn  G'-h.-Kin/it  ,Vor- 
megeri.  y.7.42.  AOK  2(*  \172'<2/}i,  file. 

"AOK  Lafipl/in,!.  Iti  Kr„-g-.lagelmth  Nr.  2,  AOK  20 
'i72.-)2/2  file;  fOh.)  AOK  20.  In  Kriegsb^Aueh,  Band 
III.  1  Sep  42,  AOK  2U  27252/3  file. 


("hobgoblin"),  which  the  German  Navy 
and  Air  if%r(*  ooerdwcted  firom  Finnish 
basf  s  oil  I  he  shore  of  Lake  Ladoga. 
The  idea  of  using  small  boats  to  inter- 
dict Soviet  traffic  on  the  lake  had  &o 
cm  red  lo  Hitler  in  the  fall  of  1941,  too 
laie  to  lie  put  into  effect.  It  was  revived 
in  the  spring  of  1042  when  the 
Leningrad  evacuation  began.  Hitler 
was  concerned  at  the  time  that 
Leningrad  would  be  completely  evacu- 
ated: in  wliich  case,  ihe  northern  flank 
would  lose  its  importance  to  tlie  Soviet 
Unioii  and  large  numbers  of  troops 
could  be  shifted  to  die  south  to  oppose 
Operation  Biau.  Consequently,  he  had 
ordered  tbg  Sofiet  boat  trai&e  on  the 
lake  to  be  "combated  with  all  means."* 


The  German  Navy  brought  German 
and  Italian  FT  boats  into  ac^km  on  ihe 
lake  in  early  July.  Tlie  Luftwaffe  had  its 
craft,  Siebel-ferries,  ready  a  month 
later.  The  Siebel-ferries  were  twin 
hulled,  powered  by  airplane  entwines, 
and  armed  with  antiaircraf  t  guns.  Lhe 
fevention  of  a  Lujhcoffe  colonel,  they 
had  oiiginally  been  liuilt  for  the  inva- 
sion of  England.  Botli  the  navy  and  the 
air  force  daimed  the  overall  eonimand 
and  so  further  impaired  an  operalion 
that  was  already  hampered  by  lack  of 
air  tm^  aftd  the  hazards  of  navigation 
(tn  the  lake  thai  was  Htudded  with 
shoals  and  rocky  outcroppfaags.  Soviet 


^*OKV/,  Wrst,  KriigsgesthieHmchf  Abmtung, 


Krii^af^AaA,  L4.-3a.6.42,  26  May  42. 1.M.T.  180? 
file. 


426 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


accounts  claim  a  victory  for  the  Soviet 
Navy,  which  had  its  own  armed  vessels 
on  the  lake.  The  Germans  regarded 
Ki.AH  \i  !  [  RMANN  as  an  enterprise  that 
was  foundering  under  the  weight  of  its 
technical  and  command  problems  long 
before  it  was  abandoned,  which  was 
done  on  6  November  when  the  lake 
began  to  freeze.'* 

The  Murmansk  Railroad 

Having  a  division  to  spare  as  a  result 
of  Operation  Wiesengrund's  being 
cam fit'd.  nifil  ic[in  n«  d  to  ilie  idea  of 
a  double  thrust  to  the  Murmansk  Rail- 
road— by  XXXVI  Mountain  Corps  to 
Kandalaksha  and  by  the  Finnish  Army 
to  Belomorsk.  In  conferences,  on  8 
and  9  July,  with  General  Erftirth,  the 
OKW  represcniati\  c  at  Mannerheim's 
headquarters,  and  with  Jodl,  on  the 
13th,  the  project  was  further  de- 
\cloped.  and  aftci  fofjl  (ariied  it  hack 
to  Fuehrer  Headquarters,  Hitler  gavf  it 
his  approval  in  Direct!^  44  cSf  21  July 
19  52.  Tuentictli  Moniiiain  Arm\  uas  to 
prepare  to  take  Kandalaksha  in  tlie  fall 
and  w&s  assured  diat  Leningrad  would 
be  taken  in  SeptenilK'i  at  the  latest  to 
free  the  requued  Finnish  forces  and 
that  5th  Mountain  Division,  which  had 
iH  t'ii  diverlffl  ro  ArmyGrouji  North  in 
ilic  winter  and  was  still  there,  would  he 
sliippcd  to  Finland  by  the  end  of  Sep- 
u  niber.  h  i  the  Kandaiaksha-Beloinoi  sk 
operation,  Hitler  assigned  the  code 
name  LAOHSefiMG  ("sabliOn  gaifidi")/" 

No  doubt.  Hitler  would  have  issued 


■  ■/itiiiki;.  \'nrthrrn  ThfOUr.  p.  2SI;  Kovalchuk, 

t.rilttlfrlDll,  pp.  I27.S— X4. 

"H)K\\:  WFSl.  Of,.  S,.  ^5I27''!-I2.  WHsiing  .Vr. 
21.7.42.  ticrnian  High         Dirctii^ts,  CMH  files. 


the  directive  for  LAt;HSFANG  soon,  in 
any  case,  to  cap  off  tlie  victory  he 
believed  developing  in  the  south 
and  to  isolate  the  Soviet  Union  in  its 
defeat.  He  knew  the  Americans  and 
British  were  opening  an  alternative 
route  to  the  Soviet  Union  through  the 
Persian  Gulf  and  Iran,  but  he  expected 
to  be  able  to  close  it  as  well  and  had 
Manstein  in  mind  for  the  mission. '^'^ 

Tlie  XXXVI  MounUtin  Corps  began 
its  planning  for  Lachsfang  on  22  July. 
Success,  it  believed,  hinged  on  two  re- 
quirements, a  fast  breakthrough  on  the 
Verman  River  line  and,  subsequentiy,  a 
quick  thrust  to  Kandalaksha  before  the 
enemy  could  make  another  stand.  The 
corps  expected  to  have  80,000  troops, 
twice  as  many  as  it  had  employed  in  the 
summer  of  1941;  and  Fifth  Air  Force 
agreed  to  provide  %OStuha$,  9  fighters, 
and  9  bombers,  more  planes  than  had 
been  available  for  the  whole  Armj  of 
Norway  operations  ia  ribe  previous 
summer.  Tmie  was  a  critical- element.  If 
necessai^y,  operations  C!0uld  be  con- 
tinued until  1  December;  but  they 
would  be  impossible  iheieaftcr  liec  aust- 
of  deep  snow  and  extreinely  short  peri- 
ods daylighL  Hie  late  wnter,  mtd- 
March  to  mid-April,  would  alToid  a 
se^nd  opportunity  but  a  considerably 
Tess  fawitrole  one  because  the  German 
troops  were  not  trained  for  winter  op- 
erations in  the  Arctic,  The  XXXVI 
Motintain  Corps  tselieved  it  would 
need  four  weeks  for  Lachsfanc  and 
wanted  to  time  the  operation  to  end  in 
mid^Novemlier,  siirtee  by  then  th« 
length  of  davliglii  would  he  less  than 
seven  hours,  and  in  succeeding  weeks. 


''•Gi-nnal  Haider's  Daify  NoUf.  vol.  II,  19  Kug  42, 
KAP2l-g- 16/4/0  file. 


SUMMER  ON  1  HE  STATIC  FRONTS 


427 


this  amount  would  ^^xtase  tiy  an  hour 
a  week/* 

At  Mannefhieim^  headquarters,  Et^ 
furih  sounded  out  ihe  Finnish  i  eatlion 
to  Lachsfang,  In  Directive  44,  Hitler 
had  describe  a  coift^anion  Fmflish 
ilirusi  i<i  Belomoisk  as  "desirable." 
Died  and  General  Weisenberger,  tlie 
6ominand«r  of  XXXVI  Mountain 
Corps,  regarded  one  as  indispensable. 
Mannerheini's  chief  of  staffs  Gejieral 
Heinridis,  indicated  that  the  Finnish 
atliuide  was  "positive,"  l>ut  Leningrad 
would  have  to  be  taken  first.  The  Fin- 
nish GtsmtnknA,  he  added*  sthG  re- 
garded il  "as  necessary"  d^  Ihe  lefi 
flank  of  Army  Group  Nopf^  be  ad- 
vanced e^  to  the  tniddie  Svir/'  The 
Germans  had  cxpc<  tcd  the  first  con- 
dition but  not  the  second.  At  the  OKH 
they  told  Mahnetheffn%  representative, 

KeiK'raaliluutnanii  ("Major  General") 
Paavo  Talvela,  that  if  tlie  marslial  in- 
sisted OR  the  laiier  ^cu^uiition'as  £f  prefeq- 
iiisiu-,  'would  have  lo  be 

dropped.  Tliis  then  bedame  die  subject 
trf"  Hfeinrieli^  August  VwSt  to  the  Wer- 
utilf.  In  the  talks  llieic,  Hcinrichs  ex- 
dianged  a  Fiiinisli  agreement  to  go 
ahead  with  LACHiarANG  for  a  tSeraian 
jjromise  to  ha\c  Arriiv  Group  North 
schedule  an  advance  to  tlie  Svir  River 
as  Jls  n^t  assignment — ^^after  it  had 
taken  Leningrad.  Tlie  Finns  proposed 
to  commit  eight  inlanU)'  divisions  and 
an  armored  division  tn  the  Bdomorsk 
operation.  For  them  alMt,  time  was  crit- 
ical. Four  of  tlie  divisions  would  have  to 
come  tmm.     Isthnui^  Fnjnt  Boiiit  of 


''^aapfl  i&llt^  A.K^  lwfiruni(sakeil.une,.  mim^S^ 
intth  und  Anbgun  a*  "Latlis/aHg,  "  22  JuT-tSS.  XXXn^ 
A.K.  2915^11  filr:  XXXVl  (Gtb^  AM.,  Qu.,  Unterlagm 
fun  -Latlujangr  1.8A2.  XXXVI  A.IL 29155/2  file. 

^oDer  Kit  I.  d.  V>n!>.  Stab  Nord,  Nr- 
lurhrung  m  ^Imdluiuknd,  2.HA2,  H  2MSi7  file. 


Leningrad,  and  because  of  poc^  roads, 
their  redeployment  could  oot  be  ae- 
compHshed  in  less  than  three  or  four 
weeks  after  Leningrad  fell.'*'' 

By  itself  LACHSFANCi  looked  good; 
however,  ft  depended  e«  Nokmoltcmt. 
and  XoRDLicin  ,  as  has  been  seen,  was 
an  uncertain  enterprise.  Tlie  German 
part  of  Lachsfanc  also  depended  on 
XXXVT  Mountain  Corps'  gelling  .'illi 
Mountaiir  Division,  which  would  have 
had  to  leave  Army  Group  North  by  15 
.'\ugusi  tfj  reat  h  the  front  in  Finland  on 
time.  But  Ruecliler  insisted  that  Army 
Group  North  could  not  execute  NtM^ 
1 1(  II I  and  defend  tlie  rest  of  its  front  if 
it  had  to  relejuse  the  division,  and 
Hitler,  finally,  oil  l&^^tlgUSt,  dedded  to 
leave  5th  Mountain  Division  with  Ai  in\ 
Group  North  and  send  3d  Mountain 
Division  to  Firili^d  instead.  When  Sfl 
Mountain  Di^  ision  luid  to  be  di\erted 
to  Army  Group  North  during  tJie  bat- 
tle for  the  bottleneck,  Hider  drew  the 
one  conclusion  left  to  him  and.  on  I 

September,  canceled  Lachsfano  lor 
1942.81 

Till'  Arrtir  ('.Diivoys 

Early  in  June,  German  agents  in 
ledaitd  tepiMPted  Convoy  PQ-t?  fonft- 

ing  off  the  southwest  coast  of  Icelanci. 
Having  that  much  lead  time  and 
twenty-four  hotirs  dl  daylight  in  die 

Arctic  to  assure  good  reconnaissance 
and  air  support,  die  German  Navy 

"><)KH.  GenSIdH,  Op.  Mt.  IN,  Ojma^tmtK  gegfii  ttif 
Muimaiilmhii,  5.S.-I2.  H  22^227  file;  Grtimr  Diani 
JVuto,  25  Aug  42,  C-tlf.5q  CMH  file;  OKW,  WFSl.  Op. 
(H)  Nr.  55139/42,  Abschri/I  jioM  Ftrnscltreibt/i  Gtn. 
£KMi  10.8.42,  OKW  119  (iIl- 

^1  ^Sk  AM,  Mtttmiagelntrh.  l.-HMM.  10  Aug 
42.  H.  Gr.  Nord  file;  OK.W.  vmk  Oft.  Nr, 

(m820/42,  I5.SA2,  Oetmaa  High  Level  VH^sdvei. 
CMH  files:  H.  Gr.  Nord.  la  fCritgd^^h,  L-30.9.42,  I 
Sep  42,  H.  Gr.  Nord  75128/14  file. 


428 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


undertcxik  another  tiy  at  getting  hs 
heavy  ships  into  action.  Luetutw,  Scheer, 
and  six  destroyers  went  to  Alta  Fiord, 
at  the  noriherniiiost  tip  of  Norway,  and 
Tirpitz,  Hipper,  and  six  destroyers  took 
up  station  in  West  Fiord,  somewhat  to 
the  south  on  the  Atlantic  side  of  ihe 
peninsula.  After  PQ-17  left  Iceland, 
on  27  June,  the  navy  learned  that, 
aside  from  cruisers  and  destroyers,  the 
convoy  also  had  a  remote  escort  of  two 
battleships  and  an  aircraft  carrier. 
(They  were  U.S.S.  Washington,  H.M.S. 
Duke  #  York,  and  the  British  carrier 
Mtiortous.)  The  Naval  Staff  then 
changed  the  deployment  and  ordered 
aH  the  ships  to  Alta  Fiord,  where  Ger- 
man air  superiority  would  be  sure  to  be 
sufficient  to  drive  off  the  battleships 
and  carrier.** 

As  PQ-17  approached  the 
Spit/lx  r;4<  n-Bear  Island  passage,  the 
time  for  die  ships  tp  set  out  had  come, 
but  the  Naval  Staff  worried  about  the 
remote  escort,  and  on  4  July,  it  con- 
dudeci  that  a  strike  would  be  impossi- 
ble. The  nestt  day,  however,  its  con- 
fidence revived,  when  not  only  the 
batdeships  and  the  carrier  but  also  the 
cruisers  ■ — there  were  seven  itt  the  es- 
cort— wcic  sigh  led  steering  west.^'' 
They  were  under  orders,  of  which  die 
Germans,  of  course,  were  not  aware, 
nol  ((>  atlvantc  iiUo  the  zone  of  Ger- 
man  air  dominance  east  of  Bear  ls~ 
land.**  Admiral  Raeder,  commander  in 


"'^Niu'/tf  Win  !)tar\.  \tA.  p|>.  36.  57.  For  U..S,  and 
BrLti>;li  . Iis| .1  isii iiiiiti  uilli  ii'gaiti  tu  Py-IT,  vir  Mm- 
ison,  Ihifilr  III  III,-  ■\lliinlti.  p.  1801  and  RoskiU,  War  at 
Sea,  vol  II.  |.  !:((.- 

""Nfivril  Wai  1)1,1, \,  vol.  35.  p.  70. 

"Roskill,  Wh,  ,11  \r„,  vol.  II,  p.  1:1.-1, /r.\n'  iv,,i.  v.  p, 

2<>1)  in.'ilni.iiriv  ili.ii  ilifcsron  would  hjvi-  .iilc- 
i|ii,iu-  lo  .ISSIIIC  passiiKf  toi   I'Q— 17.  tut!  liic 

oinvov  w.iv  Im-iiih  Usui!  nieri'ly  as  bail  lo  iure  oui  tlic 
Ihlnii,  .irnl  "rill  l^mi'ih  .\dniirakv  .  .  .  regarded  itie 
security  oi  Ltic  umvuy  m  a  secondary  mission.' 


chief  of  the  t-erman  Na\'v,  and  the 
Naval  Staff  then  decided  to  let  the 
ships  sail,  but  Hitler  strongly  enjoined 
Geaonaladinirai  ("Admiral")  Rolf  Garls, 
the  commanding  admiral.  North,  not 
to  let  them  engage  the  convoy  unless 
the  carrier  could  be  located  and  clinii- 
naied  first.  At  1500  on  the  5th,  Tirpitz, 
Scheer,  and  eight  destroyers  put  out 
from  Alta  I'iord.  Lnelzuio  and  four  de- 
stroyers stayed  beliind  because  they 
had  damaged  their  bottoms  on  the  trip 
from  West  Fiord. 

Three  hours  after  leaving  Alta  Fiord, 
Generaladmiral  Otto  Schniewind,  in 
command  aboard  Tirpitz,  knew  his 
ships  had  been  sighted  when  his  radio, 
monitors  intercepted  a  message  sent  in 
the  clear  by  a  Soviet  submarine."*  An 
hour  later,  a  British  aircraft  on  patrol 
off  North  Cape  l  eported  a  second 
sighting.  Both  messages  were  picked 
up  in  Berlin,  where  Raeder  was  torn 
fbr  another  hour  between  his  desire  to 
see  the  ships  score  a  success  against  the 
convoy,  which  he  knew  by  then  was 
scattered  and  defenseless  southeast  of 
Spitzbetgen,  and  his  duty  to  respect 
Hider's — not  to  mendon  his  own — 
concern  for  thdr  safety.  (The  British 
Naval  .Staff  had  ordered  the  c()n\  n\  to 
scatter  at  the  time  the  ciiiiser  Ibrce 
turned  back.)  At  2100,  Raeder  ordered 
Stiinicuind.  through  Carls,  lo  break 
oil  Uie  mission  and  return  to  base.,^ 
Having  second  thoughts  later,  Raeder 
I  out  Uk led  that  to  attack  convoys  was 
made  excessively  difficult  by  Hider's 
insistence  on  avoiding  risks  to  the  big 
sliips.  PQ-17,  he  toncluded,  had  of- 
fered an  oppoi  tunity  that  had  not  oc- 
curred before  and  was  not  likely  to 


■<  ',\Vi,  v//  \\n>  l>i,in.  vol.  35,  pp.  70-7^  Sep  Sibo 
tiwhrer  (kinjerrnies,  19-12,  pp.  86,  91-93. 


SUMMER  QN  THE  STATIC  FRONTS 


429 


The  Cruiser  Koun  on  Station  in  Aioa  Fiord 


come  again:  thci  ciot  c,  it  was  pi  obable 
that  the  big  ships  would  never  be  iistd 
against  the  convoys.^" 

But  Fifth  Air  Force  did  not  share  the 
navy's  doubts  and  troubles.  It  was  in  a 
positi(jn  to  hit  PQ- 17  with  devastating 
power.  By  the  time  the  convoy  de- 
parted from  Iceland,  Stumpff  had  as- 
sembled, in. tile  vicinity  of  North  Cape. 
103  twin-engine  JU-88  bombers,  42 
HE-111  torpedo-bombers,  15 
floatplane  torpedo-bombers,  30  Stukas, 
and  74  long-range  reconnaissance 
planes,  a  total  of  264  aircraft.^^  On  2 
July,  the  reconnaissance  planes  deter- 


"■kc>^kiil.  U«r  til  Sm.  VI)!.  II.  [J.  i:59;  Irving,  Tht 
I>,-.l,ihli,m  „/  C,/r,;vn  f'il-!7.  pp.  ir».'l-f>6:  Naval  Wir 
than.  viil.  ;V"i.  p.  f7. 

"•Biilish  Ail-  Mmisin  f'aiiiplilcl  24H,p.  114. 


mined  the  position  and  course  of 
PQ-17.  and  on  the  4th  the  bombers 
and  torpedo-planes  began  the  attack, 
claiming  four  sinkings  in  the  first 
strike.  During  the  day,  they  saw  the 
remote  escort  and  the  truisers  torn 
back;  and  they  saw  the  destroyers  in 
the  escort  go  off  as  well.  (The  com- 
mander of  the  destroyers,  expecting 
"to  see  tlie  cruisers  open  fire  and  tiie 
enemy's  masts  appear  on  the  horizon  at 
any  moment,"  had  decided,  without 
orders,  to  support  the  cruisers.)** 
Thereafter,  PQ-17  was  left  only  with 
what  protection  two  submarines  and  a 
few  trawlers  could  give  it,  and  Fiftli  Air 
Force  Inimt]!^  down  themeitiiant  ships 


»»Ri!ski]l,  War  ill  Sea,  vol.  11,  p.  141;  MoTaaB,Battit 
of  Ike  Ailuntic,  p.  185. 


430 


MOSCOW  TO  SIAUNGRAD 


almost  ai  leisure-.  Wlien  it  was  over,  the 
Germans  believed  they  h^d  sunk  every 
last  ship.  In  fact,  eleven  6F  thirty-six 
merchant  ships  in  PQ-17  did  reach 
Soviet  ports,  but  tlxree  of  those  were 
almost  to  the  point  of  sinking.** 

Tin.-  PQ-17  disaster  led  the  British 
Admiralty  to  propose  stopping  the 
convoys  untU  winter  a^in  brought  the 
cover  of  darkness,  but  Stalin,  who  re- 
garded any  losses  his  allies  might  suffer 
in  bringing  aid  to  the  Soviet  Union  'as 
perfectly  acceptable,  protested  vio- 
lendy."*  As  a  compromise,  after  an  in- 
terval of  nearly  two  months,  PQ-18 
sailed  in  early  September.  The  Ger- 
mans were  ready.  Fifth  Air  Force  had 
liaised  its  HE- 111  torpedo-bomber 
Strength  to  nin(.'l\-t\\i)  planes,  and  tho 
navy  had  a  dozen  submarines  stationed 
in  northern  Norway.  Raeder  and  the 
Naval  Staff  struggled  once  more  with 
their  concerns  about  the  surface  shi|js 
and  finally  alerted  Tirpitz,  Scheer,  Htppn; 
aiifl  llir  llt^lit  cmiser  Kudu  for  a  sortie 
against  eitlier  PQ-18  or  QP-14,  which 
was  expected  to  fee  coming  west  at 
about  the  same  lime.  The  hitch  again 
was  an  aircraf  t  carrier  in  the  escort,  on 
this  occa^on,  tihe  U  S.-built,  British- 
manned  escort  <  airier  Avfuger.  To  get 
rid  of  the  carrier,  die  navy  organized 
seiHeti  Sdllic^iln^  into  a  sp&dal  gi  oup, 
Wrsn^^HBii  ("carrier's  death"),  and  Fifth 
Air  Force  agreed  to  direct  a  strong  part 
of  its  effort  against  the  carrier. 

(h\  13  Septemln  r,  as  PQ-18  entered 
die  Spitzbergen-Bear  Island  passage, 
a  submarine  &%d  two  tort)ied<l^  at 


"Gencralmajiir  a,  D.  Haii-s-Dcilev  Hcihudt  von 
Rnhden,  Oif  Kampfjufkmng  tttr  Luftjlotle  5  in  Nomegen. 
1942,  Rohden  4376-4408  file;  RosIuU,  WmeiSta,  vol. 
n,  p.  143;  Irving.  Cmvirf  PQ-i?,  p.  287. 

*»Chtt«hitl.  Uing,  »j  Fnle.  pp.  26t)-73.  See  akiu 
IVMV.  vol.  V,  p.  2(«  und  IVOVSS,  vol.  11,  p.  468r. 


Ai'iii^n  and  missed.  On  the  same  day, 
Filth  Air  Force  began  its  attack  with  a 
strike  by  fifty-six  bombers.  The  bomb- 
ers eoiild  not  approach  the  carrier  that 
had  its  own  aircraft  defending  it  and 
thai  had  (he  support  of  the  annatrcrafic 
cruiser  Srylia.  The  German  pilots  also 
Ibund  it  difhtuli  to  get  at  the  merchant 
ships  because  they  maintained  a  tight 
formation  inside  a  screen  of  twelve 
destroyers.  On  the  14th,  iift^-rfipvxr 
bombers  tried  again,  and  frotn Oil 
the  attacks  continued  undl  the  19th. 
PQ-18  fared  better  than  its  predeces- 
sor but.  nevertheless,  lost  thirteen  out 
of  f  orty  ships.  Tlie  prii  e  was  also  high 
for  Fifth  Air  Force,  which  lost  twenty 
bombers  in  the  first  two  strikes.  "When 
I  lie  tarriei  eon  tinned  on  past  SpitZ- 
bcrgen  widi  PQ-18  and  then  picked 
up  QP-14  on  the  return  trip,  the  navy 
abandoned  the  sortie  by  the  surface 
ships.  In  fact,  it  instructed  the  sub- 
mannes  as  well  to  avoid  QP-14  since 
experience  with  PQ-  IS  had  shown  thai 
attacks  on  a  convoy  with  surface  and 
air  protection  were  too  risky.** 

After  PQ-18  put  in  at  Arkhangelsk, 
thus  mollifying  Stalin  for  the  lime 
beiag,  ihe  convoys  were  again  sus- 
|>eildred.  Shi|)pin<;  requirements  lor 
the  Nl5xlh  Airican  invasion,  which 
came  in  flovember,  helped  to  justify 
the  siis]ietision,  in  Western  .\llied  ii Hot 
in  Soviet  eyes.  The  North  African  land- 
ings also  had  a  significant  impact  on 
the  anlicon\o\  lorees.  .\11  of  Fifth  .Air 
Force's  HF-111  torpedo-bombers  and 
mmt  df  its  Jtl-Sis  yuA  m  he  &8m- 
ferred  to  the  Mediterranean,  leaving 


"'Rostdll,  WferruSM,  vol.  M.  pp.  278-86;  Moraon. 
Batllf  of  the  Atlantic,  pp.  .KiO-tij;  British  Air  MiJiisn  v 
Pamphli-t  248,  p.  1  hi;  Vniw/  War  £>Koy,  vol.  37.  pp, 
143,  153.  176.  212.^24. 


SUMMER  ON  I  HE  S TAI IC  FRONTS 


431 


only  die  floatplanes,  some  Stiikas.  and 
tlie  long-range  reconnaissance  units  in 
the  north.®^  \Mth  die  wnter%  darkness 


"-Roskill,  War  ,il  S,;:.  \  dI.  1 1,  p.  288;  IVMVt  voi.  V,  p. 
262;  British  Air  Minisuy  Paaiphlei  248,  p.  IIS. 


setting  in  and  the  conditions  for  air 
operations  becoming  poor,  the  ininie- 
diate  effect  of  the  ImB  VtS^Hot  signifi- 
eant.  VVliat  \\as  important  was  that  the 
German  Liijlwajje  would  never  again 
be  able  to  muster  slrailsar  stx^gtb  in 
the  Arctic^ 


CHAPTER  XXI 


The  Change  of  Sea^ns 


A  New  Spirit 

The  "iVi  shagii  iinusd!"  ("Not  a  step 
back!")  order  was  meant  to  do  more 
than  bring  a  halt  lo  a  mtieai  that  was 
threatening  to  get  out  of  hand.  Alex- 
ander Werth,  who  was  the  London 
Smdoff'nms  c^e^po»«l^titi  Moscow 
observed,  .  .  something  must  hsSne. 
happened  ...  in  high  Go^fmtlflitlt, 
Military  Kfi^  Birty  quartei*s,  tsSt  <M  t&e 
30th  [of  jtily]  the  whole  tone  of  the 
Press  radically  changed.  No  inore  1am- 
entations^rtd  ibft^F^^oiiis . . .  but  or- 
ders, harsh,  strict,  ruthless  orders. 
Clearly  what  was  aimed  at  above  all  was 
pl^etSse  miiit^  . .     W.  Avereil 

HiOTiinaEll,,  who  was  in  Moscow  two 
weeks  later  as  President  Roosevelt's 
special  envoy,  reported  that  he  had 
found  Stalin  and  eve^^'one  else  he  saw 
"exacdy  as  determined  as  ever."^  If,  as 
Stalin  most  likely  believed »  the  Ger- 
man's ultimate  objective  was  neither 
Stalingrad  nor  the  Caucasus  but 
Moscow,  then  the  tmuGn  and  the 
armed  forces  were  going  to  have  to  be 
readied  by  every  means  for  the  decisive 
battle. 


As  the  "M  shagu  naznd!"  order  was 
being  read  to  the  troops,  the  massive 
apparatus  of  public  communications 
was  swinging  into  action  to  raise  the 
will  of  the  Russian  nation,  not  just  that 
of  Stalin  and  die  Communist  party, 
behind  it,  A  national,  "patriotic"  war 
had  been  proclaimed  in  1941,  but  the 
government  had  preferred,  particu- 
larly in  the  winter  and  spring  of  1942, 
to  emphasize  the  communist-fascist  as- 
pect of  the  conflict  and  the  inevitable, 
and  speedy,  victory  of  communism.  In 
his  May  Day  order  of  the  day,  Stalin 
had  called  for  a  total  German  defeat 
during  1942.^  The  Pravda  editorial 
marking  the  start  of  the  second  year  of 
the  war  had  stated  that  "all  of  Hider's 
military  as  well  as  poUtical  plans  have 
completely  collapsed"  and  "all  prereq- 
uisites have  been  created  for  defeat  df 
the  hateful  enemy  in  1942."^ 

After  July,  the  t«ar  became  a  "pa- 
triotic" Russian  war,  and  the  word 
"Russian,"  hardly  ever  used  before  in 
context  with  the  Soviet  slate,  was  given 
prominence  in  print  and  in  military 
orders.  Heroes  of  the  "old  army,"  frojn 
Alexander  Nevskiy,  who  defeated  the 
Teutonic  Knights  in  1242,  to  Alexey 
Brusilov,  who,  in  1916,  staged  the  best 
conducted  (and  fitotst  cosdy)  Russiaii 


•  Alexander  Wertii ,  Tlie  fiarefSiaHTtgrad  (Hew  York: 
Alfred  A.  Knopf,  Inc.,  194 Y),  p.  164, 

-W.  Averell  Harriman  and  Elic  Ahel,  Special  Envoy  to 
ChutohUl  arid  StaU»,  1941-1946  (New  York:  Randoni 
Hou^  iS^t},^  168. 


^S£3^  StB^^};  %lMt(Uasa  l^^e^m 


THE  CHANGE  OF  SEASONS 


4m 


The  'Ta  i  rjo  i  ic  VVau";  A  Tank  Crew  and  Their  Tank  Named  "Kutuzov" 


offensive  of  World  War  I,  were  pub- 
lidzed  as  aiaMi|jl^  for  Swiet  officers 

and  troops.  Newspapers  printed  ac- 
counts of  Russian  military  achieve- 
ments from  the  Middle  Ages  through 
W^orld  War  I.  In  September,  the  promi- 
nent write i-  Sergey  Sergey ev-Tsenskiy 
rushed  II II I)  print  several  chapters  of  a 
novel  entitled  The  Brusihv  Breakthrough 
that  poriraved  the  general  as  "a 
sagacious  strategist  and  loyal  patitiiM, 
trusting  in  the  might  of  Russian  arms 
and  the  adamant  spirit  of  ilie  Russian 
Army."^  The  Stalin  Prize  winner,  Kon- 
stantin  Simonov,  staged  a  play,  titled 
The  Russians,  in  which  one  of  the 
was  a  former  Tsarist  officer 


who  put  on  his  old  uniform  to  fight 
again  when  his  town  was  besieged  by 
the  Nazi  Germans.*'  Stalin's  6  Sep- 
tember appeal  to  the  tro^s  concluded 
with  i^i^eiiees,  fe^am  fcav« 
always  defeated  the  Prussians,  TTie  mil- 
itary tradition  of  the  Russian  people 
lives  on  in  the  heroic  deeds  of  Soviet 
fighting  mcn."'^ 

The  duty  ol  die  patriot  was  also  to 
hale  the  enemy.  Mikhail  Shololchov, 
author  of  And  Quiet  Fbws  the  Don,  wrote 
"The  Science  of  Hatred."  In  "Cherish 
Your  Hatred  for  t&e  Mmmj"  Alecey 
Tolstoy  told  the  eountt^,    . .  at  this 


^'U^KS^aiimyJnfomationBulktm,  no,  116.29 Sep 


42. 


'USSR  Embassy,  Information  Bulletin,  no.  112, 19  Sep 
'H.  Gr.  B,  ia  Nr.  2965^42^  Fmapruck  wm.  10:9.42,  Fz. 


434 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


time  our  one  cwerwhetming  sentiment, 
our  one  passion  must  be  hatred  for  the 
enemy.  Man  must  rise  from  life  bed 
filled  uith  siiibixnn  hatred,  widi  the 
same  hatred  he  must  work  and  fight, 
and  with  hatred  utisatisfied  go  m 
sleep."''  Ilva  Khrenbwrg,  who  as  colmn- 
nist  for  llie  army  newspaper  Red  Star 
would  be  in  th<&  vangtrard  of  the  "hate 
the  enemy"  campaign  for  the  next  two 
and  one-iialf  yeais,  received  the  Stalin 
Psixt  for  a  novel,  The  Fall  of  Paris,  in 
which  he  deli\  L  !  t  d  two  messages:  that 
it  was  impossible  to  live  under  the 
German^  Siat,  in  wmnds  6f  otie 
of  the  chaiaeters,  "Yon  won't  get  rid  of 
them  with  tears.  They're  rats.  You've 
got  to  kill  them."' 

Out  of  the  piibMt  vic\\  and  that  of  the 
outside  world,  the  "patriotic  war"  and 
"hate  the  enemy"  campaigns  jjroduced 
an  offshoot:  inistiiist  ol  the  Western 
Allies,  in  particular  Russia's  old  imperi- 
alist livaf,  Great  Britain.  In  August. 
Prime  Minister  Churchill,  who  had 
gone  to  Moscow  to  persuade  Stalin  to 
give  up  tiie  idea  ef  a  secbnd  front  in 
1942,  proposed  sending  British  and 
American  air  forces  to  help  defend  tlie 
OineaiaSi  Stalin  had  said  that  would  be 
*a  great  help."^*  Wren  Generalma\or 
R  I,  Bod^ba^  the  duel  of  operations  in 
the  Genaral  Staff,  went  to  the  ^vm- 
Caucasus  Fmul  In  September  he  report- 
edly told  (ieiieral  K  iilenev: 

Are  you  aware  tlial  llie  Allies  are  trying  to 
take  advatlta^  af  our  dilficult  posiuon 
and  obtain  our  consent  to  the  despatch  of 


Biiiisli  n(>()|>s  iiiio  Iranscaucasia?  "IliaLof 
cdvitse,  laiinot  hv  .illuuecl.  The  Slate  De-i 
icnse  ('omniittec  considers  the  defense  of 
Transcaucasia  a  task  of  vital  state  impor- 
tance and  itisottr  duty  to  take  all  measum 
to  repet  the  enem)!^  attack*  wear  out 
and  defeat  thetfi^  ffiti^xl  and  the 
desh«$  olihe  Allies  tiiust  Whfitried . .  < 

The  loss  for  a  second  time  of  vast 
stretches  of  Soviet  territory  and  die 
conversion  to  the  patriotic  war t)rf)n girt 
tlic  partisan  movement  to  the  f  mx  (i  oin 
of  the  war  effort  in  the  late  summer.  By 
the  Cientral  Staffs  reckoning,  m&Bk^ 
bersliip  in  the  movement  reached 
]  00,000  by  September.*^  At  the  end  ef 
August,  the  most  successful  partisan 
cninniaiiders  from  Belorussia  and  the 
nonlicrn  Ukraine  had  been  brought  to 
Moscow  for  a  series  of  conferences 
with  Slalin  and  members  of  the  Pfilil- 
bum,  I  hese  cojiferences  had  enhanced 
the  status  of  iJie  movement  and  had 
been,  no  doitbt.  also  calculated  lo  show 
that  the  Scwiet  autliorities  could  reach 
at  will  into  the  territory  behind  the 
enemy's  lines.  To  cap  the  conferences, 
Stalin,  on  5  September,  issued  an  order 
"On  d*e  IftislfS  dt  the  Parfisan  Mrn^ 
ment"  in  which  lie  called  for  a  "broader 
and  deeper"  development  of  pardsan 
warfare  and  GcpiiiiAoH  of  th^  wav^^ 
vai^  encompass  the  vvhpl^  ^te^ 
pie.****  Ihe  call  for  a  partisan 
ttiovemeiit  "of  l^ie  whole  people"  was 
taken  up  in  party  resolutions  and  the 
press.  Briefly,  after  6  September,  when 
Marshal  Voroshilov  was  named  ils  coili^ 
mander  in  chief,  the  partisan  move- 


42. 

Miifriburg.  The  Fait  of  Paris  (lionilcia: 
Huiiiiriisdti  K-  Co..  1942),  p.  368. 

'"Cluirchill,  Hingt  of  Fath  p.  48S;  Hairtiinan  9n<A 
A\x\.  apKtal  Env^  p.  161. 


"Shtcmenko.  Soviti  General  Sii^f,  p.  62, 

'  -liohhofa  SmOsk^  Entsikl^idiya.  1978,  vd.  19,  p. 

2:^5. 

'^Vershigora,  LyueS,  pp.  %9St-9S. 
'VVMV.  vol.  V,  p.  m 


THE  CHANGE  OF  SEASONS 


435 


nu'iil  achieved  the  iKiniiiial  status  of  a 
si'paraie  branch  hi  the  armed  forces.'"^ 

A  New  AiUimity 

During  the  re\'()Iiuioii  the  word  "of- 
hcer"  had  been  excised  from  die  Soviet 
fniHiaty  vocalrulary  and  "conunander" 
siihstiliiled.  TlieTealler,  ihroiitrh  rht 
firsl  year  of  the  war,  rank  and  authoi  ii) 
were  cminterbalanced  by  a  concept  of 
sni  iaiist  cqiiaHty  and  by  political  mis- 
ti  uil.  After  July  1942,  "officer"  became 
an  aJsceptable  equivalent  for  "com- 
mander. More  important tv,  the  rela- 
tionship of  the  military,  particularly  die 
oHiccir  corps,  to  the  state  was  re- 
defined. Professional  comjjetence  was 
recc^nized,  rewar  ded ,  and  given  fuller 
play,  and  tim  fbSt^ry  leadership  was 
released  from  overt  political  tutelage 
and  surveillance. 

By  a  decree  of  29  July  1942,  the 
Presidium  of  the  Supreme  So\iet  aii> 
thorized  three  medals  for  othcers  only, 
the  Orders  of  Suvorov,  Kutuzov,  and 
Alexander  Nevskiv. "'  Tlie  order.s  were 
lo  be  awarded  to  "conmianders  for 
outstanding  setidcies  in  m^g^imtng  and 
directing  war  operations."'^  In  efleci. 
they  declared  die  Soviet  officers  to  be 
hdrs  to  the  old  Russian  miiftstry  tradi- 


•*Jti  November  1942,  because  "ihe  Stjviet  forces 
■Heft  about  to  go  over  from  the  strategic  defensive  to 
the  Strategic  offensive."  the  post  of  coinmandcr  in 
dlief  of  the  partisan  movement  was  abolished,  and 
the  CentTid  $ta£f  vm  reincorporated  into  the  Su- 
preme Hcadquartm.  IVMV,  vol.  V,  p.  290. 

**^p/^tikmdi,  'UBruzkenny*  sify,  p.  506.  Alexander 
Suvorw  <i  i^-^lSOO)  served  the  Empress  Catherine 

vma  eVcT^  mlS&  he  T&ugbt.  MiUiaQ  Rtiotxav 
(1745-1813)  was  the  Russian  commander  in  etiKtf 
against  Napoleon  from  1812  until  his  death. 

■^USSR  Emba^y,  tt^itmiatian  »uU^  no.  101.  22 
Aug  42. 


tion.  For  the  moment,  it  was  also  sig- 
nificant that  each  of  those  for  whom  an 
order  was  named  had  been  notably 
successfnl  at  getting  his  troops  to  stand 
against  a  superior  enemy — Alexander 
Nevskiy  at  Lake  Peipus  (1242),  Suvorov 
at  Lsmail  (1791),  and  Kutuzor  at  Boro- 
dino (1812). 

The  Orders  of  Suvorov,  !lti'^;»3iV, 
and  Ale.xander  Nevskiv  would 
niosdy  to  conmiandei  s  of  larger  umts 
and  to  staff  officers.  The  Order  <rf 
Kutuzov.  fnf  insi;iii(c.  was  to  be 
awarded  for  "well  worked-oui  and  ex- 
ecuted plans  li^operadons  by  SLfrmt,  an 
army,  or  a  Separate  formation,  as  a 
result  of  which  a  serious  defeat  is  in- 
flicted on  the  enemy.  .  .  Recogni- 
tion for  junior  officers  and  enlisted 
men  had  been  provided  for  in  May,  in 
anticipation  of  a  victorious  1942  cam- 
paign, with  the  official  establishment  of 
the  designation  "guards"  and  the 
founding  of  the  Order  of  the  Patriotic 
Wai\  The  latter  was  lo  be  awarded  lor 
specific  achievements:  a  certain 
nmnl^ei  of  planes  shoi  down  or  tanks 
knocked  out,  a  sticcessful  assault  on  an 
enemy  blockhouse,  a  cei  tain  number 
oi  ertg^B^firing  points  destroyed  by  a 
lank  crew,  and  so  fortlt,'''  hi  ilie  sum- 
mer, to  stimulafe  professionalism  in  tlie 
ranks  and  "popiilai  i/e  the  heroism  of 
the  .So\iet  soldier,"  the  army  began  lo 
award  honorary  titles,  such  as, 


^"Ibid..  no.  109,  12  Si  p  42. 

"Ibid;  no.  62,  23  May  42,  Tyuslikevich.  Mmudtniny^ 
li/y,  p.  506.  The  Soviet  A  i  incd  Forces  were  tin  I  he  way 
Ignysird  becoming  probably  the  most  decorated  in 
lA^ld  War  11.  By  the  war's  end,  7  million  medals, 
iiii^faiidiaf.1  £400  Hero  of  ibe  SWtei  tlnktn.mwsHb^, 
wert  0,iim  ve>,  &M[^4dti8ii.  Dbtycma  and  tegiiAe»tt 
tvoaved  ild)SillS&  uiSt  dtsitions,  and  tlie  liesignation 
"gaardi'  wa»  ^vm  w  TI  field  annie$.  6  tank  armies. 
80  corps  of  various  kinds,  and  'JdO  diviiiioits.  Deborin 
and  l^pukhovskiyi/fo^'  i  utnki,  p.  337f. 


"Sniper,"  "Expert  Machine  G\mni&r* 
and  "Expert  ArtiUerist."'* 

Indirectly  but,  nevertheless,  em- 
phatically, Stalin  let  it  be  known  that 
henceforth,  professionalism,  initiative, 
and  merit  would  lake  piecedeiue  in 
decisions  on  appointments  to  com- 
mand. In  the  late  stimmer,  Pravda, 
which  did  not  ordinarily  carry  such 
mater ialj  published  a  play  by  Alex- 
andef  Koroeichuk  called  THe  Bmt. 
Korneichuk  later  told  British  corre- 
spondent Werth  that  Stalin  had  per- 
sonally given  him  the  "geneial  idea"  for 
the  ploi.'^'  In  The  Frmt,  young  army 
commander,  Ognev,  demonstrated 
mastery  of  the  techniques  of  modern 


warfare.  His  opponents  were  the  front 
commander,  Gorlov,  a  fossilized  relic  of 
the  civil  war,  and  afwnt  staff  filled  with 
Gorlov's  "yes-men."  At  the  end^  Q|fnev 
was  given  command  of  the  fnmt  WttJi  a 
speech  that  read: 

Stalin  says  di;it  Lalonted  yoiang  gelier-als 
have  got  to  be  promoted  more  boldly  to 
Ifg^i^a^  positions  on  a  level  with  the  vet- 
eran commanders  and  that  the  men  to  be 
promoted  are  those  who  are  capable  of 
waging  war  in  the  modem  way,  not  in  the 
olcl-fasliioned  way,  men  who  are  capable  oS 
le^i  nins^  from  the  ©tperience  of  modern 
waifarc.  .  .  .^^ 

S.  M.  Shtemenko  says,  "We,  the  youth 
M  ft©  laeneital  S^f  . .  ,  regardel  The 


^"IVMV,  vol.  V,  p.  307. 
"Werth, Jiiij.fKz  at  War,  p.  423n. 


**jiil©(Sittder  Kanieichiik.  Tkf  Fmiil,  In  I'nur  Soviet 
WifPlA^ '(London:  Hutcliinsun  ik  Co.,  1944),  p.  57. 


THE  CHANGE  OF  SEASONS 


437 


Fmtit  as  an  exprcssif^n  of  the  Partv's 
policy,  as  its  appeal  tor  an  improve- 
ment in  staoi^m  of  mOhary  skiU  and 
leadership."-' 

Rokossovskiy,  himself  one  of  the 
younger  gienerals  bdaig  advaeu^^  saw 
another  aspect  of  the  iiewr approach  to 
command,  wliich  he  d^^lbei  in  the 
following  anecdote: 

Shetrtly  before  the  VoronteSt  operation  I 
came  a^n  to  Moscow  to  report  to  the 
Supreme  Commander.  When  I  had 
finished  and  was  about  to  leave,  Stalin^^ 
"Don't  ffo  vet." 

He  pnohcd  I'(>skr\obvshe\  [Stalin's  sec- 
retary |  and  asked  liim  lo  call  in  a  general 
just  rcmo\ed  from  the  command  ^fa/^fi^ 
The  following  dialt^e  took  placet 

"You  say  we  have  punished  you 
WRSngIy?* 

Tes,  because  the  GHQ  ISlavka]  repre- 
sentative kept  getttng  in  my  warn" 

-How?"  / 

"lU  inirrfcred  vviili  my  orders,  held 
conleremcs  when  it  was  necessary  to  act, 
gave  contradictory  instructions  ...  In  gen- 
eral he  tried  to  override  the  commander." 

he  got  in  your  way,  But  you  were  in 
c3omniancrof  the fimtT 

"Yes."  -f 

"Tlie  Party  and  the  Government  en- 
trusted ihajmnt  to  you.  .  . ,  Did  yotihave  a 
telephone? 

■Tes.- 

"Then  why  didn\  you  report  that  be  was 
getting  In  your  way? 

"I  didn  I  dare  coW:^^  about  your 
jetomntative*" 

^Wdl,  that  is  what  we  have  ptiMshed  you 
for:  not  daring  to  pick  up  the  receiver  and 
phone  up.  as  a  result  of  w  hich  ynu  failed  to 
tarry  out  the  operation." 

I  walked  oul  of  tlie  Sujiieme  Clum- 
tnauder's  nlluc-  witli  ihc  ilioughi  diat,  as  a 
new-fledged  Jront  commander,  1  had  just 
be«i  tsa^l  an  i^h^Bi^  lesson.'^ 

tA^Ui       puhGdty  but,  probably,  as 


much  or  more  consequence  and  effect 
than  most  or  all  of  the  otlier  adjust- 
ments to  theBiSitary  system,  Stafin  als<} 
bronchi  \  isihh  to  the  fore  his  two  best 
generals,  Zhukov  and  Vasilevskiy.  Gen- 
eral' Zhiiitov's  appointm^t,  in  August, 
as  depmy  supreme  commander  ele- 
vated his  status  in  tlie  chain  at  com- 
mand and  dtminished — although  only 
a  certain  degree— the  distance  be- 
tween the  supreme  commander  and 
the  top  military  professional.  General 
Vasilevskiy  had  less  field  command  ex- 
perience tiian  did  Zhukov,  but  he  had 
seen  more  service  at«»^neia^die  top  of 
the  General  Staff  than  an\  other  irf- 
ficer  except  Marshal  Shaposhnikov. 
Owuigf  t&  ShaposhnikoVs  declining 
health,  Vasilevskiy  had  been  atting 
chief  of  the  General  Staf  f  several  times 
and  had  otitied  a  good  dti^l  «)f  the 
chiefs  work  before  his  own  a|jpoint- 
ment  to  tlie  position  in  June  1942. 
Siiapashnikov  had  been  known  for  hSs 
charm  and  excellence  as  a  military  the- 
oretician but  not  tor  his  ability  to  stand 
^Ifi  to  Stalin.  Vasilevskiy,  like  ^nkcv, 
was  .self-confident  and  willing  to  take 
the  initiative.  He  had  much  of 
Shaposhnikov^  charm,  and  "^t  the 
same  time,  he  knew  how  to  defend  his 
own  point  of  view  in  front  of  the  Su- 
preme Commander."*^ 

After  August  1942,  Zhukov  and  Va- 
silevskiy, as  a  team,  became  Stahn's 
principal  military  advisers.  Hence- 
forth, at  least  until  late  in  the  war,  lie 
consulted  both  of  them  on  strategic 
and  operational  decisions,  whereas, 
formerly.  Stavka  decisions  had  often 
been  made  by  him  and  whichever  of 
the  xnenihers  he  chose  to  dxm^  ii|)cm» 


**Shieinenb{>,  Smntt  Cmeral  Suff,  p.  66. 
**RokotS0vskjy,5i)/ijwrVXh«f|i,  p.  118. 


"ShtciTK.-nko,  Smnet  Gmtrei  Stt^,  pp.  49^  I26-S8. 
See  also  vol',  p  68. 


438 


MOSCOW  1 0  STAUNGRAD 


which,  in  effect,  meant  by  him  alone. 
As  a  team,  Zhukov  and  Vasilevskiy  also 
became  the  premier  Stavka  field  repre- 
sentatives. Tliey  were  not,  as  they  and 
Others  had  been  in  the  past,  attached  to 
fitmt  headquarters.  Instead,  they  coor- 
dinated groups  of fronts,  and  t!ie\  Ixire 
the  authority  to  issue  orders  and  in- 
structions to  the  field  commanders. 
Zhukov  apparently  also  acquired 
chain-of-command  status  that  put  him 
between  the  other  officers  and  Stalin. 
General  Moskalenko  tells  that  when  he 
was  relieved  of  command  oi  First 
Guards  Army  and  suniillOfi€d>  to  tfic 
Kremlin  in  September  1942,  it  was 
Zhukov  who  talked  to  Stalin  (while 
Moskalenko  waited  in  an  anteroom) 
and  delivered  the  decision  on 
Moskalenko's  next  appointment.^'' 

Although  they  held  their  powers  en- 
tirely at  Stalin's  pleasine,  Zhukovs  and 
VasUevskiy's  superior  positioxis  in  the 
contmaiid  strndUTe  wene  later— again 
to  a  certain  degree — formali/ed.  In 
December  1942,  Vasilevskiy  secured 
the  appointment  of  GeiierM  Antoncw 
as  his  deputy,  and  thereafter,  Anionov 
took  oVfgr  vami  of  tlie  chief  of  the 
deneraJ  Sts0k  ti^lar  work.  In  May 
1943,  the  State  Defense  Commiiice 
named  Zhuk^srsujd  Vasilevskiy,  boiii  by 
then  iiiarsh^s  Soviet  yiiion.  to 
be  first  and  second  deputy  commissars 
ci  defense." 

After  8  September  1942;  ia^qci  lie 
sent  ilu  /.liuko\ A'asilevskiy  tea^  !feO 
take  cliaige  at  Stalingrad,  StalizL,  ■Ap' 
paiently.  was  also  willing  to  go  into 
what  mav  he  desciibed  as  voluntarv, 
partial  military  eclipse.  The  winter  and 


-•■/\MV.  u>l,  V,  p_  :','jiv.  MnsLilfiiko;  ?{a  ¥a^ 

-jiliiiilihii/i  iifijiiijvlftut.  p]i.  .')(i|-74. 

-■Slitemoiikii.  Soi-in  i.iiimil  ^uifj,  12&-29; 
1> usllkevicli,  Vuunfdu-iiuyt  illy,  \y 


spring  offensives  had  been  his  brain- 
children. The  counteroffensives  in  the 
coming  fall  and  winter  were  going  to 
be  Zhukov's  and  Vasilcvskiys.  Con- 
cerning the  initial  plan  for  an  attack  at 
Stalingrad,  the  mort  Hiskiij  states: 
"This  plan  was  set  down  on  a  map 
^[ned  by  General  G.  K,  Zhukov,  Dep- 
uty Supreme  Comtnandfer  in  C3iief, 
and  General  A.  M.  Vasilevskiy,  Chief  of 
tlie  General  Staff,  and  endorsed  by  J,  V, 
Stalin,  Supreme  Commander  in 
Chief."  At  the  meedng  of  the  State 
Defense  Committee  that  gave  final  ap- 
proval to  the  plan  in  November,  the 
S/iort  History  says,  "The  Supreme  Com- 
mander in  Chief,  who  had  devoted  a 
great  deal  of  time  to  the  ]i r  eparations 
for  the  operaUon,  listened  attentively 
to  the  arguments  put  forward  by 
Zhukov  and  Vasilevskiy."** 

In  the  Soviet  view,  then  aiul  now,  the 
n^p--ultimate  recognition  was  given  to 
llft!e«iilitary  professionals  on  9  Ocofcer 
1942,  in  a  det  iee  that  abolished  the 

i>olitical  comitiissai:  systgm  and  estab- 
ished  uhitafy  tmimirxA.  The  d«!ree, 
issued  by  the  Presidium  of  the  Su- 
preme Soviet,  in  its  significant  parts, 
read: 

The  system  of  war  commissars  which  was 
establislicfi  in  the  Red  Army  during  the 
Civil  W;i(  w  as  liased  on  mistrust  of  the  mili- 
tary cntiiinands,  \\  liich  at  that  time  still  liatl 
in  them  specialists  who  were  opposed  to 
Soviet  power. 

In  the  years  after  the  Qvil  War  the  pro- 
cess of  reorte^ting  and  training  the  miliury 
iCofiqQ»nd$  «oiB«^eted.  M  a  mult  m 
ttie  training  and  of  the  success  in  all  areas 

of  Soviet  lure,  the  silu;ili(>n  of  die  military 
tominands  in  die  Red  Army  liad  changed 
fundamentally. 


"VOV  (Kmitum  hloriya).  p,  213.  See  also/FAfV,  vol. 
VI,  p.  27  and  Zliukov,  Afeadirs,  pp.  380-8B. 


THE  CHANGE  OF  SEASONS 


439 


The  prtstnt  patriotic  war  against  the 
German  invatlers  has  welded  our  com- 
mands together  and  produced  a  large  corps 
of  talented  new  commanders  who  have 
galiiered  experience  and  who  will  remain 
tme  to  their  honor  as  of  iicers  to  the  dei^. 

Therefore,  the  Presidititn     the  Stt- 

freme  Soviet  directs: 
.  The  establishment  of  complete  unity  of 
command  in  the  Red  \rni\  ;ind  the  trans- 
fer of  full  responsibiliiy  to  die  commanders 
and  chiefs  CK  Staff  in  aU  iitsts  i£  the  Red 
Army. 

2.  The  abolition  ol  the  rar  commissars  .  .  . 
On  major  unitsj  and  potitniks  in  lesser 
units.*' 

The  decree  dtd  hot  attribute  any  dele- 
terious effects  to  the  commissar  sys- 
tem; it  only  found  the  commissars  no 
Ion|^  n^sessary.  Hie  commissars  had 
been  and  continued  to  be  portrayed  as 
dedicated  men,  frequently  of  heroic 
stature.  In  The  Fmnt,  for  instance,  it  was 
the  conunissar,  Gaidar,  who,  in  the  final 
scene,  brcjught  Gorlov  to  account  and 
siecured  Ognev  s  promodon. 

In  fact,  the  abolition  was  not  as  com- 
plete as  it  appeared.  A  "considerable 
number"  of  commissars  who  had  ac- 
quired on-the-job  experience,  as  it 
were,  were  converted  to  line  duty  and 
given  cominands  of  tJidr  own,  bnt  that 
may  have  owed  mostly  to  a  shortage  of 
officers.^"  As  it  had  in  1940,  the  struc- 
ture of  the  commissar  system  survived. 
The  9  Octobei  decree  removed  the 
commissar  but  restored  the  mmpolit, 
the  deputy  commander  for  polidcal 
affairs.  Henceforth,  a  commander  did 
have  authority  to  make  and  carry  oiit 
decisions  at  his  own  discretion,  and  the 
zcmpolit,  in  military  matter^»  was  under 


»Pi.  AOK  4,  le  Nr.  1811142.  Anlage  3,  FMtu.s  rf« 
Profsidiums  dei  Obrrsten  Sowjets  der  UdSSR,  10.9.42, 
13M.42,  Ft.  AOK  4  29365/8  file. 

'WOVSS,  vol.  II,p.4Sa 


his  ('oniinaticl,  hut  the  zctmpnii/  could 
report  liis  judgments  of  the  com- 
mander's performance  through  ase[»- 
rate  channel.^'  In  the  higher 
commands,  armies  and  fmnts  in  par- 
dcular,  the  deputies  for  political  affairs 
continiierl  (with  the  cotiimanders  and 
chief  s  of  Staff)  as  members  of  tlie  mili- 
tary eoimcih;  Wltile  they  could  no 
longei  dispute  or  cotmtermand  the 
commanders'  orders,  they  were  still 
very  often  consec|uentiaI  and  well-con- 
nected political  figures  whom  the  com- 
manders could  not  U^btly  disregard. 
The  aboIidoA  *ifthe  Comniiss^r  system 
appears  to  have  removed  the  stigma  of 
potential  unreliability  from  the  officers 
and,  in  the  longer  run,  to  have  created 
a  kind  of  partnership  between  the  [lo- 
litital  and  xhe  military  leaders  that  bodi 
groups  fbtind  UiSirful,  especially  in  pro- 
moting their  c  areers- 
Most  par  ticularly,  die  abolition  of  tiie 
commissar  system  in  no  vyrise  signaled  a 
decline  of  party  influence  or  interest  in 
the  armed  forces.  While  the  total 
number  of  Communist  party^  members 
in  the  Soviet  Union  as  of  I  January 
1943  was  still  down  somewhat  from  1 
January  1941, 3.8 w*.  3.9  million  (aftera 
large-  chop,  probablv  as  a  result  of  war 
losses,  to  3  million  on  1  January  1942), 
liite  iHlmber  of  party  members  on  mili- 
tary assignments  had  risen  I)et\veen  1 
January  1941  and  1  January  1943  from 

emjom  to  1.9  mmmn.  a  mi  mt4  of 

that  increase  had  come  in  1942.  most  of 
it  between  May  and  Decemtier,  and  as 
of  1  January  1943,  slighdy  more  than 
50  percent  of  the  party  mctiibei  shij) 
was  on  military  duty,  as  compared  to 


"'Raymond  h.  Gardioff,  Savut  MUitaty  DaOritte 
(Glencoe,  U}.:  firee  Press,  t95S),  p.  24&. 


440 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


16.5  percent  in  1941.^^  ConcuTtenlly 
witli  die  "patriotic  war"  campaign,  the 
Araiy's  Main  Political  Administration 
lindertook,  by  means  of  a  special  coun- 
cil, tQ  improve  the  |>olitical  education 
at  the  troops,  whidi  vm  tcMnd  "often 
to  have  hafi  a  formal,  bureaueratic 
diaracter"  in  the  past. 

Tlie  advances  to  Sialingiafl  and  the 
Caucasus  broij.|fht  tlie  Soviet  territory 
utidier  ^rman  escctipatioii  to  1  wiilii^ 
square  miles.  Thi,s  was  less  than  Wil 
ei|;htli  of  the  total  Soviet  land  area,  b«tt 
It  ym  almost  tiaiif  of  the  Itiirapi^n 

Sfjviet  Union,  anfl  it  was  equal  to  a  full 
lilird  of  the  United  States  (Alasi^a  £wxd 
HafWE^  ejtcltided).  in  t3i»se  t  fiiilfiofi 
square  miles,  80  million  people,  almost 
40  percent  of  the  population,  had 
lived,  and'  tMt  area  contained  47  per- 
cent of  tlie  cultivated  land — nearly  all 
of  the  best  lan4  itt  the  Soviet  UniQii,. 
Vetm  titere  also  haul  cdsW^  ?i(^erde«a: 
of  the  pig  iron,  58  perceSI Sfebd, 
63  percent  of  the  coal,  a&d  percent 
of  the  c*)tintry%  electrical  energy.^"* 
However,  as  great  as  the  damage  was,  if 
the  Germans  did  not  break  out  in  some 
new  direction  and  if  Soviet  txaiR^tisCe 
could  be  restored,  the  Soviet  war  po- 
tential was  going  to  be  substantially 
great!^  at  the  end  liie  IMS  summer 
man  it  had  been  at  the  same  time  in  the 
previous  year. 

Although  the  f eifeat  ftw^al  another 
wave  of  evacuations,  war  production 
was  on  the  rise.  Reportedly,  the  facto- 
ries mmed  ^u  M^Ml  muMt  mm^t 


^'Dtborin  and  TelpuKWvskly,  i%i  i  tewK,  p.  37S; 

IVMV,  v(,)l.  V,  p.  313. 

^w,i/v;  vol.  V,  i>,  ;to7. 

"^Ibid.,  vol.  Vi,  p.  14. 


and  24,446  tanks  in  1942.  a  good  two- 
thirds  more  aircraft  and  better  than 
three  times  as  many  tanks  as  in  1941. 
The  German  output  was  15,456  air- 
craft and  5,958  tanks.  In  1942,  Soviet 
artillery  output  exceeded  33,000  pieces 
lai  ger  than  76-mm.,  more  than  twice  as 
many  as  had  been  produced  in  1941,^^ 

As  of  November  1942.  the  Soviet 
forc  es  in  tlie  field  numbered  6.5  mil- 
lion men.^'"  The  German  and  allied 
11  <  K)ps  in  the  four  army  groups  on  the 
main  front  totaled  ai)oui  3.4  million, 
and  the  Gernrnn  and  Fimiish  con- 
i&tgenis  in  flie  fer  north  would  have 
brought  the  number  to  about  4  million. 
The  Soviet  figure,  agaur,  apparently 
does  not  include  Stavka  reserves,  which 
are  given  as  162  divisions,  188  brigades, 
and  181  regiments  at  the  start  of  tlie 
1942—1943  winter  campaign. 

During  the  summer,  organizational 
improvements  continued.  Since  late 
1*941,  the  armies  had  been  using  the 
mobile  groLi]is  as  jjanial  snlistitiites  foi' 
the  disbanded  corps,  in  the  mobile 
groups,  two  or  tntJlt!  divisions  operated 
under  the  ad  hoc  conirnanti  of  one  of 
their  headquarters,  which  liad  to  direct 
the  group  and  its  own  troops  as  Wfet! 
and  generalh  did  not  have  the  staff 
aa4-  the  communications  to  do  hoih.  In 
i#42;  twenty-eight  rifle  corps  head- 
quarters were  lormed,  enough  to  take 
over  die  functions  f  ormerly  assigned  to 
the  mobile  groups.  In  the  tank  corps' 
structure,  the  moioii/.ed  rifle  fjiigades 
were  not  providing  enougfi  infantry 
suppoi^t  lb  fnatEe  the  corps  equal 


^''Ibiil..         V,  p.  4S:  Deborin  and  lelpukliovskiy, 
Jttigi  I  looki.  p.  I'MI);  l\tK\ike,  RutslUT^  p.  24f. 
^"/l        \n\.  VI.  L'O. 

■"OKH.  Gf/iSldH.  fmrt^/r  H,;;i  Chi.  2669/42, 
Cii'i;i-i,uelji'i^h'lliini;  ili  i  n  >  hiirriclrli  ii  unit  lier  sirm- 
;.7ivivv\.A,H  Kniiilf.  SIuikI  2l).<!.-t2.  II  22/23S  file; 
tiohibovidi.  "Savianiya  sirategukesktkh,"  p.  17. 


THE  CHANGE  OF  SEASONS 


441 


jnatdiesfi&r  German  paiizer  divisions; 
eonse^tieatly,  in  September  1942, 
mechanized  corps  began  to  be  erfeatedt. 
These  consisted  of  three  mechanized 
brigades  (a  regiment  of  motorized  in- 
fentry  and  a  tank  regiment  fa  each) 
and  one  tank  brigade,  and  they  had 
173  tanks,  7  more  than  the  tank  corps 
Itad.  iJtmh^  tbecmw^e  ©f  ifi^e'^^eair  also, 

the  "guards"  designation  had  come  lo 
be  regarded  as  more  than  a  formal 
mark  of  distinction,  and  guards  forma- 
tions were  given  larger  allotments  of 
troops  and  weapons.  1  he  strength  of  a 
guards  fifie  dmSiofl,  fof  m^mst,  -was 
set  at  10,670  mem  that  of  an  ordinary 
rifle  division  was  9,435.  A  guards  rifle 
division  was  also  allowed  a  thi*i3  tSMitt 
automatic  weapons  and  4  more  artil- 
lery pieces  (9  batteries  rather  tlian  8) 
tfian  a  Tif»rfiial  infantry  division.^*  As 
had  been  die  case  with  the  shock  ar- 
mies, however,  it  appears  that  the 
guards  designation  was  often  given  be- 
fore the  other  requirements  were  met. 

The  most  etlective  weapons  were 
being  brougtit  into  play  in  increased' 
numbers.  The  T-34/76B.  with  a 
longer-barreled  gim  and  an  improved 
turret  made  its  appearance  in  time  for 
the  Stalingrad  figluing.  The  IL-2. 
Sktw^mJiki  which  had  proved  its  wortli 
m  m  aiftifcaiiik. 

accoimted  for  lietter'tMn  a  third  of  the 
1942  aircraft  production  {7,654 
planes).  Although  Soviet  designers  had 
developed  a  number  of  good  automatic 
weapons,  particularly  submachine 
gunk,  i&fiMiuss^ati^I5eifeme  Jiad 
somewhat  neglected  production  of 
these  before  the  war.^^  By  mid- 1942, 


»*^(»slikcvii-li.  VmrirJiftniy,'  sil\.  pp.  2H-t,  2R<>.  517. 

"TeTrett.  Fighling  Vehicles,  p.  35;  Deborin  and 
Tdpulchnvskiy,i<«^j  HisAi.  p.  260.See/FWSS.  toI.  I. 
pp.  415.  452. 


tlic  troops  were  getting  large  ntaosbepS 
of  what  would  become  the  infantry^ 
«aoSt  distiftiftive  weapon,  the  drum-fed 
PPSh41  (Postolet-Pulennol  Shpagina) 
submachine  gun.  Designed  by  G.  S. 
Shpagin,  it  has  been  described  as  "one 
of  the  most  crudely  made  guns  ever 
issued  on  a  large  scale."*"  Nevertheless, 
it  was  fieliable  and  effective  as  weU  as 
cheap  to  manufacture,  and  simple  to 
operate  and  maintain.'" 

Countmiffensive  Plam 
Opemtbn  Urrnms 

While  Churchill  and  Harriman  were 

in  Moscow  in  August.  Stalin  tnk!  them 
about  "a  great  counterottensive  in  two 
direction^  that  he  was  going  to  feuftich. 
"soon"  to  cut  off  the  Germans.  Har- 
riman  went  back  to  Washington  believ- 
ing Stalingritod  ivotiJd  be  lield,  «iid'  in 
November  he  thought  the  offensive 
begun  dien  around  Stalingrad  was  the 
Ott^  *StaKn  had  promised  ...  in  Au- 
gjj^fr."**  In  the  sense  that  the  idea  of  a 
cotmteroffensive  at  Stalingrad  had  oc- 
cured  to  Stalin  in  August — -m  ft  htd 
also  to  Hitler — the  November  offen- 
sive may  have  been  what  Stahn  had 
mentioned  to  HarriBtia»,  but  tbe^jaufi^ 
teroffensive,  as  it  was  prepared  and 
executed,  was  not  born  until  a  month 
after  the  Stalm-CButtihiH-Harritmii 
meeting,  and  the  idea,  apparentlv,  was 
not  Stalin's  but  Zhukov's  and 


"'Ian  v.  Hogg  and  John  Weeks.  Alililnty  Small  Arm 
aj  till'  Tuvnltctlt  Ceftkay  (New  Yart:  Hippoerene  Books, 
1977).  p.  104. 

"/VOl'SS,  vol.  I,  p.  452. 

"•-l  lai  riinan  and  Ah&\,Spmal  Envtiy,  pp.  J62,  168, 
174. 
*"See  p,  45t}. 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


General  N.  F-  Vatutin, 

COMMANB^  or  SoimtWEST  FfeONT 


As  ZIiLikov  tells  it,  he,  Vasilevskiy, 
and  Stalin  were  discussing  on  12  Sep- 
tember how  to  break  Sixth  Army's  hold 
on  the  Volga  north  of  Stalingi  ad  when 
it  occurred  uj  him  and  \'asilc\  skiy  that 
they  "would  have  to  seek  some  other 
solution  [than  the  shallow  flank  attacks 
then  being  tried].'"  Stalin's  curiosity  was 
aroused,  and  Zhukov  and  VasUevskiy 
worked  aJl  the  aact  ds^  in  the  General 
Staff  going  over  the  possibilities.  Late 
that  night  Uiey  returned  to  Stahn's  of- 
fice and  proposed  the  following:  "First, 
to  continue  wearing  out  the  enemy 
with  active  defense;  second,  to  begin 
preparation  for  a  cGita»i^?eifensive  in 
order  to  deal  tlie  enemy  a  crushing 
blow  at  Stalingrad  to  reverse  the  strate- 
gic situation  in  the  south  in  our  favor." 
Then  they  went  to  Stalingrad,  where 
the  battle  was  in  a  cridcal  phase,  to 


study  the  conditions  first  hand,  Zhukov 
to  Stall ngnul  FtidiI  and  Vasilevskiy  to 
Southeast  front.  Late  in  the  inondi,  on 
the  27tik  m  the  28th,  they  returned  m 
Moscow  a»d  presented  their  con- 
cepdoft  of  tfie  counteroffensive  plotted 
on  a  map  that  both  had  signed  and  to 
which,  after  some  discussion,  Stalin 
added  the  word  "Approved"  and  liis 
signature.^ '  Tlie  counteroffeostwe  was 
code-named  Uranus. 

In  October,  while  Sixty-second  Aifiny 
kept  the  battle  alive  in  Stalingrad, 
Zhukov  and  Vasilevskiy  worked  out  the 
specifics  of  Uranus  and  supervised  a 
buildup  on  Sixth  and  E^QOrlb  Kauzer 
Armies'  flanks.  A  major  requirement 
was  to  activate  a  new  front  headquar- 
ters. Southwest  Front,  in  the  zone  of  the 
main  effort  on  the  Don  upstream  from 
Kletskaya.  Southwest  Front  would  take 
over  Sixth,  First  Guards,  Sixty-third,  and 
Twenty-first  Armies,  or  better  than  half  of 
Rokossovskiy's  Don  Front,  and  would 
also  receive  the  Fifth  Tank  Army.  Com- 
mand OH  Southwest  Front  went  to  General 
N.  F.  Vatutin,  who,  at  age  forty-one, 
was  apparently  one  of  the  younger 
generals  being  brought  to  the  fore.  His 
only  previous  field  command  in  the 
war  was  \bn>7iezJi  Front,  for  which  he  had 
nominated  himself  and  to  which,  it  is 
said,  Stalin  had  appointed  him  on  the 
spur  of  the  moment.''^  The  command 
of  Wntnezh  Front,  which  General  Goli- 
kOv  received  as  Vatutin's  replacement, 
had  not  required  a  particularly  high 
order  of  generalship,  and  Vatutin's  se- 
lectioiv  for  the  crucial  command  in 
Uranus  prohaWy  owed  more  to  his 


"Delo,"  p.  242;  SLiiusoikn,  SKihngiiuLkina  bih'a,  p.  347; 
and  IVMV.  ^■ol.  VI,  p.  27^ 
"Vasilevskiy,  -Delo,"  p.  223;  VOV,  p.  172. 


THE  CHANGE  OF  SEASONS 


443 


earlier  service  as  Vasilevskiy's  de]>utv  in 
tlie  General  Staff.  While  his  age,  in  fact, 
may  have  counted  after  Biaiienny  (fifty- 
nine)  and  ShaposhnikcSfVl^ty)  became 
inactive,  the  top  Soviet  ^6]^erals  were 
all  relatively  young  men.  Ertstiienko 
was  fifty;  Vasilevskiy  and  TLmoshenko, 
forty-seven;  Zhukov,  forty-six;  Rokos- 
sovsldy,  forty-six;  Meretskov,  forty-five; 
Voronov.  forty-three;  Chuikov  and  Go- 
likov,  forty-two;  ?ind  Grechko,  thirty- 
nine. 

Tlie  fbiu"  field  armies  assigned  to 
Southwest  Front  were  reinforced  with 
lafefitry  and  given  mobUe  f <^ice!»  iot 
form  of  tank,  mechanized,  and  cavalry 
corps.  The  same  was  also  done  op- 
posite Fourth  Panzer  Army  to 
Imgrad  Fmnis  Sixty-fourth,  F/ffy-scvenfh, 
aod  Fifty-first  Ar?nies.  Fijth  Tank  Army, 
under  General  Leytenaftt  'R  L.  fto- 
manenko,  consisted  of  6  rifle  fli\  isions, 
2  tank  corps,  a  guards  tank  brigade,  a 
cavalry  corps,  and  artillery,  antiaircraft, 
and  inoriar  regiments.""^  It  had  been 
out  ol  the  front  throughout  the  sum- 
mtt,  being  rebuilt  at®  serving  as  a 
backstop  against  a  German  thrust  to- 
ward Moscow  via  Orel  and  Sukhiuiclii. 

The  initial  objeetlves  of  Uranus 
would  be  to  tie  down  Sixili  Army  on 
the  front  between  the  Don  and  the 
Vbl^  and,  in  Smfingtiaid,  to  smash  the 
Rumanian  armies  on  its  left  aTitl  right, 
and  to  drrusl  behind  Sixth  Ar  my  to  cut 
Unes  of  cQtmaanicatii&Ti  SEer^ss  iffie 
Don,  Fifth  Tar^  Army  was  to  be  the 
sp^^head  on  the  aorth,  where,  after 
itsS  rifle  dMiabtisr  tei  &e  first  infme 
and  two  in  the  second,  opened  a  gap  in 
Rumanian  Third  Army's  front,  the  two 
wek  <c^^  WDUld  break  ilifi@f]^li  ste^ 


ing  (or  Kalach  on  the  Don  rUic  west  of 
Stalingrad.  Following  behind  tfie  tank 
corps,  the  cavalry  corps  and  three  of 
Sixty-third  Army's  rifle  divisions  would 
fan  out  on  the  right  to  cover  the  flank 
by  establishing  a  line  on  the  Chir  River. 
Inside  the  aix  of  the  tank  army's  ad- 
vance, elements  ot  'Iiuenty-first  Army  and 
Dm  t^mi\  Sixty  fifth  Army  were  toweak 
through  past  Kletskaya  and  to  encircle 
four  German  divisions  Sixth  Army  had 
stationed  west  of  the  Don.  They  would 
get  help  from  Twenty- fourth  Ar»ty  (also 
belonging  to  Don  Fwnl),  which  was  to 
prevent  die  divisions  from  joining  the 
Sixth  Army  main  force  by  taking  the 
Don  crossings  at  Panshiiskiy  and  Ver- 
tyachiy.  Tb  complete  the  encirclement, 
Fiffy-sei'entli  and  Fifty-fnst  Ani///-s  would 
cut  throiigh  the  Fourth  Pan- 
zfer-^EtifJlanSaii  l%tirtli  Armj  lirte 
soLitE  $i|  SUkUngrad  and  would  strike 
northweStwBaifd  to  meet  Fifth  Tank  Army 
at  Kalach.*' 

The  whole  plan  hinged  critically 
keeping  Sixth  Army  and  Fourth  'Bm.* 
aejf  Airoy  locked  in  a  c6hfe§t  fbr  Sta- 
Ib^rad  and  on  not  allowing  them  to 
se^e  into  a  defensive  deployment  be- 
ibre  Uranus  was  ready,  Ehher  <sf  two 
eventualities  would  greatly  becloud  the 
prospects  for  Uranus.  One  could  have 
arisefl  fk»m  itfe  'fbf tene«s  t^-^r.  If  tJiie 
Germans  took  Stalingrad,  rhc\'  could 
wididraw  enough  troops  from  the  city 

fmrn  a  strong  reserve.  ITie  other 
couki  bt  ing  about  the  same  result  even 
if  die  Germans  only  caught  a  scent  of 
tjRAa«t3s  bfef&rehand  since  fhey  were 
tied  down  in  Stalingrad  b\  their  own 
choice,  not  by  necessity;  conseq^ueudy, 


"[General  Staff  of  the  Red  Army],  Sbondk  maU-  '"Sh/mik.  Nomer  6.  See  aks  V0fr  a,  t7§;  IVMV,  vol. 
rialov  po  huckadyii  opyta  mpiy,  Nomer  6,  Apr-May  43.     VI.  p.  28;  Vasilevskiy,  "Deb,"  p.  2^£ 


444 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


total  surprise.  To  accomplish  that  goal, 
Zhukov  and  Vasilevskiy  devised  an. 
elaborate  maskirovka  ("camouflage")  for 
Uramis/**  1 1  c  onsisted  of  three  parts: 
concealment  of  the  concept  of  the  op- 
eration, the  direction  of  the  main 
effort,  and  the  composition  of  the 
forces.*' 

lb  protect  the  concept  of  the  opera- 
tion, Zhukov  and  Vasilevskiy  laid  on  a 
heavy  blanket  of  security.  They  re- 
duced the  planning  time  allotted  to  the 
fronts  and  armies  to  an  amount  far 
below  the  previous  norms.  The  front 
commanders  were  not  told  about  the 
secret  of  Uranus  iinti!  mid-Orii lin  t, 
and  !lie\  \vere  forbidden  to  initiate  any 
plaiiiiiin^  of  their  own  before  the  first 
week  in  November.  T>  "disinform"  the 
enemy,  the  Jmnls  were  ordered  to  go 
over  to  the  defensive  on  15  October, 
and  from  then  on  all  visible  effort  was 
put  into  building  defenses.  The  civil- 
ians were  evacuated  from  villages 
within  25  kilometers  of  the  front,  and 
those  were  ringed  with  trenches — to 
give  enemy  air  recdnnaissatice  some- 
thing to  see.  Orders  [w  tiaining  to  the 
defense  were  transmitted  by  tele- 
phone, a  reHable  and  QOt  too  ctbvbus^ 
way  of  getting  them  into  enemy 
hands.^" 

Smithwm'Pmu  made  concealment  df 

the  diret  iioii  of  the  main  effort  a  par- 
ticularly difficult  and  dangerous  prob- 
lem. No  doubt,  it  would  have  been 


"'Ma.\kiniiikti  is  tlt'hnecl  in  ihe Soi'iX  Milium  t.nn'fia- 
pi'dm  as  "a  complex  ol'  measures  directed  loward 
deceiving  the  enemy.  It  includes  camouflage  by  con- 
cealmeni  and  simulation,  secrecy  and  securitv,  fi  inis 
;intl  diversions,  and  disinformation"  (deception). 

*"V'  A-  M,itsnlenko,  "Op^ra/n  Hflvn  nunkinnikii  iirfsk 
kiintmmtujilenii  pod  Stalingradom ,"  ihyeriiw-tstunihrskty 
ViUTval,  ia974),  p.  10. 

^"lini,.  p,  IhlVm,  vol.  VI,  35. 


better  ncji  to  liave  installed  another 
front  headquarters  at  all,  since  these 
were  difficult  tO  conceal  and  always 
objects  of  intense  enemy  interest.  But 
Uranus  was  too  complicated  an  opera- 
titm  for  VNo fronts  to  handle  themselves 
at  that  stage,  lb  limit  potential  damage 
to  the  maskirovka.  Headquarters,  South- 
west Front,  was  not  brought  forward 
until  28  October.'"' 

lb  prevent  the  enemy  from  deter- 
mining the  composition  of  the  forces, 
the  entire  bnildup.  with  the  cxt  t  ption 
s£Fifth.  Tank  Army,  was  done  witli  units 
of  less  than  army  size.  The  reserve^ 
usually  brought  in  close  before  an  of- 
fensive, were  held  at  Saratov  on  the 
Volga  200  miles  upstream  from  Sta- 
lingrad. Reinforcements  moved  only  at 
night,  under  strict  radio  silence.  Fifth 
Thnk  Army  made  its  500-mile  shift  from 
the  Orel-Sukhinichi  area  in  three 
weeks  of  night  marches,  the  last  on  the 
night  of  9  November.** 

At  the  last,  the  inaskirovka  itself  had 
to  be  protected  against  two  Soviet  prac- 
tices tbfatmjld  have  brought  it  to  grief: 
the  ratxfi^^  hoyn/i  ("battle  reconnais- 
sance") aiad  the  artillery  preparation. 
SiovJct  eoTOm&Tids  regarded  She 
razvedka  Imyem  as  an  indispensable ^re^ 
litQifiary  to  an  ollensive  to  teel  owt 
*dbfiectives  dP  iiltsdc«  ajf^nas  ^of  fire, 
and  the  nature  jaf  'tfce  im^tl**'®*  Cjon- 

ducted,  as  it  eostomisfaf  vm*  r«pe9t- 
edly  and  over  extended  periods  in  as 
much  as  divisional  strengths,  it  usnalh' 
alerted  the  enemy  well  before  an  offen- 
slvt  ^gan.  ^vkm  and  Vasttetrsldy 
tg^iiM     convince  the  field  commatids 


"SftomiA,  Namrr  d. 

''Vhid.;  IVMV.  vol  VI,  p.  S6;MatsvdeQko,'*C^«wtw- 

tiaytt  mtikitwlui,"  p.  13. 

"A.  SiniLskiy,  "Sposohy  vedeniya  voysliovoy  riavi&i,'' 
\byenruhitlorirlmkiy  Zhunud,  4(1976),  89-94. 


TH£.  CHANGE  OF  SEASONS 


445 


to  forego  the  mzvedka  boyctn,  hut  they 
undertook  to  reduce  the  risks  it  posed 
by  reqtiifing  it  tt>  m 
strengths  of  no  more  than  battalions 
and  at  the  same  tiiue  by  all  armies  in 
the  Stalmgraci  nvtA.  In  the  past,  ^ 
commands  had  also  engaged  in  artil- 
lery duels  and  staged  lengthy  fire  prep- 

aratl^&ns.  For  UMmjs,  tM  arallerf 

preparation  was  limited  to  an  hour  and 
a  haJf,  and  preliminary  tiring  was 

Mars  and  Umnm 

All  of  the  Soviet  accounts  depict 
UraNTIS  as  the  main  (jperation  in  the 
initial  phase  of  the  1942-1943  winter 
offensive  and  most  leave  the  reader  to 
mfer  Aat  ft  was  ifee  only  on&  Hiere 
was,  however,  f)ne  other  being  pre- 
pared in  October  1942 — Operation 
Mars.  The  Soviet  History  of  the  Second 
Wyrld  War  gives  it  just  two  sentences  in 
whiclr  its  purpose  is  stated  to  have  been 
*to  destre^  the  enemy  in  ffic  regibus  crf" 
Rzhcv  and  Novo  Sokolniki."'^''  Ar  Rzhev 
the  objective  apparenUy  was  to  finish 
tlj#  mbtk  attest  Miitii  kitfif  started  in 
the  summer.  Since  Novo  Sokolniki  was 
already  practically  in  the  front  on  Uie 
western  rim  of  the  Tbropets  bulge  and, 
b\  iisell  ,  a  point  of  only  modest  tactical 
consequence,  the  aim  there  most  likely 
was  to  strike  deep  t&  the  southwest 
behind  Army  Group  Center.  Also, 
since  the  Rzhev  area  was  well-known  to 
Zhuk^v,  ajad  he  had  advocated  con- 
centration againsf  Army  Group  Cen- 
ter, it  can  be  assumed  that  he  was  as 
mstrumental  in  devising  Mars  as  he 
was  iu  Unmns.  After  16  November,  he 


^ftJ^ibtile^kSi  "Operm^fMr^a  me^mki,"  pp,  U,  IB. 


left  Vasilevskiy  in  charge  at  Stalingrad 
and  went  to  Kalinin  and  West  Fronts  to 
talcie  ^arge  df  the  ^Bnal  pre^t^^eos 
for  M,\RS.  which  was  scheduled  to  be^ 
gin  about  a  week  after  Uranus.^^ 

MAits  could,  atthe  titee,  have  bee^% 
gi'eal  deal  more  important  than  can 
now  be  gathered  from  the  lew  raen- 
ti(Mis  of  it  given  in  the  Soviet  literature. 
It  was  laid  in  the  area  fliat,  during  1941 
and  1942,  had  consistendy  been  re- 
garded ifi  Soviet  thinking  as  the  dost 
imj^a^MiS,  strategic  direction,  the  one 
in  which  Soviet  forces  had  already  con- 
ducted a  successful  winter  offenave 
and  in  which  they  could  expect  to  be 
able  to  stage  another  on  belter  terms 
dian  the  first.  Ur.anus,  on  the  other 
hand,  was  a  highly  speculative  venture. 
The  History  of  the  Great  Patriotic  War 
almost  says  as  uioefe  in  the  following: 
"The  Stavha  .  .  .  assumed  that  the  en- 
emy, in  spite  of  his  desperate  efforts 
would  not  have  acliieved  iiis  goals,  thiSt 
his  offensive  would  have  failed  but,  yet, 
neither  would  he  have  succeeded  in 
going  on  the  d^^^se  along  liic'  entire 
Stalingrad  scctoi-  nor  changed  the  op- 
erational deployment  of  his  forces.  In 
Stalingrad  itself,  lar^e  fitf^y  forces 
would  still  continue  to  carry  on  their 
liopeless  attacks."^'  Even  understated 
as  they  are,  theSe  were  enormous  aft- 
simiptions.  To  expect  that  Sixth  Army 
would  not  somehow  manage  to  take 
Stalingrad  sometime  between  the  mid- 
dle of  September  and  the  middle  of 
November  was  a  great  deal,  fo  antici- 
pate the  Germans'—  with  the  memory 
of  Moscow  fresh  in  their  minds — con- 
tinuing a  faltering  offensive  into  the 

"Zhukov.  Mmoirs,  p.  40?,  SiSt  ^  sSftfc- 


446 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


w  iiiler  wase\  en  iiiorc.  Fiii  tht  i  niorc,  if 
the  Genmns  did  botli,  it  then  became 
necessary  to  assume  that  they  i^ouM 
also  not  know  liow  to  extricate  them- 
selves  from  an  entirclctnenl. 

tJRAMJS  wa«  a  gamble;  the  logical 
piospccts  for  Mars  were  far  better: 
and  the  deployment  as  of  mid- 
Nbveinber  itidicates  strongly  that  the 
Stavka  also  took  ibis  view.  On  the  600 
miles  of  front  between  Kholm  and 
Bolkho^  #Mtt,  opposite  Army  Group 
Cfeoter,  l,8lfl()!iOOO  troops,  24,682  artil- 
lery |i£@0e#  and  mortars,  3,375  tanks, 
and  J4^*i  idPCKait  were  deployed.  Op- 
posilse  Amy  <]hroup  B,  on  slightiv  less 
t3ian  500  ¥6U#  front  from  Novaya 
Kalitva  to  AstraftJian,  l,!03.()0(j  troops, 
15,501  artillery  pieces  and  mortars, 
1,463  tanks,  and  928  aircr^t  were  de- 
ployed. The  lOiolm-Bblkhw  sector^  17 
pcr(  cm  of  the  total  fVfjntage  bettV^n 
Lake  Ladoga  and  tiie  Caucasus,  bad 
^1.4  petv^t  of  the  troops,  S2  percent 

of  the  artillery  and  mortars,  45  percent 
of  the  tanks,  and  38  percent  of  the 
aircraft.  The  Nt&Vaya  RaiitVa- 
Asti  akhan  sector,  14  perct  nt  of  tlic  total 
frontage,  had  18.4  percent  of  the 
troops.  20.1  percent  ofthe  ar^kry  and 
mortars.  19.9  pei  cent  of  the  tanks,  and 
30.6  percent  of  the  aircraft.** 

UftANCS.  if  tfie  dfeubtsbed&uding  its 

prospects  resoKid  iluniselves  la\«)ra- 
bJy,  did  have  one  significant  advantage 
over  Mahs:  the  fore»  for  IJitAmTS 
uould  have  a  'iuhsi.iniiallv  larger  nu- 
merical advantage  over  tlie  enemy.  The 
History  (f  ike  Simid  WHdWir  Tt&Mtaim 
that  the  1.1  million  Soviet  troops  de- 
ployed in  the  Novaya  Kalitva— 
Astrakhan  s^^m&t  were  opposed  by  1 
million  ^rmans  and  Rumanians; 


"WMV,  vol.  VI,  uble  4,  p.  35. 


hence  the  Soviet  advantage  was  only 
1.1:1.^'  The  actual  combined  strength 
of  Siscth  Army,  Fourth  f^anzer  Army, 
and  Rimianian  Third  .\rnn.  lu)\u'ver, 
was  very  much  less  llian  a  million  men 
and  ih  aH  prbbability  Just  slightly  more 
than  a  half  million,  uhith  made  the 
Soviet  advantage  2U.  Ihe  ratio  in  the 
Artny  Group  Center  area  was  I.§;t, 
using  a  German  strength  estimate  of 
1,011,500  for  the  army  group  in  Sep- 
tembei- 1942.  While  die  tatids  'varied  by 
only  a  tenth  ol  a  jjoint,  the  difference 
in  tlie  composition  of  die  forces  they 
represented  was  considerable.  The 
.\rmy  Group  Center  troops  were  all 
Germaii.  Of  the  total  for  the  three 
arfmes  in  the  Uranus  area,  ctese  te  M 
percent  (245,000)  were  Rumanian 
troops.*" 

One  Soviet  account,  by  a  nobble 

atitlioritv.  General  Mavor  V.  .A..  Mat- 
stilenko,  repiesents  Mars  as  a  decep- 
tion irtcorpotafed  into  the  tJitANUs 
maskimvka.  Matsnlenko  slates,  "Din  ing 
the  preparations  lor  the  counteroiten- 
sive  at  Stalingrad,  the  Supreme  High 
C  ommand  had  the  forces  of  Kalinm 
and  \^  Frmts  display  activity  in  the 
D^terii  direction  agaifist  Attfiy^Sfoup 
Center,  crea(iiiL,r  ilie  impression  that 
the  winter  operations  were  bein^  pre- 
pared precisely  there  and^  itot  the 
southwest.  This  measure  iprodticed 
positive  results.""'  In  that  mode,  MarS 
wottid  have  repaid  the  Geimaiis  nicely 
fot  their  own  0|)eration  Kri  ,\ti.  of  the 
previous  spring,  but  KRtML  was  pure 


''■'Ibid.,  tablf  (i,  p.  iri. 

""Manfred  Keliris.  Sinlinf^r/nl  (SiiiHg.ii  i:  I)<-uik<  tic 
Verl.igs-Anstalt,  l!(74).  9.  p.  fi67;  OKII.  <„i<Sl,lll, 
Frrmtif  Hi-ne  (hi.  ,Vr  2f>f>S)l-i2.  Gfgi-mii'hi'nli-lluiii;  ilri 
l>frhiHi\i!i'ti-n  iitirl  iln  Mwjflrusit.^rhrii  Kiaijle,  Slimd 
2(l'-i  -i2.  H  22.'2:i.'.  lilr. 

"'Matsulenko.  "Operatn'mya  nuakimvka,"  p. 


THE  CHANGE  OF  SEASONS 


447 


shatn  and  illusion,  which  Mars  was  not. 
Mcxre  likely  Mars  ligured  in  the  Ura- 
ftm.^m  aotas'a  issaat  of  the  maskimvha 
but  as  a  potential  means  of  keeping  the 
battle  for  Stalingrad  going  mitil  the 
lime  was  ripe  for  Uranus.  According  to 
\he  Historj  of  the  Second  V\kirkl  Wbt;  Mars 
was  ready  as  of  23  October,  and  the 
Start  order  would  have  been  given  any- 
time thereafter  if  the  Germans  had 
begun  taking  troops  from  Army 
Group  Center  to  reinforce  the  attack 
into  Stalingrad.  What  the  Soviet  plan- 
ners did  was  compromise  Mars  to  pre- 
serve the  essential  condition  for 
Uranus.  However,  it  will  be  seen  that  in 
doing  so  tliey  befuddletl  the  enemy  as 
much  as  if  Mars  had  been  a  decep- 
tion that  in.  fact  "produced  positive 
results. 

"Tim  Yeair'&  Cumpai^i  Has 

The  Army  in  Decline 

Musing  iuiha]5pily  on  an  old  prob- 
lem, General  Haldei;  chief  of  the  Gen- 
eral Staff,  in  the  first  week  of  August 
observed,  "According  to  our  calcula- 
dons  of  early  May  . . .  we  espeeted  the 
enemy  to  be  able  to  set  up  sixty  new 
divisions  by  the  fall  muddy  peiiod." 
But  he  noted  that  sixty-nine  new  Soviet 
divisions  had  already  been  identified, 
and  the  fall  rains  were  still  a  good  two 
i3Matiy»ai«a^^  "All  told,"  he  added,  "we 
can,  perhaps,  anticipate  seeing  another 
thirty  new  divisions.""*  If  the  Soviet 
figures  are  correct,  Haider  erred  sub- 
stantially on  the  short  side.  Reportedly, 
in  the  period  April  to  October  1942, 


the  Stavka  had  lelea.sed  from  its  re- 
serves 189  rifle  divisions.  78  rifle  bri- 
gades, 30  tank  and  mechanized  c^fps, 
and  159  tank  brigades.'''  It  was  appar- 
ent that  the  Soviet  manpower  pool  was 
a  long  way  from  running  dry. 

The  same  could  scarcelv  be  said  for 
that  of  Germany.  On  8  September,  the 
Orpnkational  Branch  of  the  OKH 
announced,  "All  planning  must  take 
into  account  the  unalterable  fact  that 
the  predicted  strength  of  the  Army 
field  forces  as  of  1  November  1942  will 
be  800,000,  or  18  percent,  below  the 
established  strength  and  that  it  is  no 
longer  possible  to  reduce  those  num- 
ijers.  False  impressions  will  result  if 
units  continue  to  be  carried  as  l)eiore 
with  this  gieal  loss  of  strength."  The 
brandi,  thereupon,  propf)scd  reducing 
better  than  half  the  divisions  on  the 
Eastern  Front  from  three  regiments  to 
two.*'  The  two-regimenl  divisions 
would  remove  the  fiction  of  a  tempo- 
rar\  und^Srstrength  but  would  do  so 
essentially  b^  building  it  into  the  tables 
of  organization. 

After  two  summers  and  a  winter  in 
the  Soviet  Union,  the  German  Arni\ 
was  having  to  consume  its  own  inner 
substance.  In  Basic  Order  1.  the  first  of 
several  issued  in  the  fall  ol  l'.H2,  the 
OKH  directed  a  10  percent  rcclunjon 
in  all  staffs  and  the  transfer  of  the 
personnel  released  to  combat  assign- 
ments. Additionally,  all  rear  elements 
were  to  set  up  emergency  detaciunents 
that  could  be  sent  to  the  front  on  short 


table  4,  p.  SS;  OKH,  GenSldH,  (III)  Nr.  420743M2,  U 
22  file:  OKH,  GenStdH.  Op.  Ait  (IH),  PrmJ.  Nr.  75940^, 
ZahlenTnaessigs  Utbersichl  ueber  die  VeriAa^'^  i^^ 
siorun.  Stand  11.9.42,  H  22  Be. 


448 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


imhi  f.  Aiii:)ilu-'i-  \r<isu  order  sel  a  yoal 
ol  18U,U00  men  to  be  secured  from  tJie 
Tear  echelems  fbr  front-line  duty  by 
I  r|jlaciiig  them  uiih  flilfsiviUigc,  auxil- 
iaries recruited  among  the  Russian 
prisonefs  dFivar.**  Anomer  ^taliB^ed 

"subslilution  of  wcaixnis  forTOfili"  as  a 
principle  of  command  and  ^ecified 
mat  wlien  new,  improvai  weapons 
were  issued  the  (ines  they  replaced 
were  to  be  left  with  the  troops  to  aug- 
ment their  firepower:*' 

Vhv^v  were  gestures,  IKli' ^BSWeif. 
Since  May,  General  der  Itl^aniieile^^- 
ter  von  tJ«rnfc,  arMed  ^tfi  the  aii- 
llu)i  iiv  to  order  irrevocable  transfers  to 
die  front,  had  been  combing  the  rear 
areas  as  ftilier^  personal  represen- 
tative. Unruh's  visitations  had  aixJiised 
dismay  verging  on  terror  and  had 
earned  him  Che  aidbiathe  C5e*ieral 

Hrlih  iildriu  ("herei  Snatchcr")  bill  could 
not  be  shown  to  ba'^  added  signihcant 
numbers  to  die  combat  st^eftgiM.** 
f!i!f^,r/llior  were  already  being  so 
widely  used  in  noncombatant  roles  that 
tfiere  was  no  lar^e  block  of-  tl«6ps  left 
for  them  to  if^Blce.  Tlic  substitution 
of  weapons  for  laen  depended  on  hav- 
ing the  wrapons.  Ttie  PanAer  tank,  for 
iiisiaiuc,  r.ertnanv's  most  promising 
new  weapon,  would  for  months  yet  be 
snarled  in  development  and  prodtic- 
tion  difficnlti^. 


'H)KH.  GenStdll,  0,fi.  (tin.  Nr.  9900142, 

Grundltgender  Bejehl  Sk  I.Sjtl  U,  AOK  :il)l.-.r>',^i7; 
OKH.  GenSidH,  Org.  Aid.  KniirMngrlrmh.  Baud  l\,  1-1(1 
OC142.H  I/2I4  file. 

'"OKH.  GenSlilH,  Op.  AM.  (Ill),  Nr.  34H'>I-I2. 
Flaming  futr  .^mbon  dtr  Hematruppen  im  Winlfr 
l9-l2tlJ.  3.9.42.  H  22/235  nie;  H.  Gr.  Nord.  la 
f:n,'i;-i,i<rrhii,h.  l.~}U0.42.  10  Oct  42,  H.  Gr.  Nord 

7:.1L'H  !:.  tjle. 
■■'OKU,  GniSldll.  Oifi.  :\hl.  Kiit^agt^K^,  Bemd  IV. 
Aug  42,  H  1/214  fik-. 


The  air  lorre  had  a  manpower  sur- 
plus that  Hitler,  in  September,  agreed 
to  tap,  but  at  the  insistence  of  Reich- 
marsthall  Goering,  (ommander  in 
diief  of  the  air  forte,  he  decided  not  to 
use  rfie  men  as  Jirmy  replacements  but 
lo  form  air  Untr  field  divisions 
manned  and  ofhcered  exclusively  by 
air  fbrce  personnd.  In  "September  and 

f)(  tober,  he  ordered  that  t^vent^  such 
divisions  be  set  up  with  a  combined 
Strengtli  of  sibotit  two  hundred  ^ou* 
sand  men.  From  the  arni\  point  of 
view,  a  more  unsatisfactory  arrange- 
iQAest  woidd  have  been  difficult  to  de- 
vise. The  air  foiee  troops  had  no 
training  in  land  warfare,  and  because 
Goerin^  testrieted  the  army's  inflttetftse 
on  them,  by  claiming  that  the  "leae- 
tionary"  spirit  ol  the  army  would  im- 
pair his  troops'  National  Socialiint 
indoctrination,  iluy  were  not  likely  tO 
be  gtVi^  enough  training  to  make 
them  gnywhere  near  sintaSe  for  em- 
ployment on  die  Eastern  Front.  Wijrse 
still,  die  army  had  to  scrape  together 
^@it^  equipment  to  ou^t  die  twenty 
^^sisaolis,  and  dir  ihAersion.-^  veliitles 
akKnelbrced  p(jsipunement  of  plans  to 
bring  I^Ht  t>r  five  panzer  divisions  to 
full  streSgifil.®*  Basic  Order  3.  uliirh 
regulat^  tlie  employment  of  die  air 
fbrtse^efe  dMsisnS,  required  fiiat  &ey 
be  given  "only  defensive  missions  on 
quiet  fronts."^' 

Htlter  ^ded  Ms  own  rdiiforceaieiit 
c&  ^  baisie  order.  It  read: 

Tlie  low  t  ombai  sn  engths  of  the  fighting 
itiHips  ate  no  longer  lolerable. 

TIk'  figliting  Hoops  have  manv  jjeison- 
nel  vacancies;  Uiose  not  directly  engaged 
inc&ixta^lin0$titooe.  That  mu^eeasel 


"Vbid.,  l-l()CJct42. 

•"H.  Gr.  Nord.  la  Krifgtmgiihu^  1,-31.10-42.  15  Oct 
42,  H.  Gr.  Nord  75128/15  file. 


THE  CHANGE  OF  SEASONS 


449 


I  will — aside  from  measures  to  be  taken 
outside  the  Army — also  institute  appro- 
priate correctives  within  the  Army,  t  hose 
are  to  be  carried  out  regardless  of  all 
opposition  and  appearances  of  impos- 
sibility. On  this  score  every  cpniinander 
must  display  his  competence  as OSud^  m 
doejs  in  troop  leadgr^hip. 

In  every  mstance  in  -which  a  tmop  unit 
experiences  a  scthack.  ilic  ncKi  highest 
conunander  is  to  investigate  whether  the 
couimandLT  iinolvcd  cxliaiisied  alt  ol  the 
possiLiiiitics  to  raise  his  (onil.ial  sitenglh 
proN'ided  for  undt-i'  ni)  orders.  In  special 
cases,  I  reserve  to  myself  ihe  right  to  order 

Overhaul  at  ihe  Top 

Hitler,  as  always,  was  incUiied  to 
transpose  problems  td  Wiliefe  ^€*e 
were  not  piagmatic  answers  into  ques- 
tions of  leadersiiip  and  will.  Appar- 
ently doing  that  also  was  uppermost  in 
his  mind  oit  24  September  when  he 
dismissed  Haider  as  chief  of  the  Army 
General  Staff,  In  their  last  interview 
togethei  he  told  Haider  that  it  was  now 
necessary  to  "educate"  the  General 
Staff  in  "fanatical  faith  in  the  Idea"  and 
that  he  was  determined  to  enforce  his 
will  "also"  on  the  army.  1  he  ^c^v  chief 
of  the  General  Staff,  General  der  In- 
fanterie  Kurt  Zeitzier,  initially  at  least, 
appeared  to  be  well  suited  to  Hitler's 
fMJf Mi&  vas  a  competent  but  not 
supremely  outstanding  staff  officer. 
As  chief  of  staff,  Army  Group  D, 
which  was  stationed  in  the  Low  Coun- 
tries and  along  the  Channel  coast,  his 
energy  and  a  rotund  figure  had  earned 
him  I  he  nickname  General  Fireball. 
His  physical  activity — plus  a  friend- 
ship with  Hitlers  adjutant,  General 
Schmundt^ — -had  brought  him  acien- 


AOK  I,  in  &n^a^iit&  Nr.  S,  13  Oct  42,  Tt. 
AOK I file. 


tion  at  the  Fuehrer  Headquarters,  and 
Hitler  liad  remarked  earlier  that  Hol- 
land would  6«f  a  *t&a^  mit*  for  the 
Allies  because  Zeitzier  "buzzes  back  and 
forth  there  like  a  hornet  and  so  pre- 
vents the  troops  from  falling  asleep 
from  lack  of  contact  v/ith  the  enemy."^- 

Although  Hiller,  at  tlie  tnst,  treated 
Zeiester  ttwth  **ntmost  friendliness,"  the 
change  in  chiefs  of  the  General  Staff 
did  not  signal  a  tiew  approach  to  the 
conduct  of  the  war  such  as  the  one 
Stalin  was  making. Hitler  valued 
Zeitzier  for  his  energy.  As  a  collaborator 
and  adviser,  he  proliably  expesleS 
Zeitzier,  who  had  been  lofted  from  an 
army  group  staff  on  an  inacti\'e  front 
to  the  highest  command  echelon,  to  be 
more  complaisant  and  less  indepen- 
dent-minded tlian  Haider  had  been. 
The  in^lal  jSnendliness  toward  Zeitzier 
was  also  no  mark  of  confidence  in  the 
generals.  He  had  come  to  distrust  them 
almost  to  a  man,  ami  after  September 
1942,  he  insisted  uu  having  a  ste- 
nographer present  to  take  down  eveiy 
conversation  he  had  with  them.  At  the 
same  time,  he  gave  up  eating  liis  meals 
with  his  inner  military  cii  cle,  which  had 
been  his  practice  since  early  in  the  war, 
and  henceforth,  ate  alotie  or  with  the 
non military  members  of  his  staf  f. 

In  the  course  of  installing  the  new 
chief  of  (lie  General  Staff,  Hitler  also 
put  himself  in  position  to  overhaul  the 
whole  officer  corps,  the  General  Staff 
and  the  general  ofhcer  ranks  in  par- 
litulai",  by  placing  the  Hccrespersomilamt 
("army  officer  personnel  office")  under 
Schmundt.  To  Schmimdt  be  outlined  a 


"Henry  PScker,  ed..  Mitlm  Tiseh^isfm^^  <BotH»: 
Atlienaeuin-Verlag,  19SI>,  p.  16S". 


450 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


))oli(  \  of  rapid  prmil0fion  for  youngt-r, 
baLilc-tcsied.  ani$  presumabiy  "edu- 
eatable*  officers.  Zeitzler,  forty-seven 
yt'ars  n!d  and  a  general  officer  for  less 
Uian  a  year  al  the  time  ot  his  appoint- 
ment, was  smii  an  officer.  Wmtr  also 
proposed  !&  break  the  General  Stafft 
hold  on  the  higher  commands  by  al-- 
lowing  line  (rflScers  tb  qualify  for  the 
top  posts  and  by  requiring  General 
Statf  officers  to  show  experience  as 
troop  commanders.  Eventually  he  ex- 
pected to  abolish  the  Gencial  StafPs 
marks  of  distinction,  the  red  trou- 
ser  stripes  and  silver  ce^st  tabs.'* 
St  hmundt,  who  had  built  his  career  on 
subservience  t«)  Hider,  could  be  ex- 
pected, without  being  told,  to  seek  out 
and  arivani f  like-minded  officers. 

Wlien  he  look  up  his  post,  Zeitzler 
made  a  contribution  of  his  own  to  the 
shake-iip  of  ihe  cunimand  system.  TTie 
army  iiad  long  resented  the  influence 
of  General  Jodl's  OKW  Op^ttons 
Staff  f)n  llic  drafting  of  strategic  direc- 
tives pertaiiuiig  exclusively  to  the  East- 
ern FroHt,  whidi  was  aif  army  J^^ter. 
The  resentment  had  increased  after 
Hitler  had  become  commander  in 
chief,  army,  and  had  converted  the 
Armv  General  Staff  into  a  second  per- 
sonal stall,  and  it  liad  been  sharpened 
by  the  f leewbeeling  criticism  JodI  and 
Field  Marshal  Keiiel.  chief,  OKW,  had 
indulged  in  from  dieir  lechni<  ally  loit- 
ier  positions  in  the  chain  of  command. 
Taking  advantage  of  Jodl's  having 
fallen  into  disfavoi,  Zeitzler  demanded 
and  secured  the  OKW's  exclusion  from 
the  drafdng  of  strategic  directives  that 
applied  solely  to  the  Eastern  Front. 

Henceforth  such  direeivgs  miem  K>  Ise 


issued  as  "operations  orders'*  by  the 
OKii,  The  orders,  naturally,  continued 
to  be  written,  as  the  direcuves  had 
been,  entirely  in  accordance  with 
Hitler^  wishes. 

Operations  Order  No.  1 

A  new  course  and  stvle  ol' command 
having  been  instituted,  Operadons 
tJrder  No,  I,  issued  on  14  October, 
pur])orted  to  do  the  same  for  strategy, 
its  first  sentence  read.  This  year's 
sunSmer  aind  fall  campaigns,  excepting 
operations  under\\a\  and  several  local 
oiiensives  still  contemplated,  has  been 
eondiidcd."  Army  Group  North,  Army 
Gioup  Center,  and  .\iniv  Group  B 
were  told  to  get  ready  for  winter  in  the 
lines  they  held,  and  in  this  order  and  a 
sujjpli  niem  issued  some  days  later, 
Hider  elevated  to  the  level  of  doctrine 
the  ISitStScillTei&^Ei^  formula  he  had 
einployed  during  the  1941-1942  Soviet 
winter  offensive.  He  ordered  that  the 
winter  positfons  were  to  he  held  under 
all  circuiTistances.  Tlicie  would  be  no 
evasive  maneuvers  or  wididrawais. 
Breakthroughs  were  to  he  localized, 
and  any  intact  part  of  the  front  was 
"absolutely"  to  be  held.  Troops  cutoff 
and  encircled  were  to  ddfend  them- 
selves where  ihcv  stood  until  thc\  were 
r  elieved,  and  Hider  made  every  com- 
mander p<afsonally  responsible  to  him 
lor  the  "unconditional  execution"  of 
these  orders."'  Ihe  supplement  ex- 
I  ended  the  doctrine  dowh  t6  die  lowest 
leadet  ship  level.  "F\  er\  leader,"  il  read, 
"down  to  squad  leader  must  be  con- 

vJiieed  ^rf'hij  saered  dii^  i&aiaiid  fast* 
come  what  may,  even  if  the  enemy 


.       .   .  "XJff  Rt^er,  OEM,  GmStdH.  Op.  A**.  (1)  Nr. 

^Ibft^tmrnOi  tks  Ch^s  da  Hmi^mmielamts,    43^ltMi  i^tUknMM  Nt.  1,  if.lQ.4Z,  AOK  6 


THE  CHANGE  OF  SEASONS 


451 


outflanks  him  on  the  right  and  left, 
even  if  his  part  of  the  line  is  cut  off, 

ehf^dted,  mimm  fey  vasH^,  eir«rf©ped 

in  smoke  or  gassed."  That  was  to  be 
repeatedly  "hammered  into  all  officers 
and  nMieominissioiiecl  officem"''^' 

The  Exceptiom 

Operations  Order  No.  1,  while  osten- 
sibly keeping  the  promise  Hitter  iuade 

in  the  spring  to  bring  the  summer 
campaign  to  a  more  lunely  close  than 
hstd  h&tm  AaSxe  in  the  previous  year, 
excepted,  as  stated,  offensives  in  prog- 
ress or  still  contemplated.  Those  in 
prGgr6is&^s«*^at  Stalingrad  aaid!  te<«^tsd 
Tuapse.  Contemplated  were  NORD- 
licHT.  against  Leningrad,  and  T.wben- 
SCWLAG  ("do¥€feOt«"),  a  recently 
conceived  operation  aimed  at 
Toropets.  First  Panzer  Army's  march 
on  Groznyy,  in  abeyance  but  not  aban- 
doned, fell  nito  both  categories.  The 
exceptions  left  three  of  the  foin-  army 
groups  with  substantial  offensive  mis- 
sions to  be  completed  or  unflei  taken. 
Both  of  Army  Group  As  ai  inies  were 
in  fact  exempted  from  Operations 
Order  No.  I  and  were  instructed  to 
await  other  ijrders. 

Taubemchlag 

Bv  the  time  Operations  Order  No.  1 
appeared,  NoRDLiCHT,  however,  was 
hardly  a  viable  enterprise.  The  state  of 
Field  Marshal  Manstein's  troops  (Elev- 
enUi  Army)  alter  the  fighting  in  the 
botdeneck  and  the  lateness  of  the  sea- 
son spoke  heavily  against  it.  On  16 
OGtober,  Fliller  shelved  Nordlicht 


^OKH,  Chef  dm  Generatiahs^i^Smes,  Ak.  L  (t) 


and  instructed  Manstein  to  use  the 
artillery  to  smash  ilio  Soviet  defenses 
on  the  Leniftgrad  perimeter  and'  to 
inch  his  front  forward.'"  While  it 
would  have  been  handy  to  have  had 
li^etiitiglfad  out  ©f  the  way,  another 
long-standing  strategic  liability  of  the 
north  flank,  the  Toropets  bulge,  was 
becommg  ati  even  greater  concern  as 
IV inter  approached.  From  it  the  Rus- 
sians could  strike  in  all  directions;  east 
ini&  Wsi^  ^im^fs  Mmikt  ^^  be^ 
hind  Army  ^^op^  iD^^ei^  northwest 
behind  Army  Qfmp  f^mth,  mttk 
against  Staraya  l^lissa  and  th^  iSmm 
yansk  pocket,  or  even  if  they  were 
daring  enough,  due  west  to  the  Baltic 
coast.  The  Carman  line  on  the  western 
rim  of  the  bulge  was  atrociously  weak. 
All  that  there  on  over  a  hundred 
miles  «3if  ^r&iA  tms  the  Gruppe  Wil 
der  Chevallerie,  a  corps  headquarters 
under  Generalleutnant  Kurt  von 
der  Chevallerie,  with  fi1f€  JiiSlafitry 
divisions. 

On  14  October,  maintaining  that  "the 
best  defense  is  an  attack  of  our  own 
from  the  vicinities  of  Velikiye  Liiki  and 
Kholm,"  Hitler  ordered  Sixteenth 
Army  and  the  Gruppe  von  der 
Chevallerie  to  collaljorate  on  Opera- 
tion TAUBENSCHLAt;  thai  was  to  be 
aimed  "in  the  geiierii!  diifclion  of 
Toropets."'^  A  week  and  a  half  later 
while  Manslcin  was  at  the  Werwolf  to 
ieLti\e  his  individually  designed  and 
handcrafted  marshals  batcjn  (the  time 
for  production  of  which  caused  the 
dei^  m  his  receivMg^)  and  to  discuss 


7M0if  U,  ta  Kriegstagebuth  Mr.X  W  fitet  42,  AOit  U 

'•H.  Gn  Nord,  la  Kmgstagelmeh,  I.^31M^,  M,  W» 
Nord  75imw  filfii  Gm.  im.  t^K  A,&,i  M 


452 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


the  artillery  dt'plov  nient  against 
Leningrad.  Hider,  apparently  on  the 
spur  of  die  moment,  gave  Wm  com- 
maiif!  <>rTAUBENSCHi^G.  At  the  end  of 
the  month,  Manstein  moved  his  head- 
quarters to  Vitebsk.  By  then,  Hitler,  in 
oral  instructions  to  Manstein,  had 
made  Taubenschi  ag  contingent  on  a 
Soviet  attempt  against  Army  Group 
Center.  Manstein  thereupon  beeaine 
custodian  ot  a  dormant  front  and  a 
tentative  operation  until  the  afternoon 
of  20  November  whcti  lie  was  called 
back  from  an  inspection  trip  to  be  told 
he  was  appointed  commanding  gen- 
ei  al.  A  run  Group  Don,  and  with  his 
headquarters  would  replace  Head- 
quarters. Army  Group  B  in  the  Sta- 
lingrad sector.  He  and  an  advance 
party  boarded  a  spedal  express  train 
the  next  day,  and  Tacbenschlag. 
which  would  sliorilv  he  reduced  to 
nothing  by  iurtlier  transfers  to  the 
50Uth,  reverted  to  the  Gruppe  von  der 
ChevaUerie,*" 


TTiat  Sixth  Army's  operations  in  Sta- 
lingrad would  be  exempted  from  Op- 
erations Order  No.  1  went  without 
saying.  At  the  end  of  Se?ptember,  as  lie 
had  in  the  years  paM  Hiilcr  opened 
the  drive  for  the  VV'inier  Reliei  with  a 
speech  fn  tihe  Berlin  SportpaUst.  In  ft, 
lu  plased  on  an  old  tiieme  and 
ridiculed  tlie  publicity  he  had  lately 
been  receiving  in  the  worM  news  me- 
dia. Pinprit  ks  like  llie  Dieppe  raid  in 
August,  he  conijplained,  were  touted  as 
magmfitietit:  MSmd  vktode»  while  \m 
own  march  from  the  Donets  to  the 


A(.)K  II  ;):ll()7/l  lilr. 


Volga  and  the  (Caucasus  was  "nothing." 
"When  vve  take  Stalingrad,"  he  went  on, 
"and  you  can  depend  on  it  that  we  will, 
that  also  is  [sir]  nothing."  Later  he 
vow^  a  secxjnd  time  to  taJke  Stalingrad 
and  assured  the  audience,  "you  can  be 
certain  no  one  Will  get  US  away  from 
there.""' 

Like  .Sixth  Army,  Seventcentli  Ann\ 
was  on  the  march  and  expected  to 
continue.  Tuapse,  the  prize,  was  com- 
ing into  reach.  A  push  in  the  moun- 
tains, begun  on  14  October,  carried  to 
Shaumyan  the  next  day  and  through 
(he  low  II  the  next.  Soviet  Eighteentfi 
Army  almost  broke,  even  though  it  was 
getting  a  steady  flow  c$  reinforce- 
ments, and  Grechko.  w  lio  had  become 
an  arust  of  the  stubborn  defense  at 
Novorossiysk,  had  4©  bt  tertmght  in  as 
the  army's  new  iMB^pSidcr.**-  Seven- 
teenth Army  reported  On  the  18tli  tiiat 
the  several  days  of  easy  going  it  tiad 
ex]K'iienced  had  ended,  and  it  was 
having  to  revert  to  dislodging  the  en- 
emy piecemeal  from  posioom  he  was 
again  defending  determinedly.  A  week 
of  rain  J  flooding  mountain  rivers,  and 
w^shedknit  roads  gave  C^rtfehko  mne 
enough  to  get  his  army  in  hand  and  !o 
begin  some  counterattacks  late  in  the 
mbptih,**  Wtiat  these  mi^t  have  ac- 
compli^ied,  howe\er.  would  ne\er  hv 
kaown  because,  alter  4  November, 
thuee  weeks  of  rain  in  flit  lOwer  and 

snow  In  the  higher  elevatiottS  brought 
both  sides  to  a  full  stop. 


"'Iluitianis. //(/^-i,  v.,1.  II.  p  KI14. 
"'(■>ic<  likij.  lidlllr  fur  ll\c  i  '.iiutaius,  p.  198. 
'■7/  <.,    <..  Ill  Kiu'gsln^flmrh,  Bmll,  "MlV,  20-23 
Oil  12,  II.  C,r.  A  75126/4  We. 


THE  CHANGE  OF  SEASONS  453 


MAP  40 


First  Panzer  Army,  although  it  was  ait: 
a  standstill  in  mid-October,  was  ex- 
empted from  Operations  Order  No.  1 
because  it  still  appeared  to  have  some 
prospects  if  it  could  be  given  better 
reinforcements  than  those  it  had  re- 
ceived recently.  The  SS  Viking  Division 
liad  been  an  "acute  disappointment," 
and  a  newer  arrival,  the  Special  Pur- 
pose Corps  "Felmy,"  showed  signs  of 
being  more  exotic  than  effective.  It  was 
an  aggregation  (in  actual  strength  less 
than  one  full  division)  of  Moliam- 
medans^  mostly  recruited  from  pris- 
oneMjf-is^  eamps,  commanded  by  an 


air  force  general,  General  der  Flieger 
Helmut  Fehny.  The  Mohammedans 
Wfcte  adequately  anti-Sc*viet,but  appar- 
ently many  had  not  been  told  when 
they  were  recruited  that  they  would 
dSiibee^perted  to  fight.  Undei^orders 
to  iniprove  his  positions  pending  ar- 
rival of  reinforcements.  General  Kleist, 
commander  ttf  First  ^^ttizei"  Atmy,  oft 
14  October,  proposed  to  attack  off  his 
right  flank  to  Nalchik,  which  would 
tewel  hfs<fit»iit  seffiewliat  and  elMiiate 
a  threat  to  his  rearward  lines. ''^  Hitler 
gave  his  approval  two  days  later. 


14  Oct  42. 


454 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


Rumanian  2d  Mountain  Division  be- 
gan the  Nalchik  operadon  on  the 
morning  of  the  25th  with  air  support 
diverted  from  Seventeenth  Army — 
wbich,  no  doubt,  helped  tO  slow  the 
sedvance  on  Tuapse.  The  'RiittrariiafiS 
were  headed  almost  due  south  from 
the  Baksan  River.  While  the  distance  to 
Nalchik  was  only  about  ten  miles,  they 
had  three  swift  mountain  rivers  to 
cross,  the  Baksan,  Chegerrii  and  Urvan. 
(Map  40.)  Nevertheless,  the  day  went 
exceedingly  well.  The  division  was 
across  the  Baksan  in  two  hours  arid  by 
nightfall  had  a  spearftead  on  the 
Chegem  three  miles  north  of  Nalchik. 
The  13th  and  23d  Panzer  IJivisiqiis 
started  west  and  southwest  fftiifl  the 
Terek  the  next  morning.  Running  up- 
Sta^eaaain  the  valleys  of  the  Cherek  and 
Uiifart  ri^ssrs,  they  had  easier  going. 
For  First  B$i^r  Army,  the  operation 
was  "progresang  at  a  speed  beyond  all 
expectations."  The  Rumatiians  were  in 
Nalchik  on  the  afternoon  of  the  second 
day,  and  the  panzer  divisions  had 
d^^d  the  river  crossings  to  the  south 
atid'ieast  trapping  over  seven  thousand 
Soviet  troops. The  attack  had 
achieved  a  compound  surprise:  Trans- 
caurasii.s  Front's  North  Group,  intent  on  an 
offensive  of  its  own  it  was  preparing 
against  Mordofc,  had  ne^edted  Thk^ 
seoenlh  Army  in  the  Nalchik  area,  and 
ThMy'Samilk  Army  had  lost  control  over 
ib  troops  aftet  its  etmssmid  post  was 
bombed  on  the  morning  of  the  25th.'*" 

Turning  east  aiong  the  face  of  the 
iftocffitaJns  m  the  27tJi  and  %8iii,  #ie 
two  panzer  divisions  discovered  that 
the  Russians  had  not  recovered 


"'•Pz.  AOK  1.  hi  Kriegslagelmch  Nr.  S,  L'y-'Jfi  Oct  42, 
Pz.  AOK  1  X'4<.)0r>  Hlf. 

"^Gtechku,  Battle  Jot  the  Caucasus,  pp.  169-73. 


enough  to  make  more  than  per- 
functory stands  on  successive  river 
lines,  the  Lesken,  the  Urukh,  and  the 
Cliikola.  Kleist  then  ordcied  them  to 
keep  aping  to  the  A^don  in  the  vaiiey 
oF  whith  the  Ossetisffi  lefilitaf^  Read 
emerged  from  the  nioinitains.  When, 
they  reached  the  Ardon  they  would  be 
a  bare  twenty  miles  from  Ordzhoni- 
kidze,  and  on  the  29th,  seeing  "a 
chance  that  will  never  come  again,"  to 
take  the  city,  Kleist  told  them  to  cross 
the  Ardon  and  take  Ordzhonikidze  on 
the  run.**'  In  anodier  two  days,  13th 
Panzer  Division  was  on  the  Ardon,  and 
Kleist  was  beginning  to  talk  about 
Ordzhonikidze  as  the  "next,"  not  the 
final  objective.  On  2  November,  13th 
Panzer  Division  took  Gi/.el,  five  miles 
west  of  Ordzhonikidze,  but  by  then  the 
North  Group  had  brought  in  a  guards 
rifle  corps.  2  lank  brigades,  and  5  anti- 
tank artillery  regiments.  In  two  more 
days,  the  tanks  could  not  get  past  Gizel; 
on  the  5th,  the  division  was  almost 
encircled  by  Soviet  troops  that  had 
moved  in  behind  it  froin  me  nortfc  and 
the  south;  and  on  the  9th.  the  Nalchik 
operation  ended  when  13th  Panzer  Di- 
vision broke  out  of  Gizel  to  the  west.** 
By  then,  as  in  the  Tuapse  area,  the 
weather  was  bringing  both  sides  to  a 
stop. 

A  Winter  Offfnsive — Where? 

Questionable  as  the  other  premises 
in  Operations  Ot&et  NO.  T  Wei%  or 
would  soon  become,  one  was  rock 
hard:  there  would  be  another  Soviet 
winter  ^^sdsim  j^o  i©ne  lit^e  (^js. 
man  Gofqcotnand  donbted  it,  Os*  Au- 


"f";.  AOK  I.  hi  Krir!;sliigehwli  .\'r.  S.  27-29  Orf  42, 
Rl.  AOK  I  24!)(i(;  hk- 

*^Grechku,  BaitU'  jor  Ike  Cmtcasm,  pp.  173—81. 


THE  CHANGE  OF  SEASONS 


455 


gust,  Foreign  Armies  East  had 
submitted  its  forecast  for  the  coming 
months  and  had  concluded  that  the 
current  Soviet  objective  was  to  preserve 
enough  manpower  and  materiel  to  sus- 
tain a  second  winter  offensive.  Since 
the  Soviet  Command  had  very  likely 
figured  on  losing  the  North  Caucasus 
and  Stalingrad,  and  possibly  Moscow 
and  Leningrad,  and  could  have  antic  i- 
pated  casualties  on  the  scale  of  the  1941 
summer  campaign,  the  Foreign  Armies 
East  assumed  that  the  final  results  for 
the  Soviet  Union  would  be  better  than 
had  been  expected,  and  the  Soviet 
losses  would  be  "[of  a  magnitude  that 
would  leave]  combat-worthy  forces 
available  for  the  future."" 

To  identify  tlie  potential  locales  for  a 
Soviet  offensive  was  hardly  a  problem. 
Tlje  Army  Group  B  and  Army  Group 
Center  zones  offered  llie  best  pio.s- 
p^cts  and  the  greatest  profitability. 
Thar  the  choice  would  be  one  of  these 
could  be  assumed  a  priori.  Tlie  trick 
was  to  know  which  one.  At  Army 
Group  B,  the  extended  front  and  rela- 
livrlv  easy  terrain  invited  a  bid  to  re- 
capture Stalingrad  and  raised  the 
prospect  of  a  thrust  across  the  Don 
west  of  Stalingrad  to  Rostov,  vvbith.  if 
successful,  would  collapse  the  greater 
part  itf  the  Army  Group  B  front  and 
would  unhinge  the  entire  Army  Group 
A  front.  On  the  other  hand,  die  Soviet 
Command  would  be  under  a  heavy 
compulsion  to  liquidate  the  tlircat  ro 
Mqpow  posed  by  Army  Group  Center 
ami  wdtlM  see  tlie  Tbrtrpets  bulge  and 
the  Sukhinichi  salient  as  natural  spring- 
boards for  converging  attacks  toward 


"HJKH.  GniSldH.  Frrwii'  Hrrr,-  CM  (1)  Nr.  2492/42, 
(inlfiiihi'ii  -.III  Wi'iteivntwiikliiitg  iler  Ftt^dlag&iM'  ffefbst 
uiul  Winter.  29M.-I2.  H  3/t90  file. 


Smolensk,  which  could  not  only  drive 
the  front  away  from  Moscow  but  possi- 
bly destroy  Ninth,  Third  Panzer,  and 
Fourth  Armies  in  the  bargain.  Foreign 
Armies  East  assumed  that  the  Russians 
were  not  yet  capable  of  directing  or 
sustaining  offensives  toward  remote 
objectives,  for  instance  Rostov  or  the 
Baltic  coast,  and  so  to  an  extent  would 
be  governed  by  their  tactical  limita- 
tions. They  woiild,  therefore,  stand  to 
profit  most  reliably  from  an  offensive 
against  Army  Group  Cenl^  smedatr 
Smolensk.*" 

Six  weeks  later,  on  12  October,  Colo- 
nel Reinhard  Gehlen,  chief  of  the  For- 
ei^  Armies  East  gave  Zeitzler,  fbr 
Hjder,  a  report  "from  a  source  de* 
scribed  as  generally  reliable  that  al- 
legedly has  contacts  reaching  into  the 
Russian  leadership."  The  report  in  the 
main  duplicated  his  brancb's  earlier 
estimate,  and  from  this  he  said  "...  it 
can  he  assumed  that  the  stated  lines  of 
thinking  have  at  least  been  taken  into 
consideration  in  the  enemy's  decision- 
making process."®*  In  particular, 
Gehlen  added,  the  idea  of  an  operation 
in  the  Toropet*  bulg;e  appeared  to  Im 
attractive  tolSie  Russians. 

By  then  the  Germans  were  so  much 
impressed  with  the  Soviet  activity 
around  "^ropets  flmt  FBder  would  be 
issuing  the  first  order  for  Tauben- 
SCHLAG  in  two  days.  They  believed  the 
Russians  would  be  ready  to  start  as 
soon  as  the  lall  tains  ended,  which 
«iOlild  be  in  anotlier  two  to  three 
*teefe.®*  SiWMrdy  before  the  middle 


mid. 

■"Frnmli'  Him  Ost.  Chef,  ATr  2S&t^.  l^^^gSIM^ 
!2. 10.42.  H  3/1039  Hit. 

"^Gt  H.  Arfo.  LIX  A.K.,  la  KMe^t^kutkMK  4,  14  Oct 
42,  A.K.  30145/1  file. 


436 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUJ^JGRAD 


the  month,  Foreign  Armies  East  had 
also  detected  what  seemed  ro  he  the 
beginnings  of  a  Soviet  buildup  op]>osite 
Army  Group  B,  but  these  did  not  ap- 
pear to  Ije  on  a  scale  that  would  indi- 
cate an  otfensive  anytime  soon.  On  the 
15th,  the  branch  concluded  that  die 
Russians  would  eventually  nftempt 
somediing  against  Army  Group  B,  but 
the  main  siptificance  of  the  activityat 
the  army  group  for  the  present  was 
that  to  make  the  forces  available,  the 
Rlfesians  would  have  to  gh?e  up  what- 
ever thoughts  they  might  have  had  ot 
enlarging  the  forthcoming  operation 
against  Array  Group  Ceiiier."*^ 

In  the  last  two  weeks  of  the  month, 
the  earlier  impressions  hardened.  The 
Foreign  Armies  East  reports  indicated 
that  the  buildup  against  Army  Group 
B  was  limited  to  the  Serafimovich 
bridgehead  in  the  Rumanian  Third 
Army  sector.  On  the  31st,  the  branch 
conclutled  that  the  activity  in  the 
bridgehead  did  not  presage  a  major 
attack  and  would  probably  result  in 
nothing  more  than  a  local  effort  of 
some  kind.  At  the  same  time,  in  the 
Army  Group  Center  zone,  Ninth  Army 
expected  an  offensive  against  it  to  be- 
gin any  day,  and  as  of  30  October,  the 
army  had  anddpated  at  most  no  inore 
than  one  more  week's  respite.*'' 

Hitler  appears  to  have  rated  at  least 
the  long-run  potential  for  trouble  in 
die  Army  Group  B  zone  somewhat 
higher  than  his  intelligence  people  did. 
As  early  as  mid-August,  he  began  to 
worry  that  Stalin  might  attempt,  as  he 


put  it,  the  Russian  "standard  attack*^ 
a  thrust  toward  Rostov  directed  across 
the  Don  near  Serafimovich — which  the 
Bolsheviks  had  executed  with  devastat- 
ing success  in  1920  against  the  White 
Army  of  General  Peter  Wrangel.''''  On 
16  October,  he  reiterated  his  concern 
and  ordered  in  air  force  field  divisions 
to  stiffen  die  Italian,  Hungarian,  and 
Roiitattiatn  fronts  on  the  Don.^^  Talking 
to  Manstein  the  same  day,  he  said  he 
saw  "an  especial  danger"  in  the  front 
between  Stalingrad  and  Voronezh.*'' 
On  2  November,  when  aerial  pho- 
tographs revealed  that  the  Russians 
had  thrown  several  new  bridges  across 
the  Don  to  the  Serafimovich  bridge- 
head, he  once  more  predicted  a  major 
thrust  toward  Rostov.  Realizing  the  air 
force  field  divisions  would  count  for 
iitde  in  a  real  crisis,  he  canceled  die 
order  concerning  them  and  substituted 
a  panzer  division  and  two  infantry  divi- 
sions from  the  Western  Theater,'* 

Hitler,  howevei,  did  not  see  the  "es- 
pecial danger"  as  also  an  imminent 
one.  He  coidd  not  have  expected  the 
divisions  he  was  sending,  which  were 
stationed  on  the  Channel  coast,  to  get 
to  Army  Group  B  before  December.  To 
Manstein,  he  said  he  anticipated  an 
attack  "in  the  course  of  the  winter."  On 
31  October,  he  shifted  his  headquarters 
from  the  Wmonlf  back  to  the  W)lfs- 
schanze,  where  he  stayed  barely  a  week 
before  going  on  to  Bavaria  to  give  a 
speech  on  the  anniversary  of  the  1923 
Beer  Hall  Putsch  and  to  begin  a  two- 
week  vacation  at  theBerghof.  His  arrival 


'■'■'OKll.  GenSfilH,  Fri'iiuli-  Hfi'ir  <}.■,! ,  Kurir  Hi  urlciiung 
[en]  ,/,•>■  Fnndl'ifft  vom  13.10.  1x10.42.  H  Vmi  Ijle. 

2(i-2H  On,  ^\  On  42;  AOK  9,  Fuekrungsah- 
Ifihi}:^'  Knrw.l<iiS,-l.„i-h.  Bnuhlszeit  1.7.-3IJ0.4Z.  MttUd 
II,  au  Oct  42.  AOK  9  31624/2  file. 


Grfijiz-r  Diin-f  \ul,:,.  If,  Auu  4L'.  t:-(l(irn|  CMH  hie, 
"^[hiiL.  2(\  Ort  42. 

"^AOK  1 1,  la  Kn,'irsUi(^elmrh  ,Vr  2.  31.5  Oct  4^.  AOK 
11  3H1(;7/|  lile. 
""CwNcr  Dtaiy  Nuki,  4  Nov  42.  C-U65tj  CMH  file. 


THE  CHANGE  OF  SEASONS 


457 


in  Munich  on  the  inorning  of  8  No- 
vember coincided  witli  the  Allied  land- 
ings in  North  Africa,  and  the  mood 
among  his  party  comrades  who  had 
gathered  that  night  to  commemorate 
the  Putsch  was  depressed.  lit  his 
speech,  for  which  he  had  no  coherent 
theme,  he  virtually  ignored  North  Af- 
rica and  tried  lamely  to  inflate  the 
strategic  significance  of  Stalingrad  (as 
"a  gigantic  transshipment  center")  and 
to  explain  away  his  failure  to  finisTi  Afe 
battle  there.  He  was  determined  to 
avoid  "another  Verdun."  he  said,  and 
thei*ft)l*  employing  "very  smaU' 
assault  groups/  and  time  was  not  im- 
portant.*" For  the  next  ten  days,  Hider, 
at  the  Berghcf,  and  the  OKW,  which 
had  hurriefllv  folUtwed  him  and  had 
set  itself  up  in  Berchtesgaden  and  Salz- 
burg, we*e  preot^pteomth  the  North 
African  events  and  their  First  response 
to  them,  an  invasion  ot  unoccupied 
France.  Of  the  top  leadership,  only 
Zeitzler  stayed  behind  in  East  Prussia. 

in  the  meantime.  Foreign  Aimies 
East  was  getting  more  clues  on  Soviet 
activit\  in  llie  Army  Group  B  area  biU 
not  enough,  in  its  opinion,  to  form  a 
deaf  pictiMie.  As  latfr  as  6  "Nmemhet, 
the  branch  was  certain  the  Soviet  main 
offensive  would  be  against  Army 
GmoEp  Qthttr  aw(3  if  ib^  'Wtgrg  W  ^ 
one  on  the  Don,  it  would  eoiael^'Or."'" 
By  then,  signs  were  being  |Mefeia|.t^  of 
a  BiiSyi^p  also  soufh  of  Stalingrad 
a^liOSt  Fourth  Panzer  Army,  and  on 
01^         a  division  of  Fifth  Tank  Army 

mm  l^fis^iMt  0pm«>s|t<i  Humafipa 
'Ttdrd  Afiny.  %fo  days  lattsf,  another 


'■^SWiiaiail,  am  1932-^38. 

i'^iMii  (kt^^i^mmmm  Ost  if),  BmaMung 
«S*  M<M2a^  vst  Mggm^f^  Mhit.  6  Jl,4$,  U  3/185 
lie. 


Fifth  Tfink  Aniix  division  and  the  Head- 
quarters, Saulhwesi  Front,  were  tenta- 
tively detected.'"^  By  the  12th,  enough 
conrinnation  had  come  ni  to  raise 
sharp  ripples  of  concern  in  die  staffs  at 
Army  Gfrotip  ft,  Sixth  Army,  mA 
Foiu  th  Panzer  Army.  Foreign  Annies 
East  still  regarded  the  situation  as  too 
obscure  to  warrant  a  definitive  predlo 
tion  hut  added  that ,  .  an  attack  in  the 
near  future  against  Rumanian  Third 
Army  with  the  objective  of  cutting  the 
railroad  to  Stalingrad  and  thereby 
threatening  the  German  forces  farther 
east  and  compelling  a  withdrawal  from 
Stalingrad  must  be  taken  into  ac- 
count."'"- For  die  next  week,  Uiis  re- 
mained the  estimate  from  which  ths 
staffs  worked.  An  attack  was  expected 
and  soon.  Because  it  would  hit  the 
ftitmaS^itx^,  ft  mmM  be  ifteonverticnt 

and  |»gs^ly  more  dangerous;  but  oth- 
erwise it  was  not  expected  to  be  dif- 
ferent from  the  others  that  had  gone 
before.  Foreign  Armies  East  could  not 
find  solid  evidence  of  a  nia^r  chanjge 
in  the  Soviet  deploymeSit;  iRie  arimies 
on  the  Don  it  had  knowledge  of  were 
those  that  had  been  there  since  Sep- 
tember. The  FtJVt  "Mf^  Amy  ^Msibns  it 
identified  were  all  infantry.  Not  a  single 
one  of  the  army's  armored  elements 
he  Itrntm.  Soviet  fadio  traffic 
seemed  dearly  lo  indicate  that  Fifth 
Tank  Army  itself  was  still  stationed  in  the 
Oi^SuklmilbM  acea  imd  chiving  re- 
inforcements there. 


^^HJKtt,  Ger^tdH,  Premde  Hem  OH,  Kurze  BeaT- 
toi6*«g[<n]  der  FawKage  mm  4.11.,  SjL.  iOM.42.  H 

stm  We. 

""lUd..  12  NmM  ms'f.  467. 

^"^Abt.  Bmndt  Biere  Ost,  VMn^iW^  H 
3/10S9  file. 


CHAPTER  XXII 


Thrust  and  Coimterthrust 


the  rivfr  fhe  prize,  specifically 
the  ni^  to       fiailes  of  m  rigljt  bank 

Hill  to  R\nok.  Stalingrad  had  ceased  to 
exist,  except  as  a  wreck  and  a  ruin. 
Tliose  wfeb  liiSialiftsed  di©<i^'fltow  wp"e 
figliting  over  a  corpse,  aaid  Ibi^  teiew 
it.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Sl^m  ji^  to 
be  €f)iitfest«i  becaasfie  JWcif*  prjeeJotis  as 
it  became  smaller  and  more  murder- 
ously expensive  either  to  keep  or  to 
acquire.  By  terms  that  had  made 
the  city  an  objective  in  the  first  plat  e , 
the  issue  at  Stalingrad  Vk'as  settled:  the 
Volga  was  dosed  staS  every  inch  of 
ground  still  in  Soviet  hands  could  be 
brought  under  German  fire.  Strict  mil- 
itary logic  no  longer  applied' en  either 
ade,  however,  particularly  not  on  the 
German,  The  batde  had  acquired  a 
ti^son  t&f  existence  of  its  m^m.  No 
longer  only  the  last  phase  of 
Bjlau-Clausewitz,  it  was  a  drains  beiiag 
played  for  tite  ^iMj  aad;  tudb, 
Hitler  would  not  cotis^derit  ierQilrialed 
until  every  shred  of  organized  S@siet 
resist^saee.  was  elifflinated  from  #e 
right  bank  of  the  Volga,  By  what 
aoioutlted  to  mutual  agreement,  the 
summer  campaign  wat  Befettg  feUght 
again  in  miniature  on  the  river.  For 
Stalin,  each  fraction  of  a  mile  that  was 
held  ^«»einore  day  partially  i?edeeriaed 
the  iS^f  collapse  of  July  and  August 
and  tedught  Operation  Uranus  a  small 


step  closer  lo  reality.  For  ^MsTytohaye 
denied  the  enemy  tlie  last  iS^CtlOn  of  a 
mile  oQuid  have  drweft  feate  urifld  the 
memory  of  the  victory  losi^.  1%ie Stakes, 
however,  were  not  even.  Sl^l^Mh^dj^taiile 
to  lose  and,  possibly^  fflUCh  g£^. 
Hitler,  if  he  wanted  to  possess  the  river 
bank,  had  to  accept  tfie  suspension  of 
the  initiative  and  fight  on  his  oppo- 
nents' terms,  not  his.  He  did  that  on  6 
October  when  he  "reaffirmed  the  total 
occupation  of  Stalingrad  as  Army 
Group  B's  most  important  GmM&U."^ 


During  the  next  week,  FEtler  and 

General  Weichs,  commander  of  Army 
Group  B,  worked  with  Sixth  Army's 
commander,  General  Paulus,  to  get 
Sixth  Army  in  trim  for  another  push 
into  the  city.  Hider  canceled  Fourth 
Panzer  Atafty%  projected  u&vaxt^  to 
Astrakhan  and  ordered  its  com- 
mander. General  Hoth,  to  give  the  14th 
W&mer  Division,  his  last  ftiU-Bedged 
armored  division,  to  Sixth  Armv. 
Weichs  and  Hitler  concurred  in  letting 
Paulus  take  another  two  infantry  divi- 
sions. 79th  and  305th,  off  his  flank  on 
the  Don.  Sixth  Army  had  been  en- 
gaged fbra  month  on  plans  to  ad^^ce 
its  front  northward  somewhat,  between 
the  Volga  and  tlie  Don,  and  to  secure  a 


THKUST  AND  COUNTERTHRIJST 


459 


better  \^'inter  line.  Tliesc  now  wcie 
dropped,  and  Weichs  instructed  Faulus 
to  hme  troops  on  the  north  front 
dig  in  for  the  winter  whei  e  they  stood. ^ 
Irked  at  having  to  wait  for  the  divisions 
tolSe  moved,  Hider  ordered  intensified 
bombing  "to  deprive  the  enemy  of  the 
Opportunity  to  rebuild  his  defenses."^ 
BM  the  RiJssian  defense  ivas  getting 
stronger.  On  8  October,  massed  Soviet 
he%vy  artillery  began  firing  into  the  city 
^oiffl  east  of  the  Volga. 

On  the  10th,  Rumanian  Tliird  Army 
took  over  the  Don  front  east  of  the 
Khoper  SEhrer.  Hie  tksnaafi  siafehgtih 
was  being  drawn  inward  on  Stalingrad 
as  if  by  a  powerful  magnet.  Fourth 
j^BPtz^  Apffl?  was  also  having  to  rely  on 
tlie  Utttttaaians  to  man  most  of  its  loose 
^<mt  &0l  tite  chain  of  lakes  south  of 
Btelteli&vka.  Everyone,  especially  the 
Rumanians  themselves,  knew  they 
were  not  trained,  equipped,  or  moti- 
iftted  for  fighting  in  the  Soviet  Union. 
Fourtli  Panzer  Army  had  seen  the 
Rumanians  in  action.  On  28  Sep- 
temfeer,  isevier^l  of  their  divisions  on  the 
army's  right  flank  south  of  Beketovka 
had  given  way  before  a  halilkearted 
Soviet  zttSLGk  anA  had  fsiSeii.  ima  a 
panic  ;ind  T  ctrcat  that  took  tiSQ  <iays 
and  a  German  panzer  division  Slop. 
Mmh  had  tfflinmicBtisdl,  "Germam  ecott- 
mands  which  have  Rumanian  troops 
serving  under  them  must  reconcile 
thiansdves  to  die  feet  that  »oderateJy 
heavy  fire,  even  without  an  encniv  at- 
tack, will  be  enough  to  cause  tiiese 
troops  to  fall  baefc  and  that  the  reports 
thc>'  snbmii  concerning  their  own  sit- 
uation are  wordiiess  since  they  never 


-/&(/..  6-H  Oct  4^. 

"GmnerDmry  Naks.  7  On  42.  C^fiSqCMliffle. 


know  wbere  thciir  units  are  and  their 
estimnsgs  ^  ^mmaif  steength  are  vastly 
estaggerated:** 

The  14th  Panzer  and  305th  Infantry 
Divisions  were  ready  at  LI  Corps  on  13 
October.  The  79th  Infantry  Divisiftn 
was  coming  cast  bm  not  yet  in  place, 
and  Sixth  Army  was  still  awaiting  the 
arriva3  of  s^eral  ammunition  trains. 
Neverilieless,  although  he  might  be 
pinched  for  ammunition  in  forty-eight 
hours  if  the  trains  did  not  get  there  in 
time,  Paulus  decided  to  resume  the 
offensive  the  next  day  anyway.^  To  de- 
lay any  longer  had  its  danger  as  well. 
The  weather  was  becoming  unsettled, 
and  altho^h  a  spell  of  rain  might  not 
affect  the  fighting  in  the  city  too  much, 
it  could  paralyze  the  army's  supplies. 

Lacking  the  streng^  to  maJse  a  sin- 
gle sweep  and'  having  few  o^er  aIt<Sr- 
natives,  Paulus  [proposed  lo  take  what 
was  left  of  tlie  city  by  pieces,  working 
from  north  to  south.  In  the  first  stage, 
XIV  Pan/cr  Corps  would  push 
through  Rynok  and  Spartakovka  to  the 
mouth  of  the  Gorodishche  River,  "wfefle 
LI  Corps  occupied  the  tractor  factor) 
and  the  brickworks  and  took  a  hold  on 
the  \%lgat  «<M<ft-  isi  the  Gorodishche. 
The  LI  Corps  would  then  turn  smiih 
and  take  the  gun  factory,  the  bread 
bakej^  the  irfcaaltefgiCal  works,  and 
the  chemical  .fiatat."  On  the  advance, 
engineers  w^i&Id  take  the  lead  and 
carve  ottt  eorrid&rs  by  leveEng  entire 
blocks  of  buildings  with  explosives; 
panzer  grenadiers,  as  shock  groups, 
eil^ttsh  and  maintain  3ie  for- 


*Pz.  AOK  -I.  Ill  Kru:g:,k,gfhH,:h  m:'%^  W^MtW!i^ 
42,  Pz.  AOR  4  28183/1  file. 

'"AOK  6.  la  KrugstagdmiA  N*.  t4,  18  Oct  AOE.6 
33224/2  file. 

'AOK  6,  la  m  msm,  SM.-tZ,  AOK  6 
file. 


460 


MOSCOW  TO  STAJLINGRAD 


ward  momentum;  and  infantry  would 
do  the  clearing  and  mopping-up,  the 
gmeling  job  of  stamping  out  the  resis- 
tance yard  by  yard  and  man  hf  man. 

For  the  first,  the  formula  was  going 
to  work.  Describing  the  events  of  14 
October,  General  Cbuikov,  then  com- 
mander of  Sixth-Jourth  Army,  has  said, 
"Those  of  us  who  had  already  been 
through  a  great  deal  will  remember 
this  enemy  attack  all  our  lives."'^  Sixth 
Army  would  later  remember  the  as- 
sault on  the  tractor  factory  as  "the  one 
really  complete  success  in  the  battle  for 
the  northern  part  of  Stalingrad."* 

SUiliiigirid-Xotlli 

Early  in  the  morning  on  die  14tb, 
Paulus  set  up  his  forward  command 
post  in  Gorodishche.  west  of  the  tractor 
factory.  The  tanks  and  panzer  gren- 
adiers of  the  14th  Panzer  Division  had 
moved  out  at  daylight  in  light  rain. 
They  were  into  the  tractor  factory  by 
1000.  On  dieir  left,  305th  Infantry 
Division  pushed  through  the  workers' 
setdement  toward  the  Gorodishche 
River.  North  of  the  river.  XTV  Panzer 
Corps  had  begun  clearing  several  hills 
west  of  Spartakovka,  and  in  the  after- 
noon, 14th  Panzer  Divisions  right  flank 
reached  the  brickworks.  The  di\isi<>n 
kept  going  through  the  riight,  and  by 
0700  the  next  morning,  it  had  one  of 
its  panzer  grenadier  regiments 
through  to  the  Volga  east  of  the  tractor 
factory.  With  that,  Sixty-second  Army's 
bridgehead  was  cut  in  two.  By  dark, 
XIV  Panzer  Corps  was  at  the  western 
edge  of  Spartakovka;  the  tractor  fac- 


'Chuikov,  SUilmgrad.  p.  180. 
'AOK  6.  la  KiUg^asAudi  Nr.  14,  %  Nor  42.  AOK  6 
33224/2  fiJe. 


tory  and  brickwoiks  were  occupied; 
and  14th  Panzer  Division's  line  south  of 
the  brickworks  was  just  300  yards  Irom 
Chuikov's  command  post  that  was  dug- 
into  the  cliff  above  the  Volga  east  of  the 
gun  facloi  y.  [Map  4L) 

The  14th  Panzer  and  305th  Ixi&lltry 
Divisions  turned  south  in  the  morning 
on  the  16th.  They  had  half  of  the  gun 
factory  by  1200.  Durfetg  tiie  tfey,  U 
Corps  and  XIV  Panzer  Corps  also 
made  contact  on  the  Gorodishche 
River  west  of  Spartakovka  and  en- 
circled parts  of  several  Soviet  divisions 
between  there  and  Orlovka.  When  the 
gun  factory  and  the  blocks  of  houses  to 
the  west  of  it  were  taken  on  the  1 7ih ,  it 
looked  as  if  the  batde  could  not  last 
more  than  another  two  or  three  days. 
But  Paulus  decided  to  bring  in  the  79th 
Infantry  Division  anyway,  "to  be  ready 
for  all  eventualities."  The  resistance 
had  toughened  in  the  last  two  days, 
particularly  on  the  I7th,  and  numbers 
of  (Vrsh  tMR-my  battalions  were  being 
idenufied.  At  the  same  time  Paulus' 
strength  was  fading  again.  His  whole 
frtjiii  was  now  within  reach  of  the  So^ 
viet  artillery  across  the  riyeik  and  the 
nights  were  as  wearing  as  iSie  days 
because  Soviet  jjlancs  kept  up  a  run- 
ning bombardment  from  dark  to  day- 
light. The  OKH  liaison  officer  fe^ 
ported,  "Tile  Russians'  air  superiority 
over  Stalingrad  at  night  has  assmned 
intolerable  proportions.  The  troops 
cannot  rest.  Their  endurance  is 
strstined  to  the  limits.  The  losses  in  men 
and  material  are  unbearable  in  the 
lont;  run."-' 

One  of  Hider's  adjutants,  a  Ms^pr 
Engels,  arrived  M  Siadli  Army  on  iSke 
17th  "to  gather  personal  impressions  of 


MAP  41 


462 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


the  battle  for  Slalingrad."  Paulus  and 
his  chief  of  staff  look  liim  to  an  army 
observation  post  where  he  could  see 
some  of  the  fighting  and  tlieii  gave  him 
a  statistical  nindowii.  Since  13  Sep- 
tember, the  army  had  lost  343  officers 
and  nearly  13,0'^)  enlisted  men  (killed, 
wounded,  and  missing),  bringing  its 
total  losses  since  it  crossed  the  Don  on 
21  Augusi  to  1,068  officei  s  and  39,000 
men.  Enemy  losses,  judging  from  the 
numbers  of  prisoners  taken — 17,900 
after  13  September  and  a  total  of 
57,800  since  21  August — were  much 
higher  than  Sixth  Army's  but  not 
nearly  as  high  as  the  Soviet  los'ics  had 
been  in  previous  battles.  The  intcnsiiy 

the  fighting  could  be  deduced  from 
the  ammunition  consumed,  which  for 
the  month  of  September  amounted  to 
25  iliillion  rounds  of  l  ifie  and  machine 
gun  ammunidon,  a  half-million  anti- 
tank rounds,  and  three-quarters  of  a 
million  ai  tilleiy  rounds  of  all  calibers.^" 

On  tiie  IStli.  while  the  infantry 
worked  on  cleaning  out  pockets  of  re- 
sistance in  the  gun  factory,  LI  Corps 
repositioned  its  artillery  and  rocket 
projectors  to  bring  ibem  to  bear  on  tlit- 
next  objectives,  the  bread  bakery  and 
metallurgical  works.  Heavy  rain  had 
set  in  during  the  night,  and  by  midday, 
the  approaches  to  the  Don  bridges, 
over  which  all  of  the  army's  supplies 
had  to  come,  were  "passable  only  with 
difficulty."  I^lm  thought  he  might  be 
able  to  resume  the  advance  the  next 
afternoon  if  the  artillery  and  infantry 
were  ready  by  then,  if  the  roads  did  not 
get  worse,  and  if  the  weather  did  not 
keep  the  airplanes  grounded.  But  the 
roads  did  get  worse  as  the  rain,  iater- 


spersed  with  snow  showers,  continued 
for  two  more  days,  and  pockets  of 
Russians  v«E!r6$CiII  holed  up  in  the  gun 
factory  shops  On  the  21st  when  the  sky 
began  to  clear. 

The  LI  Corps,  under  General 
Seydlitz,  went  back  into  motion  on  the 
23d  widi  79th  Infantry  Division  in  the 
lead.  It  had  half  of  the  inetaflurgical 
works,  the  blocks  of  houses  west  of  the 
Inead  bakery,  and  most  oi  the  bakery 
itself  in  its  hands  by  afternoon  and,  at 
nightfall,  had  a  spearhead  on  the 
Volga.  The  next  day,  XIV  Panzer 
Corps,  which  had  been  diverted  by 
Soviet  attacks  on  its  north  from,  took 
the  western  two-thirds  of  Spai  takovka. 
But  the  momentum  dropped  off  fast  at 
both  corps.  The  XIV  Panzer  Corps' 
troops  had  been  in  acuon  witlioui  a 
break  for  ten  days,  and  79th  Infantry 
Division,  which  had  been  at  the  Don 
bridgeheads  for  weeks  before  coming 
into  Stalingrad,  had,  from  the  first, 
onh  been  fresh  b\  comparison  with 
Scydlitz's  other  tlivisious.  Infantry 
stretigtll  was  being  dissipated  in  a 
dozen  or  more  small  but  cosdy  actions 
aiound  oi  inside  shops  and  buildings 
in  the  metallurgical  plant  and  against 
Soviet  contingents  dug-in  along  the 
river  as  far  north  as  the  brickworks. 
For  a  week  after  the  24th,  LI  Corps' 
effort  was  totally  aljsorbed  by  day  in 
fighting  for  what  pieviuusiy  would 
have  been  considet  cd  minisciile  objec- 
tives— shops  number  1 ,  5,  and  10  in  the 
metallurgical  plant  and  a  furnace  in 
the  same  plant — and  by  night  in  trying 
to  disrupt  boat  traffic  on  the  Volga  that 
was  bringing  Chuikov  replacements 
after  dark  for  his  losses  in  the 
dayUght/* 


lyjjtf.,  17  Oct  42. 


THRUST  AND  COUNTERTHRUST  463 


On  the  Attack  at  the  Staungrao  Gun  Factory 


spot,  would  also  need  a  few  days  rest. 
Weichs  proposed  possibly  taking  two 
regiments  from  the  29th  Motorized 
Infantry  Division,  which  was  closer  to 
and  acting  as  the  mobile  reserve  for 
both  Fourth  Panzer  Army  and  Ruma- 
nian Third  Araty,  General  Richthofen, 
the  commander  of  Fourth  Air  Force, 
had  made  an  offer  that  was  welc@mi&QXi 
the  one  hand  an4  troublesome  on  the 
other.  He  had  said  he  would  be  willing 
to  relinquish  some  of  the  air  force's 
railroad  haulage  space  to  allow  the 
army  to  ship  in  more  artillery  ammuni- 
tion— because  the  fighting  was  getting 
to  be  at  such  close  quarters  that  he 
believed  "the  Luftwaffe  cannot  h&  vmf 
ejEfective  any  more,"^* 


The  Clock  Runs  Down 

Paulus,  Weichs,  and  their  chiefs  of 
staff' met  on  I  November  to  discuss  the 
question  "how  the  attack  on  Stalingrad 
can  be  nourished  with  new  forces,  since 
the  strength  of  the  79lh  infantry  Divi- 
sion has  so  far  declined  that  it  can  no 
longer  be  considered  for  larger  mis- 
sions."'^ Paulus  ihouglil  of  exchanging 
the  79th  Infantry  Division  f  ur  the  60th 
Motorized  Infantry  Division,  which 
was  on  the  XIV  Panzer  Corps  north 
front.  Getting  the  one  division  into  iJie 
line  on  the  north,  however,  and  the 
other  out  would  lake  some  time,  and 
the  60th  Motorized  Infantry  Division., 
which  had  not  exactly  been  to  a  quiet 


464 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


Two  clays  later,  Weicfes*  ^mi<^Sis££, 
General  Sodenstern,  told  General 
Schmidt,  the  Sixth  Army  chief  of  staff, 
that  the  OK.H  would  noi  allow  the  two 
regiments  to  be,  d:et«iched  from  the 
^9tfa  Motorized  Bsifehtry  Division  but 
had  insmicted  Weichs  to  lei  Paul  us 
have  five  pioneer  (combat  engineer) 
battalions  from  divisions  in  the  line  on 
the  Don.  The  idea  to  use  the  engint  ei  s 
had  come  to  Hitler,  through  air  force 
channels,  from  the  inveterate  dabbler 
in  the  ground  war,  Richthol'eii,  who 
had  been  impressed  with  the  engineers' 
performance  in  the  assault  on  me  tpae- 
tor  factory,"  Sodenstern  said  that  the 
Army  Group  B  staff  beUeved  getting 
the  engineer  battalions  would  not  be 
"bad  at  all"  for  Sixth  Army.  Sclmiidt. 
however,  replied  that  the  engineers 
could  "in  no  way  be  a  substitute  for 
infantry."  They  were  specialists,  he 
said,  "particularly  accomplished  in 
cracking  bunkers  and  other  large  ob- 
jetts,"  htit  what  ihe  armv  needed  was 
the  "strengtli"  gl  in  tan  try.  The  attack 
ofi  the  tractor  factory,  he  pomted  mit, 
had  succeeded  because  the  at  my  then 
had  infantry  to  do  die  "permanent 
mopping  up"  behind  the  engineers  and 
the  panzer  grenadiers.'^ 

Chuikov,  who  had  shitted  his  com- 
mand post  <3fft  the  Wth,  to  the  river 
bank  east  of  the  themical  ]3lant.  also 
had  an  interest,  though  of  a  diiferent 
iSOTt,  in  Sixth  Army's  problems.  Watch- 
ing the  pressure  on  his  front  drop  in 
the  last  days  ol  die  month,  lie  knew  hi§ 
anay  womd  «tir^i4ve  for  at  least  tme 
more  round.  On  the  other  hand,  his 
position  was  not  all  diat  good.  As  he 


^*Kehrig,  Stalingrad,  p.  41. 

'MDA:  6.  la  KrieffUt^^hNT.  14,  3  Nov  42,  AOR 6 
33224/2  file. 


has  put  it.  he  and  his  troops  were 
sitting  "dangling  our  legs  in  the 
Volga."**  All  Sixty-second  Army  held  on 
the  west  bank  were  two  small  Iiridge- 
heads  about  a  half-mile  deep,  die  one 
taking  in  parts  of  Rynok  and  Spar- 
lakovka,  the  other  around  the  chemical 
plant  widi  a  narrow,  ragged  tail  reach- 
ing into  the  metallurgical  plant  and 
tipstream  along  die  river  bank  to  the 
brickworks.  Replacements  continued 
to  come  across  in  as  large  numbers  a* 
the  area  could  accommodate,  and  the 
artillery  on  the  east  bank  had  come 
prominently — perhaps  decisively — 
into  play.  Sixth  Army  attributed  the 
79th  Infantry  Division's  rapid  decline 
primarily  to  the  "effect  of  die  enemy's 
massed  artillery."'^ 

But  die  predominant  Soviet  effort 
was  being  directed  elsewhere.  The 
buildup  for  Ura\i:s  was  being  brought 
to  its  conclusion.  The  Southeastern 
and  Ryazan-Ural  divisions  of  the  rail- 
road system,  the  ones  serving  the  Sta- 
lingrad region,  were  running  at  ten 
iHmes  their  aorma!  caparftifes.  Railroad 
workers  were  stationed  along  the  track 
to  supplement  the  mechanical  signal 
systems  and  to  make  it  possible  to  rufi 
ti  ains  at  c  loser  intervals,  and  cars  were 
being  heaved  off  the  tracks  at  terminal 

points  to  mold  having  m  Im^sMmd 

empties.  From  the  railheadSi  t^-^OO© 
trucks  and  horse-drawn  vehicles  deliv- 
ered cargo  to  the  front.  Troops  moved 
onh  at  night  and  bivouaced  tinder 
cover  duritig  the  day^me.'*'  Between  1 

m&  M  Umm^i  ifssefe  ©f  tfe  B%9 
FMlk  carried  160,000  troops,  430 


'•Chttikov.  Slolin^iid.  pp.  197-99. 
">10JC  6,  Jo  Krii-gstagebu^k  Nr.  14,  1  N«w  4?,  AOE  6 
33224/2  fife. 
'WOVSS,  vol.  Ul,  pp.  20-22. 


I  HRUST  AND  COUNTERTHRtlST 


465 


tanks,  600  artillery  pieces,  an^  M^OOO 
MOt0x  transport  vehicles  aaro^  the 
tiv&t  to  SMHngrad  Front.  ^* 

Between  1  and  10  November,  Gener- 
als Zhukov  and  Vasilevskiy,  as  StavM 
representatives,  conducted  a  round  of 
confei-cnccs  and  inspections  to  make 
certain  die  plans  were  understood  and 
preparations  properly  made.^''  These 
were  things  that  could  not  yet  be  taken 
for  granted  in  the  Soviet  Army,  and 
they  required  a  great  deal  of  on-the- 
spot  checking  and  coaching  of  the 
staffs.  In  his  speech  on  7  November 
c^naineteoireiting  the  anniversary  of  the 
Botehevik  Revolution,  Stalin  dropped 
the  "Not  a  step  back!"  appeal  and, 
instead,  struck  a  note  of  idgh  con- 
fidence saying,  "The  enemy  has  ali  eady 
felt  the  force  of  the  Red  Army's  blows 
at  Rsosuo^,  iit  Wm^i,Mt  Wm^  W^ 
day  is  not  far  off  &e ^iHSfiay  iwill 
feel  the  force  of  n^  Mows  fey  the  Red 
Army.  T%ere  wH  be  a  celebration  in 
our  street  too!"^^  On  1^^  November, 
Ziiukov  and  Vasilevskiy  explained  Ura- 
m^Ji  ta^  ^wtsm^^Sm  t^theMi^m  and 
Qie  Siaoha  and  assured  them  that  all 
comtzianids,  "Srom  front  to  regiment," 

nature  ^  ^  Wmmy  and  the  tech- 
niques of  ji&^lrf,  ssfMm,  artillery,  and 
snrcootdinaifln***  -Sat  SSxth  Aretiy -was 
still  on  the  offensive,  and  there  would 
be  another  round  iii  the  contest  lor  the 
eity.  Weichs  mM  Patilu*  on  B 
November,  "Tlie  general  situation  re- 
quires that  th©  buttles  around  Sta- 
lm0rad  be  enditdt  soctti/  Sixth  Aftny,  he 


"Malsulenko,  "Xtpfrativmr/a  masHrmka,'  p*  11. 
"ZhnJajv,  Memoirs,  pp.  402-04;  Vasilevsluy,  "Dela," 

vol.  VI,  p,  48. 
^*Vaisilevskiy,    Dc/u,  "  p.  247f;  Samsoaw,  Sat' 
lingfadtixija  bilvu,  pp.  350-62. 


added,  would  be  getting  the  five  pi- 
oneer battalions  in  the  next  week,  and 
lliey  should  be  combined  with  infantry 
imder  panzer  grenadier  regimental 
staf  fs.  The  next  objective  would  be  the 
chemical  plant  at  Lazur.*^  Two  days 
later.  Iiowever,  Sodenstern  called 
Schmidt  to  tell  him  the  army  group 
had  just  received  word  that  Hirier  had 
"expressed  the  opinion"  that  the 
ground  east  of  the  gun  factory  and 
metallurgical  plant  ought  to  be  taken 
first.  The  two  chiefs  of  staff  agreed — 
as  later  did  General  Zeitzler,  chief  of 
the  General  Staff — that  doing  so 
would  consume  too  nnich  stjength  and 
would  most  likely  rule  out  a  subsequent 
attack  on  the  chemical  plant.  Nev- 
ertheless, the  next  day  Pankis  received 
the  following  by  teletype  from  the 
anny  group: 

Hie  ifeighi^f  has  ordered:  Before  resum- 
ing the  attack  to  capture  the  Lazur  Cheaii- 
cal  Plant,  the  two  sections  of  the  city  the 
enenn  still  holds  cast  of  the  gun  factory 
and  east  oi  the  metallurgical  plant  are  to  be 
taken.  Onlv  aftff  ilie  bank  of  the  Volga  is 
entirely  in  our  hands  in  those  is  the 

assault  on  the  chemical  pjlilSii;' (0 

begun,^'' 

On  the  7th,  the  artillery  began  coimter- 
fire  against  die  Soviet  ardllei  y  across 
the  mvm,  mA  #&EtIi;^  told  Weichs  he 
would  start  to  move  east  of  the  gun 
lactory  on  die  Uth  and  at  the  metal- 
lurgical pliaflt*  %t  itoe  earliest  eh  the 
15th. 

While  it  waited,  the  army  made  some 
raijdom  observations  that  not 
G^ses  for  high  alarm  but  were  not 


4/«  j&*Sj«i«g»fa(*  iifr.  14,  3  Now  4^,  AOK  fi 


466 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


reassuring  either.  For  one,  in  a  siiort 
course  the  army  was  giving  to  qualify 
NCOs  from  other  branches  as  infantry 
lieutenants,  a  number  of  the  candi- 
dates declared  they  would  rather  not 
bi'  infantry  offiters  and  asked  to  Ix.- 
returned  to  their  original  branches, 
Faulm  ordered  the  iflen  dropped  from 
the  course  and  sent  to  the  infantrv.  Foi 
another,  several  days  of  below  freezing 
temperatures  sigtiafed  the  end  of  the 
I. ill  rains.  On  the  8lh  and  in  the  davs 
thereafter,  reports  on  the  Soviet 
buildup  in  the  Don  brid^heads  op- 
posite Rumanian  Tliiid  Army  became 
more  frequent.  On  the  10th,  the  army 
group  transferred  iht  Headquarters, 
XXXXVIII  Panzer  Corps,  into  tlie 
Rumanian  Third  Army  area  and 
alerted  ^  g9tb  MotititlEiBd.  In&iitry 


Division  for  a  move  in  behind  the 
RtMiaDabins  *bn  the  shortest  notiM:-''** 

On  the  other  hand,  owing  to  a  quirk 
of  nature,  Sixty-second  Army  was  con- 
fronted nwdi  chiB  most  faimtedfately 
ominous  new  development.  I'niike 
other  Russians  rivers,  the  Volga  does 
not  fireeze  qiidid%.  It  ^t  forms  shtsh, 
(hen  ice  floes  WSt  pile  up  along  the 
banks,  then  a  BoaSfflve  coat  of  drifting 
ice  than  isan  sink  ifhe  strongest  boat  but 
is  too  treacherous  to  be  crossed  f)n  foot 
by  men  or  animals.  Weeks,  in  some 
years,  mon^s,  pass  before  the  surface 
freezes  solid,  whicli  tould  have  meant 
an  extended  period  of  isolation  for 
Skcfy-smnd  Am^  duiing  the  approach 

winter  in  194^. 


The  Last  Ruu  iid 

Four  hours  before  daylight  on  the 
11th,  in  freezing  weather,  Seydlitz 
struck  east  the  gun  factory.  Wlien 
Pauius  arrived  at  hi^  forward  com- 
mand post,  just  before  1000,  word 
awaited  him  that  the  attack  was  mov- 
ing—  but  slowly.  By  nightlall,  one 
spearhead  had  rea^eS  me  dfK*  o^et*- 

looking  the  river  and  another  was  on 
tlie  shore.  Sixth  Army  reported  to  the 
OKH,  *The  attack  east  of  the  gun 
factory  in  Stalingrad  achieved  a  partial 
success  against  a  numerically  strong 
enemy  who  defended  himself  flitterly." 
Paulus  added  thai  he  would  regroup 
the  next  day  and  resume  the  advance 


By  the  12th,  Paulus  was  having  also 
to  keep  an  eye  on  Rumanian  Thini 
Army.  During  the  day,  Wcichs  told  him 
to  squeeze  10,UOU  men  out  of  his  engi- 
nes aad  artiUery  units  to  inan  a  sup- 
port line  behind  the  Rumanians. 
Meanwhile,  Hoth  was  trying  to  inter- 

M&^iMSM^  opposite  Fourth  Panzer 
Ariay,  CMe  tiring  was  certain,  he  re- 
marked, tlife  ftat^ans  were  mot  going 
through  all  the  trouble  just  tO' 
strengthen  their  dele  uses. 

East  of  die  gun  factory,  m  ihfe  ISth, 
LI  Corps  conducted  what  the  army 
described  as  "successful  shock  troop 
actioosj,"  mkinf  tm  Modes  of  lioi^s 
and      large  bult#ng;^&d  ^^^wsm^ 

*^p%A0X4M  i^nm^tbuth  m  3,  mm,  is  i^m 
4g,  Pit.  A0a  ^mmm  Bb. 


468 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGHAD 


missnrs  house."  On  the  Volga,  ice  was 
beginning  to  pile  up  along  the  bank. 
TWo  days  lat^,  aiter  baving  regrouped 
once  more,  LI  Corps  launched  more 
shock  troQp  actions  and  "further  nar- 
rowed tlie  biMgcMead  east  of  the  fiin 
factory.  During  the  night  on  flie  15th, 
Sixty-secoiid  Army  counterattacked  along 
the  whole  lirte  mA  '^''^miBti  off. 
Seydlitz's  dispositions  were  unsettled 
enoiigh,  however,  to  rule  out  even 
shock  troDps  actions  for  the  next  day. 
In  the  meantime,  tlie  drifting  ice  on 
tlie  Volga  had  compacted  into  an  al- 
most soUd  cover  estendingf  as  BttHCb  ^ 
seventy-five  yards  out  from  tJie  shore. 

There  could  not  be  any  more 
thought  or  talk  of  one  last  big  push  in 
Stalingrad.  Artillery  and  troops  were 
standing  by  to  go  out  of — not  into — 
lihe  city  to  Rumanian  Tliird  Army  and 
Fourth  Panzer  Arm\.  On  the  morning 
of  the  17th,  a  somewhat  lame  exchange 

took  place  between  MitJaf  and  Paulus. 
Hitler  sent  #e  IbBewtog  J'tefcm^  c»tkr^ 

I  am  aware  of  the  difficulties  of  the  fight- 
ing in  Stalingrad  and  of  the  decline  in 
combat  strengths.  But  the  drift  ice  on  the 
Volga  poses  even  greater  difliculties  for 
the  Russians.  If  we  exploit  this  time  span, 
w  e  will  save  ourselves  much  blood  later. 

I  tiicrefore  ecpect  that  the  leadership 
qnd  the  tfoem  will  once  nsore,  they 
d^m  baW  iti  the  past,  de^t*  'SrD  riteir 
enfMTgy  and  spirit  to  at  least  getting 
through  to  tlie  Vf)lga  at  the  gun  factory 
and  the  metallurgical  plant  and  t^dng 
these  sections  of  the  city. 

Paulus  replied; 

1  beg  to  report  to  the  Fuehrer  that  the 
commanders  m  Stalingrad  and  I  are  acting 
entirely  in  the  sense  of  this  order  to  exploit 
the  Russians'  weakness  occasioned  during 
the  past  several  days  by  the  drift  ice  on  the 
Volga.  The  Fuehrer'^  order  will  give  the 


Hitler's  expectation  Iiaji  become 
smaller,  but  Paulus'  capabili^es  were 
sfflaller  StiH.**  Tlie  t)nly  progress  of  aay 
kind  on  the  l7th  and  1 8th,  and  that  not 
substantial,  was  on  the  north  where 
XIV  ^nzer  Corps  had  been  chipping 
away  at  Spartakov  ka  and  Rynok  for 
weeks.  Paulus  proposed,  after  more  re- 
grouping, to  try  a  rfirast  m  tfat  Tolga 
out  of  the  northern  pari  of  the  metal- 
lurgical plant  on  the  20th. 

Sixth  Army  Encoded 
OperaHan  Urarms 

During  the  night  of  18  November,  it 
snowed  along  the  Don,  so  heavily  that 
visibility  at  times  fell  to  zero.  The  tem- 
perature was  20°  F.  At  0720  on  die 
I9th,  Fiflh  Tank  Army\  artillery,  in  the 
Serafimovich  bridgehead  on  the  Don 
lid  inMa!  n&^^vmk  <xf  ^tilmgrad,  and 

Twenty-first  ^4rmj''s  artillery,  on  the  Don 
west  of  KJetskaya,  received  the  alert 
(563e  "wo>rd''S«Tm«  ("siren").  Ten  minrirtess 
later,  the  command  ngon  ("fire")  came 
through,  and  3,500  guns  and  mortars 
opened  up  on  Rumaniart  Thh^  Afany. 
At  0850,  die  first  infantry  echelon,^^ 
Tank  Amy's  14^  and  47 ih  Guards  R§le 
$mMm  B^M^  mA124ih  Rifle  DM- 
:ij|o«s^  ■weai.eajlhe  attack.^"  (Map  42.) 

in  Staliligt^  and  at  FourUi  Panzer 
Army,  at  dayKght,  sky  was  ov€:t&St 
with  low-hanging  clouds  and  the  tem- 
perature was  just  above  freezing.  At 
1100,  Sodenstern  teM  tchmidt  of- 
fensive against  Rumanian  Third  Army 
had  begfun.  The  Rumanians,  be  said, 
had  reported  fevei^  *^iteal|*  tSEaC^ 
earlier  m  the  motmn$  and  a  stronger 


^"AOX  6,  la  Kriegstagebuck  Mr.  M,  17  Nov  42.  AOK.  6 
33224/2  file. 
'"Sanisonov,  Stalingradskaya  bitva,  p.  S7§t 


MAP  42 


470 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


one  at  about  0900.^'  In  the  nieantinie, 
a  momentary  break  in  the  clouds  had 
given  "a  revealing  insight  into  the  en- 
emy's movements"  opposite  Fourth 
Panzer  Army.  At  an  altitude  of  300 
feet,  a  scout  plane  had  flown  over  a 
miles-long  column  of  Soviet  tanks 
headed  west.^^  In  Stalingrad,  the  first 
part  of  the  day  was  somewhat  better 
than  usual:  two  more  blocks  of  houses 
were  taken  east  of  the  gun  factory,  and 
Paulus  reported  he  would  try  to  stay  on 
the  offensive  there  for  another  day.^'' 

Fifth  Tank  and  Twenty-first  Armies  had 
both  cracked  the  Rumanian  line  by 
1200,  and  between  1300  and  HOO,  Fifth 
Tank  Army's  /  and  XXV7  Tank  Corps  be- 
gan to  move  through.  General  Mayor 
I.  M.  Chistyakov  committed  IV  Tank 
Corps  and///  Guards  Cavalry  Corps  in  the 
Twenty-first  Army  breakthrough  an  hour 
lalei.  Rumanian  Tliird  Army  had  prac- 
tically collapsed  u^der  the  firsj.^$suli, 
and  the  Scmet  Unks,  agaiitst  itmlti 
Rumanians  had  no  antitank  weapons 
heavier  than  47-mm.,  completed  its  de- 
moralization. Sixty-fifih  Army,  under 
General  Leytenant  P.  1.  Batov,  also  had 
begun  its  attaqjt  in  the  mQiwntg,  but  it 
faced  German  divisions  Qh  tfie  tfeft 
flank  of  Sixth  Army  and  made  almost 
no  progress  except  aigainst  a  Rumanian 
cavalry  dtvisicra  tm  its  rigfn  flank  and' 
diere  advanced  only  about  three  miles 
as  opposed  to  thirteen  to  fourteen 
miles  ^lined  by  the  other  two  armies.** 

At  2200,  the  following  m^essage. 


'  '  ■\OK6.  la  Krie0aagelmehm  t4!t  l@.K0«r'4S.  AOK  6 
33224/2  file. 

AOK  ■/.  In  Kmx'.lugebmh  Nt.  Wti&t 
42,  P/.  .\OK  1  28 183/ i  die. 

33224/2  hie. 

^*shii!nd\  Xiimn  6,  See  nUa  Samsottov.  Sta- 
lingrudskuya  Oilva,  pp.  378—81. 


signed  "Weichs,"  came  off  ihe  teletype 
at  Sixth  Army:  "The  developmenl  of 
the  situation  at  Rumanian  Third  Army 
compels  radical  measures  to  secure 
forces  to  protect  the  deep  flank  of 
Sixth  Army.  All  offensive  operations  in 
Stalingrad  are  to  be  halted  at  once." 
Along  with  the  message  came  an  order 
to  take  three  panzer  divisions  and  an 
infantry  division  out  of  the  city  and  to 
deploy  them  to  meet  the  attack  on  the 
army's  left  flank.^^ 

Stalingrad  Front  began  the  offensive 
on  the  20di  after  General  Eremenko 
had  delayed  the  start  for  several  hours 
because  of  fog.  With  ease,  Fifty-senenth 
Army,  under  General  Leytenant  F.  I. 
Tblbukhin,  and  Fifty-first  Army,  under 
General  Leytenant  N.  I.  Trufanov, 
broke  through  the  Rumanian  VI 
Corps  front  along  the  lake  chain  south 
of  Bekctt.n  ka. Fourth  Panzer  Army 
yeqojrded  that  die  Rumanipi  corps  dis- 
INc^^^t^  so  rapidly  tl&at  all  measures 
ti&  step  the  fleeing  trpops  became 
useless  before  they  could  be  put  into 
execution.  At  nightfall,  the  army  con- 
cluded that  by  morning  the  Rumanian 
VI  Corps  would  have  »o  coiis^t  value 
worth  iheHtibning.  Hdtii  said  the  wdrk 
of  weeks  had  been  "ruined  in  a  day";  in 
many  places,  the  Rumanians  had  of- 
fered ho  resiBiane&  an  aO^ — they  ha4 
fallen  victim  to  "an  i»3f^eiibable  tank 
panic."  He  wanted  to  pull  back  Ruma- 
tt!an"VIl  Corps,  which  was  holding  the 
army  right  flank  south  of  VI  Corps,  but 
Weichs  refused  permission  because  he 
figal^.the'  JBawfl^ftiaiss  would  not  stop 
once  they  be^n  to  retreat.^'  (Kead- 


^''AOK  ft.  la  Krugfliigr/mili  \'r.  ly  Nov  42,  AOK.  6 
33224/2  (lie. 

^VVMV.  vol.  VI.  p. 

■■"Pi.  AOK  4,  la  Krwf;s!tigfl>ut:hNr,  S.  Teiim,  26  Hm 
42,  Pz.  AOK4  2St83/l  tile, 


THRUST  AND  COUNTERTHRUST 


471 


quarters,  RuiTiitnian  Fourth  Army,  and 
¥11  Cc»ps,  with  three  divisions,  had 
been  brought  in  at  the  end  of  October.) 

During  ihr  morning  on  the  20th, 
Headquarters,  XIV  Panzer  Ckirps  and 
the  four  divisions  from  Stalingrad 
shifted  lo  the  west  side  oi'  the  Don 
where,  together  witli  three  divisions 
already  on  the  scene,  they  prevented 
the  Twenty-first  and  Sixty-fifth  Annies 
from  fgrining  a  secondary  pocket  west 
eifthfe river.  But,  confronted  by  superior 
forCiS.aili^^tmable  to  achiev  e  full  mobil- 
ity bec^ea$e  l2ley  were  short  on  gasoline, 
they  cxnild  tidt  operate  agsdhst  me  more 
important  outer  ami  of  the  eiivt  lop- 
ment.  The  only  obstacles  in  Fifth  Tank 
Army\  path  were  rfie10(9CXVIU  Panzer 
Corps  and  remnants  of  Rumanian 
Third  Army.  1  he  Rumanians  hardly 
counted  any  longer,  although  siwne,  es- 
pet  iallv  elements  of  one  division  under 
the  Rumanian  General  Mihail  Lascar, 
fought  determinedly.'* 

Hitler  at  In  st  pinned  all  his  hopes  on 
5DtXXVlH  Panzer  Corps.  It,  however, 
eoUld  Hot  establish  contact  between  its 
two  divisions  and  in  the  end,  barel\ 
managed  to  escape  to  the  west  bank  of 
die  Chir  mvet.  (Alter  lOmmn  Van- 
zcr  Corps  got  across  the  Chir,  several 
days  later,  HiUer  had  its  commanding 
general,  Gen«mlleufnant  lecdifiEaii4 
Heim.  recalled  t()  Gcrmany,,ilri]ppeiidi' 
his  rank,  and  jailed  without  tcili.}^*  Al 
most,         Gemojitns  and  Ruaiaiikm 


**AOKfi.  la  Kmastniieliiiih  Nr.  14,  20Nov42,AOK6 
3S224/2  filf. 

"Heim  was  lekustd  in  August  1943,  witlioui  hav- 
ing tiCfti  (lied,  He  was  restored  to  lank  a  year  later 
and  appointed  lo  command  the  Boulogne  Fortress  in 
France.  Waller  Goeriiu,  Drr  Zweite  Kltkrieg,  1939- 
(Stuitgan:  Steingruben  Verlag,  195U  1952).  vol. 
I,  p.  398.  vol,  II..  p.  363;  Walter  Goerlitz.  Pautus  and 
Stalmgmd  (New  York:  awdel  Press.  1963),  p.  20)ii. 


accomplished  was  to  set  the  Fifth  Tank 
Army  timetable  hack  about  twenty-four 
hours,  and  this  was  less  their  doing 
than  a  consequence  of  the  tank  army's 
allowing  itself  to  be  drawn  into  local 
engagements  contrary  to  its  original 
orders.  After  the  delay,  the  army's  two 
tank  corps  continued  on  toward  Kalach 
and  Chir  Station  while  VlfT  Cavalry 
Corps,  aided  by  several  rifle  divisions, 
cleared  the  line  of  the  Chir,  east  of 
which  the  Germans  and  Rumanians 
liad  no  hope  of  holding.^" 

Fourth  Panzer  Army  was  split  in  two 
by  the  end  of  the  day.  The  bulk  of  its 
German  contingent,  lY  Corps  and  the 
29th  Motorized  Infantry  Division,  was 
trapped  inside  the  pocket  forming 
arounfl  Stalingrad.  Outside  the  pocket, 
Hoth  liad  left  only  tlie  Headquarters, 
Rumanian  Fburth  Army.  Rumanian  VT 
aiifl  f 'orps,  and  the  IGtli  Motorized 
Infantry  Division.  The  latter,  protect- 
ing die  army's  outer  flank,  was  cut  off 
at  Khalkuta  on  the  20th  and  had  to 
fight  its  way  west  to  Jashkul.  In  such 
condition,  Fourth  Patizdf  Army  could 
not  stem  the  advance  around  Sla- 
hngrad,  and  it  had  no  real  prospect  of 
preventing  the  Russians  from  advanc- 
ing southwest  along  the  left  side  of  the 
Don.^' 

Although  Moth  dat  not  toiow  it  at 

llic  lime,  a  command  problem  on  the 
other  side  was  doing  more  for  him 
^han. anything  he  could  have  managed. 
After  the  brcaklhi  ough,  Fifty-scvcntli 
Afiay  had  the  relatively  limited  mission 
of  turning  in  on  l&e  fltn^k  of  Sfeftfe 
Army  v^WeP^-frntAtmy  had  the  dual 


'"SImniili,  .ViiiiK-i  ft:  AOK  6.  In.  .-IftgBiM  iitbrf 
Vm^tin\gf  '•■II  ilnii  2(1.1  J. -12.  AOK  6  75 107/6  file. 

*'P£.  .ViK  I.  I«  KruxstagelmehNr,  5,  Te3 Ul,  S0~S1 
Nov  42,  fz.  .U)K  4  2H 183/1  Rk. 


472 


MOSCOW  TO  SIAUNGRAD 


mission  of  sending  its  mobile  forces, /V 
Mechanized  Corps  and  IV  Tank  Corps,  in  a 
wide  sweep  northwestward  to  complete 
the  encirclement  near  Kalat  h  and  of 
simultaneously  directing  its  infantry  di- 
visions southwestward  tcwatid  Kotel- 
nikcno  lo  K)\ei  ilu-  kit  Hank.  C^Diisid- 
ering  the  shattered  state  of  Fourth  Pan- 
zer Army  Fifty-first  Army  should  not 
have  had  irouhle,  but  Trufanov  and  his 
Staff  had  difficulty  dealing  with  the 
cotnpltcations  of  coiitroling  forces 
moving  in  divergent  directions.  As  a 
re$i4tj  the  advances  toward  Kalach  and 
Koteirtifcovo  were  «mdtiefed  more 
slowly  and  hesitantly  than  was  nctes- 
sary."*^  Toward  Kotelaikovo,  in  par- 
ticular. Fifty-first  Army  mo*ed  so 
caudously  as  to  make  Hoth  winult-i. 
Nev«i|hekss^  Fourth  Panzer  Army  was 
in  nmr  modiEi^  ^>i^er:  On  the  22i^ 
Hotib  d^cribed  Rumanian  VI  Corps  as 
sdll  pfesenliilg  "a  fantastic  picture  of 
fleeing  remnanis."*' 

Sixt/i  Army  Stays 

An  encirclement  of  a  modern  army 
is  a  cataclysmic  event.  On  the  map  ii 
often  takes  on  a  smgically  precise  ap- 
pearance. On  the  battl4?E^d  it  is  a 
rending  operation  tftat  leaves  tiie  vic- 
tim to  struggle  ill  a  stare  of  shock  with 
tlie  least  favorable  of  all  miUtary  situa- 
tions: his  lin^  of  cortitntinicatidm  are 
cut;  his  headqiiarici  s  arc  afbsH  SSpOr 
rated  from  troops;  support  efetnents 
are  skatt@«d;  atid  his  Wont  is  opened 
to  attack  £^tn  all  dirc(ii<.nv  Flu-  mo- 
msstlt  the  tittg  closes,  every  smgle  huli- 
i;idiJaliitlWtiie  pocifcet  Escape  is  upper- 


most in  the  thoughts  of  commanders 
and  men  alike,  but  escape  is  no  simple 
matter.  With  the  enemy  on  all  sides,  with 
rivers  to  cros.s,  tut  ning  around  an  army 
that  numbers  in  the  hundreds  of  thou- 
sands.iitfith  aH  offtstnen,  weapons,  vehi- 
(Ils.  sujjplics,  and  c(|uipiiieiu ,  and 
marching  it  ten,  twenty,  thirty,  or  more 
inSes  is  ctimbersotfie  and  perilous. 

The  first  efTcc  i  of  an  im]x'iKling  en- 
circlement is  to  intensify  vastly  the  nor- 
tnal  ccmftision  of  l»atiae  because  the 
at  lack  is  carried  into  the  areas  most  dif- 
ficuit  to  defend  and  because,  as  the  ad- 
vafit£:e  tii^tinues,  the  forces  being 
end^fel^iil^essively  lose  the  points 
of  rie^r<&iQ^K3ie  means  and  the  ability 
to  orient  themselves  for  a  coherent  re<- 
spouse.  It  was  se\enty  miles  from  the 
^erahmovich  bridgehead  to  the  bridge 
at  iii^db,  a  §m  mVm  taote  to 
Army's  raiUiead\at ^bit'  Station.  In  be- 
tween, in  the  an^e  of  Chir  and  the 
Don,  lay  army  and  corps  sta^Sj  aitt* 
mimition  and  supply  dumps,  tttc^f 
pools,  hospitals,  workshops — in  siiiorli 
the  nerve  center  and  prii«fica31y  the 
whole  housekeeping  establishment  of 
the  army.  All  of  these  merged  into  one 
southward  rolling  wave  of  then,  fcors«!S, 
and  trucks  ti\ing  to  escajje  the-  Soviet 
tanks.  The  Don  was  frozen  and  proba- 
bly could  have  been  Grossed'  even  by 
trucks,  but  lew  would  retreat  cast  as 
long  as  they  had  any  other  choice.'*'* 

In  the  Fuehrer  Headqaarters  the 
events  wcix  not  c  k-ar.  but  their  prolia- 
ble  consequences  were  obvious.  Short 
ijf  a  ttmsidte,  Sbcth  Army  woutid  ^thtt 
have  to  be  permitted  to  retreat  otu  of 
Stalingrad,  which  from  Hiders  point  of 


'-Skitiiik.  \'iiiriri  6.  "A  grapliK-.  sciiiltictii  ui.ili/i'd  account  «l  lltt'  Cll- 

"Fz.  M)K  -!,  Ill  KnigUtifrfbuth  Nn  StltB  in,  22  New  cinlcmenl  is  given  in  Hriiiiitli  (ierlach.  We  VerrotttU 
42,  Pz.  AOK  4  28183/i  file.  Ainiff  (Muiiidi:  Nyrnplifiiljurger,  1959). 


THRUST  AND  COUNTERTHRUST 


473 


vievr  WftS  Ui&thiiikalile.  or  a  t«B&f  wcniii 

have  to  be  ort; ;i  n  i /cd  .  On  20 
November,  Hider  created  a  new  army 
group.  Army  Group  Don,  wM^dh  trotild 
be  composed  of  Sixth  Army,  Rumanian 
Third  Army,  Fourdi  Panzer  Army,  and 
Rumanian  Fourth  Army,  and  he  gave 
Field  Marshal  Manstein  the  command. 
Manstein  would  need  about  a  week  to 
transfer  his  h^dquarters. 

Manstein's  appointment  completed 
the  Stalingrad  triumvirate  of  Hitler, 
Manstein,  and  Paulus.  At  StaliBgrad, 
Hitler  had  publicly  staked  his  personal 
prestige:  no  small  matter  for  him.  In 
( )pt;t aitoiis  (.)rd(.'r  i\o.  I  of  14  October 
he  had  established  tlir  riL;id  delt-nse, 
successful  in  the  previous  wijiter,  as  his 
answer  to  whatever  the  nesA  v^ti^ 
might  bring.  Manstein  had  a  reputa- 
don  to  uphold,  and  possibly  enlarge,  as 
an  engineer  of  victories  and  as  an  in- 
spired, fven  daring,  commander  and 
tactician.  Had  Hitler  decided  to  ap- 
point another  commander  in  chief, 
army,  Manstein  would  have  been  one 
ol  the  likeliest  candidates.  In  his  own 
mind,  Manstein  seems  to  have  begun  to 
envision  at  least  an  appointment  as 
chief  of  the  General  Staff,  widi  enough 
added  authority  to  make  him  Hider^ 
Ludendorff.^^  Pauhis.  in  his  first  army 
command,  had  louglil  ihe  campaign 
well  dius  far.  Like  Manstein  s.  his  career 
was  on  the  rise.  Ri-portediv,  Hitler 
planned  lo  bring  him  to  (he  Fuehrer 
Headi|ua!  ici  s  alter  .Stalingrad  to  re- 
place General  Jodl,  chief,  OKW  Opera- 


**General  der  Infanterie  Erich  l.udendoilt.  al- 
though noininaUy  sub<)j{]iii;iif  u>  ihe  head  uf  SMlo 
and  Lonimander  in  thiel",  t  nipt  nn  William  II.  and  in 
the  chief  (if  die  General  Suif  1,  CeiH-ralfeldniarst  hall 
Olid  von  Hindenburg,  had  directed  ibe  entire  Cer- 
ni:in  war  (^it  iXurisg  die  last  two  jrtsars  of  Vfertd 
War  1. 


tions  Staff,  who  was  in  lin^et-ing 

disfavor.^*' 

On  the  21si,  from  l3lefi«Je/jfl/  where 
be  bad  been  vaeatibi^%^  Mttler  Xit- 
dered^ESth  Army  ta'SQ^Esi  where  it  was 
"regardless  of  die  dao^^  of  a  tempo- 
rary encirdement."*'  On  the  same  day, 
he  told  Manstein  to  expect  reinforce- 
ments totaling  6  infantry  divisions,  4 
panzer  divisions,  an  air  force  field  divi- 
sion, and  an  antiaircnift  artillery  di\a- 
sion,  but  of  these,  only  2  infantry 
divisions  would  be  available  imme- 
fliately,  the  others  were  not  to  be  ex- 
pected until  the  first  week  of 
December.^** 

Hitler's  order  reached  Paulus  al 
Nizhne  Cliiisk.iya  behind  the  Chir 
River  and  outside  the  developing  en- 
i  in  lenient,  where  Sixth  Army's  winter 
lieadquartcrs  hati  been  built.  He  had 
stiiyed  in  his  forwarrl  command  post  at 
('>olu!)inski\,  on  tlie  Don  ten  miles 
north  of  Kaiach,  until  nearly  120U  on 
the  21st,  when  Soviet  tanks  heading  to- 
ward Kaiach  came  into  sight  on  the 
steppe  to  the  west.*® 

Wben  Paulus  left,  the  XIV  Panzer 
Corps  staff  look  over  (he  Golubinskiy 
command  pe>s!  and  (rom  diere,  with 
parts  of  the  1  lilt  and  16th  PanZicrlMvi- 
sions,  tried  lo  \\\vv  the  Soviet  spear- 
heads into  a  stationary  battle.  Wher- 
ever they  could,  the  Soviet  tankn  ig- 
nored I  he  Ck-rmans  aiid  roargd  past 
ihein.  The  /V  lank  Corps  lost  some 
speed:  /  Tank  Corps  let  itself  get  tied  lip 
in  a  iight;  but  XXV/  lank  Cm^s  was  not 


'"OKW.  KTB,  vol.  11,  p.  12. 

^"W.  Gr.  B.  la.  ,ir,  AOK  5.  Bti^mmBiM4i  MJi^4Sti 

\OK  (>  7riH(7/li  lilr. 

"OKH.  GniStiUl.  Op.  Abt.  (I  Silt>  .V-.  42i}'H7i42,m 
H  <•<.  B.  22.IL42.  n.  (.;r  Umi  ;<tHi94;:il>  lik-. 

'"Hi'in/  S(hri>exc\\Sltiliiii^iiil  (\'c«'  \nrk;  K,  l>.  Dut- 
luii,  1958),  p.  80;  Kehri^,  Staiingrad,  p.  163. 


474 


MOSCOW  TO  SX^NGRAD 


affected  at  all.  In  a  daring  raid  before 
dawn  on  the  morning  of  the  22d,  :\ 
taliotl  from  XXVI  Tank  Corpn  captured 
the  Don  Bridge  at  Kalach  and  roniied 
a  hedgehog  around  it.^" 

That  morning,  Pauius  Hew  into  the 
pocket.  From  the  Gumrak  airfield,  he 
informed  HiiU  r  hv  radio  tliat  the  Rus- 
sians had  taken  Kalach  and  that  Sixtli 
Army  had  been  encircled.**  In  the 
strict  sense,  Pauius'  report  was  not 
i^iiite  correct.  I  he  Germans  in  Kalach 
Held  oiit  itntil      naet  day,  and  the' 

southern  arm  of  the  encirclement  was 
not  completed.  It  was  late  on  the  23d, 
thatt  after  an  exchange  of  green  recog- 
nition flares,  IV  Tiinh:  Carps,  which  had 
crossed  the  Don  and  covered  another 
text  miles,  met  IV  Mechanized  CorfK  at 
Sovetskiy  and  closed  the  ring.'^^ 

In  the  message  to  Hitler,  Pauhis  had 
also  stated  that  he  did  not  have  any 
kind  of  a  front  on  the  south  rim  of  the 
pocket,  between  Kalach  and  Karpovka; 
therefore,  he  would  have  to  call  XIV 
Pan/er  Corps  back  and  use  its  divisions 
to  close  the  gap.  If  enough  supplies 
could  be  flown  in  and  the  gap  coiiki  be 
closed — the  latter  being  doubtful  be- 
cause of  a  shortage  of  motor  fuel  —  he 
intended  to  form  a  perimeter  aroimd 
Stalingrad.  If  a  front  could  not  be  built 
on  the  soutli,  the  only  solution,  as  he 
saw  it,  tvas  to  evacuate  Stalingrad,  to 
give  up  the  nordi  front,  i>iill  the  army 
tQgedier,  and  to  break  out  to  the  south- 
west toward  Iburth  ^tU(tr  Army,  He 
iiiG^liested  discretionary  authority  to 


'"Si  liT oeier.  Stalingrad,  pp.  81.  83-85:  Kchrig,  Sla- 
liiigriiil,  pp.  163-65,  170-72:  Samsonov,  Sta- 
lingradslmya  hitvii.  pp.  382-84. 

^>AOK  V),  r„.  KI!-!-H,<ksj>m€h  an  H.  Or,  B.22,UA2, 

AOK 1^  7')  107/;;  iik-- 

»W(jrS5,  vol.  Ill,  p.  40. 


give  such  orders  if  they  became 

fiecessai  \-.'''' 

Pauius  waited  in  vain  throupliout  the 
^ay  on  the  23d  for  a  decision  from 
Hitler,  who  was  making  his  vvayb^ickto 
the  Vmlfsschanze  by  rail  and  plane  and, 
who  at  intervals,  was  admonishing: 
Zeii/ler  bv  iclephonc  not  to  make  any 
decisions  until  he  arrived.''^  Aware  by 
nightfall  that  the  Soviet  ring  had 
closed,  Faulus  radioed  a  second  appeal 
to  tlie  OKH  in  wliich  he  stated  that  the 
gap  m  fit»nt  on  the  south  would 
expose  the  army  to  destruction  "in  the 
very  shortest  time"  if  a  breakout  were 
not  attempted.  As  the  first  step,  he 
said,  he  would  have  to  strip  the  north- 
ern front  and  deploy  the  troops  south 
for  the  escape  effort.  He  again  asked 
for  fteedoni  of  decision,  buttressing  his 
recjuest  with  die  statement  Uiat  his  five 
corps  commanN9<^'^iid)!liSlftfed  in  his  es- 
timate.'^ In  a  separate  message,  Weichs 
seconded  Pauius'  rec|iiest. 

During  the  night,  Seydlit/,  having 
con(  luded  that  a  breakout  was  inevita- 
ble and  that  Hider  would  have  to  be 
prt-sented  a  fait  accompli,  began  ptdl- 
ing  ijatk  several  LI  Cf)rps  di\isif>ns  on 
die  nordieaslern  tip  ol  the  pocket,  l  iie 
nOi^  morning.  Hitler  demanded  a  full 
report  on  the  LI  Corps  withdrawal  and 
forbade  any  furUier  actions  contrary  to 
Operations  Ordier  No.  1.  WeiCh»  at^ 
tempted  to  gloss  over  the  mattci'  bv  ex- 
[)laining  that  the  troops  had  been  taken 
liat  k  to  prepared  positions  to  gaan  a  di- 
vision for  other  <*m |dovtnent ;  but 
Hitler  was  not  convinced  and,  suspect- 
ing Pauius,  gave  Seydlitz,  bf  whose  ac- 


''WUK  h  la.  KH-}-in,k^\nH(h  <iu  H.  Gr.  B,  22.tl.42, 
AOK  t;  751(>7/:i  lilf. 
•'•^Kehug,  Sitiliiifffiul.  p, 

23.11.42,  AOK  6  73107/6  lile. 


THRUST  AND  COUNTERTHRUST 


475 


T-34  Tanks  Advancing  at  Speed 


tion  he  apparently  was  not  aware, 
command  of  the  entire  north  front, 
making  him  personally  responsible  for 
holding  that  side  of  the  pocket.^* 

Manstdn  and  part  of  his  staff  arrived 
at  Weich%  headqitarici  s  on  the  m<»rn- 
ing  of  the  24th,  where  Weichs  told  him 
Sixth  Army's  position  was  untenable. 
After  making  his  own  calculations, 
however,  Manstein  sent  the  OKH  a  less 
pessimistic  estimate  than  those  of 
Pauliis  and  Weichs.  He  agreed  that  a 
breakout  was  the  safest  course  and  that 
to  hold  out  would  be  octremely  daji^ 


>H)KH,  GenSulH.  Oji.  AN.  (!  Sllij 
Arme.  H.  Gr.  B.  H.  C.y.   Dim.  2 

GiaStdH.  Op.  Abi.  a  SIR]  ,V;.  r>  i  -i. 
6.  24.U.42,  AOK.  6  751(J7/t>  lik- 


,V(.  ■12fm-4/-l2.  rill  h 
I  n  42  Mu\  OKH. 
.        11.  <.,,.  li.  .\OK 

H.  C.r.  B.  la  Nr. 


gerous,  but  he  said  he  could  not  concur 
"at  present"  with  Army  Group  B's 
Stand  in  fa\  or  of  a  breakout.  He  said  he 
believed  a  relief  operation  could  start 
in  early  December  if  the  promised  re- 
inforcements were  supplied.  At  the 
same  time,  he  warned  that  the  break' 
out  could  stUl  become  necessary  if  a 
l  elief  force  could  not  be  assembled.*'' 
Whether  HiUer  would  have  been 
persuaded  by  the  unanimous  voices  of 
Manstein,  Weichs,  and  Paulus  is  doubt- 
ful. That  he  was  not  goin^  to  be  influ- 
enced by  the  other  two  with  Manstein 
dissenting  was  certain,  tn  fact.  Hitler 
had  made  what  was  going  to  be  his  hiial 


■f  24 2/42,  an.H.  Qn  Don,  24.11.42,  H.  Gn  Don  39694 

Hle- 


■•H>b.  Kdo.  H.  Gr.  Don.  la  Nr.  4580142,  an  UKH,  Up. 
Abi..  24.11.42,  H.  Gr.  Don  S9694«b  file;  Kchrig, 
Stalingrad,  pp.  222-24. 


476 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


decision  on  Sixth  Army  early  on  the 
24th,  without  waiting  for  Mansteins 
opinion.  He  instructed  Paulus  to  draw 
his  northwest  and  southwest  fronts  in- 
ward slighth  and  then  to  hold  the 
pocket,  and  he  promised  to  supply 
Sixth  Army  by  air.  lb  Fourth  Panzer 
Army,  he  sent  orders  to  stop  the  Rus- 
sians north  of  Koiehiikovo  and  to  get 
ready  to  GOtmterattack  north  to  re- 
establish contact  with  Sixth  Army.  In 
Hiders  mind,  the  correctness  of  the 
decision  was  probably  confirmed  less 
by  Manstein's  estimate  than  by  an  as- 
surance from  Reichsraarschall  Goe- 
riag,  €onimander  in  chief,  s&t  ft»oe — 
accepted  o\'er  Zeitzler  s  strenuously  ex- 
pressed doubts — that  the  air  force 
would  be  able  to  fly  600  tons  sup- 
plies per  day  into  the  pocket.^^ 

Two  days  later,  HiUer  put  down  his 
thoughts  on  Stalingtiid  in  a  message  to 
Mansiein.  lo  evacuate  the  city,  lie  said, 
would  mean  giving  up  the  "most  sub- 
stantia] achievement"  of  the  1942  cam- 
paign: therefore,  the  city  would  have  to 
be  held  regardless  of  the  cost,  es- 
pecially Stbsce  16  Tietal^  it  in  1943  wou  Id 
reqtiire  even  greater  sacrifices.  Fourdi 
Panzer  Army  would  liave  to  "extend  a 
hand"  to  Sixth  Army  from  the  Kotelni- 
kovo  area  and  would  ha\  e  to  hold  a 
bridgehead  around  the  confluence  ol 
the  Don  and  Chir  rivers  to  facilitate  a 
secondary  thrust  toward  Stalingrad 
from  the  west.  When  contact  with  Sixth 
Army  was  reestablished,  supplies 
would  be  moved  in;  the  citv  would  be 
held;  and  Army  Group  Don  could  be- 


'"Kebvi^,  Slttl.inf;n,il.  p.  2:^1);  OKH.  GeiiSidH .  ai,  AOh 
6,  :i.  n  13,  AOK  (1  7r>l()7/;i  dlr;  OKH.  GenShUI.  Oj,. 
Ahi  ,7  s  /i,  ,Vj,  ■<2<)yhlH2,  III!  H  Gr.  B.  H.  Clr.  Don 
.i f I Iilc:  .\/,V  7-V,  Off  Feldzi^  in  Russland  em 

Hciiinci),  di.  X.  pp.  81-82. 


gin  to  prepare  for  an  advance  north  to 
clear  out  the  area  of  the  breakthrough 
between  the  Don  and  the  Chir,^* 

Hitler  had  made  his  decision  and  was 
confidetii,  but  his  confidence  was  not 
shared  at  the  front.  On  seeing  die 
Older  of  24  Noveraber,  Seydlttz  tdd 
I'aulus  there  could  be  no  question  of 
holding;  the  army  either  had  to  bi  eak- 
out  or  succumb  within  a  short  time.  He 
believed  supplies,  which  had  already 
been  running  short  before  die  coun- 
teroffensive  began,  would  dedde  the 
issue.  To  (outid  any  hopes  on  air  sup- 
ply, he  added,  was  to  giasp  at  a  straw 
since  only  thirty  JU-52s  were  at  hand 
(on  23  November),  and  even  if  hun- 
dreds more  could  be  assembled,  a  feat 
which  was  doubtful,  the  army^  full 
retjuirements  could  still  not  be  met. 
Paulus  told  Seydlitz  to  keep  out  of 
affairs  that  were  no  concern  of  his  but, 
nevertheless,  agreed  with  Sevdlitz  in 
substance  and,  on  the  26th,  in  a  per- 
sonal letter  to  I^Blstein,  again  asked 
for  authority  to  act  at  his  own  discre- 
tion, pointing  out  that  the  first  three 
days  ot  ail  sup^f  had  brought  only  a 
fraction  of  the  promised  600  tons  and 
300  JU-52  flights  per  day.*'" 

Manstein  knew  Hitler's  thinking  atid 
did  not  answer.  After  .A.rmy  Group 
Don  was  tormalh  acli\ ated  on  the  next 
day,  the  27th,  Manstein  le^^ed  iBOre. 
Zeit/ler  told  him  (hat  he,  toi^  ivpuld 
not  be  given  the  audiority  tQ  qr4'^  ^ 
breakout— wMch  hi^  h^  linked  for  in 


'^-OKH.  C.niStiiH.  Op.  Abt.  (I  SIB)  Nr.  4209641-12.  an 
//(■(-Ml  (U'limilfMinnrsfhiill  tmi}  Majistem,  26.iLI2.  H, 
(.1.  Hon  H'lffiM/:!!)  (ilf. 

'■"/>/  (  Kiimmiiniiti-remle  Gnu-ial  dtn  LI  A.K.,  Nf. 
hfi'/IJ,  iiti  fini  Htirn  Olieibtjehhhaher  der  ft,  Ainut, 
25.//. VJ.  AOK  6  75107/3  file;  OM.  der  AOK  6,  an 
Genn  atJMmnrs<^  vm  Monstm,  2641.43,  AOK  6 
75107/3  file. 


THRUST  AND  COUNTERTHRUST 


477 


the  24  Novemfefer  estimate*  Latet, 

Richthofen,  who  was  running  the  air- 
lift, told  him  the  planes  would  not  be 
able  to  deliver  evea  30®  torn  of  sup^ 
plies  a  day.  In  the  meantime,  that 
morning,  Hitler  had  called  on  the 


treojss  m  ike  pDcket  to  stand  tmt  and 

to  convert  the  breakthrough  into  a 
Soviet  defeat  as  they  had  the  one  at 
Kharkw  in  the  spring.'^ 


«'  Ktilirig,  Stalingrad,  pp.  264,  279. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 


Stalingra 

TheReU^ 

S^id  as  th^  Getmatf  sattiatibn  was  at 

Stalingrad,  it  could  easih'  have  been  far 
worse.  However,  once  Southwest,  Dun, 
and  Stalingrad  Fronts  completed  (lie  eia*- 
circlement,  they  devoted  the  greater 
part  of  their  forces  to  fastening  the 
grip  on  Sixth  Army,  and  they  virtually 
discontinued  the  offensive  in  \hv  ("hir 
River  sector  and  against  Fourili  I'an/.er 
Army.  By  28  November,  they  had  con- 
centrated 94  divisions  and  brigades 
against  Sixth  Army  and  had  oiily  49 
units  opp0^ng  Fourth  Panzer  i&w^ 
and  Rumanian  Third  Army,  no  more 
than  20  of  these  actually  in  the  line.' 

On  the  Army  Group  Don  front, 
XVII  CU)rps  held  the  line  of  the  Chir  in 
the  noi  ih,  and  Rumanian  Third  Army 
held  the  rest  soutli  to  the  confluence  of 
the  Chir  and  Don.  Actually,  XVII 
Corps  iiad  most  of  the  remaining 
Rumanian  troops,  and  the  only  sizable 
German  miits  in  the  line  were  two 
intantry  divisions.  Rumanian  Third 
Army  existed  in  name  only;  GermaB 
staff  of  ficers  manned  its  heatk|uarters; 
and  a  scratch  force  of  small  German 
units  held  its  fl?oiit.*  la  the  Fourth 
Panzer  Army  sector,  the  remnants  of 
Fourth  Paiizer  Army  and  Rumanian 
VI  and  VII  Corps  were  redesignated 

'.^ontA,  Nomn  6. 

^Der  O  B.  derU.  Gr.B,  la  Nr.  4200M2,  an  dmFitdtmr 
uml  Ohrrhrjrhlsluaer  <<er  Hftm,  ^.11,42,  H.  Gr,  Don 
39694/3b  hie. 


i,  Finale 

Armeegiuppe  Hoth.  Under  General 
Holh,  Headquarters.  Rumanian 
Fourth  Army,  took  command  of  the 
iwo  Rimianian  corps.  Hoth  had  re- 
ported that  if  the  Russians  made  any- 
thing approaching  a  serious  effort 
against  bh  Armecpiippe,  they  could  not 
help  but  have  the  "greatest"  success.  By 
27  November,  Kotelnikovo  was  within 
Soviet  artillery  range;  but  Fifty-first 
Army  was  advancing  cautiously;  and  in 
the  last  four  days  of  the  month,  the 
first  transports  of  German  troops  for  a 
rplief  jQp^ration  began  to  arrive.^ 


Hitler  had  based  his  decision  to  keep 
Sixth  Army  at  Staltngiad  on  two 
sumpdons:  that  sufficient  forces  to 
conduct  a  successful  relief  operauon 
could  be  assembled  aiid  that  Sixth 
Army  cmlld  Ise  stistafeed  as  a  viable 
fighting  force  by  air  supply  until  ilie 
relief  was  accomplished.  The  air  supply 
problem  appeared  to  fefetwie  Of  »mple 
mthmetic — matching  1^  number  of 
planes  to  the  required  tonnages.  Such 
was  not  the  case,  but  even  if  it  had  been, 
the  problem  would  still  have  been 
beyond  solution.  In  late  Noveraber 
1942,  thcGerman  Air  "Porce  was  undei^ 
going  its  greatest  si  rain  sint  e  the  start  of 
the  war.  At  Stalingi  ad  and  in  North  Af- 


T-..  AOK  4.  In  Kru-j^.lugflmrh  Afc  5,  "BH  HI,  M-3Q 
Nov  42.  Hz.  AOK  4  28183/1  file. 


STAUNGRAD»  FINALE 


479 


rica,  ii  was  fighting  a  Iwo-front  war  in 
earnesi.  Bv  ihc  end  of  November,  400 
combat  aircraft  liad  been  transterred 
from  the  Eastern  Front  to  North  Africa, 
reducing  the  front's  niimerica!  strength 
by  a  sixth  and  its  effective  strength  by 
nearly  a  third.  Moreover,  of  2,000 
planes  left  on  the  Eastern  Front,  the 
OKW  estimated  that  no  more  than 
1*120  were  oprera^tional  on  28 
NovemI:>cr.^ 

General  Richthofen,  the  commander 
of  Fourth  Air  Force,  reported  on  25 
November  that  he  had  298  JU-52 
transports;  he  needed  500  to  supply 
Stalingrad.  And  he  recommended  that 
Sixth  Army  be  allowed  to  break  out,, a 
suggestion  tliat  Hitler  "rejected  out  of 
hand."^  He  then  began  to  use  HE— lU 
twin-engine  bombers  as  transports, 
which  reduced  the  number  of  aircraft 
available  for  combat  missions  withf)ut 
decisively  improving  the  air  supply.  In 
any  event,  even  those  aircraft  at  hand 
could  not  be  made  fully  effective  be- 
cause they  had  to  operate  across  en- 
emy-held territory,  through  contested 
airspace,  in  uncertain  weather,  and 
without  adequate  ground  support 
(particularly  on  the  Stalingrad  end  of 
Uie  run).  On  29  November,  38  JU-52s 
(maximum  load  1  ton  per  plane)  and 
21  HE-llls  (maximttm  load  1,000 
pounds  per  plane  )  took  off.  Of  these, 
12  JU-52S  and  13  HE-lUs  landed  in- 
side the  pocket.  The  following  day,  30 
JU-52S  and  36  HE-llls  landed  out  of 
39  and  38,  respectiveiy,  committed.®  At 


diat  rate,  Sb&Hk  AfMy  wotttd.1td^#  tfif  be 
saved  soon. 

On  1  December,  Army  Group  Don 
began  preparing  the  relief,  under  the 
code  name  Wintergewitter  ("winter 
storm").  The  main  effort  went  to 
Fourth  Panzer  Army's  LVU  Panzer 
Corps,  which,  with  two  fresh  panzer  di- 
visions (6th  and  23d)  then  on  the  way, 
'Would  push  northeastward  from  the 
vicinity  of  Kotelnikovo  toward  Sta- 
lingrad. Rumanian  VI  and  VII  Corps 
would  cover  its  flanks.  For  a  secondary 
effort  toward  Kalach,  out  of  a  small 
German  bridgehead  on  the  lower 
Chir,  Fourth  Pan2er  Army  was  given 
XXXXVIII  Panzer  Corps.  Headquar- 
ters, XXXXVIII  Panzer  Corps,  left  its 
two  original  divisions,  2 2d  Panzer  Divi- 
sion and  1st  Rumanian  Armored  Divi- 
sion, in  the  front  on  the  Chir  and 
assumed  command  in  the  bridgehead 
of  three  divisions  coming  in — the  11th 
Panzer  Division,  336th  Infantry  Divi- 
sion, and  7th  Air  Force  Field  Division. 
General  Paulus,  the  commander  of 
Sixth  Army,  was  to  bring  together  all  Gf 
his  armor  on  the  southwest  rim  of  the 
pocket  apd  to  be  ready  to  strike  toward 
LVIX  Pansser  Cbrps  if  ordeinsd.  He  was 
also  to  be  prepared  to  break  out  toward 
Kalach  but  was  at  the  same  time  to  hold 
hfs  fronts  on  the  north  and  in  Sta- 
lingrad. Field  Marshal  Manstein,  com- 
mander of  Ajm^y  Group  Don,  wanted 
(d1be  teady  the  Mief  operatbn 

anytime  after  daybreak  on  8 
December.^ 


'  British  Air  Minisiry  Pamphlei  2-lH,  ]>.  IS2;^ai«r 

Diary  Mfs.  29  Nov  42.  C-OeScj  CMI I  likv 

K-rriiiti  Dian  .V"/c.n,  25  Nov  42,  C-Oli.)!)  (.Mil  Hlc. 
"Sf<.-  KL-hnt.'.  Slalmirtni/.   pp.  2H:l-ilS.  OKH.  Gm- 

StflH.  G,'u.  dii..  AM.  i.  Oil.  1  Nr.  liSS07H2,  an  H.  Gr. 

Dun.  26.11.42: 11.  Gr.  Don,  EtmaU  Luftwap,  29.11.42 


and  H.  (.r.  Dmi.  luii^iti  dfr  Flui^i-Ui^f  zur  VnMtrf^uiig  drr 
6.  .Ar?ii,v  aw  ill. 11.-12.  H.  (  .r.  Ddn  :^W(i94/;U)  liie. 

'Oh.  K,l,.  .In-  H  (,r.  Dun,  la  iSr.  0343H2.  Weuutig 
Nr.  I  jin  ,  i)i„  ,„i„.n  "Wittfergewitler,"  tlZ'12,  H.  Gt. 
Don  3<H(94/;ib  die. 


480 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


DoubUimdBihp 

The  outidbk  ftsr  W!m*ReiEwrmii 
was  not  auspicious  from  the  first  and 
grew  less  promising  with  each  passing 
day.  Sixth  Army  slSllHi  two  motorizeEl 
di\isions  and  a  panzer  division  to  the 
southwest  a&  ordered,  but  after  2  De- 
ceiiifeear,  Bm  and  Sfsfegrtid  Fmm  Mt 
the  pocket  hard  for  a  week  and  tied  the 
three  divisions  down  in  defensive  l^ht- 
ing.*  On  5  Oecemfeer,  Sm^'mst  mrra 
again  bei  ann.-  active  along  the  Chir,  in 
the  Rumauiaii  I  hird  Army  sector, 
ijfeltSnf  ifetistein  to  conunit  the  ihf&e 
divisions  for  XXXXVllI  Panzer  Corps 
tliere  and,  in  effect,  to  drop  the  corps 
out  WiNl^kjEwiTTER.  Further,  the 
two  divisions  for  LVII  Corps  were  slow 
in  arriving,  and  the  QKH  instructed 
^niitetn  to  use  air  force  field  divi- 
sions, of  whicii  he  h%4 'f^.i«l^^(ffi^ 
sive  missions  only. 

%  9  December,  WiNTEaiCTWiTTEa 
had  dwindled  to  a  two-division  opera- 
tion, Neverdieless,  the  next  day,  Man- 
steiit  decided  to  get  ahead,  and  he  set 
the  time  for  the  morning  of  12  De- 
cember. Any  more  delay,  he  believed, 
eotild  not  be  tolerated  because  supplies 
were  running  short  and  because  Sox  ict 
armor  had  been  detected  moving  in 
Opposite  fourth  PanzCT  Aanfly.  Sixth 
Army  reported  that  an  average  of  only 
seventy  tons  of  siii>plies  a  day  were 
being  flow  n  in,  and  rations,  except  for 
odds  and  ends,  would  run  out  by  19 
December.^ 


"AOK  6.  hi.  .Viil/zi'it  zur  Beurtiilitiig der  Lage  6.  AtHBttt 
7.t2.  t2.  11.  Gr.  Don  file;  PktOndv,  Vtom/tk 

Minwawi  Vn\rui,  p.  391. 

•O/*.'  Ktl-i.  'In-  H.  Gr.  Don.  la  Nr.  lHWi:.  .,„  OKI  I. 
Chef  r.vnSiilH.  10.12.42.  H.  Gr.  Don  39694/4  hie;  AOK 
b.  1,1  w.  47 27 142,  mH.  Gr.Hm.  tl. iSM.  fi- &F-  J>m 
file, 


Hitler  was  still  coniident.  On  3  De- 
cember, answering  a  gloomv  Army 
Group  Don  report,  he  cautioned  Man- 
stein  to  b^  in  mind  that  Soviet  divi- 
sions were  always  smaller  and  weaker 
ilian  they  at  Hrst  ajjpeared  to  be  and 
that  the  Soviet  commands  were  ptOba- 
bly  thrown  off  balance  by  their  own 
success.  A  week  later  his  confidence 
had  grown,  and  concluding  that  the 
first  phase  of  the  Soviet  winter  offen- 
sive could  be  considered  ended  without 
having  achieved  a  decisive  success,  lie 
returned  to  the  idea  of  retaking  the 
line  on  the  Don.  By  10  December,  he 
was  at  the  point  of  planning  to  deploy 
the  7th  and  17(li  Pan/er  Divisions  on 
the  Arm\  Croup  Don  leit  Hank  and  to 
use  them  to  spearhead  an  advance 
from  the  Chir  to  the  Don.  The  next 
day  he  ordered  Manstein  to  station 
17th  Panzer  Division  in  the  XVII 
Corps  sector  on  (he  Chir,  thereby,  for 
the  time  being,  ending  tlie  possibility  of 

its  being  used  in  WimmG^wrmi"^ 
Wniergemtter  Runs  Its  Gbtme 

Jumping  off  on  time  on  the  morning 
of  the  12th.  l.VIl  Panzer  Corps  made 
good,  though  not  spectacular,  prog- 
ress. During  the  afternoon  situation 
conference  at  Fuehrer  Headquarters, 
General  Zeitzler,  the  chief  of  the  Gen- 
eral Staff,  tried  to  persuade  Hitler  to 
release  the  l7th  Panzer  Division  for 
WiNTERGEWiTTER,  but  Hitler  refused 
because  a  threat  appeared  to  be  de- 
veloping on  the  Army  Group  Dcjn  left 
flank  where  it  joined  the  right  of  Ital- 


'".Anna  7S5l,  Bnug:  H  Gr.  Dun.  fn  Nr.  0341142,  H. 
(,r.  Dun  :V_l6fl4/3b  lilt-;  Grmin  Diary  Xiiles,  10  Dec  42. 
C-Utiaq  CMH  file:  OKH,  G^nHldH,  Op.  ML  Nr. 
10I4H2.  tmH.Or  Dan,  n.tZ.42.  H.  ^  mm  39694/4 
file. 


STALINGRAD,  FINALE 


481 


Self-Propeixeo  Assault  Guns  Attack  in  Operation  WiNTiHGEwrrrER 


ian  Eighth  Army.  In  the  conference,  he 
restated  his  position  on  Stahngrad,  say- 
ing, "I  have  reached  one  conclusion, 
Zeitzier.  We  cannot,  under  any  drcum- 
siances,  give  that  [pointing  to  Sta- 
lingrad] up.  We  will  not  retake  it.  We 
know  what  that  means  ...  if  we  give 
that  up  we  sacrifice  the  whole  sense  of 
this  campaign.  To  imagine  that  I  will 
get  there  again  next  time  is  insanity."" 
On  the  second  day,  LVII  Panzer 
Corps  reached  the  Aksay  River  and 
captured  a  bridge  at  Zalivskiy;  but  on 
the  Chir  and  at  the  Don-Chir 
briflgehead,  XXXXVIII  Panzer  Corps 
barely  held  its  own  against  the  Fiftli 
3&ni  asdi^p^  Skat^  Armes,  wltMi  were 


trying  to  tighten  the  grip  on  Sixth 
Army  by  enlarging  the  buffer  /.one  on 
the  west.  Fifth  Shock  Army  was  newly 
formed  out  of  two  rifle  divisions  and  a 
tank  corps  from  the  Slavka  reserves.** 
Before  1200  Manstein  told  Hitler  tliat 
the  trouble  on  the  Chir  had  eliminated 
every  chance  of  XXXXVIII  Panzer 
Corps'  fleeing  forces  for  a  thrust  out  of 
the  bridgehead  and  that  without  such 
help,  LVII  Panzer  Corps  could  not  get 
through  to  Sixth  Army. 

Manstein  asked  for  17th  Panzer  Divi- 
sion, to  take  over  the  attack  from  the 


•*StewogT.  Dii'i^t  III 
12.12.42.  CMH  fUes. 


F.li.  Qu.,  L^ebespreehtmg  vom 


"[General  .Sl.id  of  llit-  Red  Array],  Shortiik  mtilP' 
rialin'  fHi  tiiirhi'tmii  n/itln  hjV'V,  Nimfr  8,  Aug— Oti  43; 
Pi.  AOK  4.  la  Knix^kif;,-I>mli  Nr.  5,  TeiUll.  13  Det  42. 
fc.  AOK  i  2K1S.!.  I  hie. 

'"Vasilevskij,  ZJc/u,  p.  264J. 


482 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


bridgehead,  and  for  16th  Motorized 
Infantry  Divison  (then  stationed  at 
Elista,  between  the  Army  Group  Don 
and  Army  Group  A  flanks)  to  reiiiloi  ce 
LVIl  Panzer  Corps.  HiUer  released  the 
17th  Panzer  Division  but  not  the  16th 
Motorized  Infantry  Division.  The  deci- 
sion about  17th  Panzer  Division  was 
made  easier  by  a  growing  impression  in 
the  OKH  thai  tlic  Russians  were  only 
simulating  a  buildup  on  the  Army 
Group  Don  left  flank.*'' 

For  another  four  days,  Win- 
TERGEWITTFR  went  ahead  without 
gathering  ent)ugh  momentum  to  en- 
sure an  early  success.  On  the  I  lib, 
however,  the  part  of  the  Don-Chir 
bridgehead  east  of  the  Don  had  to  be 
evacuated.  The  attack  out  of  the 
bridgehead  would  have  been  aban- 
doned in  any  case,  since  1 7th  Panzer 
Division  was  having  to  be  sent  to  l  A'Il 
Panzer  Corps.  On  the  17th  and  ibth, 
LVli  Panzer  Corps,  increased  to  three 
divisions  by  17th  Panzer  Division,  f)e- 
came  tied  down  in  fighting  around 
Knimkiy,  halfway  between  the  Askay 
andi  Mishkova  rivers. 

On  the  1 9th,  LVII  Panzer  Corps 
shook  itself  loose  arid  4tme  to  the 
Mishkova,  thiity-five  miles  from  the 
pocket.  Maiistein,  however,  told  Hitler 
that  LVII  I^nzer  Corps,  becanse  dPits 
own  losses  and  stiffening  enemy  resis- 
tance, probably  could  not  get  through 
to  Sixth  Army  and  certainly  could  not 
open  a  permanent  corridor  to  ihe 
pocket.  He  had,  he  added,  sent  his  in- 
telligence officer  into  the  pocket,  and 
lie  had  reported  thai  Sixth  Arinv  <jnly 
had  rations  for  another  three  days. 


"O.B.  da  II.  l.r.  Lhn.  h  .Vr.  259i42,  an  Cbej  ilf-x 
Grnnnlstabf^.  OKU.  I  >.  12.42.  H  Gr.  Don  39694/4  file; 
Creuier  Diary  Ntiles,  IS  Dec  42.  C-065q  CMH  file. 


Consequendy,  MaitSte^  said,  he  be- 
lieved the  only  answer  was  to  order 
Sixth  Army  to  break  out,  gradually 
pulling  back  its  fronts  on  the  north  and 
in  Stalingrad  as  it  pushed  toward  LVII 
Panzer  Corps  on  the  south.  Tliat,  he 
maintained,  would  at  least  save  most  of 
the  troops  and  whatever  equipment 
could  still  be  hauled." 

lb  Paukis,  Manstein  sent  notice  to 
get  ready  for  Operation  Donner- 
scHLAt;  ("thunderboh"),  which  would 
be  the  breakout.  The  army's  mission, 
Manstein  said,  would  have  to  include 
an  initial  push  to  the  Mishkova.  There, 
after  contact  with  LVII  Corps  was 
made,  truck  convoys,  which  were 
bringing  up  3,000  tons  of  supplies  be- 
hind the  corps,  would  be  sluiced 
through  to  the  pocket.  Subsequently, 
Sixth  Army,  taking  along  what  equip- 
ment it  could.  wdiiM  evacuate  the 
pocket  and  withdraw  south  west  ward. 
Pauitis  was  to  get  ready  but  was  not  to 
start  unLil  ordered,**^ 

Hitler,  encouraged  by  LVII  Panzer 
Corps'  getting  to  the  Mishkova,  refused 
to  approve  Do.snerschi^ag.  Instead,  he 
ordered  the:  SS  Viking  Division  trans- 
ferred from  lijpiny  Group  A  to  Fottrth 
Panzer  Army.  Sixth  Army,  he  insisted, 
was  to  stay  put  mitil  firm  contact  was 
fiStablished  with  LVII  Corps  and  a 
Complete,  oiclct  ly  withdrawal  could  be 
imdertaken.  In  the  meantime,  enough 
supplies  were  ta  be  M<ma  in,  par- 
ticularly of  motor  faeLtd  give  ihearmy 
thirty  iniles*  motntity.  (iSuer  had  heard 


"0.S.  der  H.  Gr,  Bon,  la  Nr.  036i^i  i2.  mi  t  .ht-j  ,lrs 
Generalstahe\  ties  Heera  zur  sofartigeti  Vorlagr  hem 
Fwlnrr.  !<.'  12  -12.  H.  Gi.  Doti  39694/5  file.  See  also 

Keliriji.  SUiliii^nnl.  pp. 

'W.  K,l».  li  Gr  D<,„.  I„  \k  0369142,  m6.  Amtti 
19.12.42,  H,  Gr.  Don  39694/5  file. 


STALINGRAD,  FINALE 


483 


that  the  army  had  ot^y^mouflt  i^d  tt> 
go  eighteen  miles.) 

On  the  21st,  after  LVII  Panzer  Corps 
had  failed  to  get  beyond  the  Mishkova 
in  two  more  days  of  fighting,  Gene- 
ralmajor  Friedrich  Schulz,  Manstein's 
thief  of  staff,  conferred  \\it!j  General 
Schmidt,  Paulus'  chief  of  staff,  by 
means  of  a  newly  installed  high-fre- 
quency telecommunications  system. 
Schulz  asked  whether  Sixth  Army 
could  execute  Donnerschlag.  The  op- 
eration  had  not  been  approved,  he 
added,  but  Manstein  wanted  to  be 
ready  to  go  ahead  as  soon  as  possible 
because  of  the  unhkelihood  of  LVII 
Panzer  Corps'  getting  any  closer  to  the 
pocket.  Schmidt  replied  that  the  army 
could  start  on  24  Decern  be  i,  but  he  did 
not  believe  it  could  condnue  to  hold 
the  pocket  for  any  length  of  time  there- 
after if  the  first  losses  were  heavy.  If 
Stalingrad  were  to  be  held,  he  said,  it 
would  be  better  to  fly  in  supplies  and 
replacements,  in  wliich  case  the  armv 
could  defend  itself  indefinitely.  In  the 
case  of  DowfEMiCHtAG,  he  and  I*aulus 
thought  the  chances  for  success  w  onld 
be  better  if  the  evacuation  followed  im- 
mediately upon  the  breakout,  but  they 
legardcd  evacuation,  under  anv  cir- 
cumstances, as  an  act  of  desperadon  to 
be  avoided  \int&  it  'hetmm  ^sioltitely 
necessarv.'^  The  conference  ended  on 
that  indeterminate  note. 

Manstein  transmitted  the  results  of 
the  exchange  to  the  OKH.  He  could 
give  no  assurance,  he  added,  that  if 
Sixth  Arm:yhd5i:iM*t,<5oMtai^^iii4^  tyil 
Panzer  Corps  could  he  reestabBs;hedt 


since  further  substantial  gains  by  the 
panzer  corps  were  not  to  be  ex- 
pected.In  effect  Wintercewitter 
had  failed,  and  both  Mansteiir  and 
Paulus  had  sidestepped  the  respon- 
sibility for  Donnerschlag,  which  nei- 
ther could  legally  order  without 
Hitlers  approval.  Later  in  the  day,  on 
the  21st,  Hider  talked  at  length  with 
the  chiefs  of  the  Ai  my  and  Air  Force 
General  Staffs,  but  to  those  present), 
"the  Fuehrer  seemed  no  longer  capable 
^oialdtig.a  dedsion."** 

SixA  Army  Isohted 

After  it  turned  over  the  Stalingrad 
sector  to  Army  Group  Don,  Army 
Group  B  had  just  one  function — to 
protect  the  rear  of  its  neighbors  to  the 
south.  Army  Groups  Don  and  A.  On 
the  cridcal  200-mile  stretch  of  the 
from  Voronezh  downstream  to  Ve- 
shenskaya,  that  function  fell  to  the 
Hungarian  Second  Army  and  Italiati 
Eighth  Army.  How  well  they  might  be 
expected  to  perform  under  attack  was 
predictable  because  the  Rumanians 
had  been  considered  the  best  of  the 
German  allies. 

A  glance  at  the  map  (iWa^  44)  reveals 
htjwmlnet'able  Army  Groups  Dtm  and 
A  wete  &Sld  how  much  their  existences 
depended  on  the  few  raillines  that 
reached  into  the  steppe  east  of  the 
Dnepr,  the  Donets,  and  the  Don.  The 
crucial  points  on  these  lines  were  the 
river  crossings.  Everything  going  east 
out  of  the  Dnepr  bend  depended  on 
the  bridges  at  Dnepropetrovsk  and 


'■<(). H.  <l.  H  Or.  Don.  In  Nr.  0372142,  zu  Ferti.'^pmth 
'-•Cmm;  Dian  >}ota.  19  Dec  42.  C-0(i3q  CMH  file.      OKU.  Op.  .Mil.  Nr.  521021142.  21.12.42.  H.  Or.  Don 
"F.S-CfsprmTh  Gen.  Schmdt-^  Gen,  Sehuk.  tI.J2.42.      39694/ri  lile. 
AOK  6  73107/2  ale.  '^"Gn-iner  Diai-y  Notes,  21  Dec  42,  C-4)6bq  CMH  file. 


MOSCOW  TO  STiWLINGRAD 


ZsLp&t&^hfe.  The  distance  froaa 

Dnepropetrovsk  to  the  Soviet  line  at 
Novaya  Kalitva,  in  the  center  of  the 
Italian  Eighth  Array  sector,  was  250 
miles,  whUe  from  Dnepropetrovsk  to 
the  Army  Group  Don  front  on  the 
Chir  River  was  330  miles;  to  the  left 
flank  of  Army  Group  A,  580  miles.  Bui 
the  Russians  did  not  need  to  strike  as 
far  west  as  Dnepropetrovsk.  On  the  left 
flank  of  Army  Group  Don  they  were 
within  80  miles  of  three  Donets  cross- 
ings: Voroshik)vgrad,  Kamensk- 
Shakhtinskiy,  and  Belokalilvenskaya.  A 
150-inile  march  from  the  left  flank  of 
Army  Group  Don  would  take  them  all 
the  way  to  Rostov.  Both  Army  Group  A 
and  Fourth  Panzer  Arm)  were  tied  to 
tJie  faSrMd  through  Rostov,  and  the 
Army  Group  A  left  flank  was  350  miles 
and  the  Fourdi  Panzer  Army  right 
flank  220  Qiiles  from  MmtoVi 

Safum  and  Koliso 

I  he  anomahes  of  the  German  situa- 
tion, of  course,  did  not  go  unnoticed 
on  the  Soviet  side,  and  on  the  night  of 
23  November,  Stalin  instructed  Gen- 
eral Vasilevskly,  chief  of  the  General 
Staff,  to  work  up  a  plan  for  an  offen- 
sive by  Soulhircsl  Fronl,  undei"  General 
Vatutin,  and  the  Voronezh  Front,  left 
wing,  under  General  Goliko\.  'in  (he 
general  direction  of  Millerovo  and  Ros- 
tov."-' Apparendy  Stalin  also  talked  to 
General  Moskalenko,  commander  of 
First  Guards  Army,  that  same  night 
about  somedling  possibly  even  bigger, 
an  offensive  to  liberate  Kharkov  and 
the  Don  Basin.  In  the  last  week  ot  the 
month,  Vasilevskiy  and  General 
Vpronov,  who  would  be  coordinatiog 


2 1  Vasilevskiy.  "D*/o,  "  p.  252. 


operation  a&Stavka  representatives, 
worked  on  the  plan  with  front  com- 
manders, Vatutin  and  Golikov.  General 
Zhukov,  first  deputy  commissar  for  de- 
fense, who  had  gone  to  Kalimn  and 
West  Fronts  to  take  cliarge  of  Mars,  nev* 
eriheless,  stayed  in  close  touch  with 
Stalin  and  Vasilevskiy.-'^ 

On  2  December,  Stalin  and  the 
SUxuka  m^f^atm&A  tite  {itslS^Opei  ation 
Saturn  and  set  the  readiness  date  as  10 
December.  The  objectives  wei  e  to  en- 
circle Italian  Eighth  Army  and  the 
Army  Group  Don  elements  inside  tbe 
Don  bend  and,  by  taking  Rostov  and 
the  line  of  the  lower  Don,  to  cut  off 
Fovn  th  Panzer  Armv  and  Army  Group 
A.  On  the  right,  Soullavest  Front'?,  First 
Guards  and  Third  Guards  Arynies.  the 
latter  to  lie  formed  by  dividing  First 
Guards  Army  and  adding  rifle  divisions 
and  a  mechanized  corps  from  the  re- 
serves, would  break  through  the  Italian 
Eighth  Army's  left  flank  near  Boguchar, 
head  almost  due  south  to  Miflerovo* 
cross  the  Donets  at  Kamensk-Shakh- 
tinskiy,  and  contuiue  soudi  to  Rostov. 
On  their  right,  Voronezh  F^rmt'& Sixth  Atmy 
would  provide  flank  cover  and  strike 
toward  Voroshilovgrad,  lb  torni  the 
second  arm  of  the  envelopment.  Fifth 
Tank  Army  would  break  through  across 
the  Chir  and  run  along  die  right  side  of 
the  lower  DoB  to  Rostov.^^ 

In  Moscow,  on  4  December,  Stalin 
and  Vasilevskiy  decided  also  to  finish 
off       A£tQ^»-i^^  §titiiix.^e  the  op- 


-- Mi)sk.ili'iikii,  .V(/  \iigi/--(ilti:/ihtiiiii  iifipmvtenii,  p. 
.■i57:  Vasilevskiv,  -pWy,"  pp.  255-57;  Tixukov,  Memoirst 
p.  412.  See  also  Mo.skaIeilkO,  tia  Vit^^a^mAum 
mpravlenii,  pp.  3<i()-65. 

'^VOV.  p.  178;  V;isile\skiv.  "Dp/o,"  pp.  IbGi,  258; 
/I'MV,  ml.  VI,  p,  (jjt  Liiul  liiLif)  2:  Stymiult.  !\'<i»ii>r  8:  D. 
D.  Lelyii!ilier[ko,  A/iiW.-ivi -SmUngt ail -Berlm-Prd^u 
(Moscow;  Izdatelstva  "Nauka,"  IttTOj,  p.  134. 


STALINGRAD,  FINALE 


485 


eration  the  code  name  KoLrso  ("ring"). 
The  objeci  would  be  to  split  the  pot  kt-t 
on  an  east-wost  axis  and  dien  wipe  oiii 
the  two  parts  in  succession.  Tlie  main 
effort  would  he  a  thrust  through  the 
pocket  tr<»ni  the  west  by  Den  Front, 
which  would  be  given  Second  Guards 
Army  from  the  Slai'kd  reserves  and 
would  be  ready  to  start  by  the  18th.  In 
the  same  meeting,  Stalin  and  Va- 
silevskiy  decided  to  strengthen  South- 
west Fronts  left  flank  for  Saturn  by  put- 
ting in  Fif/h  Shock  Army.  Zhukov 
indicated  that  he  had  devised  the  gen- 
eral scheme  for  KoLTSO  and  had  pro- 
posed it  to  Stalin  on  29  November.-^ 

Saturn  had  not  started,  and  Koltso 
was  not  ready  when  Manstein  began 
WrNTERGEVvi  riER.  By  Rokossovskiy's 
account,  Vasilevskiy  was  at  Headquar- 
ters, Don  Front,  on  the  morning  of  12 
December  and,  immediately  after  news 
of  the  German  attack  tame  in,  tele- 
phoned Stalin  to  ask  for  and  get^<reonil 
Guards  Army  transferred  to  Stalingrad 
Front.^^  Vasilevskiy  says  he  did  not 
make  the  request  until  later  in  the  day 
and  difl  not  get  die  Stavka's  decision 
until  that  night.^^  In  any  event,  the  los$ 
of  Seemd  Qumrds  Army  put  KoLTSO  in 

Oct  iJbe  ni^ht  gf  the  I3th,  accorditig 
to  'WSsBevskiy;  tht  Bumka  made  *the 
veiy  itoporiani  dedsaoil''  to  leduce  .Sa- 
TURN.**  Zhukov  ^t  he  and  Va- 
silevskiy and  the  fSeiteiral  Staff  had 
alr^dy  decided  for  a  "smaller  Sati  rn" 
at  the  end  of  Novembei;  when  he  had 
also  told  Staliit  to  expect  a  Ofiiaaii  at- 


tack  toward  the  Ststillgrad pocket firont 
the  Kotelnikovo  area.^*  In  any  event. 
Saturn  became  Mai.vv  Saturn  ("small 
Saturn"),  Instead  of  going  south  on  the 
line  Miilerovo-Kamensk- 
Shakhtinskiy-Rostov,  the  right  arm  of 
the  envelopment  uiuild  bear  southeast 
inside  the  Don  bend;  and  the  left  arm, 
instead  of  going  southwest,  would  go 
west.  The  two  would  meet  near  Ta- 
tsinskaya  and  Morozovsk.^**  The 
changes  in  direction  reduced  the  pro- 
jected depth  of  the  advance  by  half. 

The  conversion  to  Mai.>  v  Saturn 
may  also  have,  in  part,  been  the  result 
of  a  mood  of  caution  induced  by  events 
elsewhere.  West  Front  and  Kalinin  Front 
began  Mars  on  the  morning  of  25 
November.  In  its  initial  phase  the  of- 
fensive repeated  the  pattern  at  Sta- 
lingrad, with  massive  thrusts  from  the 
east  and  the  w-est  to  pinch  off  the  Rzhev 
salient.  Mars,  however,  had  to  do  with 
the  batde-tested  German  Ninth  Army. 
After  Twentieth  Army,  carrying  the  main 
effort  in  the  West  Front  sector  on  the 
east  face  of  the  salient,  lost  more  than 
half  its  tanks  by  coinmitting  them 
piecemeal  in  trying  to  get  a  break- 
through, one  panzer  corps  handled  the 
defense  there  wiih  case.  Kalinin 
Front's  attacks  on  tlie  west,  south  of 
Belyy  and  along  the  Ltichesa  Siver, 
went  better  and  arliieved  depths  of 
twenty  and  ten  miles  respectively;  but  a 
Ninth  Army  counterattack  on  7  Vie^ 
cember  turned  the  break-in  south  of 
Belyy  into  a  pocket,  in  which  die  Ger- 
mans eventually  counted  15,000  Soviet 


"'Vasik-\sk».  ■Ih-I.K'  p.  'iM.  ll.MV.  vol.  VI,  p.  64; 

ZbukuV,  .V/r'Wrl/n.  [J,  412. 

"■Rukussovskiv.  ioUj>rs /hi/y,  p.  152. 
"Vasilevskiy.  ■D«to,">  270£ 
"llnd.,  p.  272. 


"Zhukin,  .\/rm<i()  V  p.  1 13 

pp.  17()-7t';  l,fKii>lu-iik..,  .U^vfcw,  [)|). 

"ICencrul  Si.ill  i.l  ilit  kt-i!  Sli'nnk  malt- 

rtatov  po  izitclimitii  upylu  ivyuy.  i\<mier  9,  1944, 


486 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


A  Column  of  T-34  Tanks  in  Operation  Malyy  Satuhn 


dead  and  5,000  prisoners.  On  11  De- 
eeinber,  West  Pmnt  launched  a  second 
attempt  during  the  first  two  days  of 
which  Ninth  Army  counted  295  Soviet 
tanks  knoHd^eii}  out.  Ota  the  l^tib  and 
14th,  Mars  darkened  rapidly,  leaving 
only  the  pen^ation  along  the  Luchesa 
mver  m  be  fougttt  met  Itieo  3ie  iievr 
year.** 

M9%  Satrni  Begins 

On  16  December,  Sixth  Army,  under 
Gc'iicral  Leytenant  F.  M.  Kharitonov, 
and  First  Guards  Army,  under  General 
Kuznetsov,  broke  into  the  Italian 
Eighth  Army's  line  on  the  Don  east  of 


*W)K  '>.  !'u,liiiinft.v(liieitting.  Kri^tagi^iuA, Bund 3 , 
1-16  Dei  42,  AOK  9  31624/3  file. 


Novaya  Kalitva.  The  next  day,  Third 
Gtiards  Army,  under  General  Leytenant 
D.  D.  Lelyushenko,  joined  them  to  ex- 
tend the  push  dUiwnstream  along  the 
river.**  By  the  tfifrd  day,  all  three  ar- 
mies had  broken  through,  and  on  the 
20th,  the  Celere  and  Sforzesca  Divi- 
sions tsn  the  Italian  Eighth  Army  right 
flank  c  tjllapsed,  earrving  with  them  two 
Rumanian  divisions  on  the  left  flank  q£ 
Army  Group  Don.  Tn  ftjuf  da^,  Sau£&- 
wt'sl  Front  tiad  ripped  open  a  100-mile- 
wide  hoie.^^  (Map  43.) 
For  the  Germans,  the  problem  now 


■'-Siitnsniiin.  Slidingrftdiktiya  Attva,  p.  472,  See  also 
Lc'lyLislicnko.  p.  139. 

'^'Krii'gsl/i^fhjiili  rlr.s  ili'iil.scheii  Central',  beim  titil.  AOK 
8  V.  n.7.  l2-n.l.-ty.  ir)-20  Dec  42.  AOK  8  36188/1 
till-:  //.  Ci:  D,m.  hi.  Ijige  H.  Or.  Don,  l9-2l.L4h  H. 
Gi.  Dim  'i\nmi\6  file. 


fi  ..S_  37th^^^  ' 


'/ 

37th^"-' 
P  B  0  N  T  ordjhoiiihjj,: 


MAP  43 


488 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


■aas  somehow  tsci  scfeen  the  deep  north- 
em  flank  of  Army  Group  Don.  Fifth 
TMl  Artm  had  not  managed  to  get  its 
share  dcMAiafV  S3ia*OilN  going,  but  a 
single  envelopment  could  be  just  as  bad 
a&  a  double  one.  The  OKH  transferred 
a  corps  headquarters,  commanded  by 
General  Fretter-Pico,  from  Army 
Group  Nordi  to  lake  over  the  Army 
Group  B  fight  flank  as  Atttie^^fc^ 
teilung  Fretter-Pico.  It  gave  the  Ar- 
meeabteilung  one  fresh  infantry  divi- 
sion, the  headquarters  and  elements  of 
3d  Mountain  Division,  and  remnants 
<|f  a  weak  German  corps  tliat  had  been 
stafi6riaS  isf  a  baclt^^p  fedtlti^  tlic  Itat 
ians.  With  them,  Fretter-Pico  was  tet 
protect  the  Donets  bridges  at 
Voroshilovgrad  and  Kamensk- 
Shakhtinskiy  (which  were  open,  even 
though  the  Russians  were,  for  the  mo- 
i^eflC,  not  aiming  toward  them)  and 
somehow  stretch  a  line  east  of  the  Df>- 
nets  to  tie  in  with  Army  Group  Don- 
On  the  23d,  Man^in  told  Mitler 
that  he  would  have  to  take  at  least  one 
division,  perhaps  two,  away  for  LVII 
Panzer  Corps  to  cover  Army  Group 
Dons  left  flank.  Doing  so,  he  added, 
would  mean  giving  up  the  idea  of  re- 
lieving Sixth  Army  stIftStiae  SQ&iSi  and 
would  necessitate  long-term  air  siqjply 
for  tlie  army.  Paulus  needed  550  tons  a 
day,  bwt  KJchtiiofen  believed  200  tons 
were  the  most  that  could  be  delivered. 
U,  as  it  appeared,  air  supply  could  not 
be  guaranteed,  Manstein  saw  a  break- 
out as  the  only  solution  despite  the  risk. 
The  appearance  of  Soviet  reinforce- 
ments {Second  Guards  Arffl^^  along  the 
Mishkova,  he  pointed  out,  meant  that 
the  Russians  would  soon  be  going  over 
to  the  offensive  there  also.  whScll 
woidd  be  extremely  dangerous  since 
f  oLii  th  Panzer  Army  was  having  to  rely 


on  Rumatti«ti  ttOcfps  to  CGvtt  ft§ 

flanks,^-* 

Hiders  decision,  which  was,  in  fact, 
no  decision  at  all,  came  early  the  next 
morning.  He  authorized  Manstein  to 
transfer  "elements"  of  LVH  Panzer 
Gorp^  t&  the  army  group  left  flank  to 
protect  the  air  bases  at  Morozovsk  and 
Tatsinskaya,  which  were  essential  for 
1^3£t!b  Araiyi  ait  supply.  But  LVII  Pan- 
zer Corps  was  to  stay  on  the  Mishkova 
until  the  advance  to  Stalingrad  could 
be  resumed.  As  if  it  would  make  all  the 
difference,  he  informed  Manstein  that 
one  battalion  of  Tiger  tanks  being  sent 
to  tihtc  army  group  by  railroad  would 
across  into  Russia  near  Brest  litcuv&k 
during  tiie  day.'® 

Sixtii  Army's  Last  Chame 

A  month  is  a  long  time  to  an  en- 
circled army.  Its  moral  and  physical 
stisfefi^Qoce  reduced,  it  begins  to  wiiiier. 
Most  dramatically  and  dismayingly  af- 
fected are  the  men  themselves.  In  1941 
the  Gerioaos  had  noticed,  and  then 
forgotten,  that  large  numbers  of  Rus- 
sians captured  in  the  great  encircle- 
ments died  suddenly  without  detec- 
table symptoms.  In  December  1942,  the 
same  sort  of  deaths  began  to  be  re- 
ported in  the  Stalingrad  pocfeet;  A  pa'- 
ttif)logist  flown  in  to  perform  autopsies 
in  secret  discovered  that  under- 
um.'ml)tsmem,  iexhairstion,  and  ex- 
postire  liad  catised  the  complete  loss  of 
fatty  tissue,  changes  in  the  internal 
^rgass  and  bcttK!  #^rrow,  and,  as  the 
w^pBxnnt  direct  ismst  of  th^  deaths^  a 


*V).B.  (i  li.  Gr.  Don.  In  Xt.  037-1142.  an  Chij  M 
GmSldH.  22.12.42.  H.  G).  Don  ;496<)4/5  file. 

"OX/V.  l„  ),Si,IH,  Op.  AI)C.  (I  S/B)  Nr.  421026142,  an 
GenemlfMimiiM/itiH  tn«  Miaalmt,  23.12.42,  H,  Gr. 
Don  39694/5  tilc. 


STAUNGRAD,  FINALE 


489 


shrinking  of  ilie  heart  except  for  the 
right  ventricle,  which  was  greatly  en- 
larged. Such  heart  damage,  in  normal 
medical  practice,  had  been  regarded  as 
a  condition  that  chiefly  affected  the 
aged;  among  the  soldiers  at  Stalingrad, 
as  the  days  passed,  it  was  observed  to  be 
common  in  both  the  dead  and  the  liv- 
ing,^* In  the  Stalingrad  pocket  death 
was  no  novelty.  Sixth  Army  had  lost 
28,000  men  between  22  November  and 
23  December. 

On  18  December,  the  army  reported 
a  ration  strength  of  246,000,  including 
13,000  Rumanians,  19.300  Russian 
auxiliaries,  and  6,000  wounded;  but 
tbese  numbers  were  far  from  repre- 
senting its  effective  combat  strength.*^ 
Ail xad\  in  mid-October,  the  army  had 
reported  that  it  was  reduced  to  a  front- 
line infantry  strength  of  66,500.  By  21 
December,  it  had  only  25,000  infan- 
try.*' Service  troops  were  converted  to 
inxantryt  but  experience  showed  that 
even  under  the  excepdonal  conditions 
of  an  encirclement,  such  conversions 
were  not  easy  to  accomplish  or  es- 
pecially worth^t^h^  in  tenm  of  combat 
effectiveness.  . 

At  the  end  laf  the  first  ttjotttfii, 
hard  winter  had  not  yet  set  in.  The 
temperature  lingered  close  to  freez- 
ing— some  days  above,  some  belbW. 
Cold  days  were  likely  to  l)e  t  lear  with 
only  occasional  snow  or  wind.  Warmer 
days  brought  douds,  fog,  light  rain, 
snow,  and,  always  when  there  were  two 
or  three  such  days  in  succession,  mud. 


"Hans  I^bgld,  Am  m  Stalingrad  (Salzburg;  O. 
Mueller.  194%  fk.l8< 

«  The  figmacf  tjvlriWa  JEJehnWt  AWW^  "tfe  VSe»^ 
4es  Ktieges  in  Sialu^iad.*'  a  nwiiMwripl  j^^Hiiaady 
written  late  in  the  war  ff&m  dftds3  fit^iaan  iticjfvils. 

^Scfaroeter,  Su^agrad,  208;  Kehtig^  Sti^ngrad. 
p.  407. 


Not  as  extreme  as  it  might  have  been^ 
the  weather,  nevertheless,  was  not 
easily  borne  by  soldiers  who  were  inad- 
equately sheltered  and  clothed  and 
were  living  on  slender  rations  of  bread, 
soup,  and  occasional  horse  meat.^"  The 
instability  of  the  weather  also  affected 
the  airlift.  In  the  early  winter,  cond- 
nental  and  maritime  air  masses  met 
over  the  region  of  the  lower  Don  and 
Volga,  producing  not  only  frequent 
and  rapid  changes  in  the  weather  but 
great  vaiialions  within  relatively  slu»rt 
distances.  Consequently,  when  the  skies 
over  the  air  bases  at  latsinskaya  and 
Morozovsk  were  clear,  the  Stalingrad; 
pocket  was  sometimes  buried  in  fog. 

The  reUef  attempt  had  failed.  That 
another  could  be  made  or  that  Sixtii 
Army  could  survive  until  then  was  be- 
coming more  doubtful  every  day.  On 
file  afternoon  of  2.'^  December,  Man- 
stein  called  for  a  conlereoce  via  tele- 
type whh  IP^aulus.  He  asked  f^ulits  to 
consider  whether,  if  no  othet  course  t  e- 
mained  open,  the  breakout  (which  by 
then  was  assumed  automatically  to  in- 
clude the  evacuation)  could  be  ex- 
ecuted provided  limited  quantities  of 
motor  md  and  rations  comd  be  flown 
in  during  the  nett  few  days.  Paiilus  l  e- 
plied  Hmt  die  breakout  had  become 
liiore  difRcukvbecause  the  Russians 
had  sii  cngthened  &imx  line,  but  if  an 
attempt  were  to  be  mas^t  it  was  better 
doti<e  ri^t  ^ay  than  later.  Then  he 
asked,  "Do  you  empower  me  lo  l>Lgin 
the  preparations?  Once  begun,  they 
cannot  be  reversed." 

Manstein  replied,  "TfeiJ;  authority  I 
cannot  give  today.  I  am  hilling  for  a 
decision  tomorrow.  Hie  easeii^  point 


«Hauck.  MS  It-I  i4c  wl.  IV.  able  Xa. 


490 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


is  do  you  consider  the  army  capable  of 
forcing  its  way  through  to  Hoth  if 
supplies  for  a  longer  period  cannot  be 
assured?"  Paulus  answered,  "In  that 
case,  there  is  nothing  else  to  be  done." 
He  added  that  he  thought  the  army 
would  need  at  \v.isi  six  days  lo  gel 
ready  and  300,000  niore  gallons  of 
tnotor  fuel  plus  500  tons  of  rations 
before  it  could  attempt  to  break  out/" 
Within  the  hour,  Manstein  dis- 
patched a  situation  estimate  to  Hider  in 
wliiili  hir  outlined  three  possibilities: 
(1)  leave  Sixth  Army  where  it  was  and 
asimre  a  d^y  air  supply  of  a  mmimum 
of  500  tctiis:  (L'.l  okK-i  P;ui1us  to  hiviik 
out,  taking  the  risk  Liiat  the  army  tn^l^t 
not  get  through;  (3)  transfer  tfre^rotfi 
Motorized  Infantry  Division  and  two 
panzer  di visions  from  First  Panzer 
Army  winlediaiely  to  etiable  Fourth 
I':inzer  Apliy  to  JCsume  the  advance 
towaNI  Stalii^tgrad.'"  Again,  Hitler 
■COuM  firot  tftafee  up  his  mind  and  coun- 
lerccl  vvith  a  series  of  questions.  Was  a 
breakout  actually  possible,  and  would  it 
succeed?  When  could  it  start?  How 
lonitr  eould  Paulus  stay  in  die  poeket, 
given  the  curreni  of  supplies  or. 
perhaps.  "somew^^^ioefeaSMW  sup- 
pi  v?  Wlien  could  tihte  relief  operaj^OH 
be  resumed  if  Mamiein  were  :|^vea 
hoth  the  SS  Viking  Diviskwi  and  7th 
Patizer  Division?  Did  Manstein  think 
the  Russians  would  soon  be  stopped  l)\ 
their  own  fire)  and  supply  shortages? 
Would  Manstein  "\vekome"  being 
given  command  of  Army  Group  A  as 
well  as  D<m>** 


"TS-Crsfimnli.  Ci  ii.  Fi  tilmtiTii  hat/  imn  Ma>i\trin  ^ 
t,,->,.  Ohst.  PiihUh.  23.12J2.  AOK  fi  7SI07/5  tile. 

"Mamlnn.  an  Clti-f  Gen.  Sl/ili.  Aiitttwi  av^  htV^ 
Aiijni/fi:  23J2.42.  H.  Or.  tli.tj  :*'.tr.VM/5  tile. 

*H)KH.  GmSltlH.  Op  Abt  ,Vr  42U)m42,  (OtM.  Gr, 
Dan.  24.t2.42,  H.  Gr.  Don  39694/5  file. 


Manstein  answered  that  the  break- 
out could  begin,  as  reported,  in  six 
days.  Nobody  could  predict  whether  it 
would  succeed  or  not,  and  the  otily  way 
to  secure  a  moderate  degree  of  as- 
surance of  its  success  would  be  to  trans- 
fer two  more  panzei  divisions  from 
First  Panzer  Army.  The  SS  Viking  Divi- 
sion and  7th  Panzer  Division  would  be 
needed  on  the  army  group  left  flank 
when  they  arrived.  There  were  no  rea- 
sons to  think  the  Russians  were  going 
to  run  out  of  supplies.  As  far  as  Man- 
steins  also  taking  command  of  Army 
Group  A  was  concerned,  nobody 
would  "weUotne"  it  in  the  existing  dr- 
cutastances,  but  it  was  unavoidable. 
f!v«n  so.  it  appealed  that  fm  Sbth 
Army,  and  possibi)  Aimv  Grotl|>sl3on. 
and  A  as  well,  all  subsequent  (iei^sio^ 
wotiM  come  too  late.  Miawtem  con- 
cluded, "I  ask  that  it  be  considered  how 
the  batde  would  develop  if  we  com- 
manded on  the  other  side:*^ 

Operations  Ordi'r  No.  2 

On  24  December,  First  Guards  Ai~my 
pushed  a  spearhead  through  to  Ta- 
t.sin.skaya,  and  Tliird  Guards  .Army  came 
within  artillery  range  of  Morozovsk. 
That  same  day,  Stimd  ^mff^Ss  Army, 
General  Malinovskiv  commanding, 
forced  LVll  Panzer  Corps  back  to  the 
Aksay  Rrver.**  To  hold  the  air-supply 
base  for  Sixth  Army  at  Morozovsk  and 
recapture  the  one  at  lalsinskaya,  Man- 
Stem  Md  to  take  the  Ilth  Pana^r  Divi- 
sion from  Fouilh  Panzer  Armv.  Out  of 
the  staff  of  XVII  Corps,  he  created  die 


*H>.Ii.  <l.  H.  (i>.  Dull.  In  Xi:  (1376/42,  /in  Clict  ,1,". 
GmSldH.  24.12.42.  M,  (.1.  D.,11  :i96t|4/(i  iilf. 

**\'(J\',  pp.  183-87.  Sec  also  Sanisuimv, 
Ungradskttya  Hioa,  pp.  478-80  and  LelyushenkOi 
Moskva,  p.  147. 


SXAIJNGRAP,  FINAJ-E 


491 


Headquarters,  Ariaeeabteiluiig  Hol- 
Hdt^  under  General  derlnianterie  Karl 
Hotlidt,  file  WTLl  Corps  commander, 
and  gave  it  command  of  the  whole 
north  front.  Manstein  sent  the  Head- 
qH0t^^,  Rumanian  Third  Army,  be- 
hind tbe  Don  els  u>  collect  Rumanian 
$tt^|^l%  and  to  start  buildmg  de- 
fenses dowfistream  from  Karaensk- 
Shakhiinskiy.^'' 

To  get  a  respite  at  latsitiskaya  and 
Morozovsk,  Mmsmm  )md  feeti  fofced 

to  reduce  Fourth  Panzer  Arinys  ef  fec- 
tive strength  by  a  third;  nevertlieless, 
HMer  stai  hoped  to  bring  in  the  SS 
Viking  Division  and  7th  Panzer  Divi- 
sion in  time  to  restart  tlie  advance 
toward  Stalingrad.  Manstein's  situation 
report  of  25  December  demonstrated 
how  sliglit  ^at  hope  actually  was.  In  a 
fef  he  said,  Fifty-Jirst  mA  S^entti 
Gue^!^Amiics  would  attempt  to  encircle 
Foilrtt  Panzer  Army  on  the  Aksay 
JUvet;  Kothing  could  be  expected  of 
ribie  Rumanian  VI  and  VII  Corps,  and 
ih^  two  divisions  of  LVII  Panzer  Corps 
t^xAA  fOfuStet  tst^  tiiore  than  nineteen 
tanks  between  If  Sixth  Army 

were  not  to  be  abandoned  entirely  at 
StaliHgrad,  a  panzer  corps  (two  divi-^ 
sions)  and  ;m  inranti\'  division  would 
have  to  be  shifted  f  rom  Army  Group  A 
to  Hflflffthr  Fanzer  Army,  and  at  least 
one  infantry  division  would  ha\  e  to  be 
added  on  die  Army  Group  Don  left 
flank.« 

The  next  I  wo  days  proved  that  Man- 
stem  was  by  no  means  painting  too 
dark  a  pictare.  Oii  the  mttt 


-•"'//.  Gr.  D„n.  la,  Uge  Hi  B¥.  mUt  M^Mf^.  M- 
Gr.  Don  39694/16  file. 

*'OKH,  GenStdH.  Op.  AM.  421030/43.  an  H.  Gr. 
Dim,  24.12.42.  H.  Gr.  Don  3969*6  BJe;  O.B.  d.  H.  Gr. 
ni,n,  1,1  ,V/.  an  Chtfd.  GenStdN.  SSJ2.42,H. 

C.r.  Don  39G94/6  file. 


l  eporied  that  (aiSUSlties,  cold  (the  tem- 
perature thai  day  was  — 15°  F.),  and 
ntinger  had  so  sapped  his  army's 
strength  that  ii  could  not  execute  the 
breakout  and  evacuation  tmless  a  sup- 
ply corridor  to  the  pocket  were  opened 
first.  The  next  day,  Rumanian  VII 
Corps,  on  LVII  Panzer  Corps'  east 
flank,  mDapsed  and  fell  into  a  disor^ 
ganized  retreat.  After  thai,  the  best 
Hoth,  commander  of  Fourth  Panzer 
Army,  thought  he  could  do  was  to  take 
LVII  Panzer  Corps  back  to 
Kotelnikovo  and,  maybe,  make  anodier 
temporary  stand  there.*^ 

Hitler,  however,  was  still  looking  for 
a  cheap  way  out,  and  oii  the  27th,  he 
ordered  Army  Groups  tkm  and  A  to 
hold  where  they  were  while  Armv 
Group  B,  to  protect  the  rear  of  Don, 
retoe*  the  line  of  Rdssosh-MiHe^ 
rovo  railroad.  Arm,^:G8!0iUp  A,  he  told 
Manstein,  could  not  spare  any  divi- 
sions, and  Army  Group  Don  woidd 
ha\  e  to  make  do  with  the  SS  Viking  and 
7th  Panzer  Divisions  and  the  battalion 
of  Tiger  tanfei.'**""  iifei3BStCTifi  'protested 
that  Fourth  Panzer  Army's  two  panzer 
divisions  and  the  16th  Motorized  In- 
fentpy  ISm^on  faced  a  total  of  forty- 
three  enemy  units  (divisions,  brigades, 
and  tank,  cavalry,  and  mechanized 
eofps)  "frhile  First  Paftraer  Armf,  in  a 
well-constructed  line,  was  (ip]3oscd  b\ 
only  an  equal  number  ot  enemy  uiuLs, 
and  Se^i^ceenth  ^smy  had  to  deal 
with  no  more  than  twenty-four  Soviet 


"AOK  tf,  la  Nr.  6010/42.  an  O.B.  tf.  Gr.  I>m. 
26.12.42,  H.  Gr,  Don  39694/6  Osi  P%,  AOK  4.  la 
KrifgstagebaA  Nt,  Sy  IBi  .«?  Bec  4S,  A&S^  4, 
28183/1  We. 

^'OKH,  <3eaSi£fff,  Op.  Abt.  ([  SB)  Nr.  42W33H2  an 
dm  O.B.  d.  H.  Gt.  Don,  27.12.42  and  OKH.  GenStdH. 
Op.  Abt.  Nt.  321034/42,  yVmsungfuer  die  uieit^e  Ka^-^ 
fue/trung,  27.12.42.  H.  Gr.  Don  39694/fi  file. 


492 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


unlfo.  He  was  convinced,  he  wrote,  that 
events  woukl  ronipel  a  shift  of  forces 
from  A  lo  Don.  Tlie  sooner  the  deci- 
sion was  made,  tlic  less  costly  itwotjld 
be  in  the  hm^  run. 

Hitler  Louniered  with  Operatioiis 
Ol  der  No.  2.  Under  it.  Army  Group  A, 
holding  its  line  on  the  Black  Sea  coast 
and  in  the  Caucasus,  was  to  swing  its 
left  flank  back  by  stages  to  Salsk,  where 
it  would  he  able  to  take  over  its  own 
flank  defense.  Fourth  Panzer  Army,  if 
foiced.  could  fall  back  lo  the  liafe 
Tsimlvanskiv-Salsk.  To  coordinate 
these  nioveinents,  Manstcin  would  as- 
sume comniarKi  al  a  time  to  be  decided 
by  himself  Miller  i*i;ii(>rcd  an  earlier 
conlentioti  ot  Mansteiii's  thai  his  taking 
control  ol  Army  Group  A  would  be 
worthwhile  only  if  it  included  his  Imv- 
ing  l  ull  operational  freedom. 

The  last  days  of  die  year  brought 
another  crisis.  On  the  afternoon  of  28 
December,  Hotli  had  to  rescue  LVII 
Panzer  Corps  by  allowing  it  to  with- 
draw past  Kotelnikovo  to  the  Sal  River. 
That  opened  up  the  left  bank  of  die 
Don  to  Rostov  and  exposed  the  deep 
right  Rank  of  Armeeabteilung  Hollidt, 
and  the  next  da\,  the  Russians  pushed 
out  of  a  small  bridgehead  they  held 
near  Potemkinskaya.  Hollidt  dien  had 
to  shift  the  llih  Panzer  Division  to 
TSiialyaaskiy,  seventy  wales  down- 
stream on  I  he  Don.  to  block  their  ad- 
vance toward  Rostov.  Hitler,  in 
consequence,  ordei  ed  the  7th  PanZ!^ 
Division  to  be  held  at  Rostov  for  a 


^■'f//J.  d.  II.  <■•>.  Lhin.  1(1  Nr.  038-1142.  an  Chef  des 
Cfuiiidll.  27.12.42.  f  I.  V.\.  Don  ■J9694/6  file. 

^"OKH.  (UiiShUl.  Op.  Ahl.  iVr.  421042/42.  Opera- 
twmbffehl  A'r.  2.  2.^.12.42.  H.  Or.  Don  39694/6  file; 
O.B.  <!.  H.  Or.  Don.  lo  Nr.  0)76/42,  an  CheJ  des  Gene- 
ral.i.iiu--  -n  Ftmspntek  mm  24J2^42,  H.  Gfe  Bon 
39694^6  hie. 


possible  last-ditch  defense  of  the  cit\ 

On  the  28th,  Manstein  had  lold 
Hider  tliai  Fom  th  Panzer  Arm\'  was  no 
longer  capable  of  holding  a  bro.td 
front  south  of  the  Don  and  that  the 
Armeeabteilung  Hollidt  line  could  be 
pene^ted  from  the  north  or  sotltb  at 
anvtitiie.  He  said  lie  intended  to  turn 
Fourth  Pander  Ai  iny  east  south  of  ilie 
Sal  River  to  protect  the  rear  of  Arniv 
Croup  A,  taking  the  chance  that  the 
Russians  might  cut  lliiough  to  Rostov 
between  the  Sal  and  Don.  Armeeah- 
teiluni^  Hollidt  would  have  to  be  pulled 
bai  k,  possibly  to  a  line  sUghdy  forward 
of  the  Donets,  more  Ukdy  to  the^ver 
itseli" 

■Mf&^l^fti^  Destroy^ 

On  New  Year's  Eve,  Manstein  told 
Pauliis  that  Army  Group  Don's  pri- 
mary objective  was  to  libeiale  Sixth 
Army,  biii  the  army  would  Iiave  to  hold 
out  in  the  pocket  a  while  longer.  Hitler, 
he  said,  had  oidered  Reichsmaischail 
Goering,  commander  in  chief,  air 
force,  to  raise  the  air  supply  to  at  least 
300  tons  a  day."'^  Whether  he  knew  it  or 
not,  Manstein  had  said  farewell  to^Xlll 
Armv.  Army  Group  Don  would  hence- 
ioi  ill  he  hghting  for  its  own  life, 

lb  the  Manick  and  the  Donets 

Wien  thev  reached  the  gcncTa!  line 
Mil  le  r  o  V  o-  la  tsi  ns  kay  a  -Mo  r  oz  o\  s  k  tj  n 


■■'P;.  AOK  ■!.  In  Knfgstngrhuch  Nr.  5,  Teffi//,  ^-^l 
Dft  42.  IV.  AOK  4  28183/1  lile;  H.  Gr.  Don.  Lngfi  H.  Gr. 
Dm,  2,S-11. 12.42.  H.  tir.  Don  39694/10  ItU-;  OKH. 
CmSldH,  Oji,  Abt.  (im}  Nr.  1959142,  EmzetanurdiiuH- 
gen  dfs  Fiiditm  Mf.  79^  3Q.1X41,  B,  Gr.  Ito  36964/6 
file, 

''"O.B  ,1  I!  I.I  lh,}i.  hi  Nr.  Il^94f42.ijn  ()KH,(3ief 
drs  <.n,ru,Ui„hr..      12  12.  H.  Cr.  Don  3%94/6 He. 

31.12.42,  H.  Gi.  Don  39tj94/6  tUe. 


STALINGRAD,  FINALE 


493 


24  December,  Sixth,  First  Guards,  and 
Third  Guards  Armies  had  essentially 
completed  their  share  oF  Malyv  Sas- 

U  RN,  and  Second  Guards  and  Fifty-firSt 
Armies  on  taking  Koielnikovo,  whk^ 
thqr  iSd  0n  the  morning  <X  t9  De- 
cember^  had  wiped  out  the  last  of  Win 
TERGEWJTTER.  By  then,  Zhukov  was 
baclt  in  Moscow  working  vMn  Sf^in  oil 
plans  for  a  general  offensive  similar  to 
the  one  in  the  previous  winter.^'*  The 
m&et&  fm  first  phase  m  tifie  scmtli 
wsit0til0n  the  night  of  ?i\  December, 
In  what  Va^evsluy  refers  to  as  Opeta- 
tion  DoM.  BfeMngmd  fimnt  (renamed 
Siiitth  Front  as  of  I  January)  was  re- 
quired to  leave  behind  its  three  armies 
on  tiie  Stalingrad  pocket  and  strike 
toward  Salsk  and  along  the  south  side 
ot  tlie  Don  toward  Rostov  with  Second 
Guards,  Fifty-first,  and  Twenty-eighth  Ap- 
mii'\  (the  latlcr  being  brought  in  from 
the  east  mio  the  area  north  of  Elista). 
Fifth  Shock  Army,  which  would  be  at- 
tached to  South  Front,  would  run  aU>ng 
the  north  side  of  the  Don  toward  Kos- 
tOVi  Sotdhwest  Front  would  take  Mo- 
rn/ovsk  and  TiKsinskaya  and  veer  its 
armies  west  to  and  across  the  Donels  to 
execute  what  Zhukov  rcft-rs  to  as  "Big"- 
ger  Saturn."  On  29  l)r(  cnt!)er,  Zhukov 
had  also  instructed  '/iyinstaudtsus  Fmtil 
to  prepare"  tso-  strike  out  of  the  area 
between  Novorossiysk  and  liiapse  to 
Krasnodar,  Tikhorctsk.  and  Rostov.''"' 
If  all  of  flic  operations  worked,  the 
Soviet  forces  would  liave  cleared  ihc 
Donets  Basin  west  lo  the  line  of  Sla- 
vyansk-Mariupol  and  encircled  Foi.-*rlh 
Panzer,  Seventeenth,  and  First  Panzer 
Armies. 


*VaK  tt  \m  SeefVMK  vol.  VKpm  m^iofp^ 
B%^ewd^y,  287;  imv,  «ft  VI,  pp^  It. 

02  Mid  maps  5  and  7;  Zhukov,  Mmmrs,  p.  418; 

OmMffh'f^  voj«y.  p- 


For  his  part,  Hider  ignored  Man- 
stein's  report  ol  28  December  and,  on 
Heiv  Yeat%  I3ay,  anQ^iuiiiped  In  a  stip^ 
picffiient  to  Operation*  Older  No.  2 
Chatt  he  was  going  to  send  the 
Grossdeutschland  Division  in  addi^on 
to  the  SS  divisions  Adolf  Hitler  and 
Das  Reich  and  the  7di  SS  Division  to 
relieve  Stalingrad.  Army  Groups  B  and 
Don  were  to  hang  on  to  die  most 
favorable  positions  tor  the  jump-off. 
All  the  provisions  of  Operations  Order 
No.  2,  in  whic  h  1k'  had  directed  Hollidt 
not  to  withdraw  any  tarther  than  to  the 
line  Morozovsk-Tsimlyanskiy  wei#  |0 
remain  in  effect/'" 

Even  Hider  did  not  expect  the  divi- 
sions for  the  relief  to  be  deployed 
before  mid-Fet>i  iiarv.  To  imagine  that 
fate  and  the  Russians  would  alliiw  the 
Gettnam  that  mudl  time  was  pure  self- 
deception.  However,  although  what 
might  c(jme  nexi .  as  Manstein  had  said, 
could  easily  be  imagined,  very  tittle  had 
been  done  by  the  turn  of  the  year  to 
improve  the  German  position.  The 
withdrawals  Hider  had  approved  wc^re 
piecemeal,  and  he  still  talked  in  terms 
of  "dehnitive"  lines  and  was  beginning 
t!&  tose  himself  in  nebulous  plans  for  a 
counteroffensive.  I  lie  decision  to  bend 
back  the  left  Hank  oi  Army  t.roup  A 
was  a  significant  step,  but  after  Hider 
had  issued  the  order  lor  il  he  sliowcd 
no  desire  to  see  it  CKccuied  quickly 
and,  oo  th«  oontiar^  sfeemed  to  wel- 
come delays. 

On  2  January,  in  a  dispatch  to 
Zcii/.lcr,  Manstein  [KHnted  mt  that  al-^ 
though  it  could  Iiave  been  seen  as  soon 
as  Sixth  Army  was  encitcled  that  the 


'«(^,1$emm,  ^>  Ml  (J  Sl$)  Nr.  42m2M2, 
QperdSonA^M  Nt,  i^,  l.i.43,  H-  Gr. 


494 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


Russians  were  developing  a  major  of- 
fensive on  the  south  Bank  of  the  East- 
ern Front  and  might  strike  in  the  rear 
of  Army  Group  A,  the  OKH  (Hitler) 
had  done  nothing  until  the  last  few 
days  about  evacuating  the  wounded 
and  the  heavy  equipmenl  from  the 
Caucasus.  The  consequences  of  that 
neglect  would  be  either  to  slow  Army 
Group  As  movements  or  to  force  a 
sacrifice  ol  large  quantities  of  equip- 
ment. Because  the  OKH  was  control- 
ling all  the  substantial  shifts  of  Army 
Group  A's  forces,  Manstein  added,  no 
pui  pose  would  be  served  by  his  taking 
over  Army  Groiij)  \  Since  the  OKH 
had  also  ordered  tlie  divisions  in- 
tended for  Fourth  Panzer  Army — the 
7th  and  Ilih  Panzer  Divisions — stiii 
elsewhere,  all  he  could  do  to  protect 
Army  Group  A  was  to  order  HoCh  to 
hold  out  as  long  as  he  could  keep  his 
flanks  free.  Army  Group  A  would  have 
to  speed  up  its  withdrawal  and  take  a 
hand  in  defending  its  rear  by  transfer- 
ring a  corps  to  Salsk.*^  Unlike  some 
thdt  had  gone  before,  this  communica- 
tion did  have  at  least  one  effect:  Hider 
did  not  again  mention  Manstein^  tak- 
ing command  etf  Army  Group  A. 

In  ilie  first  week  of  the  new  year,  as 
First  and  Third  Guards  and  F^ih  Tank 
Armies  bore  in  on  it  from  the  north  and 
east,  the  Armeeabteilung  Hollidt  be- 
gan a  hectic  ninety-mile  retreat  to  the 
Donets.  On  3  January,  the  Armeeab- 
teilung Freiier-Pico  warned  that  ihe 
B04th  Inlantry  Division^  which  had 
been  deployed" fb'keep  touch  i«ith  Hdl- 
lidl's  left  flank,  could  not  be  depended 
upon.  It  lacked  training  and  combat 


*'OA  dtt  II.  Gr.  Dun,  la  .Vj.  0399/42,  an  Che/  <ki 
CenfralOiUits  4es  Metm,  2J.43,  H.  Qt.  Don  39694/6 


experience  and  could  panic  easily.-^*' 
Since  it  was  then  known  that  Vatutin 
had  massed  two  tank  corps  east  of  the 
Frciu  i-Pico-Holiidi  boundary  for  a 
probable  attack  toward  the  Donets 
crossing  at  Belokalitvenskaya,  HiUer 
had  to  release  the  4ih  Pander  Division 
on  4  January  to  prevent  a  break- 
through. On  the  5th,  having  retreated 
forty  miles  in  six  days,  Hollidt  <^<i\  r  up 
Morozovsk,  the  air  base  closest  to  Sta- 
lingrad. The  next  day.  Hitler  tried  to 
call  a  halt  "for  the  sake  of  morale  and 
to  conserve  the  strength  of  the  troops'^ 
but  with  the  Russians  probing  across 
the  Don  in  the  south  and  threatening 
to  advance  down  the  Donets  from  the 
north,  Hollidt  had  no  chance  to  stay  in 
aiu  line  east  of  the  Donets  for  mor^ 
than  a  few  days.^® 

On  the  other  side  of  the  Don.  Fourth 
Panzer  Aiin\  ranged  its  two  panzer 
divisions  and  die  SS  Viking  Division 
along  the  Kuberle  River,  which  flowed 
into  the  Sal  from  the  south.  In  the  gap 
between  the  Don  and  the  Sal,  the  HI 
Guards  Thnk  Corps  pushed  downstream 
along  I  he  south  bank  of  the  Don  and, 
at  the  end  of  the  hrst  week  in  January, 
sient  reosnnSHSsElnce  patrols  to  "Within 
twenty  miles  of  Rostov.  Hitler  urged 
Manstein  to  commit  the  Tiger  tanks, 
whiiEih  he  prediaed  would  be  able  to 
digStirt^y the  whole  tank  corps;  but  when 
til© iPgers  went  into  acuon,  which  was 
the  first  combat  etperience  for  tk&sr 
crews,  they  failed  to  live  up  to  Hider^ 
notice.  They  claimed  to  have  kpocked 
out  ei^bte^  enemy  vxe^,  but  ^ 
twenty  Hgers  in  the  battalion,  half 


■'".1.  Ahl  hflWr-Pio,.  In  Kri.'i^ilag^uek,  18.12.42- 
2.2.43.  :i  I.in  13,  A.  .\U.  r!riu-i.l'ico3178M  fHe. 

'■H)K!l,C„-nSidH.  Op.  .\hi.  Sr.  17 1143,  an.H.Gr,Dim. 
6.1  A3,  H,  Gr.  Don  39694/7  file. 


STALINGRAD.  FINALE 


495 


SoviKT  Infantry  on  the  March  Toward  the  Donets  River 


were  damaged,  Hoth  reported  diat 
tibe  OPews  needed  more  tndfiing  and 
experience.®'* 

When  a  mechanized  corps  and  a 
gu^ds  rifle  corps  began  maMiig  Aeir 
way  around  Fourth  Panzer  Army's 
north  flank,  Hider,  on  6  January,  had 
to  let  Maaastein  take  the  Vms  M&ms^ed 
Infantry  Division  away  from  Flista. 
Manstein  warned  that  the  division 
mvM  do  m>  taore  Htma  siybdlize  the 
Fourth  Panzer  Army  Une  temporarily, 
and  protesdng  diat  everything  was  ex- 
pected of  Atmy  Group  Doa  while 
nothing  was  possible  for  Army  Group 


*<^mi.  GmSm.  op.  A^.Mh2Bm,  en  O.B. 
Panzer,  7  J  AB,  H  .  ikt.lim  3mm*t^ 


A,  he  again  asked  for  a  corps  from 
Army  Orat^  A.®^ 

In  the  second  week  of  Jantiary.  even 
though  new  trouble  was  developing  in 
the  north  ag^st  Hungarian  Seeond 
Army,  the  fronts  of  the  two  southern 
army  groups  began  to  assume  some 
coherence."  Armeeabteilung  Hollidt, 
shifting  its  panzer  divisions  back  and 
forth  to  counter  threats  from  the  north 
and  the  south,  continued  its  march  to 
the  Donets,  and  Hitler  allowed  Fourth 
PcUizer  Army  to  swing  back  to  a  Hne 
fadttg  north  along  the  Manidi  Canal.*^ 

*iQm>  m^im.  op.  am.  Nt.  249m,  an  H.  Gf. 
Dm,  6.1. 4 J,  H,  fife  Ifefe  39694/7  WKt  &JS.  ikr  M.  Gr. 
Don.  la  Nr.  04&3^r  m  :^^i^swiS6jtJfi  5^i#li,H»  Gt 

'^im  l^^^Mfti&ngradtoBerlia,  pp.  81-84, 


496 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINQRAD 


First  Panzer  Army,  tb0£^  sl0:#e(i  hf 
its  heavy  equipment  imA  by  what  Mmt- 
stem,  at  least,  considered  exaggerated 
worries  aboiil  what  the  Russians  miglil 
do,  gradually  narrowed  the  gap  be- 
tween the  army  groups. 

By  the  end  of  ilic  third  week  in  the 
OlOntii,  Armecabteilung  Fretter-Pico, 
after  feving  extricated  sbffie  fourteen 
thousand  oi  its  troops  from  an  en- 
circlement near  MUlerovo,  was  in  a  line 
feeliind  the  Donets.  Armeeabteilung 
HolHdt  likewise  had  gained  the  slight 
protection  of  the  frozen  river.  On  the 
Hanf^  tMnaeli  t>eli^h  ^ie^  Bbtif 
Prolyetarskaya,  Fourth  Panzer  Army 
had  set  up  a  strongpoint  defense,  and 
Panzer  Army  had  extended  its  left 
flank  north  to  lie  into  Fourth  Panzer 
Army  east  of  Salsk."''  At  the  closest 
point,  Armeeabteilung  Hollidt  was  165 
miles  from  the  Stalingrad  pocket,  and 
Fourdi  Panzer  Army  was  190  miles 
from  It,  feut  by  then  for  Sx-th  jteiiyj  flie 
distances,  no  matter  what  they  were,  no 
longer  made  a  dilference. 

The  Stalw^ad  BJa^ 

During  the  year-end  planning  for 
Operation  Don  and  the  enlarged  Sa- 
yxmti  tlie  S&itfAffl  also  lewved  O^iiaiion 
KoLTso  for  action  against  the  Sta- 
lingrad pocket.  After  Stalin^ad  Front 
rehnqtSsned  ibrm  of  its  amies  for 
Operation  DoN  on  1  January,  General 
Rokossovskiy  s  Don  Fwni  controlled  the 
endre  petioieier  of  the  pocket  with 
seven  arooieSj  281,000  troops.^®  Gen- 


"1A.  Ak.  Pntter-Piea,  /o  KriegstageSuch,  IS'JZAZ- 
2.2.43,  14-18  Jan  43,  A.  Abt,  Frettei-Pico  31783/1  file; 
H.  Or.  J)tm.  la.  Lage  H.  Gr.  Don.  15.-19.1.43,  H.  Gr. 
acttiS9g94/7  file. 

'^4hff/^,Hamef6;lVMV,  vol.  V I .  |j,  7l"i  givestfift^n 
Frant  strength  as  2 12,000  and  Sixth  Army's  as  250,000. 
IVMV  gives  the  weapons'  sucngths  as  6,860  (Soviet) 


eral  Voronov  took  over  a^Stavka  repre- 
sentative with  Don  Front.  Since 
lfLdk.cmm^l^  iiv^tild  not  have  a  i^pib 
mobile  ^mm^  such  as  Second  OmfM 
Army  had  fceen,  the  Koltso  plan  had  to 
be  revised.  The  initial  objective  was  still 
to  split  the  pocket  on  a  west-east  line, 
but  it  would  be  done  by  stages  instead 
of  In  a  single  sweep  atfd  would  be 
directed  more  against  ilie  weaker  west- 
ern and  southern  fat  es  of  the  pocket. 
In  the  first  stage,  Sixty-fifth  Arm\^  would 
carry  die  main  effort  with  a  thrust 
from  the  northwest  to  the  southeast 
'tetimc^  Kai|M3i?Sltaya  Station.  In  the 
sec@£t^  Stl^,  TiL'enty-first  Army  would 
take  over  and  lead  a  drive  to 
Vbroponovo  Station,  and  in  the  third, 
five  armies  would  storm  in  from  the 
nordiwest,  west,  and  southwest  aiming 
to  split  what  was  left  of  the  pocket  by 
making  contact  in  Stalingrad  wiih  Si\ly- 
secoiid  Army.^*^  Koltso,  originally  sched- 
uled to  begin  on  6  January  and  to  take 
seven  days,  was  postponed  to  the  10th. 
Id  the  meantime,  Rokossovskiy  sent 
Paulus  a  suireiider  ttftimattim,  ii>i^ch 
was  rejected."^ 

By  the  be^;inning  of  the  year,  Sixth 
Army  at  Stalingraa  was- dying  a  linger- 
ing death  from  starvation  and  exhaus- 
tion. Between  1  and  23  December, 


and  4,130  (GermanI  artillery  pieces,  257  (Soviet)  and 
300  (German)  tanks,  and  300  (Soviet)  and  100  (Ger- 
man) mmbai  aircraFt.  HbmTtik  Nnrntr  6  gives  them 
6.200  (Soviet)  and  3,770  (German)  artillery  pieces, 
l.SOO  (Soviet)  and  250  (German)  tanks.  13.700  (So- 
viet) and  7,300  (German)  machine  gum,  and  18,000 
(Soviet)  and  9,400  (Clerman)  motor  vehides.  The 
Sbomik  adds  chat  the  figures  on  German  equipment 
probably  include  pieces  knocked  out  or  otherwise 
rendereid  unusable  before  the  final  battle  began. 
Sixth  Army  reported  a  strength  of  about  one  huH* 
dred  tanks  as  of  early  UeCGtlSb^. 
<"7VMV;  vol.  VI.  p.  75. 

«'S6o™rt,  Nomer  6:  IVMV.  vol  VI.  pp.  75-77; 
Rokossovskiy,  &Mj*r'j /Jui^,  pp,  157-65. 


STALINGRAD,  FINALE 


497 


supplies  airlifted  in  had  averaged  90 
tons  a  day  and  on  only  one  day.  7 
December,  did  they  i^dl  army's 
daily  minimum  requiretaent  of  300 
ions.  In  Uie  first  three  wedcs  ol  Janu- 
ary, the  average  was  120  tom%  da!f',  feal 
that  was  still  far  sliort,"*' 

Nevertheless,  Sixdi  Army  was  not  yet 
lotaily  at  the  Russians'  mei^.  Mt^Doit 
Front's  armies  had  been  in  constant  ac- 
tion a  long  time,  and  losses,  the 
■weadier,  hunger,  and  fatigue  had  also 
taken  their  toll  of  them.  In  fact.  Sixth 
Army  had  some  advantages.  One  was 
that  the  pocket  encompassed  nearly  all 
of  the  built-up  areas  in  and  around 
Stalingrad;  consequently,  the  German 
troops  had  some  shelter  and  could 
obtain  wood  for  fuel  from  demolished 
btiildings,  while  the  Russians  had  none. 
The  Germans  also  had  the  advantage 
of  field  fortifications  tliey  had  built 
during  die  siege  and,  particularly,  of 
the  Soviet  defense  lines  constructed  in 
the  summer.  Between  die  lines,  the 
terrain  was  generally  Hat  and  treeless 
but  cut  by  deep  bcdkm  {^^^iks^},  wMcb 
favored  the  defense. 

On  the  inorning  of  10  January, 
Rokossovskiy  was  with  General  Bato^. 
commander  of  Sixty-fifth  Army,  at  the 
latter's  command  post  when  Sixty-Jif  th, 
Tu't'tity-firsi,  and  Twenty-fouf^AitmAes  be- 
gan K(.)i:i,so  against  the  western  "nose" 
of  the  pocket.''"  The  first  day  brought 
gains  of  two  or  three  mites,  which  was 
disappointing  foi  Rokossovskiy  but  dis- 
maying for  Paulus.  In  the  night,  Paulas 
report  iflmt  after  ^&y^  fighSng 
there  was  no  longer  anv  jirospect  of 
holding  out  until  mid-February;  reliel 


Oxm  30694/311-5  filg, 


would  have  to  c(^me  much  sooner:  the 
promised  quantity  of  supplies  would 
have  to  be  oeEvered;  and  replacemeni: 
battalioas  wotiM  haf  e  tQ  be  flown  in  at 
once.^° 

The  Germans  managed  to  preveifct 
an  outright  breakthrough  in  the  next 
two  days  by  maneuvering  back  nine- 
teen Miles  to  the  line  of  the  Rossoshka 
River,  I'Majb  44.)  When  they  reached 
the  iiossoshka  on  the  rtighl  of  the  12th, 
the  Soviet  armies,  which  had  kept  the 
offensive  going  night  and  day,  com- 
pleted the  first  stage  of  Kolt.so,  but 
tlncy  faced,  next,  on  the  river,  what  had 
been  the  original  outer  ring  of  the 
Stalingrad  defenses.  On  the  I3di  and 
I4th,  Rokossovskiy  regrouped  to  shift 
the  main  effort  to  Twenty-first  .4rwv, 
which  would  be  heading  due  west  to- 
ward Voroponovo  Station  while 
fifth  Army  aimed  past  Pitomnik.^' 

After  Sixly-fifih  and  Twenty-first  Ar- 
mies, joined  on  the  north  by  Twenty- 
fourth  Army  and  on  the  south  by  Fifty- 
seiienth  and  Sixty-fourth  Armies,  cra(::ked 
the  Rossoshka  line  on  15  Januai  \  and 
after  repeated  pleas  from  Paulus, 
Hitler  appointed  Generalteldmarschall 
Frhard  Milch  to  direct  the  air  supply 
for  Sixth  Army.  In  the  appointment, 
Hitler  ga\c  Mikli  audiorit\  to  issue 
orders  to  all  hTanchies  of  the  Wehrmacht 
and.  for  the  first  time,  established  a 
command  poweriul  enough  to  over- 
ride all  odier  claims  on  planes,  fuel, 
and  groimd  crews  and  to  organize  the 
air  supply  on  the  scale  which  had  been 


'«j40Jf ,  la,  an  H.  Cr.  Dm  O^.^  m.1.43,  H.  Gt.  Don 

m&w  lye. 

"Kehrig.Sto/ingraaf,  pp.  506-11;  IVMV,  vol.  V.  ra^ 
1!;  Rokossovskiy,  SoiflSir^v  flufji,  p.  167. 


498 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


MAP  44 


landings  in  the  pocket  were  betoininL; 
exceedingly  dangerous,  and  in  another 
four  days,  Sau^nmt  f^mt  s/moM  take 
the  air  base  at  Tatsinsk.i\  a,  Siei^xig  the 
plaoes  to  shift  tq  fields  at  W^i^m  and 
NoYo^etfeass'k,  over  two  itttndred 
miles  from  the  pocket. 

£ariy  on  the  16th,  Sixth  Army  lost 
Mt&mmk,  (be  better  6f  its  two  aiitields 
in.  the  pocket.  Six  of  fourteen  figliters 
based  there  took  off  under  fire.  Five 
attempted  to  land  and  craslfeed  on  the 
airstrip  at  Gumrak,  which  was  still  in 
Sixth  Army's  hands.  The  pilot  of  the 
sixth  flew  out  to  the  west,  thus  ending 
I  he  fi  (filter  defcnsi- <  t\  er  the  pocket.  On 
ilie  17  th,  Fourth  Air  Force  for  a  time 
idlsd  suspended  tandrngs  at  Oonttak 


alter  a  pilot  niisiakriilv  reported  the 
trppps  were  retreating  past  it.'* 

t}&H  completed  the  seeond 

stages  of  K(  )M  so  on  the  ]7lh,  reatiiiug 
a  Une  running  irom  Voroponovo  Sta- 
tibri  northwest  to  RessosWca.  The  area 
of  the  pockel  had  Iieen  retlueed  liv 
about  two-thirds,  but  the  seven  days 
iiflotted  to  KcSLTSO  were  used  up.  Sixth 
Army,  moi  ecn  cr,  had  once  more  man- 
aged to  hold  its  front  together  and  was 
now.  On  ihe  south,  occupying  the  orig- 
inal main  SllJingrad  defense  line. 
Something  haa  gone  wrong.  Sbomik 
Nomef  $  imi  R&fcossovskiy  put  thife 


'■''Sthrueler.  Sirihnf;!ail,  p.  166;  h'ertisjnurk  tXM 
LuftfhUe4.la.  17.I.-I}.  H.  Gi.  Don  39694/8  tile. 


SrmUNGRAD,  FINALE 


499 


blame  on  faiiltv  intelligeme,  Don  Froni, 
they  said,  had  gone  into  die  offensive 
Iwettesfklg'  BailtiS  had  eighty  to  eighty- 
five  thousand  troops,  but  it  turned  out 
he  had  closer  to  two  hundred  thou- 
sand."* For  four  days  after  ihe  VTih, 
Rokossovskiy  again  regrouped.  During 
the  pause,  Paulus  reported,  on  the 
20th,  diat  jtfie  'totfess'^  cdifld  «C)t  liold 
out  more  than  a  few  days  longer.  In 
some  sectors,  he  said,  the  defenders 
had  all  been  wiped  out,  and  the  enemy 
could  maTGh  through  the  (txfut  "at 
will."^^ 

The  final  stage  d[  Komrso  began  oft 
22  January.  Fifty-seventh  Artftys  infantry, 
pressing  in  from  the  southwest  on  a 
three-mile-wide  fiont  along  the  rail- 
road, broke  through  at  Voroponovo 
Station  and  marched  east  into  Sta- 
Uagrad  with  battle  flags  flying.  To  close 
the  gap  this  lime  was  impossible.  Am- 
munition had  run  out  on  that  stretch  of 
the  front,  and  neither  troops  nor  am- 
miuiiiion  could  be  brought  in  from 
other  sectors. 

That  mght^lBmiimt^^^i&'0!^T 
via.  the  OMU 

R.ilioiis  c\h;uis«i'(l.  Over  12,000  unat- 
icih1l  (!  woiinfit'd  in  I  lie  pocket.  What  or- 
ders slioiilfl  I  give  lo  troops  who  have  no 
more  imimuniiion  and  are  siibjeclcd  to 
mass  attacks  supported  by  heavy  ariiiiery 
tire?  Hie  quickest  decision  is  necessary 
d^ce  disintegration  is  already  starting  in 
some  places.  Confidence  in  the  leadership 
still  exists,  however.^* 

Hider  answered: 


l^tVMV,  vol.  VI.  p.  78;  Sbornik.  Nomer  6; 
I^kos^oystuy,  So^Vr'v  Duty,  p.  168. 

^^m^  GmSutfl,  Chef  'dei  GmStdH,  Nr.  38143,  an 
OJS.  rf,,     We- Jim  f  9B9i(S  file. 

J.  Mik  U,  m:^^  tMer  ivr  VMtergabt  'im  nfe* 
Mu^  mi  H.  Gr.  Dm,  H.  Or.  Dm  396S4/9 

file. 


^m%l»ier  is  out  of  tlie  question. 

The  troops  will  defend  iheniselves  to  the 
last,  if  possible,  the  si?e  of  the  fortress  is  to 
be  reduced  so  thai  it  can  be  held  by  the 
troops  still  capable  of  fighting. 

The  courage  and  endurance  of  the  for- 
tress have  made  it  possible  to  establish  a 
new  front  and  begin  preparing  a  coun- 
teroperation.  Thereby,  Sixth  Army  has 
made  an  historic  contribution  to  Ger- 
many's greatest  struggle. 

As  the  front  fell  back  from  the  west, 
the  inner  city,  which  after  months  of 

Iiombardment  had  the  appearance  of  a 
landscape  in  hell,  became  a  scene  of 
ikntastic  horror.  Sixth  Army  repot  led 
twenty  thotisand  uncared-for  wounded 
and  an  equal  number  of  starving,  freez- 
ing, and  unarmed  stragglers.  Those 
who  could  took  shelter  in  the  basements 
of  the  ruins,  vvliere  tons  of  rubble  over- 
head provided  protection  against  a  eon- 
.stant  rain  of  artillery  shells.  There,  in 
darkness  and  cold,  the  sick,  the  mad,  the 
dead,  and  the  dying  crowded  together, 
those  who  could  move  daring  not  to  f  or 
fear  of  losing  iheh  places. '^'^  Over  the 
tallest  of  the  niins  in  the  center  of  the 
city,  Sixth  Army  ran  out  the  Reich  battle 
flag,  "in  order  to  fight  the  last  batdc 
under  this  symbol."'^ 

On  26  ]anum-y,S ixty-.-.eamd  Army  took 
Mamai  Hill,  and  tanks  of  Twenty-first 
.\rmy,  coming  f  rom  the  west,  linked  up 
there  to  split  the  pocket  in  two.*" 
Thereafter,  XI  Corjjs  formed  a  perim- 
eter around  the  tracloi  \\H)i  ks  on  the 
northern  edge  of  the  city  while  Sixth 


■"H.  Cr.  Den,  /a,  Abuhrift  von  fknkspruch  an  6.  Arvm 
Tiiriog'^  an  tftrm  Gmeralfeldmarschallven  Mansion, 
22.1.43,  H.  Gr.  Don  39694/9  file. 

"B.  Gr,  Dim,  la,  Tagesmeldung,  24.1.43,  H.  Gr.  Dott 
39694/9  file. 

"H.  Gr.  Dm  la.  MorgenmMung,  25  .L43,  H  .  Gr,  OSm 
39694/9  file. 
'^IVMV,  vol  VI,  p.  79;  VOV.  p.  189t 


500 


MOSCOW  i  O  STALINGRAD 


Sixth  Army  Survivors  March  Out  of  Si  alingrad  UNutR  Guard 


Army  headquarters  and  LI  and  VIII 
Corps  and  XIV  l^nzer  Corps  dug  in 
around  and  northwest  of  the  main  rail- 
road station.  The  IV  Panzer  Corps, 
which  had  been  holding  the  south 
front,  was  destroyed  on  tliat  day  In'  a 
Soviet  push  across  the  Tsarilsa  River 
fmjxt  the  south,  ^th  Army,  by  then, 
had  asked  the  air  ["orce  to  drop  onl\ 
food:  ammunition  was  not  needed, 
there  were  too  few  guns.** 

SixLli  .'\rmy  stopped  issuing  rations 
to  the  woiuided  on  28  January  to  pre- 
serve the  strength  of  the  fighting 
troops.  That  day  the  main  theme  of  llic 
midnight  situation  conference  at  the 


»AOK  6,  la,  en  H.  Gt.  Den  ueber  OKH,  26.1.43.  H. 
Gr.  Don  39694/9  file;  AOK  6,  Chtf,  an,  H.  Gr.  Dan. 
25.1.43,  H,  Gr.  Don  39694/9  file. 


Fuehrer  Headquarters  was  Hider's  de- 
sire to  have  a**  Sixth  Army  recon- 
stituifd  quickly,  using  as  many  sur- 
vivors of  the  ori^nai  army  as  could  be 
found.'* 

By  29  Januarji;  the  south  pocket  was 
split,  leaving  Paulus,  his  staE£,  and  a 
sinaTI  assortment  of  troops  irt  an  en- 
clave in  the  south  and  the  renmants  of 
LI  and  VUI  Corps  in  the  north.  The 
XrV  I^nzer  Corps  ceased  to  exist  on 
that  day.  During  the  night,  ten  small 
groups  departed  in  a  forlorn  attempt 
to  make  tjhdr  way  out  to  the  west  across 
almost  tWO' hundred  miles  of  enemy 
territory.  By  the  next  night,  LI  and 


"AOK  6,  fa.  an  M.  Gr.  Dm  ui^et  OKH,  WJ.43  and 
AOK  6,  la.  an  H,  Gr.  Don,  30.L4 1.  H  ( ,r.  Don  39694/10 
fik;  Greiner,  OAmte  Wehrmachlj iit'hning,  p.  6&. 


STAUNGRAD,  FINALE 


501 


VIII  Corps  had  ixcn  pushed  into  a 
small  area  around  a  former  Soviet 
Army  engineer  tarracks,  where  they 
suirenderfd  die  following  morning. 
Sixth  Army  headquarters  was  inside  a 
300-yard  perimeter  amund  &^  Red 
Square  held  by  the  survivors  of  the 
19fth  Grmtdkr  Regiment. 

At  0615  on  the  morning  ctf  31  Janti' 
ary,  the  radio  operator  at  Sixth  Army 
headquarters  in  the  basement  ol  the 
IMoermag  ("depaitfinent  Store*)  eti  Hed 

S(|ii;n(.  Still  the  roilowing  message: 
"Russians  are  at  the  door.  We  are  pre- 
paring to  destroy  [the  radio  equip- 
ment]."" An  hour  later,  the  last 
tninsmission  from  Sixth  Army  came 
through:  *We  are  destroying  [the 
equipment]."^"'  Paiihis  surrendered 
himself,  his  staff,  and  those  troops  with 
him  but  refijsed  to  give  an  order  to  XI 
Corps  to  do  the  same.**'*  Promoted  to 
held  marshal  just  the  day  before,  he 
beotttie  die  first  Gem^  officer  of  that 
rank  ever  to  have  been  taken  prisoner. 
Hider,  who  had  expected  the  promo- 
don  to  lead  Paulus  to  a  differeat 
choice,  declared,  "Paulus  did  an  about- 
lace  on  tlie  threshold  of  immortality."*' 
In  the  ptK;k0t  around  the  tractor 
works,  33,000  men  of  XI  Corps,  under 
General  der  Inlanterie  Karl  Suecker, 
fought  on  for  anodter  forty-ei^t 
hours.  On  1  February,  Hitler  called  on 
the  corps  to  fight  to  the  last  man, 
saying,  "Every  day,  ever  hc^r  that  is 
won  benefits  the  rest  of  the  front  de- 


**mK6,  la.an  H.  Gr.  Dim.  29.1.43  AndAOK  (5,  an  H. 
Gt.  Den,  H.  Gr.  Don  36964/9  file. 

**A0K6Ja,mH.  Gr.Dun.  31.1.43.  0615  and AOK  6. 
to,  m  H.  Gt.  Dan,  3tJJ3^  0714,  H.  Gr.  Dtm  39694/10 

''Rdkas^ski)-,  Soldier's  Huty,  p.  171. 
"•Atttte,  "Die  Wentk  (if  j  Kritga." 


cisively."^''  At  0840  the  next  moining. 
Armv  (»roup  Don  received  the  last 
message  trom  Strecker; 

XI  Corps,  with  its  six  divisions,  has  done  its 
duty  to  the  lasi. 

Long  live  the  Fuehrer! 

Long  live  Gennany! — Strecker*' 

lia  the  Ststlingrad  pocket  the  Ger- 

tnans  lost  somewhat  over  two  hundred 
thousand  men.  The  exact  total  was 
apparently  never  determined.  During 
the  rifi;!uing,  30,000  wounded  were 
down  out."''  llic  Soviet  accounts  state 
titat  147,000  German  dead  were 
counted  on  the  battlefield  and  91,000 
Germans  were  taken  prisonei,  includ- 
ing 24  generals  and  2, .^00  nilicers  of 
lessci-  rank.'"'  The  Soviet  Union  has  not 
1  eleased  figures  on  its  own  losses  in  the 
Stalingrad  batde.  However,  if  the  casu- 
alties given  ior  two  units,  ///  Cavalry 
and  VIII  Cavalry  Corps — 36  percent 
and  45  percent,  respectively,  from  19 
November  to  2  December — are  in  any 
way  representative,  the  Soviet  losses 
must  also  have  been  substantial.  An 
impression  of  the  magnitude  ol  Opera- 
don  KOLTSO  can  be  derived  f  iom  Dnv 
Fimi.^  anmtiMMon  expenditure  l>e- 
tween  10  Januarv  and  2  February  1043: 
911,000  artillery  rounds  ol  calibers  up 
to  152  -mm.,  990,000  moofflSJt' shells,  and 
24.000.000  machine  gun  and  rifle 
rounds. 

As  HIder  Irequendy  sta^,  Sixth 

Army  had  perf'ormerl  :t  service  at  a 
critical  time  by  tying  down  seveial  liun- 

"•OAV/,  CniSldll.  Oj).  Ahl.  1 1  VB)  \i:  I413I-4';.  an 
Cm.  Kil„.  Kl  /\.K..  t.2.43,  H.  Gr.  Dun  39694/10  file. 

•".\7  .4  A  ,  an  a.  &r. OainMt^^3,  0840,  H.  Gr. 
36<.)()4/I0  file. 

""Arnu,  "Die  Wend''  ili-.  Krif^rs." 

"VVOVSS.  vol.  Ill,  p.  62;  V'OV.  p.  190;  VOV 
(Krtitka\;i  hl'inyii).  p.  223. 

"'.'iifHHiA,  Nimm  V. 


502 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGKAD 


dred  thousand  Soviet  troops:  on  the 
other  hand,  it  was  a  service  performed 
for  the  wrong  reasons.  Hider  did  not, 
in  the  first  place,  keep  Sixth  Army  at 
Stalingrad  for  even  so  modestly  valid  a 
})nrpose.  He  was  coticemed  entirely 
with  presei^  ing  an  appear  ante  of  suc- 
cess for  a  campaign  he  already  knew 
bad  Med.  At  the  last,  having  kept 
"W^atTSas  happening  at  Sialiiigi  ad  from 
the  German  public  until  atter  KOLTSO 
began,  he  had  notliitlg  iietler  In  iS^d 


than  that  he  believed  a  fight  to  ihe  last 
man  would  be  less  damaging  to  itie 
national  morale  and  his  own  image 
than  a  surrender.®*  Certainly  one  can 
imagine  a  less  disasl2'«nis  development 
of'me  batde  ort  1lle^sf$ffithe^n  flank  of 

the  Eastern  Fiont  fia«''<5fermanv  if  Sixth 
Army  had  been  allowed  to  get  its 
twenty  divisions  away  from  Stalingrad 
in  lime. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 

Condusdcm 


Marshal  Chuikov  cniiilcd  his  mem- 
oir of  the  Stalingrad  battle  A'ac/info  puti 
(The  Beginning  oj  the  Road).  As  of  19  No- 
\ ember  1942,  he  said,  "'Not  a  step 
back!"  now  meant  go  forward  .  .  .  now 
meant  we  have  to  advance  to  the  west."' 
The  road  would  be  long  in  distance 
and  ill  time.  Ki  BcrliiT  1.500  miles  and 
twenty-nine  antl  a  hall  months.  Al- 
^OU^  it  Svas  new  to  Chuikov 's  Sixty- 
secorta  Arvvf,  whit  h  later,  rebuilt  and 
T&iaeaiJsd Eighth  (jiuuds  Army,  would  be 
on  it^  the  way  to  Berlin,  die  road,  ol 
course,  w^as  the  same  one  on  whidi 
German  Sixth  Army  had  begun  its 
thousand-mile  march  from  the  Soviet 
border  to  Stalingrad  seventeoci  months 
earlier. 

On  25  January  1943,  in  the  first 
congratulatorv  ordei  of  the  dav  to  be 
issued  during  the  war,  Stalin  thanked 
the  commands  and  troops  of  the  south- 
ernfmnts  and  gave  them  a  new  slogan: 
"Onward  to  deieai  the  German  oc- 
cupationists  and  to  (hive  them  out  of 
our  country!"  His  order  of  the  day  for 
23  february  1943,  which  was  the  Red 
Army's  twenty-fifth  anniversary,  as- 
sert cfl,  "Three  months  ago  Red  Army 
troops  began  an  offensive  at  the  ap- 
ptmdbe^  m  Stalingrad.  Since  then  the 


'Chuikov.  The  B^fyrSU^agrad,  p.  2]fi.  Odf^nally 
published  as  Na^tm  pvM  {MoKOW:  Voy^flilOjW 
Ijdaiektvo.  1959}u 


initiative  has  iH  t-n  in  our  hands.  .  .  . 
The  balance  of  forces  on  the  Soyiet- 
Genmsx  fro&t  has  clanged."* 

In  his  anniv0>sa!C|'  order  of  the  day. 
Stalin  also  dedsirea  "th^  batUe  at  the 
walls  of  Stalingtad*  to  Itme  been  "the 
greatest  in  tiu'  hisiorv  of  wars."  Those 
who  had  participated  in  it  were  re- 
insiMed  accordingly.  A  huttdred  and 
twelve  officets  and  troops  received  the 
tide  and  decoration  Hero  of  the  Soviet 
Union  ;  48  generals  were  awarded  the 
Older  of  Su\(>ro\  or  the  Ordt  i  of 
Kutuzov;  10,000  in  all  ranks  received 
other  decorarions;  and  700,000  were 
given  the  t.atii])aign  medal  "For  the 
Defense  of  Stalingrad."  Forty-four 
units  vifere  authorized  to  fncorporate 
place-names  associated  with  the  battle 
into  their  (jL^&ignations;  55  received 
unit  ooniift^itHation^;  and  1S3  earned 
the  tide*i|^B-ds."'' 

Charies  E.  Bohlen,  the  U.S.  State 
Department's  chief  Soviet  analyst, 
noted  with  some  concern  that  Stalin 
omitted  the  Western  AlUes  irom  tlie 
celebrattoh.  On  6  Kijvember  ,  in 
his  annual  speech  on  the  c\e  of  the 
anniversary  of  the  1917  revolution,  Sta- 
lifi  had  talked  at  length  al^Dttt  the  ad^ 
vaBtag^  a  second  front  in  Europe 


'L  SSR  Embassy,  ypi/mwifmn  Builflin.  no.  10,2&Jbi1 
43.  p,  \  :lbid..  no.  I'J.  23  I-l'l)  43,  p.  2. 

m'MY.  vol.  VI.  p.  S2:  l  Ot;  p.  190:  L  SSR  Embassy. 
It^omtation  BuUetin,  no.  12, 28  Jan  42.  p.  5. 


504 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


would  bring.  In  ihe  23  February  1943 
order  of  the  day,  he  merely  remarked 
that  in  the  absence  of  a  second  front, 
the  Soviet  Arm\  luid  borne  "the  whole 
burden  of  the  war"  thus  far,  and  he 
suggested  that  it  alone  would  be  capa- 
l)Ic  of  defeating  Germany  in  the  war. 
On  6  November,  he  had  said,  "We  are 
not  vvagini>  [tlie  war]  alone,  but  in 
conjunciioii  will)  our  allies."  And  he 
had  proposed  die  slogan:  "Hail  the 
victory  of  the  Anglo-Soviet- American 
fighting  alliance!"  He  did  not  mention 
the  alliance  in  the  23  February  order  of 
the  day.* 

The  OKW's  Armed  Foites  Ri  port 
issued  from  the  Fuehrer  Headquarters 
on  3  February  awkwardly  attempted  to 
transform  a  disaster  into  an  epic  .  The 
Opening  sentences  read:  "The  batde 
i$t  Stalingrad  has  ended.  True  to  its 
0eith  to  the  last  breath.  Sixth  Army, 
Q[Qder  the  exemplary  leadership  of 
WUM  liaarshsl  I^Ius,  has  sttccnmbed 
to  the  overwhelming  strength  of  the 
eiteniy  and  to  unfavorable  circum- 
stattces.  The  memfs  two  demands  tor 
capitulation  were  proudly  rejected. 
The  last  batde  was  fought  under  a 
swastika  Hag  flying  from  the  highe$| 
ruin  in  Stalingrad."  Depicting  the  eSs^ 
as  HiUer  had  wanted  it  to  be  but  as  tite 
world,  including  mo^  Germatis,  al- 
ready knew  it  had  not  been,  the  report 
concluded,  "Generals,  oflicers,  non- 
cofiiisissiotied  clicers  aiid  men  fought 
shoulder  to  shoulder  to  die  lasi  bullet. 
They  died  that  Germany  might  live!"  '' 

That  th«  war  in  me  East  tt%d 
changed  course  drastically  was  obvious 


'tX'pl.  t>f  Si.iic.  Fiit,-if^,i  IhUiUiiiis,  l'H3.  \<>l.  111.  ]). 
506:  USSR  I'.tiibassv,  I nju) million  Hiilletin,  no.  135, 
IW2.  pp.  1-6;  /;«</.,  IK.       35  Feb  43,  pp,  1-4. 

^Dum&rus.H liter,  vol.  II,  p.  1985. 


also  to  the  Germans  by  January  1943, 
and  Hider  and  Propaganda  Minister 
Goebbels  were  trying  to  convert  the 
calamitous  outcome  of  the  1942  cam- 
paign into  a  nadonal  commitment  to 
total  war.  On  13  January  1943,  Hitler 
issued  a  decree  stating,  "The  total  war 
confronts  us  with  tasks  .  . .  that  must 
unequivocally  be  mastered";  he  named 
a  three-man  eonmiittee,  consisting  of 
Field  Marshal  Keitel,  the  chief.  QKW; 
^feftin  BoTtnann,  the  chief  of  flie  N&ad 
Parlv  Chain  el  lory:  and  Hans  Lam- 
mers,  the  chief  of  the  Reich s  Chancel- 
li^,  nl@>yike  Sill  military,  party,  and 
Sfe*&|i^anpes  for  the  effort.'^  .S]>eakin!r 
For  Hider  on  30  January,  the  tendi 
anniversary  of  the  Nazi  seizure  of 
power,  Goebbels  called  "the  gigantic 
winter  batde  in  the  East  the  beacon  <^ 
total  war  for  the  German  Nation.'*  C3fe 
18  February,  in  an  hour-long  speech 
devoted  solely  to  the  total  war  theme, 
he  d^^ared  Etitwpe  to  be  under  an 
assatjlt  ^out  of  the  steppe"  that  only  ihe 
Geruiap  Wehrmachi  and  its  allies  could 
Stop.  The  battle  of  Stalingrad,  he  said, 
had  been  "die  greai  tocsin  of  German 
destiny;"  and  the  nation's  watchword 
hencefesTth  had  to  be  "^wjple  arise — 
gnd  storm  break  loose!"' 

Germany  was  in  fact  far  from  being 
Oil  i  tbtal  T*ar  footing  in  early  194S. 
War  production  had  been  over  40  per- 
cent greater  in  1942  than  in  1941 
(largely  owing  to  Armament  and  Mu- 
iiition.s  Minister  Speer's  organizational 
improvements),  and  1942  had  been  the 
first  year  in  which  constmner  goods 
production  had  been  cut  significaiulv. 
but  the  assumption  that  die  war  would 


'Jacdb^en.  Der  xuirilfi  Wvllhu'^i.  pp.  .'i7M-75. 
"Hfltimi  tk-ilitT.  t-il,.  O-fl'liiU-Knifii  ( Duessdclorl: 
Drosie  Verlag,  197'J).  pp.  165,  173-75.208. 


CONCLUSION 


505 


soon  be  over  had  governed  economic 
planning  until  the  end  of  the  vear. 
Gotisequently,  alfl^gii  the  ouipul  (rf 
consumei  goods  was  10  percent  less  in 
1942  dian  in  1941  (but  only  12  percent 
tes  than  in  the  last  prewar  year,  1938), 
the  tendency  had  been  to  preserve  the 
epciSttt!aer  sector  of  the  economy,  and 
the  numfeers  employ^  &i  stid*  indus- 
tries had  held  steady  even  though  ihe 
war  industry  work  force  had  declined 
almost  10  percent  between  1939  and 
1942." 

The  declaradon  of  total  war  termi- 
naced  the  pfliase  ifi  i*hidi  Itfie  prospect 
of  an  carlv  \  irlory  had  governed  pol- 
icy; however,  total  war  connoted  a 
laaiiCh  more  cogent  and  purpc«efttl 
policy  shift  than  actually  occurred. 
After  the  13  January  decree  was  pub- 
Mii^,  Mifler  tbM  the  cotaiaSttec  of 
three  that  what  he  really  wanted  them 
to  do  was  to  squeeze  another  800,000 
ttieti  cnit  of  ihe-vra^k  fe^rfeefbr  military 
service,  not  to  reorient  the  whole  war 
effort.  To  the  extent  that  it  mate- 
rialized af  all  the*eafl5effv  th^  total -w^ 

program  conformed  to  Hitlers  re- 
quest. On  27  January,  the  Office  of  the 
Generalplenipotoiaary  for  Labor  de*' 
dared  all  men  sixteen  to  sixty-five  and 
all  women  seventeen  to  Ibrty-five  sub- 
ject to  a  iabor  draft.  After  grantififf 
blanket  exemptions  in  niinierous  cate 
gories,  it  registered  3,3  million  persons 
and — ovef  ch^fe  fiestiTear  aiid  a  half- 
put  700,000  of  them  to  work.  On  4 
February,  the  Ministry  of  Economics 
ordered  all  non-war-related  hiisinesses 
to  dose  and  defined  those  as  night- 
dtibs,  luxury  bars  and  restaurants, 

jewdi^  stiom,  <a*st(sta  pmmm 


*Deiits(-hes  InstituI  I'lier  Wirtsthat'tsiVirschujig , 
DetUschi'  Induitne  im  Kriege,  pp.  'il,  46f,  49,  159,  178. 


and,  among  others,  establishlJ16i»^ 
trading  in  postage  stamps." 

PatilttS?  snrrender  brought  the  road 
to  a  dead  end  for  Germany's  allies.  By 
31  January,  the  headquarters  for  the 
Rumanian,  Italian,  and  Hungarian  Ar- 
mies were  all  out  of  the  front  and 
engaged  in  trying  to  reassemble  what 
t«as  ft^t  6f  their  troops.  (Hunganan 
Second  Army  had  l)een  smashed  by  a 
Soviet  offensive  begun  on  12  January.) 
Marshal  Mannerheim,  commander  in 
chief,  Finnish  Army,  had  asked  Twen- 
tieth Mountain  Army  to  release  all  the 

fthiiyi  mmm  fi^  battafi^)  sill  ^- 
tach^dtdit!.* 

The  ^governments  of  Finland,  Htut- 
gary,  artd  Kutnania,  whose  countries 
lay  athwart  the  Soviet  road  to  the  west 
and  would  be  the  fijst  to  experieiice 
the  assault  "out  of  the  steppe,"  were 
looking  to  their  own  salvadon,  as  was 
Italy's  Mussolini,  who  was  watchinig  the 
British  and  Americans  open  ahodier, 
and  to  him  more  dangerous,  load  in 
North  Africa.  Mussolini  pioposed 
making  a  separate  peace  MtJi  the  So- 
viet Union.  Rumanian  Marshal  An- 
tonescu  proposed  doing  die  same,  only 
with  the  Western  Allies.  In  the  early 
months  of  1943,  Finland,  Hungary, 
and  Rumania  all  began  casting  about 
t&r  mimec^  and  tiipec^tandings  with 
the  Western  Allies  ^tm%  inight  shelter 
them  from  the  full  coasetjuences  of  a 
Soiietii'fctewy.*^ 

HJIiW,  Sietlvertn-tfiHh-  Chef  Wfliiiiuiihlluehriniss- 
stabes,  Knegstagfkiidi  vdwi  l.l.-}l.3A3,  16  ■.in<\  22  \,\n 
43, 1.M.T.  Dot-.  1786  PS;  )acobsen.  De;  Wt  llhneg, 

p.  378;  He\beT.Goebbets,  pp.  189,  199. 

'"Jiiergen  Foerster,  Stalmgrnd.  Risse  mi  Bumdnm, 
l9-42-19-f3  (Freii>iirg:  Veilug  Rmiibach.  1975).  pp. 
46-66;  (Geb.)  AOK  20.  la  A'r.  13j/4j.  an  OKW.  1VF.S7. 
29A.43,  AOK  20  36560/2  file. 

•^'Foer.ster,  Stalingrad,  p.  68;  Paul  Schmidt,  Staikt 
mil  ilipiomatisrher  BueJtJie,  1923^945  (Bomy  Alhe- 
naeum  Verlag,  1949),  p.  555. 


506 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


The  ThmsiUons 
In  the  Hi^  Commands 

From  the  outset  of  tll6  war,  Hitler 
and  Stalin  were  the  actual  as  well  as 
titular  supreme  lommanders  of  their 
respecdve  arsned  forces.  Both  hiul^a&< 
ficient  power  as  heads  of  government 
in  tolaljLariaii  slates  to  conduct  the  war 
as  th^  saw  hi.  and  both  xaide  the  1942 
campaign  the  dt  fnnitive  test  of  their 
generalship.  How  each  construed  the 
results  of  the  campaign  set  the  German 
and  Soviet  Commands  on  the  courses 
they  would  follow  lo  the  war's  end. 

Until  the  late  suooxaertif  1942,  Stalin 
maintained  an  appearance  of  collegial 
command  \csled  in  the  Stavka  and  di- 
rected the  war  in  person  dirough  liie 
Stavka  and  its  adjunct,  the  General 
Staff.  At  a  higher  level,  he  also  con- 
trolled the  whole  war  effort  through 
the  Stale  Defense  Committee,  the 
GKO.  In  1941,  lie  could  not  have  done 
differently  without  setting  the  state 
and  \he  military  systems  that  he  had 
huili  around  him.sell  hopelessly  adrift. 
He  had  preserved  the  systems,  thereb\ 
probably  also  saving  (he  nation;  but  his 
generalship  after  die  Moscow  coiui- 
terattack  had  failed  to  capitalize  de- 
cisively on  that  success  and  had  paved 
the  way  for  die  second  German  sum- 
mer offensi\  1  mally,  with  the  "Ni 
shagii  namd!'  ("Noi  a  step  back!")  order 
of  28  July  1942.  Stalin  reached  what 
could  have  been  the  last  stop  short  oi 
Strategic  bankruptcy:  he  had  tcj  de- 
mand that  his  forces  sacrifice  them- 
selves lo  buy  time  for  him.  A  month 
later  he  had  to  call  on  Zhukov  and 
V^isilevskiy  to  augment  his  generalship. 

Hie  History  of  the  Secmd  Wrld  Wir 
states  that  by  appointing  a  deputy  su- 
preme commander,  Stalin  "introduced 


a  new  element  in  the  leadership  at  the 
Strategic  level"  and  that  Zhukov  and 
Vasilevskiy  "were  provided  with  plen- 
ipoteniiary  powers  and  possessed  great 
authority  in  the  fighting  forces."'^  Spe- 
cified^ Stalin  had,  in  making  Zhukov 
depiit^:  sui>reme  commander,  for  the 
first  time  installed  a  military  profes- 
sional in  the  direct  chain  of  command 
above  the  operational  level  and  had,  by 
grantilig  plenipotentiary  powers  to 
'Zhukov  and  Yaailevskiy,  created  the 
I  n  u  I  e  u  s  of  a  t  least  a  provisional  xniyiaxy 
high  coimnajKl. 

The  devdopntent  g£  cbe  high  com- 
ma nd  coritiiiued  thtou^  die  rest  of 
the  year  and  into  die  early  months  of 
IMS.  The  planning  and  execution  of 
I  lie  t  nunteroffensive  at  Stalingrad 
brought  the  commanding  general  of 
the  air  force  and  the  chiefs  of  artillery 
and  at  inor.  whose  posts  in  the  Defense 
Commissariat  had  until  then  been 
mostly  administrative,  into  the  line  of 
command  under  Zhukov  and  Va- 
silevskiy. In  December  1942,  the  artil- 
lery and  armored  and  mechanized 
forces  had  acquired  branch  status 
(which  the  air  force  already  had)  and 
theif  diiefs  had  become  commanding 
pfenerals  and  deputy  defense  loni- 
missars.  The  mosdy  ad  hoc  command 
structure  of  late  1942  was  formalized  in 
Mav  194.^  when  Zhukov's  and  Va- 
silevskiy's  appointments  as  first  and  sec- 
ond deputy  defense  commissars, 
respectiveh.  ])iii  iliem  at  the  heads  of 
both  the  line  and  staf  f  militaiy  chains 
of  command.** 

Stalin  also  gave  the  military  profes- 
sionals tangible  evidence  of  his  con- 
fidence and  their  worth  to  the  extent 


"/r.v/r.  vol.  V.  236. 

''iakiiarov.iW/rt,  p.  333. 


CONCLUSiON 


507 


that  they  probably  gained  more  in 
ranks  and  titles  than  they  did  in  actual 
influence  on  the  conduct  ol  the  war. 
On  18  January  1943,  Zhukov  became  a 
marshal  of  the  Soviet  Union,  tlie  hrst 
general  to  be  promoted  to  that  rank  in 
die  war,  and  General  Voronov  became 
a  marshal  of  artillery  under  a  less  than 
two-week-old  Central  Committee  de- 
cree authorizing  branch  marshalshipS. 
Vasilevskiy  advanced  to  gnieral  armii 
also  on  18  January  and  to  marshal  of 
the  Soviet  Union  a  month  later.  The 
Cpnjmanding  general  of  the  air  force, 
Novikov,  became  a  general  polhovnik  in 
January,  a  general  armii  in  February, 
and  received  bis  star  as  marshal  of 
aviation  in  March  1943.  Three  field 
commanding  generals — Malinovskiy, 
Rokossovskiy,  and  Vatutin — moved 
through  the  ranks  from  genera!  leyte- 
nant  to  general  armii  by  April  1943. 
Stalin's  generosity  with  promotions  was 
lavish  but  measured.  Fedorenko,  the 
-commanding  general  of  armored  mid 
mechanized  forces,  had  become  a  ge- 
neral poikewnik  in  January  1943,  but 
apparently  because  the  armored 
branch's  performance  had  ttQt  yet 
equaled  that  of  the  artillery  of  the  air 
force,  Fedorenko  was  left  to  wait  more 
than  a  year  for  his  promotion  to  mar- 
shal of  tlie  armoapea  forces.  Stalin  alsof 
made  pointed  distinctions  between  of- 
fensive and  defensive  success.  Ma- 
linovskiy, whose  army  had  smashed 
Operation  WiNrERCiiwiTTER,  moved 
up  two  grades  in  rank  and  became 
a.fnmt  conupEnid^  In  Ji943  and  a  mar- 
shal in  who  had  held 
the  Stalingrad  bridgehead  through  the 
siege,  stayed  an  army  commander  and 
ended  his  serv  ice  in  llic  w  ar  as  ,igrnerul 
polhovnik.  Rokossovskiy,  who  had  wiped 
fjut  the  Stalingrad  pocket,  became  a 


marshal  in  1944.  General  EreiStenlaj^ 
who  had  conducted  the  deTense,  was  a 
general  armii  when  the  war  ended. 
Eremenko  and  Chuikov  eventually  be- 
came marshals,  but  not  uatil  1955,  two 
years  after  Stalin  died.^* 

The  military's  relationship  to  Stalin 
had  changed.  He  had  come  ;is  close  to 
creating  a  high  command  au(l  appoint- 
mg  a  commander  in  chief  as  he  ever 
would,  and  he  had  accepted  the  profes- 
sionals' guidance.  Vasilevskiy  described 
the  new  reladonship  as  it  affected  him- 
self, Zhukov,  and  Stahn  when  he  wrote, 
"The  Stalingrad  batde  was  an  impor- 
tant turning  point  [in  Stalin's  develop- 
ment as  a  mUitary  leader].  J.  V.  Stalin 
began  not  only  to  understand  military 
stiategy  well  .  .  .  but  also  found  his  way 
about  well  in  the  operational  art.  As  a 
result,  he  exercised  a  strong  influence 
on  the  working  out  of  opera- 
tions. .  .  ."'^  That  Stalin  had  discovered 
an  effective  system  of  command,  which 
was  also  satisfactory  to  himself,  was 
evident  in  his  own  entry  into  the  mili- 
tary as  a  marshal  of  the  Soviet  Union  in 
March  1943.  What  is  most  remarkable, 
however,  is  that  after  late  1942,  Stalin 
had  managed  sutcessfully  to  foster  and 
exploit  military  professionahsm  with- 
out relinquishrng  saay  of  his  authority 
over  OT  Tvitfiin  me  armed  forces.  The 
army  had  performed  as  if  it  had  a  high 
command,  but  it  did  not.  Orders  con- 
tinued to  be  issued  m  l3xe  name  cif  the 
Stavka.  Zhukov,  as  deputy  supreme 
commander,  and  he  and  Vasilevskiy,  as 
first  and  second  deputy  defense  com- 


'■•See  the  biographical  entries  in  Ministerstvo 
'Ofborooy  SSSR,  Instttut  Voyermoy  Istorii.  Sovetskayst 
^S^amnsi^a  Entsikli^tii^  (Moscow:  "VoYSJOfm^i^ 
^aiteUlVo,  1980)  atti  k  the  registers  of  n^esMihie 
s^ropriate  volumes  oSWOt^. 

^HVMV.  vol.  V,  pc  m 


508 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


missars,  wieldetl  great  authority  when 
Stalin  desired  ihem  to,  but  it  was  his 
authority  not  theirs.  In  terms  of  real 
power,  the  distance  between  Stalin  anil 
his  deputies  always  was,  when  he 
wanted  it  to  be,  at  least  as  great  as  that 
between  a  marshal  and  a  private. 

Like  the  Soviet,  the  German  Com- 
niand  underwent  a  transition  in  1942, 
in  its  instance  completing  the  one  be- 
gun in  February  1938  when  Hider  bad 
made  himself  commander  in  chief  of 
tl^  armed  forces.  Aliht>ugh  Flitler  had 
progressively  expanded  bis  role  in  mili- 
tary affairs,  especially  during  the  early 
campaigns  of  the  war,  the  Armed 
Forces  High  Command,  the  OKW,  had 
not  evolved  into  a  true  armed  forces 
command,  and  during  the  1941  cam- 
paign in  the  Soviet  Union  the  service 
high  commands  had  continued  as 
semi-autonomous  parts  of  the  com- 
mand structure  represented  in  the 
high-level  decision-making  process  by 
their  commanders  in  chief.  In  Barba- 
ROSSA  and  Taifun,  the  Army  High 
Command,  the  OKH,  had  also  figured 
as  the  designated  high  command  for 
operations  on  the  Eastern  Front. 
However,  following  Field  Marshal 
Brauchitsch's  dismissal  in  December 
1941,  the  OKH  had  ceased  to  be  a  high 
command  in  all  but  name,  and  Hitler 
had  assumed  direct  personal  control  of 
the  Eastern  Front.  Subsequently,  the 
1942  operations  were  planned  atid  ex- 
ecuted according  to  his  specifit aiii ins. 
and  victory,  ne\'ertheless,  eluded  his 
grasp,  bringing  bim  at  the  end  Cff  Au- 
gust into  about  as  dose  an  encounter  as 
Stalin's  with  strategic  bankruptcy. 

Stalin%  response  was  rational  and 
self-serving;  Hii  lei's  only  self-serving. 
In  September  1942,  he  further  dis- 
maniled  the  consxaand  strtictxtre.  leav- 


ing himseli  alone  atop  tjie  "heap  of 
wreckage.""'  The  clean  sw-eep — of  Kei* 
tel  and  Generals  Jodi  and  Malder — 
that  HiUer  threatened  did  not  mate- 
rialize. Keitel  and  [odi  kept  their  posts 
in  the  OKW  until  the  end  of  the  war. 
But  Hitler  seemed  everything  he 
wanted:  an  OKW  and  General  Staff 
Innilv  broiiglu  into  agreement  witli 
hini  and  subservience  to  him  and, 
through  General  Schmimdt  and  the 
aimv  officer  personnel  office,  a  direct 
liold  on  t\t  i  \  officer  from  lieutenant 
to  field  marshal.  On  30  September,  just 
two  weeks  bef  ore  he  was  going  to  have 
to  issue  Operations  Order  No.  1  put- 
ting the  Eastern  Front  on  notice  to 
expect  another  bad  winter,  Hider  an- 
nounced a  victory,  not  over  the  enemy 
but  over  "an  old  world,"  that  of  military 
tradition.  He  told  the  German  people 
they  were  about  to  see  the  Nazi  social 
system  take  full  effect.  Birth,  back- 
ground, and  schooling,  he  said,  had 
ceased  to  be  criteria  for  military  prefer- 
ment, which  henceforth  would  go  only 
"to  the  brave  and  loyal  man,  the  deter- 
mined fighter  who  is  .suited  to  be  a 
leader  of  his  people."^^  To  Schmundt, 
he  talked  about  advancing  line  officers 
to  the  top  (omtnaitds  and  abolishing 
the  General  StaiTs  distinctive  red  trou- 
ser  stripes  and  sifpier  Collar  tabs^**  la 
short,  Hider  p3ao^  the  army  under  k£s 
tutelage. 

But  tfte  wiMer  was  far  worse  than 
Hitler  could  have  imagined  it  would  he 
inSeptembci  1942,  in  fact,  worse  than 
Ite  aiNady  ihought  it  had  been  tm  tht 
day  Fauliis  surrendered  in  Stalingrad; 


^'yfyt^miBt.imMauptqtuirtier.  p,  ^4- 
^fDoBa!am,itifyti  vol.  11.  p.  1922. 
*^&tli^fiigt^«r^  ia  Cb^s  da  Hmtspemmdam, 


CONCLUSION 


509 


consequently,  his  relationship  to  the 
military  came  into  question  again.  On 
1  February  1943,  Soviet  forces  began 
operations  aimed  toward  Kursk,  Khar- 
kov, and  die  Dnepr  River  crossing  at 
Dnepropetrovsk  and  Zaporozhye  that 
could  liave  engulfed  not  just  armies 
but  Army  Groups  Don  and  Center.''* 
On  the  6th,  Hitler  called  Field  Marshal 
Manstein,  tlie  Army  Group  Don  com- 
mander, to  the  Fuehrer  Headquarters 
and' — although  it  was  not  evident  at 
the  time — laid  the  groundwork  for  a 
renewed  partnership  between  himself 
and  the  niiiitary  "old  world"  that  would 
get  him  past  the  current  crisis  and 
sustain  him  through  ainathcr  tw^»t?^- 
six  months  of  twai*. 

Manstein  came  to  the  meeting  as  the 
representative  of  his  world,  that  of  the 
Genera!  Staff  in  the  pre-Nazi  tradition, 
and  its  leading  candidate  to  be  a  chief 
of  tlie  General  Staff  with  clear  respon- 
sibility and  genuine  authority.  Hitler 
Iiacl  ignored  the  idea  of  a  strong  chief 
of  the  General  Staff  when  it  first  arose 
in  early  1942,  and  he  dismissed'  tr 
impossible  when  Manstein  proposed  it 
on  6  February.  But,  althougli  he  tried 
for  four  hours,  he  could  not  do  the 
s;iine  when  Manstein  confronted  him 
with  what  he  had  come  to  regard  as  the 
General  Staffs  moSt  perfiidoiis  prfftei- 
ple.  nanielv,  fhat  maneuver  had  to  take 
precedence  over  position  on  the  defen- 
sive as  well  as  tm  offensive.  The 
events  at  Stalingrad  had  not  shaken  his 
conviction  derived  from  die  previous 
wiiitet^  expertetiee  that  vciluntary 
withdrawals  a!\\;!\';  served  the  enemv 
better  than  they  did  oneself,  but  he 


'^The  post-Stalingrad  phase  of  tlie  Swiet  1942- 
{943  -winter  uE^e^ve  is  tieated  in  ttetiiil  in  ch.  V  nf 


stopped  short  of  putting  his  con\  iction 
to  another  test  and  aiuliorized  Man- 
stein to  take  the  Army  Group  Don 
front  inside  tlic  bend  of  the  Donets 
River  back  a  hundred  miles  to  the  Miu^ 
River  line.^** 

In  the  succeeding  weeks,  Manstein 
repaid  Hitler's  reluctant  concession 
handsomely.  On  20  February,  he 
launched  an  operation  that  in  the  next 
twenty-six  days  demolished  four  Soviet 
armies  and  established  a  front  on  the 
Donets  River  nortli  to  Belgorod.  (On 
the  2Qth,  Soviet  spearheads  were  sev- 
enty miles  west  of  Kharkov,  within  ar- 
tillery range  of  Dnepropetrovsk,  and 
less  than  forty  miles  east  of  Mansteio's 
headquarters  at  Zaporozhye.)  In  the 
second  week  of  Marchj  the  recapture 
of  Kharkov,  an  event  that  would  attract 
worldwide  attention,  was  taking  shape, 
and  on  the  lOlh.  Hitler  went  to 
Zaporozhye  to  add  an  Oak  Leal  Clus- 
ter to  Manstein's  Knight's  Cross  of  the 
Iron  Cross  and  to  greet  and  hear  re- 
ports from  all  of  die  army  and  air  corps 
t^mmanders  in  the  soum.  He  was  ami- 
able, even  jocular,  and  he  foimd  the 
generals'  morale  to  be  "fantastic." 
Three  days  later,  he  staged  a  similar 
scene  at  Army  Group  Center  with  Field 
Marshal  KJugc  atid  his  generals,  who 
t?e*e  then  ctwnpleting  a  phased  evacua- 
tion of  the  Rzhev  salient  that  was  re- 
leasing enough  troops  to  block  the 
Soviet  advance  past  Kufsk.** 

Manstein  stopped  the  offensive  on 
18  J4arch  at  Belgorod,  thirty  miles 

tm^  fMWMm,  vMMk  had  immm 


'^M«teSi!lia,'f^iBrime Siege,  pp.  437-44. 
David  frving,  HMm^s  Wif  (New  "ibrk:  Viking 
Press.  1977).  pp.  49T-«^;  Ijsuk  R  Ltjchiifeiveti^.  The 
Gaebbek  JXatifs  (Garden  City^  I4.Y.:  Douye^y  Se  Co., 


510 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


tlie  14th.  Tlie  full  onset  of  the  spring 
thaw  forced  him  lo  make  this  decision, 
and  he  had  to  leave  a  deep  bulge 
around  Kursk,  but  Hider  could  pro- 
claim a  victory  in  his  annual  Memorial 
Day  address  on  the  21.st  (which  he  had 
postponed  for  a  week  in  anticipation  of 
such  an  announcement).  From  the 
Potsdam  Armory,  the  shrine  to  Prus- 
sian and  German  feats  of  arms,  he  told 
the  nation  and  the  world  that  Europe 
had  been  saved,  and  preparations  were 
under  way  to  secure  additional  suc- 
cesses in  the  coming  months  and  to 
assure  the  final  victory.  On  13  March, 
he  had  signed  Operations  Order  No.  5 
alerting  Manstein  and  Kluge  to  be 
ready  to  seize  the  initiathi'e  again  as 
soon  as  the  spring  muddy  season 
ended," 

JBidd  marshals  and  the  rest  of 
the  i&ld  Wprid"  military  establishment 
would  be  ready  with  few  exceptions  in 
the  spring  of  1943  and  for  as  long 
thereafter  as  Hiiltr  wanted  them.  In  a 
long  talk  with  Goebbels  on  9  March, 
day  before  his  Visit  to  Manstein, 
Hitler  liad  revealed  how  he  meant  to 
reciprocate.  He  said  he  did  not  trust  a 
sin^e  one  efthe^fuaeals;  they  al!  tried 
lo  swindle  him  t«faenever  they  could; 
they  did  not  even  t^nderstand  their 
own  trade — war:  the  entire  c^cer- 
itainiiig  system  had  lux  n  wi  ong  for 
generations.  "Slowly  but  surely,"  he 
coaduded,  leadership  setecdon  l^the 
armed  forces  woidd  be  changed; 
Schmundt  would  see  to  that.*^ 


The  primary  componiattts  of  the 

blitzkrieg  were  the  doctrine  of  com- 
bined arms,  the  deep  operation,  and 
the  envelopment.  The  first  two  were 
late  developmetus  crfWorld  War  I,  The 
Germans  and  Uae  AUtes  had  tised  com- 
bined artns  in  1918  to  adhieve  deeper 
penetrations  of  the  enemy  feoBt  man 
they  had  previously  managed  at  any 
time  since  1914.  During  the  interwar 
period,  the  deep  opeiatioii  (essentially 
as  it  had  been  conceived  in  the  German 
General  Staffs  tactical  instructions, 
"The  Attack  in  Positional  ^\arf;^t■'"  *>f 
January  1918,  a  coordinated  frontal 
thrust  designed  to  break  through  mul- 
tiple defense  lines  to  depths  of  twenty^ 
five  or  thirty  miles  in  several  weeks)  was 
regarded  as  the  most  practicable  means 
r>f  averting  another  trench  deadlcx:k 
such  as  had  occurml  in  World  W*r 
The  envelopment  dtiied  tei:  to  f  Aii^ 
gust  of  216  B.C.  whaena  Carthaginian 
force  under  Hannibal  encircled  and 
annihilated  a  much  larger  Roman 
fort^e  under  the  Consul  Tereniius 
Vaito  at  Cannae.  Hannibal's  accom- 
plishment had  been  long  admired  but 
seldom  repealed.  The  ]7re-\\'orld  War  I 
Chief  of  the  German  General  Stall, 
Generalfeldmarschall  AliVed  (^sdP  von 
Schlieffen.  anah/ed  the  seveial  dozen 
eighteenth  and  nineteenth  century  bat- 
tles in  which  enveloping  maneuvers 
had  been  emploved  and  found  only 
one  fully  successlul  encirdement — the 
Battle  of  Sedan  hi  September 
which  decided  the  Franco-Prussian 


"Unmarus.  Hitln.  vol.  M.  \>.  i[W.  OKII.  (  '■>  nSUlH. 
Op.  Aht.  Sr.  ^3l>!63H3.  <)/,nril,fiishrf,hl  \>.  5.  /?,?.■/ J. 
CMH  liK'v 

Ja(i>bser),£>('r  zuinli-  WfltJmeg,  pp.  383-85. 


^'trich  Lufti-iuliii-n,  Vrkuniifn  ilfr  Obersten 
Hmnlrilung  Ufber  ihre  liirligkeil  1916/18  (Btilin;  E.  S. 
Mittler  u  .SoliTi.  1920).  pp.  641-66;  Herniaim 
["i>t-rtsth,  Krifgskiin.'^l  liruir  tind  morgra  (BerUlU 
WUhelm  Andenuann,  1939).  pp.  228-35. 


CONCLUSION 


511 


Wkr  against  FraiKc,  Schlicffen  con.- 
diuled,  and  militat  y  opinion  generaHy 
concurred  during  and  after  V^srliiVfiit 
I,  that  to  attempt  an  cmirciement,  un- 
less the  opjportunitj'  for  one  arose  by 
d^nce  in  tne  course  of  a  balllg;,  vms  an 
almo.si  [line  gamble  because  Ml  en- 
velopment, even  by  a  nuaic^tleafly  su- 
perior force,  was  tftfficuft  to  complete 
and  easy  to  evade.  In  Sclilieffens  opin- 
ion, a  complete  batde  of  encirclement 
required  a  daring  and  imaginative 
Hannibal  and  a  sfubbornlv  inflexible 
lereuiius  Varro,  "bodi  cooperadng  lor 
attainnimt  of  the  great  goal."** 

In  the  German  campaigns  againsi 
Poland  September  1939  ;^d  France 
Siid  the  txm  CkitilatilBs  in  May  and 
June  1940.  strate^flivelopments  and 
combined  arms  deep  operations  con- 
dtieted  at  high  speed  and  to  gieater 
depths  iban  had  pie\i<>nslv  been 
diought  possible  produced  die  bUtz- 
krieg.  the  f94l  campaign  against 
the  Soviet  Union,  the  envelopment  was 
incorporated  into  the  deep  operation 
to  form  die  Zangenangriff  ("pincers 
movement"),  the  double  envelopment 
repeatedly  executed  along  die  strategic 
fines  €if  attadc^  The  Mitz&ieg  attained 
the  highest  state  of  its  operational  de- 
velopment in  the  1941  campaign  in  the 
Escst  but  &id  not  achieve  a  decisive 
strategic  result.  On  fi  July  1942,  when 
tlie  Stavka  ordered  tlie  retreat  in  the 
southern  sector,  Stalin  stopped  playing 


'^S<  lilit'f fell  hirnst-ll  tlt:si^;iif(i  itic  nexl  ciivdoj)- 
nK'Ul  111  lie  allt'iiipifd  iillci  Si'<l;iii.  Ext-ruted  .iIilt  iiis 
dfiUll.  il  iuiJciJ  in  Scplciiilit-r  ItHI.  The  biitllf  iif 
Tanni-'nbprg,  the  (k'liiiau  victmy  on  llic  l.Lisuiii 
From  in  Aiipist  H(14.  produdd  the  one  ^iintssliil 
endrdenicnr  in  Wojld  Win  I. 

"-Mfrett  v(in  Schlietfcn.  (Mininr  (Fort  Leavenwortli: 
Till-  (,.iiiini,iiid  and  General  M.itl  S.  iuMil  J'ress,  1981), 
pp.  li'J7-30ti;  ¥ot:nsch,  Knegikiiml,  p.  246. 


Tcrentius  Vano  to  Hider's  Hannibal, 
and  the  encirclemenis  accomplished 
diereafter  were  mosdy  of  empty  space. 

In  November  1942,  the  loles 
changed,  ai^d  Hitler  cooperated  in 
German  Stx^  Anny%  encitxrlfetnent 
and  annihilation.  Soviet  histories  rank 
the  battle  as  "the  Cannae  of  die  twen- 
tieth century";  as  "the  first  example  in 
llie  histor\'  of  wai  of  such  a  ]5o\verful 
enemy  grouping,  equipped  widi  the 
latest  technol  logy,  being  encircled  and 
totally  liquidated":  and  as  having  "en- 
riched the  military  art  with  a  classical 
example  of  the  modem  offensive  oper- 
ation."^^ The  einelopment  is  stated  to 
have  been  the  boviet  main  form  of 
maneuver  in  th«  Ofiex&tbmtsoildutit^ 
from  late  1942  until  the  end  of  the 
war.^*" 

ift  #ie  nsorfi'dis  from  November  1942 

to  February  I9i?>.  the  envelopment  was 
indeed  the  main  form;  the  Soviet  rec- 
ord shows  ten  major  enveloping  opera- 
lions  to  have  been  initiated  and  to  have 
been  components  of  a  second  winter 
general  oSetmve  on  the  entire  fttmt 
from  Leningrad  south  to  the  T:iinau 
Peninsula,  Had  they  been  completed 
hy  WardA  1943  m  pfaiuted,  tihe  Sctviet 
forces  in  the  center  and  the  south 
wotiM  liave  reached  the  Dnepr  River 
seven  mon^s  earlier  and  diose  in  the 
north  the  Narva  Ri\cr-Lake  Pcipus 
line  eleven  months  earlier  dian  they 
actusdU]^  <iid.  However,  oidy  tb^ee  of  tlie 
operations  \\ere  completed,  the  one  at 
Staliiagmd  and  two  cn  kfser  magiiitiide 
and  ^ecttven^  earaied  out  against 
G&rtam  Second  Army  and  Hungarian 


"'Bagramyan.  rstoriyri  vagfit,  p.1^itV0VSS.  vDl  JH, 
p.  65;  VOV  (Kmtkaya  hutriya),  p,  174- 

"Platonov.  Vtoraya  Mmnviyn  Vtymi.  p.  867;  IVOVSS, 
vol.  VI.  p.  235;  Hagramy an. htonya  miyn,  p.  479. 


512 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


Second  Army  in  lale  January  1943.  Of 
the  others,  Mars  failed;  Saturn  was 
reduced  to  providing  support  on  the 
approaches  to  the  Stalingrad  pocket; 
abd  two,  on  the  Narva  River- Lake 
Iltaen  line  and  oil  Hitnan  Penin- 
sula, did  not  materialize.  The  three 
directed  toward  Kursk,  Kharkov,  and 
the  Dnepr  bend  regained  substantial 
and  important  territory  but  also 
brought  on  a  reverse  that  restored  the 
initiative  to  the  Germans  in  the  spring 
of  1943.^^  The  victory  at  Stalingrad, 
great  as  it  was,  was  not  economical  in 
either  time  or  effort.  On  the  whole,  in 
the  1942-1943  winter  offensive,  the 
Soviet  cotnmands  did  not  demonstrate 
a  capability  to  employ  the  envelopment 
as  a  consistently' eSectivfi  ionact  of 
maneuver. 

The  Stavha  did  not  indude  a  single 
envelopment  in  its  plans  tor  the  year 
194^.  The  Soviet  MiliUir^  Encyclopedia 
ifets  hrhe  fehdrdertients  completed  be- 
tween January  1944  and  May  1945.  but 
all  of  tibose,  except  possibly  the  last, 
resulted  f^m  opportunities  that  oc- 
curred in  operations  dining  which  they 
had  not  been  planned.^"  Wlien  Zhukdv 
and  Vasilevskiy  proposed  to  open  the 
1943  summer  offensi\e  witli  envelop- 
Wients,  Stalin  told  them  he  had  had 
eaoo^  of  envelbpments;  they  were  a 
lil3^Uiyi  the  mission  was  to  drive  the 
Gerinans  off  Soviet  territory  fast.^^  In 
his  memoirs,  General  Shtemenko  states 
that  the  General  Seiff,  in  which  he  was 


"fV'AfV.  vol.  VI.  ni;:])is  'l.  11).  11. 

""Tlie  last,  rht- fill  II  c  k-inc[il  ol  Arniv  Cirtmp  (jentet 
east  of  Prague,  was  ioiii[ik-l(.-(l  ini.  11  May  194.").  four 
day.*  after  ihe  war  aj^aitur  (ifrniam  li.icl  ended. 
^enmiy:  I' iilMkli^jwIiya.  vol.  VI.  [)p,  'il .  liU-'Ki. 

"G.  K.  Zhiikov,  Voipominaniya  i  raimysiileuiya 
(Mdscou:  Izdatelami  Agtastva  Pccbati  Mov(»ti, 
1969),  p.  5 1  a. 


the  operations  chief  during  the  war, 
evaluated  the  envelopment  in  1943  and 
concluded  that  "because  of  the  time 
required,  the  complications  of  the  ma- 
neuver, and  other  considerations,  it 
was  far  from  profitable  to  encircle 
every  enemy  grouping.  "^^ 

In  the  summer  of  1943,  the  Soviet 
forces  abandoned  the  blitzkrieg  tactics 
tlicy  had  employed  in  the  previous 
winter  campaign  and  took  up  the 
"cleaving  blow"  (rassekaymhchiy  udar),  a 
less  sophisticated  and  inherently  more 
ponderous  mode  of  conducting  opera- 
tions but  one  vastly  more  reliable  in  the 
hands  of  Soviet  commands  and  troops. 
The  cleaving  blow  derived  f  rom  a  fortn 
of  combined  arms  deep  operation 
(based  on  the  German  General  Staffs 
"The  Attack  in  Positional  Warfare"  of 
1918)  developed  in  the  Soviet  Army  in 
the  early  19'^')s  and  emerged  as  the 
true  main  form  of  Soviet  World  W^  11 
operations  in  the  1943  summer  offisn^ 
sive,  the  advance  to  the  Dnepr  River.  In 
August,  six  fronts  launched  massive 
cleaving  blows,  frontal  thrusts  running 
paiallel  to  each  olher.^^  Tlie  objectives 
were  to  overwhelm  the  enemy's  de- 
fenses and  to  force  him  back  on  a 
broad  fi'onf  (o\  cr  se\  en  hundred  miles 
broad  in  tiiat  instance). 

The  eleven  and  one-half  months 
from  5  December  1941  to  19  November 
1^2  iJie  time  <tf  ded^on  on  all 
fronts  in  World  Wai  II.  On  5  De- 
cember 1941,  the  Soviet  forces  coun- 
terstttei^alai  at  Wcrnxm,  Hie  Japanese 


(Moscow  Voycnnoye  Izdatclstvo.  1981),  vol.  1,  p.  236. 

'''f)n  ihi-  i.iiinns  rmd  llicu  r<.>rm  at  this jft^f! see- 
Ziemke,  Suilmgmd  li>  Berlin,  ch.  Vlll. 


CONCLUSION 


513 


attiick  on  Pearl  Harbor  on  7  December 
and  die  German  declaration  of  war 
four  days  later  iatougfit  the  tlmteiJ 
States  into  the  \sat.  Dur  ing  the  Sllltinier 
of  1942,  die  Germans  achieved  their 
farthest  advances  in  the  Soviet  UnioM 
and  North  Africa  and  the  Japanese 
theirs  in  the  Pacific.  In  November 
1942,  tJie  British  brolee  thnougb  at  EI 

Alamein  on  the  3d;  American  and 
British  forces  landed  in  Morocco  and 
Algeria  on  the  8th;  the  Japanese  Navy 
abandoned  the  fight  for  Guadalcanal  at 
sea  on  the  I5th;  and  the  Soviet  offen- 
si*©  began  af  Sti^gfaa  tM  the  tMi. 
After  Novenilier  1942.  the  Axis  was  on 
the  defensive  and  in  recession  on  all 

However,  the  Soviet  victory  at  Sta- 
jiagrad  resulted  from  both  sides'  com- 
Hjitiittueiil  ^f'  their  inaiii  fof^efs  W  & 
S^i^lien-month  coiJtest  for  the  strate- 
gic Idiiiative.  By  cQSai^rison,  the  West- 
em  Allies  ^ehteved  th^  staceesses  at 
Guadalcanal  and  in  North  Africa  much 
more  clieaply  and  easily.  In  the  Soviet 
analysis,  ehts  disproporEoititf  s^te 
of  effort  confirms  the  Eastern  Front  as 
the  "main  and  decisive  f  ront"  in  the  war 
and  tte  deasion  there  as  having  afeo 
"caused  German \  and  its  allies  to  go 
ov^  to  the  del  en  si  ve  in  all  of  the  World 
II theaters."  In  the  Soviet  view,  also, 
the  Western  Allies  hrst  roused  them- 
sdves  to  genuine  participation  in  die 
war  "after  tt  ^mamie  apparent  [in  the 
winter  1942- 19431  that  the  Soviet 
Uniofl  was  in  the  position  to  liberate  die 
peoples  of  Europe  the  fascia  y<ske 
by  means  of  its  own  strength."''^ 

But  the  Soviet  Union  did  not  Hberate 
Europe  by  its  own  strength,  and  it  re- 
mained a  bystander  to  the  PadfiG  war 


"VVMV,  vol,  VI,  pp.  318,  504. 


until  Japan's  defeat  was  assured.  Tlie 
Soviet  Union  did  not  singie-handedly 
©pefi  the  itad  t&  viet^rf  m  W©rid  '^fer 

II  by  the  decision  o\  cr  (icrmany  in  the 
East.  From  December  1941  on,  the 
tJiMted  W&%ES  Cawied  the  burden  of  a 
two-front  war  with  Germany  and  Japan 
and  assumed  the  tremendous  task  of 
buildj}^  stiffid^iit  men^  lit  grdtmd^ 
sea,  and  air  forces  to  impose  a  second 
front  on  Germany.  The  roads  that 
began  at  Staliiigr^  fbr  the  Soviet 
forces  and  in  North  Africa  for  those  of 
the  Western  Allies  converged  in  the 
heart  of  Germany,  After  the  U.S.  Navy 
had  foiccd  ihe  Japanese  Navy  to  with- 
draw f  rom  die  waters  around  Guadal- 
canal, the  "rMfeat  of  the  Japanese 
armed  forces  would  not  until  Ja« 
pan  surrendered."'^ 

Ute  period  of  the  decision  over  Ger- 
many as  it  is  construed  in  this  volume 
does  not  figure  in  die  Soviet  periodiza- 
tion  of  the  Soviet-German  war,  the 
Great  Patriotic  War.  It  falls  within  two 
larger  periods:  that  of  the  strategic  der 
Ifertsive  (22  June  1941  to  19  November 
1942),  in  which  the  Mosrow  coun- 
teroffensive  begiin  on  3  December 
1941  produced  a  '^dtcal  etenge"  (pii- 
vnro!)  in  the  war,  and  that  of  the  "radical 
turn"  (perelum)  (19  November  1942  to 
December  1943),  w  liirh  ihe  encijdte- 
ment  at  Stalingrad  initiated.  This  treat- 
ment enables  Soviet  war  history  to  do 
justice  to  the  full  nnfoldhig  oi  Soviet 
military  power  h\  bringing  the  battle  of 
Kursk  in  July  1943  (a  German  offen- 
smashed  at  the  start)  and  the  sum- 
mer orieiisive  begun  in  August  1943 
(prooi  that  the  Soviet  f  orces  did  not 


"Paul  S.  HuW,  A  BatUe  History  the  Impmal  Japarme 
Navy  (1941-194^)  (Annapolis:  fimd  Itisrirutc  Press, 
1978),  p,  247. 


514 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


need  the  help  of  "General  Wnter")  into 
the  period  of  the  radical  turn  while  also 
preserving  the  stature  of  the  two  great 
turning  points,  at  Stalingrad  and  Mos- 
cow, without  slighting  father  of  them. 
On  the  other  hatud,  non-Soviet  waf  his- 
tory is  concerned  with  German  failure 
as  well  as  Soviet  success  and  with  the 
circumstances  of  and  reasons  for  botfo. 
These  concerns  have  detenaittis^  the 
time  span  nf  this  voluine. 

During  ilie  intetval-  Off&teA  in  this 
volume,  the  courses  of  the  war  and  of 
world  history  turned.  At  Moscow,  on  5 
December  1941,  the  Soviet  reserves  and 
the  weather  transformed  what  would 
in  any  event  have  been  a  most  un- 
satisfactory ending  to  the  German  1941 
campaign  into  a  disaster.  The  United 
States'  entry  into  die  war  made  Ger- 
many%  defeat  inescapable  if  the  Ger- 
man forces  could  not  overcome  the 
Soviet  Union  before  the  American 
power  came  into  play,  and  that  they 
could  not  have  done  zifter  5  December 
1941.  Germany  could  not  have  done 
more  thereafter  than  to  keep  the  stra- 
tegic initiative  oiU  of  Soviet  hands,  and 
it  failed  at  that  on  19  November  1942. 
Hie  battles  at  Moscow  and  Stalingrad 
were  indeed  the  radical  pfwnmt  and  the 
radical  perekm  of  the  war  in  tlie  East. 
Tiaeifirst  terminated  Germany's  bid  for 
warM jpovvcr:  ilic  second  pui  liie  Soviet 
Uiii^  on  the  road  to  a  full  share  in  the 
victory  and  to  superpower  status. 

Tlu'  ^ovci  iiing  factors  in  the  Soviet 
decision  over  Germany  were  the  Soviet 
manpower,  industri»i  base,  and  ter-- 
riioi  y.  t'.crinan  strategies  designed  pri- 
marily to  destroy  Soviet  manpower 
proved  inadequate  in  1941  and  abor- 
tive in  1912.  Des]>iit'  tlie  Germans'  best 
efforts,  the  Soviet  sirengtli  at  tbe  front 
grew  from  2.9  mittictfi  men  in  June 


1941  to  4.2  million  in  December  1'.I41 
and  then  to  5.5  milhon  in  Jime  1942 
and  to  6.1  million  in  November  1942.** 
In  Mardl  1943,  Hider  still  rated  the  So- 
viet UnionU  running  out  of  txmKpovm: 
*s6mBt  &F  later*  as  his  best  stratei^G 
proj|Mi!S*in  the  war  but  concedled  &at 
he  no  longer  counted  on  it.^' 

The  Soviet  industrial  base  figured  in 
the  December  1940  plan  for  Operation 
Bar^ARQSSA  primarily  as  a  German  war 
aim.  Had  Barbakossa  beeiiterraiHSfted 
as  planned  on  the  Arkhangelsk -Volga 
River  line,  it  would  have  brought  the 
central  (Moscow- Upper  Volga)  and 
southern  (Doiiels  Basin)  industrial  re- 
gions, which  then  accoimted  for  over 
80  percent  of  productive  capacity,  un- 
der German  (oturol.  Hiiler's  derision 
in  August  1941  to  shift  the  main  effort 
from  the  center  to  the  south  and 
thereby  make  the  industrial  base  also  a 
strategic  objective  closed  down  the 
southern  region,  wftidb  accounted  for 
over  half  of  Soviet  output  particularly 
of  coal  and  steel,  but  in  the  subsequent 
course  of  events  put  Moscow  and  the 
central  region  out  of  German  reach. ^'^ 
The  drastic  declines  in  Soviet  coal  (63 
percent)  and  steel  (58  percent)  prodtrfe- 
tion  in  the  last  quarter  of  1941  resuhcd 
from  the  disruption  and  partial  loss  of 
ibe  soudlem  indtisttial  r^gion.  Bui  the 
German  reverse  at  Moscow  in  De- 
cember 1941  left  the  Soviet  Union  in 
possession  of  the  central  region,  and  it 
and  two  oilict  regions,  the  Urals  and 
the  western  Siberian  (Kuznets  Basin), 


^"IVMV,  vol.  V.  p.  143  and  vol.  VI,  p.  Hfi.  table 4. 

^'Jacobseil,  Pir  zweitf  WMrieg.  p.  384. 

"The  estimates  ol  the  relative  impoi  tance  of  the 
central  and  souiliern  regions  arc  based  on  Theodore 
Shabad.Giograf^yi^  theSmiet  Unio?i:  A  Regumal Survey 
(New  York:  C^umtna  Univmitjr  Press,  19B1K  pa.  79, 
107. 


CONCLUSION 


515 


sufficed  to  decide  the  contest  for  the 
industrial  base  in  the  Soviet  favor.'" 

The  German  1942  offensive  totally 
crippled  the  souiJieni  industrial  region 
and  caused  a  drastic  decline  in  oil  out- 
put in  the  Caucasus.  The  following 
table  show  s  that  coal,  steel,  and  oil  pro- 
duction, in  millions  of  tons,  did  not  re- 
cover during  the  war:** 


Cunimodity 

1940  1941 

l'>12 

1943  1944 

1945 

Cffld   .  .  .  .  . 

165.9  151.4 

75.5 

93.1  121.5 

149.3 

Sted  

1B.3  17.9 

8.1 

8.5  10.9 

12.3 

OU   

31.1  33.0 

22.0 

IS.O  18.3 

19.4 

German  ou 

tput,  also  in 

millions  of 

tons,  during 

roughly 

the 

was  as  follow 

Coiiiiaadtt]f 

15)41 

1942 

1943 

1  !)44 

Coal     ,  .  . 

,  .  246.0 

258.0 

269.0  281.0 

32.1 

34.6 

OU   

.  .  4.8 

5.6 

6.6 

Nt'vcrihcles.s,  in  1942,  Soviet  output  al- 
ready liad  surpassed  thai  of  Germany 
in  tanks  and  other  armored  vehicles 
(24.400  Soviet;  4.800  German),  in  air- 
crait  (21,700  Soviet;  14,700  German  J, 
in  itif^try  tifles  atnl  (4  mil- 

lion Soviet;  1.4  million  German),  and  in 
artillery  (for  which  comparable  Hgm  cs 
are  not  available).  Soviet  accounts  al- 
irihutc  this  remarkable  leal  eniirely  lo 
the  Communist  systems  ability  to  over- 
cemie adverse  circumstances,  but  it  also 
appears  likely  that  stocks  of  strategic 
materials,  particularly  steel  and  odier 
metals,  had  been  amimulated  before 


The  iliH islon  cnili!  |)T(il>,il>ly  be aitribuied equa]h> 
ucit  (11  tlic  livc  vr.ti  plans  (<jr  iiidusthalizalion,  whlot 
during  the  Ul30s  luid  p]<>iiH)tt.'d  industrial  develop- 
ment in  the  easlt-m  rt-gitms  (for  the  purpose  of 
puciing  the  plants  out  of  bniubiDg  range). 
"/TOV.  vol.  XII,  p.  161. 

"Ueiitsches  Insiiiut  flier  Wiracbafbfitrscfaung, 

Dtutsrht  Industtit  im  Knege.  p.  52. 


the  war.'*^  Certainly,  the  3  million  tons 
of  lend-lease  supplies  dehvered  by  30 
June  1943  and  the  Western  Allies'  com- 
mitment to  provide  much  greater 
quantities  thereaf  ter  (all  told  17.5  mil- 
lion long  tons,  16.4  million  of  them 
from  the  I'liiied  Slates)  helped  the 
Soviet  Union  to  devote  its  own  re- 
sources to  weapons  and  ammunition 
production,''*^ 

The  vastness  of  its  territory  had  been 
the  most  vexing  strategic  problem  the 
Rus.sian  Empire  presented  to  a  would- 
be  conqueror.  In  June  1811,  a  year  be- 
fore Napoleon  I  made  his  attempt, 
Tsai  Alcxande!  put  it  in  classic  foi  ni  to 
Generail  Armand  de  CatUaincourt,  the 
French  ambassadof  m  St.  Petersburg: 
"We  have  |}Ien!v  sp;Ke,"  Alexander 
said,  "...  which  means  that  we  need 
never  accept  a  dictated  peace,  no  mat- 
ter \\  hat  reverses  we  may  suffcr."^^ 
During  the  civil  war  of  1918-1921  and 
before  that  contest  for  the  territory 
of  the  empire  was  resolved,  .Stalin 
propounds  the  principle  of  "the  sta- 
bility of  the  rear."  In  it  he 'maintained 
that  the  Conmnmisi  military  success 
in  the  war  then  going  on  or  in  any 
otiber  required  possession  of  the  Rus- 
sian heartland,  the  broad  hell  of  ethnic 
Russian  territory  lying  roughly  be* 
iween  Moscow  and  L^iin^jrsul'  in  the 
wesi  and  l  eadiing  eastward  into  the 
Ural  Mountains.  '"' 


"/l.VIV,  vol.  XII.  pp.  KiMW;  Zakliaiuv.  VI  hi.  p. 
4571':  l)eut5clws  Instlitit  fufi  Wtmchaft<il<iistlnmg, 
Deuhi lie  InAuilrif  im  Kiu  ff.  pp.  71.  IH3. 

*^]tm£^.Ri!itds  lit  Hussia.  app.  A,  table  1. 

■'■'Armand  dt-  ( :.iiilaiiu~ourt,  Mcmoires  dii  gi'neml  dt 
Cmitaimnurt  (Piiiis:  l.ibricrif  Plon,  1933),  vol.  1,  p. 
292. 

"Stalin  defined  (he  si.ible  rear  as  being  'of  prime 
importance  to  die  front,  because  it  is  from  ihc  re.-jr, 
and  die  rear  alone,  dial  the  front  obtains  not  (miy  all 
kinds     supplies,  but  also  iu  manpower,  seniimenis, 

iCanlmued) 


516 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


Alexander'^  ptiucipit  of  sp^e 

(vvliic  li,  of  course,  was  so  generally  ac- 
cepifd  c-vcn  in  his  time  as  to  hardly 
need  to  be  stated)  and  Stalin's  ol  the 
stabihty  f»f  the  rear  dominated  the 
strategies  of  both  sides  in  the  struggle 
for  the  iieamm.  TIte  Soviet  I^det^hip 
i2sed  space  as  a  last  resort,  suit  as  tlie 
weapon  of  choice  AleJtander  had 
seemed  to  imply  it  was.  It  was  ready  on 
22  June  1941  to  fight  a  war  of  attrition 
but  not  one  deep  in  its  own  territory; 
nevertheless,  it  did  that  —  involuntarily 
in  1941  and  deliberately  from  6  July  to 
19  November  1942.  On  the  other  hand, 
it  applied  the  principle  ol  the  stability 
of  the  rear,  in  the  terms  Stalin  had 
stated  it  two  decades  earlier,  as  soon  as 
fee  fikc^  mxffse  of  the  war  became 
app£u«nt.  Brom  easly  July  1941  to  19 


(Contimitii 

nod  idewi "  Dudog  Wbi  ld  War  II,  he  established  the 
siabUi^  of  ihe  fcar  as  the  rhiei'  oi'  several  so-called 
permaneot  operating  factors  in  war.  Stalin, 
SocAinmiya,  voL  IV.  pp.  284-88.  K.  E. 

VonMhUov,  StaHn  and  the  Armed  Forces  of  the  USSR 
momnn  ¥os^^  Languages  Publishiiig  House, 


November  1942  (and  for  at  least  some 

weeks  after),  the  Soviet  main  effort  was 
always  in  the  centei,  on  die  approaclies 
to  Moscow,  the  citadel  of  thehedr^and. 
The  German  blitzkrieg,  I  he  most  effec- 
tive fcjrm  of  the  war  oi  annihilaiion  yet 
devised,  had  to  come  to  grips  with  the 
Soviet  main  forces.  It  did  not  do  that. 
Hitler  had  di\enefl  the  main  effort 
from  the  centei  to  tlie  south  in  August 
1941  and  again  in  the  summer  of  1942, 
thereby,  in  the  first  instance,  dissipat- 
ing his  best  chance  and,  in  the  second, 
his  last  chain c  of  annihilating  (he  mass 
of  die  Soviet  Ai  my,  wliicfi  hati  been  die 
stated  fit^my  objective  in  the  original 
Barb.AROSS.^  directive  of  December 
1940  and  all  those  issued  iliereafter. 
VVliellier  the  outcome  toiild  have  been 
ililferent  if  the  diversions  had  not  been 
made  is  now  at  best  a  nKjot  t|uestion. 
However,  their  having  been  made 
could  ha\e  had  no  other  result  than  to 
siibstantiale  a  predittion  Alexander 
had  based  on  the  principle  of  space, 
wtiich  was  that  under  its  conditions,  the 
woidtl-be  c<jnqueror  was  likely  in  the 
end  to  have  to  m0&^  tiie  |@nns  of  hit 
intended  victim. 


Appendix  A 

lable  of  Equivalent  Banks 


German  Soviet  tf  S,  Equiualeni 

Rdcfasmarscliall*  None  None 

GeneralfeldoiarschaU  Marshal  Snvetskogo  Soyuza      General  of  the  Army 

None  Glavnyi  Marshal  None 

None  Marshal  None 

Generalobem  General  Armii  Qg^^Oit. 

General  der  InfanteiMSi  Gi^iix^  JNQbmiflilii  S^m^^k^mtG^sgal 

der  Ai-ti!lt-rif.  der 

Idieiri  i.  .md  so  iurth 

Generalli  uiii  int  General  Leytenant  MajorGeneral 

Generalmajor  General  Mayor  Brigadier  General 


'Created  for  Heramna  Gociitig  in  July  1940  aod  tidd  oatfhfViiUf 


Appendix  B 

Comparative  Sizes  of  Major  Commands, 
November  1941  to  January  194S 


GeTTrutn 

1.  Army  Ciroiips 

On  tlie  Eastern  Front  4  to  5  plus  the 
Twentieth  Mountain  Anny  and 
fkinish  Army  to  Septai^ier  I9M 

%.  Annies 

2  tD4inananQy  group 

3.  Qirps  (including  Panzer  Corps) 

SttQ  7  m  an  mmf 

4.  Divisifnis 

2  to  7  ill  a  corps 

AtXTHORIZED  SntENCTHS,  DIVISttMS 


Panzer  Division  14,000 
(103  to  IS5  tanlcs)  to 

17,000 

Motorized  Divi^oa  14,000 
tanks) 

Infantry  Division,  9  battalions  I5,()U0 

Iniantn  Di\ision.  6  baltalioiis  12,700 

Artillery  Division  3,380 
(llSgmis) 


Smriei 

1.  FniTiti  tSimet  army  groups) 


2.  Armies 

3  lo  9  in  Afiimt.  Prbbaliki  avra^e 

5  to  7 

3.  Rifle  Corps 

Disbanded  August  1941,  reactivEded 
lace  1942  with  3  to  9  i^daotis 

4.  Divisions 

2  to  3  in  a  corps 

At)tHORIZEOSTRl'  M  ri  ls  ARMORED  CORPS 

AND  DIVISIONS 


Tank  Corps  ( 189  tanks)  1 0,500 

Met^anized  Coi|»  16,000 

(186  tanks) 

Ri(K  Division  g,S75 

Giiatds  Rjfir  Division  10.585 

Artillery  Division  6,530 
(210  guns) 


Note  on  Sources 


/ 

When  the  Center  of  Military  History 
volumes  on  World  War  II  in  the  Soviet 
Union  were  planned  in  tiie  late  1950s, 
the  German  military  records  then  in 
the  custody  of  the  National  Archives 
were  almost  the  only  primary  sources 
available.  Although  a  vast  quantity  of 
Soviet  literature  having  to  do  with  tlie 
war  has  since  been  published,  the  ac- 
cessible Soviet  documentary  evidence 
remains  sparse.  Consequently,  the  Ger- 
man records  are  still  the  source  closest 
to  the  events.  They  are  a  vast  collection 
even  ;ifiei  li;i\insj;  ht.'en  selectivelv  mi- 
crotilmed  under  tiie  auspices  of  the 
doraBMtteeibr  the  Study  of  War  Docu- 
ments of  the  American  Historical  Asso- 
ciation, Although  the  origmals,  from 
whidi  this  valiultiie  twas  written,  have 
been  returned  to  Germany,  the  docu- 
ments dted.  can,  for  the  most  part,  be 
located  by  Ullit  or  agency  and  ftjktef 
number  thiXRIgh  the  Guides  to  German 
Records  Microfilmed  at  AUsxan^ria,  Va. 
(19^410 1977)  prepared  and  published 
by  the  National  Archives  and  Records 
Administration,  Washington,  O.C. 
20408-0001. 

In  the  German  military  records, 
those  of  the  Armed  Forces  High  Com- 
mand (OKW),  Army  High  C^tnand 
(OKH),  and  army  field  commands 
(army  groups,  armies,  corps,  and  divi- 
sions)  are  the  most  useful.  Relatively 
few  German  Air  Force  operational  rec- 
Qtds  survived  the  w^r.  The  best  general 
suixtnaarjr  qF  ^0$e  that  diidt  ii  British 


Air  Ministry  Pamphlci  248,  Jlise 
and  Fall  oj  the  German  Air  Force  (London: 
His  Majesty's  Stationery  Office,  1948). 
Hermann  Ploclier,  The  German  Air  Force 
Verstis  Russia,  1942,  USAF  Historical 
Studies  No.  154,  published  by  the  U.S. 
Air  Force  Historical  Division,  treats  the 
1942  operations  in  general  from  an  air 
force  point  of  view.  The  German  Navy 
and  the  High  Command  of  I  he  Navy 
(OKM)  were  only  peripherally  in- 
volved i»  the  war  on  me  ESstfem  Wmat. 
The  OKM,  however,  received  and  pre- 
served a  complete  set  ol  strategic  direc- 
tives, the  OKM,  Weisungen  OKW 
(Fuehrer),  1939—45.  which  are  dted  in 
die  text  as  German  High  Level  Direc- 
tives, CMH  files,  and  nave  been  pub- 
lished with  a  few  variations  and 
omissions  as  Walter  Hubatsch,  ed.. 
Hirer's  Weisungen  Fuer  die  Krie^u^ 
rung  1939-1945  (Frankfurt:  Bernard 
und  Graefe,  1962). 

AMiougfa  the  OKW  iKXupied  the 
next  to  highest  plaCe  iii  the  German 
chain  oi  command  aitdacted  as  Hitlers 
pR?sonal  staff,  ks  portion  with  regard 
tf)  the  Eastern  Front  was  somewhat 
anomalous  because  the  East  (Finland 
excepted)  wasr  die»igiiated  ^  an  fMM 
theater  and  because  by  194 1  rival i\ 
between  die  OKW  and  the  OKH  had 
ripi^flisd  into  outright  hostility.  Tiie 
con^'ersion  of  the  Army  General  Staff 
into  a  second  personal  staff  after  Hider 
became  commander  in  chief,  army,  in 
Deccm[)er  1941,  added  a  complication. 
Nevertheless,  until  late  September 
IMS  when  it  was%|^passed  almost  com-r 


520 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


pictrh,  lUv  OKW  received  detailed 
daily  reports  on  the  operatiaQs  in  the 
East,  and  ^  OKW  Operatiom  Staff 
had  a  significant  hand  in  strategic  deci- 
sion making  for  the  Eastern  Front.  A 
convenient  compilation  of  OKW  mate- 
rials is  Petcv  Ki  list  Scliramm.  gt-n.  ed., 
Kriegstagebuch  4ei  Oberhommandos  der 
Weh  rmacht  (Vfkhtmach  tfuehrungsslab) 
(Frankfurti  Bernard  8c  Graefe, 
1961-1965).  Volume  1,  1940-1941 
(Hans^Adolf  Jacobsen,  ed.),  and  Vol- 
ume 1 1 , 1942  (Andreas  Hi!lgrubei .  ed . ), 
contain  the  so-called  QKW  War  Uiary 
for  1941  and  1942  "With  cbmtnentary  by 
ilic  former  deputy  chief  of  the  OKW^ 
Operations  Staff,  General  Walter  War- 
]G^0nt,  arai  TelatiM'  documents.  The 
most  useful  OKW  doeumcnt  is  the 
OKW,  WFST.  KricgsgeschichUkhen  Ab- 
teilung,  Kriegstagdmdi,  the  war  diary 
fragment  for  the  months  April 
through  June  1942  by  Colonel  Walter 
Schem,  Hider^  cffidaJ  war  historian, 
that  became  Intet  national  Military  Tri- 
bunal Document  1809  PS.  It  is  supple- 
pitted  by  Helmuth  Greiner's  A«/z«j^ 
nungen  ueber  die  Lagnnrtmege  und  Bp- 
^reckimgea  im  fuehrerhauptquartier  vom 
12.  Augu^  1942  hk  mm  17.  Mam:  1943 
(Greiticr  Diar^  Kiitr-.,  Historical  Division, 
United  States  Army,  Europe,  MS  # 
C-065a).  A  descrii>ion  d£  die  OEW 
role  ill  the  conduct  of  the  war  by  an 
eyewitness  who  was  also  a  professional 
historian  is  in  Hetiaudt  Clreinet^  Dm 
Oberstr  mhrmarhtfuehrun^,  1^^9-1943 
(Wiesbaden;  Limes  Verlag*  10^1). 

the  OKH  was  the  central  staff  for 
the  conduct  of  the  war  against  the 
Soviet  Union,  and  after  September 
I94t  theEtsiierii  KY»nt^^itii€Kdusive 
anfi  sole  responfiMlly,  Hie  OKH  rec- 
ords that  havt  «timved,  ^oiugh  sub- 
stantial in  btinc,  are  lftagtiiiotttajry>  The 


two  most  valuable  arc  the  Haidrr  Diary 
and  theXa^f  Osi  situation  maps.  The 
ffaider  Diary,  published  as  Franz 
Haider.  Kritf^stagchiK h  (Stuttgart:  W, 
Kohlhainmei,  1964),  is  the  personal 
diary  kept  by  the  chief  of  tfie  General 
Staff  until  September  1942.  It  is  sup- 
plemented by  Gmerai  Haider's  Daily 
Notes  (Historical  Division,  United  States 
Army,  Europe.  EAP  21-g- 16/4/0  file). 
The  Lage  Ost  maps,  printed  daily  by  the 
Operations  Branch,  OKH,  at  a  iscal^of 
1:1,000.0()(K  are  tlie  source,  with  cor- 
rections and  additions  to  die  Soviet 
dispositions,  for  the  maps  that  appear 
in  this  vohime. 

Among  the  OKH  records,  those  of 
die  most  important  branch.  Opera- 
tions, are  the  least  complete,  f)ut,  for- 
tunately, Operations  Branch  docu- 
joeats  and  ^omiwnnications  of  other 
Isn^is  frequently  found  theii  way  into 
the  files  of  other  branches  and  of  die 
field  commands.  The  Organization 
Branch  records  still  in  existence  give 
information  concerning  German 
Strengths,  losses,  replacements,  man- 
power resources,  and  changes  in  the 
army  organizational  structure.  A 
bratich  war  disfffOlCft,  iSin^Mff,  ^g. 
Abt.,  Krii'gsltigf'hiirh)  also  ex i sis  for  the 
months  January  dirough  June  1942. 
The  most  nearly  continuotts  of  the 
C^KH  files  are  those  of  Foreign  Armies 
East  {Fremde  Heere  Ost),  the  Eastern 
Intelligence  Branch.  The  branch 
turned  out  a  vast  number  of  intel- 
ligence estimates  dealing  with  individ- 
tial  Sectors  and  with  the  whole  Eastern 
Front.  It  also  issued  frequent  long- and 
short-range  summaries  and  from  time 
to  time  made  comparisons  df  Gemtsin 
and  Soviet  strengths.  Enoiif^h  of  those 
have  survived  to  form  a  complete  intel- 
ligoice  picture  for^e  E^ti^rn  Si'om  as 


NOTE  ON  SOURCES 


521 


it  appeared  to  tlu-  {iennans.  Unfor* 
lunaieiy,  the  Euslcrn  intelligence 
Branch  much  oi  the  time  was  more 
diligent  than  perspicacious.  The  most 
i;intali?ing  of  the  OKH  records  is  » 
iJiij  (In  llf't'rfsiuestung  und  Btjelilsimbfr 
des  ErsatzJieeres,  Der  Chef  des  States.  Ta- 
gebuch,  the  intermittent  diary  ol  the 
chief  of  staff  to  the  powerful  ciiiel  of 
Army  Armainent  and  the  lt)eplaceiiietit 
Arniv. 

for  the  liistory  of  tlie  war  in  tlie 
Soviet  Union  the  army  group  records 
are  prime  sourrcs.  llie  army  group 
headquarters  \w\v  \\iv  direct  link  be- 
tween the  German  High  Command 
(Hitler  and  the  OKH)  and  the  front 
and  were,  within  the  limits  Hider  im- 
posed, themselves  originating  agencies 
for  operational  decisions.  In  accor- 
dance with  German  practice,  die  army 
group  and  other  field  commands  each 
kept  an  la  ("operations")  war  diar)'  in 
which  were  recorded  the  incoming  and 
outgoing  orders,  summaries  of  reports 
and  conferences,  situation  estimates, 
the  progress  of  operations,  weather, 
temperatm  e.  and  other  items  of  opei  a- 
tional  or  historical  significance.  The 
orders,  reports,  and  other  papers  were 
filed  separately  in  annexes  (Aithigm) 
tiiat  were  the  central  records  of  die 
field  commands.  At  the  army  group 
level,  the  war  diaries  were  generally 
kept  with  a  conscious  eye  to  history, 
sometimes  by  trained  Iiistorians;  and 
fretjuendy  the  commanding  generals 
and  chiefs  of  staff  confided  matters  to 
the  diary  that  were  not  recorded 
elsewhere  or  transmitted  outside  the 
headquaiters.  The  army  group  records 
also  provide  operational  plans,  after- 
action reports,  transcripts  of  telephone 
and  other  conferences,  message  files, 
and  ^es  of  Ckefmehm — top  secret  doc- 


Timents  that  were  not  entered  in  the 

war  diaries. 

For  the  period  this  volume  covers, 
the  la  war  diaries  of  Army  Group 
Nortii  and  Army  Group  A  are  com- 
plete. The  Army  Group  Aiilagni  are 
dl^^g;  those  for  Army  Group  North 
are  partial.  Only  the  December  1941 
segment  of  the  la  war  diary  and  scat- 
tered Anlagm  survive  from  Army 
Group  Cenier,  and  from  Army  Group 
South  (B),  only  a  very  Anlagm.  For 
the  months  January  to  July  1942,  Ge- 
neralfeldmarschall  Fedor  von  Bock's 
Kriegstagebuch,  Osten  (the  Bock  Dinry)  is 
an  adequate  and  in  some  respects  supe- 
rior substitute  for  the  missing  Army 
Group  South  la  war  diary.  Wilhelm 
Ritter  von  Leeb's  Tagebuchomf&eiek^ 
mtngen  und  Ijigi'hiitii/'ihingfn  aiis  zv'fi 
Weltkrtegen  (Siiitiyart:  Deutsclie  V'er- 
lags-Anstalt,  1976)  supplements  the 
Army  Group  North  la  war  diary  for 
the  period  to  February  1942. 

The  army  records,  which  are 
organized  in  the  same  manner  as  those 
of  the  army  groups,  provide  tactical 
information  ^(mipensate  in  the 
main  for  the  missing  parts  of  the  army 
group  collections.  While  the  army  com- 
mands did  not  have  as  continuous  ac- 
cess to  the  top  or  as  broad  a  view  as  the 
army  groups  had,  they  were  a  great 
deal  closer  to  the  batdcfield;  GO»- 
sequenUy,  the  actual  conduct  of  opera- 
tions, even  in  die  period  of  Hitler^ 
ascendancy,  was  determined  much  of 
the  time  by  the  interacdon  of  an  army 
with  the  army  group  and  the  OKH 
(Hider),  Tlic  army  records  are  siiffi- 
ciendy  complete  to  give  reasonable 
and,  in  the  majority  of  cases,  detailed 
ctnerage  of  all  important  operations. 

Opera  dons  and  aspects  of  command 
at  various  levels  are  dealt  with  from  the 


522 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


points  eif  tie#  of  participants  in  Wkltei* 
Warlimont,  Inside  Hitler's  HcadtpitirUns 
(New  York:  Praeger,  1961);  Walter 
@o^^y  e«l.i  tlie  Mmom  ^^kM  Mm- 
iSs«^' plew  York:  Stein  and  Day, 
1S66J;  EricM  von  Manstein,  Loji  Yictoriei 
(Chicago:  Henry  Regneryr  1958); 
Heinz  Guderian,  Pamer  Leader  (New 
York:  Dy^tton.  lW^)l  ml^  a  biography 

York:  The  Citad4|%ii% 
ter  GoerUtz.  F.  MeMentibtoj  &mmm 
Generals  of  Wtrld  War  II  (NoriSiait, 
Okla.:  University  of  Oklahcwm  Jress, 
1977)  and  Otto  E.  Moll,  Die  dmtschen 
Generalfeldmarschaeile,  1939-1945 
(Rastatt/Baden:  Erich  Pabel.  1961) 
provide  general  biographical  informa- 
tion and  assessments. 

Some  aspects  of  tlie  German  conduct 
of  the  war  in  the  Soviet  Union  that 
have  been  regarded  as  peripheral  to 
this  volume  have  been  given  extensive 
treatment  elsewhere:  occupation  pohcy 
and  practice  in  Alessmder  Dallin,  Ger- 
man R\df  in  Rvssia,  1941-1945  (New 
York;  St.  Martins  Press,  1957);  the 
mass  murder  of  Soviet  Jews  in  Raul 
Hilberg,  The  Di'stritrtion  nf  the  European 
Jews  (Chicago:  Quadrangle  Books, 
1961):  and  the  Wcgen  SS  in  George  H. 
Stein,  The  Waffen  SS  (Ithaca,  N.Y.:  Cor- 
nell University  Press,  1966);  Charles  W. 
Sydnor,  Jr.,  Soldiers  of  Destruction 
(Princeton,  NJ.:  Princeton  University 
Press,  1977);  and  James  J.  Weingartner, 
BMer's  Guard  (CarIx)|KMe,  IE:  South- 
&m  Illinois  University  I*ress,  19*74). 

n 

Except  for  scattered  captured  docu- 
ments, interrogations,  and  analyse 
v^hich  filtered  through  the  German 
wartime  intelligence  agencies,  the  only 


-materials  available  fbf  tJie  study  of  the 
Soviet  side  ot  the  waT  aie  tliose  that 
have  been  processed  by  the  Soviet  pub- 
lailiiiBg  m^iiBery.  They  areindispeais**' 
able  because  there  are  virtually  no 
others,  but  they  pose  problems,  some- 
times of  credifeillty,  more  often  f£  ex- 
egesis. The  approv  ed  Soviet  pictin  e  of 
the  war  is  not  false,  but  it  is  always 
cottlftslled,  c^eft  co«[t*%ed,  and,  Si 
spite  of  its  earnestness  and  bulk,  In 
some  respects  gives  an  impressioti  of 
heififg  hiitefical  tt^mpe  fm&.  A  mtOr 
prehensive  overview  and  an  expert 
analysis  of  the  Soviet  World  War  11 
Iterature  are  available  in  Michael  Par^ 
rish,  The  USSR  in  World  War  11:  An 
Annotated  Biblixtgiaphy  of  Books  Pvblished 
in  the  Soviet  Unim  1945-1975  WiA  Ad- 
denda for  the  Years  1975-1980  (New  York: 
Garland  Publishing,  1981). 

The  Great  Patriotic  War  is,  next  to 
the  Bolshevik  Revoludon,  the  most  im- 
portant event  in  the  history  of  the 
Soviet  state.  As  sa^  it  1ms  rei^£fied  asi 
immediacy  for  the  Soviet  government, 
military  forces,  and  society  that  has 
long  ago  faded  among  tMe  oQifer  pa*- 
ticipants  in  World  War  II.  Con- 
sequently, in  die  Soviet  ofhcial  view,  the 
nM  JqM  Mstmy  or  iiosialg^  it  is 
a  matter  of  present  consequence  with 
implicadons  for  die  future.  Marshal  A, 
A.  Grechkot  in  IJte  Armed  Forces  cf  the 
Soviet  State  (Washington,  D.C.:  GPO. 
1977;  Moscow:  Voyennoye  Izdatelstvo, 
1975),  ranks  the  lutown  lessons  of  tifie 
war  and  those  stiU  to  be  discovered 
equally  with  new  technology  and  mih- 
t^fy  wtj^tf  as  guidance  for  the  Soviet 
armed  jfesces  in  die  1970s  and  1980s. 
The  S^t^iel  concern,  therefore,  goes 
l!ifg^@l^  and  analysis  and 

extmdi-l!0|}iriertfecting  much  that  is  con- 
sidered Stfll  to  he  security  informauon 


NOTE  ON  SOURCES 


523 


and  to  translating  the  war  and  its 
lessons  into  currently  meaninsjful 
terms.  As  a  result,  the  Soviet  literature 
On  ^e  war  has  emerg^.ui0<'@neiitally^ 
accumulating  substance  at  tiirtes  ver\ 
slowly,  at  times  in  bursts,  always  stop- 
pm§  short  of  com|dete  disdq$iiri^  jH^ 
ways  subject  to  rewion  in  substance  as 
well  as  in  interpretation. 

AlthougiT  the  Soviet  Army's  XMteef 
torate  of  Military  History  had  been  at 
work  under  Boris  Shaposhnikov,  the 
former  chief  of  the  Army  General 
Staff,  since  late  1942,  war  history  did 
not  begin  to  appear  in  the  Soviet  Union 
in  opeti  foMaiaitil  more  than  a  decade 
after  the  war  ended.  As  long  as  Stalin 
lived,  problems  of  security  and  credit 
(and  blame)  prevented  release  of  any- 
thintr  beyond  panegyrics  to  Stalin, 
Ijlasis  against  former  allies  and  en- 
emies, and  compilations  of  the  wartime 
TASS  communiques.  One  exception 
was  the  partisan  aspect  of  the  war, 
about  which  several  substantial  books 
appeared,  notably  P.  Vershigora's 
s  cfmtoi  sovestyu  (Moscow:  Sovetskiy 
Pisatel,  1951).  Nikita  Khrushchev 
launched  the  systematic  Soviet  study  of 
World  War  11  in  his  speech  to  the 
Twentieth  Parly  Congress  in  1956.  He 
announced  then  tliat  he  had  ordered  a 
comprehensive  history  of  the  Great  Pa- 
uiotic  War  to  be  written,  and  during 
the  hours-long  speech  he  made  a  series 
of  revelations  about  the  conduct  of  the 
war  that  by  themselves  constituted  a 
maior  act  of  revisionism. 

while  the  big  work  was  being  written 
a  number  of  single-volume  histories 
were  put  into  print  to  preview  it  and 
apparendy  to  establish  parameters  of 
approach  and  treatment.  The  fitsi  of 
these  was  Vazneyshye  opera  tsiy  Velihoy 
Oi^estvmnoy  \byny  (Moscow:  Voyen- 


noye  I/datelstvo,  1956)  edited  by  Col.  P 
A.  Zliiliit.  As  a  collection  of  battle  stud- 
ies ratht  J  than  a  continuous  picture  of 
military  infallibility,  this  work  dealt 
widi  the  early  defeats— as  defensive 
successes.  Stalin's  name  virtually  disap- 
peared, and  the  glory  and  credit  were 
redistributed  to  the  party,  the  army, 
and  the  Soviet  people.  Scattered  men- 
tions of  mistakes  and  errors,  none  big 
enough  or  reaching  high  enough  to 
roil  the  smooth  surface,  gave  a  touch  of 
cridcal  analysis.  In  1958  General  S.  P. 
Platonov  published  a  history  of  World 
War  II,  Vloraya  Mirovaya  Voyna 
(Moscow:  Voyennoye  Izdatelst\  o).  Tlie 
Platonov  history  carried  somewhat  fur- 
ther the  trend  toward  limited  objec- 
dvity  Zhilin  had  begun  and  broadbed 
aspects  of  the  Soviet  conduct  of  the  war 
that  Zhilin's  episodic  approach  had 
sidestepped.  Bodi  Zhilin  and  Platonov 
were  associated  with  the  Soviet  Army 
Directorate  of  Military  History,  ana 
Zhilin  would  later  be  its  longtime  chief. 
The  Vazney&hye  operatsiy  and  Vtoraya 
Mimoaya  V(^na  established  standards 
for  Soviet  World  War  II  historiography 
that  have  pre\'ailed  ever  since.  The 
deviations,  though  numerous,  have 
never  been  in  more  than  degree.  Two 
other  early  works  are  K.  S.  Kolganov, 
Razvitye  TaMku  Sooetskoy  Armi  v  Gody 
Velikoy  O leches tvenmy  Voyny  1941-45 
(Moscow:  Voyennoye  IzdatelstvOi. 
1959)  and  B.  S.  Telpukhovskiy.  \^H^ 
kaya  Olechestvennaya  Voyna  Sovetsho^ 
S^ma  1941-45  (Moscow:  VoyemiQye 
izdateJstvo,  1959). 

Istoriya  Velihy  Otirhcstvftnioy  \hyn\  So- 
vetskQga  Sgyuza  1941-45  [History  oj  the 
Great  P&tmtic  ¥/ar]  (Moscow:  Voyen- 
noye Izdatelslvo)  began  appearing  in 
1960  and  was  completed  in  six  volumes 
in  1963.  Prepared  by  the  Lostitut  of 


524 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


Marxism-Leninism  (Institut  Mark- 
sizma-Leninizma),  it  covers  in  substan- 
tial detail  the  whole  military,  political, 
and  economic  history  of  the  -war  in  the 
Soviet  Union,  including  its  origins  and 
its  aftermath.  The  authoi  ship  is  collec- 
tive and  includes  prominently  three  of 
the  writers  mentioned  above,  Zhilin, 
Platonov,  and  Telpukhovskiy,  among 
some  dozens  of  othes«.  Qg^taii 
dealing  with  militarv  operations  ap- 
pear to  follow,  in  places  almost  word 
for  word,  the  Platonov  history.  On  the 
whole,  the  accounts  of  military  opera- 
tions carry  forward  the  trends  ob- 
served in  the  Zhilin  and  Platonov 
works  without  approaching  full  frank- 
ness or  objectivity.  Names,  dates,  units, 
tactical  maneuvers,  and  operational 
plans  are  given  more  coherent  treat- 
ment than  in  the  earlier  works.  Soviet 
mistakes,  defeats,  and  setbacks,  with 
relatively  few  known  exceptions, 
though  not  ignored,  are  often  handled 
so  obliquely  as  to  escape  all  but  the 
closest  attention.  Strengths,  losses,  pro- 
duction figures,  and  other  statistics  arc 
given  in  detail  for  the  German  and 
other  armies  but  not  for  the  Soviet 
forces.  For  the  first  time  Soviet 
strengths  are  occasionally  given  in  con- 
crete figures,  but  Soviet  casualties  and 
losses  continue  to  be  generally  ignored, 
and  SovieJiitai&tics  are  most  often  pre- 
sented as  percentages  and  ratios  de- 
tWed  from  undisclosed  bases.  The 
volumes  are  heavily  dociuncnted  with 
sources  published  outside  the  Soviet 
Union  but  only  with  meaningless  file- 
number  references  to  Soviet  docu- 
ments. The  process  of  high-level  deci- 
sion making  is  left  nebulous  ratcept  for 
frequent  citations  of  presumably  unan- 
imous decisions  and  directives  from 
the  Stavka.  Notable  in  the  volumes  is 


the  all  but  total  disappearance  of  Stalin 
and  Marshal  Zluikov  and  Khrushchev's 
elevation  to  a  position  ot  miUtary 
prominence. 

Dining  the  Khrushchev  years  the 
war  history  became  or  at  least  came  to 
be  regarded  as  a  significant  asset  to  the 
government,  the  parrv,  and  the  armed 
forces  and  to  many  individuals  in  each, 
llie  credit  Stalin  had  formerly  monop- 
olized could  be  redistributed  and  in  the 
process  increased  not  diminished. 
Even  the  mistakes,  KJirushchev  had 
demonstrated,  could  be  interpreted  to 
advantage.  And  the  victory  was  there, 
indispuable,  m  be  cdebrated  without 
end. 

Particularly  when  it  came  to  persons, 
however,  past  achievement  had  to  be 
coordinated  with  current  status;  con- 
sequently, Khrushchev's  enforced  re- 
tirement in  1964  made  the  History  of  the 
Great  Patriotic  War  politically  obsolete  a 
few  months  after  its  concluding  vol- 
ume was  published.  The//wtory  was  not 
disavowed  and  has  continued  since  as 
ostensibly  the  definitive  work  on  the 
Great  Patriotic  War,  but  publication  of 
book-length  war  history  of  any  kind 
dropped  markedly  through  the  rest  of 
the  1960s,  apparendy  because  a  new 
orientation  was  being  sought.  In  the 
interim,  the  organ  of  the  Ministry  of 
Defense,  the  \bymn0-istoricheskiy  Z/mrnnl 
(Military  History  Journal),  became  the 
forum  for  competing  approaches  aild 
an  outlet  for  persons  and  interests  that 
had  been  slighted  during  the  Khrush- 
chev years.  Articles  from  the  journal 
form  a  substantial  part  of  the  source 
material  for  this  volume. 

The  twenty-fifth  anniversary  of  the 
victory  brcjught  a  wave  of  war  history 
publication  in  1970,  Most  of  die  works 
were  merely  commemorative.  One, 


NOTE  ON  SOURCES 


525 


however,  estal>lislied  a  landmark:  it  was 
the  second  edidon  of  die  Institut  Mark- 
mMa-Leniriiam,  VeWmy&  Otechesiam'- 
rmya  \hyiia  Suvetskogo  Soyuza,  1941-45 
{Kf&tkaya  Istoriya)  (Moscow:  Voyemioye 
tzdat^tvo).  The  fim  edition  of  the 
Kratkaya  hioma  (Short  History),  printed 
in  1964,  had  been  a  one-volume  sum- 
mary €^  iiie  sk-^olftme  history.  Is  tit 
ah  eady  the  larger  work's  frequent  and 
often  fulsome  references  to  Khru- 
shchev had  disappeared,  and  Stalin 
had  been  partially  rchabilitaled  as  su- 
preme commander  in  chief.  The  sec- 
owA  ^ticai,  also  later  punished  in 
abridged  form  in  English  as  the  Great 
Patriotic  War  of  the  Soviet  Urmn,  1941— 
1945  (M«»t?6w:  Progress  I^lii^hers, 
1974),  was  presented  as  a  revision  and 
g^j^nsion  incorporating  five  years' 
p^qgjiess  la  r^eafdi  gad  the  ^fesulb  ^ 
neeendy  published tft^Uoirs  and  mono- 
graphs, it  was  in  ^^EtiaUty  a  new  work, 
more  aii  Ihterim  substis^fies^  the  six- 
volume  history  ihan  asl^^^  version  of 
it.  Like  the  Platonov  Y^imm  in  the  lat€ 
195^,  it  ^ppsstev^f  alio  i<i^s  ^^gt(M 
to  establish  new  standards  for  die  fu- 
ture, its  chief  attributes  were  fac- 
tuSltiessr,  meu^ngfiil  mm  e£  statisies 
(by  comparison  with  previous  practfeejli 
determinedly  evenlianded  treatllieili 
of  persons,  and  a  heightened  dSfeet  of 
objectivity  in  judgments  on  cvenls. 

Also  in  1970,  apparendy  as  a  com- 
l^iitloii  piece  to  the  Kfa^aym  fstenyu,  P. 
A.  Zhilin  edited  and  the  Izdatclstvo 
Politcheskoy  iiteratury  (Moscow)  pub- 
lished WMEpfst  &^eh^Mfi^nm^  Wfm, 

Kmtkiy  naiirhiw-fmpuhmm  ocherk  (Grmt 
Patiwtic  War,  Popular  Scientijic  Sketch). 
Sln£e  no  Soviet  work  on  the  whole  war, 
particularly  one  edited  by  the  chief  of 
the  Military  flistory  Directorate,  is 
meant  to  he  mer^jf  t  |»6j^»iarizatid©, 


the  Fhpuie^  Sdentifir  Skrtck  must  be 
taken,  db*^  with  the  Platonov  history, 
the  kratkttya  fstoriya,  and  A.  A.. 
Grtchkofi  Gofly  iioyny  (Moscow:  Voyen- 
noye  Izdatelstvo,  1976),  as  a  major  part 
of  Soviet  war  literature. 

The  Twenty-fourth  Party  Coagw^s, 
held  in  early  1971,  took  note  of  recent 
Soviet  adiievetfteots  in  military  history 
and  chaiged  the  historical  profession 
with  two  tasks  for  the  future;  one  was 
to  delineate  the  Soviet  collaboration 
widi  all  "jjrogressivc"  peoples  in  World 
War  11;  the  other  was  to  comhat  "felsi- 
fications"  perpetrated  in  'Woridl-V^'M 
history  by  bourgeois  historians.'  With 
that  guidance  and  with  die  then  Minis- 
ter of  Defense,  Marshal  A.  A.  Grechko, 
as  chairman  of  the  editorial  commis- 
sion, the  historical  organizations  in  the 
Mtttistry  of  Defense,  the  tMtiHfte  of 
Marxisra-Leninism.  and  the  Academy 
of  Sciences  set  about  wi  iting  a  com- 
prehensive history  of  World  War  II  in 
twelve  \olLimes,  the  Istoriya  Vtoroi 
Mirovoi  Voyny,  1939-1945  (Moscow; 
Voyennoye  Izdatelstvo, 
Aside  from  establishing  an  official  So- 
viet version  of  the  whole  war,  the  His- 
lary  &f&e  Second  Wtrld  Tter  ftas  provided 
a  vehicle  for  rewriting  llic  deal  Pa- 
triotic War  on  a  scale  substantially  the 
same  m-  the  ishc-t^tome  history  of  tJle 
Khrushchev  period.  The  approach 
parallels  the  Kratkaya  Istoriya  in  treat- 
ment of  lafermaHon  and  persons.  No- 
table are  the  reappearance  of  Stalin  as 
the  central  hgure,  thoroughgoing  dis- 
cn^iofees  of  strategic  deeMdn  making, 
and  lavish  provision  of  statistit  s. 

The  History  of  the  Second  World  War  is 


526 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


Ciirrenlly  the  most  authoritative  Soviet 
work  on  the  war,  and  all  otibers  con- 
form to  It  in  fundamental  matters  of 
substance  and  imcrpretation  (as  they 
did  previously  to  ihe  History  of  the  Great 
P&&wdc  H&r).  It  has  brought  Soviet 
historiography  t)f  the  war  to  the  state  of 
being  highly  intormative  witliout  being 
truly  enlightening.  On  the  iatter  scO«fi 
it  (Joes  somewhat  less  then  llie  Shornik 
materiubv  po  izuchenv^  opyta  voyny  ( (Col- 
lection of  Mmeriakf&f  ^  Study  ^ the  Wbr 
Experience}  produced  by  the  Directoi- 
ate  of  Military  History  under  the  for- 
vem  #ief  of  tfed  Getseral  Staff, 
ShaposhflifcOill',  bciwcen  !ate  1942  and 
ld4§  (for  dibtsibulion  only  to  division 
cxnfimafiders  and  above). 

The  publication  of  thegeaeral  histo- 
ries m  die  1960s  and  70i|-iN^  accom- 
panied by  a  flood  Hi  mttmkts  of  all 
desniptii  ttis.  A  kreiieroiis  sampling  of 
die  niemoii  s  published  in  the  eaily  to 
ia|d^I^(^  is  to  be  foliMd— together 
with  commentary  and  an  extensive  "se- 
Iceted"  bibliography — in  Seweryn 
Bialerl  Sie&A  emd  His  Gem^  ip^ew 
librk:  Pegasus,  1969).  Bmm^  ^  &6 
ixAes  of  their  autliors  in  the  war^  tbe 
fiiost  mgmBjcmt  memoirs  are  those  of 
the  Marshals  G.  K.  Zhukov  and  A.  Nf. 
Vasilevskiy,  which  were  published  as 
The  Mmom  Mmshal  Zfe^lffsef  (New 
York:  Delacnne  Press,  1971)  and  Drh 
vsey  iJiizni  (Moscow:  Izdatelstvo  Po- 
liddieskoy  literatury,  1976). 

Vasili  Chuikov^  The  Battle  for  St/i- 
Ungrad  (New  ^rk:  Holt,  Rinehart  & 
Winston.  1964)»pibl[ishedtn  Rus^an  in 
I959|  has  the  distinction  of  being  the 
first  major  war  memoir,  and  it  remains 
one  of  the  best.  Thifi  mo&t  prominent 
figure  in  many  of  the  memoirs  is  StaHn, 
and  some  of  tlie  most  revealing  re- 
collections of  him  are  given  in  A.  1. 


Eremenko's  The  Arduous  Beginning 
(Moscow:  Progress  Publishers,  1966) 
and  FimrU  voyny  (Donetsk:  Donbass, 
1971).  In  two  books.  The  Soviet  General 
Staff  at  War,  1941-45  (Moscow:  Pro- 
gress Publishers,  1970)  miA  Thet^  Sve 
Months  (Garden  City:  Doubleda\, 
197 7)j  S.  M,  Shtemenko  has  provided 
Ae  dosesti  though  stifl  fragmentary, 
look  into  the  workings  of  the  Soviet 
General  Staff.  Nikita  Khrushchev's 
Khrushchev  Remembers  (Boston:  Little, 
Brown,  1970)  offers  sidelights  on  the 
war  and  the  text  of  his  speech  to  the 
Twentieth  Party  Congress.  K.  K. 
Rokossovskiy,  in  .4  Soldier's  Duty 
(Moscow:  Progress  Publishers,  1970), 
and  K.  A.  Meretskov,  in  Serving  ihe 
Pef^U  (Moscow:  Progress  Publisfiers, 
1971),  ^ve  array  group  commanders' 
views  of  the  war.  At  the  army  level  are 
I.  Kh.  Bagramvans  Tah  shli  my  k  pobede 
(Moscow:  Voyennoye  izdatelstvo^ 
1977);  D.  0^  Lelyushenko's  Mosko&-Sia^ 
I  i  II  g  r  (I  (l-Wer.iin-  P  r  a  ga  (Moscow  : 
Izdatelstvo  *Naiuka."  1970);  and  K.  S. 
Moskalehko%  yugo-zapadm'm 
napravleriii  (Moscow:  Izdatelstvo 
•Nauka,"  1969), 

In  me  mes^mBtm  ^  tsonj^igns  and 
battles,  die  line  between  history  and 
reminiscence  frequently  is  somewliat 
indistinct.  Andrei  Gwmb0s  Sii^  fsr 
the  Cduaisits  (Moscow:  Progress  Pub- 
Ushers,  1971)  is  a  history  written  by  a 
fortner  inlnister  of  defafise  who  had 
commanded  armies  in  the  Caucasus, 
where  Leonid  Brezhnev  had  also 
served — as  a  polidcal  ^Beer.  JVaiefcafo)))! 
period  voyny  (Moscow:  Voyennoye 
Izdatelstvo,  1974)  is  a  study  of  the 
prewar  plans  and  the  first  please  df  the 
war  done  under  the  super\ision  of  S.  P. 
Ivanov,  C(jniinandajit  of  the  Voroshilov 
Aoidemy  of  the  General  Staff.  G.  I. 


NOTE  ON  SOURCES 


527 


V;ine\("\,  et  al..  Geroiclwskaya  obomna 
Sevastopolya,  1941-1942  (Moscow;  Vo- 
yennoye  liaSatelstvo,  1969)  is  a  adle& 
tivc  work  with  pariicijxinls  in  the  Se~ 
va$to^ol  siege  among  the  authors.  Ute 
most  mteii^eiy  researched  works  sem 
A.  M.  Sains(HiC)\ 's  Sfalingradskaya  ^it^ 
(Moscow:  Izdaielsivo  "Nauka,"  1060, 
1968);  Wmitn  Pav!cjv%  lemn^ntd  1941 
{Cliicago;  University  of  C-fiit  ago  Pi  ess, 
1965);  and  V.  M.  Ko\a.\chiik'& Lennierad 
ibobhaya  zemlya  (Leningrad!  l«daiewtvo 
"Nauka."  1975).  Among  the  manv 
works  in  whicli  die  contributors  were 
also  participants  ifi  tli(^  faatde  are  Bth« 
mStalingrad  (Volgograd:  Xi/hnivc-Vol- 
zhskoye  Knizlmoye  izdaielstvOj  1969), 
editsBd  by  A.  M.  B0t<3^iai  SfeBf^m^ 
vvki  islorii  (Moscow:  Izdatelstvo  "Pro- 
gress," 1976),  edited  by^  V.  I.  Chuikov; 
Razgrmn  niimi^kihfaslmiikh  ;  "v^V;  po^ 
Moskx'tty  (Moscow:  Vbyennoye 
Izdatelstvo,  1964),  edited  by  V.  D. 
Sokolovskiy;  ViUkaya  bitifa  pod  Moskvoy 
(Mos(i)\v;  Voyennovr  I/datclsivo, 
1961),  edited  by  V.  N.  Yevstigneyev;  and 
Pr&val  gitlerovskogo  nastupleniya 
Moskvu  and  30  let  voormhennyhh  sU  SSSR 
(Moscow:  Izdatelstvo  "Nauka,"  1966 
and  1968,  respectively),  edited  by  M.  B. 
Zakharov.  Two  works  nol  of  Soviet  aii- 
djorslnp  but  written  from  an  intiiiiate 
acquaititamee  wil|i  tfee  evei5te  thef  de- 
s(  rihf  are  Harnsofo  E.  Salistjurvs  Thr 
900  Days  (New  York:  Harper  &  Row, 
19€i)  and  Alaeander  Worths,  IHh^  Vko' 
cf  Stalingrad  (New  York:  Alfred  A. 
Knopl.  inc..  1947). 

Background  and  ii^ellaneofis  in- 
formation on  a  broad  l  ange  of  subjects 
having  to  do  with  the  Soviet  war  expe- 
nence  are  to  be  found  in  the  ^Vm/mg: 
G.A.  Deborin  and  B.  S.  Teljnikhod^laj^ 

i  uroki  velikiy  otechestvmnoy 
(Moscow:  Uidm^ivo  "Mysl,"  1971^,  cna 


tile  resiilis  and  lessons  of  ihe  Great 
Pauiotic  War;  Embassy  of  the  USSR, 
Washington.  D.C.,  Injbhmtkm  StMeUn 
(1942-1948);  Minisierstvo  Ohorony, 
^SR,  Utoriya  voyn  i  iioyetinoga  iskustva 
(Moscow:  Voyennoye  Izdatelstvo, 
1970),  on  the  hislon  of  war  and  die  art 
of  war;  Ministerstvo  Oborony,  SSSR, 
Inslifut  ■Vbycnuoy  Istorii,  Sovetskaya 
vayi'imaw  nit.siklopi'diyo  (Moscow:  Vo- 
yennoye lz(iatelstvo,  1976-1980).  a 
military  encyclopedia;  and  S.  A.  Tyush- 
ke\  ich,  el  al,,  Stn-rlskiye  vooruzJu'iinyf  sHy 
(Moscow:  Voyennoye  Izdatelstvo^ 
1978),  on  the  organization  and' d^ 
\  elopnieni  of  the  Soviet  armed  fort  es, 
rhe  Information  Bulletin  is  the  source 
Sdf  antttnber  of  tibe  ^tistraii^njs  in  1^ 
volume.  Ihigi  i  i/m^  also  tG^udes  aU' 
essay  on  "bourgeois  falsifie^^of  World 
War  II  history,  the  present  writer 
among  them.  Tlie  s.mie  suhjeci  is  given 
book-length  treatment  in  V.  S. 
Makhalova  and  A.  V.  Beshensteva^ 

Voyna,  is/iifi\ii ,  iilndagiya  (Moscow: 

Izdatelstvo  Politicheskoy  literatury, 

Partisan  anrl  nndergroimd  opera- 
tions are  treated  separately  in  the  gen- 
et^ hi^tdries  and  have  a  Bteratui%  dp 
their  own.  The  woi  ks  cited  here  are  a 
miniscule  sample  ot  die  many  dial  have 
been  published.  V.  Ye.  Bystrov,  ed., 
Gnvi  podpolya  (Moscow;  Izdatelstvo  Po- 
liticheskoy Literatury,  1970)  and  A.  A. 
KtiZfiyaefV,  Bdpolnye  partinynye  organy 
k/nnpartii  htdarussii  v  gody  velihty 
otechestvenwy  voyny  (Minsk:  Izdatelstvo 
''Belana  *  I9^75^  deal  with  the  under- 
ground. In  ;iddltion  to  Vershigora's 
Lyudi  s  chistoi  sovestyu,  already  men- 
ti^iaed,  itspresentadve  works  oli  par- 
tisan warfare  are  1..  Tsanavas  Vse- 
narodnaya  parlizamkaya  vmna  v  Behrussii 


523 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


Gosizdat,  1919-1951)  and  A,  I. 
Zalesskiy's  Gewickeskiy  podvig  millmwv  v 
tylu  vraga  (Mittskr  Izdatelst'vo 
"Belarus."  1970).  TIu'  inort-  anal\tical 
accounis  are  those  in  tiie  SuvietgeiieraJ 
vmt  fmtones  and  in  studies  of  piartisan 
warfare  done  oiit$id0  the  Soviei  Uniim. 
The  most  compreh^sive  of  die  latter 
are  Che  laonograph  series  published  as 
War  Documcntalion  Project,  Project 
"Alexander"  Sivdies  (Washington,  D.G.: 
Air  Research  and  Development  Ckmi- 
mand,  1953-53).  Others  are  The  Soxijrt 
Partisans  in  \^rld  WarJI  (Madjson:  Uni- 
versity of  Wisconsin  PlPess,  1^164),  edi* 
ted  by  John  A.  .Armstrfing.  which 
presehts  some  ol  tlie  War  Documenta- 
tion Project  monographs  in  condensed 
[dim  uith  an  iimoduction  and  exten- 
sive bibliography;  Erich  Hesscs  Der 
sowjetrussasehfi  Pm^sanenhieg,  1941  bis 
1944  (Goettingen:  Musierschraidt, 
1969);  and  Edgar  M.  iioweii  s  The  Soviet 
Panmm  M^mm,  1941-^1914 
ington,  D.C.t  GPO»  1956)v 

/// 

lb  provide  the  Army  widi  a  toiii- 
preheiisive  record  of  the  German  mili- 
ary experieiKv  in  World  War  II,  the 
Foreign  Military  Suidies  Program  of 
the  Htstolicai  Division,  United  States 
Anns,  Europe,  produced,  by  the  time 
It  was  terminated  in  1961,  some  2,400 
tnamiscriip&.  Hie^  authors  were,  £cn' the 
most  part,  former  high-ranking  Ger- 
man officers.  At  first  tliey  w  rote  mainly 
from  memory  about  events  in  which 
they  had  pla\ed  kc\  roU-s.  Beginning  in 
1948  more  comprthensive  projects 
W6re  initiated.  These  were  assigned  to 
teams  that  then  made  use  of  records  in 
tlie  custody  of  the  United  States  Army, 
records  secured  through  private 


sources,  interviews,  and  the  nit  inhers' 
own  experience.  0\erall  supervision 
and  direction  of  the  projects  was  in  the 
hands  of  a  Control  Grouj>.  hcaclcfl 
throughout  its  existence  by  Gene- 
rsdlobCTst  aiJ&,  paaz  Wafldar.  In  1954 
the  HistOTlOtl  DlviSiillWi,  United  Stales 
Army,  Eufope,  pubfished  a  complete 
list  of  the  maiittscripts,  theneompMted 
or  projected,  in  the  G tilde  In  I'nretgn 
Military  Studies  1945  -54.  A  lull  set  of 
the  manuscripts  is  ofi  deposit  in  iHe 
Center  of  Military  History,  Department 
ol  ilie  Army,  Washington,  D.C.  A  sec* 
ond  set  has  becfl  Utttti^ed  te  &e  his- 
torical office  of  the  German  Bun- 
deswehr.  That  part  of  tlie  war  in  the 
Sowtet- Union  with  which  this  volume  is 
concerned  is  covered  by  the  series  at 
the  strategic  level  by  MS  #  1-9,  Ge- 
neraloberst  a.D.  Gotthard  Heim|eir'i^«r 
Feldzug  in  Russian  (I  ein  operativif 
Ueberbiick;  and  at  the  operational  level 
by  MS  #  P-114a,  Generallaifiraiita.D, 
Friedricb  Six(,  Dir  Feldzug  gi'gcn  die 
Sowjet-U nii)n  im  NoidabschnUt  der  Oitjmnl 
and  by  MS  #  P^114c,  Gatier^  der 
Artilleric  a.D.  Fjfied*idh.  Wilhelm 
Hauck,  Bit'  ()f)eraH6nm  der  deulschen 
Heeresgnippm  an  der  Ck^mi^  1941  bis 
J945  sucdlirhr.s  Gehiel. 

The  Center  of  Military  History,  De- 
partment of  the  Army,  has  projected  in 
its  Army  Historical  Series  a  three-vol- 
ume history  ot  ilie  German-Sciviel  con- 
flict. The  present  volume  is  the  second, 
and  the  third  is  F.arl  F.  Zicnike.  V/a- 
liiigmd  til  Berlin:  The  Gennait  Dejeal  in.  the 
East  (Washington,  D.C.:  GPO,  1968). 
Additionally,  the  Center  of  Military 
History  has  published  Depart nunt  of 
the  Army  Pamphlet  20-26 la,  George 
Blau,  The  Genmni  Campaign  in  Russia  — 
Planning  and  Operations,  1940-1942 
(Washiagton,  D.G.:  GPO,  1955)  and 


NOTE  ON  SOURCES 


^2,9 


Earl  F.  Ziemke.  The  German  Northern 
Theater  oj  Operations,  1940-194J  (Wash- 
ington, D.C.:  GPO,  1959). 

Tlie  Histoi  icLil  Office  of  the  German 
Bundeswher  has  published  Manfred 
Kehrig's  5fa/m|p-fl(/  (Stuttgart:  Deutsche 
Verlags-Anstalt,  1974)  and  Klaus  Rein- 
hardt's  Die  Wende  vor  Moskau  (Stuttgart: 
Deutsche  Verlags-Anstalt,  1972),  and  is 
engaged  in  publishing  a  ten-volume 
C^mi  history,  Das  Dnitsche  Reich  und 
^^weite  Weltkricg  (Stuttgart:  Deutsche 
Verlags-Anstalf,  1979-  ).  The 
Academy  of  Sciences,  Central  Institute 
for  History,  of  the  German  Democratic 
B^&ublic  is  publishing  a  projected 
eight-volume  history,  Deutschland  im 
zweitm  Weltkrieg  (Berlin:  Akademie* 
Verlag,1974-  ). 

IV 

The  body  of  general  literature  deal- 
ing with  the  German-Soviet  conflict  is 
large  and  growing.  C'omprehensive 
bibliographies,  periodically  brou^t 
up-to-date,  are  to  be  found  in  thCTOP' 
vue  d'Histoire  de  la  DeiLxiemc  Guerre  Man- 
diale  and  the  Buecherschau  der 
V^ltkriegskmkmi.  Botfi  list  books  and 
articles  in  all  languages  and  carrv  bibli- 
ograjphic  articles  and  reviews  of  sigmfi- 
eafit  works. 

Two  conipiehensive  studies  in  En- 
glish are  John  Erickson's  The  Road  to 
Stalingrad  (Londoat  'WHdenfeld  and 
Nirholson,  1975)  and  Albert  Seaton's 
The  Russo-Genrian  1941  -1945  (New 
York:  Praegen  Wttji.  A  iiQfeewef  libf  ac- 
count in  German  is  Kurt  \'on  Tip- 
pelskirchs  Geschickte  des  Zweiten 
Wdtkneges  (Boniir  h^enwemmW&h/g, 
1956).  The  author  was  both  a  t^hed 
historian  and  a  corps  and  aiiafly  com- 
mander itm  i^fife  iRpaiit  Brief 


authoritative  accounts  of  the  whole  war 
are  to  be  found  in  Vincent  J.  Esposito's 
A  Concise  History  of  Wirld  War  11  (New 
York:  Praeger,  1964);  Martha  Byrd 
Hoyle's  A  Vibrld  in  Flames  (New  York: 
Atheneima,  1970);  and  Hans-Adolf  Ja- 
cobsen*sJ9J9-79-/5,  DerZweite  Weltkrieg 
in  Chwnik  und  Dokumenten  (Darmstadt: 
Wehr  und  Wissen  Verlagsgesellschaft, 
1961). 

The  German-Soviet  conflict  has  been 
set  in  the  contexts  of  politics  and  grand 
strategy  in  a  variety  of  works.  The 
Soviet  Union's  relations  with  its  West- 
ern AUies  are  treated  in,  among  others, 
Winston  S.  Churchill's  The  Hinge  uf  Fate 
(Boston:  Houghton  MifOin,  1950); 
Hie*feefrrJfeis'  Churchill,  Roosevelt,  Stalin 
(Ihinceton:  Princeton  UuIm.  rsit\  Press, 
1957);  J.  M.  A.  Gwyer's  Grand  Strategy 
(London;  Her  Majesty's  Stationery  Of- 
fiLe,  1961).  vol.  Ill,  pt.  I:  Maurice 
Madoff  and  Edwin  M.  Snells  Strategic 
Planning  for  Coalition  Warfare,  1941- 
]942  (Washington,  D.C.:  GPO  1953); 
Robert  E.  Sherwood's  Roosevelt  and 
ffofMm  (NewYofV:  Harpei;  1950)-,  and 
Llewellyn  Woodw'arcis  BHMsk  Foreign 
Policy  in  the  Second  Whrld  War  (London: 
Her  Majesty's  Stationery  Office.  1962). 
Hitler,  Ri'dt'u  luul  Pntclaniatimu  n.  1932- 
1945  (Munich:  Sueddeutscher  Verlag, 
1^5),  edited  by  Max  D<atiafus,  is  a 
mine  of  information  on.  HiUcr's  war 
leadership  including  relations  with  his 
allies,  as  is  also,  in  a  more  limited 
fashion,  CnwhUcls-Reden  (Duesseklorf: 
DrgtSte  Verlag,  1972),  edited  by  Hehuut 
Mfe^dl'.  Otheir  works  dealing  with  the 
Cermnii  coalition  are  Wipert  \'()n  Rhie- 
chers  Gesandter  zwischen  Diktatur  und 
BtmmwB»  fMe^mi^mi  tiBies  Verlag. 
1951);  Galeazzo  Om^The  Ciaw,  n,- 
anes  1939-1943  {Gm^mCity:  Double- 
day,  liai5>j  WalfliBfii^  Mittkls  Der 


530 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


Finnische  Krieg,  1941-1944  (Wiesbaden: 
limes  Verlag,  1977);  Mario  D.  Fenyo's 
Hitler,  Horthy,  and  Hungary  (New 
Haven:  Yale  University  Press,  1972); 
Juergen  Foerster's  Stalingrad,  Risse  im 
Buendniss,  1942—1943  (Freiburg;  Ver- 
lag Rombach,  1975);  and  Paul 
Schmidt's  Statist  auj  diploma li.u  her 
Buehne,  1923-1945  (Bonn:  Athc- 
naeum-Verlag,  1949). 

Albert  Speer,  in  Inside  the  Third  Reich 
(New  York:  Macmillan,  1970),  and 
Nikolai  Voznesenskiy,  in  The  Economy  tij 
the  USSR  During  mrld  War  II  (Wash- 
ington, D.C.:  Public  Affairs  Press, 
1948),  describe  their  countries'  war 
economies  from  the  points  of  view  of 
the  men  who  ran  them.  Two  other 
significant  works  on  German  war  pro- 
duction are  Willi  A.  Boelcke,  Drntsch- 
lands  Ruestung  im  Zweiten  Weltkrieg 
(Frankfurt:  Athcnaion,  1969)  and 
jpeutsthes  Institut  fuer  Wirtschafts- 
f&rschung.  Die  Deutsche  Industrie  im 
Kriege,  1939-1945  (Berlin:  Duncker  Be 
Humboldt,  1954).  Fhe  Soviet  war  econ- 
omy is  covered  in  the  general  histories. 

Allied  aid  shipments  to  the  Soviet 
Union  through  the  Arctic  ports  and  the 
Persian  Gulf  are  treated  in  David  Ir- 
ving, The  DestnictiiD)  <>[  ('<>)rroy  PQ^17 
(New  York:  Simon  and  Schuster,  1968)i. 
Itebert  H.  Jones,  7%s  Ifeois  ib  Russm: 
United  States  Lend-Lease  to  the  Soviet  U nion 
(Norman,  Okla.:  University  of 
Oklahoma  Press,  1969);  Mckm^  M.. 
Lm^tmmtd  Robert  W.  Q^Me^iGh&al 


Logistics  and  Strategy,  J94&^2943  (Wash- 
ington, D.C.;  GPO.  1955);  Samuel 
Eliot  Morhon,  Battle  of  the  Atiantk,  Sep- 
iriiihrr  1939-May  1943  (Boston:  Litde, 
Brown,  1947);  X  Vail  Motter,  The  Per- 
sian Corridor  and  Aid  to  Russia  (Wash- 
ington, D.C.:  GPO,  1952);  and  S.  W. 
Roskill,  The  War  at  Sea,  1939-1945 
(London:  Her  Majesty's  Stationery  Of- 
fice, 1954). 

Information  on  weapons,  fighting  ve- 
hicles, and  aircraft  is  available  in  John 
Batchelor  and  Ian  Hogg,  Arfo'/Zery  (New 
York:  Charles  Scribner's  Sons,'l972); 
Peter  Chamberlain  and  Hilary  L.  Doyle, 
Encyclopedia  of  German  Tanks  (New  Yoi  k; 
Arco,  1978);  Ian  V.  Hogg  and  John 
Weeks,  Military  Small  Arms  of  the  Twen- 
tieth Century  (New  York:  Hippocrene 
Books,  1977);  John  Kirk  and  Robert 
Young,  Jr. ,  Great  Weapons  of  Wrrld  War  U 
(NcwVotk:  Bonanza  Books,  1961);  I.E. 
Krupchenko  et  al.,  Sovetskiye  tankovye 
voyska  (Moscow:  Voyennoye  Izdatelstvo, 
1973);  Rudolf  Lusar,  German  Secret 
Weapons  of  the  Second  W)rld  War  (New 
York:  Philosophical  Library,  1959); 
jnhn  Milsom,/?u55ifln  Tanks,  1900-1970 
(London;  Arms  and  Armour  Press, 
1970) ;  Ian  Parsons,  ed . ,  The  Encyclctpedia 
of  Air  Warfare  (London:  Salamander 
Books,  1974);  B.  Perrett,  Fighting  Vehi- 
ci^(f^  Red  Army  (London:  Ian  Allen, 
1969);  and  Christopher  Shepherd, Ger- 
man  Aircraft  of  Wrrld  War  II  (London: 
Sidgwick  &  Jackson,  1975). 


Glossary 


Ataive  defease 


Armeegruppe 
Airoy  group 


A  Soviet  theory  f)f  cli'fcnsc  toiittut  tccl  by  gener- 
ally offensive  means,  espoused  particularly  by 

A  GeW&SBiSS  ^mmand  intermediate  between  9 

Corps  anil  an  army,  usually  under  an  enlarged 

corps  headquarters. 
A  Genaan  conuiiand  arrangement  in  which  one 

atmy  feead^ititftiefs  vrm  subordinated  to 

Sinpther. 

HeBresgt'uppi'  (Ger.),  Jmnt  (Russ.) — a  headquar- 
ters establiki«d  to  ccsiunand  two  or  xmre 
armies. 


Balka 


Commissar 


DORA 


Deep  guUies  in ' 

Union. 
Hide's  BaviiJia»  retr^, 


A  cabinet  minister  in  the  Soviet  government.  In 
the  Soviet  Armed  Forces,  [nior  to  October 
1942,  a  political  oflicer  assigned  to  each  mili- 
tary headquarter  s  with  the  p&DKr  to  couilter- 
:Siand  orders  given  by  the  cdpmi^der. 

@^||ifgl|:g00-n3m.  gun. 

A  Soviet  army  ^ttttp. 

Hitler's  title  a$  Gennan  diief  of  state. 


GAMMA 
Gestapo 

Guards 


H^^'^^i^Siaviei  Union 


German  420-mni-  gLiii. 

Qdltamie  Staatspolizet,  the  GeEtaan  Secret  Stgte 


An  honorific  designation  given  to  elite  imits  and 
to  Soviet  units  that  had  disuiiguished  them- 
selves in  cQmljai. 

Tide  given  For  acts  df  feSEceptional  bravery  or 

exceptional  |ierfbrmance  in  comnianH.  The 
award  consisttti  of  the  Order  ot  Lenin,  llie 
highest  decoration  for  valor,  a  certificate 
signed  by  the  chairman  of  the  Presidium  of 
the  Supreme  Soviet,  and  the  Gold  Star  Medal, 
which  was  awarded  only  to  Heroes  of  the 
Soviet  Union  and  Heroes  of  Socialist  Labor. 


532 


MOSCOW  TO  SIALINGEAD 


Jaeger 
JU-52 


KARL 

Knight's  Cross  of  the  Imn 
Komsomol 


NRVD 


OWL 
OKM 

OKVV 

Pemp 
Panther 

^mer  tU 


Russian  auxiliaries,  mostly  prisoners  of  w;u.  who 
a&Vef^  with  German  units  on  the  Eastern 
Vtvotm  orients  nonciombatant  capacities. 

Term  used  to  designate  German  light  infantry. 
The  Gernan  JUfihm  f  ^  ^imotor  trsospoft 

German  540-mni.  siege  mortar. 

The  highest  class  of  die  Iron  Cross  and  the  most 

prized  of  the  German  "World  War  II  military 

decorations. 
KommunktichesMy  Soyuz  Mohdyezki,  the  (Soviet) 

Communist  Youth  League  for  adolescents 

and  young  adults  aged  14  lo  28  years. 

Nadmdnyy  Komissarial  Venutrennihh  Del  (People's 
Commissariat  of  Internal  Affairs),  the  Soviet 
internal  secar%  attd  Secret  poMcal  police 

ministry. 

Oberkommando  des  Heeres,  the  German  Army 

High  Command. 
Oberkunniandv  der  Luftwaffe,  the  OeiTJtiati  Air 

Forte  High  OjinSBEp^dj^^ 

Navy  High  Command. 
Oberkomjnando  der  WehrmacliL,  the  German 
Ajifted  Forces  {figb  Ctommand. 

C5enHan  WotM  "Wfer  I  army  Slang  for  Poles  and 

Rus.sians.  Used  in  World  War  II  fo  4.&fS^3S 
the  Soviet  peasant  wagon.s. 

A  German  tank,  designated  Panzer  V.  It 
mounted  a  long-barreled  75-inmt.|p4}i,  and  in 
its  sloping  armor  and  low  silhtjuette  was  pai:^ 
tcrned  aftt-r  the  Soviet  T-:^4.  It  was  not  in 
quaiiUty  production  until  early  I94L'). 

A  German  prewar-model  tank,  mounting  in  its 
latest  version  (1942)  a  long-barreled  BO-mm, 
antitank  gun. 

The  latest  of  the  prewar  German  tanks,  and 
mounting  in  its  latest  version  (1942)  a  long- 
hairreled,  high-velocity  75-nmi.  gun,  whi^ 
supplanted  a  short,  75-IRS9,j,  low- velocity  guti. 

Armored  infantry. 

PiM  mksmditel,  a  Iow-«chek)n  poMtical  oflcei; 


Literally,  time  without  toadis-  'fhe  faH  and 
spring  mitddy  periods  m  the  Soviet  Umon, 


GLOSSARY 


533 


RSFSR 


RoUbahn 


SS 


Selt-pi  upcUed  assault  gun 


Shock  mm^ 

SlUurmovik 
Stavha 


T-34 


Tiger 


mffm-SS 
Wehnnacht 
Weiivolf 
Wintei-  War 


Russian  Soviei  Federated  SQielaEffit  Repitblit  .  die 
largest  of  tlie  Soviet  repuli^cSt  comprising  75 
fmctni  of  the  USSR's  total  land  and  55 
percent  of  its  population. 

A  highway. 

Schutzsta/Jel,  elite  guard  of  the  Nazi  Party. 

A  lightly  aitnm%<d»^aj^Qgel  vehicle  mounting  a 
rel;ui\  cly  hca\7  ^^wOiWid  intended  to  be  used 
as  close-support  artery. 

An  army  (Soviet)  reinforced  to  lead  break- 
through operations. 

Soviet  F^u^m  II-2  ground  attack  bomber. 

Slii'i'hi  \'i  I hlim'tiiiij^ii  (_Uaviii)hn}uiiiiiuiii>x'(uuya  (Sl;tl( 
of  the  Supreme  High  tx)iiimand),  under  Sudiii, 
the  lop-level  Soviet  military  executive  commit- 
tee. Decisions  made  in  the  name  of  the  Stavhl 
appear  frequently  to  have  been  made  by  Stalin 
aloiu", 

Slurlzkampfjlugzeug  (dive-bomber).  Although  all 
German  bcMiOfs.  in  opera^onal  use  during 
WVirlf!  War  II  were  built  to  ha\e  a  dive- 
bombing  capability,  tlie  "SiwAo"  as  such  was  the 

The  tank  that  was  the  mainstay  of  the  Soviet 

armored  forces  lhrf)iigli(ml  World  War  II.  It 
iiioiniied  (1942)  a  short-barreled  76.2-mm. 
gini.  Slojjiug  armc>r  on  the  turret  and  glacis 
plaie  gave  it  partipulafly  gPPd  prptecdon 
against  andtank  fire. 
A  German  tank,  designated  Paii/rer  V'l.  mount 
ing  an  HH-nim.  gun.  At  37  tons,  die  heaviest 
tank  on  the  Kastern  Fritni  in  1942  where  it 
appeared  hf  st  (in  small  uiunbers  in.  the  late 
stiniMer). 

Bettb^  head.  The  emblem  of  the  SS  con- 
centration camp  guards. 

The  combat  units  of  the  SS. 

The  German  Armed  Forces. 

HiUer's  headquarters  at  Mnniisa  in  the  Ukraine, 

The  Soviet-Finnish  war  of  1939-1940, 

Hltlet)i  ttl^^^uafte^  la  1^ 


Code  Names 


BARBARt)SSA 

Bettelstab  ("Beggar's  Staff") 

BiAU  CBlue"^ 

Bluecher 

Braunschweig  ("Brunswick") 
BnuECiULNSCHLAG  {"Bridging") 


ChRISTOPHOKUS 

Clausewitz 

DAMJ>^HAM^^ER  ("Steam 

D£KFFUKC£R 
DONNERSCMIAG 

("TlmnderbQlt") 

EtEFANT 


Fn  1  R/  AUBER  MaglC*") 

FiM  [iREiHHt  ^"Meton*) 
Georgk 

Coiin  vt)N  Berlichi.\(.kn 


Hannover 


Klabal'termann 
("H<il)o<ib!in") 
Kt»i.Mt.sBt,RG  pusiliuii 


German 

Thf  1941  offensive  in  the  Sf)viei  Union. 
Proposed  operation  a^aimt  the  Oranienbaum 

pt>cket,  summer  1942. 
The  1942  suniinci  offensive  in  tiieSo?MetUni<m, 

with  phases  I,  11,  and  111. 
Attack  across  Kerch  Strait,  August  1942. 
Bij\u  renamed,.  30  June  1942. 
Projected  offenQ^ve  Id  dose  the  Ibropets  bulge, 

spring  1942. 

^togram  to  secure  vehid^  &xim  the  civilian 
sector  for  Army  Grou^  Centet^  January  1942. 
Blau  II. 

Bl.AU  III. 

Projected  Ninth  .A^rm\  diive  from  Rzhev  6o 
Osta.shkov.  siimTner  ]i}42. 

Pinjecied  Sixth  Army  breakout  from  Stalin- 
grad, December  1942. 

Advance  into  the  Caucasus,  JuIy^Kovemlier 
1942. 

Ttogram  to  secure  trudts  &l&t6  ^^dvilian  see^ 
iQXvJauuary  1942, 

Original  cf>dc  name  for  W  njin  n  n  i . 

Army  Group  B  tinnl  aii.uk  to  Stalingrad, 

July-November  1942, 
Operaaon  a^unst  the  Izyuni  bulge,  May  1942. 

Eighleemli  Anin  ^liai  c  oi  Nnkni  ii  in  . 
Air  operation  against  Soviet  naval  forces  at 
Leiui%tad>  Ap^  1942. 

Operation  against  the  Soviet-held  pocket  west  of 
Vyasaaa,  Ms^-Jime  1942. 

Boat  operation  against  Soviet  traffic  on  Lake 

Ladoga,  Julv  1942. 
Gei  inan  rear  lijie  west  of  Moscow,  winter  1942. 


CODE  NAMES 

LAiCniSrA»t&  f Salmon  Gatdi'^ 


MooRBKANQ  ("Swamp  Fire") 


NoKiti.u  !iT  ("Aurora 
Borealis") 


Orkan  fioroado") 


RAUffTiER  ("Beast  of  Prey") 
Rheingold 


SCHUNGPFLANZE  ("^fec") 
SEVDirrz 

Stoirfang  ( "Sturgeon 

Taifun  ("Typhoon") 
Taubenschlag  ("Dovecote'^ 
Trapenjacd  ("Bustard 
Hunt") 

VooELSAXL.  ("Bird  Song") 


WALRUERE  ("Valkyrie") 
WiESENGRLiNU  ("Meadow 
WlLHELM 
WiNKEUtlED 

Slorm") 
WiKBLLwiNU  ("Wliirlwind") 


635 

German  decep^fe  cjpetacien,  ftfey-July  1942. 

sna  and  Bdorodrsk,  sumlnes' 

Oi;)LTatinn  K,  pindi^  ofF  the -Fgigp^fn^  .sslfiient, 
summer  1942> 

Projected  operation  to  talfce  Leningrad, 

1942. 

Pi  ojet  ted  attadfe  liv^  the*B»<Qp@ts  bulge,  Mardi 
1942. 

Proposi  ci  iiperation  to  eliniinate  the  SidsMmdu 

salieni,  summer  1942. 

Operation  gainst  the  Volkhov  pocket,  March 
1942. 

Pi  ograni  lo  o  eate  six  new  divisions  with  caUed- 
up  deterred  men,  January  1942. 

Operation  to  widen  the  corridor  to  the  Dem- 

yansk  pocket,  October  1942. 
Operation  west  oCSychevka,  July  1942. 
Operation  against  Sevastopol,  June  1942, 

Drivf  on  Moscow,  October-Det  ember  1941. 
Projected  attack  on  Toropels,  October  1942. 
Operation  on  the  Kerch  Peninsula,  May  1942. 

Antipartisan  operation  in  the  Bryansk  Forest, 
June 

Progi  am  to  set  up  four  new  divisions,  January 
1942. 

Army  ol  Lapland  project  to  occupy  the 

Rybatchiy  Peninsula,  June  1942. 
Operation  a^inst  the  Vdchansk  salient,  June 

1942, 

Substitute  for  Schungpflanze,  executed  Oc- 
tober 1942. 

Operation  to  reli^  Mk#i  Armyiat  StsKioi|[radi 

Oereinbcr  1942. 
Operation  to  pinch  off  part  ol  tlie  Sukhiiudli 

salient,  August  1942. 


S36 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


Malyy  SmruN  Clittle 

Saturn") 
Maki 

Saturn 

Uranus 


Soviet 

Final  attack  cm  Ssst^k  Army  at  Stalingrad.,  Janu- 
ary  1943. 

Reduced  versioii  of  Saturn  and  die  one  actually 

executed. 

OffV-nsive  ag;iinst  the  N'mtSu  Army  Rzhev  Salient, 
fall  and  winter  1942. 

Ptxjjected  offensive  west  of  Stalingrad  aimed  at 
Rt^tO^tr,  November  1942. 

Counteroffensive  at  Stalingrad,  November 
1942. 


Index 


Abfflaneroyo  Scatioii:  385 

Ae^  mmawtaai^  40,  S7,  70,  73,  95,  116.  123, 

ISI,  161,  257,  286.  250,  281, 329. 332.  371 
Air  FoHEc,  Geiman:  Ste  Air  units,  Gcmum;  Lttfiute^i, 
Air        Soiitet.  <$«  Air  iiiiits,  Se^^ 

ti^wtffe  (OKL). 
Airstreagth,  Germaa:  7.  296. 300,  440, 478-79,  515 

locngtbt  Soviet:  12-13. 19, 145, 170,  SS2,  302. 

901,440, 446,460. 515 
Air  titdta,  German:  425,  448,  478 
nr  Air  Corps:  275.  278,  314,  388 
Vni  iUr  Corpc  130, 204, 267. 275, 278,  31D,  320, 

386.  388 
Rrsi  Air  Force:  6 
Second  Aii-  Force:  6 

Fourth  Air  Force:  6.  375.  388,  415,  463, 

Fifth  Air  Fbrce:  7. 228. 234. 236. 424.  m.  429-^ 

Air  Force  Field  Divisioiu: 
Mebdle:  4SS 
7th:  479 
Air  units,  Soviet 

Eighth  Air  Army;  357 
Aircraft.  German;  3,  192.  296,  308 

HE- 1 1 1:  55.  236-37, 429-30.  479 

JU-52:  130.  188.476,  479 

JLr_a7  (Sluka):  12,  191,  193,  196.  198,  234,  278, 
314 

JLr-88:  237.  429 

ME-109;  12 

Storch  161,  245 
Aijcralt,  Soviet:  3.  12.  19.5,  332,  384,  342,  441 
Aircraft  production:  11,  SOO 
Ak-Monav  Heights:  114 
Aksay  River:  382,  384,  481-82,  400-91 
Aleksevevskoye:  158 
AlcLsiii:  94-95 
AlexaiicH-r,  Tsar;  515-16 
Algeria;  513 

AU-Union  Cenlral  Comiiiitlee:  200-01 

Allies,  Wcsienr  3.  39.  233,  304-05.  307. 423-24.434, 

449,  3I>3.  ri05.  S13.  615 
Alia  Fiord:  428 
Aluminum:  3'),  285 
Alushta:  107.  HI 

Ammunilion  .shortages.  Cennan.  SU  Xj^j^XAo,  Gh>- 
man,  shortages,  amniunitioq. 


Amtnunition  shoruigeti,  Soviet  Ste  Logtiiits,  Soviet, 

Anapa:  351 
Angcrburg:  4,  155 
And-Conuntem  Pact:  54-55.  222 
Antipanissn  openokMU,  Gensan:  207-09,  213-14, 
217-10.  244 

Antitank  weapons,  Genaan:  II,         120.  228, 

293-94,  325.  470 
An^^aak  weaponi,  SpviiR:  11 
Antonetoi,  Manhkl  ton:  30S.  505 
Antonov,  General  Le;iK$tSt|E.A<  I.:  438 
Arctic,  operations  int  41tr2t8i  S^t^.  231vSS3-^. 

423.  427-31 
Arctic  Ocean:  6.  134,  SSS-^^S 
Ardon  River:  454 

Arkhangelsk:  14.  44,  233,  430,514 
Armavir:  358.  370,  372.  375 

Armed  Forces  High  Conmnnd.  Stt  ObirlmiltDmM^ 

V/ehrmuchi  (OKW). 
Anned  Forces  Operations  Susil,  See  mdir' l^m^^ 

mandn  tier  WehrvuutU  (OKW), 
Armeeabieilungen 

Fretter-Pico:  488,  494, 496 

Hollldt:  4$l-^S,  4S4^g@ 
Armeegruppen 

Dostler:  160-61 

Friedrich;  160-61 

Guderian:  94,  100 

Hoth:  478 

Klebt:  273,  276,  281-82 
Schcrer:  188-89,  195 
Schmidt:  100,  122-23 
von  Mackensen :  L'i'J-lil 
Weichs:  322.  331.331> 
Armies,  German.  Ste  also  AnnceabteiluiiKen- 
Army  of  Lapland;  222-25,  227,  231-32.  423-24 
Army  of  N<mvav:  7,  28,  39,  220-22,  234,  23(i,  291, 
426 

Ftrst  Pan/er:  fi,  4a,  51.  54,  156,  158-r>0.  451, 
453-54,  490-91,  493,  496 

and  Rlav:  313-14,  318.  323-25,  330,  333,  338, 
343-47,  349-51.  354-5(),  358,  3rin-(i2 

moves  NjuarH  St:iliiigr.id:  3(54-65,  370-73,  375. 
377.  379 -SI I 

winter  catiL|iLiinii.  1941-1942;  105 
Second:  37,  r>(i.  -,  ij.  yM> 

^  fiAKBAROSsA  begins;  30,  32-34 


538 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


Vtd  Soviet  vnava  cQume«lBfeiuiHfr,  ]94l-li4t: 

midesUoKiam.  40, 90, 5$,  00,^-48 
and  Blau:  329,  342 

and  Soviet  winter  oounieroQensive,  1941—1942: 
65-^7.  69.  7S-7S.  77,  »).  S6, 9(H91„  U-9&> 

100-101.  122.  lai-^.  m.  140.  iw,  m 

175.  178-79 
and  WiRBElSVINO:  998. 4A§^i  413 

Ullrd:  395 

Hiiid  Panzer.  6,  IIS,  124-25.  t$7,  130-34,  140, 

161.  165-68.  170-71,  173,  2lt,^  ^4%  2$0« 

404-06,  4SS 
eatttth;  5, 30, 34. 402. 404^,^ 

drive  on  Moscow:  39,  SO.  591^1!^, 

and  HANNOVEit;  241-48 

and  Soviet  ivintiiir  CBUnietDEfenuve,  1941-1942: 

70.  8$,  9s-i^  io  )  Hi».  11%  m.  mr-w, 

212 

in  the  YuT^attK»-ypta^  $tm  ITS.  176,  178-ti 
fbunh  Panzer:  5^90 
and  Blau;  $22-24,  S9S-i?,  3a#^*IJ;  S44, 

346-47 

moves  to\vaid  Stalingrad:  349-51,  354-56.  358. 

360,  362.  365,  370,  374.  378.  382,  384-85. 

387-88,  391-92. 595.  398,  403 
mid  Soviet  winter  counteroBcnsiv^  l9il^iS^i 

122,  124-25.  127-28,  131-34,  149,  ffil-^S. 

168-  70.  173,  176.  179-82 
<pring  offensiw,  1942:  241-42 

and  Stalingtad:  442-43,  446,  457-Sg.  463, 
467-68.  470^^.  4^6, 478^,  4S2,  m,  488. 
490-96 

Sixth:  6,  S'>.  I'lK,  \m.  37H 

and  Blal';  313^ir>.  lily,  ■^2'>-2■i.  32S.  331-37, 

339-40.  343-4f).  3'->7 
in  the  Don  bend:  3.1 1,  3j4-.^.=>,  357.  359-61, 

3^-d4,  S82-8B 
and  RtlBXKICi-s:  270,  272-73,  275,  279-82 
a.  StaBngrad:  391.  393-97,  442-43.  446-46, 

452,  457-60,  462,  464-65,  467-68.  470-76. 

478^4,488-93.  496-302.  503,  504.  511 
irintercaiopaign,  1941-1942:  74,  105 
Ninth 

as  Barbaross.^  begins:  5,  27,  30,  32 
baltle  for  Moscow;  49—50,  65 
tlie  From.  February  1942:  173-76,  182-85,  189. 
192 

R2hev-Sychevka  operation:  398,  400,  402-03. 
405-08.  413.  445,  451,  465-5t>,  iS5-m 

and  Soviet  winter  coimteroffensive,  1941-1942: 
65,  70.  7.'i,  79-81.  80.  92-94,  101-03.  118-19, 
122,  124-25,  130-33,  140.  161.  166-67. 

169-  71 

qnisgfl^sive,  1942:  241-42,  249-52 


Amies,  German— CBa&aOQd 

iradXeidapidrSSl,  3SB,  m,  41%  414.  '^Sl. 
451 

and  Sewtopol:  106.  309-10,  314.  319.  321.  324 
attd  -war  in  ibc  O^gmi  S5, 42. 105-09, 111-13, 
lift.  lit.  2tt-^,m  869 
SixteendK  SM.  t4&.  MS.  H?.  iSl-SS^  I7$t  I'm 
183, 186^,  Wi,  igs.  iSS^  4d»,  ill.  4I«.  4SI, 
451 

Sewnceenth:  6.  32.  105.  141.  156-59,  161.  272, 

276-79,  282,  322,  324.  346,  353-56.  358,  360, 

362-63,  370-73. 375-76,  379,  454,  491, 493 
Eighteenth:  5,  32, 143,  151-52,  173,  im»  188-90, 

194-98,  256-57,  SS9, 409,  41 1-12, 414,418 
Twentieth  Mountain:  412,  424.  426,  505 
^tenueis  Rumanian.  See  aiso  Rumanian  forces- 

Ibird:  7,  33. 370, 376.  395, 443. 446,  456-57. 459, 

466-68,  470-71.  473. 478. 480. 491 
Fburth:  7. 33,  395, 443. 471. 473, 478 
Aimies.  Soviet 
indtpeadm  Goa^i  321 
tntkbendentMeiritimx  106,  141,261,311 
fkst  Guards:  383-85.  387,  391,  393-94,  438,  442. 

484,  486,  490,  493-94 
fiua  Shock:  59-«0.  62-63.  66-67.  70.  90.  93. 

153-54. 166,  171,  255,  391 
First  Tank:  301,  357,  363,  383,  384n 
Second  Guards:  485.  488,  490-91.  493,  496 
Second  Shock:  137. 139,  145-^.  m,  ;50-61. 1§3, 

175. 186-92,  194-%.  197. 25S-4i()(.  416, '^tl 
TTiiVrf:  65.  90,  122 

mrd  Guards:  484,  486. 490.  493-94 

Vtird  Shofk:  140.  147-49,  151.  153-54.  197,  212. 

215,  241 
Third  Tank:  301.  398 
Fourth:  137,  139.  145-46 
Fourth  Indeprndent:  51 

Ftrurth  Shock:  140,  147^9.  169^71.212,214-15. 

217,  .'J82,  402,  405,  408 
Fourth  Tank:  301,  357,  36^.  ,^83-84 
Fifth:       59,  88.  92-93.  404 
Fiftk  ShMk:  481,  485,  493 

Fifth  Tank:  301,  325-26,  332,  337,  341-42.  S98. 

442-44,  457.  468,  470-7l.  481.  484.  488,  494 
SixtA:  158-59.  271. 273, 276. 278-79, 281-82, 337, 

442,  484,  486.  493 
Sntnlh:  226 
Eighth:  45.  416,  418 
Eighth  GiMrds:  503 

,\inih:  51,  156,  159.  271. 378-79,  38S.  MS.  S40. 

367,  370,  374 
Teuth:  60,  67,  70.  73.  88-90, 97, 101. 122-123. 164. 

248,  252,  254,  342,  384 
Eleventh:  140,  147-48.  151-58,255 
Twelfth:  361,  367.  370.  374 
Thirteenth:  65.  68.  90,  122.  334 
Fmaumh:  226-28,  231 

S&tMUt  DC*.  38. 51,  57.  SiMSOk  70.  f  8. 166, 176, 
342 


INDEX 


%jil»at&:  51,  Se?,  S74, 381. 452 

Ttm^:  iO,  $%  60.  67,  70,  88. 93, 190.  SST^SS. 

400.  403-04,  495 
Twen^^i  141.  270. 3S7.  343,  353.  357.  383-84. 

442-43,468. 470-71, 496-97. 499 
llhtnif'ataHiit  m  mm,  169 

Twenty^fAim,  Mi,  SSf,  3B7j  S6i,  M^m,  *iS, 
497 

TVM^hsirffc:  60. 139,  227.  329^.3^,^2 
Twet^-sexKfM:  140,  148 
Tiimi)-a^:  270,  273-75,  313,  316,  3S7, 493 
33wi^4iMA-.  fttt-^  67,  TOi,      ^      91.  13Q. 

i«7.  iti.  m  iS4.m,m 

nmAi  49-50, 57, 67-68, 70. 88-90. 92-93, 400, 

405-04,497-08 
7Mi^  jftxit  64«.6?r  70t  73. 88-90^  9^  130. 400, 403. 

407-'^08 

ThiTty-0ard:  86. 97. 164. 170-71. 176. 17&-®.ftt> 

855,859,404 
IT^y^iufHt:  140^  147, 101, 153 
TU'^^avemki  51,60, 159;  367. 370.  374.  454 
nirtj^^gAlftt  1S6,  !5t.  270-71,  313, 357 
mrff-ninlk:  90.  92. 94. 102-03,  122.  130-31. 167, 

170-71.17^  184-a5, 241*42.  250-52 
FbrtieAi  141. 334-^7 

Fmts'fhnd:  88,  97*  187-^8,  Jfl»  176, 180^  I82:-8f$ 
Foriy^ouTth:  105,  lOS-09.  il8»  U-Mt.  26*,  269, 

370.  374 
Fmtj^fih:  370 
Fm^sixtk:  370,  372 
F^rtyseventk:  262,  269, 367,  374 
Pwts^intlv.  50, 88, 97i  Ue^M&.jm 
F^:  49,  53.  59, 8&  Vlimi  11^'^  tWtk 

182,  248, 245-46 
F^^;  105.  108.  114-17.  2^,  SS3.  $$!, 

443,  470-72,478.491,493 
Fifiy-first  Indtpendtnti  36 
F^j^ond:  137.  139-40, 145--I6, 156 
f^^ourth:  139,  145,  186.  189^91,  m  197 
F^-sixth:  367,  374 
Pyiy-sixth  Independent;  51 

/|%i^nw(fft:  156.  158-59.  270-71.  278-82.  357. 
383.  443.470-71.497,499 

F^-fighlh:  374 

Fijiy-nmlh:  137,  l3d;  146, 150,259 
SAdi^:  60,  337 

SBtff^:  60, 90,  122-23,  176.  325.  342 
Sixty. second:  353-54,  357.  983-84.  387-88. 
392-93.  396.  442.  460,  46^  466, 469, 496.  409, 

503 

Sixty-third'.  337,  353,  383,  442-43 

Sixty-hirili:  :ir.3-54.  357.  382-83.  387-88.  392. 

S94.  4rs.  400.  497 
Sxfyjtfth:  443.  470-71.  496-97 
Sb^sixtk:  387. 391 
Amor  suengtb.  German:  7.  45,  139,  294.  308, 325. 

440, 515.  $«<a&a  lank*.  GeitiBtD. 


Armor  strenKth.  Soviet:  1 1.  16,  31. 40.  59n.  139.  262. 

2?^,  300,,  308, 326,  363, 4M,  ^  446,  516.  Stt 
Ikola,  Soiiet 
Anny,  Hungaiian  Second:  322-23.  334.  483.  49S, 

505, 512.  Sa  abo  Hungarian  fistss. 
Jixsny.  Indian  E^9ltuJ23^84, 363, 375. 480. 483-84, 

Anay  Grou{)s,  German 
A:  322,  324.  338,  345-47.  349-51.  353.  358, 
360^62,  364-71,  374-79,  395.  451,  465.. 
482-«4;  490-95 
B:  322,  324,  346-48.  351,  354-56,  358-69,  365, 
375,  378.  386.  446.  450.  452,  455-58.  464-66. 
476.483.488^491.4^ 
Ceiiifier:44.SQ9 
autnmn-winur  ompai^rn,  1942:  446-47, 

450-52.  456-57 
as  Babbasossa  begiitt:  5-6, 28;  34 
b^e  for  Moscow:  36,  40,  45-46.  49,  68,  87, 

61-62.  67 
audi  Dnepr-Dvina  line:  30, 32-33 
andlltelriHU,f^niai7  1942: 173. 176-85,  186. 
1^.  195 

^  §01^  ««F(it«n»i:  Jffli,  208-09,  212-13, 
gI7-4S 

and  S0«i»  ffitisfoHbolt^  19^:  238.  240-54, 
264, 2B6^  322, 924.  i2»-30. 375 

saimBercampalgn,  1942: 398, 400. 402, 404-06, 
«)8-09,  41 1.421 

and  Taifi  n:  34-40,  42 

winter  campaign,  1942:  67.  69-70.  74-75,  78, 
80-83,  86-92,  94-96.  101-02,  lOBf  119*82, 
122-24,  127,  130,  132-34,  140.  148^,  156, 
159.  161,  167,  169-71,  178,  182 
Hk  449 

Don:  452,  473.  476.  478-80.  482-84,  486,  488, 

490-93.495,  501,509 
North:  57  2.'i7  264.  400.  450-51 
as  B.A.RBAW  js^A  begins:  5-7,  28 
and  Finnish  Araiy:  7.  220-21.  224.  232,  426-27 
and  Leningrad:  32.  34-36.  40-43.  45-46, 69, 81, 

359,408-09.411-15.  417-18,  420.  488 
missions,  spring  1942:  283.  286.  294-95 
and  Soviet  partisans:  206.  212.  217 
and  Soviet  winter  tounteroffensive.  1941-1942: 

116,  130.  143-4.-).  148-49.  151-52.  169,  173, 

183,  186-98 
acTikhvin:  51,  69,  71,  81.  224 
South 

as  Barb-'Miossa  begins:  b-7,  27-28 
and  Bi^\l  :  312.  314-16,  322-28.  ,330.  334 
battle  for  Dnepr-Oviiia  line:  32-3.5 
evacuation  of  Rostov:  'iS-'yb,  69 
the  Front,  Febnian  1942:  173.  188 
missions,  spring  1942:  283,  286-87,  294^96,298 
under  Riindstedt:  ?>.  43-46,  54,  87 
and  Soviet  partisans:  206.  217—18 
tal^s  Kharkxw  and  Stalino:  35, 40-41 
war  In  the  souib:  44-4S,  263, 272. 275 


540 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


Army  Groups,  German— Continued 
South— Continued 

winter  campaign.  1941-194(2;  09,  ft?,  91,  IffS, 
^    115.  U  7, 137, 

Secdnd  Ramtet:  5. 27-28,  30,  33-S&, 

-nun)  ftanzer:  6.  27,  30,  3$,  37-40.  49k^t  fi?. 

60-6S,  65-70,  73,  75,  77-78,  80-82,  91-:^. 

103. 118, 156 
fburtb  Paaxer;  S,^7,3SS,  35, 3?-40, 49-^0, 52~SS. 

57. 60^1, 6s,  e^m  n.  n^^'m.m^,  oa-ss. 

101. 103,  Its 
At&tf  Cawps,  Sonitt 
aadtSta:  S7S.mi 
Son  aptratmati 
iliinneiiw  Opmiimak  S67.  S70 
JVm»:  416. 419^20, 422 
i«&rtA:  370,  374 
^a&:  382 

Amty  Migb  Comnend.  Goioan.  See  Oberhmttmiiito 

ArtiUety  sucngih,  German:  7.  93.  116.  1M,  139, 

293-94, 309- 12,411. 414. 515 
Artillery  strength,  Soviet:  11, 18, 31, 47, 49, 139, 14S, 

262,  300-302,  308,  416, 440, 446 
Astialduia:  359,  370,  375. 399. 446, 458 
AiiDagiTi  430 
Aydar  River:  346 
Azov,  Sea  of  :  139,  141,353 
Azm.>  Nami  Flolilta  :  1 10 

Bagramyan,  General  Armii  Ivan:  141. 239, 270, 275, 
278-79, 281,  905.  314. 385 

Baksan  Ri%'er:  454 

Baku:  44.  352,        366.  370-.71 

Balakla\'3:  106,  312,  320 

BalaUeva:  158-59.  269,S8I-4GI' 

Balkans:  4.  6.  13.322 

Baltic  coasc  16-17 

BaltK  Fleet,  .Soviet:  189 

Baltic  Sea:  3.  6,  189-90,  224.  306, 361,418. 451, 455 

Baltic  Stales:  5.  12.  32,  135.  208.  220 
Banak:  228, 423 

Baranov-.  General  Mayor  V.  K.:  247 

Barbaros-sa;  3-7.  13-15.  22.  25-34,  44,  88.  152; 

207-08.  286,508.514,516 
Bat«nis  Sea:  5f>,  139,239 
B:in)vsk:  127 

B.in  ikady  gim  factorv':  391,  396 
Banenkovo:  160,  27a-79 
Basic  Orders:  447-48 
Bataysk:  35ti 

Batov,  General  Lcytenant  P.  1.;  170,  +97 
Battalion,  German,  189tb  Self-propelled  Assault  Gun: 
169 

Baiumi:  365.  370 
Bavaria:  317,  -131.  456 
Bear  island:  236.  42H.  430 
Beketovka.  4.M*.  ■170 
Belbek.  River:  106,  1Q8 


Bdtev:  fr-^.  I'QO-'IOi.  tTSMH.  1^  39S, 

404 

Belgian  troops:  380 

Be^oRku  m.  m,  m.  m 

WMuSilSfiaiiSu^  484, 494 

idcmwA:  234-26, 42d^7 

SfAomaiB!  SOO,  202-04,  li07^  215. 246, 

General  Mayor  P.  A.:  59. 1S3^  169-70, 182, 
m.  268, 402 
Bd^!  169,       195.^41, 156-Sl,  485 

BetestovsQa  River:  273 

Be^:  293,  321, 330, 45&-57, 473 

Bena,  Lavrenti:  217,  372 

Beriin:  4,  54,  78.  86-87,  249,  321, 452, 503 

Bessarabia:  7,  12,  135 

Bettelstab;  411-12 

Bialystok:  27-28,  297 

Black  Sea:  5,  7,  33, 55, 105. 134,  173,  239,  SfiSi^^SOe. 

368,365-67,370-71,575*4?® 
Black  Sta  ma*:  tOS^,  108, 8«^  ST? 
Bjuuu 
iteploynjcnt:  321-32 
execation  of:  333't49,  551, 358,  ^8 
planning:  287-M,  S96^.  Bfl9.  $10, 
317-18,  425 
BlieMr^  campaigns:  15. 43,  53.  407.  510-12,  516 
BttrecHER:  351-52,  358-59.  376-77, 412 
Bobkin,  General  Mayor  L.  V.:  271 
Bobkin  Gwup:  271.  273. 276. 279,  281-82 
Bock,  GeDeral&ldffiancball  Sedoi  von 
and  Army  Gioap  Center:  5,  33,  42,  45.  49-50.  71, 

75-77, 86-87. 140. 165-60,  218 
and  Army  GnDup  South:  262-64. 272-76.  314-16 
and  attack  on  Momxw:  37. 43, 51-54.  59. 61-63 
Operadon  Blao:  318,  321-24.  330-32.  334-39, 
344-61 

Operadon  Fridericus:  272-76,  281-82,  318 

Operation  Stoerfang;  316,  318 

and  operadons  in  die  Crimea:  262,  264 

plans  apnng  1942  offenave;  286-90. 299 

and  Soviet  partisan  warlare:  218 

and  Soviet  winter  counteroffensive,  194 1-1942:  63, 
67-68,  71-83.  86-87.  90,  94-96,  140.  165-60 

turns  over  comniaiiil  to  Weichs:  347^-48 
Bodin,  General  Mayor  P.  1.:  434 
Boehringer,  Colonel 111 
Bogorodiisk:  60 
Bosiichav:  3L'4.  346,  484 
Bolik-ii,  ClLiiies  E.:  503 
Bokovska\i!:  354 

Boidin,  (;ciier.il  Levieii.iiH  I.  V.;  97 
Bolkhov:  176.  446 
Bolsluna  Orlo\  ka:  355,  357 
Bul!>l]i.)\  "Ii>kmak:  156 
Boiva  River:  252 
B(>riieffel»k:  SOS 
Bormann.  Msofin?  504 


INDEX 


541 


Boiodinu:  435 
Borovsk:  127,  131 
floznya: 

Bnuichitsch,  Generalfeldinarscball  Water  von;  4,  14, 
43.  54-55.  61,  78-81.  83-85,  87,  96,  15i,  298, 

508 

Braunschweig:  336.  339-40,  358 
flrennecke,  GeneralnKyor  Mjuu  45,  86, 148,  152 
Brest:  233 
Btestlitovsk:  488 

Bridges:  3.  80,' 200,  234.  333.  SBSi^lSs  ^teS 
Brigade,  Fmnish  12th:  228 
Brigades,  German 

Grodeck:  266-68 

Lehrbrigade  900:  53 

SS  Cavalry:  131-32 
Brigades,  Rumanian:  117 

4th  Cavalry:  1 12 

8th  Cavalry:  112 
Brigades,  Soviet;  31,  440-41 

1st  Belmmsian  Partig0iz  2f)S 

Sth  Airbome:  245 

8th  Shi:  228-30 

8lh  Tajik:  32 

12th  Naval:  228.231 

79th  Naval  Infantn-  108 

80th  Rifle:  229-30 

85lh  InfUfeiidenl:  332 
Brockdorff-Ahlefeldt.  GeneraUeafflaftt  ©firf  W^tfer 

von:  154,  189.  193.  197 
Bri'eckenschlac:  183.  185,  241.  398. 411 

Brusilov,  Alexey:  432 

Bryansk:  37,  90,  95.  122-25,  14^-41, 176,  179,  21?^ 

216,  241-42,246,252,  297 
Budenny,  Marshal  Sovelskogo  Soyiua  Semen:  25,  30, 

34,  36,  261,  31 1.  320,  325,  367,  378. 443 
Bug  River:  8 

Budget,  German  armament;  15 
Budget.  Soviet  armament!  IS 
Bulgaiiiii,  N.  A.:  194 
Bulgaria:  4,  291 
Burkik  River:  313,  316 

Busch,  Gcncialoberst  Ernst:  3if.  143.  147-^.  131, 
189,  192.412-13.421 

Cannons,  Soviet:  11.  126 
Carls,  Cieiieraladmiral  Rolf:  428 
Carj>atliian  Mountains:  3,  8 
Caspian  St-a:        3S8.  SfiSi  S7S 
Casualties 

German;  45,  (iS,  73,  102,  Kil.  I67i  177,188,314, 
321.  381,  392,  -i06-(t7,  462,  489.  49t.  499,  501 
Soviet:  47h,  126.  16,3,  232.  245,  248,  2.59,,  ^€9,, 
296-97,  392,  423,  462,  485-86,  501 
Caucasus 

and  German  pkinnmg:  16,  238.  283,  286-87.  289, 
298.  322-24.  351,  358.  432,  446.  452.  492,515 
oil  in:  16,  43-44.  287.  298-99.  371.  515 
operations  in:  44, 326,  361. 364. 366-81,  388,  412, 
494 


Caucasus — ConUnued 

and  Soviet  planning:  21 .  4 ! .  5 1 .  26 1 .  266,  302-03. 
307.  319.  434,  455 
Caulaincourt,  General  Armand  de:  .515 
Cavalry.  Soviet:  53,  102,  163 

Central  Committee,  Conmamigtfety:  200-201,  214, 

361,384,507 
Chegem  River:  454 
Chekalin:  97-100 
Cherek  River:  454 

Cherevichenko,  General  FS&OfQtklfiyL^t '54^5^361. 

367.  378.  381 
Cherka.ssv:  269 
Chern:  332 
Chernaya  River:  106 

Chevallerie,  Generalleutnant  Kwt  von  der:  451 
Chibisov.  General  Le)rtenani  N.  Vc:  537 
Chikola  River:  454 

Oar  River:  346,  353-54,  357.  443,  471-73,  ^6. 

478-82,  484 
Chisryakov,  General  Mayor  1.  M.i4^ 
Christophorus:  120,  177 
Chudovo:  40,  150.  186,  191 

Chuiko%',  General  Levtenant  V.  i.:  353.  382,  393-96. 

443,  460,  462.  464.  51)3,  507 
Churchill.  Winston  S..  3.  233.  304,  423-24,  434,  441 
Ciano,  Count  Gaicaz/ij:  292 

Civilians:  29,  49,  85,  96,  125,  131.  135,  137,  208-09, 
294,  330,  357.  387,  408,  418,  444,  505.  Sae4i«i 

Partisans ,  S< iviet. 
Clauslvvs  I  !  /:  -AM'..  338,  349,  458 
Oimate.  Set  Weather. 
Goal:  39.  105.  135.  285.  440.  515 
Coastal  StalT  A/ov:  324,  338,  345 
CrflaboraK M s :  "l\>-\ 
Combat  effei  ii\ein'ss:  48,  489 
Command  smiamc  .  German:  3-7,  80-85 
Command  srrui  unr-.  S^iviet:  7-13,  25-29 
Commissar  s\sifm.  .SoMet:  9—10.  439 
Commissariat  of  Defense:  7,  10-11,  18,  23.  25,  302, 

361,441,  506 
Communications,  See  also  Radio;  Telegraph; 

Telephone, 
German:  4,  78.  81,  147,483 
.Soviet:  I'J.  L'4-25.  241 
Commiinisi  P;irt\'.  Soviet:  7,  10,27.41,  138,  206.  361. 

384.  432.  437 
Conscription.  German;  423 
Convoys;  233-37,  42Sj  4gSr^ 
Copper:  285 

Corps.  Finnish  111;  221.223,  227-^.231-32 

Corps,  (  iennan 

Felmv  (.Special  Purpose):  453 

Mouiuaiii  Corps  Nonvav:  223,  227-28,  231-32, 
423 

1:  188-89.  191-92,  197.  257 

11:  I  1 7.  151-54,  188-89.  192,  194-95.  197. 

234-55.  411-13,  421 
Hi  t  424 


542 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


Corps.  German— Contmued 
ni  TsMter:  51.  54-55,  160,  278-82.  313-16,  318, 

373 
IV:  365,  471 

IV  Panzer:  501 

V:  85,  102. 133-34,374 

V  Panzer:  99.  102,  127.  131,  134, 166,  180-88 
VI:  104,  130-38.  l§&-m 

VIII:  275,  278,  SSI.        344-46,  357.  SaS,  3S?. 

500-501 
X:  151-M,  188,  192-93 
XI:  159-60,  382,  499,  501 
Xn:  171 
XIII:  97-98 

XIV  Piinzer:  51.  54.  35:3,  357-58.  360.  363. 

384  ST,  ;MM-?i3,  -i'J5-96, 459-60, 462-63. 468. 

471.  173-7  !.  500 
XVII;  47»,  4«(),  490-91 
XVIII  Mmiiitain:  232,  424 
XX:  127-28,  163 

XXIII:  130-31.  133-34,  167-69.  171 

XXIV  Panzer.  95,  100.  122-23,  164, 178,  333-36, 

344,  346,  357-58.  384-85 
XXVI:  418-21 
XXVII:  130,  13*J 

XXX:  108.  1      2fi6.  268,  312,  314,  318-20.421 

XXXI \':  ^'■\.  ri.sii 

XXXVI  M<Htn[.-iiii:  223-24,  227-29,  426-27 
XXXVI  Patuej  :  166 
XXXVIU:  188,  19\.  196-97.  257.  259 
XXXX:  163 

XXXX  P.iti/f.:  129.  323.  331.  339.  344.  346,  365. 

37:1 

XXXXI  Paiucr:  167 
XXXXII:  107,  1  12^15,  266.  268 
XXXXIII:  95-98,  128-29.  161-63 
XXXXIV:  318,871.376 
XXXXVl:  83 

XXXX VI  RiMWi  :  171 

XXXXVII  P;iti/,cr:  yH,  252,  2,54 

XXXXVIII  P:i[i/ei-:  333-37,  339.  344,  346,  365, 
387.  393-94.  396.  466.  471,  479-81 

XXXXIX  Mountain:  370-77 

LI:  355.  358,  384-85.  387.  391-96.  459-60,  462. 

467-68,  4fM.  800 
LI  I:  379 
LI  1 1  Panzer:  98 

LlVt  urn.  I  13.  312,  316,  318-20 
LVII:  163.  480 

lA  ll  P,in/c!   127-28.  371.  374,380.  479-83,  488, 
490-92 
Coi  p.s,  RiinKrniaii.  312,  319 

VI  Mmiiuarii:  365.  470-72.  479,  491 

VII  Moiirir;u!i:  470-71.478-79,  491 
Corps,  Soviet:  12.  440-41 

I  Cavalry:  159-60 

/  Guards  Cnvalr,-.  59,  fl7,  1S8.  163,  169.  181-82. 

215,  240-41 
/  Guarth  Killf-  L52-54 
/  Kalimn  Partisan:  215 


Corps,  Soviitt^^43ontuiaed 

/  Tank:  332,  334-36.  341,  470,  473 
U  Guards  Cavahj;  92, 40S 

memairyt  501 

m  Guards  Cavahj:  470 

///  Guattit  Tank:  494 

IVAirlmme:  140,  164,  170. 182,243,245,247 
iVC«a«iiRi^;416.419 

IV  Mtdmnised:  472,  474 

WTank:  332, 334-36. 408, 470.  472-74 

V  Cavalry:  139-60 
VICamhy:  156, 159 

VI  Guards  R^:  25B 
V7  Tank:  403 

V!l  Cavalry:  332 

VII  Tank:  341 

VIII  Cuwilry:  332,  471,  501 
VIII  GtutnLi  Cavalry:  408 
VI 1 1  Tank:  403 

A'  Guards  Rifle:  379 

XI  Cavalry:  164.  167.  170.  241-42,250-^ 

XJII  Tank:  363 

XVI  Tank:  332.  334-36,  341 

AT//  Tatik:  334-3© 

XXI  Tank:  278 

XXIII  Timk:  278 

XXIV  Ttmk:  334-36 
XVV7  Tank:  470.  473-74 
XXV;//  Tank:  363 

Cottbus;  309 

Council  of  Labor  and  Defense:  8 
Council  c£  ftople^  Commissars;  7,  29,  199 
Countcrimurgencjr,  See  Anttpaniaan  operBtiom, 

GctinatL, 
Crete;  fi 

Crime;»:  3.-)-36.  40,  42,  85.  105-17,  137,  139,  141, 
156.  191),  239.  261-69,  275-78.  309,  317,  319. 
321.  324.  338.  405,  418 

Cripps,  Sir  Stafford:  3 

Cnada:  291 

Damfpiumhkk:  336 
Deceptions,  German:  328 
Deceptions,  Soviet:  444-47,  464 
Decorations.  German  military:  321 
Decorations,  Soviet  imBl!«!^,3t|k  #11,  SOS 
Dednuvu:  62,  66 

Defense  Contodiiaaiat  Stt-VtofMi  Comtoismi»t  <sf 

Defense. 
Defense  Council,  Soviet:  7*-S 
Demidov:  171,  173 

Demyaiisk:  140,  143.  147-48.  151-55,  173,  186-95. 

197,  240,  254-55,  321,  409,  411,  413,  415-16, 

421.  451 
Denmark:  54 

DERFLlNOtR:  398-400,  403 

Derkul  River:  324.  344 

Desna  Rivet:  246,  252,  25  1 

Detachment,  German,  Panzer  60:  117,  158-60 


INDEX 


543 


Dieppe:  452 

OieU,  General  der  GetntKHn^nie  Eduant:  222-23, 

225.  228-32.  423-2^  43$^ 
IXetrkh.  Dr.  Olio:  39 
IMetrich,  SS  OberKmppeaft(^bier.|»M* 

Dimitrov:  57,  59-60 

Directives.  German,  Sm  BlCfaKr  IKrective& 
Divisions,  Finnish 
J;  223 

3d:  223 
6(h:  228 
Divisions,  German:  7,  45 
Adolf  HiUcr  {SS):  493 
Das  Reich  (SS):  53,  166,  168.  4'J3 
Ho*:  375 

Grossdeulsrhland:  336.  340,  344-47,  349.  355, 

357-58,  364-ri5,  375.  405-^,499 
Jaeger:  358.  3<-)6.  418,  422 
Uiu/:  381 

Lcibstandarie  Adolf  Hider  (SS):  Si-SS,  3^ 

Nord  (SS):  223 

Totenkopf  (SS):  255,422 

Viking  (SS):  379,  453,  482.490-#l.  494 

1st  Mountain:  2i^2 

1st  Panzer:  70,  75,  168,  2.50-51,  402 

2d  Mountain:  223,  231.  424 

2d  Panzer:  53,  25(i,  402 

3d  Mo(ori?cd  liilamry':  340,  358 

3d  Mounlmrr  118.  427.  488 

3d  I^aii7cr:  HXI,  275,282,349 

PanztT    l(Ml-l(M,  12B,  4M 
5tli  Jaeger;  42  1-22 
5th  Ught;  152-5-1 
.')rh  Mountain:  224,  418.  426-27 
'Mil  Panzer:  53,  1 80-82. 250-51,  «»2 
'nil  Infantrs-:  102 
tiili  M.Hiiisaiii:  223,228,424 
(nil  Paii/or:  185.  479 
7tli  -Mouniain:  224-25.  232,  424 
7th  Pan/cr;  y.-i.  480.  490-92,  494 
7ih  (SS):  49.^ 
9lh  Panzei:  343,  407 
10th  Panzer:  53,  213-14 
1  Uh  Panzer;  53,  404,  479.  490,  492,  494 
12ih  Panzer;  418,  420 
13lh  Panzer;  55,  379,  454 
14th  Moioriztd:  250 

14th  Panzer:  1:>9,  2H1-82,  349.  458-60,  473 
16th  MoiunzcH  Intantiy:  337,  S44-4S«  375.  471. 

482,  490-91,  493 
16th  Panzer:  282.318.473 
1 7th  Panzer;  53.  57.  480-82 
IHUi  Paii/,ff;  123.  164 
19th  Panzer;  244.  246 
20ih  Panzer;  171.  250-51 
22d  Inlantrv:  108,  319 

22cl  Panzer:  261,  263.  266-68.  278.  318,  37S.  479 
23d  Panzer:  273,  282,  330-32,  339.  345.  347,  454. 
479 

24ih  Infentry:  319,  420-21 


Di%-isions,  German— Coniinued 
24th  Panzer:  340,  344-47.  357 
26ih  Infantry-:  102 
28lh  Jaeger:  418 
28ih  Light:  261,  266-68 
29th  Motorized  Infantry;  346 
45th  Infantry:  74,  95 
46th  Infantry:  107.  109-10, 112,  U7 
30th  Infantry:  366-^ 
58th  Infaiitrv:  197 

60th  Motorized  Infantry;  282,35S.46S 

71st  Infenlry:  273,  396 

72d  Infentry:  405.  - 

78th  Infantrv-:  402 

79th  IntinitiT;  458-60.  4^-<»4 

95th  Inlantr)':  74, 407 

100th  Jaeger:  396 

100th  IJ^ht;  159 

lOlsi  1  inlii  318 

102(i  hilLitiiiv:  402 

mill  InLiutiT:  379 

lt3ili  Infantrv:  273 

12 Ui  liifanfry:  421 

123d  Infanm-:  147 

I26di  Iniamn';  146,  421 

132d  Infamrv:  115-17,266-69,421 

134th  liilanin;  95 

161st  Infantn';  400 

163d  Infantrv  221,228 

167th  Inf.iiiiiT;  98 

169ili  223 

170ili  hilaiiirv:  117,266,268-69,418,420-21 

197ili  InfauiiT;  244,251         "  *"  " 

20Sth  Inlaulrv;  164 

210th  Infantrv;  424 

21oth  Infatun:  146 

221st  Secuiity;  246 

22.3d  Infanin':  418 

227th  Intaiiin  ;  418 

258ili  Inlanin;  62 

288ili  liil.min:  223 

290th  Iiif,iiiiiT;  153-54 

29Cith  Inlaiiiiv:  98 

304lh  Iiir,uitr>:  494 

305ih  Inlanliv;  275.  458-60 

330ih  Iiiiaiun;  171 

336th  Inlantrv:  479 

339th  ljif;nirrv:  252 

707th  So(iirit\;  252 
Divisions,  Rumanian:  371 

Ui  Anitiin-d;  479 

2d  MiHiiii.uii;  454 

18ili;  1  17 
Divisions,  Sm  iel:  13,  31,  440-41 

Isl  Gu(nd\  Cav/dry:  247 

1st  Giiardi  liiflf.  421 

isl  Snuileink  PiiitLian:  215 

2d  Giiaidi  Cnvahy:  247 

10th  Gutird'.:  228 

10th  NKVDl  384 


644 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


Divisions,  Soviet— Continued 

13th  GuanL  Order  6f  Lemn  iJi/fe:  394 

14th  Guards  Riflti  'iM 

l4thRip:  228 

im  Rip:  170 

23i  Guards:  228,  230 

•#M  Guards  Rip:  468 

80th  Cavaln:  189 

n9thRifk  :  46S 

124th  Rip:  468 

186th  Rip:  229-30 

2mh  Infantn:  63 

327fh  Rifli'i  188-89 

529;A  ffi^t':  247 

3-fyth  Rip:  108 
Dnepr  bend:  'M 

Dnepr  River:  ".,  21,  'JS^2'J  141.  156-59. 

170,  i7(i.  202,      2m.  4!s;^,  509,  5n-ii' 

lliR[)]-lJviTi;i  line:  21,  23,  1S-M),  32,  lii,  140,  202 
Dnepropetrovsk:  91.  139,  141.  156-58,  160,  270. 

483-K4,  ri<l9 
Dno:  140,  147,  153 
Don  Operation:  493,  496 

Don  River:  44,  54,  65,  95.  283.  287.  289-90,  307,  3 1 9. 
322^24,  326.  337,  339.  343.  346-47.  349-61, 
363,  365,  366-67.  372.  377,  382,  396,  412, 
442-43.  455-57.  458-59,  462,  468,  471-74, 
476,  478.  480,  482-84.  486,  489,  492-94,  496 
Don  Rner  bend:  288,  352-61,  384-87,  395-96,  485 
Donets  Basin:  16.  33,  39,  41,  69.  105,  133,  141.  324. 
■!93.  515 

Donets  River:  105,  137,  139.  141,  156-58,  272.  279, 
281-83.  289.  310,  316,  318,  323-24.  343, 
346-47,  349,  353-55.  452,  483-84.  488, 
491-96,  509 

DoNNi  i<-si:tii.At;:  482-83 

Donskol.  Diiniti-\  :  4  I 

DOR.A.:  309-10.  316,  411 

Dora  Lane:  191-93,  197.256.259 

Dorogobuzh:  246 

Double  envelopment:  132.  312.  .'ill  Siv  ahu  Kul-IicIc- 
ment  operations.  C'.etiiiaii;  Eiitii clement  opera- 
tions, So\iel. 

Dovator.  General  Mayor  L.  M,;  88,  92-93 

Dubiia:  94 

Dubrovka:  422 

Duie  i>j  Vnrk.  H.M.S.:  428 

Diikovshchina:  171.  241 

Dutch  troops:  381 

Dvina  River:  21.,  23.  27-30.  32.  61,  140,  170,  202 

East  Prussia:  5,  8.  55,  80,  348.  351 
Economy.  German  wartime:  15,  299,  504—05 
Etoiiomy.  Soviet  WOTtime;  135,.  299»  440 
Eden.  .Anthony:  135 
Elirenburff,  llya:  434 
Edelweis-S:  358,  366-81 
EI  Alamein :  5 1 3 
Elbrus,  Mount:  371-72 


Electricity:  135.  285.  440 
Elephant:  120,  177 
EHstai  375.  482.  49S.  496 
Elkhorovo:  379 

EltCtFdement  operations,  German:  14.  27-28,  30. 
33-34,  37,  39-40,  52,  182-83.  29n,  :il4,  316, 
336.  344,  349,  354.  358.  387,  488,  5 1 1 

Encirclement  operations.  Soviet:  71,  120-22,  125, 
129.  139-40.  153-55,  !70-7i,  270.  275,  443, 
472.  474,  47s,  485.  48S,  493,  496,  51  1-13 

Engels,  Major:  460 

English  Channel:  233.  291.  346.  423,  449,  456 
Envelopment.  See  Double  envelopment;  Entirclement 

operations.  German;  Encirclement  operations, 

Soviet. 

Ereinenko.  Marshal  Sovetskogo  Sovuza  .\.  L.:  18.  443 
and  lUyaii^k  !-r<>nl\  33-34,  36-37,  148,  150 
:)nd  SoMet  offensive.  |anuaiT  1942:  148-49,  169, 
171 

and  Staiingiad:  382-8,5.  387.  393-91.  396.  170. 
507 

Erfnith.  Genera!  de:  Snianlerie  VV.ildeiiMi  :  223-26. 
426-27 

Erika  l.inic:  191-92.  194.  196-97.  256-57,  259 
Esioniir  32 

Eiiperjint'iiial  Oigiitii,'.attiiii  (.ietiier:  244  -  45 

Ealkciilinrst,  Gciieralobersi  .Nikolaus:  2211-22,  225. 
291 

Fedmeiiko.  (.cm-ral  l.cvlcii:iin  Ya.  N.:  336,  ;")07 

Fednro-,  k.i,  i'i2.  ivi 

Fegcleiii.  Bnii.idcruehrer  Otto  Hermann:  131 

Ichn\.  General  iler  Flieger  Helmuli  453 

Feodosiya:  105.  107-17,  141,266 

Hnland:  4.  8-10.  14-16,  28,  39-40.  54.  135.  220, 
303,  418,  424,  426-27.  505,  .S>c  tiko  Winter  War, 
1939-1940. 

Finland,  Gulf  of:  139.  143,  189-91.411 
.Knnish  Army:  4-5.  7.  10.  32,  35.  37.  40,  44,  46.  81, 
1.S4,  192-93.  195.  220-33.  291,  409.  412-13, 
415,  426-27,  440,  3il5,  if,-  aho  ,\\m\.  Finnish 
1 1th;  Corps.  Finnish  111;  Divisions,  Finnish. 

Ft.st:HRt:iitr.H:  359,395 

Folient,  Cape:  321 

ForelKii  .Annies.  East:  296-97.  305,  455-S7 
Foic-igii  Miiii-sin.  German:  222 
ForiificaiiMus:  21,  316,  321 
Fortresses:  42.  105-08.  154-55.  324,  411 
Fons.  Soviet:  310.  316,  318,  320-21 
France:  15.  177,  292.299.457.511 
Fretter-Pico.  Generd  \^et  i^Xtii}^^  M<yit»pi3%ii  feu; 
267-68,  488 

F&it.ERK  L  s:  272-73.  275-8Z,  310,  312-14.  317-19, 

325,  330,  344 
iTnl()\.  General  Lev  tenant  V.  A.:  35,226-27 
FronitH.  Cicneialobersi  Friedrich:  84,  87 
Frmili.  Soviet:  8 

Btyanslr.  36-37.  148.  156,  217,  396,  398 

and  Bi.At  :  325-26.  332.  334.  341-^ 

composiuon  of:  33-34,  49 


INDEX 


343 


Frenb,  Soviet— Comiittwdi 
Ajionxt— Continued 
sad  Smici  winter  countBTORbl^tns, 

90.  122-23,  140-41 
and  spring  ofTensive.  l9&iSMkMB@^^^  S07^ 
CmtTvl;  32-34.  214 

Crimean;  156,  261-63.  265-66,  268-69,  311 
Don:  396,  442-43.  478.  48(t,  4K,'i,  496-99,  501 

hi,  F.u'.f.;„:  8 

Knhmn:  ^'17,  240,  246,  308.  3'lti.  406 

■iiid  ficfcnsf  lit  Moscow;  37,  49— BO 

and  MARS;  445-46.  484-85 

wintei  countciTitTensive,  1941-1942;  62,64-65, 
67, '.Ht.  124-25.  14(1.  149.  153.  176,  184-86 
KmUian.  35,  139.  217,  226-27.  2411 
Umngrad:  8,  36.  49.  137.  J45,  186.  197,  217.  226. 

240,  255.  257  59.  408, 416, 428 
North:  8.  32,  226 

North  Caucasut:  Ml,  320,  SSB» JJ@.  SNt, 

378 

.\„>lh:r>-.l:  H.  24-'.',S.  ^0,  32.  36.  HO-41,  14S,  147, 

I5U.  lcS6,  194.  197.240.255.416 
Reserve:  32,  36-37 
South:  8. 28,  33-34.  36. 353.  493 

and  BLAU-  325-26,  343-44,  .349-51 

and  defense  of  Moscow:  49,  51,  54 

merged  inio  North  Caucasus;  367 

spring  frffeiuive.  1942:  269-71,  278-79.  307-fl8 

wtBter  «ounuia£GeUsi«^  1IM1>>1942:  13^7,  141, 

156,  isa 

Souikta.ft:  382-84.  S94, 896. 4^ 
Southwest:  36 

as  B.A,RnAK(}s&A  begins:  8.  24-2S 

snd  Bi.AU:  314.  325-26,  334,  337,  340,  343-44, 
349-51 

defends  Moscow:  50,  54,  60 

ordered  lo  hold  Kiev:  33-34 

spring  oHensive.  1942:  239,  269-70,  273,  27S, 

ami  St^ghidr  353,  442-44.  457,  478,  480, 

484—85  493  498 
winter  offensive.  1941-1942:  64-65,  67.  137, 
141,  156. 15S-S9 
Slatingmd-.  353,  357.  363.  S70,  3^-34,  ftm-^, 
396,  442-43,  465,  470,  478.  480.  485,  493,  496 
Tramcaticastu:  105.  108.  141.  156,  261,  370,  372, 

mAeo:  m,  im,  145-46, 150,  ISS,  IM,  198,  t^. 

240. 255,  258.  408. 416. 422 
Vmmah:  343,  353,  442.  484 

baste  fbrMoKOw:  36-37, 49»50,  S9,t>t 
and  nmSi  44S-46,  484-8S 
mi  partissijis;  209, 213-14. 21? 
and  R2he«>-Syefacvka  epmH^tOOi  1^*  4Q2, 
407 

spring-summer  c£knjiive,  1942:        i^',  345, 
308. 325. 942 


F\mUt,  Soriei— Coniintied 

W^—OmtinaeA 
mnter  couDterofibnsive.  1 94 1  -  !  942 ;  64-06, 
76-77, 88-90. 124-23, 140-41,  176 
Fuehm  Diwcdws:  261 

21;  14 

32:  15,  284 

33:  33 

34;  33 

35:  34 

41:  74. 105, 286^88. 290, 293. 296,  310, 312, 3^. 
409 

43:  351 

44:  412.  426 

.15:  :(ri8-(i"i,  :57l . 

Fuehrer  He.idquarTer-i:  33.  69.  80-81.  84-87.  95,  97. 
132,  147-48.  155,  163,  167,  173.  179-80, 
18.5-90,  192.  197,  224.  339.  347-48,  351,  407, 
413-14.  426.  449.  472-73.  480,  500,  504.  509. 
See  oko  WeruiolJ;  Wulfsschanze. 

FmsoMi:  245 

(.;.iblc[i/.  GetiL-ralleutiiant  Eccard  von:  130 
Gaitolnui:  421-22 
GAMMA:  :i09-l 0,411 

Gasoline  shoi'tjij^es,  Qemm.  ^  lJ&i^0eu»,  Gttvmi, 

shonages,  fuel. 
Gasoline  «h»na|^SltSi^  S»  LogiuiBli^SiHritjt,  *ilOt& 

ages,  fuel. 
Gasparyan,  Major:  213-14 
Gamltwka:  387 
Gchlen,  Colonel  Reinhard:  455 
General  Staff,  German  Army:  512 

25.  69, 14S,  212, 272.  283,  318.  SS7. 351, 
374,  582. 447. 449. 465. 473, 480, 509 
early  rale:  14, 43-^.  84, 90 
and  Hider:  348, 490, 483.  508-09 
General  SiafT,  Soviet  Army: 
Chief  of:  8,  16-17,  33,  50,  62. 137, 197i  ^8, 2*Bi 

270.  278-79.  283.  341,  437-38,  m 
early  planning:  8. 15-19,  21. 23, 30^  SS 
mA  sgtwig  (Ofaimen  19^i  SS8HI(».  WS.  Slf 
^  Stalingrad:  43^  4i& 

strategic  rote:  38.  &1»  64^  1S9,  14^,  258.  S05-47, 
326, 332, 342,506.^2 
Gisu^:  I62i  208 

Gttsa,  iSmimSas^i»  "Wem^  innt  IS!,.  IfiS 
Gizdi  494 

GEO  (Gotudofsttmnji  Kmilil  flfimn^):  2S-90i  87, 
188. 1»0.«X7,  238-39. 279.  m,  305,  382.  885, 
438.506 

Gneisenau:  233,  291 
Gocbbcls,  Joseph:  120.  292-93 

Reidinnarxliall  Hcramnii:  4,  6,  448,  476, 

Goerlitz  Forest:  4 

GoETZ  VDN  Bcruchincbn:  W6 

GOLIATH:  309-10, 312 


546 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


Coliko\.  (.eneral  Lc^lEDaiu  F.  I.r  60,  325-S6,  332, 

334-37,  341,  343,  384,  442-43,  484 
( iohihinskiy;  473 

( idlushkevich,  GencTai  Mayor  V.  S.:  242 

<  ...iiiL-l;  269 
C.iimhary:  388 

Gordov,  General  Ltrtcnant  V.  N.;  357, 383»84 

Oil  kiv:  37.  44.  46.  .50.  283.  308 
tiurndisc  Ik':  46(1 
GMifdwi  lie  River;  459-60 

Cnjuidnv.iiiskov,  Cicneral  l^tenaut  A.  M.;  ZTlj  278 
General  Pblkovnik  0, 1.1  162 

( idrokhovatka:  318 
Cjiirshechnove:  331) 

(;<ivorov.  Ci-neral  1  .rvteiuitt  '89$ 

Gr«/  Zeppclm:  ^35 

Great  Britain:  3.  6,  13.  29,  39|4&  135, 222,  22.i.  231, 
233,  2<»9,  304-05,  307,  338,  346,  349,  423.  426. 
428.  434,  505,  5!3 

Grechko.  A.  A.:  141-42,  326,  361.  443,  452 

Greiffenberg,  Generabnaior  Ham  wn:  45,  81,  98, 
324,  347 

Greiner,  Captain  HdOUIt;  S?7 

GrtKlno:  24.  272 

Groups.  German.  Sm  Atj%<Sn«^''Ge«i$IW. 

Groups,  Soviet 
BtcKk  Sea:  378, 381 
Don  Opemtiamil:  367 
Maritime  Operational:  367-70 
Affua:  416,  419-20,422 
North:  370, 374, 454 
Soulh:  382 

Gtoinyy:  307,  352.        366,  371,  373-7*,  375, 

379-80,  451 
Gnippe  von  der  CSievallerie:  4S1-52 
Grusbuan  Military  Road:  358.  371,  373, 379 
Grazino:  409,  414 
Gryaznov,  General  Mayor  A,  S,:  154 
Guadalcanal:  513 

Guderian,  Generaloberst  Heinz:  46,  50,  179 
relieved  (rf'aunmand:  100,  128,  155 
and  Second  Ftozer  Group:  28,  30  33-34 
mad  Soviet  coumeroffeasive,  December  1941: 
66-67,  73.  77-80. 85-86,  94-100.  128 

Gummk:  391.  474,  498 

Guns,  German:  74.  294,  515.  Sh  also  HowitzeiS, 
GoniBUii:  liiiieyae  funs,  German- 

S<Nnm.:  13,  32S 
7S-mm.:  ll.SSS 

88-iniR.:  40, 100. 126, 165. 190,  325 
Guos.  Soviet:  11,  lOS,  126,  300.  441,  515.  «X» 

Cannons,  Soviet  lifa(^iae,giiiu[,  S^yia. 
Gshat  River;  403 

Gzhaok:  76,  60, 94. 96, 163. 166, 171. 180, 241 
Cd)acQikr1ft%a  ibsition:  132 

Haeakl^  @ett^  der  Iji&tuetie  Siegfried:  ^7 
ttii^  Getienil(^tei4t  ftami  37,  212.  220,  249; 


Haider,  Generalobersi  Franz— Continued 
and  Bi^u;  331.  337-40.  344.  347-48 
and  Directive  45:  364 
eariv  siratej^y:  25,  28,  33 
jiul  t  ill  ill  Icment  at  Rostov:  3.54— 5(i,  3lin 
.iiul  L-viiL  11.11  ion  of  Deinvaiisk  pfitkei;  415,  421 
jiid  FKiiit  KiCL'.;  272-73,  31M 
and  Hitlei's  .'itrategit  objcfii\es,  November  1941: 

43-41.1,  283.  285-.S7,  29(1,  298 
and  ofiensivc,  Nuu-niber   1941:  43-46,  50.  53, 

ril-r,2 

and  operations  in  the  Caucasus:  374,  376-77,  379 
plans  campaign,  wintra^  |9U~-1^:  69,  75-78, 81, 

84,  86-87,  192 
replaced  as  chief.  Array  Geaoal  Sl^:  84-85,  4^ 
and  Soviet  counieroffeRtiife,  BeceiDlier  1941: 
61-62,  73.  75-78,  81,  84,  06-87,  90,  97-lOt, 
103-104.  192 
and  Soviet  offensive,  January  1942:  188—29, 
131  32,  1.34,  148-49.  151-52.  169 
HaniiilMl;  510-11 
Hannovkk;  LMl.  250.  252,  398 
Harko:  30fi.  309 

Harritiian.  VV  .Averell:  39.  432,  441 
Hcim,  Generalleuinant  Ferdinand:  471 
Heinrichs,  Jalkavaenkenraali  Erik:  415.  427 
■Heinrici,  General  der  Infanteri  Gotthardi'  129, 
*     161-63.  169, 171, 178-80. 244-48. 403 
HeuBinger.  ColonduMi^  49,  6l,  80,  IQO.  354-55. 

385,414-15 
Himer.  Gencralmajor  KuiC  HS-H 
«i#fr:  236,  428.  430 

Hitler,  Adolf;  4-5,  35.  42,  382,  388.  595.  432,  451, 

453,  See  ofaw  Futhrw  Directives. 
Anti-Corn  inteni  PaO;  54-55 
'Annameni  1942"  of  10  January  1942:  284 
and  annamencs  prtKuremeni:  87.  91-92 
assumes  command  of  army;  80-85,  87,  450, 508 
and  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor:  78 
and  Barbadossa:  3. 13-15, 33 
ttui  Bum  (Sucfrieo):  287,  290,  297.  310.  318, 

aai-22.  324-25.  328. 331.  337-40, 344-48 
Siid  BKtiEt.KENScm.Ac:  192-93,  19G-9S,  409 
aad  campaign,  winter  1941-42:  69-74,  79-87.  91. 

94-104,  105,  115,  123,  127-13^  147-149, 

178-80, 183-8S.  188.  m 
mi  Gmmixt  e^tin^iom'.  966,  S?4>  878-81 
icoiBatinBent    RAinmex:  l^^dS 
Slid  antwrsion  cd  tocsI  war  economy:  299 
aUd  ilie  Crimea:  105,  115,  310,312,  314,  321 
Ib^sioa  making:  69-70,  8<hM,  I<$0,  134,  354. 

474-77.  483.  490.  493 
directive,  8  December  1941:  74. 105,  2S6 
esdtnaies  of  Sonet  sti^ngth:  13-15,  ^ 
and  &esm  ksadaue  te  ettkdeiaeai  at  Heiavaiuk: 

i47-4aij  iSsSif 

"Ha^OiaS  wsUtance't  81-84.  94.  97-104.  118-20. 

IS^.  185. 130-33. 450,  472-73, 475-77, 499 
and  Finland:  5. 40. 189-90. 220. 22^4, 231, 233, 

409,411,  415,424.426 


INDEX 


547 


tlitler,  Adolf— Continued 

and  Fmderici-'s:  272-73,  27fi,  281.  a  10,  312,  317, 

sso 

and  his  generals:  4.  33,  63,  78-87,  94,  100,  122, 
132,  155,  259.  291-92.  331.  357-4»i,m  164. 
449-.'i0,  471.  473.  508-10 

341(1  C;crman  Nav-y  :  2S3'-SS,  425. 428 

and  Hungaty:  290 

Uid  Japan:  78,  286 

and  [he  Koemgsberc  Line:  130.  132.  134,  16J. 

164.  166^-67,  169.  171-72,  173 
leadership  priodples:  81-85, 362,  448-49 
aud  Leningrad;  opeistiOm  4^.  tllfKr,  4S0. 

451 -.^2 

and  manpower  ]j)VK  Li!ft!iciii;  I'l,  M7,  1 20, 176 
and  Mussolini:  290-91.  293.299 
names  commiiiee  for  total  e{fi»t:  504-05 
and  North  Africa:  457 
and  Norway:  233-34.  236.  291-92,  299 
and  offcnsire,  November  1941:  43-44,  54-57.  286 
plans  attack  on  Moscow:  37-39 
aiir!  pussihlc  Anglo-American  landings:  231,  233, 
i^'ti  -  '.I'J. ;'.  Hi.  423 

.iiui  Rci(lii-I  niciflent:  3Sl»-32 

Uiital  Iroin  Ro.stuv:  .')4  I'^T,  1  U> 

and  Russo-Japanese  lu'iiii ireat\:  20 

and  Soviet  pmisans:  L'OT,  2I7-I'i.  372 

speech  of  26  Aprin942;     J  'i  t 

and  Stalingrad:  375.  441.  -i'u  .  ri.s-60.  464-65. 

468.  471-77,  478,  48(1-83.  488,  490-95,  497, 

499-502,  304 
statements  after  Slalin^ad:  504 
andSTOERFANG:  310.  312,  314,318,321 
slratcgic  options.  spniiK  1942:  188-92,  241-42. 

2(1 1.  263-6-4,  2H3-93.  297-99.  306 
as  a  straicgist:  4.  13-1.-).  33.  84-87.  93,  122. 

129-30.  147-49,   152-55,  176,  178,  283-93, 

306.  329.  3.ii-.>.'^,  3.'>7-.'>9.  364-65.  412. 

475-77,  514,  51(S 
sKjxeme  coniniandcr  nt  .u  mcd  forces;  3-4,  450, 

"idti,  fifW-lO 
anil  Vu  HLNScni-.u.:  45i-.)2,  455 
ai  HVra  o//:  351.  360,  113,  415,  451-52,  456 
aiu!  WrLHtLM:  316,  312,  33(1 
and  "VViMier  Re  lie! "  pmnciiii:  39.452 
and  V\'[nnFL\viNi>:  402-07.  413 

ai  \Vol/,.,  lni„ze  .  4,  54-55.  80,  195i.  SSfl^  SSI, 
338,  403,  409,  456.  474 
Hocpner,  C.eneraloberst  Erich:  32.  39.  49,  53.  62,  65, 
67,  73.  8(1,  92,  101-03,  1 18.  127-28.  131.  133, 
155 

HoUidl.  (.ciH-ial  tier  Inliinteric  Karl:  491-94 

Home  goards,  So%'iei:  29 

Hopkins.  HanT  L.;  1 1 .  42 

Hoises:  7,  11:'.,  29:',.  L".>5.  464 

Honln.  .\(hnii,il  \!il.lns.  291 

Huili,  ( ri'iietalobcT'^l  Ht  i  in.m 
and  Bi.AL  :  322.  336.  339-41.  344,  346 
commands  Fourth  Panzer  Armv:  336, 340^1,  S40, 
354-55.357.360,365.491  ' 


Hitler,  Adolf— Continued 

and  the  Izyum  bulge:  156.  158-59 

and  Stalingrad:  382,  385-88,  392-93,  4S8>&9, 

467.  470-72.  478.  490-92.  494-95 
and  Third  Panzer  Group:  27.  30,  49.  155-56 
Howitzers,  German:  126.  165.  293.  309 
Howitzers,  Soviet:  70 
Hiibe.  Generalleuinani  Hans:  395 
Hiichner.  Generalmajoi  Werner:  198 
Hungarian  forces:  286.  290,  456^495.  503.  See  alia 

Army,  Hungarian  Secwifli-.^ 
Huaguy:  4, 16, 286, 605 

Itelanrt:  233,  235-36fc^'*|?.iS9 

Umen.  Lake:  137.  140.  143-48,  150-51.  153,  166, 

173,  186,202.409,512 
Industrial  base.  German:  285.  514-15 
Industrial  base.  Soviet:  28,  42,  135,  514-15 
Informaiioii  B n re :iu,  Soviet:  135,204 
Ingermadhiiiit-  11*9, 411  " 
(nliernian:  31 '.I 

totellige  ntf ,  Cic  1 1 1 1  ,i  u :  65 .  7  I .  lOT,  l&S,  tSS,  208,. 244, 

25 1 .  239,  296.  302,  326,  329,  33f ,  455-56 
Intelligence.  ScHw$!  SMTB,  S(&,  S29. 33i 
Iran:  298,  426 
Iron:  39,  133.  285, 300, 440 
Ismail:  435 

Isttuntis  Float,  Finnish:  415, 427 
Uoa:  66 

Italian  forces:  'j  m.  'i     37S.  425,  456,  505.  Sn  «£» 

Armv,  Italian  I-"i^li(h. 
halv:  4,  16.  286.  292,  505 
Ivanov.  General  .'Vnnii  S-  I'.:  16-19.  22 
Ivaiivovskove:  193 

Izyum:  139,  141,  155-61,  173,  269-81.  310.  313. 
3J8. 347'    »  • 

japan:  13.  16,20,48,78.134,3(^,512 

Jashkul:  471 

Jodl,  Gcnetal  der  Artillcrie  Alfred;  4,  63.  79-Hl .  S4. 

87.  129,  363-65. 377-78.  413-14,  426. 450, 473. 

508 
Ji  i'iter:  423 

K  l  ine:  94,  96.  103-04.  130,  132.  134.  161.  164-66. 

169-70.  175 
Kai  ha  River:  1 06 
Kagahiik  River:  36(1 

Kaiach:  357-5S.  360,  363.  382.  384,  393.  443, 
471-74.  479 

KaUnin:  37.  40  49-50,  64-63.  67,  70,  73,  79-80,  88, 

93-94.  308.  329 
Kalitva  River:  344 

KahHpi:  »9,  95,  97, 99-108,  ta2, 124-25. 140, 398. 
400 

Rahi'^a,  \Ia|i>i :  252 

Kamonsk-Shakinckiv;  346-47,  349-51,  359,  382. 

484-85,  4K.S,  491 
Kaminski,  fironislav:  216 


548 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


Kandalaksha:  28. 230.  SSS^.  SEW,  m 
Kardymovo:  213-14 
Karelia:  202n,  217.  224 

Karelia.  Isihmus  of:  34-35,  40.  220-21.  224,  226, 

^09,  412 
KARL:  309-10.  316,411 
Kannamno:  404,  406 
Karpovka:  474 
Karpovka  River:  387 
Katpovskaya  Station:  496 
Kashira:  50,  53, 57-60 
Kaunas:  24 

Kazakov,  General  Armii  M.  I.:  326 
KcikI,  Generalmajor  Bodwin:  84,  8" 
Keitcl,  Ccnei.iifelflt!i,iisi!ial]  \Vilhflra:  S0»  W.  148, 
290. 340,  347,  4 1 3,  420, 450. 508 

chief.  OKW:  4.  86,  331.  337, 8SI,fid<l 

and  List^  resignauon:  37? 

and  war  in  Finla^^SS^^  339^ 
Kemi:  22H,  234 

KeEiipf.  <  •t-iieral  det  Piinzertruppen  Werner:  3'.I3 
Kerch;  Hl5-l.kS,  110-12,  114-13.  262,  2ti7-C9, 

310-12,  314,  320,  370 
Kerch   Pciiiimila:  42,    105,   109-13.  115-16.  158, 

2l.il  -(>2,  269,  275.  310.  'Mil 
Kerch  Strait:  1 16-17,  261.  346.  351.  376. 412 
Kestenga:  226-29.  SSlr^i  SlB^ufiBWl* 
Rhalkuia:  471 

Kharitono\,  General  Lo'tenaiii  I'.  M.:  48fi 
Kh,irk..v:  33.35.40.  105.  141,  l.'.ll-.M),  214. 239, 246, 
i''i'i-75,  278,  281.  293,  307,  310,  316,  B2S,  326. 

:5l'H-2<J,  347,  477,  484.  509,  '.12 
khLMsoiics,  Cape:  320-21 

Kholiii:  140,  143.  140.  151.  153-54.  173.  l»6-90, 

I '.12,  l'.H-95.  I'JT.  321,  446.  451 
Khoper  River:  363. 395,  459 
Khozin.  Genetal  LejTtenaat  M.  $.:  4$,  Wft  li6>  197, 

255-58 

Khnishche^v  Nikita  S.:  15.  22,  25.  23^;  ^  HffS, 

27S-79,  282.  30.'i.  314,  384. 393 
Kie^  .7,  14,  'J:i.  yi-M.  42,  60,  125,  HI.  207,814 
Kinzfi.  (Colonel  Eberhard:  297 
kinshi:  137,  139, 143,  145. 409, 413-14. 41t 
Kirkenes:  228 

Eiov:  123,  173.  178-79.  212,  HI,  244,  S,49^ 

252. 342. 406 
Kirpi'iii)'..  (.t  iieral  Rjlkovnik  M.  P.;  8,  SS 
Kl  vit.M  II  um.^.\n:  424,  426 
Kicist.  ( k-iii'i  iiloberM  Ewald  von 
and  liiii  Panzer  \rttiv:  51.  54-57.  159-60.  318. 

34';i,  3r)n.  371.  375,  378-80.  453-54 
and  I  ii  SI  Panzer  droup;  32-34 
.jii.l  l/Miiii  hulge:  l59-^,27€->?8,2a0-'83 
;it  N.ili  Ink:  453 

and  opt-rutittns  In  ihi."  Caucasus:  371,376,579-81 

and  rctreai  from  Rostov:  51,  :"i4— 57 
Kleiskara:  353.  384-H5,  442-43,  4(i,S 
Klin:  49.  52-53. 57-59, 61-62, 64, 60-67.  70.  73,  75, 
77,80,88.92.247 


lEluge,  Generalteldflaatsclx^  ^tmShet  voUit  SG^  34, 

50.  52-53 

attempts  to  close  Kirov  gap:  1 78-Sl,  IfiilUBS 
aod  Hannover:  242,  244,  246,  248,  250 
receives  Operations  Order  No.  5:  510 
and  retreat  to  K-Line:  161-64.  166-67,  169, 
171-72 

and  Rzhev-Sychevka  operation:  402-03,  407.  509 
antl  Sevoutz:  242.  250 

and  Soviet  counteroffensive.  December  1941: 
62-63,  68,  73.  76,  78-79,  82-83.  85-87, 
96-104,  1 19,  122,  127-129.  131-32. 134 

and  Soviet  offei»iw,  Jantiary  1948:  127-29, 

131-32.  134 
on  Soviet  panisan  warfere:  212 
Klukhorskiv  Pass;  372-74.  376 
KJvkov,  General  Leytenaat N.  K.t  145 
Koeln:  430 
Koenigsberg:  24 

KOENIGSBERG  Line:  Su  SfiMte. 
Kola  Peninsula:  234 
Kolomna:  60 

Kqutso:  484-85.  496-98,  501-02 
Konev.  General  Fblkcnmik  Ivan:  3&-37, 49, 62. 66, 90, 
92.  125,  149,  169,  185,  398,  400 

Konotop:  34 

Konrad.  General  der  Gebirgstruppe  Rudolph:  377 

Kotistandnovskiy:  351,  354,  357 
Konieichuk,  Alexander:  4S6 
Koiocha  River:  336 
Korotoyak:  323.  339 

Kosienko,  General  Leytenanl  F,  Ya.;  141 
Koielnikovo:  382,  472. 476, 478-79. 485.  492-93 
Kodin  Island:  4 1 1 
Kolluban;  395 
Kovpak,  S.  A.--  202); 

KoiUn,  General  l.cMenanl  D,  T:  106,  lOS-09.  Ml. 

2(jl,  2(53.  2ii,')-66,  269,391 
Krasiiava  Pnlv;in:i:  53.  57,,ilH''^t'^.S7,  117 

AVavfiiv  Ktii'kiii:  110—11 

Ktosnry  krim  :  ]  I  f> 

Krasiiudai:  3(i7,  3i'>7.  371-72.  493 

Kra.snograd:  91,  U7"' 

Krasnv  Okty^bi  ideiailurgicai  works:  390,  394, 396 

Krasny  Sulin:  360 

Kremenchug:  34 

Kicnienskara:  357,  385,  395 

Rri -MI,:  328-31),  342,  400 

Krivov  Rog:  141 

Kroiniadi,  Colonel  Konstandn:  244 

Krotishtadi:  41 1 
Kwpoikin:  370 

Kruchcnkin,  (leneralMajDr  V  D.s  363 
Krulev,  A.  V,:  150 
Krynisk:  373-74 
Krvniskive  Gon :  loM,  112 
Krvst^'nopol:  24 
Kshen  River:  333-34 

Kubaa  River:  307, 362, 366, 370-73, 375,  S79 


INDEX 


S49 


Kuberle  River:  494 

Kuebter.  Cc^neial       GebirpHm'^ic  Ludwig: 

103,  127,  163 
Kaec^fer,  GeacaafeWt»WjBfaflig<i»>Sima{  92,  S64, 

421 

and  Brueckenschlag:  tiS^  469 

and  MooRaBANDi  41 1-12 

and  Norducht:  413-15, 417-19,  48? 

promoted  to  Generalfeld'maTschall:  259 

and  ScHLiNCPtANZE:  411-15 

and  Soviet  couaieroffensive,  winter  1941—1942: 
143,  148-49,  151-52.  188, 191-9®,  igS-97 

and  Volkhov  pocket:  257^59 
Kuibyshev:  39 
Kuniskiy:  482 
Kundryudiya  River:  355 
Kupomsnoye:  392 
Kai^sk:  S13-14,  318 

Kurochkin,  General  Leytenani  R.  A.:  36,  140,  147, 
149, 162-5S,  186, 194, 265 

Kursk:  36.  50,  70,  74,  76,  80,  94,  W,  l&t  105.  ISS. 
141,  147,  149,  152-53.  156.  240,  249,  255,  287, 
307.  322-23.  326.  332.  336,  342.  509-10. 

Kuznets  Basin:  514 
Kumeisov,  Admiral  N.  G.i  7. 25 
KuBietiKir.  Getieral  I>bUitn!aik  F.  t :  8,  25^  32.  SS^-M, 
62.66,48^ 

Lachsfang:  426—27 

Ladoga,  Lake:  7.  32.  35-36.  40-42.  44,  46.  57. 
136-37.  139.  143,  150,  220-26,  283,  286.  408, 

ts^8nl£;  9irMt  m,  ISO,  165-66 

il^^mie^  Hails:  504 

I4U«!,  SeneKiImajor  Rubett:'381 

l^scar,  General  Mihail:  471 

ti^vamaari;  190,  193 

"LsyjC"  t&emical  plant:  390,  465 

Ix^,  >£iiei|«raUeIdmarschaU  W^heUn  von:  5,  40, 

42Ht5*  71.^^1,145. 147-48,  ISl*. 

155   

h&pi^a^.G&md  lifiimeib,  &.}  57,  J8^  48& 
Lenin,  V,  l.f  8,  306. 361-6?^ 

baste  fer:  29,  32,  34-57,  40-42.  45-46.  |T,  09, 
80-81,  134-37,  139-40.  143-45,  147, 
%BSr-m  m,  189,  X96-97.  224^26.  231, 
25?.  2Sg,  *62,  559.  409, 408-09 

as  a  German  objective:  5,         m^^iS,  34, 
61,  87,  286-87,         413^1%  *Et, 
451-52.455,511,515 

and  Soviet  strmegy:  41^^^ 
Lesl^  River:  454 

Ifivashev,  General         A.  fS:  lfi4  I'M 
L^j240 

Llebemt^  in.  C^.  kun  von:  46 


Lindemaun,  CeiiciaJ  del  Kavallerie  Gcorg;         It) J, 

257-59,  414,  418-19 
Lipkaii:  8 
Lisichansk:  346 

List,  Generalfeidmarschall  Wilhekn:  291,  322.  324, 
338,  345-46.  353-55,  36E^ -36^^.  370-71^ 
373,  375-78 

Um  JUver;  423-24 

Livny:  65,  74,  94-95, 97,  99 

Lizyukov,  General  Mayor  A.  I.:  154, 342—44 

Loehr,  Generaloberst  Alexander:  27S 

Lofoten  Islands:  231 

Logistics,  German.  See  also  Air  strength.  German; 
Armoc  strength,  German;  Kailioads:  Soads;  iaSf 
vidual  iKius  by  name, 
anateriel  strengtfar  7, 86, 293-97, 40^  479 

iihortages 

ammunition:  74,  91,  116.  126,  133.  145,  4'^ 
268, 293,  295, 325,  359,  363, 382, 499      =  ' 

dothiiig;4S,55i.91.  120 

ibod:  91, 133, 145,  149,  171. 496. 499 

&id:  74,  87.  91.  133. 149,  293. 359^60.  362-63, 
370,  374—75.  382, 474 

sa^^^^u$.0mik     n,  m,  tmiVPk 

production:  IS,  39,  284-85,  298-96,  fOO. 
S«!|-05.  514-15 
Logbtks,  Soviet.  Set  also  Air  strength,  Savkt;  i^iippr 
strength,  Soviet;  Artillery  strength,  Scniie^  ibitt- 
roada;  Rtiads;  individual  items  by  naoHt .  t 
laaierid  jttrettgth:  12-13, 47, 135,  SOI,  i& 

wsumiaidon:  149, 300, 320, 501 

&o&i     im  m 

fiiel:  149 

weapons:  145 
supply  operations:  136,  145, 150,  170,  320, 408 
W^P9^iaio»:  11-^1%  15, 39, 135. 2B9-S00, 440, 

tie&Sie^:  34 

Londott:  304,  30? 

Lopatin,  Geaicral  Leytenaot  A.  I  j  99S' 
LouUu:  220-24, 227 

Lovat  River;  147, 153, 188, 192-93, 195, 197,421-22 
Lozovaya:  15S 
Lozovenk^i  kSl^ 

Ltj^««?gfe:  3,  6,  54.  70,  77,  102,  120,  129,  164,  170. 
180.  188-91,  193,  195-96.  236,  246.  264,  275, 
278, 318. 369. 421-22. 425, 431,  <m.Seeolso  Air 
Cbrce.  German. 

L"Wtvt^ 


Ism,  Genml  heym^t  V.  H.:  108 
Lyuban:  145.  IS&,  186-94^  t«7*  409 

Machine  guns,  German:  120,  2S8,  294,  SOO 
Machine  guns.  Soviet:  U,  21, 106,  300. 441«S0I 
Mackeiucai,  Genera]  ^ler  KamUedA  Sbolianl  wan:  j$» 
159--60 

Main  Administtation  6t  !tetidG!il  Itapiganda  <]f  tlie 

Army:  201 
MMO^R^^cd  Mministnition:  9-10 
Miibi  VoMbA  Directorate:  269 
Makhachkala:  870-71.  374,  380 
Malenkov.  G.  M.:  29, 190.  279. 384 
Malgobek:  379 

Mafinavskj7,  General  Leyienant  R.  Va.:  141.  156-58. 

278.  325.  370. 391. 490, 507 
Malo^roslaveis:  127-28,  131, 161 
Mamai  HiU:  99^-9*,  396^  4$S.4^ 

Mikafi^&dm,  Hiinilial  Carl:  7.  10.  40.  221.  223-26, 
mt  aSffi,  291, 293.  409.  415.  424.  426-27,  505 

Umptitmi  German:  lSk  J7fi,  Sg{t^  9^4^.  Set 
TtDop  strengtb^^^^enllilit. 

IMtttMnr.  Soviet:  15. 28.  Sf ,  47-^,  15S,  139, 145. 
Sai^,  361,  447,  S14.  fat  aim  IVaoj^  meagOt, 

351.  426 

and  attack  on  Stalingrad:  473,  475-76,  479-83, 

4SS,  488-99 

tmvard  Fendorijia  and  'Kenii:  }QB«09.  l  liE. 

115-17.  156-58 
kad»  Army  Group  Don  to  Belgorod:  509-rl(t- 
and  Nokducht:  414-15,418-23, 451 
rmuored  to  iE|]laBe  Jodh  S4 
m.  Serastopol:  106-08.  112^19.  115,  SiO^lI. 

314-16.  318-21 
and  tMnrntsmttus  458, 4S6 

M«civtfi^r$$il59,493 
Mass:  *»-47. 485-86, 512 
Manball,  ^fioenil  George  C:  SSf 
Marty:  196 

Maslennikov.  General  Leyteaani  1. 1.:  94,  370 
Matenkloti,  GeneTalleutnam  Franz:  113,  266 
Materiel.  See  Logatics,  German;  Logisdc^  Soviet. 
Matema,  General  tier  In&nierie  Riedsieb;  Wt 
Maisulenko,  Gtmatsd.  Mayor  V.  A.:  446 
Mauerwald;  4 
Madtn.  Gorin:  196 

ll%kop:  44-46. 286.  SSI .  3SS.  S6S-66. 37d-?4.  SS6 
Mettiteirancan  Sea:  431 
Mekendjrevy  Gory:  108 

Mekhis,  L,  Z.:  9. 145>  201. 217, 261, 265-66, 269 
MeiDeh24 

Memskov.  General  Arcnit  Kuil:  16-17, 443 
comniaiids  VbZfaw  Bwi/:  137,  139,  145-46.  150. 

153.  186. 189-90.  197.  255-56, 258-59. 416-20 
cflensive  to  break  tieningrad  blodsade:  416-20 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


Metetskov,  General  Armit  KiHl— Continued 

oEfetiisveatHkhvtn:  51,  71 

offensive,  winter  1941-1942:  137,  139,  145-46. 
150. 153,  186,  189-90.  197 

and  push  toward  Lyuban:  188-89 

reinforces  Second  Shadi  Aimjf:  255— S6 
Meshkoirskaya:  346.  351 
Mga:  416-18 
Mikhaylov:  67.  70.  73 
Milch,  GencraUeldmarschall  Erhard:  497 
Military  Council.  Soviet:  239,  270,  278-79 
Militaiy  Districts.  Soviet:  8,  12.  18^19,  f&.  Su  ttUe 
FrotOs,  Soviet. 

BaUk  Speckdt  8 

lAarkov  :  21 

Kiev  Special:  8.  16 

leningntd:  8.  226 

UiadiGmiamu:  21 

Odeiaa  :  8 
Ural;  21 
Volga  :  21 

W^m  Special:  8, 21 
IMQOnevo:  289.  328,  346-47.  m  355^  3S9,  368. 
484-85,  492, 496 

Minsk:  5.  27-28. 30.  206 

Mishkova  River:  482-83.  488 

Mius  River:  54-55,  57,  68.  353-54,  509 

Mobilization,  Soviet:  8, 18-19. 23, 28. 30, 105. 

Mode).  General  der  PaawrmMftien  WaSut:  166-69. 

183-85, 250, 40S,  40S.  4&7 
ModderK,  Cokmel  VHmert  H 

Mobkom:  342 

MolotDv,  Vyadieslav  M.:  7-8,  25,  29. 304, 307 

Mootm^aiaim;  411-12 
Morale 

German:  73. 77,  92.  103. 16l.  166. 176i  HA 
Smex:  90,  135. 138. 212, 354, 418 
MteeiGCo:  313 

Monnaink:M7^3SU  394-55. 485,488-^ 
Monais,  6«nnadf  iSd,  300, 309 
Mortars,  Soviet:  II.  13,  47.  145,  262,  301,  416,  448, 
501 

Hmmi  S,  14,      ^,  29.  M,  90.  Set  alto  vndtt 

batde  few  8fMI6, 47-68. 69-71, 88 

and  Cenoan  strategy:  29,  33, 44, 5Qit  5S,  S9,  57^ 

1^5,  f4l,  255.  298,  302-IKS^  314,  iSS^,  S^, 

400, 404, 485,  443.  465 
Nfiliiary  IMimict:  8 
andpaitisuu:  208,210 
resumes  presiege  status;  135 
and  Soviet  sdrategy;  16,  23. 47. 49. 57-59. 64,  H  HKb 

125,  134.  137.  139-40.  238-39,  302-03. 

m  341-^  352, 443,^  455. 506, 512-15 


INDEX 


551 


Moscow  Riven  &S 

Uoaam-V^  Gftoai!;  SQ»  5S»  $7,^  l%  6^. 
Moslulciik^  iCSoKia!        1LS>.x  141.  ^S. 

36S.  584-BS.  391, 399,  438.  484 
Motor  vriiicles.  German:  7.  45,  US.  120,  177,  28S. 

393.  295.  328 
MotiHrwhkies,  Soviet:  IS,  70 
Moidok:  374-75. 377, 379.  454 
Mozhaysk:  30. 32, 37-39,  307 
Mtseiuk:  37. 40, 90. 132. 926 
Mud:  40, 1 16-17.  lif,  185,  m,  314 

Munldoia  Minisuy:  83 
Munnan  Coast:  236 

Mtummak:  3,  7.  28.  36,  43-44.  220.  StS-SS. 

NKVD:  10.  53, 19%  301.  m  StS^l^  St?. 

384 

NKVDO.O.:10.  lSl.atfi 
Nalchik:  453-54 
Napoleon:  41,  292,  4aSn»  MS 
Nara  River:  97 
Narva  River:  511-12 
Narvik:  231,  233.  321 
Natyr  line:  262. 267-68 
Navy.  British:  231, 296. 426r-a0 
Navy.  German:  4,  i|>~7r,  tSS^t,  i&t,  SdBi  4S!S, 
427-31 

Navy.  Soviet:  8.  105.  tOt-«l,  illj^ll,  190,  196,  320. 

S58,  365.  426 
N:ivv.  I'.S.;  296,  428,  513 

Niivv  High  Comtnaud.  S#y-0i^olHWias<^  4$r 

Knegsmaniie.  ~ 
Nelidovo:  241 

Neva  River:  35,  143, 408,  4 16, 419, 422 
Ne\skiv,  Alexander:  41,  432,  435 
Nemmozhmk:  110 
Nikolayc%-:  141.269 
Nikolav<fvskaya:  357 
Nikopol:  141 

Niihne  Chirskaya:  358,  47:^ 
Norducht;  409-18,  420.  423.  427.  451 
Nordpol:  241-42 

North  Africa:  4,  303,  319.  338.  430,  457.  478-79, 

505,  513 
Nonh  Cape:  428-29 

Norway:  7.  223,  22H.  231.  888-37.  291-®.  299.418* 

423-24.  428.  430 
Noshevalovo:  193 

Novaya  Kalitvar  287,  343-45.  44().  484,  486 

Novgorod:  139,  143,  145. 191 

Novikov,  Cenei  al  Leyienant  A.  A.:  385,  507 

No\o  Sokoluiki:  445 

Novocherkassk:  498 

Novokhopersk:  326 

Novorossiysk:  106.  108,  321,  351,  367,  372-74. 

376-79,  452,  493 
NovDsU:  74. 94r~95, 99 


tfOMitKUniiskiy:  326 

OKH.  Sit  Oberlmamtdo  da  Uteres. 
OKL.  Sh  Obetkoammito  dtr  Lufim^t. 
X3l!i3A,SK  f&erhmme/adii  der  Krie^tarme. 
OKW  $«r  <»^a>mmmdo  dtr  Wehrmacki. 
Oki^ammndo  eUs  Httru  (OK.H):  54.  $£1  87ft. 
STO-81.  417-18,  494,  SOS 
aoATssoie  for  Moscow;  51. 61, 63, 69 
vailSRtjECKeNSCMLAG:  192, 194-95 
tnd  campaign,  spring-suromer  1942:  272,  275, 
285-87,  293-94,  296.  298.  310.  316,  318.  321. 
329,  331,  399-40.  344-47.  351.  360.  371, 
414-15.  ^1 

and  campaign,  winter  1941-1942:  73-74,  77,  90, 
98-99, 101. 120, 13I-S2,  IS4. 155. 161. 180, 188 

^SOA  OitEcdve  45:  37 1 

eady  nraKgy:  7, 14. 34, 42-45 

and  Finnish  Army:  220, 415, 420, 427 

Mid  Hidcr:  33, 80-81, 83-84. 86-87, 99, 176;  100, 
285,  457 

and  Leningrad:  69,  411,  416-17 

Operations  Branch;  80.  173,  354, 411 

Ctogauizatfonal  QtantJi:  322,  327,  447 

and  !U»sms:  190, 194, 197 

and  i«m!%  isa  IblieP'Oziiaidt^ClrdiXuiiA;^!^  16, 
80 

tole:  4,  7,  84.  450 

and  Soviet  partisans;  208.  218 

and  Stalingrad:  354,  3li2,  382,  385.  388,  460.  464, 

467,  474-7.^1.  480,  482-83.  488,  499 
and  war  in  the  Crimcii:  190.  261,  263 
Oberkvmvuindo  dir  Krwgsnuirtne  (OKM):  4 
Oberkommindo  der  Lujtu  affe  (OKL):  4,  6-7,  264 
Obfrkommando  der  Wehrmacht  (OKW);  63.  319,  3fi4, 

479 

Armed  Forees  Operations  Staff;  44.  79.  129.  287, 

310,  377.  413.  450.  473 
Chief:  4,  84.  86,  148.  290.  337.  351.  413,  450 
and  Hitler:  83.  87.  378 
intelligence  organization  (Alm'ifhr):  244 
Operations  Branch:  81 

Operations  Staff:  4,  79.  129.  363,  377,  450, 473 
and  partisans:  209 

plans,  spring  1942;  293.  296.  423-24 
role;  4,  7.  73,  83-84,  208-09,  378,  508 
itraiegy:  33,  221,  236.  331, 342, 426, 457. 504 
and  war  in  l^lnland:  7, 39, 228-25. 232 

OiM>yan:  105 

Oboaerska^a;  224 

Obsha  River:  250-51 

October  Hetmluttoit:  196 

Odessa:  3.  33,  106,  141,  206 

an.  Soviet:  16,  43-44,  S87,  SS8^       3%;  Sl^, 
371.  515 

Okii  River:  40,  50,  60,  86.  95-101,  123,  128,  307 
Oktyabrskiv.  Admiral  F.  S.:  105-06,  108,311.  320 
Olenino:  176.  184-8.1.  241,  260 
Olonets,  Isthmus  of:  220 


552 


MOSCOW  TO  STAUNGRAD 


Otf m  River:  336 

Onega.  Lake:  35, 42, 139, 226 

Opeiaiwns  Orders.  Set  aJso  FUehier  GitcGtivtW, 

1;  450^.473-74, 508 

ts4$MS 

5:  SIO 
PpuIcCapetlOB,  110 
OliWienbauin:  143,  408-09,  411 
Qniyioiiikidze:  573,  376,  379-80,  454 
Chd:  37,  50.  73-74,94-^98.  XQh  ISS.  141,  m,  m, 

240. 326. 33«imm  m,m.m^  m 
jQi^        m  m  m 

Qdunia,  Generd  tTrtiien:  ^ 
Osintotf:  244 

Oskol  River:  313.  318,  333.  337.  339 

Ossetiim  Military  Road:  358.  371,  454 

Osiashitov:  36,  49,  130-31.  140,  143.  147.  176. 

183-86. 189, 192. 241. 255.  S9S.  411, 421 
OsdogDzhzk:  399-40 
Otradnoye:  416 

fecific  Ocean:  78,  134. 233, 513 

Panji  wagons:  40, 177 

Itansilirsluiy:  443 

fSuwer  AbteiiuHg  300:  309 

Roiira'  armies.  See  under  Armies,  Gernmn^. 

fttast  groups:  3. 5-6.  See  also  under  Am&aiiCenieast 

Corps,  German;  Divisions,  German, 
Parmrschreek:  195 

Parpach.  Isthmus  of:  109-10.  112-14,  261-63,  266. 
268-69 

Itetisam,  Soviet:  29, 37.  lOS,  123.  163-64, 173.  178, 
182. 199-219. 241-49. 252-54, 330, 434-35.  Su 
also  Antipanisan  operations,  Germaiu 
Paulus,  Gencriil  Her  Panzennippen  FHediidi;  SI6 
andBLAu:  328,  33a,  337,  339-40 
andthelzyxm  bulge:  15S.  160,  273.  275.  282 
moves  toward  Stalingrad:  354-55,  357,  360.  363, 
382 

and  Stalingrad:  382.  3X4  Hrt,  391-97,  458-60. 

462-68.  470.  473-7(3,  179.  482-83,  488-98. 

496-97.  499-502,  504-05,  508 
Pavlov,  General  Arniii  D.  G.:  8,  2S 
Pavlovsk:  351,  353,  363 
Pearl  Harbor:  7H.  513 
fcchenga:  220.  223,  231,  234.  423-24 
Peipus,  Lake:  435.  511 

IVopIe's  Commissariat  of  Defease:  7-8,  17-18,  23, 
302,  506 

R'ople's  Commissariat  of  Iraemal  A^ire.  See  NKVD. 
K-iiple's  Comniissaj&tfiflhe  NWjft 
Perefcop;  71.  141 
f^remvshl;  97.  100 

Pt-rsian  Gulf:  426 

I'fi  vorsunsk;      -^l.'l,  269 

Pervushin,  General  Leytenant  A.  N.:  108 


Ftschanka:  391 
SlealMKMlai  384-85 

frnrn  Geneial  Lcjnenaat  L  EL:  106,  31 1, 321. 381 
leta&rOxye:  281-82,  S6S 
XlGSiiaiik:  387.  497 
yiMta  River:  95-96 

fogonye:  190,194.409,411.414,418 
Poland:  12,  123,  135,  177.212,272,511 
Rilist  River:  155 

i^^ttera;  9.  !€,  23, 1$7. 190. 194.434.  m 

%!io|jqjm!nla>,  P.  K.;  216~l? 

fimpcn  GengnSMsfiit  V.  S.;  8, 97 
Fi»M:he,  Dr.  Ferdil^Mil:  #7 
Itotapov,  Generad  lij^nrtf.  1.:  92 
ftMettilUtttkaya:  492 
Ptmz  Bugfn:  233-34,  236,  29 1 
TnpifX.  Marobcs:  5. 14, 16-17, 202 
Pripyai  River:  8 
Prisoners  of  war 
German:  501 

Soviet:  27.  32.  34.  37.  152,  252.  269,  316,  318, 330, 
344.  348-49,  356.  423,  448.  462,  486 
Praductiop.  Ste  l^ogistia,  German;  Logistia,  Sonet. 
Vtft^lytsaccA^i  M2,  496 
Propaganda 

German:  22. 39. 251-52, 259. 504 

Soviet:  201 
Propaganda  Ministry,  GenDiUU'^ 
Protopopovka:  281 
Piotw  River:  52.  103 
Pskov:  2K,  148.  153,  418 
PudcHi:  203 -(H 

Purkaycv,  tJcneral  Le^tenant  M.  A«  148 
Pushkin:  414 
Pya  Lake:  229 

Radio 

German:  70.  IKS.  243.  ,^01 

Soviet:  12.  14,  145,  151.444,457 
Raeder,  Gmssadmir..!  trich:  4.6-7,  233,  235.  428-30 
Railro;ids:  12.  14,  41,43.45.  123,  147,  152.  156.  170, 
IK4.  302,  483 

Klin-K:jliiiin:  73 

Klin-MoMow:  53 

Kropotkin-Armavir:  370 

K.ursk-Otel:  80,  95.  122 

Kursk- Voronezh:  336 

Leiiiugrad-Lvuban-Chudovo:  186 

Mga-Volkho\':  416,  418 

M  tllerovo-  Kamei*jfc5i>jaahtijS*^ 

Moscow  belt:  70 

Moscow- Leningrad :  145,  150 

Moscow- Rzhev;  93 

Moscow-Smolensk:  124 

Murmansk  (Kirov):  7.  36,  220.  224-25.  227-28. 

234,  302,  412-13,  420.  426 
Novgoiod-Chudovo:  191 


INDEX 


553 


Rasti-iibmn-Aiincrhurg;  4 
Russosh-Milk  iovri:  491 
Salsk-St;ilii!gi iiil-  5ri?> 
Stalingrad  rcumii:  ;*87.  391.464 
Siikhiini'lii-Kaliiga;  102 
TliKuiKli  'likhviti:  136 
\..|,,g,la-  riklniii:  57 
\  \;i7tiia- Kaluga;  124 
\  \azma-K]i<n :  214 
\\azma-\In«'nu  :  \24 
Vva/ma-Rzlifv:  iL'i,  l:5;^-33,  16H 
\  \a/iiia-Smolcnsk:  140.  241 
V\a7aiia-Sychc\'ka:  185 
Ramushevor  195 

RasputitM:  13.  40-43.  177,  179,  181-86.  194-95, 

197-98,  241,264.  272.  a«6 
Rastcnbuig:  5.  337.  351 
Ralbxier:  190-94 
Razgulyayevka  Station:  392-93 
Readiness,  German  combat:  294.  327-28 
Readiness.  Soviet  combat:  17.  20-23,  49 
Redp  River:  193 
Regiments.  Cierman 

Brandenburg;  228 

78th  Infantry:  102 

193d  lafsmaj:^ 

288th  In&ntiy:  383 

430ih  In&noy:  408 
Regimaiti,  Soviet 

Kduga:  501 

"La2o"  Pofi^i  i4& 

(Mm:  254 

■^ZMo"  Portfaftn:  243,  245 

t9«kGrfiiadkr.  501 
^tlettcoattiussariats:  208,  212 
Rcichcl,  Major  Joachim:  330-32. 336,  339, 342 
Bekbenau,  Generalieldiiianchall  Waller  von:  32.  55, 

Iteliite»tt,  Gffibml^aut  4$,  M;«2-63.  65, 

67-68,  73,  82,iiiOi.  103.  119,  131-33,  165 
Ranontnaya:  355,  MSU  ^2 
ItonbieBiBentit  Cainitii:  S%  83,  171, 176^  283.  SftB^ 

snsoai 

Keffj^tceuKiits,  Soviet:  21. 28.  S4, 48^49^  eS,  tS9,  Vtt, 
SS5.  &e  o&o  under  Staoka. 

{tif^^Bsim,  General  der  fKeeer  WstfigaraK  wn: 
1S»-31.  264,  266.  275,  tW.  SM.  m  4J6. 
463-64. 479vm  488 

Riga:  28.  152 

Ritchie.  Lieutenant  General  NeQ  M.:  338 
River  crossings:  14 

Roads:  13-14. 40, 118. 413, 462,S«a&(i  Jidfta^ 
Dtikhovshchina-Beljiy:  241 

KheitBi'Oeii^jpiisk:  148 
Kfo»9oi»SiiKdaBl^  iS4 
Uem&»-'Vfyimti  170 


Roads — Coniiinied 

Nm  gorod-Chiidovo:  191 
Orel-Tula:  96 

Smolensk- Moscow;  49.  62.  124 

Spas-Dcincnsk-Suklsiiiirhi;  178 

Starava  Russa-Demyansk;  147-48,  193 

Volcliansk-Kharkov;  275 

Vyazma-Moscow:  124 

Yukhnov-Ghatsk:  163.  180 
Rodimtsev,  General  Mayor  A.  1.:  394 
Rognedlno;  854 

Rokossovskiy,  General  Ley  tenant  Konstantiii:  57.  70, 
166,  343,  396.  437. 442-43.  485,  496-99,  507 

RoUbahn:  128-29,  133.  I6t-63,  169-70.  173, 
178-80.  241-42,  247-48 

Ronianenko,  General  Lo  tenani  P.  L.:  443 

Romiiy:  34 

Roosevelt,  Franklin  D.;  3.  304,  482 
Roslavl:  79,  96.  212, 841,  £47 
Rosso^h:  344,  491 
Rossoshka;  498 
I^issoshka  River;  497 

IStsman  campaign  for:  44.  61.  69.  105.  286-87, 
Sm,  324,  347.  351.  353-56.  358.  360.  362-«3. 
S66. 371, 405,  455-56.  484-85, 492 
Soviet  offensive  at:  49.  51,  54-55,  67,  fiS-66, 134. 
307, 465.  493-94, 498 

iialA(>/>/ammutution:  92,  100, 126,  165. 195,  268 

Rovaniemi:  225 

Rovno:  28,  272 

Rtidnya:  140.  170 

Rugozeni:  2S4 

Rumania:  4-5.  16,  286,  290,  505 

Rumanian  forces:  4-5, 7,  107, 1 16. 156. 261-62. 266. 

282. 286. 290, 312.  365,  371. 376, 395, 443,  446. 

459. 478. 483. 486-89^  491,  $0$.  Stf  also  Annies.. 

Rumanian. 

Rundstedt,  Generalfi^dnranidull  Geiai  «!EB»:  S.  >i8, 46, 

54-55.61,87,185 
jtooi^GeneTal  der  In&nierie  mdiaid:  131. 165, 171, 

;*S8-S5.  360. 371. 373. 375. 378-79.  S8I 
ItkUK^  Anw^ff  libefalifflA:  SSP 
Ba^lRiver;  10, 8^91 1I^-4S6 
Ryabyshev.  General  Lrjrtenant  0.  L:  136,  270 
Ryazan:  3?,  50,  60,  73,  464 
Rybachiy  FeniasMte^  SkS, 
Rybinsk:  42, 44j  MO 
Rynok:  SaO^mf^  4l&k  fSS 
Ryti.  RistesSie 

m^v;  90,  $s>$i     iss.  m,  i4q, 

166^71,  IIS^H.  184-85,  2$»>4I.  391^ 
400-407,  413, 44S.  485, 509 
RzhevvGihaisk-Oiel'Kursk  Line:  76.  78.  80,  Ml  96. 

Sabuiw,  A.  K.:  202i» 
St.  Nazaire:  291 
St.  Xlsiniibaif:  m 

m^iS^,  SSST.  492, 494 


554 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


Sall^i:  220,  223 

Salsk:  :162.  366,  492-94.496 

Sal?.liutg:  291,  293.457 

San  River;  16 

Saiuh.irn  Pass;  ;!74.  376 

Sapim  Hel^hls;  318-20 

Sai,(r<A  :  SI.IS.  X>h,  -144 

Sarau-v,  NK\1)  C:olrtnel  A.  A,;  384 

Saturn;  484 -H8,  493,  496,  6i8 

Scandinavia;  4.  220 

SchamhorsI:  2:i3.  2'.l! 

Scheer:  234,  430 

Schercr.  Gencralmajor  TTieodor:  I8H-89,  194 
Schlicflen.  Generalfeklniarschall  Alfred  Gral  von; 
510-11 

Schlingpflanze:  411-15,  421 

Schluesselburg:  35,  40,  143 

Schmidi.  General  der  Panzertruppen  Rudolf:  404 
and  attack  on  Stalingrad:  464-65.  468.  483 
and  Soviet  counteroftcnsive,  December  1941:  67t 
74.  80.  94-96,  99-102,  122-23. 164,  178-79 

Schmundt,  Generahnajor  Rudolf:  79,  81 -8S,  86-87, 

128. 155,  isL  m.  m.  m,  4ib.  440-50.  m, 

510 

Schniewind,  Generaladmiral  Otto:  4S8 
Schobeit,  Generaioberst  Franz  Ritler  von:  S3,  42 
Schocmer,  Geneialleutnant  Fcrdiixandc  3^.  2S1 
Schulz,  Generaltnajor  Friedrich:  483 
Scylla:  430 

Second  from  oo  the  Contiiiem:  39. 41. 304-05 
Securii^  tnx^  (knusni  1^  lfl,-Wi^^^ 
SeHAan:  190 

Serafimovich;  3S8,  357-58.  395. 4S6, 4W 
Sergeyev-Tsenskiy.  Sergey:  433 
SerpukhcH':  50,  52 

Sevastopol:  3.  42,  105-09,  113,  ItS-16.  141,  3S2, 

309-12,  314,  317,  319-21,  411,414-15 
SteaOi^l  Defense  R£pon:  106,  261-62.  311.  321 

SevA:  140-41' 

Sevdutz:  242-43,  249-52,  398 
Seydlitz-Kurzbach.  Generalmajor  Walter  von: 

192-95. 197. 391-94.  462.  467-68,  474.4TO 
Slutpoiiluukov,  Marshal  Soveukogo  Soyuzs  Bw^t 

m-li^m^M,  tS7->38,  197,  838-40.  270.  ^7, 

m 

Sbaiimj^rt:  3^-81, 4iS 

Shaumyan:  1 10 

Shchigry:  326.  332-38 

Shkredo.  R.  V,:  203 

Shmyiv?.  Mihay  Fdipovich:  fSSSl'-ilSt 

i3biemirQ<r^:  202-05. 214^15 

^otoHW  Mikhail:  433 

Sjnemoilm  General  Annii  Sergt»  M.:  S65.  S8S,  436i 

SIS 
Siberia:  $14 


SipKs]  o>itiinuiik8lipIIS,.80!l(kt:  12 

Siila^Mni,  Kcnraafiraajuri  ("Major  General")  H,:  221. 

T2'.i-':V2.  421 
Siiiilt  i.,!I(p1;  111-12.  116,  141 

Kitiisiaiitui :  433 
-.1,  Heigiu.s:  416.  418-19 

^i.c.niiskaya:357,  385.  395 
Ski  injDps,  Soviet;  148,  188,  227-30 
Slav7ansk;  158-59,  269,  493 
SuecjotLHAMMER:  423 
Sloboda  a»OB6umji  IBl 
Slovakia:  4 

Smolensk:  5, 16. 29-30,  32-33. 35. 49, 62.  78-79, 88, 
94.  100.  124,  130.  132.  140-41.  169-70.  182. 
208.  212.  214-15.  240-42,  249,  403.  405, 455 

Sodenstcm,  Gencralmajor  George  von:  45,  64, 
464-65,  468 

Sokoloi'.  Colonel  S.  V.:  170 

Sokolovo:  213 

Sokolovskty,  Marshal  V.  D.:  22,  59n,  62.  64. 209 

Solnechnogorsk:  53. 57, 61. 66, 88, 92 

Sorge.  Richard:  S3. 48 

Sosna  River:  333 

Sovetskiy;  474 

Spanish  forces:  303tt 

Spanakovka:  390. 459-60,  462. 464, 468 

^t^S'Pemensk:  161-63. 169, 178,  242,  S44 

SpiGtlaja  pDlist:  150. 153, 188 

Speer,  Albeit:  284.  292, 504 

Spttzb»gen:  236,  428. 430 

Sp^oeck,  GeneraUeutnam  Graf  Hans  von:  112-15 

"^(Sdtubstqjfel)  forces:  83.  102,  S08-09, 223. 255 

Stalin,  Josef:  8. 10.  15-16.  363.  378,416 

address  of  3  July  1941:  29 

iMa»^1  NovenOier  1941: 41^42 

sod  tiat^  tbr  Kiev:  Sl^Sf 

and  Blaij:  326,  336.  342 

and  BridshfAmencan  second  front:  39,  135.  434, 
andeeino^480 

and  defense  of  Moscow:  49-5 1 , 64, 61-63 

and  defense  of  Stalingrad:  352,  382,  384, 3g7-89» 

391-92, 394, 458, 484-85. 493.  jPOa^ 
md.  hia  g^erala:  16-18,  23,  30,  S4,  197, 

m^SMi  48fr-37. 442. 506-08,  &tS 
an4<6lC0:  S9 

Kharkov  offe»i««:      m  S78-«l9.  Si2 
teac^hip  qualities:  30,  litS.  1^8,114, 506-dS 
atnd  lend-lease;  1 1. 39, 42 
inei)^>er.  Council  of  Peopled  Commiiaars:  7, 29 
mXaem^B^timOf  wiA  Ji{mm)^  20, 48, 78 
and  Oneroiisii  Don:.  49ft 
Onder^e.  ^7:  S01 
and  psSmgi  H.  W9, 217, 434 
Dlam  tmt^imiag  1942;  23SHI0, 256, 258, 261. 

*BS,  SflS,  S06 
preinvasion  straiegy:  l6»JS<20<^t27 
principle  of  'stability  ^|}senBEir%  SIS 


INDEX 


533 


Stslin,  Josef— Continued 

and  the  Reicfacl  papers:  332 

and  Stovfai:  2S,  30. 33,  65,  88. 26 1,  506 

as  a  straiegiii:  16-18,  49.  134-42,  154,  166,  197, 
270,  273,  299,  352-53,  456,  493,  507,  511,  516 

as  supreme  commander:  25-27,  30,  33,  154,  217, 
361,  437-38,  506-08 

and  toi^  war  economy:  299 

and  Ckanus:  441-«^  4«>,  468 
Stalin  line:  SI,  ^.  Si 
Stalingrad:  308.  324,  326.  346. 364-65 

battle  for:  458-77,  478-^02,  503-04,  506-09, 

de&fiH»  battle  begins:  352«S7, 43S,  4$&,  440~47, 
45S-«7 

German  AnB]^  emti  tonatd:  357-59,  362,  370, 
375-76. 380,  382-97,  461-52 
&alino:  40-41,  280.  324. 372,  37? 
Stalincgorsk:  62,  88 

Staraya  Russa:  30,  140,         147-48,  151-|$i  175, 

186, 192-93, 409,  413,  451 
Siars^  Rnssa-Bryamk  line:  30 
SQaftsa;:afl!,9S^^  101-03, 130 

Staryy  Krim:  1 12 

Staryy  Oskol:  323,  337.  339 

State  Defense  CooimittBe,  Stt  GKO. 

Stoufai  of  the  High  CoauiatubCt  25, 28-30. 387, 416, 

SIl.  Set  aba  -J^j^tbe  Supi^tne  High 

Orwnniand- 

Slml4u  oFi]ie  Sifimeawi  High  CofDmand:  35, 352, 512 
and%tAtR  9S0,  SiGS-26, 334. 337, 341-43, 507 
and  Sty&nsk  Frwtff.iSS;^  90 
and  Caucasus:  9$K  W%  373, 3S1 
and  mmaiBlS^miit,  nfysiet  t34.h-19ias  6)^. 
m  @7.  BB-m,  97, 108!,  m,  1^7,  TSS^. 
I47i  1,43, 153. 156. 159. 164, 166. 170. 176, 180, 
IB4-86,  188-89, 194 
and  dffiSaiK  ofSfesc^  ^..&l,M,Wi.M$.Am 

fijld  n!$R»enta;^ves:  153, 86l.^4S|,.  S?3!i385. 
■)S7-IS.  465, 484, 06 

i«,  148, 155.  li^  m,  iet.  lee.  m,  m  is8, 

184-86,  188-90. 194 
and  Leningrad:  40S,  416 

m^  aSBem^  i{)raiig  l942.'  197,  226, 238-40,  255, 

^57-^,  300,       306-Oa.  314 
teserves:  37,  42,  47n.  49,  57-60,  62,  88-90^  1S9« 

166,  176,  238,  270,  27B.  302,  SfSS,  U*,  Ul, 
447, 491 ,  ^ 

R^i  30-41.35,42 

and  Satukn:  485, 496 

and  Soviet  General  Staff:  30, 137 

and  Stalin:  25, 30, 33.  65.  88.  506 

and  Stalingtad:  352-53,  445-46 

war  in  the  south:  105.  108,  261,  265,  26&-70, 
i7S,  278-79,  370 
Seed:  39. 135, 285. 297. 300. 440, 515 


Steflea,  Ooetal  Ilia:  290 

Stepanov,  Army  Cominisxar  Second  Rank  P.  C:  343 
Stoerfam  :  :iIO,  312.  314-16,  318-21 
Sttatf  gii  objectives,  German:  Stt  War  aims,  Gennaa. 
Strategy,  German;  3,  13-15.  See  also  mdtr  Hidecv 

Adolf:  Oberkommando  des  Hurts  (OKH). 
Soategy,  Soviet :  1 8-2 \,2%.Sef  also  under  Stalin,  Josef: 

S^vAo  of  the  Supreme  High  Command. 
Stiata.  GeoetalobenK  Adolf:  32,  49,  79. 66,  93-94. 

101-03,  119,  130-34,  155,  16&^7 
StrecJter,  General  der  Infantene  Kari:  501 
Seuelpnagel,  Generalobem  Carl  Heiniich  von:  32 
StniBpi^  GenetsOiobaacMaiu-Jtieigen:  234, 236, 424, 

429 

Submarines:  234,  aSS-iy.  -tiW-SO 
Sudak  River:  370 

JSnUunichi:  101-02.  120,  122-23, 125.  128-29.  164. 

169.  173-75.  178-80.  212,  241,  398,  400,  404, 

443-44,  455,  457 
Siaarami;  871-74.  377 
SultatKSvka  line:  262.  268 
Sumy:  140-41 

Superior  Special  Finpase  Staff  8:  !!@4 

Supreme  Command,  Soviet:  30,  47,  138,  238,  306, 

308,  438,  446.  Set  also  Stafio,  JoieK  Stavka  cS  (ha 

Supreme  High  Command. 
Surazh:  203-04.  214  ^ 
Suuiaaari:  189, 195 
SuvDixw,  Akunder:  41, 43!^ 
Suwalki:  24 

Svir  Riven  1K^,40, 44, 220-21. 224-^5. 409. 427 
Svyatoye,  Late.'  Im 
Sweden:  233,  292 

Sychevka:  133-34,  140,  168,  171,  184-86,  250.  898, 

400,40^^,407 
Sy2rafi:60,f(7 

Tactics,  German:  25,  33,  510^11.  Set  el»  Sit^lf!^ 

ment  opcraiioBi^  Oe^iQiaiL 
'Bictics.  Soviet;  511-]Si'S^il<K«  EndrdetBMttopeta- 

tions,  Soviet. 
'Gtgaun^  54, 105,  SSMli 

mvela,  KeneradlliMaiaiiil  ItavO:  427 

'Qoaan  Beninatdft:  ICKPOS,  81 1^  351,  35S,  376, 

llittfciitiieiapfai  «s^^AiaiQraim^  Armor 

tia^  Gmmsti  3,  7, 6$,  91,  jlS,  300,  SIS.  S»  aha 
Armor  stmigiii,  Gennan, 
effect  of  mud  on:  40 
Buiher:  448 
eamaerlrSiSI 
Banser  II:  1 1 

I^erni:  II,  14.300,335 
fWrlV:  11,300,325 


556 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


Iknks.  Gennan— Continued 
PajUicr  VI  (Tiger):  325,  «3, 417-19,  488, 491, 494 

ISbdu.  Soriet:  12.  31,  65,  301w|»>  Sf«3.  .518.  Smalw 
Armor  strength,  Soviet. 
KV  (KUment  Vonshiiov):  11.  IS,  32, 165, 326 
T-34  (Stalin):  1 1,  IS,  33, 40, 90,  98, 126. 165,  190, 

T-70;  300 
Ttawa:  97 

'BmniMk^:  SH,  485, 488-93,  «SS 
Taussmschi^;  451-S2, 4S5 
l%legra])lt:  12 

IGd^ioiie:  12, 77, 169,  m  444 

Iteidt  Rhisri  307. 370, 373-75,       879-81. 4M 

Soudieagteni:  322 

Western:  4,  73. 77, 358. 375, 480 

HwA  CiSHciiMif;  361,  AdSn,  Ali 
Wti&aotstem:  30 

J9Mtfibu«deni:  30.  35,  137,  141,  156.  159.  217,  238, 
269^70,  ^«i2|l^309»^314. 325 

nkhomslL:  3S6,  tSOi  S63-^,  493 

Ttkhvini  40-43,  ^,  49.  51.  57.  68-71,  80-81,  lOS, 

134-36,  139-40.  143-45, 224,  46& 
TJin  River:  100.  122,  333-34 
tlmoshenko.  Macsbal  Sovetskogo  SeyttKh'^Stoaif 
7-8,24,34-36.49.65.443 

and  Blau:  3SS-2^.  332 

and  Onqt^Ovina  fine;  29-30.  K 

and  the         bul^:  156.  S6£i-f  I^  SSS,^S$iM^ 

and  Kliarkov  erosive:  326 

plans  strategy,  spring  19455:  S8S-4$^  S69-?l;,  t7if, 

305.  314 
piuimaon  attai^:  22-23 
and  die  Reichel  papers:  332 
at  Rooct:  51,54,  65 

and  SovAimiem  Thealtn  SS.  13^^  143. 1!^  12^ 
and  Soviet  couaterafiEbuiw;,  vikim  1941^19^ 

137. 141, 156, 1S9 
and  Stalin:  25, 314, 325,  SS& 

7%^:  233-35. 2»I.  «i8,  ^ 
Tobruk:  319 
Todt.  Dr.  Fiit2:  284 

Tolbukhin,  General  LeytenantF.  l.i  470 

ToLsto);  Alexey;  433 
Top  Lake:  228-29 

Toiopets:  140,  143,  149,  167,  169-70.212.814-15, 
240-41. 264. 409, 421. 4iS,  451.  ^ 


Thugemd:  430 
lYanacaiicasus:  49, 371. 434 
IVansport  Ministry  :  83 
Trappenjagd:  262-69 
TveUioitRivak^:  385 
T^mM  war£iic:  406,  444,  SIO 
%»^ira:  234-35,  291 

Sw«  «tength,  Gennan:  7.  36.  4S,  66-67. 107,118, 

aiK,  303, 324. 327. 397, 441, 446-48, 489 
Tcotm  mtt^^  Soviet:  12-13.  21,  28,  36.  48-49, 

66-4?,  106,  138,  145,  262,  273,  301-03. 

308. 326,  416, 440.  446-47.  514 
Ikads,  AmericaQ'btnk:  12 
"nuckg,  German:  85. 91. 120. 17?,  3S8,4S2 
•Riucka,  Soviet:  12,  136, 464 
IVii&nav,  General  Lejrtenant  N.  I.:  470,  472 
T«mtsa  River:  382.  387.  390-91,  393-94.  396.  500 
Tvmtyanskiy:  351. 353-55.  357.  360.  382. 492-93 
'Riapse:  365, 367. 370-71.  373-74,  376-77,  379-81. 

451-52,  454.  493 
lUcfaachevddy,  Manh^  SoveLskugo  Soyuza  M.  U.: 

Kfla:  87.  40.  «9-50.  53,  57.  62-63,  65.  67,  79-^, 
87-88.  94-97,  124, 127, 136.  308, 326. 329,  352 
Turkey:  134,  302. 370 
'niMlffid{;262.26S 
Tfti&maa^,  190, 195 

l^lenev,  General  Armii  F.  V.:  8.  33,  370, 434 

Uckennann,  Generalnugor  Horst  «^  189-90t  198 
Udet.  Genetaloberst  Ernst:  54 
Ugra  River:  180-81,  183,243-45 
Ulhu:  223.  223-29.  424 

Ukrattw:  16.  33,  55,  158,  177.  20(7,  226,  298.  S51. 

361,  434 
lllyanovoi  404 
Utnan:  32 

Unconventsonal  war&re.  See  Partisam,  SCMio. 
United  States:  13,  20.  29,  39,  42.  7S,  135,  822,  228, 

231,  234.  304-05.  307.  349.  424,  486,  ltM)5. 

513-15 

Unrvb.  General  der  In&uteiie  Water  von:  448 

Upa  River:  62 

Ural  Mouncajiu:  21,  BIS 

Ukanus:  442-47, 464, 468-72 

Unikb  River:  4S4 

Urvan  River:  4S4 

Udovaya:  66 

ViUbu  HiUs:  143 

Vkno,  Connil  Ibrentius:  510-11 

Vasilevskiy.  Marshal  A.  M.:  142,  506 

and  Blau:  326,  337,  341-42 

and  Crimean  front:  262,  265-66,  268 

and  defense  of  Stalingrad:  363,  3^,  884^^494, 
441-4S,  465, 484-85, 493 

mify  aaa)Kgf;  16-20. 22 

and  the  Izymn  bu^e;  270. 278-79, 28 1 


INDEX 


557 


Vasilevskty,  Marshal  A.  M.— ContiilUlNl 
and  Operation  Don:  493 

and  Soviet  ecHmteroffensive,  Decemb»  ISU;  62, 

64-65 

strategy,  spring  1942:  238,  240,  257-60,  303,  307 
and  Zhukov:  437-38.  441-42.  444-45,  465. 
484-85.  506-07.  512 
Vialievshchina:  193 

\%tutin,  Genenil  N.  V.t  2S,  194.  343,  Hi.  494. 

507 

Vatuta  River:  398,  400,  403 

Velikiye  I.uki:  140,  171.  173,  240, 409, 4S1 

Velizh:  140.  169-71,  173 

Verkhnt^f  Cheinoye.  Lake:  288 

Vcrnian  River:  223.  227.  426 

Vein*  hiv:  385-86,443 

Vesheiisk,iv:i:  483 

Vctrna  River;  254 

Victorious:  428 

Victiiighoff,  General  tier  Puiuertruppen  Heinrich- 
Guttfried  von:  250-^.  402-^ 

Vinnitsa:  351.  355 
\  Mc  hsk:      203,  206,  214, 452 
Viiibil.  Ciate:  29-30 
Vladimir- Volynskiv:  24 
VbdislavTivka;  112^14.  117 
Vladivcjstok:  298 

Vlasov,  General  Levienant  Andrei:  60,  190,  192, 

257-6(1 
Vor.F.i.SANC:  252-54 
\'iiil>»kafo  Station:  136 
Vol.  lunsk:  270,  273.  275,  282.  310,  313,  31$ 
Vfill^a  rinlilla:  464 
Voljja  Reservoir:  50 

Volga  River:  14.  42  44.  57.  60.  65,  67,  80.  93-94. 
130.  169.  288.  303,  307.  352-54.  357-59.  365, 
37H.  3H2.  385-87,  'Mm,  392.  ;f94.  396.  398.  400, 
407,  442-44.  452,  462.  464-68.  489.  515 

Volkhov:  57.80.  136, 188~91.  l«»-96. 255. 408. 41 1. 
416,  418 

Volkhov'  River:  34.  42.  80.  137,  139.  143-45,  150-51, 

173,  175.  186.  189,  197,  254-55,  258-59,  409, 

411,  413-14,  416 
Vologda:  44-46.  57.  283,  308 
Votokoiamsk:  50,  61.  93.  11)1-02.  127.  166 
Vortmezli:  61.  287.  290.  3117.  322-26,  333,  336-:17. 

339-48.  407.  437.  ^'iti.  !f<:i 
Voninov,  General  P.>lk-.\iiik  NiknLn.  443.  484,  496. 

.507 

Voix.ponovo  Station:  388.  391.  496-99 

Voioshilov,  Marshal  Suvelsk());(i  Sajniza  KfinwnU  7, 

25.  29.  153,  186.  190,  434 
VoM.slniuvjrrad:  323,  353.  484,488 
Voiosliilov.^k:  307,  365.  375 
Vorya  River:  404,  406 
Voinesenskiy.  Nikolai:  138 
V.skh(Kli :  244 

Vyazma:  37.  77.  90,  124-25,  132-34.  140,  163-64, 


Vyazma — Continued 

167-71,  176.  180-82,  1H4-8S,  212,  239-48. 

244,  297 
V^sochaoovka:  346 
Vyttigta:  42 

WagdBs.  See  Panje  wagons. 
WAt-KiFRt:  120.  171.  177 
War  iiiiiis.  t  .enii.iii:  13-15 
V\ar  Dt.  p,-irtment,  U.S.,  3 
Wat  Kaines,  Soviet;  17—18 
Wat  plans.  Soviet:  8 

Wai  limont.  General  der  Itt&Dtetie  Walter:  377—78 

Warsaw:  5.  170 
Waslimgtan,  U.S.S.:  428 

Weapons,  German:  7.  40.  131,  195.  284-85,  294.  Set 
also  .Antitank  weapons,  (iernian;  Gun.s.  (>eniiail. 
Weapms.  Soviet:  12.  !4~I5,  135.  300,  441 
Weather:  13.  40.  42,  51-52.  63-07,  80.  87,  90.  1 10. 
113,  116.  133.  !.52.  I3>i.  Iii3.  166,  177,267,462, 
lliT-C.s.  4!<'.t  ".1-1  Srv  ,.•/„.  Hmputiljn. 
Weii  lih.  t.eiieialolicrsi  M.Lxitnilian  von 
and  Bi  At  :  322.  331.  333,  339,347-48 
and  Second  Aimv:  32,  50.  122 
and  Stalingrad:  3."i.'i.  386-88,  393,  396-97, 
458-59,  463-65.  467.  470. 474-75 
Ueisenherger.  General  der  In&UBilie  Kaii  K:  ^3, 

427 

WVllcs.  Sumner:  2n 
Wcrth,  Alexander:  432.  436 

WerwBf:  351,  360.  376-77,  888, 4t9^<iit^«e7.  451. 

456 

West  i'ioKl;  428 

Western  Riwers.  .SVc  .Mlics.  Western. 
Willie  Sea;  224 
WlEsENCRUND:  424,  426 

Wietersheim,  General  der  t^nzotryppeii  GusOiv  von; 

387,  391-92,  395 
Wii  Ht  rM:  310.  312-16.  318-19.325,330,344 

WiNKFi  RiFo:  415.  420-22 
"U'mtei  Relief":  39.  452 

Winter  War,  1939-1940:  5,  10.  14-15,  18,  193,  £20 
W'iNTi  Rr.FwiTTVR:  479-80,  482-83,  485,,  493,  507 
V\'iKrii  iwiNu:  398-406,  413 
Willing.  Rolf:  222 

W„llx-.rfumze:  4.  54-55.  57.  80,  155,  290,  293,  331. 

338.  351.  4lt3,  40't.  4.56.  474 
Wi:ingel.  Genei  al  IVlci ;  456 

Vaila  Mountains:  312 
^aklnl)Ina:  53.  60.  63,67 
Yalta:  107.  115,  141 
Yaroslavl:  37,  44,  SO,  61 
Vattse^o:  30 
Ycfremov:  iVi 

Yefremov,  t.em  lal  Lcvtenum  M,  G.:  164.  170,  183 
Yelets:  65.  67.  74-75.  94-95,337 
Velnya;  176,  246-47 


558 


MOSCOW  TO  STALINGRAD 


YevpuMi  na:  1 15-16,  HI 
Yeya  Rjvt  r:  362 

Yukhnov;  101-02.  122.  125,  12<t.  140.  161-eS»  169, 
171.  173^76,  17M-S1,  332,  :WM,  400 

Zakhann.  tkneiaJ  Mayor  f.  D.:  62 
Zahiskiv:  481 
ZaUitlivo:  154 

Zap.ul.,.l^a  Utaa  Wwr:  220.  288.  286-48.  StlnSt 

Zai)nin/live:  141,  156.484,909 

Z.Tilnii,,\,  K.  S.:  2(16 

Zeit^ln.  (k-iu-i;i1  ilci  [nl.iiueiH  kiiit;  449~^,  4&S, 
4.>7.  4(j;i,  474,  470.  480-«l.  493 

ZJi,'t,'z>i\,ilivv:  1 10 
Zhizfirvc  12:1  164,  17(1 
Zliiwli  a  River:  404.  40(5 

Zhukov.  General  Annii  Geoi;gi:  S,  13.  S3,  280.  303, 

343 

appointed  deputy  SUptettC  CO^Riiadc^:  387, 

437-38.  506 
beeoaiei  GmdanliBl  of  the  Sonet  Xlition:  507 


JShukov,  General  Armii  Gemgi— ('.oiuniuwl 

and  roimtci-offcnsivc.  Dfccmbei    1941;  61—63, 

fi5-6(>,  77,  HK-yO 
and  defense  of  I-eiiin^r,icl:  36-37 
and  defense  ut  Mosldw  :  4^t-51,  60-6:! 
and  defense  of  Stalingnid:  387-88,  391-92,  394, 

441,  444-4.5,  465,  4H4-85,  493 
eat  ly  strategy:  16-19,  21-22,  25,  27,  34 
and  encitrlemeot  qCAniiy  OtOlip  Center:  170-72, 

176,  182 
and  Orel  offensive:  342.  144 
plans  strategy,  Siwiag  1942:  238-40.  235,  303 
and  Rzhe\4!|(^ieii&  oifensiie:  3%,  400,  40S«04, 

406-07 

and  Soviet  offensive,  wnitcr  1942;  122,  125,  ISS, 

166,  170-72.  176,  182,  183 
and  Slavka:  25.  27,  30.  176,  182,  185 
works  closely  with  Vasilevskiy;  437-38,  441, 

443-44,  465, 484, 506-07,  512 
Zinivei:  275 

Zorn,  General  majot  B.:  192, 198, 197 

Zossen:  81.  324 

Ztiliiwiv:  398.  4110.  402-03,  407 
Zusha  River:  40.  95-96.  98.  100.  122